shankara* (788-820 ad)

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Shankara* Shankara* (788-820 AD) (788-820 AD) Commentary on the Vedanta Sutras (Brahmasutra-Bhashya) Text, 229-250 *Sankara, Sancara, Shamkara 12/19/05

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12/19/05. Shankara* (788-820 AD). Commentary on the Vedanta Sutras (Brahmasutra-Bhashya). * Sankara, Sancara, Shamkara. Text, 229-250. Shankara. Background. India & Hinduism. Hinduism. Basic Beliefs Sacred Literature The Raja Yoga System. See Notes on Hinduism. Outline of the Text. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Shankara* (788-820 AD)

Shankara*Shankara*(788-820 AD)(788-820 AD)

Commentary on the Vedanta Sutras(Brahmasutra-Bhashya)

Text, 229-250*Sankara, Sancara, Shamkara

12/19/05

Page 2: Shankara* (788-820 AD)
Page 3: Shankara* (788-820 AD)

BackgroundBackground

India

&

Hinduism

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Page 5: Shankara* (788-820 AD)

Hinduism

Basic Beliefs

Sacred Literature

The Raja Yoga System

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Outline of the TextOutline of the Text

Self (Atman) & Non-Self -- the problem of superimposition (229-230)

The Desire to Know Brahman (230-233)

Knowing Brahman (230-231)

Brahman as the cause of the world (not in text)

The relationship between Brahman and Self (Atman) -- identity (231-233)

Critique of Other Philosophical Systems (233-250)

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3 Critique of Other Philosophical Systems, cont’d

Vedanta vs. Samkhya (233-241)

Brahman as the cause of the world’s existence The Vedanta critique of Samkhya metaphysics (the

purusha-prakriti theory) The Samkhya critique of Vedantic non-dualism

Vedanta vs. Vaisheshika (atomism) (241-245)

Brahman as the material cause of the world Critique of Vaisheshika atomism Critique of the Vaisheshika theory of categories

(Continued on next slide)

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3 Critique of Other Philosophical Systems, cont’d

Vedanta vs. Buddhist Philosophy (245-250)

Shankara’s non-dualism vs. Buddhist Realism, Idealism, & Voidism -- Editor’s Comment

Critique of Buddhist Realism -- interdependent causation & momentariness

Critique of Buddhist Idealism -- consciousness-onlyCritique of Buddhist Voidism -- emptiness =

nothingness (?)General assessment of Buddhist philosophy

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Self & Not-Self (subject & object) The mistake of superimposition How is objectification of the Self possible, since

it is not an object of sense perception? First, Self is not absolutely a non-object. It is the object [reference] of the word

“I,” & it is known to have real (objective) existence through direct intuition (“I am”) [Descartes: “I think; therefore I am”].

Second, objectification of things that are not objects of sense perception takes place (e.g., the dark blue color of the ether).

Ignorance (avidya) as opposed to knowledge (vidya) as the basis of superimposition.

Examples of ignorant objectification of the Self .

The path to knowledge of the Self: study of the Vedanta Sutras.

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Knowing Brahman

Prerequisites to knowledge of Brahman

Knowledge of Brahman as the highest good

Is Brahman known or not known?Brahman (“the greatest”) [“that than which nothing greater can be conceived”?] is known to exist & is the universal Self (Atman).

Also, the Self is known to exist [because it is impossible for anyone to think “I am not”? (Descartes again)].

2. The Desire to Know Brahman

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since there are many conflicting views of the nature of the Self (231) & of its relationship with Brahman,

it is necessary to inquire further into the nature of Brahman & of the Self & into

the relationship between them (231).

(Why is it necessary?)

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Brahman as cause of the world

The origin, subsistence, & dissolution of the world must (each) be caused. (Why?)

The cause cannot be non-intelligent matter (prakriti), nor atoms, nor non-being, nor the world itself. (Why not?)

Brahman (omniscient & omnipotent) is the only possible cause of the world’s origin, subsistence, & dissolution. (Why?)

2. The Desire to Know Brahman, cont’d

(Not in Text)

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The relationship between Brahman & Self (231-3)

Description of Brahman: eternal, all-knowing, absolutely self-sufficient, ever pure, intelligent, free, pure knowledge, absolute bliss, omnipresent, immutable, non-composite (one), self-illuminating.

