short history-sulu sultanate

8/4/2019 Short History-Sulu Sultanate

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Appendices1. India and Orienta] O f f i c e ~ s copies of agreements between the English and the Sulus in the2. Treaties between the East India Company and Sulu: J761-1769

a) Articles of Friendship and Commerce bet\veen the English and the Sulus by Dalrympleand Sultan Muazzidin, 28.01.176]b) Articles of alliance between Sultan Alimudin I and the Honourable United Company of

Merchants ofEngland, 1763c) C ; ~ c . D ~ S-,)"iTt S;;ltanAhmudin I, 1764d) Treaty ofFriendship and Commerce berween Sultan Alimudin and Dalrymple, 1764e) Giant from the Sultan ofSulu, 1769

3. Treaty bet\veen Spain and Sulu of 18364. Trea:y concluded by Commodore Wilkes "ith the Sultan of Sulu, 1842 (SO Jfce: Zalde andZaide)5. Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Her M ~ e s t y and the Sultan of Borneo,27.05 18476. Convention of Commerce etc. between Great Britain and SuJu, 29.05.18497. Stipulations with the Su1tan and Datus of Jolo, 30.08.18508. Act ofre-submission by the SultanofSulu to Spain of 19.04.18519. Protocol between Spain, Great Britain and Germany on 11 ~ 0 3 . 187710. Admission of Spanish soverei&'11ty by the Sultan of SuIu, 22.07. 18781 I. The North Borneo Treaty of 1878 benveen Jamalu1 Alam and Overbeck (Source Zaide andLalde, Document No. 319)12. The Sulu Code ofJamc.Jp1 "-Jam and the Ne'Y Sulu Code nfH?jiFLltu (1902)B. Protoc.ol bet\veen Spain., Great Britain and Germany regarding claims to Sulu and S a b a h ~ 07.03 1885

, . / ct.:( ment::; ::::oncerning rile Establishment of the Brl cisll 1-'. u h : : : : ~ : : ' ; n :,.IOf': ~ ~ ( H J , ~ ( O , 24.12.188815. Agreement between the Sulu Sultan and Datus and General John C. Bates (Jolo, August20,1899)16.. Agreement between the governor-general of the Philipt" es and the Sultan of Sulu(Zamboanga, March 2 2 ~ 1915)17. A&'Teernent for the transfer of sovereif,1flty from the British 1, rth Borneo Company to theBritish Crown, 26.06.1946 (incomplete)18. loint Statement by the Governments of Great Britain al'


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1450 (c.)15781675 (c.)1737l76118491851187818781884-18931898189919031914191519701935193619461946196319681968J9711972197219761977J987199619961()99

Chronology of Key EventsFormation of the Sultanate bv Abu BahCommencement ofHostilities ben.veen the Spanish and SulusCession ofNorth Borneo to the Su1tan of SuluAllmudln I signs peace treaty \\ith SpainFIrst Treaty \\ith the East lndia CompanyRajah B r o o k . ~ signs treaty with SuluSulu - Spain TreatyLease ah'feement ofNorth Borneo to British North Borneo Company (January)Sulu Treaty 'with Spain (July)Civil ~ r a r in SuluTreaty ofParis: US acquires sovereignty over the PhilippinesBates AgTeementFormation ofMoro Province sihrnifies direct rule for Sulucf)rmatIon otthe Department ofMmdal1ae and S 1 1 ~ "':::arpenter AgreementBureau ofNon-Christian Tribes assumes administration ofbik,)5Fonnation of he Philippine CommomvealthDeath of Jamalul Kiram 11Annexation ofNorth Bomeo by the British CrownThe Philippines becomes independent[ncorporation ofNorth Borneo \vithin the Malaysian FederationJabjdah MassacreFormation of the Muslim fndependenceMovementFormation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)Declaration of Martial La,v by Ferdinand MarcosOutbreak o f ~ T a r Tripoli Agreement between fvfNLF and the Marcos GovernmentB r e a k d o ~ \ V n of the Tripoli AgreementJeddah talks behveen the MNLF and the Aquino GovernmentMisuari and Ramos sign peace dealFormation of the South Philippines Council for Peace and DevelopmentMNLF and Abu Sayyaf continue to tlght


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Chronology of Sultans

1450 Sharif (1)Kamaludin (2)Alaudin (3)

1500 Aunirul Umara (4)Muizzul (5)1550 Nasirudin I (6)Pangiran Buddirnan (7)

Shah Tangah (8)1600 Bongsu (9)1650 Pangiran Bakhtiar (10)Sahabudin (11 )1700 Shatludin (12)

Badamdin I (13)Nasirudin II (14)

]750 A1imudin J (15)Muazzidin (16)Aljrnudin n (17)l $ r 3 ~ 1 (18)Sharafudin (19)Alimudin III (20)A1iudin (21 ):3hakiru tlaL \,22)Jamalul Kiram (23)1850 Pulalun (24)Jama1u] Alam I (25)Badarudinn (26)

1990 Jamalul Kiram II (27)1950 Julaspi Kiram (28)

Rodinood (29)Kudhar (30)

c. 1450-c. 1480

-c. 1579c. 1579-c.16toc.1610-1649C. J649-c. 1685c. ] 685-c. ] 71 0c. 1710-c. 1718c 1718-1732

1732-1735J735-1748, 1764-17741748-17631763-1764, 1778-17911 ~ " " 4 -t _.-.0I I 1'+- J J I ()] 79J -) ~ f ) ~ 1808-1 ~ \ ) g 1808-c. 18211823-18421842-18621862-18811 8 8 1 - J 8 ~ 1 1886-19361936-19941994-19991999-


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Abstract

In this Short History of Suitt, a s)TIopsis of the forthcoming historiob'Taphy Complete History ofSulu \>,ill be made. The account will use pre-history and relations with China as its point ofdeparture in order to provide the historical contexi: of the formation of the Sulu Sultanate in thef l1t+c"n1'h """n+-'u""" 'Th" , ' ~ e ~ < > n l , " , , ~ , ,,+' + h ~ C"l" C . , h a - ~ + " .. .;11 +l..o_ l . . ~ ___ + 1 ~ _ .._..l l . . _ . c _ ~ " , +h- -------+t. l\ . vJ t -U' ~ 1 i. i ~ _ J. l t \ . . . :ES n \ " , . r l ; . i . . l V 2 . " _ ~ -,.Of q \ ' ~ ' L.Il..lh.


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IntroductionThe Historical Context of the Formation of the Sulu Sultanate

Since the formation of the sultanate ofSulu over five hundred years age, SuJu has, for large periods,wielded remarkable levels of economic and political power. Sulu, in the face of repeated attacks bythe Spanish invaders, held firm and maintained its sovereignty. The pattern of resistance tocolonisation has persisted for over four hundred years. The most recent peace treaty in thisprotracted cycle of cont1ict, defensive submission., peaceful interlude and offensive riposte \vasS Iguru 111 I Y"io 'lJ)'j,tkarii;l u)c'Nur Misuaii 01 t; Ii:: -Mul v 1-1 aLivnai Libela t IU j l l ' f ( l i l arid.t !'C:'iucilt l ' uca .Ramo:; of the Philippines. This Short HistOJ:" (:lthe S'ulu ,Sultanate \\ill analyse the modem politicalpredicament of Sulu after outlining the last five hl.ndred years of SuJu's jX)Iitical history have.Before embarking on that historiob'Taphical journey, the remainderof this chapter \\'i11 contexiualisethe formation of the Sultanate.Two structural arguments can be put forward to explain why such a small nation was able tomaintain its identity and independence far so long. The first argument concerns geography andtrade, \\hile the second addresses geOb'Taphy, the arrival of IsJam and the early institutionalisation ofa formal polity along Islamic hnes. Each of these explanations will be elucidated upon before thehistory of Sulu' s ruling family is discussed in the nexi chapter.

Sulu as a Trading CentreSituated between Malacp , China ane. the ~ . ~ \ J ] n c c a s , Suli.;s commanding economic location he'enabled it to play an active part in international trade. Its ports are believed to have received" ' ~ r : ~ ~ P : r : , r ~ l . : ~ r ~ :-.3 ear!y as the ~ e v p . D . t . l ) ce!lturv (C}w Man 190 0). C h i n e c ~ h;C1:ori.Cl'15 ( \ f ~ h p : " h i ~ - f A ~ , . . , t h an"; tOUlceenth centuries such as Chao Ju-Kua, \\Tang Tayuan and MaTuan-LlH hav(; altinned ,.ilelong history of Sulu-Chinese trading relations. All three refer to 982 AD as the first confirmabledate of economic interaction (M Tuan-Lin 1319; Wang Tayuan 1349 cited in Zaide and Zaide1979). Indeed pre-Islamic rulers ofSulu paid tribute to the M i : l ~ court five times between 1416 and1424 (\\Tang Tehming 1967). A Sulu king who died in Chinawhile on his \\'ay to 0ffer tribute wasaccorded a royal burial (MajuJ, 1973). Although trading relatic,r:: with the Chinese fell away to adeL'Tee in the tollowing centuries. they reached new heights iF tne eighteenth centurv. The Chinese_. _. - - -' -"are but one of countless peoples \:vho have come to Sulu to tnd,c. The Chinese have been followedby the Indian traders, by Arabs, BUf,rinese, Dutch anlt B r i t ~ 3 1 t. The Sultan derived substantialpecuniary resources from port charges and tariffs in additi011 fJ the tribute that he collected from hisown subjects and periodically from other peoples such as the Visayans.

