sierra club pollution & deception 9-11 report 2005
TRANSCRIPT
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Explore, enjoy and protect the planet
PollutionandDeception at Ground Zero REVISITED
Monday, September 17, 2001:The New York Stock Exchange reopens
and workers return to a still- polluted
Lower Manhattan financial district.
WHY IT COULD HAPPEN AGAIN
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
I. Why We Must Prevent the Failures of 9/11 from Being Repeated: New Information
on the Human Health Impacts and Potential Future Hazards from 9/11 Pollution . . . . . . 6
New Confirmation that Human Health Impacts from 9/11 Pollution Are Persisting . 7
New Information on the Potential Future Health Hazards from 9/11 Pollution . . . . . 9
II. Why All Americans Should Demand Strong Policies to Protect the Public Against
Health Risks in National Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
People from Many States Came to Help New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Security Concerns and Potential Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
III. Why It Is Reasonable to Worry that the Federal Administration Will Not Meet Its Duty
to Assess Fully the Severity and Extent of Contamination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Need for Public Debate on Optimization Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Need for Investigation of EPA Testing Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
IV. Why It Will Be Harder to Learn the Truth About Health Risks from Future
Terrorist Attacks and National Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
V. Why OSHA May Fail Again to Protect Rescue and Recovery Workers and When It
Tries to Protect Workers, Its Hands Could Be Tied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
VI. Why It Is Reasonable to Predict that EPA Will Fail to Conduct a Proper Cleanup of
Contamination from a Terrorist Attack or National Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
VII. Why Americans Should Assume that the Federal Administration Will Praise, then
Abandon, the Patriotic Rescue/Recovery Workers, Area Employees and Residents
Who Help to Rebuild an Area Devastated by a Terrorist Attack or Disaster . . . . . . . . . 34
Medical Screening and Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Medical Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
VIII. Why Americans Should Assume that No One Will Be Held Accountable for Failures
of Our Government to Protect the Public Against Pollution from an Attack or Disaster 40
Appendix A: The Ground Zero Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
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1
INTRODUCTION
In August 2004, the Sierra Club issued a report entitled,Pollution and Deception at Ground
Zero, which documented that many hundreds of people in New York City had become ill because of
exposure to pollution from the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center. The report found
that if our federal government had responded to the disaster with proper vigilance for peoples health,many toxic exposures could have been avoided. It also expressed concern that such missteps could be
repeated in a future disaster. In this report, the Sierra Club revisits these issues to determine whether
or not Americans should feel assured that our federal government will take sufficient steps to protect
health and safety in future disasters. The answer is no.
Americans cannot count on the White House Council on Environmental Quality, the Department
of Homeland Security, EPA or OSHA to protect public health in the aftermath of a terrorist attack or
national disaster. Based on the federal administrations new emergency management policies and its
continued failure to provide a proper cleanup and health management response to the 9/11 attack
Americans should assume that in any future national disaster, if political pressure is applied to resume
human activity in the affected area:
S EPA will fail to determine how harmful the contamination is and how far it spreads;
also, under its new relationship with the Department of Homeland Security, it may use
weakened toxic cleanup goals under a new federal optimization policy;
S Under the newNational Response Plan, messages to the public about health and safety
will be filtered by centralized PR staff who answer to an administration that has
repeatedly disregarded scientific data if it conflicts with a political agenda;
S OSHA will not enforce safety laws to protect rescue and recovery workers and under
the newNational Response Plan, OSHA will not have the last word in debates onworker safety;
S The federal government will fail to conduct a proper cleanup of the contamination;
S The federal Administration will praise, then abandon, the rescue/recovery workers and
the people who return to rebuild the area but then suffer health effects; and,
S No one will be held accountable for our governments failure to protect the public from
the aftermath of a terrorist attack or national disaster.
This is not what Americans deserve from their government. At times, our nation may have to
make hard choices, but concealing from the public critically important information about health risks
is not the way to manage the situation. Americans deserve and should be able to expect the straight
story about what risks they face. They also have a right to expect strong government action to protect
rescue and recovery workers and to ensure safety for the people who return and restore the affected area.
Anything less is a betrayal of the publics trust in national leadership.
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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary of Findings
S People clearly needed better protection from the pollution caused by the 9/11 attack. Early
studies raised concerns about persistent health effects from the exposures. Now, newlyreleased data confirm that not only rescue/recovery workers but also residents, small
business owners and area employees have 9/11-related respiratory health effects
symptoms that did not disappear even after a year or longer.
