A Story of Canadian Military Communications 1903 – 2013

BGen William J. Patterson OMM, CD (Ret’d)

Published by The Military Communications and Electronics Museum Foundation

SATELLITETOSEMAPHORE

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cha pte r thre e

The 1916 Canadian Corps Signal Service with the Signal School, 5th Infantry Divisional Artillery Signals Section, and

8th Army Canadian Field Artillery Brigade Signal Sub-Section serves in France, 1917 – 1919

The year 1917 began with the Allies planning two spring offensives. TheFrench were to attack in the area of

Compiegne, about 40 miles south of Vimy Ridge, while the British were to attack the high ground around Arras. As part of the British Army, the Canadian Corps was as- signed the most difficult task of all, Vimy Ridge, the key German stronghold, that had resisted three major attacks in 1915 and 1916. While the Allies were planning for their oper- ations, the Germans were making a tactical ad- justment based on defence in depth. Fighting on three fronts had stretched the German Army to the breaking point, and in order to reduce its forces on the Western Front, it shortened its defensive line. The Germans made a surprise withdrawal of about 20 miles across a front of 50 miles in mid March 1917 to the Hindenburg Line. The withdrawal, however, did not include the vital ground at Vimy Ridge, which was the cornerstone of the German defences in the area of Arras.

It was to this area that the Canadian Corps was moved after the campaign at the Somme. It had three months to prepare for the assault. Success was dependent on the Canadian ar- tillery neutralizing the German front line de- fenders until the Canadian

infantry reached them. Then the infantry, using new weapons and tactics, could fight its way forward once inside the German lines. The artillery, now

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armed with plenty of shrapnel shells to cut the German wire, would lead the infantry into the German defences behind an improved creep- ing barrage, while at the same time Canadian counter-battery guns would be silencing the German batteries. The formation of the Cana- dian Machine Gun Corps (CMGC) armed with the Vickers Machine Gun, capable of both di- rect and indirect fire, gave intimate support to the infantry in the face of German counter- attacks. The infantry at the platoon level, now armed with the Lewis light machine gun, was re-organized into four sections: rifle, grenade, rifle grenade, and Lewis gun, allowing it to fight its way forward using fire and movement. The three months preparation time permitted the Corps to build roads, railways, and tunnels to ensure that the assaulting troops could be maintained during the attack with few casual- ties from German artillery. The extra time also gave the infantry the opportunity to practise their attack in a secure training area set-up to resemble the ground over which they would move.

Canadian Signallers had their part to play. As of 17 January 1917, it was the Canadian Corps Signal Service (CCSS). The corps and divisional signal companies spent the three months preparing the communication lines that would keep the artillery and infantry in immediate contact up to the day of the assault, and then carry them forward right into the

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German defences. For example, 4 Div Sigs Coy recorded that it had buried 1,350 yards of cable, 7 feet deep, at a cost of 13,500 hours of work, which was completed just 24 hours before 9 April. 1 Div Sigs Coy noted in its War Diary that 450 men of the 107th

Battalion had laboured on its cable laying at a cost of 6 killed and 7 wounded. While wireless was still not ac- cepted by the users, the Wireless Section per- sisted and set up a station close to the front to ensure good reception. Unfortunately, it was spotted by the Germans and received a direct hit, which buried the two operators alive. They were dug out 10 hours later, remarkably un- hurt, but the wireless set was a write-off. Every facet of signalling was employed: from corps HQ to divisional HQ airline was used, from di- vision to brigade both airline and cable, from brigade forward all cable. Even visual signal points, using Lucas Lamps, were established. The Brigade Signal Sections were to accom- pany the third wave in the assault dragging telephone cable behind them. To supplement their manpower, the CHQ Sig Coy sent an of- ficer and ten men to each Division. Most im- portantly, 2 officers and 54 men were assigned permanently to the Canadian Heavy Artillery HQ to ensure that Canadian counter-battery fire was timely and effective. Something new was tried: communication by the induction method, that required no cable. Called Power Buzzer, it needed heavy equipment and high power, which could only be supplied in the front lines by heavy re-chargeable batteries. The heavy equipment had to be manhandled, which was a detriment, and the soil composi- tion affected the reception of the Morse Code signal. In good soil it could transmit a signal up to 2,000 yards. It did work, in some in- stances at Vimy, where wireless did not. One tried and true method was to prepare lad- dered lines, two cables, about 60 yards apart, joined together at intervals like the rungs on a ladder, and pull them forward following the advancing infantry. They had the advantage that if shellfire broke part of one of the lines the

current would still flow by way of the rungs to the other line and back again to the broken line beyond the break. The disadvantage was

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once broken in many places it was difficult to repair, unlike a single cable.

The thorough preparation by the Canadian Corps was realized at 0530 hours on Easter Monday, 9 April, when the four divisions in line went over the top. Within two hours the infantry were in the heart of the German de- fences. By early afternoon, Canadians were over most of the Ridge and working their way down the slopes toward the village of Vimy. Only on the extreme left flank was the attack floundering. There 4 CID, which had as its ob- jectives Point 145, the highest point of land, the site of the Vimy Memorial, and the “Pim- ple,” an adjoining high point, took four days to secure its final objective. The Battle of Vimy Ridge was a Canadian success story and a turn- ing point in the fortunes of the Canadian Corps. After the costly and futile attacks in 1915 and 1916, the Corps proved that with good preparation, training, and experience it could fight and win far beyond expectations. It was also to prove a turning point in the quest for Canadian nationhood.

Sometimes, in the effort to find good places to set up a signal station or to look for German signal equipment, often superior to the British, signallers got themselves ahead of the action. A Spr Gregson went into a dark Ger- man dugout and found some good equip- ment, but while rescuing it, realized that another person wanted it too. After a short struggle, Gregson, who was a powerful man, won out only to find the other person was the German operator, who was trying to take his equipment with him. Spr C.T. Corbett had a similar experience in the Spandau Hof Tun- nel, where he came across four Germans who had been left behind. Corbett’s Colt revolver made the difference and he had four prison- ers. The general appreciation by the signal companies at Vimy was that the telephone using cable worked well, especially by the for- ward elements with laddered lines; visual sig- nalling, wireless, and power

buzzer were not needed.In six days, the Canadian Corps advanced

4,500 yards and captured 54 guns, 104 trench mortars,124 machine guns, and over

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4,000 prisoners. The human cost for the en- tire Vimy campaign was 13,477 casualties, 17 per cent of the total of 81,000, far less than the Battle of the Somme and much more re- warding. Canadian Signallers bore their share of casualties with 12 killed, or died of wounds, between 1 January and 30 June 1917: Lt H.L. Uglow, Sigmn T.H. Cashmore, Sgt J. Cunningham, mid, Cpl G.A. Keen, SprJ. Jardine, Spr H.A. Logan, Spr H. Mann, SgtP.A. MacGillivray, MM, Spr G.G. McCollum, Sigmn C. McKinnon, Spr R. McKnight, and Spr H.R. Stewart.

During the same period there were a num- ber of awards. Majs E. Forde and G.A. Cline received the DSO. A special honour was given to Maj Forde, who was appointed AD Signals on 17 June 1917 and promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. Now a Canadian was in charge of the Canadian Corps Signal Service (CCSS), although in theory he reported to the Chief Engineer. Maj Cline assumed command of 1 Div Sigs Coy on 20 June 1917. Other awards were made: the MC to 4; DCM to 2; MM to 30; Bar to the MM to 2; MiD to 13.