The Early Arrival ofIslam and Formal Political StructuresA second benefit of Sulu's geographic position takes the analysis briefly into the realm of prehistory. Su1u has been the gate\vay of the Philippines for thousands of years. The lower sea levels ofthe past revealed land bridges across Wildt is 110\\' the Sulu Archipelago from mainland South EastAsia to the islands which lead to the Pacific Ocean (Agoncilo and Alfonso 1960). For over thirtythousand years, wave after wave of peoples have migrated through the Sulu Archipelago (ibid.). Asgatekeeper to the Philippineso Sulu \\'as the first rebrion of the Philippines to feel the influences ofIslam. It is not possible to pinpoint the exact date of the arrival of Islam in the Sulu Archipelago.Rather than emphasising the centralityofone or two Islamic missionaries such as Sharif Makdon (an Islamic missionary and Arab judge),Majul has provided a compelling case for the ,iew that the advent of Islam in Sulu can be


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interpreted as "a function of the general expansion of Islam in Malaysia" (Sal1eby I 9 0 ~ , 158; MaJul1973,35).J ~ " " ' ' ' T ' ' ' ' ' ' ' _ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' + " " ' - ~ " " " ' - ' - " " " s ......1.. ...... + ....... ........... ....l.........+--...-.. ...... __ ,,+ A _ .... 1- . . . - ~ " ' ..... ......._ ....-.;ro.,. .......... . :1 +-_ ..... ..:l ...........r- ............._'"' ..... ,..... C ' . , . ~ 1 ~ ... L ________ ....1.., ............ ...-..1-' - ' a )Vl - . l , t ; \ . . t a l a . I C U ~ -UHH. (..l .::"tl\:..rQ.\.l)" . : lUc . a l l J V I ... " IQ l . I _ l J l . 1 " " . : ) l V l " : l 1 J ( " ' ~ allU U( . l -U\ d.: ' ) \ .. U-IIi \ . . l\.J > JUJU - . l IV l l l Ul\..< u , . llllicentury (Cayongcat 1986). This would seem to be a valid assertion in the light of the massacre ofthousands of foreign merchants (many of them Muslims) in Khanfu (Canton) in 878 AD (Tibbets1957). The resulting Diaspora scattered amongst the islands and coasts of South East Asia. Anevent \\ith similar historical consequences was the sacking of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258(Majul 1973, 50). Thus, although figures such as Tuan Masha'ika and SharifMakdon would haveyield more plausible results. Pursuing this line of enquiry, l'v1ajul expounds the various theC'riesassociated with the adH;i1t of Islam in the Sulu region. The first two theories, already touched Ui:JVl1,focus on the roles of trade and missionaries. The third theory is of bJfater sibTflificance for thisnarrative. This theory could be tenned as the political economy approach. Islamic p o 1 i ~ j c a l institutions favoured missionaries and Muslim traders, while the traders in turn supported andstrengthened the political institutions economically (Maju11973, 49).Ultimately, the formation ofpolitical institutions along Islamic lines would be the basis upon whichthe ad\'ance of the christianising Spanish colonialists would falter. The Northern Philippines, bycontrast, was still without centralised political institutions and offered little resistance to theSpaniards. Exceptions did exist, not Jeast amongst the 1'v1usIims already living in the North.

Ip,c tiC:"lOli of lslamlc and Pre-Islamic l'oliticfil F o ~ m s Thus the formation of the Sultanate in SuJu, coupled with its economically strategic location, hasfonned much of the basis upon \vhich the Sulu people have resisted four centuries of c0I':'nisation:


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Chapter OneThe C.enealogy of the Sulu SultanateTl . . " l ~ ~ ~ _ , < " " . l - - C ' " l + ~ ~ 1 , r ~ - ' I ; ~ D " - ' I ; _ ~ , , . ~ ~ ~ ~ 1.." + - ~ ~ , , - ' I C ' " I ~ ~ _ C l . . ~ _ ; + l . . _ , _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . l - - + l . . ~ _ 1 , _ 4 - t . ~ _ ~ ~ 1 - 1 1[\ .... 11u..: .a6l,.. . t . l l 0u1UHl 1 LUU J l .L \ 'VU.U1VVU. \..Jail. v""' LIQ\..-LrU t.\J , , - JU l ta l t Jl1UIU UJ JI IL -a l ' ' : ' \ , /1 LU,--, fJ1\,..cLIH..lJQ (11"0tarsilas emanating from the royal family and datus. In 1908. SaJeebyo drawing largely on the tarsilaofHadji Buto (Sultan Jamalul Kiram's one time 'prime minister') produced what is widely regardedas the most authoritatiye account of the Sulu genealogy thus far. One of the best knovm efforts tooutline the lineage of the Sulu royaJ family prior to Saleeby's account "vas made by the East IndiaCompany's V,,'jJham DalI}1TIple, However, MajuJ has taken sl1ch acc{)unts one state further andexc1usiyely (Forrest, 1969) on these three studies, a genealogy of the Sulu royal famjly will now besuggested. A more detailed account oft;t(; actions and careers of the various Sultans will be drawninto the following analysis of the history ofSuJu from 1450 to the present day.While the Sulu Chronolomr for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is beyond reasonable doubt(any differences depend not on the lack of rellable information but on vanations in theinterpretation of history), the historical bases for the geneaiof,ry of the fifteentho sixteenth, stillseventeenth is not and never will be, ~ n t i r e l y insulated from error. Oral inputs and the hand offolklore can impede accuracy.'TI1e royal tarsilas, as well as detailing genealogical accounts, also assert descent from t h ~ Prophetvia the Sharif Abu Bah. The term Sharif according to some Muslims denotes descent from theprophet Mohammed's grandson Hasan. The tarsilas, as \\'as earlier suggested, assert l1nks \\'ith ther;c-bbT11i-.: toca! I',,:.-,t. COllnecnons are abo mad.e to the r ~ 6 ; V t l ' ~ 0:;,U r " ~ - ~ t lamll1es. j ! , , ~ '\]ex3dJer the Great l e g ~ n d i::; common in the Malay A l l T l ~ 1 < : , 1:>'lt is riot f 0 ~ m d IT. be Sulu Genealosy(Mdjue 1973).Till' r lct Sultan, Suhan Shant (;\bu bakl) was succeedeu t_.: K a l l ) a ; u u i ~ l , l; ;'


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ISultan BOllgsu(9) (c. 1610-c. 1649)IPangiran Bakhtiar ( l 0) cc. 1649-c. 1685)

~ a h a b u d i l l (\11) Sbafiudm (12)N asirndiu (14 )

Baaarlldm r r 3 )AlirrfUdill 1(15) Muazzidlrl (16)

Alimudin l ~ r (20)

Harun aI-RashidAliudln

r- - : - - - -oadarudin IT (26)

Tambuyollg

Piandao DatuOmbra

Aliuciin (21)lamalul Lram (23)PulalLmh)I.:amaiul AJdJ}1 ; \2::;.'lamalul n(n)

iSharafuUin (l9)Alimudin n JJ7)ShiliJlah (22) ,

Datu Janlalul KiTam

Dahl AtikI

Iulasp: Kiram (28) T ~ h n Esmilil PonjonganNapsu t>-lariam Rada Jabara_e n \ -\it11ar (30)1Dewa Mahadi Harris F adzil it;,

The Family Tree of the Sulu Sultanate 1610-Present


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Chapter TwoThe Sulu Sultanate before the Arriyal of the Spaniards. 1450-1578

