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r;. Revised: 24 November ·•997

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MOST CONFIDENTIAL

3 Audiences/Relationships/ Vulnerabilities/Action Plans

Key tar¥ets have beeo identified v..ithln audience groupings and relationships and vulnerabilities identi.fied prior to setting out Action Plans covering t'.he perlod September 1997 • May ! 998.

i) NGOs SU. and SPDC have cultivated active relationships with a llUil)ber of leading NGOs and churches, both inside and outside Nigeria. The quality of these relationships ranges from supportive to scepticaL or even hostile.

\Ale see three main objectives,

First1 to build kuovlledget underst~diog and relationships among potentially supportive NGOs vvhich \vill enable the Group)s reputation to be reinforced among the constituencies served by these organisations,

Second, a central objective must be to make it more difficult for hard-core campaigners to sustain their campaigns against Shell.

Third, SPDC and SlL must continue l'ith the plan to help build NGO capacity ID. the Delta and to roo\1e from a program.me of community assistance to a programme of sustainable community development

ln our relationships with other NGOs~ ·v-1e need to ensure adequate and accurate information is made available to these groups on a timely basis. We also need to manage their e).'Pectations.

There is a number of targets \111hich fall into four categories:

a) Those ·w"hu have attaeked us/accuse us of lying and having ' 1slick PR,~/uuliltelr t-0 change their stance1 e.g;

<:> Project Underground

R..ain.foi·est Action Net\\•ork

' Sierra Club

' Bodysllop

Proposed strategy: monitor their statements. rebut allegations \Vbere necessary. challenge basis on Vlhlcb. they continue their campaign against Shell in order to make it more difficult for them to sustain it.

b) Those '\Yho ha\·e attacked us/don1t trust us/not c.onYerted/cu;rrently not acth·e. e.g:

!} Greenpeace

' Friend• of tho Earth lahbough linked \\ith Siem C'lu\>1

' Wotld\\ide Fund for 'Jarure

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CONFIDENTIAL DEF oo·; 4i $9

MOST CONFIDENTIAL () Mileudefensie

Proposed strategy: monitor tbeir statements~ respond where necessary, ensure they are'kept infbnned of progress.

Prlo~ies: (to be agreed)

c) 'lhose '"ho have attn eked us/possl.bilit:y of beginning to build tTust and 'understanding, e.g:

' Amnesty lntemalional

' Pax Christi

• HUlllall Rights Watch

' PJ:RCIECCR

Proposed strategy: build on current relationsWps1 encourage buy~in to the complexity of the issue: act on their sensible sugge~ions.

d) Those \\'e have relntionships \'l:'ith and consider aUiet:, e.g:

() International institute for Envirorun~nta\ Development

o Living Earth

~ Conservation Foundation

• Reverend Leon Sullivan's NGOs (IFESH and Ole) Pro Natura

° Council for Foreign Relations

• M:EMJSA

I> Environment Council

Proposed strategy: de\•elop a process of 1istructured dialogue·' to sMre dilemmas 'V.'ith friendly and middle-ground NGOs, includiug main church groups, with two workshops to be held • one in December (focus: impact of SPDC budget cuts) and one in March (in advance of the AGMs). Emphasis in March workshop will be on environmental NGOs. In additiont focus on continuing relationships \\~th key NGOs (particularly .Amnesty International and Pax Christi~

ii) Churches Following the publication during the last eight months oft\\10 Church reports~ one froro a lllllt of the World Council of Churches and the other from Bread for the World, a prominent Protestant church group in Germany • the Nigeria team has embarked OU a programme of building relationships "itb Church groups, ·

In panicular, a stronger relationship has now been established with the World Council of Churches. In addition. relationships have beeo developed '~~th iodi:\'idu.al church members of the wee in indh-idua! countries, including Nigeria. We "ill continue to sustain and develop these relarionshlps. 11ith the aim of building: a tru,;ting partnership which "ill lead"' the de\·elopment of joint projects in the Delta.

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MOST CONFIDENTIAL P-rioritised into tv'i'O levels~ Level I (urgen.tlimportant); and Level 2- (Secondary)

Level l: ECCR, Dutch Council° of Churches; UK Methodist Church; UK Baptist Church; World Council of Churches; Churches in Nigeria; German Churches (particularly Bread for tbeWorltl), ·

Level 2: Roman Catbolic Church; Southern African Churches, Church of England; Scandillavian Churches; US Church groups (particularly !CCR); Canadian Churches Task Force- linked with ECCR); other African churches.

Proposed strategy: continue to build relationslllps, ensure contacts are weJl.briefud and understand the Shell position. Religious media will be u.sed when necessary to get our views across. Clmrches will be included in the workshops with NOOs in December and March.

