self-orientations in self and social judgment

Self-Orientations in Self and Social JudgmentAuthor(s): Mark D. AlickeSource: Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1999), pp. 35-39Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1449520 .

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Psychological Inquiry Copyright ? 1999 by 1999, Vol. 10, No. 1, 35-78 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

COMMENTARIES

Self-Orientations in Self and Social Judgment

Mark D. Alicke Department of Psychology

Ohio University

The proposition that desires, needs, and goals influence people's thoughts, attitudes, and judgments is en- demic to many social psychological theories. Researchers have continually struggled, however, to establish these motivational phenomena vis-a-vis alternative information-processing explanations. This struggle is necessitated by the difficulties that motivational theories have introduced throughout psychology's history. Instinct theories in the 1920s, for example, threatened to discourage investigation into other behavioral antecedents. Drive theories in the 1950s complicated functional behavioral laws and were difficult to confirm empirically. In fact, Skinner was able to forge a behavior theory that was arguably more powerful than those of his contemporaries while dispensing completely with motivational terms.

Despite these difficulties, most psychologists, Skinnerians notwithstanding, have found the motivation concept indispensable. As the articles in this symposium demonstrate, motivational concepts are ascendant in social psychology. Social psychologists have deployed the motivation concept primarily to ex- plain people's need to forge, maintain, or recoup positive self-concepts. In addition to self-enhancement and self-protection needs (Dunning, this issue), the authors in this symposium discuss the need to maintain favorable views of one's peers (Kunda & Sinclair, this issue) or relationship partners (Murray, this issue). Ulti- mately, these needs also subserve self-enhancement in that the desire to view close others positively accrues self-benefits.

Having convincingly surmounted alternative explanations of motivational phenomena, researchers have begun to address the conditions in which different motives prevail. Sedikides and Strube (1995), for example, considered the circumstances under which four self-related motives-self-enhancement, self-verification, self-assessment, and self-improvement-are most likely to be activated. They assume, for example, that self-assessment needs predominate with highly diagnostic tasks, whereas self-enhancement prevails with ambiguous tasks.

Presumably, diagnostic tasks enable accurate assessment of abilities and characteristics, whereas ambiguous tasks provide the latitude to define one's characteristics self-servingly. In addition to coordi- nating motives with situations, researchers have ex- amined how different motives influence the kinds of information people seek. Taylor, Neter, and Wayment (1995), for example, showed that people seeking self-improvement tend to compare themselves with superior others, whereas those seeking self-enhancement prefer inferior comparison targets.

In this article, I outline an expanded view of self-related motives couched in terms of six self-orientations. Self-orientations are evoked by chal- lenges to the self s integrity or opportunities for self-advancement. The self-orientation perspective as- sumes that internal processes, such as thinking about one's behavior, characteristics, or circumstances, or external events, such as social or task feedback, evoke cognitive and emotional states that favor, but do not dictate, particular motivated strategies. A person who receives unfavorable social feedback, for example, may become sad, angry, or energized, leading to ex- ceptional openness (e.g., self-evaluation or self-improvement motives) or defensiveness (e.g., self-verification or self-enhancement motives) in self-evaluations and social judgments. Whether a person favors relatively biased or unbiased self- and social judgments depends on the strength of the orientation, the type of information that is available to assess self and others, and personality factors. A single person may enter into different self-orientations within a relatively short time frame, and people vary in their chronic tendencies to occupy each self-orientation.

The six basic self-orientations are the habitual self, the beleaguered self, the exalted self, the analytic self, the malleable self, and the existential self. The habitual self refers to people's usual self- and social judgment tendencies, whereas the other five orientations repre- sent special self-threats or opportunities. In terms of the self-orientation approach, Kunda and Sinclair's target article in this issue describes circumstances in



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which the beleaguered self encourages the application of negative stereotypes and in which the exalted self encourages positive stereotypes. Murray's (this issue) target article shows how the habitual self exaggerates relationship partners' virtues. Dunning's (this issue) work illustrates how the beleaguered self capitalizes on ambiguity to protect or improve a threatened self-image.

In assessing how self-orientations influence cognition, judgment, and behavior, it is important to con- sider people's awareness of possible distortions in their self-judgments and social impressions. Aware- ness of potential biases determines the stability of motivated strategies and the scope of their influence. Awareness of one's biases ranges from processes that are deeply unconscious to those that can easily be brought into focal awareness. In the remainder of this article, I outline and illustrate the six self-orientations.