Sl1l::au Shaiif ( 1 ) ~ f v r m ~ r member of ~ v 1 a l a c c - a ' s ]u1i3t Sj:stem (Cayo_ilgcat: 1 ~ ) S 6 ~ '1-0), did Hiuen totransform the dominions of Rajah Baginda into a fonnal political system. Sultan Sharif remodelledthe pohtical leadership of the islands along the lines of an Arab sultanate. He appointed wanrs andpanglimas, the former acting as ministers, the latter as judges or governors (Cayongcat 1986, 11)He proclaimed himself as Sultan and claimed that Mohammed was his direct ancestor (GO\ving:1964) Although he asserted his right to be seen as the absolute sovereibm and O\\ner of all lands, healong strict A.rabian lines, but was tempered by existing political traditions (Saleeby J908) Thisfusion of new and old systems arguably made the ~ u J t a n a t e more accountable than other Islamicpolities, \\-ith the Datu system pro\iding a considerable amount of accountability (see below).Sultan Sharif utilised his knowledge of Islamic ju.isprudence to promulgate a code of laws- thefirst of many Sulu Codes (see appendices). The laws were modified in accordance \\ith localtradition (Saleeby 1908, 163). It \vas this consolidation of the forces of the state \vhich increasedSuIu's ref,rional influence (ibid.).Thus by 1450 the Sultanate gad been established (Che Man 1990). Before the arrival of theSpaniards, the Sulu Sultanate had become the --relatively largest, best organised and most powerfulpolitical entity in the Philippines Islands" (Majul 1965, 229). Most of the islands surrounding Sulu(or JoJo), including Basilan, were tributary to the Sultan of Sulu (ibid.). When the first Spaniardsarrived in 1521 under the stewardship of Magellan, "the power of Sulu was felt allover Luzon andthe V ~ ; : , a : : : ' a n i S I ~ ; n c ! < ; > ine C e l e l ) ~ " S-;, ~ \ 1. Alaudin was succeeded by SultaI: Amirul Umara (4). Notmentioned in the Sulu genea!of,'Y or. i, Dab}1Uple's list, he has elsewhere been declared a brrandsonof Sultan Sharif (Majul 1973, 14,. )1 teresting!y he is believed to have been the same person asSultan Bulkeiah, the fifth Sultan of erunei who according to the Brunei Selesilah " ~ c o n q u e r e d thekingdom of Soolook and merle a E' Jendency of Selurong" (Low 1880). The conquering of Suluprobably reters to a raid. The Sp1,-:'" ~ l a h also asserts that Sultan Bulkeiah married the daughter of theSulu Sultan - Laila Men Chanei.The fifth Sultan was one Sultan .Muizzul Mutawadin (5). The Sulu genealogy refers to him asMaharajah Upo, and state that he succeeded to the throne upon the death of Kamaludin (Saleeby1908). This would perhaps lend credence to the view that Amirul Umara was from Brunei. Thesixth Sultan was, according to a number of tarsilas, Sultan Nasirudin I (6). However, neitherOalI}111ple nor the Sulu geneakgy mentioned him, and he could thus have been an usurper (MajulI9T, ! : ' ~ . The 5n1u genealogy states that Sultan Pangiran Buddiman ( M u h : m : ~ T . . e ~ !..!.!H'llim) (7)succeeded to the sultanate upon the death of Sultan l'v1u'luul Mutawadi'in (Majul, 1973, ] 5). TheMaguindanao tarsilas claim that Panf,riran Buddiman was related to the Brunei royal family (Forrest1969), while a Spanish source suggests that he was a Bornean who was married to the Sultan ofBrunei's sister (letter from Francisco de Sande to Liciendado Antolinez on 28.07. t578 in Venturadel Arco, Doc1llJ1entos, Datos y Re/adoncs para la Historia de Filipinas, hasfa hom ineditosie/mente copiados de los originales exi.,,fenles en archivos y nibliOlccas. Vol. n in Majul 1973, 16).Saleeby identified him as Rajah Iro, Pangiran of Brunei, who fought the Spanish when theyattacked Brunei in 1578 (Majul 1973, 15).

12


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In June 1578, Rodriguez de Figueroa arrived in .1010 to collect tribute. Sultan Pangiran Buddimanresisted but then surrendered twelve pearls and some gold (Biair and Robertson in .f\'lajul 1973,112). Sulu at this point in time claimed sovereignty over the islands of Sulu, Tawi-Tav\i, Basilanand Zambctinga and_ C a \ 1 t e - ~ { } n rv1indanao- ( i b i ~ } . The S . p n . ; } i ~ r d s then turned their attention to-Mindanao as being a vital prerequisite to their designs in the Moluccas. The Sultanates of the South,feeling their trade, faith and independence under threat, began the ne:\.1: stage of the contlict bylaunching an offensive against the Spanish. This offensive in the Visayas was initially lead by theMaguindanaoans, but later on the early decades of the seventeenth century, the Sulu Sultan played aleading role.By this stage Sultan Pangiran Buddiman had died, and Sultan Shah Tangah (Pengiran Tingah)(8)had assumed the mantel. His r u l ~ \vas contested by Alxlasaolan leading, allegedly, to the Sultanseeking the support of the Spanish in 1608 after the Spaniards had raided Sulu in 1602. Sultan ShahTangah died in the conf1Jct with Abdasaolan and was succee.ded by his relative Sultan MawallilWasit Bongsu (9) (Combos 1897). Sultan Bongsu had c10se connections with Brunei (Majul 1973,123,1,

Sultan Bongsu pursued an aggressive policy towards the Spanish mounting raids in the Camarinesin 1616 and in 1627 (l\1ajul 1973. 123). These raids were not necessarily simply concerned \\ithplunder. Arguably they were also aimed at procunng tribute, an act which challenged Spanish rule,and therefore apolitical act rather than a piratical one. The second raid (lead by the Sultan himself)elicited a finn response from the Spaniards. The Spaniards found Jolo to be a flourishing tradingcommunity. The Spanjards prece.ded to bum and destroy the to\,\TI including the wealthy Chinesequaner. rrlf' SL:t1F'l!]'': jJdhr:e,3no the principal n: ..J::.que were also burnt. The Spaniard,:; louted. q ; a T g ~ quan>'.'


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lasted from the] 660s until 1718 when the Spaniards returned to Zamboanga. The first \\'ave of theMoro wars had lasted almost a century and had begun \\ith Spanish aggression against the Borneansbefore the Sultanates fought back from the last years of the six1:eenth century through the early; j c c ~ d " ~ of .1.-". ~ ~ , > ~ - + < > p - + h ~ , ~ _ + " n ~ ' on1, . c , , ~ , 1 , . ~ < ' : ~ n ~ l ' ~ ~ r l ~ t ~ n r l ' m _ . ~ .. ~ - ~ ~ n . ~ ~ ; _ h " ' + r ~ , , ~ . . . 1 e r u a \ : . . , : ~ U l \ : . ~ ~ ~ \ " " J - 1 l \ " " " - - 1 . t t . . t L ' ' ' ' ' 1 1 l L L l ) ~ . 1 ) " H . 1.l tHo. - I...-'l-"-",-U a . . 1 U ~ LV UU'\U.LI\. . - ..... \ . . . f l tv , " - U 5 ~ U U UIo."..-.LX.t\" 'fJ'trU .concerns forced their retreat.The period of interlude in the 1vforo\vars \>'ith the Spaniards began v.ith Basilan reverting to beingtributary to Sulu. It was a period when the Sultanates consolidated their political power andadvanced their commercial activities. Sultan Bakhtiar of Su1u, for example, \\-Tote to the Dutchmonopoly over trade to the south of Sulu (Majul ] 973, ] 71-172). This interlude of relative peacedid not. however, ex1:cll.d to BruneL

the Dutch. This Chapter FourBow the Sultan ofSulu acquired North Borneo, 1662-c. 1675

Events in Brunei in the latter half of the seventeent.i} century have had important ramifications forthe history of Sulu. The Dutch had succeeded in eroding Brunei's economic power. The level oftributes collected internally by the Su1tan had been increased, which had seemingly provokedinternal dissent (Majul 1973). In 1662, the Bendahara Abdul Mubin and his followers killedMuhammed Ali, the twelfth Sultan ofBTUJlei, following the death of one of the Bendahara's sons atthe hands of the Sultan.. The teud split the ruling family (the Bendahara ,vas the deceased Sultan ofBnmej's nephew) and provoked a civil war wt.ich lasted For OVLf fen y e a r ~ _ l he Br:lldahara Abdui~ , f H b i n was proclaimed as the new Suh;m of Brunei. He ll,-


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The cession extended from Keemanees northv.ard and included the islands of Palawan. Ban!uev. . . . . . . . ~ -and Ba]ambangan (H 102-36)_ Some debate surrounds the date of the cession of North Borneo to Q"-;+,-,,.., "'l"""'." ...rlA,..l: '"l .... .......plo .p,,+,-__ + h ' ~ 4 ~ + ~ ~ " n l - - ~ ...+ 1'7(\,1 ( n , , l - . . , - - , . - l . - ~ ; t - - . . J ; _ l < " ~ - _ . 1 ' ..'7 ...0t!. !l.. UV.LJL i LV i ! L U ..... .n .u .uu '"- ' l 0U-11.)' 11 l - "'"" UlJ to ' " " uul-v Ut UVVU - l 1 J v-r \ LJa 1) H.t}fic;, \ .. l C;:U lI J lVla. j U l l" 7 - . J ~ 18I). However, Majul argues that the date was most likely 1675. He cites the Sejarah Benmai'sreference to the Brunei civil war lasted for ten years according to the Brunei Selesilah. Finally thePangiran Bongsu may have waited for n\'o ye.ars before resisting (Majul 1973, J83). A Spanishreport indicates that Sultan Muaddin died in J690, and Sultan Jamalul Alam ""Tote a letter on the17th of September 1879 claiming that "from the year 1105 Hegira (1693) during the reign of the latetribute'" (Montero y Vidal 1882 cited in Majul 1973, 184)_ Thus the date of the cession l'-an be;'estricted to the period between 1672 and] 693. Majul proffers a slight iltconsistency in that JamalulAlam implied that the cession took place in the reign of Sultan Sahabudin, and yet l\1ajul elsewherealleges that that Sultan's reib11 began in 1685_ This inconsistency could however be due to a delaybetween the date of the cession and the initiation of tribute payments to the Sultan of Sulu, leavingMajurs date of 1675 as the most reasonable estimate.