British attacks continued in the Vimy area

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after the capture of Vimy Ridge. The only Canadian participation consisted of 1 CID’s successful attack on Arleux-en-Gohelle on 28 April. In early May, the British continued to attack in the Scarpe River valley, and the Canadian Corps continued to play a small part. One brigade each from 1 and 2 CIDs continued the advance beyond Arleux on 3 May and captured the village of Fresnoy-en- Gohelle. During the attack by 6 CIB of 2 CID, German shelling fell all around the divisional signal office. Fearing a direct hit, Maj A.A. An- derson ordered all, except the superintendent and one operator, out to a dugout, while he operated the divisional exchange personally until the shelling stopped. The Germans were determined not to give up the village, and after the British 5th Division had relieved 1 CID, they counter-attacked and succeeded in recovering all the ground gained on 3 - 4 May. Although local actions continued in the area, particularly some very successful large-scale raids by 3 and 4 CIDs in the Avion Sector dur- ing May and June, offensive operations ceased pending preparations for an assault in the area of the City of Lens. In July 1917, as a re-

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LCol Forde, 1917, wearing his DSO ribbon won at Vimy Ridge.

sult of the experience at Vimy and with an an- ticipated attack in the near future, the estab- lishment of the divisional signal companies, for better communications to the divisional ar- tillery, was boosted to 10 officers, plus 3 at- tached, 278 men, and 133 horses. The additional personnel, now part of the HQ Sec- tion of divisional signal companies, were sig- nallers from the two artillery brigades attached to each infantry division. The strength of the CHQ Sigs Coy was also in- creased to 15 officers and 496 men. Although it might seem unusual to veteran signal offi- cers, the supply of signal equipment was often obtained from civilian sources during the First World War. In May 1917, Capt Earnshaw, OC of CHQ Sigs Coy, took Lts Bates and Hughes to Paris to buy spare parts for the French tele- phone exchanges Canadians were using and linesmen’s telephones from the Western Elec- tric store. They were gone three days presum- ably the other attractions of Paris did not go unheeded. Another unusual occurrence was the approval of the Corps Commander for Capt Earnshaw to have three months’ leave in Canada. His position was taken over on 5 July by Maj F.G.

Malloch.

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On 9 June 1917, LGen Arthur Currie as- sumed command of the Canadian Corps, the first and only Canadian to do so. On 7 July, Sir Douglas Haig, Commander of the British Forces, ordered Currie to capture the City of Lens, the centre of the most crowded coal- mining area in France. By this time in the war, Lens and the surrounding pit-heads were badly damaged by artillery fire. The Canadian Corps, less 4 CID in reserve, took up positions opposite the Lens area by the middle of July. Currie was not happy with a frontal assault on Lens because it lay in a valley bordered by two dominating features: Hill 70 to the north and Sallaumines Hill to the southeast. His solu- tion, eventually agreed to by Haig, was to take Hill 70 by the end of July, making the German defences in Lens open to Canadian observa- tion and artillery fire. To deceive the Ger- mans, Currie mounted a successful diversionary attack by 3 CID in the Sallaumines area on 23 July. In order to ensure perfect communications for the attack, three direct lines were dug from Corps HQ to each Div HQ, while two direct lines were dug from each Div HQ to the Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery (CCHA) HQ. The cable work was undertaken by 20 sappers under the command of Lts C.O. Fellowes and H.A. Golwyne and the digging by 400 men of the 124th Battalion. On 30 July, Gen Currie asked to have Fellowes, Golwyne and their 20 sappers paraded so he could

Two signallers using a German rifle as a pole for a airline connection.The signaller standing has a CSC cap badge but is wearing

CE collar badges. [CME Museum]

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thank them personally for a difficult job well done. Unfortunately, bad weather meant that the follow-up attack on Hill 70 had to be post- poned from the last day of July to 15 August, so it was almost impossible to conceal the Canadian intentions. The attack of 1 and 2 CIDs began at 0425 hours 15 August 1917, and the tactics successfully employed at Vimy Ridge worked again: careful preparation with rehearsals by the assaulting infantry battalions, a concentrated artillery rolling barrage and pinpointed counter-battery fire, and by bring- ing forward 48 machine guns

per brigade to

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meet the inevitable German counter-attacks; the attack was highly successful. By 0600, most of the objectives were reached after an advance of 1,500 yards. A diversionary attack by units of 4 CID into Lens itself did divert much of the German firepower away from Hill 70, but the fierce resistance of its German defend- ers showed that they were not pre- pared to give it up easily. German counter-attacks continued almost without ceasing for three days, but after 18 attempts to regain the heights, the Germans had lost the Battle of Hill 70. In order to straighten the front line, a direct attack was made on 21 August by both 2 and 4 CIDs into Lens. While there was some local suc- cess as the fighting went on until 25 August, the Canadians found fighting in a built-up area full of blocked streets, deep cellars, and ruined buildings a new and costly experience. Although the Canadi- ans had captured the dominating ground of Hill 70, the Germans continued to hold Lens almost to the end of the war. The victory cost 8,677 casualties, 17 per cent of the 50,000 troops involved. It did demonstrate that the Cana- dian Corps was a formidable fight- ing machine that was improving

its attack techniques with each successive op- eration.

The action at Hill 70 was particularly costly for signallers as lines forward from brigades to battalions during the advance were constantly broken by shellfire. SSgt Adams laid line be- ginning at 0100 hours on 17 August in No- Man’s-Land throughout the hours of darkness, and continued on for four hours in daylight, although in full view of the Germans, to complete the job. The Hill 70 action also saw a new enterprise for signals: an organiza- tion called I TOC, which stood for Intercept

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1917 Corps Operations Room with numerous telephone connections.

Telephone, or IT where the letter T was re- placed by the phonetic alphabet symbol “toc.” Four stations, employing the induction method, were set up for the attack at Hill 70 in an endeavour to discover the location of German artillery batteries, and the location of counter-attack forces.

There were 11 fatalities during the opera- tions for Hill 70: LCpl A. Cochrane, Sigmn J. Coffey, Sigmn H.S. Dowson, Spr J.H. Grandin, Spr H.J. Hammond, Sgt E.W. McLellan, SprE.W. Nelson, Spr E.A. Scott, Spr H. Stamp, Sigmn A.D. Watterson, and Spr H. Worthing- ton. There were numerous awards for gal- lantry: the MC to 4; DCM to 1; MM to 24; Bar to the MM to 4.

While the Canadian Corps was undertaking the capture of Hill 70, the British Army was on a campaign designed to capture the Chan- nel ports on the

Belgian coast, which were

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being used as bases by German submarines. Although the Allied lines

went from the Chan- nel to Switzerland, the land near the coast had been flooded by Belgian engineers at the be- ginning of the

war, and was virtually impassa- ble. The solution was to attack from the Ypres

Salient to gain the high ground beyond the in- undated area, and then to swing toward the Channel ports. The way was barred by

the Ger- mans holding a position on a high ridge cen- tered on the village of

Passchendaele. Preliminary to the main cam-

paign was the need for the British to seize a spur, the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge. On 7 June 1917, the battle opened at 0310 hours with the detona- tion of 19 mines packed with 465 tons of explosives. The as-

MC sault by 9 divisions was over-

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whelming, but the British failed to follow it up with an immediate advance, and lost a chance for success when the weather was still favourable. More time was lost while the British were shuffling their forces to ensure that they had maximum strength at the main point of the next attack. Unfortunately, the Germans became aware of the build-up and proceeded to reinforce their forces in the area. The main attack did not take place until 31 July and initially went well. That night heavy rain began to fall, which went on for four days, bringing the advance to a halt. By 2 August, the Battle of Pilckem Ridge was over, the British having advanced some 3,000 yards but at a cost of 32,000 casualties, three times those of Vimy Ridge. When the weather im- proved somewhat, the attack continued as the Battle of Langemarck, which produced a minor gain to the north of St Julien. The weather deteriorated again and by the end of August, the furthest British advance was only three miles. Although Sir Douglas Haig claimed that the Germans were being worn down by attrition, the same was also true for the British, whose casualties for the month to- taled 68,000. The effect of heavy casualties and abysmal weather had seriously weakened the British offensive, and it was decided to change the point of the attack from the Fifth Army to the Second Army. Once again the re- distribution of forces took three weeks of good weather. The offensive was renewed on 20 September with the objective, the Menin Road Ridge. It was quickly overrun, and the offensive resumed on the 26th with the capture of Polygon Wood. The British advance contin- ued to the top of Gravenstafel Ridge, a total advance of 4,000 yards in the previous two weeks. Still, the original objectives of 31 July had not been reached; Passchendaele was still more than a mile away from the foremost British troops. Heavy rain began again on 4 October and turned the heavily shelled area into a “porridge of mud.” Although the two British Army commanders recommended a halt to the

offensive, Sir Douglas Haig wanted to gain the higher ground of the Passchen- daele Ridge for the winter. So two more at-

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tacks were made: one on the 9th and one on the 12th, but fierce German resistance and the muddy ground prevailed, although the British and Australian troops were only 2,500 yards from the final objective. Fifty-one British divi- sions had been bloodied in the Flanders of- fensive and all were exhausted. Only nine untouched divisions remained including the four Canadian, and they were selected to reach the final objective.