The Habitual Self

Most people possess at least moderately favorable self-images. Research on the better-than-average effect, for example, shows that people view themselves more favorably than an average peer on most characteristics (Alicke, 1985; Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; Brown, 1986; Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). Similarly, people view the chances that good things will befall them and that bad things will evade them to be greater than that of the average peer (Perloff & Fetzer, 1986; Weinstein, 1980). As Taylor and Brown (1988, 1994) argued, favorable self-views serve adaptive purposes such as fa- cilitating positive mood, increasing the willingness to help others, and escalating motivation and persistence on tasks.

For most people, therefore, the habitual self entails a relatively favorable self-image, one they are highly motivated to maintain. The habitual self is also the baseline for judging others. Ordinarily, people view others moderately positively (Matlin & Stang, 1978; Sears, 1983), although negative information carries more weight (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). In the habitual self mode, people apply stereotypes and ex- pectations at a chronic level without much thought or reflection. Because this self-image is habitual, people are unaware of the motivated strategies they apply to themselves or others.

I assume, however, that many habitual judgments can be easily counteracted. In the same way that people lack cognitive resources to challenge ingrained cul- tural beliefs (McGuire, 1962), they may also lack sufficient resources to counterargue personal truisms. One source of evidence for the malleability of the habitual self-orientation comes from research showing that the better-than-average effect is significantly diminished

when comparisons are made with a real person rather than with a hypothetical peer (Alicke et al., 1995). The better-than-average effect is further reduced when people have personal contact with the comparison target. This effect is also attenuated when the judgmental criteria are objective rather than subjective. For example, people are less biased in assessing abilities (Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989) than social characteristics, or in judging their traits using predefined criteria rather than with their own idiosyncratic, self-serving trait definitions (Dunning et al., 1989).

Unfavorable person impressions and social judgments that stem from habitual stereotypes or negative response tendencies may also be alterable in the habitual self-orientation. Personal contact with outgroup members, for example, might be sufficient to heighten awareness of negative stereotypes and, therefore, reduce the tendency to view them negatively. Similarly, the well-established tendency to blame victims for their misfortune might be reduced by making people aware of this bias. Positivity biases might also be influ- enced by heightened awareness. Murray's (this issue) target article shows that people habitually exaggerate their relationship partners' virtues and downplay their faults. In the same way that researchers have shown that diagnostic data reduce people's optimism about their susceptibility to misfortune (Weinstein, 1984; Weinstein & Lachendro, 1982), exposure to debiasing information might make people less sanguine about their partners' merits and more realistic about their de- merits.

The Beleaguered Self

The beleaguered self is the most widely studied self-orientation. The beleaguered self is activated by imminent threats to the self-concept. In most social psychological research, self-concept threat derives from unfavorable task or social feedback. Numerous attributional studies, for example, provide participants with failure feedback to assess its influence on self and social judgments. The beleaguered self orientation can also be activated by unpleasant ruminations or dysphoric mood states. This orientation is more likely than any other to engender defensive processes geared toward deflecting self-concept threat or altering negative mood. Defensive processes may include excuses for poor performance or unacceptable behavior, or more drastic defense mechanisms such as repression and denial. As Taylor et al. (1995) noted, however, negative states may simultaneously elicit various motivated strategies. Thus, a person in the beleaguered self orientation may be making excuses for poor performance (self-enhancement motive) while looking for ways to improve (self-improvement motive).

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Derogatory cognitive and judgment propensities such as applying negative stereotypes, blaming victims, and rejecting outgroup members are likely to be maximized in the beleaguered self orientation. These derogatory judgment tendencies protect one's belief systems and perceived competence, although they may also stem primarily from mood states such as anger. On the other hand, mood states such as sadness or grief may lead to more favorable judgments of others, per- haps in an attempt to repair the mood (Cialdini & Kendrick, 1976).

I assume that people's awareness of their motivated distortions in the beleaguered self orientation depends on the strength of their motivation. In general, people who are highly motivated to protect themselves are least aware of distortions in their self or social judgments. Thus, self-serving strategies in self and social judgment are more stable and less susceptible to disconfirmation in the beleaguered self orientation than in the habitual self orientation.

The Exalted Self

The exalted self is the mirror image of the beleaguered self orientation. Whereas the beleaguered self tries to restore facets of the self-concept to a baseline level (self-maintenance), the exalted self seeks to establish higher levels of self-functioning (self-improvement). The exalted self is promoted when people receive favorable task or social feedback, experience positive life events (e.g., promotion, marriage, birth of a child), identify with a successful group or person, simply engage in optimistic thinking, or are in a positive mood.

Ironically, many motivated processes in the exalted self orientation are similar to those in the beleaguered orientation. Whereas people experiencing self-concept threat selectively search their memories for positive information in an attempt to return to baseline (Kunda, 1990), those in the exalted orientation do the same for self-improvement. These orientations differ primarily in that people may be willing to incur greater self-concept risk in the exalted self orientation by, for example, making upward social comparisons. By com- paring with superior others, people's hyperinflated self-images may steer them into situations that doom them to failure. Put another way, it is a short tumble from the exalted self to the beleaguered self.