Chapter fiveThe Ascendancy of Sulu, 1675-1842

SuJtan Bakhtiar is believed to have been succeeded by Sultan Shahabudin (11) in 1685 (Saleeby1908) In this case the Brunei cession of North Borneo would have occurred in the reign of thefOffiter. jose lviomero 'Y' Vidars 3CCC-uUC, H1SfO!'la ~ l e La Firaten(J A1a{a..vo-A-lahomefana tOnA1indan(Jo, Jo!o " f:Jomeo, includes a reference to Shah3bud.n c.ollecting trIbute from NOltt BJrne:)-from as early as 1693 (J\-1ajul 1973,20). He reigned from c. 1685-1710 and is said to have-'ceded"P ~ l a w a n to the Spanish (ibid} Shahabudin was succeeded by his brother ~ v h o became Sultan~ a : H h l c i m (i2) .~ ~ i " . " . r f i u d l l l abdicated mfavour of his brother '.vile becameSuftao'lsadarudin I ( 1 3 ) ~ Sultan Badarudln whose mother was a Tirun, and who married a Tirun, spent a considerable amountof time subjugating the Tiruns of North Borneo (Majul 1973, 188)_ The Tiruns were seemingly themost reluctant people in North Borneo to submit to the Sulu yoke, and periodically rebel1ed.Similarities, or rather continuities, could be drawD'oet ."en the reign of Badarudin 1 and that ofAlimudin L Nor only were they both inYolv;::d,.r:in s'lppressing the Timns, they also bothendeavoured to centralise the political i n s t i t u t j o n ~ , o f t h e ~ u l t a n a t e to make the Sulu polity conformto a greater extent \vith the more traditional fOTIas-of' s'amic governance favoured in the MiddleEast The Sulu system had thus far embodied a sit,'TIiflCu.nt degree of devolution of powers amongstthe Datus and appointees of the Sultanate_Sultan Badarudin was succeeded by Sultan Nasirudin II (14). He was a son or a grandson ofShahabudin via a daughter and was knO\\"'!1 by the Spaniards as Datu Sabdula_ He chal1enged therule of B a d a r u d i n ~ torcing him into exile in 1732, whereupon Nasirudin became Sultan. Anotheraccount has it that Sultan Badarudin was happy to scrrender his position ifhis grand nephew provedhimself to be an accomplished combatant Nasirudin failed in an attempt in 1734 to capture Taytayfort (MajuJ 1973, 195) T ~ i S , precipitated a certain unease \\ith Sultan Nasimdin II amongst th2Datus. In 1735, Sultan Badarudin r s son was proclaimed as Sultan Alimudin I (15) and Nasirudinleft for Mamboing (De La Costa 1965} The new Sultan did not however take office in Jol0 until thefollowing year (Majul 1973, 198)_ Sultan Alimudin 1's reign is the first about which a significantamount is knO\\l1_ Apart from his close relationship with the Spaniards, Alimudin r \vas knO\\ l1 toWilliam Dalrymple of the East India Company.Imprisoned in Manila and baptised a Christian, Alimudin, perhaps more than most, was prey to thecontradictions that have c.onfronted the Sulu Sultans through the centuries_ Such contradictions


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include that bet,veen the Sultan's attempts to centralise political power and the opposition of theDatus to such m o v e s ~ the continuing efforts of the Spanish to colonise Sulu and Sulu's r e s i s t a n c e ~ and the persistent attempts of the Iberian Europeans to Christi anise the Moros despite entrenched(,pp0siti00 Gvlajul 1 9 7 ~ " 2C}).Early in Alimudin's r e j b ' l l ~ the 1737 peace treaty was signed with the Spaniards. The very fact thatthe Spaniards entered into such a treaty showed that they yjewed SuIu as an independent state.Ha\lng made peace v.ith the Spaniardso the Sultan was free to follow up the efforts of his father inpacifYing the Tirun territories I , and in particular the area bet\veen Sibuko River and Tapeadurian, {--' . f.- : . , - ~ ".0,-':1 ' ")()(\>, ;. ...__ l . . . ~ _ r:.J-"'" + 1 - . ~ rr:_p _,." -f"-----:;t.:--...l " ' ~ .... . . . . ; 1 1 ~ " ' ! " ' ... + ...........n"h....,....;+ +--c: -t1.,...;">o . n r ' \ + ~ ~ ' " 0 __ ,...1~ _ { ' w - - ' ! . J ~ i .:..J _ f ~ , . , __ , ~ , "t'. :"_ 1-. l ' ._LLh i. ' L ~ l ' l j !E . , . L I _ l ! F i ...... I1,JH,i< . t H \ , ~ .. d.". . . .,:.., " . , ' " ;U! , . . - "d I,.'\'j:\.. ... , i . / . t i t .1 .. , - ' \ . . t l . . L " , " , " - ~ ~ Panglimas of the Sultan who resided amongst them (Majul 1973,201). In accordance \\-;th the 1737lIeaty, Spain supplied a number of troops for the expedition \vhich H.:;ulted in the Tirun chiefsreaffirming their allegiance to the sovereignty of the Sulu Sultan (Legajo 707, Archivo General DeIndias, Sevilla, cited in Majul, 1973,202).Alimudin clearly attempted to use the Spaniards to secure his own posltlOn from rivals andrebellious subjects. Spanish support for the Tirun sorties resulted in the foundation of a Jesuitmission in SuI u (Barrantes 1878 inMaj ul ] 973, 204). Despite, or more likely because of hisrelations \\ith the Spaniards, Alimudin's opponents multiplied. Amongst them ,vas his brother DatuBantilan. Other Datus \"lere also opposed to Alimudin, partly on account of his attempts tocentralise power. Ahmudin is alleged to have ignored the decision-making power of the Datus(11aju11973,214).AI1TIlUdm's response tC' hi::; domestic problems w a ~ tc set forth tor M-aniia to procure rurtt-;::;;Spanish support ('\1,;>j 1 11 1973, 214). Although Alimudin slJ[vived an assassination a t t e r r r r ~ on hisway out of Sulu, fie was soon succeeded by his brother Bantilan who took the title of SultanMuizzidin (16) (M!liul 1973,216) Alimudin was imprisoned by Sl,Janish and did not return to SuluiintiJl !64.Relations deteriorated with the Spaniards. The Sulus increased their raids while the Spanish~ s u m e d a bellicose stance and seemed quite uninteT"p


