Session 2: Political Demography and Russia’s Past and Future

Sergei V. ZakharovInstitute of Demography (IDEM)

Higher School of Economics (HSE)Moscow, Russia

szakharov@hse.ru

First International Conference on Political Demography and Social Macro-Dynamics

Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration

Moscow, December 13-14, 2013

The Demographic Demise of the Soviet Union

I strongly support the idea. Demographic differences, backed by cultural differences made it impossible for the existence of the USSR.

It should be noted that Russian demographers have always talked about it. Fundamental works on the demographic problems of the USSR, even the ones that were published during the period of Soviet censorship, devoted to these issues.

See, for example: A.Volkov, A.Vishnevsky (eds.) Human Reproduction in the USSR (1983).

Only need to have in mind that for obvious reasons, the Russian experts could not do political conclusions

2

Monica Duffy Toft

History and Demography in the Caucasus as a Political Minefield: The Case of the Sochi Olympics

The role of demographic factors in social change in the North Caucasus is very high. Just as proved their influence in North Africa and in other regions of the world.

The erosion of traditional values and the destruction of the traditional organization of the demographic system not only leads to the emergence of the avant-garde political forces, which is important for the modernization of society, but also to the consolidation of conservative forces, who are losing their power.

Time is working against the latter. Unfortunately we live in a period of confrontation. To what extent do we have the resources and tools to reduce the negative consequences of this conflict?3

Georgi Derluguian

Russian Youth Movements: Hope or Hype?

Youth movements, organized and supported by power - an important channel for obtaining resources, social capital. They are an effective way to lift the career of a young person.

Can we talk about the fundamental differences with the Soviet period??

4

Jennifer Dabs Sciubba

Russia’s Recent Fertility Increase – Why it Occurred and Can it be Sustained?

At the macro level demographic statistics we have strong evidence that pronatalist policy influenced period indicators of fertility. Cohort fertility indicators, taking into account the data for 2012 (outstanding increase in period fertility rates) also showed a positive reaction , albeit a weak one.

Historical trend towards lower ultimate cohort fertility in Russia apparently stopped at the level of 1.6 births per woman.

5

V.N. Archangelskiy, J.V. Zinkina, A.V. Korotayev

Russia’s Recent Fertility Increase – Why it Occurred and Can it be Sustained?

At the same time, there is no clear evidence on the microdata level, namely on economic policies (in particular, the parent capital ) had a strong positive response. Until today, the econometric analysis does not give grounds for optimism. Neither the intentions nor the realization of intentions did not change principially.

Future changes in fertility under the sign of great uncertainty. While we can not say that the generations born in the 1980s will have more children than their parents .

We also worrying that fertility increased more significantly in those regions where it was above average before the policy intervention, especially in rural areas.6

Completed Cohort and Period Total Fertility in Russia (average number of births to a woman by age 50): birth cohorts 1841-1982 (extrapolation with fixed ASFR as of 2012), period 1897-2012

7 Source: Zakharov S.V. (2008). Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition. Demographic Research. Vol. 19, p.910 (http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol19/24/ ). (Updated for 2012 data)

1870

1880

1890

1900

1910

1920

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980

Calendar Year

Birth

s pe

r w

oman

Birth Cohort

Period

Cohort

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

11,21,41,61,8

22,22,42,62,8

1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Calendar Year

Birth

s pe

r w

oman

Birth Cohort

Period

Cohort

1,85 - 1,91,6 - 1,65

Different Indicators of Total Fertility: Cohort versus Synthetic Measures, Russia, 1979-2012

8

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

1

1,2

1,4

1,6

1,8

2

2,2

2,4

1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985

Calendar Year

Birt

hs p

er w

oman

Female Birth CohortCTFR actual

CTFR expected (fixed ASFR for 2012)PTFR

PTFRst (1959 cohort age pattern as a standard)Period Mean Birth Order

adjPTFR (B-F method)

Period indicators

Cohort indicators

Cumulated Period ASFR, Russia: 1979-2012, per 1000

90

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

by 20by 25by 30by 35by 40by 50 (PTFR)

Cumulated Cohort ASFR, Russia: Cohorts1945-1990, per 1000

10

0200400600800

100012001400160018002000

1945195019551960196519701975198019851990Female birth cohort

by 20by 25by 30by 35by 40by 50 (CTFR)

Differences in Cumulated cohort ASFR between base (1960) and subsequent cohorts 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985

11

-0,6

-0,5

-0,4

-0,3

-0,2

-0,1

0

0,1

15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

Birth

s pe

r w

oman

Age

c1960c1965c1970c1975c1980c1985

Period Parity Progression Ratios, 1979-2012(transitions to the next birth for women)

12

00,10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,9

1

1979

1982

1985

1988

1991

1994

1997

2000

2003

2006

2009

2012

PPR 0-->1PPR 1-->2PPR 2-->3PPR 3-->4PPR 4-->5

Cohort Parity Progression Ratios by Age of 20, 25, 30, 35, 50: Transition 01

13

00,10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,9

1

1955

1957

1959

1961

1963

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

Female birth cohort

PPR 0-->1

by 20by 25by 30by 35by 50

Cohort Parity Progression Ratios by Age of 20, 25, 30, 35, 50: Transition 12

14

00,10,20,30,40,50,60,70,8

1955

1957

1959

1961

1963

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

Female birth cohort

PPR 1-->2

by 20by 25by 30by 35by 50

Cohort Parity Progression Ratios by Age of 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 50: Transition 23

15

0

0,05

0,1

0,15

0,2

0,25

0,3

1955

1957

1959

1961

1963

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

Female birth cohort

PPR 2-->3

by 20by 25by 30by 35by 40by 50

Cohort Parity Progression Ratios by Age of 25, 30, 35, 40, 50: Transition 34

16

0,10,120,140,160,18

0,20,220,240,260,28

0,3

Female birth cohort

PPR 3-->4

by 25by 30by 35by 40by 50