S The Department of Homeland Security is proposing to use optimization a policy
approach that will consider societal values and needs, such as economic impacts to
determine toxic cleanup levels for national emergencies, and EPA apparently will not have
final authority over standards or guidelines; this is of concern given the adverse health
consequences of the haste to reopen Wall Street after the 9/11 attack.
SEPAs newHomeland Security Strategy document lacks a clear policy declaration that itwill issue assurances of safety only after assessing the pollution hazards as a whole rather
than basing its assurances merely on individual chemicals, as occurred in the World Trade
Center disaster; also, it fails to adopt a better safe than sorry approach to reduce human
exposures while awaiting complete information on pollution.
S The Department of Homeland Securitys newNational Response Plan denies OSHA final
say over the protection of rescue and recovery workers, giving authority for dispute
resolution to a Joint Field Office Coordination Group.
S New Yorkers still await a proper response to the World Trade Center attack, including a
proper cleanup of the contamination that permeated homes and workplaces, and a properprogram for medical monitoring and care for the people exposed to 9/11 pollution.
S New studies of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and benzene pollutants that
were in the Ground Zero air indicate the need to monitor public health not only for cancer
but also for immune system impacts and effects on offspring. Also, new data on asthma
impacts in western Brooklyn indicate the need to investigate 9/11 impacts there.
S Rather than investigate the failures of the Workers Compensation System to aid people who
became ill from 9/11 pollution exposure, and solve the problems, the federal government
is simply turning its back on the unmet needs.
S Congress has failed to investigate and obtain disclosure of the identities of persons in the
White House who suppressed 9/11 health warnings that EPA otherwise would have issued,
and there has still been no comprehensive investigation of the methods EPA used to test the
air emissions and dust, which were the subjects of significant controversy.
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S All Americans should be concerned about what happened at Ground Zero. Many other states
besides New York are home to residents who were made ill by exposure to 9/11 pollution.
Although health effects statistics are not available, 9/11 clinical programs have screened 846
rescue and recovery workers from other states, including 363 from New Jersey, 88 from
Massachusetts, 79 from California, 77 from Ohio, 66 from Illinois, and 30 from Florida.
Over half of the 2,680 injured people who applied to the short-lived federal victim
compensation fund reported asthma or respiratory symptoms, and 339 of them lived in other
states. These states included:
New Jersey 182 applicants
Virginia 53 applicants
Pennsylvania 24 applicants
Florida 22 applicants
Also, a future disaster releasing toxic contaminants could happen in any state. Louisiana and
Mississippi are facing unknown levels of contamination as a result of the Katrina hurricane.Several reports have noted, in addition, that Americas chemical facilities remain
particularly vulnerable nationwide.
The unmistakable conclusion that must be drawn is that America remains at risk not only from terrorist
attacks and natural disasters, but also from our own federal governments unwillingness to put public
health and safety first in its response to such national emergencies.
Recommendations
Congress should hold hearings to:
S Investigate the Department of Homeland Securitys new optimization policy initiative and
challenge its role in establishing toxic cleanup goals and making cleanup decisions;
S Demand a clarification of EPAs new relationship to the Department of Homeland Security,
especially with regard to environmental cleanup in the aftermath of a disaster, and
investigate whether or not public health warnings may be compromised as a result;
S Demand a reversal of OSHAs decision not to carry out enforcement of safety and health
laws for rescue and recovery workers in national disasters, and challenge the federal
Administrations decision to take final authority for worker safety out of OSHAs hands;
S Investigate the failure of New York States Workers Compensation System to assist the
workers made ill by 9/11 pollution; and,
S Demand that the federal administration disclose the identities of the persons in the White
House who suppressed warnings of health risks from the 9/11 terrorist attack.
