shooting the messenger: explaining public discontent with the news media

Shooting the Messenger: Explaining Public Discontent with the News Media

David A. Jones James Madison University

More and more Americans are disgruntled with the news media-a troubling problem in a democracy that depends so much on news organizations to inform its citizens, This study offers and tests a set of explanations for declining satisfaction with news providers. Much of the existing content-based research might suggest that the public is growing weaty of the media’s aggressive style, their preoccupation with scandal and the personal lives of politicians, and other tendencies. This stu4, however; explores the extent to which the media are suffering from the same sense of general discontent that has affected all political institutions. It also examines the role of partisanship and ideology, in particular the widely reported view among conservative Republicans that the media are biased against them. How much of the public’s dissatisfaction with the media may be explained by general political discontent and perceptions of bias? To explore these questions, this study analyzes national survey data provided by Pew Research Center for the People and the Press that include several indicators measuring public perceptions of the media.

I t is no secret that many Americans are disgruntled with the news media. Recent polls suggest that only one-third ofAmericans approve of the media’s performance (West 2001, 104). In the mid-I 990s, only about ten percent said they have a “great deal” of confidence in the media, a decline of about 20 percentage points from two decades earlier (Dautrich and Hartley 1999). Although such ratings ebb and flow, clearly the trend is downward (Kurtz 2002).

This study will examine a partial set of explanations for the public’s low opinion ofthe media. Working with survey data provided by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, I will first take a close look at key characteristics of respondents who expressed strong dissatisfaction with the news media. Secondly, I will analyze a basic model of “media satisfaction,” allowing comparison of various attitudinal, behavioral, and demographic explanatory factors.

Why should we be concerned about deteriorating public perceptions of the media?After all, nearly all news organizations are part of privately-owned

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corporations that seek to earn profits, not formal political institutions enshrined in the U.S. Constitution (Downie and Kaiser 2002). The media’s lowly public stature should concern us because of their crucial role in sustaining a democracy made up of informed citizens. Throughout much of this nation’s history, citizens informed themselves through contact with family, friends, community leaders, and organizations such as political parties. Although interpersonal communication remains a vital source of influence, the media have replaced political parties as the key sources of political information (Lenart 1994; Patterson 1993). Yet the poll numbers summarized previously suggest that many Americans do not believe what they see, read, and hear. Unfortunately, “without a trustworthy source of information, the public is left without the ability to discern the important issues of the day, the differences between candidates in elections, and whether what the candidates and advertisers are telling them is accurate” (Dautrich and Hartley 1999, 15).

This dynamic not only weakens democratic processes, it also has done serious damage to the media themselves (West 200 1). Traditional news organizations-especially the nightly network news-are suffering from declining audiences (Rich 2002). Out of desperation, more of the “news hole’’ is being filled with “soft news” and tabloid-style programming, a trend that troubles journalists as much as it does some academics (Downie and Kaiser 2002; Patterson 2000).

Other effects are more subtle. News organizations such as 60 Minutes and ABC News are sometimes “caving” to legal attacks by large corporations in part because “they know that they will not find the receptive audiences they once experienced in court” (Sanford 1999, 1-2). With their image in tatters, “the media are discovering that their crumbling credibility with the public is reflected in the courts” (8). As the media pull back from aggressive investigative reporting, Americans become “more dependent than ever on the government for our understanding of human events” (10).

Related Research

What explains the public’s dissatisfaction with the media? In part they may be turned off by long-term shifts in how the media report the news. Overall, news about public affairs is more negative than it used to be (Patterson 1993). This negativity bias partly stems from the rise of interpretive reporting- analytical journalism that goes beyond straight-facts objective reporting. Sometimes labeled “news analysis” and sometimes not, stories of this type

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attempt to place the stories in a broader context (West 2001). The story reports not only what happened, but also tries to explain why. The explanation often reflects the cynical attitudes journalists have toward politicians and their motives. For example, if a candidate announces a proposal to fix health care, an interpretive news story would frame the event in terms of the candidate’s political motives, leading off with such phrases as, “Hoping to boost his popularity among elderly voters,” or “In a move designed to distract voters from the nation’s economic problems.” While it may be true that the candidate is motivated by potential political gains, it is also possible-if not likely-that the candidate is also concerned with making good public policy. In any case, the long-term impact of such coverage may cut both ways, contributing not only to “video malaise” and declining trust in government, but also “blame the messenger” phenomenon-that is, a public backlash against the media (Cappellaand Jamieson 1997; Miller, Goldenberg, and Erbring 1979; Robinson 1976; West 2001).