On 14 September 1917, the officers and men of 2 Div Sigs Coy, who had landed in France on the same date two years previously, celebrated the anniversary with a party. Only three officers Maj Anderson and Lts Mc- Cracken and McKinnon, who were both ser- geants at the time, and 111 of the 204 men remained. Their record of achievement was 4 MCs, 3 DCMs, 30 MMs, and 8 MiDs. Seven men had been killed and two serving with the RFC were missing. A total of 23 menhad been commissioned, in- cluding many with the RFC. There was an obvious feeling of solidarity in 2 Div Sigs Coy. Dur- ing the month of September,the CHQ Sigs Coy recorded that

MMNo. 57 Airline Company hadconstructed 20,000 yards of 12 pair perma- nent airline cable using 275 miles of wire.

The Canadian Corps took over from the ex- hausted Australian-New Zealand Corps (Anzac) on 18 October 1917, almost in the same spot 1 CID had been before the fateful gas attack on 22 April 1915. General Currie faced a dreadful situation. The area leading up to Passchendaele was a vast swamp marred by thousands of shell holes full of water. Cur- rie realized that getting men and guns forward to continue the advance was a matter of engi- neering as well as the Canadian expertise in artillery-infantry co-operation. Beginning on 18 October, 21 CE field companies bolstered by 2 infantry and 4 pioneer battalions, set to work to build plank roads to get the heavy guns of the CFA and their ammunition depots far enough forward

to be able to support the infantry assault. Some idea of the amount of work that was required to support the assault-

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ing troops can be gauged from the activities of 11 CIB of 4 CID. Placed in reserve, while 10 and 12 CIBs supporting 3 CID made the initial assault on 26 October, the 5,000 men of 11 CIB assisted by building roads, digging a com- munication trench for telephone wire down six feet, carrying supplies forward and the wounded back, and forming a mule train de- tachment of 250 mules. Only by such extreme measures was the Canadian Corps able to ad- vance up the muddy slopes to Passchendaele in four phases. The first, which lasted from the 26th to the 28th, was partially successful and gained a foothold on higher drier ground. The second phase, which began on 30 Octo- ber with 3 and 4 CIDs continuing the attack, was more successful and gained all its objec- tives. The third and last large-scale phase took place on 6 November with 1 and 2 CIDs re- placing 3 and 4 CIDs. The Village of Passchen- daele was finally captured. To complete the capture of the entire ridge, a fourth phase by using only one brigade of 1 CID took place on 10

November. Again, it was successful and

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after a short period of consolidating the front line by 4 CID, the Canadian Corps returned to its former position on the Lens-Vimy front by20 November. In the mind of many who fought there, Passchendaele was the worst of all the fighting during the four years of war. It was costly, too; Canadian casualties totaled 15,654, which was 20 per cent of the 81,000 officers and men involved.

Once again, shellfire constantly broke tele- phone lines forward of brigade HQ. Fortu- nately, the Lucas Lamp and runners worked well. For the first time, wireless telegraphy (W/T) was a real success. Maj W.A. Steel, MC, wrote a history of W/T after the war and in it described its use at Passchendaele. As has been recounted already, the use of W/T since its introduction in early 1916 had been negli- gible, partly because it was a new and a strange concept to commanders at all levels. In July 1917, Lt F.H.M. Jones was appointed Corps W/T officer and for the first time there was a viable wireless organization. Each division was given an NCO and 9 operators with 2 sets, 3

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power buzzers, 2 amplifiers with accumula- tors, re-chargeable batteries, sufficient to set up two stations. One brigade per division re- ceived a set making it possible to send mes- sages from brigade to division to corps. The power buzzer/amplifier arrangement did not require an aerial or a cable connection but the equipment was heavy and shellfire could damage the leads in the earth. Generally, power buzzer was little used except in long es- tablished positions. By 1917, continuous wave (CW) sets using vacuum tubes were in service. They were lighter, used shorter aerials, had greater range, and suffered less from interfer- ence. At Passchendaele, there were four W/T stations: Corps HQ, Divisional HQ, a Step-up station, nicknamed ‘Gallipoli’, and a Forward station, just behind the advancing infantry. The Forward station consisted by a party of seven under the command of Cpl J.A. Craig. To get into position on 6 November 1917, the party had to trudge through four and one-half miles of mud under shellfire. Setting-up in a corner of a captured German pillbox, already occupied by an infantry company HQ and a regimental aid post, they were in touch with Divisional HQ by 1400 hours. They moved the next morning to a cellar near an artillery For- ward Observation Officer (FOO) who, through them, was able to talk directly to LColA.G.L McNaughton, later the first Canadian Army Commander in the Second World War, in charge of the Corps counter-battery organ- ization. The group stayed there until 18 No- vember to help co-ordinate artillery fire against German counter-attacks. The group, which was relieved every 48 hours, suffered no casualties. This success for W/T changed the attitudes of senior commanders and it proved its worth in the campaigns of 1918.*

Passchendaele was even more costly for the CCSS than Vimy Ridge or Hill 70. There were 13 fatal casualties: Lt J.M. Beckett, Sgt F. Bed- ford, Cpl T.R. Craven, MM, Sigmn N.A. Ernewein, Spr A.T. McFadden, Spr C.F. Patter- son, Cpl H.E. Shill, Spr J.W. Tribble, Spr H.N.

*See Appendix 10 for an extract of Cpl J. A. Craig’s report]

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Vanstone, Cpl C.H. Waites, Cpl E.A. Warden, A/Cpl L.M. Wilde, MM, and Spr J. Wood. In particular, 4 Div Sigs Coy had three men killed and 8 wounded by mustard gas.

As a result of the involved and difficult situ- ation at Passchendaele, there were numerous awards for service beyond the call of duty: the MC to 9; one new award, the Bar to the MC to Capt M.R. McCracken; DCM to 6; MM to 33; Bar to the MM to 5; and for the first time a Sec- ond Bar to the MM to A/Sgt G.J. Oliver and Cpl L.P. Smardon; MiD to 11.

For the first seven months of 1918, the Canadian Corps held a seven mile sector cen- tred on Lens. They were spared thereby the three German offensives designed to defeat the Allies before the Americans could put many divisions into France. The main German thrusts were both south and north of the Canadian sector, and while temporarily suc- cessful against both the French and the British Army, the result was a serious weakening of the German Army. In late March and early April, the Canadian divisions took over more and more of the front lines to relieve British divisions needed desperately further south. To ensure that the Corps could hold the line in the case of a German attack, the Canadian di- visions spent the time increasing the defences

Sending a wireless message using Morse Code; note the accumulator beside the set.

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An 80 foot aerial erected at Corps HQ.

of their area by adding 250 miles of trenches, 300 miles of wire entanglements, and 200 tun- neled machine gun emplacements. The divi- sional signal companies were busy also with digging-in miles of cable down six feet, most were put down seven feet, and setting-up vi- sual telegraphy (V/T) and W/T stations. An 80 foot aerial was erected at Corps HQ. The statis- tics for the period were impressive: 118 miles of 40 pair underground cables, 152 miles of 10 pair airline cables, and 8 miles of 50 pair cables laid through tunnels. All signallers who arrived in France with 1 Div Sigs Coy were now allowed to wear coloured, French Grey, shoul- der straps. The 1 Div Sigs Coy war diary con- tained a sad note on 10 April 1918, when it recorded that the CO’s charger “Trumpeter” which

had come to France in 1915, had gone

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totally blind and had to be evacuated. On 23 February, 3 Div Sigs Coy recorded that it had ploughed two acres of land in order to set up a farm and, although from time to time it mentioned that the farm was doing well, it never stated the type of produce grown.

Almost none of the Canadian Corps was in- volved in the desperate battles the French and British armies had in repelling the German of- fensive that began on 21 March 1918. The most-easily despatched Canadians to assist the British were members of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade. On 23 March, a dismounted force of 800 men helped the British 18th Division re- tire across the Crozat Canal. On the same day, Gen Seely’s brigade staff and 200 cavalry oper- ated in the same area helping to seal-off gaps in the fluid defences. One of the more cele- brated actions occurred on 30 March - 1 April, when a cavalry detachment formed from all three Canadian regiments took part in the Battle of Moreuil Wood, while a dismounted force attacked the adjacent Rifle Wood. The Cavalry Brigade’s action brought its support- ing Signal Troop into the fray. By now, an all- Canadian force under the command of CaptS.A. Lee, Fort Garry Horse (FGH), it was con- stantly on the move throughout late March and early April.

German artillery fire wounded a number of men, one of whom was Cpl J.E. Holmes, who was awarded a MiD.

Laying line in a communication trench.

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Laying line using a cable wagon.