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The federal administration should:
S Revise its National Response Plan, EPA Homeland Security Strategy document and
National Incident Management Plan to establish a policy that public health assurances are
issued only after assessing the pollution hazards as a whole, rather than basing assurancesmerely on individual chemicals, and incorporate a better safe than sorry approach to
reduce human exposures while awaiting complete information on pollution;
S Restore the primacy of EPA in developing cleanup goals for pollution released in national
emergencies;
S Revise itsNational Response Plan, OSHA National Emergency Management Plan, and
National Incident Management Plan documents to ensure that OSHA has the final word in
health and safety protections for rescue and recovery workers in a national emergency;
SDisclose the identities of the persons in the White House who suppressed warnings of healthrisks from the terrorist attack;
S Develop a program to identify the volunteers from states other than New York who worked
in the Ground Zero area for medical screening; follow up on the health impacts of the
injured people who applied to the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund; and establish
a health screening project in Brooklyn to follow up on the results of the new asthma study
and identify people made ill from the attacks;
S Address the gaps in medical care funding that remain for recovery workers because of the
limitations of the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund and the failures of the Workers
Compensation System, and establish a program to assist, as needed, those residents, smallbusiness owners, students and area employees who are ill from 9/11 pollution exposure;
S Provide proper long-term funding -- at least 20 years but preferably 30 -- for medical
monitoring, and include monitoring for immune system effects and effects on offspring; and
S Adopt the recommendations of the World Trade Center Community-Labor Coalition to
make EPAs proposed testing and cleanup plan for World Trade Center contamination of
homes and workplaces into an effective and credible program that will identify and clean
up any remaining hazards.
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Background
In 2004, the Sierra Club issued a report showing how the federal government failed to inform
the public of the hazards of the World Trade Center pollution, fulfill its legal duties to enforce worker
safety rules, and conduct a proper environmental cleanup. The report made the following findings:
S Our federal government should have considered the pollution dangerous unless rigorous
testing proved the conditions to be safe. It did not. Instead, EPA and OSHA under the
White House Council on Environmental Qualitys direction behaved as though they
had no understanding of pollution and its impacts, and as though they did not know their
own statutory duties.
S Then, when confronted with information revealing harm such as the fact that the 9/11
dust was highly caustic or that office workers in a building several blocks from Ground
Zero were still suffering health effects months after the attack the federal government
simply did not disclose this information to the public.
S Also, the Bush administrations new disaster planning documents appeared to
institutionalize OSHAs failure to enforce health and safety standards for response
workers and establish centralized political control of hazard communications without
strong policies to protect the public against false assurances.
These failures have prolonged the harms of the September 11 attack for New York City residents and
those people from other states who generously came to help. The 2004 report recommended several
steps that the federal government should take to mitigate the harm caused by its failure to issue proper
health risk warnings, clean up the remaining World Trade Center contamination in homes and
workplaces, and promote stronger standards for protecting public health and safety in future disasters.
It urged that the Bush administration must restore trust in its agencies. Yet, today, the problemsidentified in the report remain unresolved, and new national disaster policies may make the situation
even worse.
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NYC D ept. of Health and Mental Hygiene, The WTCHR Quarterly Enrollment Update: Data Through1
Friday, September 10, 2004, World Trade Center Health Registry Data Snapshot(Fig. 8). A 2002 study found that
332 firefighters and one EMS worker had WTC cough severe enough to require four or more consecutive weeks of
medical leave; 87 percent also had gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD). Prezant, D.J., et al., Cough andBronchial Responsiveness in Firefighters at the World Trade Center Site, New Eng. J Med. 347(11):806-15 (2002).
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I. Why We Must Prevent the Failures of 9/11 from Being Repeated: New Information on the
Human Health Impacts and Potential Future Hazards from 9/11 Pollution
People clearly needed better protection from the pollution caused by the September 11, 2001
attack in New York City. The City Department of Health and Mental Hygienes World Trade Center
Health Registry reports that nearly 27,000 people have reported experiencing sinus problems or noseirritation after the attack, and over 21,000 reported a persistent cough. The agency reports that it does
not know for how long these symptoms lasted, and our government has not made the effort to find out.1
The federal government has failed to identify, quantify and track:
S the children who are still suffering health effects;
S the elderly people who are still suffering health effects;
S the people with asthma or other respiratory diseases who still suffer health effects;
S the people with immune system deficiencies whose conditions worsened;
S the otherwise healthy residents and college students who still suffer health effects;
S the small business owners who still suffer health effects;
Sthe building cleaners and custodians who still suffer health effects;
S the office workers, food service workers, small business employees and other area
employees who still suffer health effects;
S the transport workers, communications workers, carpenters, or electricians, plumbers,
sanitation workers, reporters and film technicians who still suffer health effects;
S the social service Ground Zero volunteers who still suffer health effects.
