‘shadows of uncertainty’: clausewitz's timeless analysis of chance in war

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Shadows of Uncertainty:Clausewitz's Timeless Analysisof Chance in WarThomas Waldman aa Kabul Centre for Strategic Studies , AfghanistanPublished online: 20 Sep 2010.

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Defence Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 2010), pp. 336368ISSN 1470-2436http://www.informaworld.comDOI: 10.1080/14702436.2010.503678 2010 Taylor & Francis

ARTICLE

Shadows of Uncertainty: Clausewitzs Timeless Analysis of

Chance in War

THOMAS WALDMAN

Taylor and FrancisFDEF_A_503678.sgm10.1080/14702436.2010.503678Defence Studies1470-2436 (print)/1743-9698 (online)Original Article2010Taylor & Francis103000000September [email protected]

Think, too, of the great part that is played by the unpredictable in war:think of it now, before you are actually committed to war. The longera war lasts, the more things tend to depend on accidents. Neither younor we can see them: we have to abide their outcome in the dark.

Thucydides

This article examines in some detail one of the central elements of Carl vonClausewitzs remarkable trinity which concerns the play of chance andprobability within which the creative spirit is free to roam.

1

Clausewitzexplains how war, like no other human activity is so continuously oruniversally bound up with chance and that there is an interplay of possi-bilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout thelength and breadth of the tapestry.

2

Clausewitzs description may appearlittle more than his common-sense bordering on wit,

3

however thisignores the fact that others have overlooked chance as an integral elementof the nature of war. Earlier thinkers had either marginalised its importanceor subscribed so fully to its force that they abandoned all hope of producingconcrete theory, while today its anticipated negation represents the basis ofan entire school of thought which contends that a technological Revolutionin Military Affairs (RMA) promises to dispel Clausewitzs fog of war.

4

Colin Gray reminds us that, commonplace though emphasis upon the roleof chance in war may appear, such emphasis is highly unusual amongstrategic theorists.

5

Humans like to feel in control of their environment, to be the mastersof their fate, and may feel uncomfortable when things have to be left tochance, the course of events cannot be reliably predicted or, as Machiavelli

Thomas Waldman, Research Fellow at the Kabul Centre for Strategic Studies, Afghanistan.

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337

suggested, fortune appears as a fiendish Goddess wanting to be mistress ofall human affairs.

6

Such thinking can lead to dangerous misunderstanding,strategic myopia and even historical myth.

7

For such reasons, Clausewitzsanalysis remains important today: it forces us to confront reality and toemphasise the demands chance and uncertainty places on human action,will and creativity.

In order to comprehend Clausewitzs ideas, the article begins by consid-ering some of the influences, precedents, and experiences that contributedto his ideas, before presenting a detailed analysis based on textual analysisand secondary scholarship.

Influences

The origins of Clausewitzs ideas on this subject are certainly somewhatunclear and diverse: aspects of his own experiences merge with imageryreflective of Romantic literature; humanistic philosophy finds its place nextto concepts drawn from the physical sciences. Yet, despite this eclecticism,the following analysis draws attention to three areas for which there isreason to believe that they contributed importantly to his ideas: these are,precedents in existing military theory; Machiavelli; and Clausewitzs ownexperiences.

Existing Military Theory

Clausewitz was adamant that earlier Enlightenment theorists had devotedinsufficient attention to the concepts of chance and uncertainty. Rational-ist theorists preferred to emphasise those aspects of war that were tangible,controllable, and calculable. Such thinkers were not entirely blind to theexistence of chance, rather it was the nature of their theoretical approachthat precluded the incorporation of these factors into their systems: a formof methodological determinism.

8

As Gat states, Enlightenment thinkerswere quite aware of the factors of uncertainty but focused on what theyconsidered to be suitable for intellectual formulation.

9

Clausewitzexplicitly attacked such views when he stated that those thinkers aimed atfixed values; but everything in war is uncertain and calculations have to bemade with variable quantities.

10

While some theorists appreciated theimpact of chance on war, they failed to formulate such ideas into clearconcepts and develop them in theory, which ultimately led to a significantdisconnect between their ideas and reality. As Clausewitz noted, suchfactors were vital because they were ultimately what differentiated realwar from war on paper and which theory must tackle if it is to remainrelevant.

11

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The Enlightenment theorists failure to seriously analyse chance mightbe characterised as a form of theoretical denial or what today we might termcognitive dissonance

12

the refusal to contemplate that which you cannotreliably explain. Theory would only concern itself with that which wasexplicable through observable laws. Determined to reduce warfare to asystem, they focused on those areas which were most susceptible to precisecalculation. They started from the bottom up, developing systems directedmainly at tactical matters or fields where the enemys independent will didnot have to be taken into account, rather than at the more complex andintangible problems associated with strategy.

13

Foremost among these wasthe science of siege warfare, which encouraged the belief that theory couldconfine itself to mathematical prescriptions that would leave almostnothing to chance.

14

In the 17th century, Marshal Vauban purported to have discovered aninfallible method of defending a fortress

15

while also (somewhat paradoxi-cally) claiming to have devised a plan for the besieging army, offering analmost certain breakthrough with little bloodshed.

16

Although Vauban alsoconsidered the role of fortresses as part of the larger strategic picture, theselectivity of his theory is clear and thus the extent to which uncertaintycould be eliminated through its application was necessarily limited.

17

Later theorists such as Count Jacques de Guibert (174390) and BaronDietrich von Blow (17571807) , although army officers by training, hadlittle experience of actual warfare and were thus poor qualified to appreciatethe existence and effect of chronic uncertainty.

18

This is reflected in Blowsconcentration on geometrical lines of operation, whereby elaboratestrategic planning would serve to reduce the element of pure chance thatFrederick [the Great] had feared in it. Armed with such principles hebelieved planning could become more fruitful, prediction somewhat morepossible, warfare more of a science.

19

It would be inaccurate to claim that all previous thinkers had not recog-nised the difficulties that chance presented for theory. Marshal Maurice deSaxe (16961750) recognised that often outcomes will be dependent uponthe favor of fortune, which sometimes is very inconstant

20

and that, as aresult, commanders require courage and intelligence, a talent for suddenand appropriate improvisation, and the ability to see the opportunity andto know how to use it.

21

Likewise Baron Henri-Antoine de Jomini recogn-ised uncertainty as one of the chief causes of the great difference betweenthe theory and the practice of war.

22

Yet, as Echevarria notes, the problemis not so much that Jomini assumed a world without friction, but rather thathis underlying assumption was that if a commander were to hold fast to[his] proposed principles, and use them as guidelines, he would succeed in

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the face of the confusion and chaos of battle.

23

Futhermore, Jomini makesthe point that if success was achieved by chance, then it would be chanceaction in line with principles, nothing else. Clausewitz believed theoristslike Jomini directed their principles towards unilateral activity andconsidered only factors that could be mathematically calculated.

24

Theythus formulated wholly lopsided principle[s] that could never govern a realsituation.

25

Saxe and Jomini failed to grasp or sufficiently articulate, as Clausewitzsubsequently would, that chance could not simply be viewed as somethingincidental to theory, but was in fact central to it. As Daniel Moran notes,even those fully aware of wars uncertain nature,

might feel that the surest path to clarity requires that incidentaldifficulties be ignored, in the same way that a scientist seeking aconstant pattern or signal within a mass of data is entitled, indeedrequired, to ignore the noise that surrounds it. For Clausewitz it wasunrealistic to adopt such an attitude to war, in which the effects ofchance are so profound that they become the signal, the centralreality, and not an exogenous variable to be discounted.

26

Given these theorists tendency to marginalise chance in their theoriesit is not surprising that detailed discussions of genius are largely absent fromtheir work or mentioned only in passing. They devoted little attention tothis subject or situated it in a sublime realm presumed to be beyondtheory. If war is determined by rational laws, what role is there for geniuswhen presumably the enemy will submit following the application of logi-cal principles? Such wars would be decided by superior algebra rather thancreative genius. This characteristic of rationalist theory led to a curiousposition, which Clausewitz would later mock, whereby anything not clearlyexplicable through correct principles must be due to the workings ofsublime genius which is able to spurn the rules. As Echevarria states,Enlightenment writers tended to place genius outside the realm of whatcould be understood scientifically. They regarded genius as a rare, inexpli-cable, and therefore inconvenient phenomenon.