Much of the media negativity is a byproduct of Watergate, which may have triggered another relevant shift in American journalism. Watergate brought to light a disturbing character study of a sitting U.S. president. Nixon’s bizarre behavior convinced many journalists, and political scientists such as James David Barber (1 992), that a president’s “character” matters-that election coverage should analyze not only the issue positions of each candidate, but also their personalities and personal histories (Downie and Kaiser 2002). By this logic, Watergate might never have happened had news organizations dug deeper into Nixon’s personality before he won the election. Since then, character-based reporting has flourished as all aspects of politicians’ lives have come under greater scrutiny (West 2001). Scandal stories have become more commonplace as even respectable news outlets began working with a broader definition of scandalous behavior that now includes extramarital affairs. Television news organizations thrive on these stories because they attract large audiences. For the cable news outlets, such stories provide captivating fodder to f i l l their massive 24-hour “news holes.” Indeed, news ratings seem to escalate during what Larry Sabato (1 99 1 ) calls media “feeding frenzies”-that is, “the press coverage attending any political event or circumstance where a critical mass of journalists leap to cover the same embarrassing or scandalous subject and pursue it intensely, often excessively, and sometimes uncontrollably” (6). However, even though feeding frenzies seem to boost ratings and sell newspapers, polls suggest that many Americans are turned off by such coverage, and they blame the negativity on both the media and the public officials under scrutiny (Dautrich and Hartley 1999).


Many Americans may also be dissatisfied with other media preoccupations. During election season, news organizations spend vastly more time and space covering “process stories” that focus on “horse race” or “game” aspects of the campaign: who is ahead, who is behind, and what strategies each campaign is employing to win (Robinson and Sheehan 1983). Policy issues by contrast get relatively little coverage. Yet voters need and say that they want more reporting on how the candidates differ on policy issues. This disconnect frustrates voters, electoral campaign organizations, and journalists, some of whom are presumably tom between professional norms that favor substance and profit-motivated pressure to give the people what they want (Dautrich and Hartley 1999; Matalin and Carville 1995). To borrow a metaphor from political consultant James Carville, the ratings suggest that what many people want are more cheeseburgers; but what many say they want is more spinach (Matalin and Carville 1995). When asked their opinion of the media, they complain about the abundance of cheeseburgers and paucity of healthy vegetables. Then they eat another cheeseburger.

Surely the public’s dissatisfaction stems in part from a combination of these shifts in the content of the news. Troublesome changes in news content have been thoroughly documented and the effects of these shifts are still being sorted out. But as Dautrich and Hartley (1 999) point out, the scholarly focus on news content and audience effects underplays the public’s perceptions of the source of media messages. Dautrich and Hartley’s research helps bridge this gap by documenting the depth and breadth of voter’s discontent, yet there remains aneed for multivariate modeling ofthe public’s views toward the news media. Along with a related study analyzing National Election Study data (Jones 2003), this analysis is designed to provide a starting point using existing data. Polls suggest the public’s view of the media is souring. What individual-level factors explain such negative views?

Research Design

It would be impossible to offer a complete explanation of the individual attitudes involving the media. For one, measures are limited on both sides of the equation. Although the National Election Study and other large political surveys include a large number of indicators of media exposure, they rarely ask respondents about their attitudes toward the media’ This paucity hinders researchers’ ability to test models that treat such attitudes as dependent variables. It also limits the range of testable explanatory factors since narrower media-related attitudes could serve as useful independent variables. For

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example, an individual’s general level of satisfaction with the media could be explained in part by the extent to which he or she believes the media are preoccupied with the personal lives of politicians. The large national political datasets do not include measures ofthe latter. Nor are respondents frequently asked about their feelings toward aggressive reporting, horse-race coverage, and other factors raised the in the research summarized here.