On 18 May 1918, the Canadian Corps went into a reserve position to rest and train for up- coming offensives. Whilst out of the line, the various signal companies engaged in a variety of activities. CHQ Sigs Coy borrowed a ser- geant major from the infantry to take the men through physical training and infantry drill. The company spent eight days on the range; it is often forgotten that signallers had to fight as infantry on occasion. There were cable wagon competitions to prepare the corps sig- nal companies for a grand competition. The winner within CHQ Sigs Coy was Cable Section CH, which had a score of 78 out of 90. The competition consisted of running a line 2 miles and sending 2 messages each way, then reeling up and dismantling the cable. The men had to wear drill order and no galloping was permitted. Maj G.A. Cline was judge. All sections continued to practise V/T especially with the Lamp. Most importantly, there was practice establishing communications during offensive operations in open warfare. Some of the training was

done wearing gas helmets; all

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signallers went through the gas chamber at regular intervals to ensure their respirators worked.

During May 1918, the Corps Survey Sec- tion, which was responsible for the accurate surveying of gun positions and the making of maps for all levels of command, took on a new role. Although the science of locating enemy batteries by flash spotting had been develop- ing for some time, by the spring of 1918 it had been perfected to the point where its accuracy in locating German artillery locations was suf- ficient to ensure a large measure of success by Canadian counter-battery fire. By locating spotting teams right in the front line or in the forward edge of an attacking force, made it possible to deal with German artillery batteries by counter-battery fire before they could in- flict serious casualties among the front-line in- fantry. In order to get the locations of the German batteries back to the counter-battery guns, good communications were required. Consequently, the Corps Survey Section, a CE organization under the command of Capt

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W.R. Flewin, was increased in size to 5 officers and 172 men, in particular by the addition of a signal section of 52 men led by Lt H.W. McPhail from CHQ Sigs Coy. During the months of May and June, two flash-spotting teams carried out airburst ranging experi- ments, using shells designed to burst in the air to better spot their exact location. It was ex- tremely dangerous work, particularly under German gas shelling, and during the two months four men were awarded the MM: SgtA.W. Carmichael, Cpl E.S. Fleischmann, CplR.J. Rogers, and Spr J.S. Wood.

3 DRs ready to start out.

At the time that the British Army reduced its brigades from four to three battalions be- cause of a lack of manpower, the Canadian Corps was not only keeping its four battalion- brigades but also increased their strength. In order to ensure that there were adequate re- inforcements for the impending offensives, the Canadian 5th Infantry Division (5 CID), which had been formed in England in January 1917, was broken up. The 5 CID’s artillery, in- cluding the Signal Section, engineers, and ma- chine gun companies had already been sent to France to bolster the Canadian Corps in September 1917. Each of the Canadian in- fantry battalions in France was augmented by 100 men, while the number of Vickers ma- chine guns per division was doubled to 96. The three engineer companies per division

were increased to three battalions. The

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strength of the divisional signal companies was increased significantly to provide commu- nications to the larger units of the artillery, en- gineers, and machine gun corps. Its strength, which began in 1915 as 6 officers and 202 men, had been increased over the years to 13 officers and 288 men. The strength of the Corps Signal Company had also been in- creased to 19 officers and 516 men. Although 5 CID’s 13th

and 14th Artillery Brigades had been in France since 20 September 1917, they did not join the Canadian Corps until 1918. There, they supported the various divisions in the line, while their supporting Signal Sec- tions trained along with the other Corps sec- tions.*

Although the period from January to July was one of trench warfare with no major of- fensive action, as well as a period of about six weeks out of the line for specialized training, there were the inevitable deaths, mostly due to German shelling, particularly gas shells. During this period of relative inactivity there were 13 fatalities amongst the CCSS, as many as at Passchendaele: Spr H.J. Brazier, MM, SprL.D. Corke, LCpl G. Edgerley, MM, Sigmn S. England, Spr J. Gallagher, Spr P.R. Kerr, LCplR. Leavitt, MM, Spr K.H. Lind, Spr F.E. McLardy, Spr J.J. Madden, Spr W.C. Speck, Spr H.G. Ward, and Spr E.A. White. At the same time that Spr McLardy of 2 Div Sigs Coy was killed on 8 April by a direct hit on his dugout, four other men were wounded, fol- lowed by five wounded the next day, all by German gas shells. As well, two former sig- nallers, who were commissioned in the RFC/RAF, died during this period: Lts G. Gee and C.D. Harrison.

There were few awards for leadership and bravery. Capt A. Hartley was awarded the MC. The DCM went to Cpl L.D. Johnson and A CplW.F. Marsh. The MM was awarded to LCpl E. McLaren and Spr G. Watson. During this pe- riod, when performing good and faithful serv- ice rather than gallantry, there were a number of awards of the Meritorious Service Medal (MSM). In October 1916, the MSM, a British

*See Appendix 12 for the 1918 CCSS establishment.

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1 Div Sigs Coy Officers June 1918.Back row, l-r Lts S.R. Parker, MC, E.G.Weeks, MC & Bar, MM & Bar, R.E.Turnbull, (Lt Clarissimo, French Army interpreter), J.A.M.Young, MC & Bar, C.O. Fellowes,W. H. Dawson. Middle row, l-r Capt Carson (Pay), Capt A.E. Stewart, MC, Maj G.A. Cline, DSO (CO), A/Maj P. Earnshaw, MC, A/Capt J.E. Genet, MC. Front row, l-r Lts F. S. Merry,W.C. Dix, H.W. McPhail.

decoration, was extended to members of the CEF who had performed meritorious service. The first awards to Canadian Signallers went to Sgt H.J. Ayris, Cpl I.P. Crawford, Spr G.A.

Franklin, Cpl A.J.L. Haynes, and Cpl R.G. McEwan. A MiD went to Capt W. McIntosh.

1 July1918, Dominion Day, was the scene of the biggest Canadian Corps Sports Day to date. Nearly 50,000 soldiers gathered at Tinc- ques, a small village 14 miles west of Arras, to witness a day of track and field events. Among the spectators were HRH, the Duke of Con- naught, the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Bor- den, and members of his cabinet, and Gen John Pershing, the US Commander-in-Chief. Top honours in track and field went to 1 CID, while the 44th Battalion won the soccer title, and the 7th Battalion, CE, the baseball trophy. The long period of rest and extensive train- ing, especially in the attack, ended on 15 July, when the Canadian Corps returned to the line. What was kept as a strongly-guarded se- cret was the plan for a full-scale offensive to be mounted on 8 August near Amiens. The at- tack, from right to left, was to consist of two French corps, the Canadian Corps, the Aus- tralian Corps, and the British 3rd Corps. To get into position, the Canadians had to move by train and bus to a concentration area south- west of Amiens. The move, to the concentra-

27

tion area and to the attack jumping-off places, was executed by night, and wireless sets were only put on net a couple of hours before the attack. The Germans were not totally unaware that something was going on. They had no- ticed that the Canadians, who were recog- nized as “Shock Troops,” had been taken out of the line but did not think a major offensive was being mounted. By 8 August, there were 21 Allied divisions lined up against 14 Ger- man. What no one could have guessed was that the war would end in 100 days.

The Canadian attack began at 0420 hours, 8 August, a day about which the German com- mander, Gen Ludendorff, wrote, “was the black day of the German Army in the history of this war.” To achieve surprise there was no preliminary bombardment, the three assault- ing divisions relying on a moving barrage and the firepower of 48 tanks per division. The whole assault went like clockwork, as brigade after brigade and division after division leapfrogged one another across the whole front, and by the end of the day, the Canadian Corps had advanced 8 miles and had captured 5,033 prisoners and 161 guns. On the second day, the advance was four miles, as German re- sistance stiffened and on the third day, only two miles as the Germans rushed more and more troops to the area. On 11 August, the Corps spent the day solidifying the front; as the operation had spent itself. For the next eight days, there was a lull in the fighting after which the Canadian Corps was withdrawn to resume the attack elsewhere. The Amiens op- eration had moved the front lines forward 14 miles, liberated 27 villages, and captured over 9,000 prisoners and nearly 200 guns. The cost was 11,725 casualties, 13 per cent of the at- tacking force of 91,000.