The exalted self orientation may encourage either benevolent or derogatory social judgments, depending on one's confidence in the exalted domain. A person who has received a boost in his or her perceived ability level, for example, and who feels comfortable at this higher position, may be charitable in assessing others' abilities. Conversely, a person who has recently inher- ited wealth may feel insecure in his or her nouveau

riche position and compensate by denigrating less for- tunate others.

The Analytic Self

The analytic self is engaged when the benefits of accurate self- and other-knowledge outweigh the potential for psychological pain. In other words, the analytic self prevails when the benefits of accuracy or the costs of inaccuracy override threats to self-esteem. Situa- tions in which self-esteem threats are minimal, therefore, also encourage this orientation. For example, people may enjoy testing their skill at television game shows even if they believe their ability is relatively low, provided the skills the game entails are peripheral rather than central to their self-concepts.

The analytic orientation is also facilitated when the task is highly diagnostic of the characteristic being an- alyzed, when cognitive resources are available, and when time pressures are minimal. Because the analytic self orientation entails a desire to evaluate oneself and others as accurately as possible, motivated biases are minimized. In judging oneself and others, therefore, people will use diagnostic information searches, logi- cal inference rules, and rational decision strategies, at least to the level of their capabilities.

The analytic self orientation is analogous to the self-evaluation orientation advanced by Festinger (1954) in his original social comparison theory. Thus, the analytic self orientation should lead to preferences for lateral or upward social comparisons. Lateral comparisons (i.e., comparisons with a similar other) provide information about one's cur- rent level of functioning, whereas upward comparisons potentially provide data for self-improvement. Because upward comparisons are advantageous in the analytic self orientation, people are likely to ex- tol rather than derogate those with superior characteristics or abilities.

The Malleable Self

Self-presentations can induce self-concept changes. Research has shown, for example, that positive self-presentations lead to more positive self-views than negative self-presentations (Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas, & Skelton, 1981). This suggests that self-beliefs fluctuate in accordance with the nature of self-presentations. The malleable self-orientation refers to alterations in the self-concept or in person impressions that result from specific self-presentational enactments. I assume that people vary in their awareness of. the contingencies that guide their self-presentations and that greater awareness dimin- ishes self-concept change. This assumption derives

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from the attributional discounting principle (Kelley, 1972), which can be viewed as a tendency to correct at- tributions in accordance with the prominence of external reinforcement contingencies. Just as we are less likely to assume a person is rude if his or her behavior is attributable to severely stressful circumstances, we are less likely to internalize our own public behavior when the controlling contingencies are obvious rather than subtle (Alicke, 1987).

Self-presentations also influence person impressions. People who are instructed to enact extravert roles, for example, see others as more introverted, whereas the reverse is true for people instructed to act as introverts (Alicke & Klotz, 1993). Thus, self-presentations can influence social judgments by leading perceivers to contrast other people's behavior with their own. This is a special case of social projection in which people use their own behavior as a guide- line for evaluating others (Krueger, 1998).

Awareness of behavioral contingencies, however, might be somewhat less important in social projection than in self-assessment; even when people are cogni- zant that their behavior was designed to obtain rewards or to avoid costs, they might still be unaware of the projection process. This suggests the possibility that people may in some circumstances discount their own constrained behavior but nevertheless use it as a basis for evaluating others.

The Existential Self

In social and personality psychology, the self-concept usually refers to people's evaluations of their abilities and social characteristics. However, the self also entails deeper beliefs about life's mean- ings and purposes. These existential thoughts are ac- centuated by major positive and negative life events such as marriage, the birth of a child, the death of a loved one, or a serious illness. Important life events can lead to substantial transformations in one's circumstances such as occupational changes, changes in relationship partners, and alterations in status. Changing circumstances, routines, and responsibili- ties, in turn, lead to interactions and comparisons with different types of people, changing norms, and transformed belief systems.

In the existential self orientation, therefore, people are susceptible to relatively major self-concept changes such as might take place in religious conver- sions or as a result of therapy or self-help programs. Heightened motivation to establish the validity of sometimes extreme beliefs may make people espe- cially likely to exhibit social projection. Social projection may take the form of exaggerating the number of people who share one's beliefs or of increasing the tendency to evaluate others according to one's own stan-

dards and values (Alicke, 1993; Alicke, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1996).