27

However, at the other extreme, the increasingly dominant Romanticworld-view depicted war as the sphere of clashing wills, rising emotions,uncertainty, and confusion diverse complexity and endless confusion;[that] could only be mastered by the generals practical genius and ironwill.

28

The

Sturm und Drang

writers emphasised the play of chance intheir works, as well as the subjective creative will that must overcome it: acentral theme in Johann Schillers

Wallenstein

(1796) which was one ofClausewitzs favourite works.

29

That Clausewitzs own inquiries into the

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psychological qualities of great commanders such as a GustavusAdolphus, Frederick the Great, or Napoleon often stressed character andspirit over education or cognitive ability, betrays a debt to the Romantics.

30

Also, in this vein, Georg von Berenhorsts work articulated a view of wardetermined purely by the contingent, exceptional, and unpredictable.

31

Heheld that, far from being scientific, war was anarchic, dominated by acci-dent Efforts to control, let alone abolish, this primeval wildness wereabsurd.

32

Clausewitz was at least sympathetic to the causes of Berenhorstsdespair, yet would not follow him in his submission to the caprice offortune. Clausewitzs conception of genius differed from that of theRomantics, so where Goethes genius acted spontaneously Clausewitzsgenius took action only after correctly assessing the overall situation.

33

Clausewitzs was an altogether more cerebral genius. The teaching of Lieu-tenant Gerhard von Scharnhorst (17551813) his great friend and mentor may have been vital. Paret notes that, even though the Berlin Academywas still teaching the Enlightenment dogma that sound theory could elim-inate chance, Scharnhorst was encouraging his students to consider themore realistic notion of the ability of theory to help men deal with surprise,to help them exploit the unforeseen.

34

So, essentially there was either a perceptible avoidance of the subject inexisting theory, or where chance was considered, it was marked by an overlymelodramatic reaction. Nevertheless, some of the ideas that Clausewitzwould ultimately develop are detectable. Progressing beyond these prece-dents, the Prussian would develop a conception which represented neithera capitulation to fortune nor an overoptimistic belief in theorys ability toovercome it. It appears Clausewitz had to reach further back in time to finda thinker Machiavelli who had appreciated more fully the importance ofchance in war.

Fortune and Virtue in Machiavelli

We know that Clausewitz was an avid reader of Machiavelli and believedthat his judgement in military matters is very sound.

35

Machiavellisrendering of

fortuna

and

virt

which pervade all his major works

36

furnished Clausewitz with the conceptual keys to his analysis.

Fortuna

forMachiavelli held a similar meaning to the chance employed by Clausewitz,in essence referring to the incalculable and the fortuitous. Machiavellibelieved that, The continued existence of struggles and uncertaintiespatterns the character and the methods of war: there is no safe course.

37

Neal Wood notes that for him, In no other human situation are chance,accident, and uncertainty so prominent as in the peril and hardship ofmilitary encounter.

38

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In the penultimate chapter of

The Prince

(1513) Machiavelli notes howmany people in his own times, because of the great variations and changes,beyond human imaginings, had come to believe that there is no pointsweating over things, but that one should submit to the rulings of chance.Machiavelli does not subscribe to this fatalistic view, but instead proposes acompromise that allows for the operation of human will: fortune isprobably arbiter of half the things we do, leaving the other half or so to becontrolled by ourselves.

39

He did not share the widespread contemporarybelief that man is entirely in the hands of

Fortuna

.

40

This amalgam of chance and human will broadly reflects the duality thatClausewitz proposes, for instance when he states that with uncertainty inone scale, courage and self-confidence must be thrown into the balance.

41

Machiavelli explains how fortune is not a wholly overpowering force; likea violent raging river, one can still take precautions to control its power.

42

Here, both share the belief that in facing the vicissitudes of chance, menmust adapt to changing times because fortune is changeable whereas menare obstinate in their ways, men prosper so long as fortune and policy are inaccord, and where there is a clash they fail. Machiavelli declares thatfortune is a woman and as such one can only command her with greateraudacity.

43

The key for Machiavelli is acting when fortune favours you what wemight term opportunism. As he states, Nothing is of greater importance intime of war than knowing how to make the best of a fair opportunity whenit is offered.

44

In

The Prince

he explains that outstanding princes do notseem to have from fortune anything other than opportunity. Fortune, as itwere, provided the matter but they gave it its form; without opportunitytheir prowess would have been extinguished, and without such prowess theopportunity would have come in vain.

45

Machiavellis insights helpedClausewitz develop a conception of chance which was, if not unambigu-ously positive, at least malleable in hands of great ability.

The qualities that enable men to face fortune are encapsulated in Machi-avellis concept of

virt

, which strikingly parallels Clausewitzs discussion ofgenius. These similarities are noted by Wood, who states that Clausewitzsanalysis of the qualities of generalship and of military virtue can be inter-preted as an illuminating commentary upon Machiavellis concept of

virt

.

46

The attributes associated with

virt

in Machiavellis work arestrikingly Clausewitzian: boldness, bravery, resolution, and decisivenesscombined with endurance and firmness, the necessary resilience, [and] thepower of sustaining a course of action until the end is achieved.

47

Virt

isassociated with vital creative energy

48

and resembles the notion of creativespirit in the trinity.

Virt

for Machiavelli and Clausewitz is never simply the

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Romantic notion of unruly energy, unbridled ferocity, and rapidlyexhausted boldness, rather intellect and knowledge serve to direct andcontrol the bold creative urge.

49

So, for both, chance is not necessarily cause for despair, but isnevertheless a powerful force that cannot be avoided. As Paret notes ofClausewitz, to exclude or deny chance was to go against nature Despite its constant power, chance was more than danger: it was a posi-tive force to be exploited.

50

Fortune rules mostly where men lack

virt

orgenius attributes which apply to all actors in war.

51

These parallelssuggest Clausewitz was heavily indebted to Machiavelli the two thinkersclosely correspond in their understanding of this subject, even if theirways of expressing it differed.

Clausewitzs Experiences

Clausewitz believed the best proofs in theory are personal and historicalexperience: careful consideration of both emphasised to him the enormousdistance that separated actual warfare and existing theories. They presentedneat, precise, and sterile principles which could not be reconciled with theconfused and messy reality he had witnessed. What was the element thatkept theory so divorced from reality? Early in his studies Clausewitzrecognised that the missing factor was the uncertainty, unpredictability, andfriction of war. Following the Wars of the First Coalition (179297) hisregiment was endlessly drilled in antiquated methods and Clausewitzwould later recall his disdain at the formalistic, ceremonial character ofthese maneuvers

52

when, as he stated, even a modicum of reflection onthese exercises was bound to lead at once to the realization that none ofthis had taken place in the war that we had fought.

53

Clausewitz was struck by the omnipresence of chance events in the warsin which he had fought; perhaps none more so than during the disastroustwin defeats at Jena-Auerstdt in 1806. The Prussian campaign, Clausewitzobserved, was dogged by every kind of friction from divided command,indecision, insubordination, disorder, and confusion.

54

The defeat was alsopartly caused by the failure of Prussian intelligence.

55

Clausewitzs dismiss-ive views of intelligence may well derive from this experience andNapoleons skilful use of deception and operations security may havepersuaded him of the difficulty of ever accurately determining the enemysintentions.

56

So, Clausewitz concluded his lectures on little war in 1811with the following modest statement:

As little combat experience as I have, it is enough to give me an accu-rate view of the way most episodes in war unfold, as well as the

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numerous chance incidents, which touch everything, and of thenumerous difficulties that inhibit accurate execution of the preciseplans that theory tends to formulate. We might term these the frictionof the whole machinery, which can be recognised only throughexperience, and which so many authors ignore completely.

57

Perhaps also Clausewitz was compelled to emphasise this aspect of wardue to the extent to which the character of the wars of the Napoleonic erawere more suffused with chance than those of the 18th century and eventhose of the First Coalition, as rules and geometric calculation gave way topassion, massive friction and uncertainty.

58

The French Revolution madepossible mass conscription, which necessitated far-reaching changes in theorganisation, supply, discipline, and training of the new armies, which in turnwould greatly increase the tempo and range of operations the wars of thisperiod would become more complex and less predictable than before.