The Amiens operation was a totally new ex- perience for the CCSS. Never before had an attack moved over such a great distance in so short a time. Communications were stretched to the maximum, but the increased establish- ments of the corps and divisional signal com- panies and their specialized training in the months prior to August made

for successful work. The heavy use of tanks tore up the

28

hastily-laid cables cross-country as the advance went forward. W/T, one set and 3 signallers, were stationed with each infantry brigade, and V/T was heavily used and the laying of cable, either on the ground or by airline on low poles continued. Lt A.W. Murdock of CHQ Sigs Coy laid a line to 4 CID HQ a distance of 9 miles. Every agency was used – the RAF dropped maps and messages to the V/T sta- tions. DRs were put to the test, having to drive at night over unknown territory, subject to German bombing. Of great assistance was the allocation of a number of the Canadian Light Horse to each division to act as mounted DRs. The various signal centres which had to leave the protection of their dugouts and live under canvas, while on the move, were very suscepti- ble to bombing. A great amount of German equipment was captured, including a Baden- wagen, a mobile shower unit, which could ac- commodate 12 men a time. Although it did not come with operating instructions, enter- prising signallers of the CHQ Sigs Coy had it operating in no time. Similarly, 1 Div Sigs Coy made good use of three captured German switchboards that were superior to the French ones in use. 2 Div Sigs Coy’s war diary ex- plained in great detail how the company was re-organized into four groups for the offen- sive: A - 13 men, operators with W/T, linemen and mounted DRs; B - 15 men with 4 Power Buzzers; C - 11 men; D - 34 men with 11 miles of single wire. Each group had a French 4-line exchange, 3 telephones, 2 flags, and a Lucas lamp. As 2 CID moved forward these groups leapfrogged one another to keep communica- tions open. The cable wagons continued to lay cable over rough terrain and linemen contin- ued to fix breaks caused by shellfire. Before the battle began, 3 Div Sigs Coy suffered a se- rious loss when its company commander, MajA. Leavitt, and Lt E. W. Auld were hit by shell- fire during a reconnaissance on 7 August; Leavitt was badly wounded and Auld killed. Fortunately, the company 2i/c, Capt J.H. Lee- son, MC, promoted from the ranks in 1916, was a well-experienced

officer. He took over command until late on 8 August, when CaptK.M. Campbell arrived to command the com-

29

pany until Leavitt returned at Christmas 1918. The use of German equipment by 3 Div Sigs Coy knew no bounds; captured German pi- geons were employed successfully. The loss of horses was particularly severe in 4 Div Sigs Coy. Its HQ was hit by a bomb that killed CplI.P. Crawford, MSM, and four horses; five more were killed as German shelling hit the Horse Lines. The use of Fullerphones and four letter call stations from division forward proved to be excellent signal security. The Corps Survey Section was augmented by a team led by Lt Dawson and 16 men from CCHA with four W/T sets to work with the flash spotting teams. The teams were surveyed in accurately and their observations of Ger- man artillery locations by compass bearings on the flash of the guns were sent by wireless directly to the Commander of Counter-Battery Operations.

The Canadian Corps moved north to the Arras Sector and occupied the front line just south of the Scarpe River. The battle that took place from 26 to 31 August became known as the Battle of the Scarpe. This time there was no possibility of surprise as the Germans rec- ognized the Canadians and prepared for an

attack. It began at 0300 hours on 26 August with 2 CID on the right and 3 CID on the left. By having reasonable objectives and good ar- tillery support the attack went according to plan and at the end of the day, the Canadians had advanced about 3,000 yards and had smashed German counter-attacks. The next day, the same two divisions resumed the at- tack, when 3 CID began its assault at 0455 hours followed by 2 CID at 1000 hours. The German resistance increased and the gains on the 27th were less than the day before, but the two divisions resumed the attack the following day. The fighting was fierce and the advance was slow but steady. After three days, the two divisions had suffered nearly 6,000 casualties and were worn out. The Canadians had ad- vanced over five miles and captured over 3,000 prisoners, 53 guns, and 519 machine guns. Unfortunately, not all of the Fresnes- Rouvroy line and Vis-en-Artois Switch had been captured, and it had to be before the next phase – the assault of the Drocourt- Queant Line (D-Q Line) could begin. From 29 to 31 August, 1 CID in the south and British 4th Division in the north of the Sector made small but significant gains preparing the way

30

for 4 CID to move into position between them. The Battle of the Scarpe cost the Canadian Corps 6,836 casualties, 15 per cent of the 46,000 participants.

The Amiens and the Scarpe campaigns were not only very successful from a commu- nications point of view but also were very light in terms of signaller casualties. There were only five killed: Lt E.W. Auld, Cpl I.P. Craw- ford, MSM, Spr S.E. Simmins, Spr R. Taylor, and Spr R.C. Woodward. The good work by signallers was acknowledged in the form of awards for gallantry and leadership: the MC to

Capt W.A. Steel wearing his 1918 MC Ribbon.

2; Bar to the MC to 3; DCM to 6; MM to 27; Bar to the MM to 1; Second Bar to the MM to 1.

Three divisions in line faced the D-Q Line, one of the strongest German defence systems on the Western Front. Its centre was the Vil- lage of Dury and its strongest point was Mont Dury and its signature Windmill. The British 4th Division could only put one brigade into the line, which increased the task of the Cana- dian 4 CID. The attack began on 2 September 1918 and

in spite of increasing German resist- ance the Canadians made a dent in the formi-

31

dable D-Q Line. The attack resumed the fol- lowing day, but during the night the Germans made a strategic withdrawal behind the next major obstacle, the Canal du Nord. By 5 Sep- tember, the Germans had given up all the land they had captured in their spring offensive. The Canadians had broken the back of the D- Q Line at a cost of another 7,218 casualties,15.5 per cent of the attacking force of 46,000. A sense of the intensity of the fighting can be gained from the one day of 2 September, when seven VCs were won, the most of any day in the War.

The D-Q Line conflict only lasted a few days but it and the move up to the Canal du Nord was more deadly for signallers than Amiens and the Scarpe. The CCSS lost 6 men: Lt R.W.E. Christie, Sgt W. Barratt, Sgt H.L. Buck, MM, Spr G.J. Hamilton, Spr F.B. Robertson, and Spr W.J. Wild. The CHQ Sigs Coy recorded the constant frustration of putting up airline along the road to Cambrai only to have the Germans shoot it down as fast as it was put up. 1 Div Sigs Coy reported much the same thing with the Germans shooting down their aerial for W/T, but noting that it was up again in 10 minutes. Once again, laying and maintaining cable was difficult due to the frequent moving of headquarters and heavy shelling, but 2 Div Sigs Coy reported good communications, es- pecially with W/T and V/T. 3 Div Sigs Coy found that putting cable on short poles was better than laying it on the rough terrain, which caused breaks.

Once again, there were a number of awards for gallantry: the MC to 6; DCM to 5; and for the first time the Bar to the DCM to Cpl A.W. Mitchell; MM to 18; Bar to the MM to 5; MiD to 10.

To guard the vital city of Cambrai and the open country to the east, the Germans had two lines of defence: the Canal du Nord, which was under construction and dry, and the Canal de l’Escaut. Gen Currie decided to attack in two phases: first to get over the Canal du Nord and capture the

dominating feature of Bourlon Wood; second to cross the Canal de l’Escaut and capture the City of Cambrai. The attack began on 27 September 1918 at

32

0520 hours with 1 CID on the left and 4 CID on the right. With an extra strong engineer presence and continuous artillery support by leapfrogging batteries, the two divisions were over the canal and into the German main de- fences by nightfall. Their success allowed room for the British 11th Division to come up on the left of 1 CID and for 3 CID to come up on the right of 4 CID to continue the attack on the following day. The fighting on the 28th was fierce as the Germans fought tenaciously to hold onto their strong defensive positions. The advance continued on the 29th but the third day of the attack was even more bitter and less satisfying. There were few gains in spite of suffering over 2,000 casualties. Never- theless, General Currie felt that it was better to keep attacking thus preventing the Ger- mans from mounting a serious counter-attack. 3 and 4 CIDs therefore resumed the attack on 30 September but to little avail, leaving the Canadian Corps still far from its ultimate ob- jective of the Canal de l’Escaut. The attack continued with all four divisions resuming the assault at 0500 hours on 1 October. On the left, the British 11th

Division and 1 CID made

no headway but 3 and 4 CIDs did advance the line about a mile. By now all the leading divi- sions were extremely tired and on 2 October, they were ordered to hold the line while 2 CID took over much of the front. In five days, the Canadian Corps had captured more than 7,000 prisoners and 205 guns. It had broken the last organized German defences in front of Cambrai, which the Germans seemed de- termined to defend to the death. The end came on the night of 9 October at 0130 hours, when 2 CID completely surprised the Germans, who were in the midst of a general withdrawal, including the desertion of Cam- brai. The advance continued on the 10th and the 11th by 2 CID, which made some progress, but the Germans continued to resist strongly. This point marked the end of the battle by the Canadian Corps and most of it was withdrawn into reserve. The Battle of the Canal du Nord- Cambrai had lasted 15 days, during which the Corps had broken the back of one the most heavily defended German positions. The cost of 13,672 casualties was high, 20 per cent of the 68,500 Canadians involved. From the Scarpe to Cambrai, the Canadian Corps had

33

34

taken 18,585 prisoners, captured 371 guns and nearly 2,000 machine guns, liberating over 116 square miles of French territory, in- cluding 54 towns and villages.