Responsibilities:

The Nigeria team (Emeka Achebe/Alan DetheridgelWchael Mcgarry/Noble Pepple) will support Robin Armn, P:>.'X focal point ou Churches.

ii1} Unions Feedback from OUs indicates that1 generally1 Nigeria is not an issue for unions. l-Iov.1ever, it is important that we continue to monitor at OD level. The Nigeria team will maintain coutact '\\ith lCEM. an international umbrella. union whlch has e:\.-pressed concern for union leaders \¥ho remain jailed in Nigeria.

In addition, statements by the T&.G Union in the UK are being monitored - its leader was outspoken at tbe time of Ken SarowV/hva)s death.

ln the US1 close links bet\lleen the unions and \'ariOUS organisations \Vitb links tO the African continent indicate that unions could prO\ide an operational frame\vork for any future campaigns there,

Priorities:

Maintain relationship \\ith lCEM; monitor ,;e\1·.'S of unions at OU level.

Responsibilities:

Alan Detherldge/Emeka Achebe

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iv) Media Over the past year there has been a gradual improvement in the quality of roedia knowledge concerning SPDC's operations in Nigeria, which has been reflected in an impro\•ement of some of the coverage the issue has received. An. important factor in thls has been the programme of site \~sits, as well as a number of media briefings held in key target countries,

Ho\vever~ there are now some indications that this programme ma:y be beginning to generate increasing counter .. reaction.~ and th.is needs to be considere-d carefully. In additioD.i where the programme has been used as a means of attempting to convert hostile joumalists1

this has not been successful, and the result has been unnecessary and negative publicicy. Consideration should also be given to the possioillty that reporters' \oisits to Sl?DC roay be simply keeping alive an issue that has begun to wane in ne\VS valua

A further issue which needs to be considered is that the \~sit programme may have generated hostility from the Nigerian authorltie~ in that the media have generally been tmderstanding and supportive of SPDC and SILltbe Group generally, but qulte condemnatory tO\\•atds the Nigerian Goverit.roeot,

The media r~latiQns problems •Ne have faced have largely been the result of a combln.ation of poor factual knowledge in the media of our operations and limited or unhappy relationships. The media~ particularly during J 996. have also been the subject of vigorous targeting by a range of indh~duals and organlsations> including PEN (from the uinside}1

),

MOSOP, Body Shop, Amnesty lnteauttional, the Sima Club, Greenpeaoe and Friends of the Earth. 'This means '\Ve have had to manage a situation '\Vhere sig:aificant media have been quick to report the grievances and position of cenain pressure groups~ but have not g1ven the same iVeigbt to the SPDC or Group position or response.

There is conflict betvi.reen the attitudes and asso.xoptions of our critics and \Vhat \\le believe to be the facts. The difficulty is the natural tendency of journalists not to accept or to tiust information provided by big business in response to pressuxe group critics. There has also been only limited countervcolltact by Shell; and almost no suppo1ti've lobbying by interesrs sympathetic to ShelPs position \1.·'hich could have delivered third party endOrse.ruent (altbough there would ha\'e beeo fe\\' prepared to do this, particularly in the early days of the lssue). The promotion of third party endorsement in the media needs greater liaison between e)..'1.ernal relations/issues support and media relations.

It also needs to be recognised that for 0 long ti.me to come \Ve will remain eh-posed to hostile and potentially damaging co,1erage by \Vay Of longer~fotm investigative reportl.ng in both electronic and print roedia. A range of high profile roedla • such as, in the UR Newsnigbt, Panorama, World in Action. Dispatches, File on Four, The Guardian/Observer; US international roedia. such as the New York Times md Washington Post haw could have iVOr1dv .. ide impact; and else.i\'here in Europ~. major national dailies in each of the Scandinavian countries and in Germany ~ inter atra have the capacity to produce damaging items \Vhlch are based on a small amount of nei\' material tvhioh is critical of SPDC or the i\~der Group: but i\'b1cb is given coute~'t by revisiting the 11:raditionaln complaints. It is difficult to head off or prevent such co\'erage praactb:ely .. but the damage can be contained and mitigated to some degree \\ilth a timely and effecth·e intervention by media relations.

In addressing lhe medi:1 re.l:niou;;: ..::baUeugcF. prt:sente<l by the ~igerla issue it sho11ld ~·.: recognised bo'VI' much of a part the Operating Coropanie:; have to play in effectively managing their fl\\11 n1edia 111e ueed for a co~11rdin:ned and consi:;ten\ res;pcnu:e i:: Yital This 1uean!' the operating ... ·on1paniei:. n~e>d tl' liai.i:q .::lo!:ely i\i.th Crroup media relations: a.th'!.