59

These personal experiences, combined with his detailed analyses of vari-ous campaigns revealed how often outcomes were decided by chance andluck, how the detailed plans of commanders rarely survived contact withthe enemy, and how mistaken reports on the strengths or dispositions of theenemy often were. The challenge, however, would be to explain suchfactors in a theoretical manner, using clear concepts, and to reveal theirrelationship to other aspects of war.

Analysis

Now we have some idea of the various influences on Clausewitzs thought,we can explore the subject in greater detail. The various concepts of chance,uncertainty, probability, friction, the fog of war, and genius are all stronglyrelated and interconnected. Nevertheless, Clausewitz meant somethingspecific in his use of these individual concepts; they do not simply representsynonyms for a single phenomenon, therefore it is important to explore thedistinguishing features of each. Equally, the various concepts clearly consti-tute a coherent family of ideas connected by a common thread. Moderninterpreters often emphasise the integration of these concepts, employinggeneric terms such as general friction, which encompasses danger,exertion, uncertainty and chance.

60

Such approaches are welcome, but onlyif based on a solid grasp of the individual concepts that comprise them.

The Intruder: Chance

The concept of chance employed by Clausewitz is intended in its pureform, of arbitrary and incalculable events characterised by an absence of

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predictability or regularity in the sequence of action and its antecedentconditions.

61

Chance is the intruder that makes everything uncertain andinterferes with the whole course of events.

62

If chance renders war thedomain of the unexpected

63

one can perhaps understand the cognitivedissonance displayed by Enlightenment theorists given that it representsthe negation of the very order and uniformity they sought to uncover.

64

Because the very nature of something that happened by chance is that itwas unforeseen, we can prepare only in the general sense of anticipating itsprobable existence; as something we know will occur, but we are ignorantas to the precise form it will take. It was recognition of this fact thatcompelled the elder Moltke to claim that there was no point in devisingdetailed schemes beyond the deployment phase.

65

Clausewitz explains howwar is rich in unique episodes. Each is an uncharted sea, full of reefs. Thecommander may suspect the reefs existence without ever having seenthem; now he has to steer past them in the dark.

66

In war, success or failurerarely accrues simply from the skill or incompetence of the commander,but is greatly determined by good luck or misfortune. Although this is notsomething humans like to accept Clausewitz describes the tendency toexplain success as the result of genius alone as a gratifying assumption

67

that even successful commanders leave to chance what they cannot controlis the ultimate acknowledgement its centrality.

68

In addition to this standard conception, Alan Beyerchen, drawing on thework of the French mathematician Jules Poincar, has identified two otherprincipal forms of chance in Clausewitzs work. Beyerchen refers to a formof chance deriving from analytical blindness.

69

This is perhaps bestconceived as chance that results from human mental weakness, or asPoincar put it, our frailty and ignorance an inability to comprehend thewhole so that we may happen to overlook circumstances which, at firstsight, seemed completely foreign to the anticipated fact, to which we shouldnever have dreamed of attributing any influence.70 When things do notproceed as expected due to causes that lay beyond our mental horizon, suchoccurrences appear as blind chance as E. H. Carr had it, they are themeasure of our ignorance.71 This myopia might also derive from a form ofcognitive dissonance or intolerance of ambiguity, as noted earlier: theway in which humans deal with developments that appear discrepant or donot fit with preconceived ideas, but which leads to self-delusion andmisperception.72

A large part of the experience of chance may in fact turn out to be dueto this fundamental human weakness. No human mind is capable ofcomprehending simultaneously the complex whole, its interactions, andthe infinite relations between causes and effects. With hindsight we may be

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CLAUSEWITZS ANALYSIS OF CHANCE IN WAR 345

able to better understand the circumstances that led to certain events, butthe point remains that, for those involved at the time, whether due to sheerincompetence or analytical blindness, events were not foreseen. We mustbe mindful, as Clausewitz counselled, not to project our knowledge of whatwe know happened, back on to those who had to make decisions at thetime.73

Another form of chance Beyerchen highlights concerns the concept ofmicro-cause or what historians might know as the problem of Cleopatrasnose.74 Micro-cause refers to situations in which disproportionately largeeffects result from apparently trifling initial causes. Clausewitz draws atten-tion to this problem in relation to his discussion of the critical analysis ofpast campaigns: the process is made difficult by the fact that in war, as inlife generally, all parts of the whole are interconnected and thus the effectsproduced, however small their cause, must influence all subsequentmilitary operations and modify their final outcome to some degree.Furthermore, if such causes happen to be transitory or accidental, historymay not have recorded them at all.75 The great gap between infinitely smalland inappreciable causes and such potentially enormous, inescapableeffects means we have to ascribe to chance that which we could not hope toexplain. This is not so much a function of human weakness as the objectivefact of the incredible complexity of reality Clausewitz emphasises thevast, almost infinite distance there can be between cause and effect.76

To subscribe to the pervasive existence of chance in war is not to denythat things are causally determined as E. H. Carr notes, accident is not anabsence of causal determination.77 The point is that causes in war are some-times so incredibly small as to escape our notice and appear detached fromobservable effects or appear so unexpectedly from beyond our conceptualradar that they appear as chance. Put differently, we can maintain that everychance event does ultimately have causes, they were just causes we failed tosee, understand, or predict. They are nevertheless rightly consideredobjective, as far as they are both a consequence of the human condition andthe incredible randomness of reality.

A final point to note is to be suspicious of commanders who retrospec-tively explain their own failure in war by an appeal to chance. Just as E. H.Carr describes how, In a group or a nation which is riding in the trough,not on the crest, of historical events, theories that stress the role of chanceor accident in history will be found to prevail,78 so defeated generals will belooking to explain away their shortcomings by claiming the Goddess ofFortune was against them, when in success that same general would nodoubt emphasise his complete control of the situation throughout.79

Chance contributes to both success and failure, but rarely is it the sole

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346 DEFENCE STUDIES

arbiter of either: both talent and incompetence figure greatly. One mightsuspect an underlying ineptitude in those who claim all is decided bychance, and a measure of undeserved self-assurance in those who deny itsexistence. In what was perhaps a rare instance of modesty, Napoleon wasquoted as saying, Engage the enemy, and see what happens80 it is tellingthat one of historys greatest commanders should pay heed to chance andluck in this way.

The Shadows of Uncertainty81

Clausewitz remarked that war is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters ofthe factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greateror lesser intensity.82 So, how are we to distinguish this concept from that ofchance? Certainly these concepts are related in the sense that a psychologi-cal state of uncertainty is often a consequence of the play of chance. Yet, asHerbig notes, one may feel uncertain for many reasons other than chance,and chance does not always lead to uncertainty.83

The concept of uncertainty essentially refers to the human reaction tothat which cannot be fully known or controlled and concerns the subjectivepsychological condition of those involved in war.84 As such, uncertaintybecomes evident as integral to the nature of war as soon as we consider thehuman forces that are central to it. To ensure theory does not lose touchwith reality, Clausewitz stresses that it must also take the human factor intoaccount The art of war deals with living and moral forces. Consequently,it cannot attain the absolute, or certainty; it must always leave a margin foruncertainty.85 War is not only about factors that can be counted orcalculated, but is suffused with psychological factors which are inseparablefrom physical factors: unlike an alloy, they cannot be separated by chemicalprocesses.86

All decisions in war must be taken with regard to consequences in thismoral realm; whether this relates to ones own forces, government, andwider society, or those of the enemy and neutral actors. As Clausewitzstates, it would be platitudinous to list all such phenomena because most arecommonly known. A few examples indicate the types of issues concerned:the enemys intentions and strength of will, public opinion, morale, and soon. It is because these factors are inherently intangible and unpredictable they cannot be classified or counted that attaining certainty as to theirprecise character or ultimate effect is necessarily limited regardless of thequantity or quality of information one might have.87 Clausewitz explainshow similar actions against different people, or even against the samepeople at a different time, can produce entirely different effects. Further-more, he notes how, for the commander, Thousands of wrong turns

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running in all directions tempt his perceptions; and if the range, confusionand complexity of the issues are not enough to overwhelm him the dangersand responsibilities are.88

The extent to which uncertainty and confusion is typical in war is exac-erbated by the incredible prevalence and potency of the factor of surprise.89

The enemy will be constantly trying to achieve the unexpected arrival oftheir forces where not expected through the use of deception, secrecy,speed, and cunning. What Clausewitz describes as the universal urge tosurprise can have a serious paralysing psychological effect on morale andloosen the bonds of cohesion within the force. Importantly, surprise, asClausewitz emphasises, is often dependent on chance, coincidence, and themistakes or misperceptions of the opponent.90 Surprise, therefore, stemsfrom the weakness of human perception and basic uncertainties.