The cost to the CCSS from 27 September to 11 October was 7 dead: Spr R.S. Bartlett, SgtC.V. Boyd, MM, Sigmn H. Ellis, Spr W. Greend- halgh, Spr W.D. Spear, MM, Spr D.E. Stegh- meier, and Spr D.S. Stuart. All of the Divisional Signal Companies made reports in their war diaries on their experiences: 1 Div Sigs Coy’s dismounted parties carrying a cable across the Canal went into the cellar of a chateau and captured 28 Germans hiding there; 2 Div Sigs Coy reported that although the new CW, MK III, W/T sets worked well, line was still laid from brigade to battalion under direct observation of the enemy, resulting in one of the cable wagon horses being killed by MG fire; 3 Div Sigs Coy observed that tank sup- port was a mixed blessing; the tanks were con- stantly tearing down the pole lines; 4 Div Sigs Coy noted that lines on short poles worked better during rapid advances. In spite of these difficulties, the CHQ Sigs Coy recorded that at the Canal du Nord it had built 6 miles of air-

line in one day. It proudly reported that since 8 August the Company had constructed 58 miles of 6 pair semi-permanent lines, and had rewired 18 miles of former German lines.

The severity of the fighting brought many names forward for awards of gallantry: the MC to 6; Bar to the MC to 1; DCM to 3; Bar to the DCM to Sgt H.J. Faulkner; MM to 24; Bar to the MM to 2; Second Bar to the MM to 1.

By 16 October, 1, 2, and 4 CIDs were back in the line and probing German defences. On the next day, they found that the Germans were in the midst of a general retreat, al- though they continued to defend the line of the Canal de la Sensee. It was 18 October be- fore 2 and 4 CIDs made bridgeheads over the canal. Once across, all three divisions made rapid progress, and on the 19th the Canadians advanced 12,000 yards, the greatest advance of the war. On 20 October, 2 CID went into re- serve, to be followed by 1 CID on the 22nd. The advance continued by 3CID on the left and 4 CID on the right. By the evening of the 23rd, the Canadian Corps was holding a front eight

35

miles long against the west bank of the Canal de l’Escaut, with the Germans defending the

36

east bank. There was a pause in the war on this front for a few days as the Canadian Corps was far ahead of its British flanking divisions, which needed to catch up. At the same time, the Canadians had stretched their supply lines to the maximum and a few days were needed to rest and replenish the front-line troops. On 1 November 1918, the battle for Valenciennes began with 10 CIB, “going over the top”, at 0515 hours, supported by the heaviest barrage of artillery and machine gun fire ever given to a single brigade. In a little more than an hour, the dominating height of Mont Houy had been captured and by 1020 hours Canadians were in the suburbs of the City. Gen Currie recorded that the operation on 1 November was one of the most successful the Corps had yet performed. The battle continued on the next day, but the Germans soon abandoned Valenciennes and all the ground to its imme- diate east. The advance towards Mons was made difficult more by German demolitions, hilly terrain, and constant rain, than by seri- ous German resistance. By 7 November, 4 CID was replaced by 2 CID, and it and 3 CID led the way into Belgium, where for the first time Canadians saw a countryside little affected by devastation. In the early morning hours of 11 November, Mons was captured. At 1100 hours, an Armistice, that had been some weeks in negotiation, came into effect, and the war was over.

Being well-trained signallers the Canadian Corps Cease Fire message was saved:

Corps Wrls G121Hostilities will cease at 1100 K on 11 November,Troops will stand fast on the line reached atthat hour which will be reported to Corps HQ aaaDefensive precautions will be maintained There will be no intercourse of any description with the enemyFurther instructions will follow aaa Dvsn GOCRA CCHA CMGC CERepeated all concerned Acknowledge

Can Corps 0605 K

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Although there were no major battles during the last days of the war, the number of fatal ca- sualties from mid October to 31 December, to account for those dying of wounds, was high. By this time in 1918, deaths from Spanish in- fluenza were occurring. The CCSS lost 15 men during this period: Spr H.L. Beals, MM, SprC.I. Brewer, Spr J.H. Cameron, Spr C.L. Cash- more, Spr W. Hotten, Spr A.M. Lawson, MM, Spr D. MacDougall, Spr C.A. Merriam, SprA.C. Palston, Spr R.A. Partridge, Spr W.F. Pearen, Spr J. Quinn, Spr J.C, Routh, Spr D.M. Smith, MM, and Spr W.H. Wells.

During the last month of the war, the War Diaries of the Signal Companies were mostly silent. CHQ Sigs Coy, however recorded its en- tire communication organization, which gave a good impression of how all the companies worked. The strength consisted of 19 officers and 516 men divided among the following work areas: office staff, DR Section, Wireless Section, Electrical light detail, Pigeon detail, Airline and Cable Sections, and the CCHA HQ and two Artillery Brigade Sub-sections. The of- fice staff was composed of a Signal Master, Su- perintendent, Assistant Superintendent, 17 Telegraphers, 2 DR clerks, 3 Message clerks, a Checker, and 3 Orderlies (organized in 3 daily reliefs). There was a Main Office with two 30 line exchanges with 2 operators on each relief; a Sub Station (Arras) with a cor- poral, 5 operators, and 5 orderlies with two 30 line exchanges and 3 telegraph sounders; a Sub Station (Duisans) with an officer, 9 oper- ators and 2 orderlies with an equal amount of equipment. It noted there were four DR daily runs to divisional HQs over an average dis- tance of 20 miles. On one occasion 19,526 despatches were carried, plus there were 155 special runs. That same day there were 150 pi- geon flights. The Light detail consisted of 3 men to set up163 lights and to run the gener- ator. At the divisional level the detail looked

after137 lights. There were 126 horses to be cared for and, when rations had to be deliv- ered, the Company was spread over 13 loca- tions.

As the war in Europe was coming to a close and the CCSS was waiting to go home, sig-

38

nallers were engaged in another theatre of op- erations, Siberia. They were part of an Ameri- can-British and Japanese effort to support the “White Russians,” the forces loyal to the de- posed Czar, against the “Red Russians,” the Bolsheviks. Canada agreed to send troops to Siberia in late 1918. The area around the great port of Vladivostok, the terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway, was held by a Czech force, guaranteed safe passage back to their homeland. There was a concern that they might be overcome by either the Bolsheviks or German prisoners who had been freed by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 9 February 1918.

The Canadian Siberian Expeditionary Force consisted on nearly 5,000 all ranks It was formed from personnel stationed in Canada in the late summer and early fall of 1918. As part of the Canadian contingent, the 6th Divisional Signal Company (6 Div Sigs Coy) began to be raised in Saint John in August but soon moved on 14 September to Rockcliffe, in Ottawa, to join some of the members of the Ottawa Signal Depot, which had been closed. It was commanded by Capt W. McIntosh, who along with Capts A.B. Fennell, MC, and T.C. McGill, had been sent back from France for this specific duty. Five other officers, all with- out overseas experience, Lts Bell, Byam, Flem- ing, Prickett, and Thom were assigned to the Company.

An Advance Party of the Canadian contin- gent under the Force Commander, MGen J.H. Elmsley, consisting of 680 all ranks, includ- ing Capt McGill and 23 signallers, sailed from Vancouver on 11 October 1918 and arrived at Vladivostok on the 26th. Capt McGill, who kept the only war diary for 6 Div Sigs Coy, settled his tiny group in the existing Russian barracks, and proceeded to train. None of the men was trained as signallers and the group had no equipment. McGill borrowed some flags from the US Army and began to teach semaphore. Finally, on 1 November, some Morse flags and buzzer phones arrived and work continued in spite of extreme cold. By 18 November, the men had progressed to work

with the helio- graph and to do some work on the existing Russian overhead cables.