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said to be particularly rich (ibid.). Sulu's trading, relations with the Dutch and .the British wereconducted for political motives as much as for commercial motives. Sultan Badarudin I'sreestablishment of diplomatic relations with the Chinese court, and the sending of tribute wereactions as-c.ribed for ' p u r c l ) ~ e i A J n o m i ~ ~ a l motives CrvfajuJ 1073-: 251 : ! ~ AJiuTudin I, scnt at least t\\-Oembassies to China, while Muizzidin sent a number (1v1ajul 1973, 251). The Chinese, apart fTOmengaging in mutuallv beneficial trade with the STIlus, attending the Ruma Bichara' s meetings on-- - - -' / '- ' '- "trade policy, 'tribute' and returning hrifts (which exceeded the value of the tribute) had this policy,had to say about the STIlus, "The Sulu people belong to the Malay race. They \-'{ere good fighters:brave and cruel. \\'hen Spain conquered Luzon, she tried her best to make Sulu one of her ~ - ~ ... ~ - + ~ - - t ~ - 1. ." . (".'" , , ~ c . _ ~ ~ ~ T h ~ l " - h + h ~ S n a - ~ ~ - r l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ + ~ h ~ ~ ' - ~ ~ - ~ + ~ - - ~ ~ , , ~ - t . . ~ _ ..1 . . ~ . " . ~ - ~ ' ~ t l j l " < . H C \ A t H ( ) \ : : ; ~ ... ')'(h . - ' t l fU ' ' - ' 1 ' ' J ~ t . I_J'JJ-,t;. ~ : \ . . I C 'c I l t H ( ' \ ' l . ~ \ . " P ' " ' I " i ' _ ~ t ~ .... t'l_.'J...'; I.t\ . ' i ; . ~ ! o ( j . "_"',:.HJt'-,.-.J '-'"(". - ~ / ( ~ ~ k _ - Y _ " ' d > t { . defeated" (Ching annals in 1-1ajul 1973,25 I).T71e Arrival o f he British.'The grO\vlng role of the British in the region from the mid-eighteenth century wasultimateI:y tohave profound consequence for Sulu. In the early stages of their relationship, the Sulus regardedthe British as useful potential allies against the Spaniards and of the Sulu Sultanate in North Borneo(MajuJ 1973). The latter were threatening the possession British were aILxious to establish a tradingpost in the region that could serve as a hnk benveen India and Canton. Sulu and North Borneo (aswell as much of Mindanao) \",ere the only places in the region which maintained theirindependence, and therefore provided an acceptable location for a British settlement It \vas v,ithsuch an eventuality in mind that the treaty of January 28 1761 'was signed. The treaty was for thepurposes of friendship and commerce. A piece of land was to be supplied for the establishment of atacrory, and a defensive allIance was !alu out (see appendice:,)(!>.lajul 12Y /J , L)5 j In September1762, the island of B2hmibangan was ceded to the British (Majul 1973, 254). In the fono'}. ~ 1 ' ( 7 m o n t ~ the British seized Manila from the Spaniards, and subsequently entered into negotiatiolls\vith the fonner Sultan 2NB. The tenn Sulu is used to refer to the state of SuJu, the archipelago andtLe island. .1010 is the p r i n ~ i p a l town and port en the island or Suiu. Hu" . e\el. the krm JGL,sometimes refers to the island of SuIu.Alimudin to the effect that they would return him to Jo]o in return for his co-operation. A treatywas declared between the British and Alimudin in January : 763 to such an effect (Majul 1973256) By June 1763 Sultan Muizzidin had died and had been rer1aced by one of lus sons, \vho hadbeen proclaimed Sultan Alimndin n (17). The latter rejected Dutch advances, confirmed theBalambangan cession (Balanibangan had been occupied in Ja'nary 1763 by Dalrymple - H 102),and "ii-lade adoration' of southern Palawan and Nmth B"cT,eo" (Home Miscellaneous Series,Volume 102, No.3, folios 49-50, lOR, in MajuJ 1973, 25 7 ).The following year in June, Sultan Alimudin (now baptised) was welcomed back and reinstated asSultan (Majul 1973,258). Contronted with debts owing to the East India Company, the Sultan thenceded to that company his North Borneo territories from Kimanis to Towson Abai, although one ofthe Sultan's sons was to be governor of the province, and rather than being a cession in the Westernlegal sense, the cession was probably only meant as the grdnting, ofa trade monopoly (Majul 1973,259). The whole of Palawan \vas allegedly included in this 'cession' (ibid.). The treaty of 9th

, ' -September 1763 between A 1 i m s d ~ r : T :n:d th'? British only included the Southern part of Palawan,North Borneo and the intermediate islands to the East India Company (li'102:37). On September28th, a further, and sl1ghtly more elaborate commerce and friendship treaty was signed (H 102) Itseems that the East India Company was still owed a substantial sum by Sulu. One further treatybetween the British and Alimudin followed in 1769 when the Sultan confirn1ed his sale ofPalawanand North Borneo to the British (H 102).The comparison bet\\'een the 'cessions' of the 1760s and the lease of 1878 is interesting. Why werethe British happy to aHm,v a 17605 treaty to lapse unchallenged, and even go as far as to

18


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acknmvledge that the Sultan after the 17605 once again "exercised control over the Northern part ofthe island;! of Borneo (Colonial Report 1963) when the 1878 lease was pursued so vigorously? Theanswer is clear economically and in terms of real pol1tics, but not so clear legally A similar lease'C,!cr ~ l G r t h -Bomc-O \vas acquircd- b)- the /\.fficnCau- Trading C v f f i p a u ) ~ ' -in ! .e65 1 (co'venng lessterritoT);) but, like the treaties of the 1760s, was allo\yed to lapse (Irwin).Sultan Alimudin I had coined money with the aim of establishing a tmifonn currency under statesupervision (De 1a Costa 1965,98). He had moreover begun the codification of the laws of Sulu -Koranjc as w-ell as customaT)' (Ibid.). He had made et-forts to fonn a state army (ibid.). He hadr0t" ....-k-1- ...... , : : . . - " ' ~ ? ..... ,.,;+h +t.., ... (,J_.oI'"'\ ....... ]...... - r , . . l ~ .f.-..,-.,.. - ...... ( ) " , - . ; ~ ...... l - . . ~ .......... 1I'\.1"+-h ..-}:!"", ......... . f - ~ . . - ..... r- ....... ...... ...;+l....; __ :00 .. , ..1-..: ....1- ""- ..... , ..... ~ - + - . . 1 ~ ~ . . " . . _ . . . 4 . ; l . , , ~ : ~ . : . , ! . i":. :0"'ii":;.::,.;...~ \ . V . : : ' .. L C ~ ~ " . l ' l;.. .1J.'!.) .......Y'\..;1 11 "t-U . ( ' " ( I ' 'U'...r' ' .*:J'- -, 7i.'-_ ." t" .... ~ \ ~ f ',o ..:! ) 1. '


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\vas dramatically reduced. Arguably, the Spanish attack on the Samals, by reduClng. the power ofthe Samals, rendered the Sulu Sultanate a service as the Samats \"ere of an independent mindsetT .. 18'1'1 th,. , ,'hieh was neverimplemented. The increasing engagement of otber European pt1\\'ers in the SuJu area \vould haveserve-d to convince the Spanish of the urgency of their need to secure their Southern frontiers

The greatest provocation was provided by the Treaty concluded between James Brooke of Britainand the Sultan PuJa1uf} in 1849 (see ,1ppendices)_ Amongst t . ~ e artic1es were a cornmitment to reducepiracy and to engage in intensified le\-els of trade. The Spanish concerned by this treaty, as well asby recent French and Dutch manoeuvres, initiated a new military campaign against Sutu in 1851,Spanish troops landed at lola on February 2ih, 1851 ( 1 \ . 1 ~ u l 1973, 286). lola ,vas destroyed yetag.:.iIL In t l K ~ SUDSi;:'-IDCrH treaTY (see appendices), tIle Sulus p r v r n i ~ e d w fly 1-J,e spamsl' flag., suppressj-1iracy (something they -were barely able to do), anO\;( the Spanish a trair'lllg post and sma1) g a ~ i l i s o n at Jo10, and not to sign any treaties with foreign powers. The Sulus perceived the Ireaty as beingprimarily one of friendshin, while the Spanish saw it as signif}ring: Sulu's incorporOltion within thE''::;PdJlish II1011aH.:hy (Ivi::lJu: !::i73, 266)Although SuJu retained its independence, Basilan moved to accept Spanish soveceignty (Majul1973,288). In 1860, Spain established a politico-military government in six d i s t r i c t ~ . F;ve of thesewere in Mindancl.I and the si);.111 was BastIan (MajuI 1973,288). The fact that Sulu wasn,-,1 .ndudedwas a tacit reGogri! on on the part of the Europeans that Su1u retained its independence..In 1862, Sultan PI iLiun died_ He had been regarded as an able and just administrator (Sated}' 1908,218), who like 'b':; father had published a re\ised code of Sulu laws. The land over "'hie', 'Ie ruledhad been desGLed by a British \isitor in J848 as being well populated and b ~ i r : . f ..;omposedprimarily of fishennen and Crunese t r a d e r s ~ that the island was highly cultivated and had anabundance of cattle (Saleeby J908, 201). PuJaJun was replaced by his son who became SultanJamalul Alam (25). His claim was contested by Datu Daniel who \\ished the ;;ultanate to bebestowed upon a descendant of Sultan Shakirullah (1v1ajul 1973, 289). Jamalul Alam, although hebegan his reign \\iL.1 opponents, gained the respect of many not least the ulama and the Budanuns\\ith whom it is said he discussed important decisions (1\-1ajul 1973,292). hrnalu! Alam carried outa number of public \\orks. He built roads. bridges and mosques, and allegedly c\:ec:Jted the laws\\ith justice and force (Saleeby 1908.219). He published 2, '2cvi,:, of !?'.\'S \\-hleh was reputed to bemilder than that of his predecessors \Sa1eeby 1908,232). Howeyer the contemporary geopoliticalcontex1: lead to an erosion of his power and that of his nation.Realising that the Sulus remained independent, the Spanish launched another assault on theembattled nation in 1876. By this stage, the Spanish had steam \var vessels. For Saleeby, just as heargues that the introduction of fireamls provoked its rise to power in the fifteenth century (Saleeby1908, 221). The February 1876 bombardment forced the Sultan to retreat to Bud D a ~ \>,,'hile someSulus resorted to guerrilla tactics and to ajuramentado (religious fighting) (Majul 1973, 293). This


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war of attrition and repression continued officially until July 1878 when the Sultan entered into apeace agreement with the Spaniards_ Not only had the protocol of 1877 between Britain, Spain andGermany (see appendices) been signed during this time, but the North Borneo territories of theSu1ta1Iate had b e ~ n le3Sed to-the British NoFtl:-Bameo Camp:!}), on 22nd af January 1878. .Under attack from and occupied by the Spaniards, and 'with the Dutch encroaching into his Borneanlands, the Sultan gave BaTOn Overbeck a lease over his North Borneo territories ' ~ w i t h absolutepower of life and death of the inhabitants of the country \'vith all the absolute rights of property overthe soD of the country" (see appendices)_ Overbeck manipulated the situation to his benefit by, t ~ n i n g t h e b , = ~ ' ; ' , : " g ~ d S'J.ltanthat >