So, in gauging and evaluating such factors, Clausewitz extolled thevirtues of intuition, the inward eye,91 and discreet judgement.92 Forinstance, when discussing decisions regarding the levels of effort to be madeand force to be employed, he states that such intangibles introduceuncertainties that make it difficult to gauge the amount of resistance to befaced and, in consequence, the means required and the objectives to be set,so the most appropriate approach is to,

gauge the strength and situation of the opposing state gauge thecharacter and abilities of its government and people and do the samein regard to our own. Finally, we must evaluate the political sympa-thies of other states and the effect that war may have on them.93

The stress on judgement over calculation is a direct consequence of uncer-tainty deriving from the inescapable presence of intangibles. This point iseasily overlooked. Even for militaries equipped with the most advancedintelligence gathering technology, definitively determining potential effectsand reactions in the sphere of the mind and spirit will remain a unattainablechimera. As David Kahn notes, not even the most energetic intelligenceoperation can penetrate an enemys brain.94 Moreover, even the enemymight not fully know itself the limits of its ambitions.95

Lack of proper understanding is often exacerbated by forms of ethno-centrism and strategic-cultural myopia, which distort accurate assessmentsof ones enemies (and even ones own or allies) intentions and capabilities,or the political environment. As Ken Booth argues, this lack of empathy hasmeant an absence of intimate understanding of the feelings, thoughts andmotives of others: this has prevented an accurate forecasting of likelyresponses.96 Clausewitz was well aware of the way such perspectives distortevaluations, which are not only a problem of obtaining objective

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knowledge, but also crucially dependent on the qualities of mind andcharacter of the men making the decision.97 All actors make sense of theworld through unique cultural perspectives. They observe, orientate them-selves, and act based on assumptions, prejudices, and even illusions aboutthe world. It is also easily forgotten that all information (even if derivedfrom advanced sources) only attains meaning once it is digested by humanagents and subsequently used as the basis for decisions decisions that willinevitably be shaped by the unique outlook of the actor. The consequencesarising from ethnocentric perspectives can be serious, exacerbate uncer-tainty and be highly detrimental to operations: for instance, a failure tounderstand enemy intentions can increase the likelihood of political, strate-gic, or tactical surprise.98 Also, cultural taboos may distort clear thinking, sothe Western nuclear taboo (non-utility as orthodoxy), for instance, mightcloud the fact that others may see atomic weapons as potentially useful.99

The Fog of WarRegardless of the difficulties of mitigating uncertainty associated withmoral forces, the information upon which assessments are made in war is,for Clausewitz, ineluctably deficient. The Prussian general is wellknown for his emphasis on the interminable poverty of reliable informationin war and his dismissive attitude regarding the substance and value ofintelligence. In a notably evocative passage Clausewitz states that,

the general unreliability of all information presents a special problemin war: all action takes place, so to speak, in a kind of twilight, which,like fog or moonlight, often seems to make things seem grotesqueand larger than they really are. Whatever is hidden from full view inthis feeble light has to be guessed at by talent, or simply left tochance.100

This general idea is expressed in many other parts of his work.101 Clausewitzstates that, If we consider the actual basis of this information, howunreliable and transient it is, we soon realise that war is a flimsy structurethat can easily collapse and bury us in ruins.102 At best, and even this may bedoubted, Clausewitz notes, that the only situation a commander can knowis his own; his opponents he can know only from unreliable intelligence.103

Moreover, it is likely that the enemy will be doing his level best to deny usknowledge of its intentions, or even actively attempting to deceive, fool, andsurprise us. Also, intelligence is often false and inaccurate because fearcauses people to exaggerate bad news.104 Ken Booth has remarked that,Worst-case forecasting is to strategic analysis what the god of the gaps isto theology: it fills in for what we do not understand. In conditions of

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danger, where survival may be in jeopardy, there may be a proclivity for thepossible to become thought of as the probable.105

So, fear, intermixed with chance, numerous imponderables, thelimitations of accurate observation and the vast amount of variablesinvolved before which Newton himself would quail are provided assome of the chief reasons for Clausewitzs scepticism with regard to thereliability of information.106 Together, these factors create what Clausewitzmemorably termed the fog of war. However, as Kahn rightly points out,despite this intense scepticism regarding intelligence, Clausewitz does notdogmatically maintain that it can never serve.107 Clausewitz takes it forgranted that more and better information will be sought, the potential valueof which would be dependent on the commanders ability to effectivelyexploit what was made available, but perhaps more importantly, to be ableto withstand the endless torrent of false or contradictory reports.108

Nevertheless, the central point for Clausewitz is that a superlative degree ofaccurate information is both an objective impossibility and a dangerouslydeceptive fantasy.

Of course, since Clausewitz wrote, intelligence-gathering techniqueshave been enhanced by enormous strides in technology and institutionalspecialisation. Both the potential quality and quantity of information avail-able to politicians, commanders, and troops is vastly superior to that inClausewitzs day.109 Some of the major developments would perhapsinclude the development of large staff bureaucracies and permanent,professional military and civilian intelligence bodies; signals intelligenceand the more advanced cryptographical techniques associated with WorldWar II. In more recent years, intelligence-gathering techniques havebecome enormously technologically sophisticated.

Yet, as argued, by specialist scholars, regardless of technologicaladvances, failures of intelligence are inevitable. As soon as one explores theactual processes and organisational dynamics of the acquisition, analysis,and appreciation of intelligence, the potential for failure is overwhelming.The sources of this inevitability of failure particularly at strategic levels have been masterfully studied by Richard Betts, Robert Jervis, and MichaelHandel.110 They point to such factors as basic human psychology, ingrainedpreconceptions, the nature of the relationships between consumers andproducers of intelligence, differences of opinion among analysts anddecision-makers, but perhaps most importantly the wishful thinking, cava-lier disregard of professional analysts, and the premises and preconcep-tions of policy makers.111

Also, one only has to factor in the enemys almost certain efforts in therealm of counter-intelligence, misinformation, deception, and so on none

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of which can be definitively negated and scepticism creeps back in. Knoxnotes that intelligence collection devices obey the same dialectical law asweaponry. Counteraction or evasion or deception may at any point surpriseeven or especially those made slothful by seemingly effortless techno-logical superiority.112

While perhaps Clausewitz was too stridently dismissive of intelligencegiven the limited nature of the art in his time, it would be just as mistakento be overly impressed by the claims of those information warriors whostalk the corridors of modern military organisations. As Keegan states:There is no such thing as the golden secret, the piece of pure intelligence,which will resolve all .113 Early 21st century high-profile Westernintelligence failures in relation to the 9/11 attacks and Iraqs putativeweapons of mass destruction arsenal only adds credence to these insights.

Lifting the Fog?In recent decades a so-called Revolution in Military Affairs has beenproclaimed. Its more extreme proponents believe it will lift the fog of warand remove friction and uncertainty. This idea is centred around the impactof new technologies and seriously took hold in the 1990s. Its materialcomponents can be divided into systems: sensors, such as satellites andunmanned aerial vehicles (drones); communications, such as computersand command centres; and advanced weaponry, such as cruise missiles, theparadigmatic weapon of the RMA.114

However, it is their complete integration the system of systems thatrepresents what is specifically novel. The associated doctrine of NetworkCentric Warfare (NCW) focuses on the prospect of achieving dominantbattlespace knowledge and holds out the potential for the seamless collec-tion, assessment, and communication of information, allowing force to beapplied through advanced weapons systems with greater range, lethality,and accuracy. All this contributes to enhanced situational awareness andimproved mission effectiveness encapsulated in the concept of FullSpectrum Dominance.