39

On 5 December 1918, more of the Cana- dian contingent arrived, bringing the first mail to the Advance Party since it had left Van- couver. The ship brought Lee-Enfield rifles to replace the Ross rifles which the Advance Party had been issued. At the end of Decem- ber, Capt McGill’s men were tested to see if they could reach the standard of 15 words a minute for Buzzer, 10 words a minute for Morse flag, and 6 words a minute for Helio- graph. Finally, in January 1919, the Company received one motorcycle and could open a sig- nal office and commence DR runs. On 15 Jan- uary, Lt Thom and 23 men arrived to join 16 CIB as its signal section. It was not until 27 February that Maj McIntosh and the remain- der of 6 Div Sigs Coy, 6 officers and 152 men arrived. On 6 March, the rest of the signal equipment was unloaded: a 10-line cordless magneto exchange, 4 – 3 buzzer exchanges, Lucas lamps, 23 telephones, and W/T equip- ment. Only now could the Company be com- pletely functional.

Signallers suffered from a shortage of water in March when the water mains broke because of heavy frost, and the men had to go so long without bathing that there were outbreaks of scabies and lice. They continued to connect the Canadian units by line, V/T and W/T, in spite of the local civilians stealing the airlines. In any case, the efforts of 6 Div Sigs Coy were soon to come to an end as the Canadian Gov- ernment decided to withdraw its troops. It is- sued an evacuation order on 10 April 1919, and on the 21st, Maj McIntosh, 5 officers, and 107 signallers embarked for Vancouver. In early May, all communications were closed down as the remainder of the Canadian con- tingent prepared to leave Siberia. On 19 May, Capt T.C. McGill and Lt Thom with 43 men left for Vancouver. To everyone’s surprise, LtH.E. Prickett, resigned his commission and he and 11 men went to work for the British Rail- way Mission in Siberia. The Siberian episode was probably one of frustration for the partic- ipants but at least there were no

fatalities among the Signals personnel. Capt McGill, who was there from beginning to end, was made a Member of the Order of the British

40

Empire (MBE), the only Signal officer to be so honoured in the First World War.

During the latter part of 1918 and going on into 1919, decorations were awarded in great numbers: some for specific actions, some for general good service above the call of duty, and in some cases seemingly as a matter of catch-up. Maj R.L. Wheeler and Capt W.H. McMurray were made Officers of the British Empire (OBE), a decoration normally awarded to staff officers.

The DSO was awarded to Majs A.A. Ander- son and P.E. Earnshaw. Other awards were: the MC to 10; Bar to the MC to 4; DCM to 6; MM to172; Bar to the MM to 12; Second Bar to the MM to 6; MSM to 29; MiD to 31. Throughout the war there were 23 awards to CCSS personnel by Foreign Governments.*

As part of the Armistice conditions, the Al- lies were to occupy the Rhineland. Nearly half of the Canadian Corps, mainly 1 and 2 CIDs, and some of the supporting arms and services, left Mons on 18 November 1918 to march through Belgium and into Germany, crossing the Rhine at Cologne and Bonn. Naturally, all soldiers were anxious to return to Canada, and those over the Rhine began, on 5 January

*See Appendix 7

1919, to re-join the rest of the Canadian Corps in Belgium. By 6 February, all Canadi- ans were in Belgium, where the return of stores had already begun. Leave was gener- ously granted and education courses for sol- diers were given under divisional arrangements and at the Khaki University, which had a number of Colleges throughout England. Demobilization of the Corps began with 3 CID leaving Le Havre for England in early March, and with the withdrawal of 4 CID in mid-April, the last of the Canadians had left Europe. Most men spent about a month in England before returning to Canada, and by fall all were home.

The officers and men of the CCSS had an important role, even after the end of the war. Communications had to be maintained, and although lines were not broken by shellfire, often wire disappeared for its copper value. For those Signals personnel who crossed over the Rhine to Germany, communications back to Corps HQ were vital. CHQ Sigs Coy and most of 1 and 2 Div Sigs Coys accompanied the Canadian contingent that garrisoned Ger- many for December 1918 and most of Janu- ary 1919. To expedite communications, CHQ Sigs Coy sent a long-range CW set in order to

Corps Sigs Coy MT Sec.

41

1914-1915 Star

be able to work back to Army HQ. Lt J.C. Craig, at one point, worked the W/T a dis- tance of 48 miles. Good use was made of existing German lines. While at Bonn, Ger- many, the routine of the CHQ Sigs Coy, with 17 officers and 651 men on ration strength,

The 1 Div Sigs Coy war diary did not even mention the Armistice on 11 November. It did make a note of crossing the German border on 4 December 1918. Once settled in new quarters in Germany, time was spent in clean- ing equipment, painting wagons, and con- ducting rides. New Year’s dinner was an improvement on Christmas dinner, which had to be delayed for the want of poultry. The

included church parades, route marching, squad drill, PT, and sports. On New Year’s Day, there were special sports events, where it was noted that tent-pegging* was exceptionally good. That evening, the Dumbells, a Concert Group from 2 CID, put on entertainment for all ranks. LCol E. Forde took the opportunity to inspect every Section of the Company. Pic- tures were taken of all Signals personnel at the site of the Rhine Bridge at Bonn. Back in Bel- gium in February, there were opportunities for sight-seeing. It was noted, with pride, that 8 officers, 67 men, plus 5 from the CASC and 1 from the CAMC were eligible for the 1914- 15 Star; to be eligible personnel had to have been in France prior to 31 December 1915. CHQ Sigs Coy men began to leave for Canada as early as April but the main group did not leave from Le Havre until 11 May. The CHQ Sigs Coy war diary noted that there was $7,000 in the Canteen Fund.

*Tent-pegging was a sport in which a rider tries at full gallop to carry off at the point of a lance a tent-peg fixed in the ground; remember the Signal Service was a mounted corps.

meal on 31 December began at 1800 hours in a large German restaurant on the banks of the Rhine. The hall was highly decorated and all officers were present. The NCOs acted as wait- ers and the CO spoke. There was a concert fol- lowing the dinner. By 6 January, the Company was on its way back to Belgium, where the process of turning-in equipment began. An of- ficial photograph was taken of all officers and NCOs in February. On 1 March 1919, Maj Earnshaw and Capt Stewart met with LCol Forde and all senior officers of the Canadian Signal Service to plan the organization of a Signal Association. The Company sailed for England on 29 March and was quartered in Bramshott Camp. Two officers, Capt A.E. Stewart and Lt J.A.M. Young, were invited to Buckingham Palace to be invested with their Military Crosses. The oldest of the signal com- panies sailed for Canada on 3 May 1919.

The 2 Div Sigs Coy war diary did note the end of the war on 11 November and that the Company went on a route march on the 15th, which was not much of a celebration! The march to Germany was noteworthy for the de-

42

A pristine cable wagon section drawn up for inspection in Bonn, Germany.

43

Corps Heavy Artillery Sigs Sec. [The three Sigs Coys, and their Secs that went to Germany in November 1918, had their photographs taken in Bonn in 1919.

struction by fire on 5 December of the lorry carrying the company rations and the officers’ kits. Apparently the vehicle overheated trying to climb the hills. The official crossing of the Rhine was held on 13 December but on the 20th there was a special ceremony for all the Company’s originals at the Bonn Bridge. The officers present were Maj Anderson, Capt McKinnon and Lts Harcourt and Wyman, all except for Anderson had been promoted from the ranks. An official photograph of all the Signal officers in Germany was taken on 5 January. Back in Belgium by 19 January, the Company personnel engaged in sports and education classes. During March, the Com- pany’s horses were turned over to the Belgian Government. On 12 April 1919, the Company left France for good.

The 3 Div Sigs Coy moved into the City of Mons on 11 November. The next day it at- tended a concert by the Dumbells, 2 CID’s fa- mous concert group, which continued to entertain in Canada in the 1920s. The Com- pany, like the other companies, complained

of the civilians stealing the telephone cables for their copper content. A contingent of 2 of- ficers and 15 men attended a Service of Thanksgiving for Victory in the Town Theatre in Mons. On 27 November, 3 CID mounted a Guard of Honour for the King of the Belgians. It was noted that censorship of mail had ended, as did the prohibition on the use of cameras. The Company welcomed the return of Maj A. Leavitt at the Christmas Dinner. MajK.M. Campbell, who had replaced Maj Leavitt after he was wounded on 7 August, was posted to Canadian General Headquarters in Lon- don. The 3rd Division was the first to go home, so on 13 February 1919, 3 Div Sigs Coy left France for Witley Camp in England. During March, the unit suffered from an epidemic of Spanish influenza, while the men were being assigned to different drafts depending on where they wished to be discharged. Nine drafts totaling 150 men were spread across the major cities of Canada from Halifax to Van- couver. The war diary of 3 Div Sigs

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Coy ended on 18 March 1919.