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Paris. From the vantage point that the Sulus retained their sovereib'TIty at this point, there is no legalbasis for Americ.an sovereignty over Sulu and their presence in Sulu from] 899 can be seen as Actof Aggression. The substantial resistance of the Sulus in the first fifteen years of the twentieth~ ~ ~ h . ~ s ~ ~ o ~ ... _ > _ . . l ~ _ 1 ~ _ ~ ..1 . . ~ .. +1..c ~ ~ ~ , , 1 ~ C., l U \ . . . ~ . c I ... ~ ~ ~ ~ _ .. ~ . C I A - e n ' c ~ ~ - U l ~ "n . 1 . . ~ ..1 . . ~ _ .. " " ~ J 1 l U _ l ) \",,-1 \"v tV \. til 'U:\"_LU1J\,;. 'lI10t U l ~ - \ . J 1 - 1 J \ : . . Vi Jt.ll Hau llUl ( iv \ , . . - \ . . . .pn.. u .,:-l._iJJ J Q..1J J Ie " Vi 'Lll\", vU l t 1 'hand., some see the treaty as signifying the end of the Sulus' four hundred and hventy-six yearindependence.The British continued in 1880 to speak of Sulu's Bomean possessions (FO 57217), no doubt becauseit slllted its strategy at that point to portray Slllu as independent Once Spain had acknowledgedlonger politic for the British to query Spain's rights within the Sulu archipelago. The juramentadosand other forms of resistance persisted in Sulu, although the SultaIt I..i ied to discourage such actions(NfajuI 1973, 301). In February ] 881, some Sulus tried to storm the gates of 1010 (ibid} Less thantwo months later lamalul Alam died. Disaf,'Teement over the succession had already arisen, and thecompeting factions - that supporting Jamalul Alam's eldest son Badarudin (later Badarudin II) andthat lead by Jamalul AIam's second wife lnchi Jamila, and supporting Amirul Kiram (later Sultan.Tamalul Kiram If). The succession disputes of the 1880s and 18905 precipitated civil wars whichfurther weakened the Sultanate and drained its tinancial resources. The first and more peaceabledispute was settled in 1881 when the Datns and the Budanun chiefs backed the nineteen year oldBadarudin \-vho thereby became Sultan Badarudin I I (26).Badarudin spent much of his rein on pilgrimage to Mecca. Povler \vas delegated to lnchi Jamila andDatu AJiudin in his absence. On his return, he attempte.d to set up a police force. He had alsofolioWe


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recof,'Tlised Spanish sovereIgnty in Sulu in exchange for Spanish renunciatlOTI of their claims toNorth Borneo (see appendices). The British expressed no interest in supponing Amim! Kiram (Fa572114). Thus isolated by the resolution of intra-european hostilities, and uD\\illmg to travel to- _ ~ ~ / r a r L i l a ; i \ r i l - i r t ~ 1 ;\-as pG\vcrlc33 tc .prevent the S}klnish frem p r G - C 1 3 ~ m ~ n g -H3nm Q ~ ~ S ~ : J t ~ ~ on 2 i ~ t h September 1886, and having him escorted to Sulu the f()lIowing .Month (lv1ajul 1973.3(6)With military assistance, Sultan Harun carne ashore and attacked his opponents. Mannbung, seat oflvniruJ Kiram, was attacked in a land-sea operation orchestrated by Hamn and the SpanishGovernor. of Sulu. Despite his superior military power, Hamn never succeeded in paciD:ing hissiege and that no European ventured to go outside the walls of the town (Fa 572!?5). Meanwhilethe Sultan of Brunei had issued a claim that Palawan, Balabak and Kagavan de SLi}.1 belonged to_ J _him. In response the Spanish claimed that these islands belonged to them. The Sulus \vere in noposition to press their claim (Majul 1973, 308).His situation untenable, Harun finally left for Palawan on the 16th of December 1893. By early1894, the Spanish had recognised that Amirul Kiram now Sultan Jamalu1 Kiram If (27) (ibid.).Jamalul Kiram II visited Basilan to collect tribute from the people there, but in 1895 .1010 wasattacked by residents of I.nti and Pa1iku!' presumably by followers of the Shakimllah house(Saleeby 1908, 245). [n 1897 JamaJuJ Kiram felt sure enough of his position to visit Sandakan. TheSultan \vas clearly trying to reassert his authority over his dominions (Majul 1973, 309). Howeverin 1899, the Spaniards left 1010 town to allow American troops to occupy the to\\Tl. Thus began anew era of Sulu resistance to forei!:,'11 occupation.

Chapter SevenSulu under American Occupation, 1899-1946

Tn the twentieth century, under l\merican and Filipino sovereignty, the Sulu Sultanate has beenfurther weakened The Moros have been increasingly marginalised both economically andpolitically. The latest phase of the Moro \\'ars began in the early seventies, and despite the peaceagreement of 1996 between the .tv1NLF leader NUT Misuari ane !11e Philippine President FidelRamos, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front CM1LF) and the more .\.i:reme Abu Sayyaf Groupc.ontinue to fight the Philippine ann)". The actions of these grOiJ\}:, while largely confined toMindanao, do occasionally spread to Sulu.The follo\\ing analysis of SuIu in the twentieth century \\ill (,;1;;1) I F ~ the contexi of these events inorder to c1arii}' the contemJXlrary situation in Sulu. The analysis of SuIu in the twentieth century isine\.i:ricabJy bound up \\ith that of Mindanao. The same could be said for Southern Palawan,although the latter-s lesser territorial and economic significance relegates to a peripheral JXlsition inthe narrative. The term Moro will be used to specify the southern Muslims as a whole. That is to saythe thirteen ethnic groups \vhich make up the southern Ivfuslims - namely the Maranao,!\1aguindanao, Tausug, Sarna!, Yakan, Sangij, Badjao, Kolibugall, .lama 1'.1apun, flanu!1, Palawanon,Kalagan and IvloJbog (Che fVlan 1990. 19). Three of these b'TOUr-S ha\'e come to be dominant in theMoro movement - the Tausul2s (.[ol)3.'1'.''') t h ( ~ M'lranaos and the r-..1af!:uindanaos (J\1ercado 1984..152).

Theoretical FrameworkSamuel Huntington \\Tote in the late sixties that "a revolution or a violent separatist movementoccurs in a political system that is incapable of accommodating the democratic participation of theseparatist group" (Syed Serajul fslam, 1998). Other factors include the relative deprivation of the


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group, the cultural 'otherness' of the group, the level of repression agamst the group, and themanipulation of ethnicity by ethnic minority elites (ibid.). In order to be successful, such amovement requires strong leaders, internal cohesiveness and external support (ibid ).Building on such theoretical premises, this analysis of SuIu in the twentieth century wdl discllss therelative deprivation of the 1\10ro people economically and pohtically, as well as the Imdern1ining 01their culture. Bearim! such issues in mind. and dravving on the common strands of their modern.history, the re: or tribute \vas col1ected from the Sulus, and their territorY was exempted fromthe H!-'Cr,,'tion af the ! a \ v ~ or [fle PhilifJpwe lsltiud.::;. t-ll{)reover, the pead i n d u s r r : ~ lealained to t t ~ hands of the Sulus (ibjd.). The lack of capitulation to the Spaniards is echoed by the Christianmissionary Gowing \vho stated that the life of the Sulu people "refrained practically unchanged.Very few became Christians. The Spanish education system was not extended" to the people ofSuIll, no r e ~ ' U J a r t r i b u t e s were applied, an-::l Su)., customs prevailed (GO\\ing, 1964).The wording of the Bates Agreement (see appen.iices), like that of so many agreements before iLwas contentious (Forbes 1925 0 2771. Although ro,bes asserts that the Bates agreement made Sulu aprotectorate of the United States, the SlIlus re;:;rrded it as merely amounting to the recognition ofthe American f1ag" and noL contrary to the. ,T"erican "iew, embodying any transfer of sovereisrnty(Forbes 1925, 277). According to ehe Man, the Moros acknowledged American sovereignty andpledged to help suppress piracy and arrest individuals charged \\ith crimes against non-Moros,whlle the United States agreed to protect Moros from foreign intrusions and to respect the authorityof the Sultan and other chiefs (Che 1"fan 1990, 46-47). Other scholars have interpreted it asacknowledging the Sultan's authority to govern his people (Syed Serajul Islam 1998) Mercado doesnot view the Bates Af:,rreement in such neutral light For h j m ~ the Bates treaty "",as p U I e l ~ adeceptive and expedient ploy by the A m e r i , . ~ a n expeditionary forces to prevent any alliance betweenthe Sultanate :md thf' Fili;-in0 re\'olulionaries and to neutralise the Mow forces in 1 \ 1 i n d : : r : : : : ~ : : ':.b!,::the American tTOOpS were engaged in the pacification campmgns in Luzon and the Vis3vas"(Mercado 1984, 174),Mercado also asserts that the Bates Treaty had no legal or constitutional basis. "for the treat\- - ' . 'etween General Bates and the Sultan of Sulu had never been sanctioned by the US President andCongress"Obid.). A similar postulation has been made by Mercado concerning the matter in whichthe United States had acquired the Philippines in the first place. The Americans had exploited thePhilippine revolts against Spanish rule, which had culminated in the Philippine Revolution of 1896,