CONFID>ENTXAl DEF 0014Hl2

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MOST CONFlDENTlAL (as outlined in tl:ie ne"~ paragraph) Group media relations need. to be able to disseminate accurate infomlation rapidly if the initiative is not to be lost. This is being tevie\ved in a '"ii.der context.

A further operational issue which has been a factor D; the quality of media coverage has been the ·challenge of conducting speedy1 accurate nev.1s management in a tone more likely to arouse sympathy than hostility. For reasons related to quality of resources, inadequate systems and inflexibility of culture, we have not always met this challenge successfully.

Priorities~

We would see the following media as our principal targets. [Note tl:iat by identifying the Financial Times, BBC World Service, CNN and the Econmnist the international dimension is largely covered. However, as outlined above, the need for the major Operating Companies effecti\)ely to manage their 0¥.lil media is vital]:

(NB: P,ior10• media to come from Sltell Nederland, SlieU Oil, Deutsche Site/I and Scandinavia)

a) Financial Tin>es, DailyTelegrnph;The Times, Tb.e \ndependent

Stable relationships with these newspapers has now been established, evidenced by regular and reasonably balanced coverage and regular contact betvveen journalists from these publications and tbe media relations team. The aim is to roailttain stability in these relationships.

Proposed strategy: continue 'i..ith regular briefings of journalists and give consideration to \'ldeo-linked briefings from S)?DC in Nigeria to reporters invited to Shell centre, Notv»itbstanding the foreg~ing; \Ve also recognise the need to take the «foot off the gas" a little. \Ve recommend coi::itinuing \\'1th the existing program.me of contact benveen media relations and journalists and continuing the progr-amme of social contact between senior editorial 5g;:ures and CMD.

bl The Economist

We are building a relationship slow!)' with the new correspondent v.'.ho has receutly taken over the energy portfolio.\¥~ have better contacts at senior levei with continuing contact involving the Editor, as \Veil as the industrial and commercia.l editors. These need to be pursued v-.:ith some vigour but also \"ith tbe knowledge that they are unlikely to feature Nigeria more than t\\ice iu nny year, Ho\\'ever, such is tbefr global influence1 they have to be seen as major players in the long term

Proposed strategy: we vml involve the n~1 correspondent in briefings \.Vb.ere appropriate and continue to build the relationships vAth the publication th.rough the contact prograIDDle

c) Bl~C World Sm•ice (WS) R•dio

Relationsh.ips are unde\·eloped with the BBC World Set\1ce (WS) though preliminary contacts have been made, The complicated structtue of the \\'orld Service means the most ifill.uential programmes must be effecth'ely targeted for leading BBC WS journalists (businessleuviron.mentlforeign aflilll:s) to trust Sbell~pro\~ded information.

Concerns: recent chang.es at the BBC. including a ne\\• correspondent in Nigeria (Hillary -\udersson i~ 110\i.. the BBC\\'~ lag:os .:-L)ttespCludent). 3S \VeU as: Coromoinve.alth attitudes to Nigeria,

CONFUllENTIAL

MOST CONFIDENTIAL Proposed strategy: involve BBC WS journalists in briefings and offer interviews where requested. For example, targeted BBC WS programmes will be included on press release distributions. We will identify and cultivate important editorial and senior management staff tlu:ough a contact programme. SPDC will continue to build a relationsltlp with Hilary Andersson and any of her kno\\!Jl contacts in the divisions.

d) CNN

A go-od relationship has now beeo establlsbed with senior management of CNN hltemational and with some correspondents. Other correspondents now need to be included. C'NN reacts instantly to world events and v..1e need to be able to provide spokespersons1 footage, etc at the same speed.

Proposed str.atogy: we will continue V\1th individual brielliJJ;s for CNN management; involve other correspondents in briefings '\Vhere appropriate; and continue to build relationships \vi.thin the overall contact programme.

e) NeV11s \'!'ire services

Good relationships v..ith moSt of the ·v.iire services is evidenced by regulart balmced reporting of business related stories. The Group/SPDC position is nearly always reported. Current relationshlps must be maintained and built upon,

Hovlever~ there are frustrations \Vi.th our slo\vness to respond. We should recognise that in the main they serve traders and other commercial interests~ although some ne\Vspapers do carry their stories,

Proposed strategy: improve SPDC ne\VS gathering, liaison with London and dissemination of factual and cleared information. Nom1thstanding tbe foregoing, we should also recognise the need to take the 1<foot off the gas1

' a little, We \Vill continue \i...rlth the ex.isting contact programme bet'l.veen meclia relations and \Vi.re service reporters.