Fortunately, the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press conducts a variety of data-rich national surveys that focus on media-related attitudes and behavior. The following analysis draws upon data from Pew’s biennial media consumption survey conducted in April and May 2000.* This particular survey includes a promising single indicator of the public’s general level satisfaction with the national media’s coverage of politics. Specifically, respondents were asked the following question: How satisfied are you with the media’s coverage of news about political figures and events in Washington? Are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not too satisfied, or not at all satisfied? It is important to point out that this question was a follow-up posed only to 6 1.5 percent of the 3,142-person sample. The remaining respondents were omitted because in a previous question they said they either “not very closely” or “not at all closely” follow the news about political figures and events in Washington. This means the analysis is limited to subjects who said they follow such news either “very closely” or “somewhat closely,” 17.6 and 43.9 percent respectively. This limitation is unfortunate. Removing subjects who expressed low levels of interest in political news reduces our ability to assess the explanatory role of media-consumption habits. Low consumers of political news are taken out of the equation. Surely many of these subjects would shed light on the media’s problems. Still, indicators of public attitudes toward the media are rare and the subsample does cany at least one advantage: by professing close attention to the news, the subjects benefit from a good deal of experience with the subject at hand.

Nonetheless, given the limitations of this measure, the current analysis also will rely upon a second indicator of public attitudes toward the media. Respondents were asked whether they completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, or completely disagree with the following statement: People who decide what to put on TV news or in the newspapers are out of touch with people like me. This indicator measures a related concept, albeit one less directly referring to Media Satisfaction and more to a sense of Media Eficacy. The two measures are only moderately correlated, R = .287 and tau-b = .249, underlining their conceptual differences. Unlike the Satisfaction question, however, the Eficacy question was posed to all respondents and


only 10 1 did not answer. Therefore, I use it primarily to account for the biases that might occur when focusing on the more politically attentive subsample. The results are not presented in the bivariate tables.

Results

How serious is the media’s public perception problem? Turning first to the Media Sarisfaction concept, only about 15 percent of the subsample said they were “very satisfied” with the media’s coverage of national politics. That compares with 47 percent who said they were “fairly satisfied” and 26 percent who were “not very satisfied.” Even more disgruntled were the 233 respondents, making up 12.3 percent, who said they were “not satisfied at all” with media coverage.’

Journalists fared a bit worse on the Media Eflcacy dimension. More than half of the respondents agreed that news people are out of touch: 18 percent claimed to “completely agree” and 34 percent “mostly agree” with the statement, That compares with only eleven percent who completely disagreed with the statement and 34 percent who mostly disagreed.

Much of the subsequent analysis will highlight the respondents who expressed the most dissatisfaction with the media: in particular the 233 respondents who said they were “not satisfied at all” with the media’s coverage of national politics. Although this group represents only twelve percent of the sample, it is these subjects who pose the greatest challenge to news organizations trying to preserve the trust of their readers and viewers. The intensity of their views offsets the statistical disadvantage of focusing on a group this small.

Among whom is dissatisfaction with the media highest? More specifically, what are the characteristics and views of the subjects who said they were “not satisfied at all” with the media? What about the respondents who were more likely to agree that journalists are out of touch? When assessing the role of media-related factors, it is important to remember that most of the subjects examined here indicated at least some interest in following the news. That is, they said they follow national political news at least “somewhat closely.’’

Satisfaction with the Nation Not surprisingly as demonstrated in Table 1, a strong relationship emerged

between respondents’ sense of satisfaction with the country and their satisfaction with the media.4 Among respondents who said they were “not satisfied at all” with the media’s coverage of political figures and events in

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Table 1. Satisfaction with Nation’s Direction and Media Satisfaction

Media Satisfaction

Nation Not at all Not too Fairly very Total Satisfaction % ## % # % # % # % # Unsatisfied 31.6 68 46.2 213 60.4 489 67.9 180 543 950 Satisfied 68.4 147 53.8 248 39.6 320 32.1 85 45.7 800 Total 100.0 215 100.0 461 100.0 809 100.0 265 100.0 1,750 X2 = 88.8; p = .OOO Tau-c = -.236

Questions: All in all, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country today? How satisfied are you with the media’s coverage of news about political figures and events in Washington?