As a result, we still do not know the total number of people who are sick from 9/11 pollution. We know
that many thousands of people do suffer health impacts, but we do not know the total number. We do
not know because our federal government has not bothered to find out.
These people are not supposed to exist. Our federal government leaders, in their rush to reopenthe New York Stock Exchange and other Wall Street businesses and perhaps in an ideological
reluctance to acknowledge that pollution can make people sick urged everyone to come back to Lower
Manhattan. Barricades were removed. Our federal government declared the air safe. It did not limit its
welcome to healthy adults. Everyone, including young children, could return.
Neither the federal nor the local government made any reasonable effort to evaluate the safety
of homes and workplaces before issuing this broad invitation. Families with children were encouraged
to return to their homes. Schools were reopened. Employees generally had no choice at all in the matter.
No government agency said that people with respiratory conditions should consult their doctors before
they returned, or that workers should be excused from returning until the workplace was properly
cleaned. After all, according to EPA, Lower Manhattan was safe.
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GAO, September 11: Health Effects in the Aftermath of the World Trade Center Attack(Testimony to the2
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Comm. on Government
Reform)(GAO-04-1068T)(Sept. 8, 2004)(hereafter, GAO Report on WTC Health Effects), pp. 16 and 23.
Statement of Dr. John Howa rd, Director, National Inst. For Occupl Safety and He alth, in, Devlin Barrett,3
Sept. 11-related Cancers May Not Appear for Decades, Doctors Tell Congress, Associated Press (Sept. 8, 2004).
A screening of 250 rescue a nd recovery workers had foun d that nine months after the attack, 45% still had4
at least one pulmonary symptom and 52% had an ear, nose or throat symptom. R. Herbert and S. Levin, World
Trade Center Worker and Volunteer Med ical Screening Program: Report of Initial Findings to the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and H ealth of the CDC(2003). Eleven mon ths after the attack, 358 firefighters and
five EMS worke rs remained on medica l leave or light duty assignment because of respiratory illness that occurred
after WTC exposure. CDC, Injuries and Illnesses Among New York City Fire Department Rescue Workers AfterResponding to the World Trade Center Attacks, Morbid & Mortal Wkly Rpt51(special issue):1-5 (Sept. 11, 2002).
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Even the people who worked directly on the pile at Ground Zero should not be sick. The federal
government insists that they provided the workers with protective gear. It blames workers for failing
to use it, while failing to acknowledge the mixed messages about safety that EPA sent and OSHAs
failure to enforce safety standards. OSHA insists that its non-enforcement, cooperative agreement
approach to worker health and safety at Ground Zero which actually allowed rampant violation of the
requirements of protective gear that should have been in place was a great success story.
So no one should be sick.
But they are. And our federal government has neglected even to count them. In 2004, the U.S.
General Accounting Office (GAO) evaluated federal actions taken to study the health effects of the 9/11
pollution and found that no comprehensive, coordinated effort occurred. The GAO identified six
government programs with varying purposes and limitations, but reported that an estimated 250,000
to 400,000 people were exposed or at risk of exposure to 9/11 pollution, and the full health impact of
the attack is unknown. At a September 2004 Congressional hearing, when Representative Carolyn2
Mahoney asked the director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, how many
people are still sick, he responded, Im not sure anyone could give you an exact figure. We do,3however, know more than we did a year ago.
New Confirmation that Human Health Impacts from 9/11 Pollution Are Persisting
It has taken three years or longer for studies to emerge confirming what workers and residents
already know that health effects from Ground Zero have persisted for a year or longer. While early
studies had revealed cause for concern, the newly released data indicate that not only thousands of4
workers but also thousands of residents experienced 9/11-related respiratory health effects that
persisted for a year or longer, and may still persist.
S A study of over a thousand rescue and recovery workers found that 78 percent reported
persistent WTC-related symptoms. An average of about eight months and a range of
seven weeks to well over a year (63 weeks) had elapsed since they had stopped working
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The study examined a subset of 1,138 of the 11,768 rescue and recovery workers and volunteers screened5
by the Mount Sinai Medical School by the end 2002, and found that 851 reported persistent symptoms. CDC,
Physical Health Status of World Trade Center Rescue and Recovery Workers and Volunteers New York City,July, 2002-August 2004,Morbid & Mortal Wkly Rpt53(35):807-12 (Sept. 10, 2004).