Yet, despite these far-reaching developments, many commentators haveemphasised the limitations of such claims. Indeed, many of the problemsClausewitz identified remain: inevitably new solutions spawn new prob-lems and new dependencies create new vulnerabilities.115 For instance, thereis a serious potential problem of potential information overload, wherebycommanders cannot comprehend the immense noise they are faced with:as Clausewitz put it, we know more, but this makes us more, not less,uncertain.116 Once all information has been collected it still has to becomprehended, interpreted, and acted upon. At all stages human fallibility

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and innumerable complications intervene, reflecting the eternal problem ofconverting information into knowledge and knowledge into action. Over-emphasis on new technologies can also lead to a form of informationdependence, distracting attention away from crucial intangibles such asmorale, the orientation of allies, or the state of domestic opinion: suchstrategic tunnel vision potentially downplays the value of human percep-tion of cultural and political dynamics.117

The deepest cause for scepticism relates to the challenge of convertingtechnological superiority into political effect. If indeed a revolution is takingplace, it is principally occurring at tactical/operational levels, whereas instrategy success is not so narrowly dependent on better weaponry andequipment. Sir Lawrence Freedman notes that, the real difficulty is thatmilitary power can only be truly judged against the political purposes it isintended to serve.118 Advanced systems may enable rapid victories againstconventional forces, however this by no means guarantees their translationinto meaningful political outcomes.119 This is not to argue that informationsuperiority is not worth attaining, only that it should not be seen as amagical elixir, particularly at the strategic level. So, should Clausewitzsscepticism be viewed as hopelessly time-bound? The weight of professionalopinion would suggest not. As Gray succinctly concludes, no technicalpanacea can eliminate uncertainty altogether.120

Decision-making DynamicsThe paucity of reliable information is further exacerbated by clashes ofopinion among decision-makers and precisely because the lack of informa-tion inevitably leaves room for diverse judgements. Clausewitz explainshow such disputes are often overlooked retrospectively because they areseen as the scaffolding that can be removed once the building iscomplete.121 In other words, when we look back on a successful operation,for instance, it is rarely the difficult decisions that led to action that are thefocus, but rather the action itself and its outcome this has the effect ofdownplaying the fundamental problem of choice that decision-makers faced,so that what the layman gets to know of military events is usually nonde-script [and] it would be impossible to guess what obstacles were facedand overcome.122 Clausewitz could not fail to recognise this problem assuch paralysis in decision-making was largely to blame for Prussias defeatin 1806. Probably with such events in mind, he states that, Nowhere aredifferences of opinion so acute as in war, and fresh opinions never cease tobatter at ones convictions.123

In this respect, if there was ever a suitable subject for counter-factualreasoning, then strategic history is a prime contender. What if questions

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encourage consideration of the acute problems actors faced and that areoften lost in narrative accounts whereby events are often explained with anunderlying air of inevitability. Of course, things did turn out as they did forgood reason and thus lingering too long in this realm of might-have-beenscan be unhealthy for things to have been different, the causes would alsohave had to be different124 nevertheless, consideration of alternativefutures can impress upon the observer the great uncertainty that alwaysconfronts decision-makers.

The negative effects or symptoms of uncertainty often include delay,hesitation, and vacillation. Such effects should not be confused with activestrategies of delaying or avoiding battle, such as the Periclean125 or Fabian126

approach, although the latters strategy may have derived from an indecisivepsychological disposition rather than considered waiting. Moreover, tothose not inured to uncertainty, the psychological consequences of uncer-tainty can so relentlessly sap confidence as to induce great anxiety, if notoutright behavioural paralysis consider for instance General Erich Luden-dorffs nervous breakdown in 1918. Clausewitz notes how most generals,when they ought to act, are paralysed by unnecessary doubts.127

Irresolution and reluctance to act, Clausewitz remarks, particularlyharm those on the offensive, which generally requires continuous momen-tum, quick decision, and exploitation of the initiative: if the commanderdemands absolute certainty he will inevitably delay until the optimummoment for action has passed. A mind racked by uncertainty will alwayswant that little bit more time to weigh up alternatives and check all availableinformation before acting. Much to his consternation, in 1809 Clausewitzhad witnessed the strategic consequences of such vacillation when Napo-leon was close to collapse against the Austrians at Aspern-Essling in 1809and the Prussian King, Frederick William failed to act: his hopeless messageto the Austrians was, One more victory and I am with you.128 The instancesof such fatal indecision are legion. A notable example is that of Unioncommander George McClellan during the American Civil War, whorefused to attack even when armed with the enemys campaign plan andwith circumstances favouring action.129

Equally, however, uncertainty can also lead to overconfidence, even inthe face of an enemys massive numerical superiority because, after all,fortune purportedly favours the bold. Clausewitz suggests that a balancedreaction to uncertainty is required: While one man may lose his best chancethrough timidity another will plunge in head first and end up looking asdazed and surprised as if he had just been fished out of the water.130 AsClausewitz recognised, it is part of human nature to place confidence inones own success. It was this sentiment that lay behind Clausewitzs

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thinking in his Political Declaration of 1812 in which he argued that evenagainst the odds, Prussia could find courage in despair: It is true that theprobability of success is against us How can anyone demand the probabil-ity of success! It is enough that success is not impossible; whoever asks formore contradicts himself.131

The overriding consequence of this chronic uncertainty is that almost allmajor decisions will be largely based on probability and inference andshaped by the psychological disposition of and nature of the relationshipsbetween the commanders and statesmen at the time rather than any universalstandard. Clausewitz states that, Circumstances vary so enormously in war,and are so indefinable, that a vast array of factors has to be appreciated mostly in the light of probabilities alone. 132 As such, he is adamant that reli-able prediction is impossible: absolute, so-called mathematical factors neverfind a firm basis in military calculations.133 In a more objective sense, it is thisunpredictability which entails that, as he puts it, no prescriptive formulationuniversal enough to deserve that the name of law can be applied to theconstant change and diversity of the phenomena of war134.

Incidental frictionIf the Enlightenment military thinkers had conceived of military institutionsas mathematical reason in action or as great machines where each partfulfilled its prescribed function, with no waste motion and no supernumer-ary cogs,135 then it was Clausewitz who shrewdly introduced the logical,adverse corollary of the metaphor through his concept of friction. Frictionwas notably absent from the military machines envisaged by the militaryphilosophes, as if they operated in a vacuum. The Prussian thinker endeav-oured to correct this oversight. In The Principles of War Clausewitz comparesthe conduct of war to the workings of an intricate machine with tremen-dous friction.136 In On War he describes how, Iron will power can overcomethis friction but of course it wears down the machine as well.137 But ashe makes clear in his study of The Campaign of 1812, the analogy does notentirely suffice because, unlike in mechanics, the friction cannot be reducedto a few points, but is everywhere in contact with chance.138

As Barry Watts has persuasively shown, the concept of friction can beunderstood in both its incidental and general manifestations. In the firstinstance, friction needs to be understood as a separate phenomenonexplaining a particular pervasive feature of war. The concept appears fairlyearly in Clausewitzs thinking and rapidly became a major theme in OnWar.139 Incidental friction is for Clausewitz an unseen, all pervadingelement and a force that theory can never quite define,140 but its generalfeatures are quite clear, particularly when accompanied by the powerful

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metaphors he provides. It is a factor that reduces the efficiency of the wholeand impedes activity through natural inertia as countless minor incidents combine to lower the general level of performance.141 A defining featureof the concept is its cumulative nature, in the sense that a multitude of smalldifficulties leads to much larger problems. It conveys, as Beyerchen notes,the amplification of a microcause to a macro-consequence, in a kind ofcascade of things gone wrong.142 Clausewitz states that difficulties accumu-late and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless onehas experienced war.143

This cumulative effect results largely from the nature of militaries,which like complex and intricate machines, are made up of many individualparts each with the potential to produce friction and make, as Clausewitzputs it, the apparently easy so difficult.144 It is these factors that make warlike movement in a resistant element and here Clausewitz employs theanalogy of walking in water: Just as the simplest and most natural of move-ments, walking, cannot easily be performed in water, so in war it is difficultfor normal efforts to achieve even moderate results.145 Friction is composedof all manner of difficulties, whether they be fatigue, command incoher-ence, adverse weather conditions, insufficient provisions and more: hestates that it would take volumes to cover them all.

Moreover, Clausewitz explains that friction is everywhere in contactwith chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured, just becausethey are largely due to chance.146 He also notes that, Often we encounterobstacles which were impossible to foresee147 and that you can never knowwhen one of the parts of the whole will chance to delay things or somehowmake them go wrong.148 Friction, like chance, is not something that can beprevented or forestalled one can only attempt to limit its effects and bemindful of its universal presence.