Source: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (2000)

Washington, two-thirds also expressed dissatisfaction with the direction in which the country was heading. By contrast, general political discontent was expressed by only about 40 percent of respondents who were “fairly satisfied” with political news and one-third of those who said they were ‘’very satisfied.” Similarly, on the efficacy measure, two-thirds of respondents who said they “completely agree” that news people are out of touch also expressed dissatisfaction with the country’s direction. That compares with about 40 percent of respondents with high levels of media efficacy.

Ideology and Partisanship Conservative Republicans were particularly dissatisfied with the media.

As evidenced in Table 2, self-identified conservatives made up more than half of respondents who said they were “not satisfied at all” with the media’s coverage of news about political figures and events in Washington. Only 20 percent of this group labeled themselves either “liberal” or “very liberal.” By contrast, as Table 3 shows, members of the “not satisfied at all” group also were nearly twice as likely to label themselves Republican than Democrat.

A similar pattern emerges for Media Eficucy. Among the respondents who said they “completely agree” that media officials are out of touch with people like themselves, about 52 percent labeled themselves either


Table 2. Ideology and Media Satisfaction

Not at all

VeryLiberal 6 3 14 Liberal 13.1 29 Moderate 23.4 52 Conservative 35.6 79 very Conservative 21.6 48 Total 100.0 m Xz = 80.6; p = .OOO Tau-c = -.060

I deo I ogy % #

Media Satisfaction

Not too Fairly Yo # Yo # 6.7 32 43 37 15.5 74 14.0 121 35.8 171 413 357 32.3 154 35.4 306

9.6 46 5.1 44 100.0 477 100.0 865

very Total % # % # 7.9 22 5.7 105

14.4 40 14.3 264 38.1 I06 372 686 31.7 88 34.0 627

7.9 22 8.7 160 100.0 278 100.0 1,842

Question: How satisfied are you with the media’s coverage of news about political figures and events in Washington?


Table 3. Party Identification and Media Satisfaction

Media Satisfaction

Not at all Not too Fairly very Total party Yo # Yo # Yo # % # Yo # Democrat 22.4 50 33.1 158 33.9 296 44.0 121 33.8 625 Independent, other 34.5 77 323 154 33.0 288 28.4 78 32.3 597 Republican 43.0 96 34.6 165 33.0 288 27.6 76 33.8 625 Total 100.0 223 100.0 477 100.0 872 100.0 275 100.0 1,847 X2 = 27.8; p = .OOO V =0.087


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“conservative” or “very conservative.” Only about 20 percent chose either liberal label. About 37 percent of this group consider themselves Republican compared with 25 percent who at least lean toward the democrat^.^

Talk Radio It appears that many of these discontented conservatives have turned to

talk radio as an alternative to conventional political media. Table 4 shows that about 38 percent of those most disgruntled with the media said they “regularly” listen to “radio shows that invite listeners to call in to discuss current events, public issues and politics.” That compares with just 15 percent of respondents who said they were satisfied with the media. In fact, the results suggest that political talk radio regularly attracts more than half of the respondents who expressed some form of dissatisfaction with the media.

This pattern does not hold for those who expressed low levels of Media E@cacy. Although respondents who “completely agree” that news people are out of touch were disproportionately more likely to listen to talk radio regularly, the overall relationship is weak. Overall, respondents with low media efficacy were not disproportionately more likely to tune in political talk radio.

