severe space weather

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Resilience and Emergencies Division Severe Space Weather H56 and marmite. Hollywood or Business Continuity for Dummies. Science versus the facts. Robert Third Resilience Team - North September 2014

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Resilience and Emergencies Division

Severe Space Weather H56 and marmite. Hollywood or Business Continuity for Dummies. Science versus the facts.

Robert ThirdResilience Team - North

September 2014

• Introduction

– Conflicting scientific evidence/facts

• Space weather

– the sun and its magnetic activity

• Severe space weather risk

– H56 reasonable worst case scenario

– Impacts and/or common consequences

• Next steps

– International collaboration – advance space science, forecasting, alerting and measures quantifying severity

– Government work programme - High Impacts Hazards Team

– Local Resilience Forums’ considerations and preparedness

Conclusion

– Myths and hype

The Sneeze

With a large sneeze there are three things that spring to mind that can be likened, sort of, to space weather events: - explosive eruption/gust/wind, like solar storms/solar flares/CMEs - unseen germs like solar energetic particles causing radiation- sound and noise ‘atchoo’ like x-rays and solar radio noise [sic]

Space weather Space weather events are changes in space of: plasma, radiation and magnetic fields, driven by the energy from the sun and carried by the solar wind.

Solar flares and coronal mass ejections released; causing disturbances in magnetic field and geomagnetic storms

Solar energetic particle emissions increase radiation levels, causing radiation storms

X-ray emissions (and solar radio noise) cause radio disturbances/blackouts

Space weather summary table Space weather/solar storm event

Occurrence Consequence Impacts Timings

Solar flares and Coronal Mass Ejections(‘gusts’ in solar wind)

Disturbance of the earth’s magnetic field

Geomagnetic stormsGenerate induced currents

Risk to power networks 17 hours to 4 daysDamage to satellite

electronics

Degradation of radio communications

Solar energetic particles

Large numbers of energetic particles emitted from the sun

Radiation stormsIncreased radiation levels

Radiation dosage 30 minutes to 20 hours

Damage to satellite electronics

Degradation of radio communications

X-rays and solar radio noise

Disturbances of the ionosphere

Radio blackouts Loss of radio (HF) communications

8 minutes

Degradation of navigation systems

H56 reasonable worst case scenario

•Recent solar storm events have had less severe impacts and appear relatively benign:

1921 – Geomagnetic storm

1958 – USA radio blackout

1989 – Hydro-Quebec blackout

2003 – ‘The Halloween event’

Carrington Event 1859; the largest space weather event recorded

– Solar activity of significant magnitude and overlap/synchrony– Duration 1-2 weeks (storm lasting for approx 3 days – some

effects felt for weeks or months - build up, slow down) – Probability 1% per annum during solar maximum– Impacts were globally felt but the severity and scale varied

with location [and academic report/scientific interpretation]

2013 National Risk RegisterNational risk rating: high (requires and national and local response)

National likelihood assessment: medium – high

National impact assessment: moderate

Potential disruptive impacts to numerous technologies and infrastructure:

– power networks– aviation sector– satellite services– communications systems– GPS

H56 impacts & consequences: Power

Official sensitive 8

• Factors of local vulnerability:• Local geology – granite (Aberdeen)• Length and resistance of power lines -

urban vs rural/popn./conurbation size• Proximity to the coast – end of line

(Kings Lynn)• Types of transformers – new or old

• In UK, 13 super grid transformers possibly damaged or taken out of service; two English coastal substations affected with outages lasting a few hours - localised blackouts - medium term 1 month

UK electricity network is more resilient than those in other countries (USA)

• Smaller generators could be affected but National Grid would manage this in their operating reserve – minimal impact on end user.

National Grid - planning for power outages

• Planning for over 20 years:

H56 Impacts and consequences: Communications

UK mobile/cellular network is more robust than the USA and much of Europe

• Concerns over future standards (near miss 4G network)

But relies on power supplies

• Airwave not significantly affected – mitigation measures; engineered out the issues

H56 impacts & consequences: Satellites

An estimated 10% of the satellite fleet will be inoperative or lost for a few days

Most will be recovered, all will be aged

Satellite navigation and accurate timing losses (GPS) 1 – 3 days

• Satellite disruptions: interruptions & degradations lasting several days

• Temporary short-term (1hour) nationwide losses of wireless systems including: mobile phones, internet and other related services.

H56 Impact and consequences: Aviation

Increased pilot and ATC workload

Aircrew and passengers subject to 20mSv of radiation

Disturbances to Satcom and HF communications affecting ships & aircraft

• Work to understand the nature of the risk for the UK since first appeared in National Risk Assessment in 2011.

• Met Office ‘own’ space weather risk - developing 24/7 forecasting capability.

• Co-ordination provided by CCS in Cabinet Office. Severe Space Weather and Effusive Volcanoes Projects set up in April 2013.

• Accountable to High Impact Hazards Programme Board.

• Expert Advisory Groups ensure work of the projects informed by evidence.

• Continue international collaboration (US, EU, NATO)

• Main outputs: enhanced capabilities to be reflected in preparedness strategy for responding to a severe space weather incident.

Next steps: UK Government's approach

• There remain significant uncertainties. Science still evolving and hard to evaluate interdependencies between impacts.

• Impacts likely to be felt internationally. How closely aligned do international responses need to be?

• Affected organisations might have global reach. How should Governments work with them?

• Can capability required be built by individual organisations or does it need intervention at national or international level?

• Time from notification of an event to impacts being experienced is short.

• How best should local responders plan for these types of events?

Policy implications

Conclusion•Known knowns, known unknowns and unknown unknowns…•H56 Severe space weather risk is based upon our best current understanding of a complex risk but• It involves a high degree of interdependency and interconnectivity between

vulnerable technologies

• It has theoretical impacts which are not necessarily proven or tested or fully understood

Questions

• Robert Third

[email protected]

• 0303 444 8130

This presentation was delivered at a BCI forum event. For details of upcoming events please click here.

For details of BCI membership please click here.