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The 4 Div Sigs Coy, after a couple of small moves in Belgium, settled down the usual rou- tine of handing in stores, sending men on leave, and playing sports. It noted that Lt D.B. Holman and 50 men had left for England to attend various university courses, while 10 men had gone to the Khaki University. The Company closed out its diary on 30 April 1919, but during the months waiting to go home, it produced a 150 page history with the names of everyone who had served within its ranks and a general account of their joint ac- tivities from the time of formation on 18 April 1916 until the end of the war. Some of the thoughts gave an insight into the minds of the officers and men of the CCSS during the First World War:With the discomforts of our quarters were

mingled the nervous strain of the switch- board, the ceaseless repairing of lines, and the toilsome carrying of water and rations through the mud and shelling, hitherto unrivaled. But, for the huddled group in the old dug-out corner, the sombreness of their surroundings was quite dispelled in that mellow hour between the advent of

nied human retaliation when an irate voice bellowed, “Get off this line signals, and mind your own business.” But to ward off a pending cross-examination, he could say, “moment, please, another call,” and serenely smiling, sketch in the air, during an appropriate interval, a caricature of the offending officer. Then his “Yes Sir!” would likely be answered with “Oh! never mind, thanks,” ‘C’est la guerre.’

But the memory of those of us, our friends and fellow worker, left behind, is one that will remain. For us the future shows a guiding hand and points the road to pass; for them, that finger moving on the wallhas spelt a last “VE.” To them all honour -we shall not forget.

There were still more to not forget in 1919,1920, and even four in 1921 as the ravages of war took more victims as the result of wounds, injuries, and health issues from time in the trenches as assessed by the Department of Veteran Af- fairs. There were 24 deaths

the rum jar and their somewhat uncertain

British War Medal during these 3 years:

repose.Never was the courage of the section (W/T)

more severely tried than in the almost helpless struggle to keep up communica- tions in this position. A slough of mud, a hail of shells, sleepless nights, and anxious days - toil, danger, and physical discomfort found the limits of human endurance.Never have we felt more deeply the satis- faction of a task accomplished, than when we bid adieu to Passchendaele.

It took an enterprising genius as exchange operator, by heck – an SOS King rather than one who would wring his hands and wail, “Cheeses, cheeses, now I am up shin creek.” He required marvelous self-con- trol. If he reported in reply to an urgent call for CJB during a shoot, “Line out, Sir”

it was not his to reason why at the com- ment, “Out! well, who took it out?” When doing expedient work in busy hours, in- quiring “Finished here, Sir,” he was de-

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Lt R. Brown; Sgts W. J. Dwyer, H. Jones, and

C.S. Shaw; Cpls T.A. Johnston and R.H. King; LCpl J.F. Norton, DCM; Sprs M.L. Aikin, R. J. Ashworth, G. Atkinson, E.O. Benson, C.H. Brand, H.E. Davis, M.J. Fulton, A.H. Hellyer,E. H. Kenty, F.A. Knowles, T.C. Lockwood,H.E. McRitchie, C.A. Millen, J.L.B. Murdock,J. Ryan, W.A. Shergold, H. South, and L.A. Stokes.

Canada’s contribution to the First World War was outstanding. With a population of about eight million, and only a million and half men of military age, Canada raised 619,636 men for the CEF. In addition, about 10,000 served in the naval forces and 24,000 in the British air forces, although many of them came from CEF. Fatal casualties num- bered 60,661, of which 59,544 were members of the CEF, including 143 signallers. There were 172,950 non-fatal casualties, of which 531 were signallers.

The CCSS was a tiny force within the CEF. At

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most, 2,500 served in France out the CEF’s total of 418,000 serving overseas, in France and elsewhere. Signallers made up less than one per cent of the CEF in France, yet their contribution to Canadian achievements was far greater. The British acknowledged that the Canadian insistence that communication ca- bles be buried at least six feet down and the persistent use of wireless were two of the most important reasons for Canada’s success on the battlefield. Both in the attack and in the de- fence, the ability to bring down artillery fire on the inevitable German counter-attack and to seek out and destroy enemy gun positions by counter-bombardment fire were funda- mental to the success of the CEF, beginning with Vimy and culminating in the victories of the “One Hundred Days.”

The gallantry decorations and awards for service over and above the call of duty given to members of the CCSS were far in excess of their share based on its strength. Their record of 686 awards, to 567 individuals, as detailed in Appendix 7, speaks for itself:1. There were 857 awards of the DSO, six

Sig- nal officers were recipients. Only 70 officers were awarded both the DSO and the MC, Maj P.E. Earnshaw was one;

2. There were 3,195 awards of the MC, 51 sig-nal officers were recipients. Only 294 offi-

24 awards of the DCM and Bar, Sgt H.J. Faulkner and Cpl J. Winters were two. There were 255 awards of the DCM and the MM, 9 were signallers. There were 42 awards of the DCM and the MM and Bar, 3 were signallers. There were five awards of the DCM and the MM and two Bars, Sgt A.K. Hibbert and A/Sgt G.J. Oliver were two;

4. There were 12,345 awards of the MM, 375 signallers were recipients. There were 237 recipients of the MM and Bar, 37 were sig- nallers. There were 38 recipients of the MM and two Bars, 10 were signallers;

5. There were 1,372 recipients of the MSM, 34 were signallers;

6. There were 5,149 recipients of a MiD, 79 were signallers of which 9 were mentioned twice, and one was mentioned three times.

While it is difficult to choose two individuals amongst so many deserving signallers, two do deserve special notice. Two signallers were awarded the DCM and the MM with two Bars, Sgt H. K Hibbert and A/Sgt G. J. Oliver. Both were outstanding signallers and their citations attest to it.Oliver’s DCM citation is differ-

cers were awarded a Bar to their MC, 7 were signal officers. Only 15 officers were awarded the MC and the OBE, Capt W. H.

ent, however, from all of the signallers’ citations:

Victory Medalwith MiD

McMurray was one. Only 8 officers were awarded the MC and Bar and were holders of the DCM, Lt F. Barber was one. There were only two officers awarded the MC and Bar and the MM and Bar, Lt E.G. Weeks was one. There were only eight officers awarded the MC and Bar and the MM, Lt M.R. Mc- Cracken was one. There were 45 officers awarded the MC and the DCM, Lts H.S. Quigley and Capt C. Shergold were two. There were 73 officers awarded the MC and the MM, Lt B. Faughnan, Lt R.B. Gibson, Capt F.S. McPherson, and Lt H.K. Wyman were four;

3. There were 1,984 awards of the DCM, 48

signallers were recipients. There were only

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For marked gallantry and devotion to duty during the attack east of the Canal du Nord from 27th to 30th September 1918. He was the NCO i/c of the party of sig- nallers. Shortly after starting forward he found that the infantry had passed over a machine gun nest which was sweeping the western bank of the canal. Immediately he telephoned his brigade, and artillery fire was directed on the nest and all but one machine gun was put out of action. He then got in rear of the machine gun and rushed it single-handed, shot four of the crew with his revolver, and took the fifth prisoner. He did splendid work.

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Whether the members of the CCSS were teleg- raphers, runners, visual or wireless operators, linemen, transport men, DRs, or switchboard operators, they set a standard of professional- ism that carried them from a minor militia unit before the war to permanent army status in 1919. Once again the writers of 4 Div Sigs Coy history said it best:

Many and varied are the duties of signallers. They exist, in small numbers, throughout every branch of army organization. No unit, however small, is complete without them. No formation, however powerful, is either safe or effective unless the signaller and his precious means of communication be continuously at its service. Though never unimportant, he is usually an incon- spicuous part, often unobserved and more often unrecognized. Yet none have learned better than he the futility of mere “eye service,” and the conscious joy of duty well done.

The same anonymous signallers signed off with a poem to their comrades who would not be going home. It was written in Morse Code:

And when the last VE is sounded, And the angel sends CI,Let’s hope you’ll be found RD sapper For there’ll be no IMI

A rough translation might be:

And when the last message is sent, And the angel says come home,Let’s hope you’ll be found all right sapper For there’ll be no second call.

Amen!