Table 4. Political Talk Radio Listening and Media Satisfaction ~~

Media Satisfaction

Not at all Not too Fairly very Total Listen to PTR % # % # % # % # % # Never 22.0 29 27-6 66 33.0 147 35.5 49 30.5 291 W l Y 13.6 18 25.9 62 24.7 110 22.5 31 23.1 PI Sometimes 26.5 35 243 58 283 126 275 38 26.9 257 Regularly 37.9 50 222 53 14.1 63 145 63 19.5 186 Total 100.0 132 100.0 239 100.0 446 100.0 138 100.0 955 Xz=45.4; p= .OOO Tau-c = -.I 21

Questions: How often, if ever, do you listen to radio shows that invite listeners to call in to discuss current events, public issues and politics? How satisfied are you with the media’s coverage of news about political figures and events in Washington?


Shooting ihe Messenger 251

Internet Unlike with talk radio, dissatisfied respondents were only slightly more

likely to “sometimes go online to get political news.” Table 5 shows that political Internet use was high among those who were “not satisfied at all” with the media, but not much higher than what was reported for those who were “very satisfied,” at 60 and 58 percent respectively. Overall, the relationship was weak. Similarly, Internet use was no higher among respondents who expressed low levels of media efficacy. Perhaps, though, these results should not be surprising in light of the tendency of major Internet news sites to be affiliated with major news organizations such as CNN, MSNBC, and the Associated Press.

Table 5. Political Internet Use and Media Satisfaction

Media Satisfaction

Political Not at all Not too Fairly very Total Internet Use yo # Yo # Yo # % # Yo # Yes 60.3 79 50.2 144 45.8 235 57.6 80 50.3 538 No 39.7 52 49.8 143 54.2 278 42.4 59 49.6 531 Total 100.0 131 100.0 2%’ 100.0 513 100.0 139 100.0 1,070 X2 = 1 3.2; p = .040 V = .079

Questions: Do you sometimes go online to get political news? (yes or no) How satisfied are you with the media’s coverage of news about political figures and events in Washington?


Demographics With the exception of respondent gender, the usual demographic factors

do not help much in explaining variation in people’s attitudes toward the media. The results in Table 6 show that about 62 percent of media malcontents were men, while females made up nearly 58 percent of the group who said they were ‘’very satisfied” with political news. Respondents expressing low levels of media efficacy also were more likely to be male. The slightly higher rate of media discontent among men is difficult to explain; in light of the apparent

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Table 6. Gender and Media Satisfaction

Media Satisfaction

Not at all Not too Fairly very Total Gender YQ # ?h # % # % # % # Female 38.2 89 502 258 53.0 473 55.7 157 50.8 %7 Male 61.8 144 49.8 246 47.0 420 443 125 492 935 Total 100.0 233 100.0 494 100.0 893 100.0 282 100.0 1,902 Xz = 19.2; p = .OOO v=.101

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partisadideological aspect of the dissatisfaction, perhaps the differences between men and women relate to the “gender gap” that has emerged in recent elections. As for other demographic factors, significant differences did not emerge between whites and non-whites. The same was true for differences between categories of income, education, and region of residence.

A Multivariate Test The bivariate results presented so far provide a straightforward, albeit

incomplete, set of explanation for public discontent with the media. Satisfaction with the media appears to be unusually low among conservative Republicans. This is particularly true for regular listeners oftalk radio. Finally, respondents who expressed low levels of satisfaction with the nation in general also tended to express dissatisfaction with the media.

The ideological or partisan component of this phenomenon provides perhaps the most compelling avenue for further analysis. Charges of “liberal bias” in the media remain largely overlooked by political scientists, such as Graber (1 997,959, with only a few exceptions (Dautrich and Hartley 1999; Lichter and Rothman 1986; Patterson 1995; Wilhoit and Weaver 1991). Even


To explore the depth of these relationships, I developed a basic logistic regression model that regressed Media Satisfaction and Media Eflcacy on the factors that emerged as significant at bivariate level. This allowed me to isolate the effect of ideology and talk radio listening while controlling for respondents’ gender and sense of satisfaction with the nation.