Conclusions and Future Directions

The self-orientation perspective views motivated judgment strategies as issuing from cognitive and emotional states that favor some forms of information gathering and processing over others. Which strategy predominates depends on the strength of the orientation, the information available in the situation, and personality factors. People's levels of awareness of potential biases determine the susceptibility to change of their motivated self- and social judgment tendencies.

Focusing on self-orientations rather than specific motives per se allows for greater flexibility in ac- counting for self- and social judgment tendencies. For example, a racially biased person may refrain from applying negative stereotypes when in the exalted self mode due positive mood or an elevated self-concept, or by becoming more aware (at least temporarily) of his or her biases. Thus, whereas people may have characteristic ways of assessing self and others, these tendencies may vary, and different self-orientations may predominate. Future research is needed to clarify the motivated strategies that predominate in each orientation and to assess changes in cognitive and judgmental processes that occur as a result of heightened awareness of potential biases.

Note

Mark D. Alicke, Ohio University, Department of Psychology, Athens, OH 45701.

References

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Alicke, M. D. (1987). Public explanation and private ratiocination: Communication between the public and private selves. In R. H. Hogan & W. H. Jones (Eds.), Perspectives in personality: The- ory, measurement, and interpersonal dynamics (Vol. 2, pp. 143-180). Greenwich, CT: JAI.

Alicke, M. D. (1993). Egocentric standards of conduct evaluation. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 14, 171-192.

Alicke, M. D., & Klotz, M. L. (1993). Social roles and social judgment: How an impression conveyed influences an impression formed. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 185-194.

Alicke, M. D., Klotz, M. L., Breitenbecher, D. L., Yurak, T. J., & Vredenburg, D. S. (1995). Personal contact, individuation and the better than average effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 804-825.

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Alicke, M. D., Yurak, T. J., & Vredenburg, D. S. (1996). Using personal attitudes to judge others: The role of outcomes and consensus. Journal of Research in Personality, 30, 103-119.

Allison, S. T., Messick, D. M., & Goethals, G. R. (1989). On being better but not smarter than others: The Muhammad Ali effect. Social Cognition, 7, 275-296.

Brown, J. D. (1986). Evaluations of self and others: Self-enhancement biases in social judgments. Social Cognition, 4, 353-376.

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Dunning, D., Meyerowitz, J. A., & Holzberg, A. D. (1989). Ambigu- ity and self-evaluation: The role of idiosyncratic trait definitions in self-serving assessments of ability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 1082-1090.

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Jones, E. E., Rhodewalt, F., Berglas, S., & Skelton, J. A. (1981). Effects of strategic self-presentation on subsequent self-esteem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41, 407-421.

Kelley, H. H. (1972). Causal schemata and the attribution process. In E. E. Jones, D. E. Kanouse, H. H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett, S. Valins, & B. Weiner (Eds.), Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior (pp. 151-174). Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.

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Sears, D. 0. (1983). The person-positivity bias. Journal of Personal- ity and Social Psychology, 44, 233-249.

Sedikides, C., & Strube, M. J. (1995). The multiply motivated self. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 1330-1335.

Skowronski, J. J., & Carlston, D. E. (1987). Social judgment and social memory: The role of cue diagnosticity in negativity, positivity, and extremity biases. Journal of Personality and So- cial Psychology, 52, 689-699.

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Taylor S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1994). Positive illusions and well-being revisited: Separating fact from fiction. Psychologi- cal Bulletin, 116, 21-27.

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Weinstein, N. D. (1980). Unrealistic optimism about future life events. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 806-820.

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You Say You Want a Revolution (Well, You Know, We'd All Love to See the Plan)

Jonathon D. Brown and Margaret A. Marshall Department of Psychology University of Washington

For psychoanalysis, it is axiomatic that cognition is largely if not entirely in the service of affective and motivational processes, and that needs, wishes, and conflicts are involved in categorizing and selecting information to be consciously perceived and processed. (Westen, 1990, p. 43)

The influence of motivational forces, so axiomatic to psychoanalysts, has been highly problematic for social psychologists. For reasons to be explained in the next section of this commentary, social psychologists have typically denied that affectively based motives and needs influence basic psychological processes. Al- though the articles in this issue depart from this tradi- tion, we thought readers might be interested in knowing why social psychologists have been reluctant

to admit that motivational processes shape social judgments. Accordingly, we begin our commentary with a review of this theoretical debate.

The Role of Motives in Psychological Life

A real-life example provides our point of depar- ture. John McEnroe is widely regarded as one of the greatest tennis players of all time. He also earned a reputation as a "crybaby" and a "hothead." On numerous occasions, McEnroe complained about the line calls he received during matches. He insisted (often vociferously) that his shots had landed in the court, even though the tennis officials had ruled that they

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self-orientations in self and social judgment

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