Description of Self: permanent, unitary, eternally unchanging, present in everything, imperishable, eternally pure & free.

2. The Desire to Know Brahman, cont’d

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one, i.e., identical,

& knowledge of this identity is moksha (final release & experience of

the union of Self & Brahman).

Knowledge & realization of the identity of Atman & Brahman also result in freedom from the transmigratory world (samsara), whereas ignorance (avidya) of the “supreme identity” binds us to that world.

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Tat tvam asi!*Tat tvam asi!*This means

“That thou art!”

The “That” refers to Brahman;

the “thou” refers to the Self (Atman).

*From the Chandogya Upanishad, VI, 8, 7

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Two experiences of Brahman

Brahman as other than the Self, qualified by limiting conditions (definable characteristics), an object of religious devotion.

This view is based on ignorance (avidya).

Brahman as one (identical) with the Self, free from all limiting conditions (having no definable qualities or characteristics), not an object of religious devotion [because not other than the Self].

This view is based on knowledge (vidya).

2. The Desire to Know Brahman, cont’d

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How the Self gets confused with the Not-Self

& how the individual soul awakens to its true identity as the universal Self (Atman)

through critical thought & reflection

2. The Desire to Know Brahman, cont’d

Dream states & waking states

The rope-snake analogy

Page 18: Shankara* (788-820 AD)

Critique of Other Philosophical Systems

The orthodox schools

Samkhya & Yoga

Nyaya & Vaisheshika

Mimamsa & Vedanta

The unorthodox schools

Buddhism

Jainism

Carvaka

(See Text, 233, fn 1)

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(Text, 233-241)

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Samkhya-Yoga Cosmology(metaphysical dualism)

Consciousness, Self, Subject

Origin, Subsistence, & Dissolution of Worlds

Disruption of Equilibrium -- Intermingling of Gunas

Matter, Not-Self, Object

Equilibrium of the Three Gunas (sattva, rajas, tamas)

(no real interaction)

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Shankara’s Cosmology

“Non-Dualism”

(Advaita)

(Rope) (Snake)

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The issues addressed in Shankara’s treatment of Samkhya-Yoga philosophy

The efficient & material causation of the world’s existence

How can the pradhana (prakriti) be active or activated?

The Samkhya-Yoga critique of Shankara’s non-dualism

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Two kinds of causationTwo kinds of causation Material causation

The material cause of an entity (e.g., a clay pot) is the matter or substance of which the entity is made or composed or constructed (e.g., clay).

Efficient causation The efficient cause of an

entity or event is the active agent that produces the entity or event (e.g., a potter molds clay to form a clay pot).

Causation of the World’s Existence

Shankara & the Samkhya-Yoga philosophers agree that Brahman (purusha) is the efficient cause of the world’s existence. They

disagree about the material causation of the world.

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The disagreement:

For Shankara, Brahman is the

material cause of the world.

The world is an appearance of Brahman projected from & by Brahman through the power of maya.

For Samkhya-Yoga, the pradhana (prakriti) is

the material cause of the world.

The world is other than Brahman (purusha), which is the efficient but not the material cause of the world.

(Non-Dualism vs. Dualism again)

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The argumentsThe arguments

Why & how does Samkhya-Yoga argue that Brahman cannot be the material cause of the world?

How does Shankara respond to the S-Y position on this matter? How does he argue that Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the world?

Causation of the World’s Existence

(233-237)

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Samkhya-Yoga: An effect cannot have qualities different from the qualities of its material cause. The world is non-intelligent (non-conscious), composed of parts, and impure (a mixture of pleasure, pain, & numbness). Brahman (purusha) is intelligent (conscious), one (not composed of parts), and pure (not a mixture of qualities). Therefore, Brahman (purusha) cannot be the material cause of the world.

Vedanta (Shankara): (1) Some effects have qualities different from the qualities of their material causes (humans [intelligent, conscious] growing hair & nails; cow dung [non-intelligent, non-living] giving rise to scorpions & similar animals. (2) Originally, there was nothing but Brahman. If the material from which the world is made is other than Brahman, then that material must emerge from Brahman. (3) In fact, the whole world is intelligent (or a manifestation of intelligence).

pp. 233-237

Page 28: Shankara* (788-820 AD)

Let’s go over pp. 237 in detail.