As Table 7 shows, the results are mixed. First, they affirm the explanatory power of individuals’ sense of satisfaction with the nation. There is clear support for the common-sense relationship between satisfaction with the country’s direction and satisfaction with the media; the former also remains key to explaining Media Eficacy. For other factors, though, the results are

Table 7. Predictors of Attitudes toward Political Media

Media Satisfaction” Media Eficacyb Predictor CoeK Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Satisfaction with nationC 0.880** .150 0.871 ** ,120 Ideology 5-pt (5 = very conservative) -0.078 .074 -0.201 ** .05 9 Talk Radio Listening“ -0.238 * * .067 -0.038 ,054 Male -0.401 ** .149 -0.640* * .119 Constant 1 . I 94* * 217 0.495** . I 6 6 XZ 67.33** 99.74** N 857 1 2% * p > .05 ** p > 0.01

Note: a A binomial “Satisfied” versus “Not Satisfied” variable was created from the question, “How satisfied are you with the media’s coverage ofnews about political figures and events in Washington? Are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not too satisfied, or not at all satisfied?” A binomial “Agree” or “Disagree” variable was created from the question, “People

who decide what to put on TV news or in the newspapers are out of touch with people like me”: completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, or completely disagree. ‘Respondents were asked, “How satisfied are you with the media’s coverage of news about political figures and events in Washington? Are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not too satisfied, or not at all satisfied?” * Respondents were asked, “How often, if ever, do you listen to radio shows that invite listeners to call in to discuss current events, public issues, and politics: regularly, sometimes, rarely, or never?”


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murky. As with the bivariate analysis, talk radio is a significant indicator of media satisfaction, but is unrelated to Media Efjicucy. By contrast, ideology is significantly related to efficacy, but not to media satisfaction.

The research on talk radio helps clarify these patterns. Researchers have consistently found that regular talk radio listeners are also heavy consumers of traditional media (Barker 2002; Davis and Owen 1998; Owen 1997).

Table 8. Predictors of Attitudes toward Political Media, Conservatives versus Non-Conservatives

Media Satisfaction” Non-

Conservative Conservative

Predictor CoeK Error Coeff. Error Satisfaction with nationc 1.148** 229 0.583** 203 Talk Radio

Std. Std.

Listeningd -0363** .I01 -0.101 .091 Male -0.420 232 -0331 . I99 Constant 1Z7** 249 0.866** .I97 X2 5231** I 1.54**

*p>.O5; **p>O.OI N 387 470

Media Efficacyb

Conservative Conservative

Coeff. Error CoeK Emr

Non-

Std. Std.

0.767** .190 0.893** .156

-0.267** .087 0.122 .071 -0.640** .I95 -0.550** .I53 0.058 .l% 0.084 .I43 46.72** 43.99** 539 755

Note: a A binomial “Satisfied” versus “Not Satisfied” vm‘able was created from the question, “How satisfied are you with the media’s coverage of news about political figures and events in Washington? Are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not too satisfied, or not at all satisfied?” A binomial “Agree” or “Disagree” variable was created from the question, “People

who decide what to put on TV news or in the newspapers are out of touch with people like me”: completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, or completely disagree.

Respondents were asked, “How satisfied are you with the media’s coverage of news about political figures and events in Washington? Are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not too satisfied, or not at all satisfied?’

Respondents were asked, “HOW often, if ever, do you listen to radio shows that invite listeners to call in to discuss current events, public issues, and politics: regularly, sometimes, rarely, or never?”



Although they may perceive the news as biased, they do not tune out; in fact, they spend disproportionately more time watching conventional TV news and reading newspapers. Just as regular voters report high levels of political efficacy, regular news consumers can be expected to feel in touch with the people who report the news.

To deal with the potential interaction between talk radio and ideology variables, the analysis turned to the testing of two separate models-one for conservatives, the other for non-conservatives. These results, recorded in Table 8, demonstrate the importance of respondents’ political orientations in explaining their feelings toward the media. Only among conservatives is talk radio listening associated with Media Satisfaction. Their sense of Media Satisfaction is also affected more deeply by their satisfaction with the nation. As for Media Eficacy, ideology seems less important, although again the impact of talk radio listening is limited to conservatives.