General FrictionSo far we have discussed the prominent concepts in theoretical isolation toarrive at a firmer understanding of their distinctive features. However,Clausewitz also believed that it was possible for these factors to beconceived of in a unitary sense. All these factors, along with danger thedebilitating element and physical exertion, correspond with respect totheir restrictive effect and as Clausewitz argued, for this reason can begrouped into a single concept of general friction.149 As commentators haveconcluded, the various concepts discussed in this article, coalesce tocomprise a compound concept of general friction. There are clearly manyoverlaps in relation to the individual concepts discussed above, such aschance and uncertainty, but the idea of general friction can be regarded as a

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means to collectively perceive all the various ways in which activity in waris impeded everywhere and at every stage. The basic nature of the forcebeing described is essentially analogous to that associated with incidentalfriction, but here it encompasses the whole range of factors associated withaction in war.

In Wattss excellent study, he draws attention to other potential sourcesof general friction, which are identifiable in Clausewitzs wider work. Inparticular, he draws attention to the political constraints on the use of forceand the intractable difficulty of matching military means to political ends.150

Whatever factors we include, the overarching thrust is clear, as is the extentto which this friction pervades the entire gamut of war, from thosedetermining the political object to individual soldiers. While identificationof this intrinsically restrictive force in war may seem like cause for outrightnegativity, this would be a mistaken conclusion. Given wars interactivenature, it is always necessarily relative.151 This tremendous friction in war issomething best offset through the efforts of the energetic and creativegenius natures compensation for uncertainty.

Playing the Lethal Game of WarWar, states Clausewitz, can be compared to a game of chance, a gamble, andthus guesswork and luck come to play a large part in war.152 In its dangerand seriousness war is perhaps most akin to Russian roulette,153 but this doesnot convey the extraordinary talents required, which are perhaps moreaccurately captured in the analogy of card games, such as poker, where it isa matter of skill as well as odds.154 In the latter, ones fate, while still subjectto the laws of probability, is more heavily dependent on choice andaccurately reading ones opponents, while in the former ones fate is leftpurely to chance. In his analysis of Napoleons 1799 campaign, Clausewitzstates that, since war always has something of the nature of a game, theconduct of war cannot avoid this element at every stage, and thecommander, who has little inclination for the game, will, without anticipat-ing it, be left behind the line and will fall into deep debt in the great accountbook of military success.155 Yet, what makes war such a unique game ofchance is the mixture of uncertainty with ever-present danger, fear, physicalexertion and, for the commander and policy-maker, an enormous burdenof responsibility: so luck in war is of a higher quality than luck ingambling.156 Far from being a mere pastime, Clausewitz asserts, war is nota place for irresponsible enthusiasts. It is a serious means to a seriousend.157

On War is essentially geared towards preparing commanders for thisrelentless struggle with the unforeseen.158 Yet he recognised no book can

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provide the requisite abilities needed to face such an ephemeral foe. AsParet explains, Clausewitz believed it is the creative employment of intel-lectual and psychological strengths that alone can overcome friction, exploitchance, and turn the imponderables into an asset.159 The qualities of geniusrepresent the counterpoise to the effects of chance and uncertainty or, asClausewitz puts it, With uncertainty in one scale, courage and self-confidence must be thrown into the other to correct the balance.160

Here a definite dualism is apparent concerning the inherent interrela-tionship between the condition of uncertainty on one hand and theconsequent human reaction on the other: they form two sides of the samecoin. The relationship can often appear somewhat unbalanced, with chancedictating terms to the submissive human will. However, a more accurateconception is one of mutual dependence and even symbiosis in so far ashuman creativity, free will, boundless imagination, and choice arefundamental causes of the condition in the first instance. Put simply, thefact that the enemy is a living and thinking entity with a will of its own is amajor source of chance and uncertainty war is never activity aimed atinanimate matter.161 As Gray states, War is a duel and the enemy may proveuncooperative.162

Even absent the unpredictability of the external physical sources ofchance, this fundamental reality may appear, almost paradoxically, to beboth problem and solution. Consequently, the apparent relationship thatemerges between chance and creativity is more one of chicken and egg,especially when war is viewed properly, as Clausewitz insisted it alwaysshould, as an interactive, multilateral whole.

Genius: The Creative TalentAs noted earlier, in his description of genius, Clausewitz was echoingmany of those attributes which Machiavelli had identified in his conceptof vitr, while examining them in a more systematic and analyticalfashion. Considering that fact that the science of psychology was only inits infancy as Clausewitz acknowledged his penetrating analysis inBook 1, Chapter 3 is a jewel of his work. Clausewitz prefaced hisdiscussion with the observation that genius is the combination of certainqualities of mind and temperament that are specific to war and that maynot necessarily be appropriate elsewhere, emphasising that the gifts ofmilitary genius are those which pertain to the unique climate of war.The qualities required are different from those of pure understanding,intellect, or even technical knowledge. Rather, for Clausewitz, genius isa complex mix of intellect and emotional qualities, a blend of brains andtemperament.163

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As Strachan notes, The romantic in Clausewitz had to embrace themilitary genius, the rationalist had to define him.164 Genius in war, heexplained, must be grounded in courage. However, if the old adageconfirms that discretion is the larger part of valour, then Clausewitzemphasised a form of courage that was not wild, but controlled andeducated.165 Courage encompasses such traits as boldness, presence of mind(such as dealing with the unexpected or keeping ones nerve), strength ofwill (in the face of anxiety and crushing responsibility), as well as the abilityto take risks and to trust in fortune. Purely rational thinking would struggleto cope with or even be overwhelmed by the lack of evidence and certaintyin war, so rather a form of intellectual instinct or coup doeil the quickrecognition of a truth reinforced by determination was necessary,166

which would enable the commander to effectively turn knowledge intoability.167

The military genius would also need to possess adaptability andcreativity, combined with great strength of character, as well as lucidity andfirmness of mind in order to follow through steadily, to carry out theplan, and not to be thrown off course by a thousand diversions.168 All thisrequires great energy or what Clausewitz terms a spirit of endeavour.169

Importantly, and recalling Machiavelli, genius is not just about coping withuncertainty but actively exploiting it, thus one can attempt to turnuncertainty to ones own advantage.170

Individuals of great ability continue to exert an enormous influence, forinstance, consider the importance of American General David Petraeus inrecent years.171 Echevarria also makes the point that Clausewitzs frameworkof genius is by no means limited to conventional military figures.172 Forinstance, the ideas can be extended to guerrilla leaders such as Mao Zedong,counter-insurgent specialists such as Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer orperhaps even terrorist masterminds such as Osama bin Laden. However, inthe face of the growing complexity of war, a notable feature of modernwarfare has been the increasing collegiality of command and the rise ofsprawling military bureaucracies and planning staffs.173 During the 19thcentury General Staffs emerged which increasingly took responsibility formany of the decisions that would formerly have taken place in thecommanders mind.174 As a result, genius has become increasingly dissoci-ated from the individual and supplanted by considerations of bureaucraticefficiency and consensual decision-making. These changes have primarilybeen functional imperatives in response to the expanded dimensions andvarieties of knowledge required in modern warfare. However thesedevelopments have encouraged practices and behaviour often unsuited todealing with the uncertainties of war; not least excessively rigid planning.

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For instance, in the decades prior to 1914, planning became an obsessionof European staffs, yet, as events were to reveal, brilliant execution of thewrong plan can be extremely dangerous. The French strict adherence toPlan 17 led to dispositions and movements almost wilfully unsuited tounfolding events.175 This is not to argue that detailed planning is unimpor-tant. Rather, the danger is that rigid plans can become confused with futurereality, when in fact no blueprint, however sophisticated, can entirelyaccount for unpredictable events that will inevitably be encountered at alllevels. Dogmatic planning can encourage a mistaken belief that victory canbe orchestrated in advance: Gray quotes US Rear Admiral Joseph C. WylieJr (191193) who stated that planning for certitude is the greatest of allmilitary mistakes.176 In this regard, the genius of the overall commander canbe the crucial factor preserving the element of coup doeil, flexibility, andadaptability in the face of failed plans and unexpected occurrences.