This is the section entitled,

“(2) The primal cause of the world must be intelligent”.

Causation of the World’s Existence

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According to Shankara,

S-Y’s dualistic cosmology

makes activity & motion

(& therefore the existence of the world)

impossible.

How can the pradhana (prakriti) be active or activated? (237-8)

How does he explain & back up this criticism?

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S-Y dualism negates motion.

How can the pradhana be activated by purusha? How does the disequilibrium of the gunas originate? How does the Mahat arise? (237-8)

How can the pradhana serve any purposes of purusha? (238)

Can (or how can) purusha move the pradhana? (239)

The activity of the pradhana is impossible (or unintelligible) on S-Y assumptions (239).

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The S-Y critique of Shankara’s Non-Dualism (239-240)

Non-Dualism destroys the distinction between sufferer & cause of suffering, between the desiring person & the object desired, between the non-desiring person & the object not desired (the object of aversion).

Non-Dualism also makes final release from suffering impossible [because suffering would then belong to the essence of the Self], contrary to Scripture, whereas Dualism makes final release possible [because suffering would then be distinct from the Self].

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How does Shankara respond to the S-Y critique of his Non-Dualism?

How does he explain the relationship between sufferer & cause of suffering?

Text, 240-241

All subject-object dualities are phenomenal (apparent) only; they are not “really real”; there is no duality in the Brahman-Atman.

Release from suffering results from the realization that suffering is not “really real,” & that realization comes with knowledge of Brahman-Atman.

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Perhaps neither S-Y Dualism nor Shankara’s Non-Dualistic Vedanta can do justice to the subject-object distinction.

What do you think?

(See fn 1 on p. 241)

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*

*(I.e., Nyaya-Vaisheshika)

(Text, 241-244)

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The issues addressed in Shankara’s treatment of Nyaya-Vaisheshika atomism

The material causation of the world (Can an intelligent cause produce effects that do not possess intelligence?)

Problems with atomism:The problem of initial atomic motionThe indivisibility & immutability of atoms

The N-V categories of the understanding (substance, quality, motion, generality, particularity, inherence)

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Buddhist Realism (Sautrantika & Vaibhashika)

Buddhist Idealism (Yogacara)

Buddhist Voidism (Madhyamaka)

(Text, 244-250)

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Shankara vs. Buddhist Realism

The chain of interdependent causation - cannot explain the material & mental aggregations that are governed by the Wheel of Becoming

The Buddhist doctrine of momentariness undermines the principle of causality (168-9)

is inconsistent with the phenomenon of remembrance

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1.Ignorance

12.Aging & Dying 2.

Impulse to Exist

Con- scious-

ness

3.

5.Six Senses

11.Birth

10.Becom-

ing

6.Contact

7.Sensations

8.Craving

4.Mind- Body

9.Cling-

ing

Greed Delusion

Hatred

Heaven

Hell

Human Realm

Demon Realm

Animal Realm

Hungry Ghost Realm

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Shankara vs. Buddhist (Yogacara) Idealism

5 arguments in support of Yogacara idealism (248)

Shankara’s general response (including rejections of the five arguments for idealism) (248-250)

The external world is given as a phenomenon in consciousness & is experienced as external.

The existence of the external world is confirmed by all the standard means of knowledge (pramanas). [See next slide]

Although consciousness is always accompanied by an object, there is a distinction between consciousness & object (i.e., they are not identical).

Examples of dreams, illusions, & mirages do not prove the truth of idealism.

The Yogacara explanation of the variety of ideas implies an infinite regress [see fn 3 on p. 250].

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The Standard Means of Knowledge (pramanas):

Perception

Inference

Verbal testimony (scripture)

Comparison (analogy)

Postulation

Valid non-perception

Fn 1, p. 249

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Shankara vs. Buddhist Voidism

Voidism is negated by all of the standard means of knowledge

(pramanas).

Text, 250

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Shankara’s final assessment Shankara’s final assessment of Buddhist philosophyof Buddhist philosophy

Text, 250

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The End