In sum, three patterns emerge from these results: individual attitudes toward the media stem in part from a person’s perception of national political conditions; a striking ideological component to people’s feelings toward the media is present, with conservative members of the public holding the media in particularly low regard, particularly those who listen to political talk radio; and finally, men give the media slightly lower ratings than women.

Discussion

In journalism circles there has been much hand wringing about the precipitous decline in public satisfaction with the media (Fallows 1996). Journalists may be somewhat reassured by the evidence that much of the discontent stems from a broader problem. Satisfaction with government institutions and politics more generally has also declined over the long term, a phenomenon that scholars have struggled to explain (Norris 1999; Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997). This analysis confirms Bennett, Rhine, and Flickinger’s (1 999) assertion that “perceptions of the media are linked with perceptions of government” (1 7), a relationship found in other studies (Jones 2003; Pinkleton and Austin 2002) and explored at length by Stephen Bennett and his colleagues. Thus, the political media’s lowly stature may stem more from general political malaise than many of shortcomings of contemporary news coverage.

Yet the discontent among a significant portion of the audience-a large number of conservative Republicans-is bound to be more troubling for news providers concerned about declining viewers and readers. The Fox News

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Channel, a 24-hour news network created by Rupert Murdoch and former GOP operative Roger Ailes, now pulls in larger audiences than CNN and other cable news outlets largely by attracting a disproportionate number of conservatives and Republicans (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2004). Conservatives have also flocked to political talk radio (Barker 2002; Davis and Owen 1998). Seemingly in response to Fox’s success, CNN has undertaken a series of new hires and format changes while MSNBC has added a handful of conservative talk show hosts (Auletta 2003).

Coupled with the conservative tenor of general media discontent analyzed here, these trends support the notion that “political polarization is increasingly reflected in the public’s news viewing habits”-that ‘‘conservatives and liberals are increasingly choosing sides” in their news consumption habits (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2004, 1 and 13). Indeed, the Pew Center finds that just as Fox News and talk radio provide a news haven of sorts to conservatives and Republicans, the audiences for CNN andNationa1 Public Radio have become distinctly more Democratic. The hoopla surrounding Fahrenheit 9/11 is an additional reminder that the documentary form has always been more of an outlet for progressive causes (Menand 2004).

Less clear are the implications of “media polarization” for a democracy. On the plus side, the emergence of more partisan outlets reflects the growing diversity of media options. Americans may now readily get their news not only from their local newspaper and one of the “Big Three” networks, but also several 24-hour cable networks, nationally syndicated talk shows, and internet “blogs.” Perhaps the emergence of Fox News and Rush Limbaugh for conservatives and NPR for liberals represents a healthy correction after years of “mainstreaming” by homogenous mass media (Gerbner et al. 1982). Conservatives who are disgruntled with the establishment media now have somewhere else to go. On the other hand, the more people rely on like- minded partisan sources, the less they expose themselves to views unlike their own. As Diana Mutz (1 998) argues, “Exposure to dissimilar views is a central element-if not the sine qua non-f the kind of human social capital that is needed to maintain a productive democratic citizenry” (1).

What explains conservatives’ high levels of dissatisfaction with the media? It is no secret that many on the right accuse journalists and the news they provide of being biased toward liberal causes and Democratic candidates (Dautrich and Hartley 1999). This view dates back at least to the first Nixon administration, when Vice President Spiro Agnew used a series of speeches to chide critical journalists for being “nattering nabobs of negativism” (West 2001.65). Since then, “the liberal media” have been the target of a legion of

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Republican politicians. North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms routinely made the liberal bias charge, focusing his attacks on CBS News anchor Dan Rather-a Helms campaign bumper sticker read, “Rather Biased”- and on the Raleigh News & Observer, Helms’ hometown newspaper. In 1992, the Bush reelection campaign was convinced that the media were biased against them (Matalin and Camille 1999, a view summarized with a bumper sticker that read “Annoy the Media-Vote for Bush,” and in the waning days of the 1996 presidential campaign, Bob Dole lashed out at the media for giving President Clinton a free ride (Shogan 2001).