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for their own benefit (Mercado J984). The Spaniards had already been stretched by Mora resistancein tbe south, and 19orot resistance in the north_ The i\mericans had seemingly courted the exiledPhilippine leadership of Auginaldo in Hong Kong, sailed v.1th the nationalists to Manila where it is-c--..... :f"1o..:J. 1-1..,,",+ +-1--....... A --.. .... ~ r - " . . n .... "' ................-ro-?-...:J .,...,....,. .. ....-,..........;a.....; -"-.. .... +, - ~ " ! T ! ......... ....nr


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those of PangJima Hassan in 1901 and Maharajah Andung in 1904, Inter-Muslim disputes includedthe [ndanan-Tahil feud in 1900, the South Ubian-Tandubas dispute in 1900, the Sanda Uprising in19] 9 and the clispute between Su1tan Badarudin's son-in-law, Datu Ombra. and Tambuyong over;UC-CC33icll tv-the Su1tailutc and property rights (Tuil 1977}There were a number oflarger confrontations \'lith the Americans. These included the Pala Uprisingin 1904-1905 in 1010 in response to the anti-slavery la\vs in which 320 Muslims \\'ere killed (Tan1977). The anti-slavery laws deprived the traditional Sulu leaders of an important source of theirwealth (Che Iv1an 1990, 49). More famously, there was the Bud Dajo battle of 1906 in which 994Bud Dajo when Governor Pershing, who had until then focused his attentions on economicdevelopment, issued a Jecree to disarm the Moros (Che Man 1990, 50). In 1904, there had L - ~ \ = n 34,000 1.10ros ready to fight (Hurley 1938,263), ofwhich one source alleges that 15,000 died in allthe campaigns against the Americans (Hurley] 938,266).The American campaigns of 1899-1913 serious1y damaged the Sulus' military capacity and furthereroded the Sultan's power. The Americans suspected the Sultan of being, "m cahoots with theresisting leaders'- (Tan 1993, 9). fndeed, in 1903, JamaluJ Kiram II had supported PanglimaHassan's rebellion \"hich ..,vas launched in response to the replacement of Agarna (reli;rlous) courts\\ith the western system of urisprudence (CheMan 1990,48).Tn J913, the Battle ofBagsak took place. The latter, in which 450 Muslims were kined, is often seenas the preface to the Carpenter Agreement of 1915, by \,'hich the Sultan relinquished hiss O " : : , [ e l , ~ , , ! l t y out retamec1 his spiritual power t l ~ , 1 1977). It tas ,illce t r a n s p ~ r ~ d ";13"[ nns agreementw ~ s nE',:er {atified (S.a.f.1. document c.olk::;tion} This is of c.)ilsiderab1e impor!ane,_> as rather likethe July 1878 treaty between Spain and Su1u, this was the last significant political agreementl",etween the SUlll and the Americans before the incDrporation of the Muslim south into the;. :depenJent Republic oJ the ?hl1Ippines.Ir 1913, Moro Province had been reorganised into the Department of !v1in'ianao and Sulu. It was atthiS ~ l m c t u r e that Carpenter had become Governor. A policy of Filip n isat On' had been undertaken,b",' \VI. ';1. the Christian Filipinos were given gJcaterpowers in the administrativl , 'fMoro-land (Che1\1


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Convinced of the futility of their etTorts, some Moro leaders decided to enter the system which hadbeen imposed upon them. Amongst them was Arolas Tulawi ofSulu who became a delegate to theConstitutional Convention in 1934 (Ibid.). In 1935, Datu Ombra Amilbangsa in Sulu and Datuc ; _ ~ . . ~ + D ~ l ~ I - . . ~ ~ ~ ' ' ' C - ~ < 1 ' 1 ~ ~ + ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I - . . , " , - ~ ~ f : " h ~ l d ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l A ~ ~ ~ ~ ; l - . . l . . i n . . l ' ~ . \ r T ~ . . : I ~ r , 1 . . ~ 'J_l l l . : ' )UUl Ua l VUJ .U - i l '" :I.\,..- \"'-.I"\..\".;l\...U ;:, UH .... . . I i J l . J " \ - J . ~ \..H LU\""- l "UUv . l - l ' U . l ~ . : " > " " ' \ " . . : 1 - H U J J \ -1U \.LJ. V I 1U \ . . UI \"Commonwealth, the political predicament of the Sulus deteriorated further when the AdministrativeCode for Mindanao and SuJu, which had given the south exemption from certain laws, was repealed(ibid.). TheMoro Board, which had been established to settle some disputes according to traditionalMOIO Jaws, was also repealed. In 1917, the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes was replaced by theOffice of Commissioner for Mindanao and Sulu (Gmving 1979). The Office was concernedsocial and economic prof,rrammes for the Moros \vere reduced and Jamalu] K;ram's 'successor' \vasnot recognisW . (Che Man 1990, 55). DC\'dopment efforts under the Commonwealth were carriedout primarily tor the benefit of the Christian settlers and foreign entrepreneurs (GO"v.ing ]979, 1 7 6 ~ 177). There was some anned r e s i s t a n c e ~ particularly around L'mao in Mindanao, but these protestssoon fell away as most Moros supported the war efforts against the Japanese occupiers (Che Mail1990). The resistance of the Moros bet\\'een 1899 and 1946 had not been cohesively organised, andafter 1913, it had never been very intense.The incorporation of Sulu into the Philippines was bitterly contested by many Moros. Prior toindependence on July 4th 1946, the Moro leaders submitted a memorandum to the United Statesgovernment ""vhich stated, "Vole do not \vant to be included in the Philippines Independence. Foronce independence is launched, there win be trouble between us and the Christian Filipinos becausefrom time immemorial these two people have not lived hannoniously '" It is not proper [for twoa ; l t a ~ . r ) r : ! . : ; b c J peopk', to INe rogether under oIle flag" (pute Rah'lmul ;,rSyc


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Chapter EightFrom "Independence' to \Var, Sulu 1946-1999

Before the "'af.Following the Second \Vorld War, there was a marked resurgence oflslam (Che Man 1990,

57). From the early 19505, a stream of I\'iuslim preachers went to J\1indanao and Sulu, and_ , ~ \ : h G ! ; r : ~ r _ ~ F 3 ' ~ v e r c : . : 0 f t c ~ c d tv - 1 v r i ~ s 1 1 m 3 ~ ~ d c ~ t s ~ - h ) ~ J . 1 n j ~ : c ~ s i ' r i c : ; in the _ ~ " , ' f ~ d d I Q ' { ~ 3 . , S t . \ ( 1 h ~ d ) r l ! ) v . ~ f ~ - \ ; : C " , ~ _ secesslonist af:,ritations were subdued between 1946 and 1968 (Tan 1993). To a degree this CaT' heattributed to the partial cooptio:) of the traditional A1oro leaders by their Phihppine counterparts(tv1ercado 1984, 154: Syed Serajul Islam 1998: Tan 1993).

The Philippine Government made concessions to the traditional Moro leaders, and someMoro leaders engaged in joc'al and national politics. The Mm\" elite as a whole sat relatively easilywith the national integration policy (T8n 1993). Several members of the traditional Muslim elitetook up local and national political positions (ibid.). Some of the families \\ho may ha\'e beeninvolved in this process were the Kirams, the Abubakrs, the Tmva1is, the Rasuls, the Sangkulis, theAnnis, and later the Tans and the Loongs (Tan 1993,41). The Taosugs and Samals elected LeonFernandez, a catholic ]a,Yyer, as Governor of Sulu, In addition, the Izquierdos, Calixtos and theCarpizos enjoyed political patronage in local 1010poiJtIcs (l'1TI ] 993-,41)_ Cbme:se families ~ ~ . : h as rhe Tans, Lims, Kongs, eos and IIv.:, '1! ~ q l roles (ibid.). The Muslim leadership sained access to resources, and allegedly henefit' jfrom Ilnancial resources sent for development and other purposes (ibid,).

Ti l t : lilCltaSlng sense ot alienation atncngst t h ~ Moro peupie COm;nLi(;U lU 610\\, as t h ~ l f relative deprivation was compounded by economic and political policies. 1-1ercado argues thatindependence made little difference in terms of increased self determination within the archipelago(Mercado 1984). He quotes the US 41gh Commissioner in the Philippines, Paul McNutt_ assaymg_Politically we brought the Islands throu (1 progressive steps to the verge of independence,Economically. we brought the Islands thnL;h p r o ~ : " T e s s i v e steps to almost complete dependenceupon our markets (Mercado 1984, J5.:1).