ODs

In addition to the international media handled by the Group media relations team bi London, and their counierparts in the US and Netherlands, OU PA staff are responsible for building relationships with journalists in their countries in co:rmection \~'.ith the Nigeria issue. They also put fonvard journalists for press visits to the Delta. Tlie Ni,geria team will continue to \Vork \vith OU PA staff and assist them in delivering the comroimications objectives on the issue. at local level. Priority \\iill be given to Germany and Scandina\rian countries \Vhe.re the threat is currently greatest

RESPONSIBILITIES:

James Herbert will be the focal poiut in lhe media team for the Nigeria issue, supported by Eric Nickson (co-ordinated by Michael l\1eg.arry for the Nigeria team).

v) internal ln line \\>fth the lo\\' public ptofile of tbe issue. the level of staff concern in most .:::ountrles appears lo~·.

The roain internal groups include management and staff in the sen~ce companies in London and The Hague; Business Committees: and Operating tloits. Methods of comnnillkation range from face-to-face briefings to the pro\'lsion of publications. ln addition. \\titten briefings are distributed n) electronic mail

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MOST CONFIDENTIAL Research '\\till be carried ouL amongst internal audiences to establish the le\1el of knowledge that exists on the issue and the range of information required. Th.is \vill ensure we provide the appropriate level of information.

State of current relationships:

We believe the level of understanding of the issues involved is reasonable. Articles appear regularly in staff publications and notices relating to specific events are posted by electronic !1l!iil. In addition, a number of meetings have beeu held iu the central offices to pro\1de an opportu:nity for staff to hear first hand about specific issues related to Nigeria.

Individual OUs are responsible for ad\>ising their oW1l staff about the issue, assisted by the Nigeria team.

It is recommended that the CUITent colllJllUJllcatiou policy relating to staff continues and that \Ve continue to answer any concerns. lt is important that v.,1e monitor the level of concern amongst staff about the issue. To achieve this1 a small research project vvill be carried out amongst a representative snmple to assess the impact oftbe issue.

PROPOSED STRATEGY

Communications:

Regular communication \i..~tb all staff groups \\ill continue as and \.Vhen necessary. In addition1 in~house publications \yill be targeted \Vi.th two articles n year on prog1ess ID Nigeria.

A research project \Vill be esrsblished to monitor staff concern on the issue.

Respo)lsibillties:

Noble Pepple/Barbara La"Tence, will bave responsibility for tbis element of the programme, liaising as necessary v.~th Human Resources and Peter Hunt, the PXX focal point for interoa1 communications.

vi) Shareholders Briefings of institutional shareholders v..ill take place as n~cessary in liaison \\i.th the lnvestor Relatioos tea:ro. In particular, a programme of contact \\1th instirutional shareholders 'Will be considered in advance of the AGMs.

Responsibility:

Alan Detheddge \Vill liaise with Investor Relations.

vii) Governments/!nter·Governmental Organisations Governmen1s:

Apart from Nigeria~ relationships \\1th go\'emments to be c-onsidl:'.red include those in the Netherlands, Noitb America (USiCanada). Scandina\ia (Deru:nark. Finland. Norn•y and S\veden). South .A.frica, United '[(jng.dom. and Germany.

:\igeri.a:

Clearly. the !\lgerian Go\·emment has a major impact on the lssue. ~egative 'ie'\V& '"ithln the go,·ernmeot :ibottr the relationship \\i.tb SF'D.C h:f\'<!! rurfnce:d recently 1nd SPDC \(;

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CONFIOEUTIAL OEF 0014"Hl5

MOST CONFIDENTIAL developing a strategy to deal \\ii.th these. Relationships in Nigeria '\:Vi11 be thr0\\13 into

'sharper focus in the ensuing 12 months as the transition programme continues.

Other Governments:

SIL and OUs will continue to brief the Foreign Offices of governments as and when requlred or requested to do so by OUs, Particular emphasis will be placed o~ the relatipnship v..1rh the relatively new UK Labour Governblent,

Intergovernmental Organisations

The development agencies associated with intergovernmental organisations1 including the European Union, UNICEF, World Bank, Collllllonwealth (includlng Mioisterial Action Group) will be briefed as necessary in order to buildlng understanding.