Are the bias charges justified? Research results are mixed. On one hand, survey research indicates that the journalism profession is dominated by liberals and Democrats (Lichter and Rothman 1986; Wilhoit and Weaver 199 1 ). One set of experiments suggest that even though journalists may be more “left of center” than decidedly liberal, their personal views do affect the decisions they make, “from the stories they select to the headlines they write” (Patterson 1995, 20). Still, little evidence exists that the news stories these journalists actually produce are slanted to the left in a consistent manner (Beck et al. 2002; Page 1996; Robinson and Sheehan 1983). Some critics argue that the opposite is true-that the media’s corporate ownership pushes editorial decision- making in a relatively conservative, pro-establishment direction (Bennett 1996). Others portray the media as fundamentally centrist entities that foster political moderation and conformity (Gerbner et al. 1982). More recently, critics accused the mainstream news media of failing to scrutinize White House claims about the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, an accusation to which many news organizations have responded with widespread mea culpas (Kurtz 2004).

None of these perspectives contradicts the possibility that news coverage occasionally favors one party over the other. During election campaigns, for example, which candidate enjoys better coverage depends in part on who is winning, who is making mistakes, and who is making the right campaign moves. The 1992 presidential campaign provides a case in point. Compared with Bill Clinton and Ross Perot, Republican President Bush did indeed get the most negative coverage, but his bad press could have been a product of two other factors: a lingering recession, which inevitably hurts the sitting president, and a faltering campaign. Indeed, during the course of the general election campaign, the tone of coverage of all three candidates seemed to ebb and flow depending on their standing in the polls. Since election coverage tends to focus on horse-race aspects of the race, the most negative press goes to the candidate who is behind or who fails to meet expectations. That was Bush.

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Clinton, by contrast, benefited from significantly more positive coverage in part because this “Comeback Kid” was backed by a groundbreaking campaign organization, beat early expectations, took the lead, and won the horse race. If the media were biased toward Clinton, it was less because he was a Democrat and more because he ran a successful campaign (Jones 1995).

Clinton’s honeymoon with the press ended shortly after the election was over. By the end of the symbolically important First 100 Days, Clinton was on his way to suffering from the most negative press coverage any modem president, a pattern that continued throughout much of his Presidency. White House reporters trusted Clinton even less than Republicans did, leading to a “yawning gap between the Clintonites and the journalists” (Kurtz 1998, mi). Indeed, the Clinton case suggests that rather than a liberal bias, there exists an ovemding bias against politicians in general. The focus on individual instances of apparent ideological bias overlooks the tendency of the national media to portray most political actors and institutions negatively (Patterson 1993; Robinson 1976).

Still, as this analysis shows, it is conservative and Republican members ofthe public who are the most dissatisfied with the media. The 1992 election may have been an isolated case, but many Republicans seethe over what they viewed as blatantly biased coverage. To many on the right, coverage of the 1992 election was typical, not isolated. This perception is alarming. At the very least, “perceptions of political bias may diminish the value and credibility of the news product ... [which] inhibit the use of the news to make informed judgments” (Dautrich and Hartley 1999, 1 12).


Acknowledgement: I would like to thank the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press for generously making its survey data available to the public.

Notes

I One exception was the 2000 edition of the National Election Study, data from which I analyzed in a related article (Jones 2003).

2This dataset was chosen over others made available by Pew because it includes the most complete set of political indicators. In addition to media- related questions, respondents were asked about their partisanship, ideology, and various demographic characteristics. Other Pew surveys have a more varied set of media questions, but relatively few non-media items.

3The timing of this survey is worth noting here. Conducted in spring 2000, it captures the public’s view of the media before 9/11. Although the media’s reputation, along with that of other political institutions, improved significantly in the months that followed the terrorist attacks, it was “back in the toilet” less than a year later (Kurtz 2002).

4Respondents were asked, “All in all, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country today?”

Perhaps the partisan differences would have been more striking had respondents been given the option of identifying themselves as either “strong Republican” or “strong Democrat.” Unfortunately, the questionnaire did not include measures of partisanship strength.

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