The Moros continued to be dispossessed of their ancestral lands fn some cases thetraditional leaders became the owners of fonnerly public lands and tended to either sell them tosettlers or to enter into ne\v partnership ,\oith foreign and national businessmen(ibid,), ThePhilippine gm'emment passed a series of laws to lebritimize its expropriation of lands traditionaJlyo"med by Moros for plantation agriculture or resettlement projects (S:,/ed Serajul Islam ] 998), In195 7, the Commission on National [nkh'Tation CCNt} was set up to accelerate the integration of theMoros (Tan 1993).

The lack of material benefit for the Moro people of Mindanao and Sulu was an the moreremarkable when the natural wealth of he Muslim part ofthe Philippines is rehristered.More than 500:0 of coconut production and timber production v,ere concentrated in

Mindanao and Sulu (Mercado 1984, 153). Bananas and pineapples. major c\.port crops and rubber,were predominantly produced in Mindanao and Sulu(ibid.). More than half of the country's fishcatch - for export and domestic consumption was from the waters ofMindanao and Sulu in 1984(ibid,). Moreover, on Mindanao, there are mineral deposits of copper, gold, mckel, coal, iron, zincand lead, manganese and chromate (ibid). In 1984, there were twenty-three American and ten


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Japanese corporations involved in Mindanao (ibid.).Development projects seemed to bypass the 1\10111S who failed to benefit from infrastructureprojects (Gowingo 1979). The Philippine Senate Committee on National Minorities reported "thatU7. to 197! theITi y,,'a:; not a Siiidc iliif::ation -pro','eet in aTr" D1iiiiicir-.a.lit; "\vh.::[ec t'",1uslirHs c(institllted ar __....... l_majority (Philippine Senate in Che Man. 1990,61). According to George, 'Two decades after thePhilippines became independent, 1-1uslims in Mindanao were adevitalized people, their laws and customs in danger of disintegrating" (George] 980 0 122).Moreover, due to the intensification of the transmigTation drive, the non-:l'v10m population hadincreased from 2,010 0223 in 1948 to 6)94,224 in 1970 (Che Man 1990,60). Competition from thepDst- 1946 period (Che Man 1990,60). A degree of government repression resulted as some Sulusengaged in smuggling and banditry (ibid.'!- In 1961, Datu Ombra Amilban!:,rsa, the son-in-law ofBadarudin n and one time claimant of the Sultanate. introduced Congress Bm 5682 call1ng for~ ' G r a n t i n g and Recobrnising the IndependeEce of the Prmince of Sulu" (ibid.).

The situation in the south deteriorated after Ferdinand Marcos became President in 1965. In1968, the Jabidah Massacre took placeo twenty-eight Muslim military trainees were murdered,allegedly \vhen they refuse-d to take part in 'Operation Merdeka' in which troops were to bedeployed in North Borneo to a&ritate tor N0I1h Borneo to become a part of the Philippines (lv1ercado1984; Che Man 1990, Gowing 1979).

Not only did this incident result in Malaysla breaking off diplomatic relations, it also actedas a fuse for the latent conflict in the south. Later that year the Muslim independence Mo;'ementwas formed by Datu Udtog IV1atalam. This organisation had the ex-press objective of creating anIslamic Republic ofM'jndanao, SuIu and PaIawan (CheMan, 199061). The MIM had international," !PpDl T+!'-'!T! Maiayslc ,,-,\'hHAl &::;Slsted m traming the hIst mnety Mt!"l iU I reCruit:.: ;!;g{Jenlia warrareon the Malay-Thai border (!v1ercado 1984, Che l\1an 199n) Rashid T"Jcm(!.:, an establicPlous Manila massacre occurred_ wnen 65 Muslims were i!unned 00WP

. ' , ' .' "--n a mosque in Mind,'nQv (mid.). This intensified the rebgious aspect of the conflict Within a YfJTthe Libyan Gm'ernment had oftered their support to the secessionists, and the Muslim organisationshad become more unified (l\1ercado 1984; Che Man 1990).

By this stage, the Mora National Liberation Front(MNLF) had been formed3, partially inresponse to disil1usionment \\1th some of the 1V1Thlleaders who were being offered deals by Manila.Datu Udtog !\1atalam had allegedly been offered the position of Presidential Adviser on Muslimaffairs (t\{ired 1984). In:1eed the MTM had come to be seen as a vehicle for the traditional ruling Ltndp ' J l i ! ; c : : : ~ l l'arnilies of the Muslim south to maintain and recour ~ ~ e : : ' ; ; : - i ' . i l : 3 i : ~ d political andeconomic positions (ibid.). Discontent among the Mora traditional leaders had arisen when theireconomic and Political positions \\1thin the south had been "undermined by their Christiancounterparts" (ibid.). Hmvever the Moro independence movement moved from being centred on adispute bet\\een Muslim and Christian leaders to being focused on the demands and aspirations of awider section of the community. A precedent had been set whereby some Moros vie\ved L.1eirtraditional leaders with mistrust. The lvfNLF was thus formed in part as a rejection oftlle traditionalleadership both politically and ideologically (Che Man 1990). Howeyer, some traditional leaderssuch as the Mindanao fonner conb'Tessman, Rashid Lucman, were included within theMNLF


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Ideoloh>1CalLeaning.EtrtnlC SltppvrtBase.

LeftTausug-Joloanvs

Islamic Stateislamic~ , " 1 a g u i D d a n a o s

Center-Right

Macapanton Abbas (secretaT)'), Senator Domocao Alonto, Senator MamintaiT a m " ' ~ " r ~ ~ r ~ ~ s < " m ~ ~ "1 ; n ; ~ ~ ~ ~ , . o r ~ ~ ~ , , ~ ~ ~ ~ _ n ~ f " l - l ' d T u c m ~ - ~ r ' h ~ " r ~ ~ ..l UUH' t . t . ' - ' H ~ 5 1 , " " .... )o t t(Hf- ,#"',H l . . . i lHIC..q.1'Vtt. '\.. .. t . . F . l ~ J _ \ . . . . ~ . ' t . - 1 ( a . u pq1 .~ J U L , "i_it l!!: ; L J d tU IV l t ! .U l-t:'1Sinsuat, Sultan Amilkadra Abubakar, Mrs. Soared Tamano, Abdul Karim Sidri,Musib Buat. Farouk Carpizo, and Nur Misuari (Che :Man 1990,76 77).GeographicalSupport Base.Origins ofLeadership andname of leadeL

SuJu Cotabato LanaoRadjca1, young, Traditional, Traditional, secular,secular. Leader Nut relibrious, aristocratic. LeaderMisuari aristocratic. Leader Dimas Pundatu

Hashim SalamatTable One: Principal Cleavages of the Moms, I 980s.The MNLF had made a number of mistakes. The development of a grassroots democraticrevolutionary movement had not been sufficiently advance.d. Dependence on foreif,JU support hadIllat::,: t1


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Chapter NineThe Su luPotitical System

Sultanate before the erosion of its politica1 pO\vers since the last decades of the nineteenth century.The political status of Sulu has changed in the twentieth century, not least since the formation of theRepublic of the Pllllippinesin 1946. Now, \\ithjn Sulu, actual and aspiring pohtical representatives\ie for position, and the patronage systems of contemporary representati\e democracies havereplaced the shifting alliances of the Sultanate's polity (Kiefer 1972). The situatlOn has been furthercamplic.3.ted b ~ / the fi2htl!1rr ' ~ l h j c ! - l engulfed Sulu in t h ~ ~ a r l \ ~ 1.970:; :15 the 1 ' - ~ 1 v t ~ , l'Jati0na11.jberafion-

'- ' - - ...Front fought the Philippine government for an independent Moro State (George 1 9 8 0 ~ McKenna1998; CheMan 1990).However, before the latest bout of fighting there were clear signs that aspects of thetraditional elite political structure lingered on in more than the personage of the Sultan (Arce1983). f\n analysis of the polity as it stood one hundred years ago therefore retains a relevance forunderstanding the underlying traditional political structures of the contemporary era. The follo\\ingaccount does include observations stemming from the second half of the t\\'entieth century. [1should however be recognised that there is a dearth of accounts addressing the situation in Sulusince Lf.Je peace agreement of 1996.

The following analysis draws primarily from articles by Kiefer (1972), Kiefer (l971),Majul(1965) and includes references to Forrest (1969). The best accOunt of the state of Sulu's politicalstructures is provided by 1'\rce (1983). The analysis \\-ill move from a sociological emphasis to ap ~ ' : i t i c a ) - i n s t i l a l i o n a l analysis

As has already been noted, the Tausug-dominated Sulu polity \vas based on a locali n t e r p r e t a t i o n ~ of Islamic political ideas, and incorporated South East Asian notions of governance,

short history-sulu sultanate

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