Military VirtuesSo far we have concentrated principally on higher command in war, but wemust also consider relevant features evident at lower levels. Indeed, one ofthe central problems in war is how to produce soldiers willing to risk theirlives in the debilitating element of battle and stand fast in the face of poten-tial death.177 As Dyer notes, Soldiers in battle, however stable they mayappear, are always a potential mob capable of panic and flight.178 Desertion,mutiny and the collapse of morale are the nightmares of generals.Consequently, throughout history, armed groups of all persuasions havedeveloped a diverse range of mechanisms (consciously and unconsciously)to overcome such problems, even if they sometimes solidified into culturalhabits that no longer truly served their purpose.179 Nevertheless, where thelatter occurred, military necessity, and the requirement to adapt or die,generally engendered the discarding of outdated forms.

Clausewitz discussed such issues through the concepts of militaryvirtues and military spirit, which in fighting forces he regarded as thesteering quality, [the] refinement of base ore into precious metal.180 Today,many of the qualities which Clausewitz recognised as vital in command areincreasingly required by soldiers at all levels as closed order formations havebeen increasingly replaced by more open fighting, such as skirmishing orguerrilla operations, demanding the free play of intelligence, the clevermerging of boldness with caution.181 Clausewitz believed that foremostamong the virtues that can reduce friction in fighting forces is simplycombat experience or long familiarity with danger, and described it as theonly lubricant that will reduce the abrasion of friction.182 He noted how,Habit hardens the body for great exertions, strengthens the heart in great

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peril, and fortifies judgement against first impressions.183 For militarieswithout direct experience of war, efforts are often made to provide troopswith training approaching true battlefield conditions, although, as Clause-witz recognised, peacetime maneuvers are a feeble substitute for the realthing.184

The development of detailed military doctrine has become a centralmeans to reduce uncertainty given the complexity and technicality ofmodern warfare. Dyer notes how militaries are often criticised for reducingaction to routines and rules, but all it amounts to in practice, is a desperateand partially successful attempt to reduce the immense number of variables[in war].185 This is true, but doctrine can also be greatly counterproductivedue to the rigidity of thinking it encourages. Clausewitz warned that, in wartheoretical directives tend to be less useful here than in any other sphere.186

The dangers of such methodism was revealed in Vietnam, whereDoctrine became dogma187 and the US Army found it difficult to adapt tothe unique demands of counter-insurgency, being as the troops were,geared to fight large-scale conflicts. Of course, in 1806 Clausewitz hadwitnessed the most downright stupidity to which methodicism ever led.188

It is little wonder that the new Prussian Army Regulations of 1812, whichClausewitz helped draft, emphasised flexibility, initiative, and exploitationof the unexpected.189

Discipline and drill represent historic practices that derive from theimperative to stand fast in the face of the enemy without giving way tothe natural impulses of fear and panic.190 Clausewitz notes how such prac-tices form an army that maintains its cohesion under the most murderousfire; that cannot be shaken by imaginary fears and resists well-founded oneswith all its might.191 Strict discipline has often been employed wheresoldiers have been reluctant to fight. At times, outright coercion has beenruthlessly applied. Indeed, the term decimation derives from the Romanpunishment of executing every tenth man from units who were defeated orotherwise humiliated in battle.192

Countless other ways of preparing troops for the uncertainties of warhave been adopted. Formalised hierarchies ensure orders are followed inthe confusion of war. Regimental insignia, flags (or colours), ceremonies,and histories serve to foster a culture of duty, valour, and group belongingnecessary to maintain cohesion in an atmosphere of disorientating confu-sion. Such characteristics are not exclusive to regular military institutions.In the brutal conflicts in West Africa during the 1990s, rebel forces, such asthe Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, wore distinctive Americansports gear, were branded with tattoos, and adopted noms de guerre.193

Also guerrilla forces and terrorist organisations frequently adopt the

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nomenclature of regular forces. Indeed, Clausewitz describes how fightersoften think of themselves as a member of a guild, in whose customs thespirit of war is given pride of place.194 Efforts to boost morale can takethe form of inspiring eve-of-battle speeches or measures to encourage thevilification of the enemy.195

Also, at a more personal level, if, as Clausewitz stated, what is mostneeded in the lower ranks is courage and self-confidence,196 then soldiersthroughout history have adopted diverse ways of reconciling themselves tothe dangers and uncertainties of war, such as taking drugs,197 drinking alco-hol,198 saying prayers, singing songs, covering themselves in war paint, andfinding consolation in religion or even Stoic philosophy.199

These examples are intended to emphasise the extent to which many ofthe iconic images and practices we associate with war derive largely from itsinherent uncertain nature. But, as Clausewitz believed, none of thesemeasures can truly prepare the soldier for the sheer emotional intensity andconfusion of actual combat. As he states, discipline, skill, goodwill, a certainpride, and high morale have no strength of their own. They stand or falltogether. One crack and the whole thing goes, like glass too quicklycooled.200 Like the best lubricants, they can only reduce the friction of war,but not entirely eradicate it.

Reflections

Theorists prior to and since Clausewitz have approached the concept ofchance in a manner which tends to be either parochial, melodramatic orsmugly dismissive. Following Machiavelli, Clausewitz developed a morerealistic conception. For him chance is essentially neutral: it can createpossibilities and opportunities to be exploited, or equally dash the best laidplans.201 Uncertainty may paralyse one commander, but it may appear toanother as a world full of possibilities within which creative genius can takewing. Given a rough equality between belligerents in relation to thesefactors, this is where genius, political acumen, flexible planning, effectiveintelligence, morale, experience and other factors can be crucial. The scopefor chance and uncertainty in war is vast, complex, and inescapable. Yet,while always there, it must be remembered that it is always there for theenemy also.202 This sentiment was expressed by Thucydides when he stated,That imponderable element of the future is the thing which counts in thelong run, and, just as we are most frequently deceived by it, so too it can beof the greatest possible use to us.203

Clausewitz was impressed by the demands chance and uncertaintymakes on those faced with such a reality. His fascination with the creative

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talents such conditions call forth is revealed when he states that, Althoughour intellect always longs for clarity and certainty, our nature often findsuncertainty fascinating. It prefers to daydream in the realms of chance andluck rather than accompany the intellect on its narrow and tortuous path ofphilosophical inquiry and logical deduction.204 Individual soldiers facedwith the fear of death or commanders holding the fate of nations intheir hands must make decisions in the midst of relentless uncertainty andcrushing responsibility: what greater test can the human will face?

Chance and uncertainty should not be conceived as being everywhere,all of the time there are observable linear cause-and-effect relationships inwar. However, uncertainty is central to the nature of the phenomenon,along with the measures humans employ to overcome it. Modern develop-ments, such as those associated with high-tech systems or professionalinstitutional intelligence agencies have not rendered these insights obsolete.If anything, these ideas may be even more relevant to modern warfarewhich takes place in multiple dimensions, often among civilian popula-tions, employs a mind-boggling mix of old and new technologies, and ispervaded by endlessly complex political, legal, and ethical dynamics,refracted through the omnipresent 24-hour mass media, and involvesmultiple actors, diverse groups, and complex bureaucracies.205

During the Iraq War of 2003 Coalition forces armed with advancednetworked technology and precision weapons, shaped in their applicationby detailed doctrine, rigorous training exercises, and detailed operationalplanning pushed aside what Iraqi opposition barred the advance toBaghdad. Yet, however much these forces managed to dissipate the fog ofwar at the operational level, unforeseen occurrences in all of wars dimen-sions would, in the years that followed, render what immediate gains theyhad achieved almost meaningless. In many respects, they were a victim oftheir own operational, technical potency, where over-confidence bred arro-gance and strategic myopia. Too few troops were deployed to contain theviolent insurgency that ensued, itself a manifestation of political dynamicsignored by Pentagon planners over-enamoured by technical solutions andblinded by utopian scenarios. Furthermore, it took a flexible, determinedand intelligent commander to rescue the US effort from the desperatestate in which it had fallen. The Iraq War underlines the extent to whichClausewitzs analysis remains relevant still today.

NOTES

1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War [1832] , trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret(New York: Everymans Library 1993) p.101.