Our strategy will be to involve these organisations where possible, the World Bank in particular, in building capacity within tbe Delta,

Responsibilities:

The Nigeria team \Vil.I support OUs and Robin Aram in building relationships v.iith Go\•em.ments and lntergovemmental bodies.

viii) Academia There are nvo main groups to be targeted M professors!lecturers'board members of major universities in strategically important countries~ and students/young people,

Clearly, v·Ath limited funding direct from the Nigeria issue budget, a full scale communications programme targeting these groups is not possible and a more targeted approach is required.

V-le recommend three !i"l:ra::o.ds \Vhlcb form our approach to these audiences:

The continued development of a case stu.dy on the Nigeria issue '"'"hicb \Ve bope to place, as a reference document, "\\1th a number of major universities, particularly business schools.

The Nigeria tearo as \Ve1J as OUs in their o\\ill countries should accept invitations to speak at major universities, building understanding about the complexit;• of the issue. As part of tltls, an improved range of \'ideo material and professionally produced pres:eu.tations v.ill be pan of the 11001 kitn.

Schools: at intern:tediate levc:J~ require accurate information about Nigeria. \Ve ha·ve found out from researcb into the provision of school packs that it \\rould not be possible for Shell to produce branded materials wbkh focus on fue issue and which could be used in sohool curricula, We should therefore seek a partuer (for example, the Royal Geographical Society) who could produce and distribute generic information for schools about the societal and economic issues: faced by Nigeria, and help children and young people understand the complexity of the issues that face that country,

Responsibilities:

!\1icb.ae1 Megarry:'Noble Pepple ..-\mout l\1oSten

CONF!liJJENTIAt. DEF Q0\ 4'166

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ix:) Other opinion leaders/influencers A strategic aim for the ne>.i lZ months should be to increase the number of allies who understand SPDC's (and the Group's) position. This will be achieved through third-part)' endorsement ~ using influential figures to communicate our messages. These wouJd include:

o Relevant and useful advocates '\vho have been to Nigeria

' NGO leaders such as Richard Sandbrook

• World figures such as Reverend Leon Sullivan

• Church leaders (both inside and outside Nigeria)

• Third parties in Nigeria (fur example, professors at universities)

The key focus for third-party endorsement will be the 1998 "People and Environment~' report.

Responsibility - Nigeria team (Alan Detheridge/Michae\ Megarry) and SPDC (Nick Wood).

x) · Consumers/general pub!lc Concern about tbe.issue ex-pressed by botb existing and potential customers rises and fulls with the public profile of the issue. As stated earlier, the issue has a )ow public profile currently. Hov.iever1 it i.s important tbat OUs continue to monitor the level of interest in tb.e issue amongst customers/public in their respecth·e countries so that \l./e can take early action if, for some reason, the situation changes.

CONFl.OENlfrAL ilEF 00~4167

MOST CONFIDENTIAL

4 Communications Tools

In the communioations mix emphasis is heing given to the fullovring: oowmunicatious tools:

Media relations

Mecfu '\\ill be used se1ectively to get our message across to a v.~de cross-section of our audiences:. using third~parties where possible to give endorsement.

Face tc face events

Key audiences will be briefed indMdually or collectively where appropriate. Most will be headed up by the Nigeria team, With specialists being drafted in as required.

Special d.il~mma sharing e\lents will be held v.ihere roerobers of the key audience groupings \\Ul be brought together for a series of special dlnuers to discuss eier.nents of tbe Nigeria issu.e, emphasising its comp 1exicy.

Speeches

There v.ill be a number of opportllllities during the ne>.~ eight months when members of ClvID and others \\ill give speeches on issues that impact the Nigerian situation. These are additional opportunities to cotnmun.icate our key messages. '

Additional public speaking opportunities should be cre•ted for those directly involved in the Nigeria issuet such as Ron van den Bergi Emeka Achebe and Alan Detheridge,

Publications

SPDC orl,,oinate a number of publications during the year, such as briefing documents and their annual report, "People and the Environnzent\ These publications ·will be used in hriefing meetings \\ith key audiencesi or sent to them as a follov..• u.p.

Videos

h is anticipated that video will be used tactically to rebut specific allegations emerging fro'lll the Delta (for example, the video ne.\i..1s release produced recently relating to oil spills).

lt is also recommended that a longer \ideo ~ l2~l5 minutes - be produced, su.rnmarising. major topics such as:

oil spills generally, focusing on sabotage

o \ 1isual evidence of en\irorunental reroediatioa \VOrk

views from third parties tbat will help progress in the Delta

This can be used to help brief audiences.

Letters

Tue Nigeria team i\'ill continue to respond to letters sent to SU.. from indhiduals or protest groups in ci."lnne0tion ''itl1 tl\e issue and to assist Shell companies generally \\ilh rucb res-ponses

' .,

CONFIDENTIAL DEF 00'14168