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362 DEFENCE STUDIES

2 Ibid. p. 97.3 Marx quoted in Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London: Pimlico 2002) p.13.4 The popular classic is Bill Owens, Lifting the Fog of War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP 2001).5 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: OUP 1999) p.95.6 Quoted in Hanna F. Pitkin, Fortune is a Woman (Univ. of Chicago Press 1999) p.153.7 Howard explains how successes that were due more to exceptional luck may be written in

terms of brilliant generalship, often in order to massage narratives of national greatness.Michael Howard, The Causes of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1983) p.190.

8 Jerome G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer, Chance in Human Affairs, Sociological Theory12/1 (March 1994) p.53.

9 Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: OUP2001) p.187.

10 Clausewitz, On War (note 1) p.156.11 Ibid. p.138. As Alan Beyerchen comments, Facing up to the intrinsic presence of chance,

complexity, and ambiguity in war is imperative. For Clausewitz, this is preferable to therisk of being blind-sided by the strictures of a theory artificially imposed on the messinessof reality in the name of clarity. Alan Beyerchen, Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and theImportance of Imagery, available online at , retrieved 20 April 2009.

12 Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm 1979) p.25.13 Martin van Creveld, The Art of War: War and Military Thought (New York: Smithsonian

Books, 2005) p.78.14 Clausewitz himself acknowledged that siege warfare was primarily a matter of mathematics

and geometry. Clausewitz, On War (note 1) p.251.15 Richard Holmes, Vauban, Marshal Sbastien le Prestre de (16381707), in Richard

Holmes (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Military History (Oxford: OUP 2003) p.946.16 Gat, Military Thought (note 9) p.37.17 See Henry Guerlac, Vauban: The Impact of Science on War, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers

of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton UP 1986) pp.8390.18 R.R. Palmer, Frederick the Great, Guibert, Blow: From Dynastic to National War, in

Paret (note 17) p. 95.19 Ibid. p.117.20 Maurice de Saxe, Reveries on the Art of War [1757], trans. and ed. Thomas R. Phillips (New

York: Dover Publications 2007) p.18.21 Ibid. pp.11719.22 Antoine-Henri de Jomini, The Art of War [1838], trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill

(Texas: El Paso Norte Press 2005) p.215.23 Antulio J. Echevarria II, Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford: OUP 2007) p.108.24 Clausewitz, On War (note 1) p.155.25 Ibid. p.156.26 Daniel Moran, Strategic Theory and the History of War, in John Baylis, James Wirtz ,

Eliot Cohen and Colin S. Gray (eds.), Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction toStrategic Studies (New York: OUP 2002) p.8.

27 Echevarria, Clausewitz (note 23) p.102.28 Gat (note 9) p.315.29 Ibid.pp.1812.30 Ibid. p.183.31 Michael Howard, Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: OUP 2002) p.23.32 Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times (Princeton UP

1985) p.202.33 Echevarria (note 23) p.112.34 Paret, Clausewitz and the State (note 32) p.71.35 Peter Paret writes that, As a student in Berlin, Clausewitz had read Machiavellis Discorsi

and Arte della Guerra Either during those years or soon after the war he had also read ThePrince. Ibid. p. 169.

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36 Niccol Machiavelli, The Discourses [1516], trans. Leslie J. Walker (London: Penguin2003); The Prince [1513], trans. George Bull (London: Penguin, 1999); and The Art of War[1521], trans. Ellis Farneworth (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press 2001).

37 Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War, in Paret, Makers (note 17)p.24.

38 Neal Wood, Some Common Aspects of the Thought of Seneca and Machiavelli,Renaissance Quarterly 21/1 (1968) pp.15 and 20.

39 Machiavelli, The Prince (note 36) p.79.40 Gilbert, Machiavelli (note 37) p.24.41 Clausewitz, On War (note 1) p.97.42 Machiavelli, The Prince (note 36) p.80.43 Ibid. p.82.44 Machiavelli, Art of War (note 36) p.202. Also, one chapter in the Discourses is entitled, That

it behoves one to adapt Oneself to the Times if one wants to enjoy Continued GoodFortune. Machiavelli, Discourses (note 36) pp.4302.

45 Machiavelli, The Prince (note 36) p.18.46 Neal Wood, Introduction, in Machiavelli, Art of War (note 36) p.xlvi.47 Machiavelli, Art of War (note 36) p.lv.48 Ibid.49 Ibid.50 Paret, Clausewitz and the State (note 32) p.203.51 Machiavellis virt was not confined to the military commander, but was the quality that

enabled any human to face the whims of fortune. Clausewitz equally emphasised thevirtues and spirit that enabled ordinary soldiers to face the possibility of death in battle.

52 Paret, Clausewitz and the State (note 32) p.45.53 Carl von Clausewitz, Observations on Prussia in Her Great Catastrophe, in Clausewitz,

Historical and Political Writings, trans. and ed. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran (Princeton UP1992) p. 40.

54 Ibid. pp.3284. See also Roger Parkinson, Clausewitz: A Biography (New York: Stein & Day1979) pp.5182.

55 Hugh Smith, On Clausewitz (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan 2005) p.150.56 Although the French suffered their own weaknesses on this score, particularly in relation

to reconnaissance and communications and largely because Napoleon attempted to do toomuch. Peter Paret, Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power(Princeton UP 1993) p.88.

57 Quoted in Paret, Clausewitz and the State (note 32) p.191.58 Parkinson, Clausewitz (note 54) p.312.59 Paret, Understanding War (note 56) p.7860 See Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War (Washington DC: National

Defense Univ. 1996).61 Christopher Bassford, The Primacy of Policy and the Trinity in Clausewitzs Mature

Thought, in Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (eds.), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: OUP 2007) p.89.

62 Clausewitz, On War (note 1) p.117.63 Ibid. p.119.64 J. G. Manis and B.N. Meltzer, Chance in Human Affairs, Sociological Theory 12 (1994)

p.46.65 Gat (note 9) p.336. Moltke had been a student at the Berlin war school while Clausewitz

was its director, but there is no evidence of the two ever meeting. We do however knowthat Moltke was a great admirer of Clausewitz, even if he misrepresented many of his ideas.

66 Clausewitz, On War (note 1) p.139.67 Ibid. p. 195.68 Katherine L. Herbig, Chance and Uncertainty in On War, in Michael I. Handel, Clause-

witz and Modern Strategy (London: Frank Cass 1986) p.109.69 Beyerchen (note 11).

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364 DEFENCE STUDIES

70 Henri Poincare, Science and Method (Princeton UP 1949) p.75.71 Edward Hallett Carr, What is History? (London: Penguin 1990) p.102.72 See Booth, Strategy (note 12) p.25.73 On this point Clausewitz states that we can understand why later critics who know all the

previous and attendant circumstances must not be influenced by their knowledge whenthey ask which among the unknown facts they themselves would have considered probableat the time of the action. Clausewitz, On War (note 1) p.193.

74 The theory has it that it was the beauty of Cleopatras nose that determined the outcomeof the decisive Battle of Actium due to Antonys infatuation. See Carr (note 71) pp.87108.

75 Clausewitz (note 1) pp.1825.76 Ibid. p. 698.77 Carr (note 71) p.99.78 Ibid. p.101.79 So Hitler denied his own responsibility for failure as he dictated to his secretary Martin

Bormann in the Spring of 1945. As Overy notes, to Hitler, Germany was a plaything forfate, doomed by the forces of world history. Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (London:Pimlico 1996) p.315.

80 Quoted in Herbig (note 68) p.108. Napoleon also stated that I have never really been myown master; I have always been governed by circumstances. Quoted in Charles Esdaile,Napoleons Wars (London: Penguin 2008) p.2.

81 Carl von Clausewitz, The Principles of War, trans. and ed. Hans W. Gatzke (New York:Dover Publications 2003) p.64.

82 Clausewitz, On War (note 1) p.117.83 Herbig (note 68) p.104. A chance event that works in ones favour may even strengthen

ones resolve, clarify something that was formerly shrouded, or make possible an actionpreviously discounted.

84 Uncertainty usually manifests itself in the asking of questions such as: where is the enemy,what are his plans/intentions, when will he strike, what will I do next, what will be theeffect of this action, and so forth.

85 Clausewitz, On War (note 1) p.97.86 Ibid. p.216.87 Ibid. pp.21617.88 Ibid. p.693.89 Colin S. Gray, How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?, Parameters 35/1

(Spring 2005) p.15.90 Clausewitz,

‘shadows of uncertainty’: clausewitz's timeless analysis of chance in war

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