CDC, Physical Health Status of World Trade Center Rescue and Recovery Workers, supra, p. 8126
(Editorial Note). In a study of 62 of the nearly 3,000 N YC transport worke rs exposed to the 9/11 po llution, 10 to 25percent reported persistent eye and nose or throat irritation, and/or respiratory symptoms 7 m onths after the attack.
Loren Tapp, et al., Physical and Mental Health Symptoms Among NYC Transit Workers Seven and One-half
Months After the WTC Attacks, Am J Indl Med. 47:475-83 (2005).
Shao Lin, et al., Upper Respiratory Symptoms and Other Health Effects Among Residents Living Near7
the World Trade Center Site After September 11, 2001, Am J Epid. 162(6) (Sept. 15, 2005). The study was begun
eight months after the attack, and surveyed 49 residential buildings with approxima tely 9,200 households living
within 1.5 kilometers of Ground Zero. The number of qualified respondents was 2,362.
GAO Report on WTC Health Effects, p. 6. In a representative sample of 179 Fire Dep artment rescue8
workers, 23 percent of the highly exposed subjects and 11 percent of the moderately exposed rescue workers still
suffered from persistent bronchial hyperreactivity a year after the attack. A year after the attack 16 percent had
reactive airways dysfunction syndrome. G. Banauch, et al., Bronchial Hyperactivity and Other Inhalation Lung
Injuries in Rescue Recovery Workers After the World Trade center Collapse, Crit Care Med. 33:S102-06 (2005).[T]he particulate matter from the plume can b e irritating to your eyes, nose and throat. It can cause more
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serious reactions in sensitive populations, such as people with respiratory problems or asthma, acc ording to health
officials, but does not cause any irreversible health effects. Statement of Kathleen Callahan, Acting Dep uty
Regional Administrator, EPA Region 1, before the New York State Assembly (Nov. 26, 2001).
An EPA press release issued in March 2002 asserted, tests conducted since September 11 haveth10
indicated that there is no evidence o f significant long-term health risks to residents and office workers from the air
quality in Lower Manhattan. EPA Region 2, Press Release, Federal, State and City Agencies Announce Actionsfor Lower Manhattan Air Quality (Mar. 25, 2002).
8
at Ground Zero or the site had been cleaned up. The Centers for Disease Control noted,5
[T]he persistence of symptoms for greater than one year after the 9/11 event is a new
finding and requires further study.6
S Over 1,000 residents 43.7 percent of the 2,362 residents included in a recently
published survey reported that at least one new-onset upper respiratory symptom stillpersisted a year after the attack. The study concluded that residents of the affected area
reported significantly more upper respiratory symptoms than residents of the control
area.7
S As of March 2004, about 380 firefighters were still unable to serve as firefighters
because of respiratory illnesses that they had developed after WTC exposure.8
Assurances at the time that respiratory symptoms would be temporary and that residents were not at9
risk of long-term health effects apparently were based more on what the federal government wanted10
to be true than on scientific knowledge.
New research has confirmed the existence of World Trade Center Cough as a specific medical
condition. A special CT scan analysis of 20 patients with the symptoms commonly associated with
World Trade Center Cough patients who did not have asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD) or another more easily diagnosed respiratory ailment found that they suffer from a
respiratory ailment characterized by small airway disease. Such air trapping, a manifestation of
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The researchers use of an end -expirato ry, high resolution CT revealed abn ormalities in the lung11
airways that a standard CT did not reveal. David Mendelson, et al., Abstract, Air Trapping Detected on End-
Expiratory High Resolution CT in Symptomatic World Trade Center (AC) Rescue and Recovery Workers
(presented at the Annual Meeting of the Radiological Society of North America, Nov. 30, 2004)
); Radiological Society of North America,
Press Release, CT He lps Find Cause of Puzzling Cough in W TC Rescue W orkers (Nov. 30, 2004)().
Anna Gosline, CT Scans Explain Mysterious 9/11 Cough,NewScientist.com News Service (Nov. 2004)12
().Ginger Adams Otis, Lungs Were Destroyed: Cite 9/11 Exposure for EMTs Death, The Chief(July 8,
13
2005); Ridgely Ochs, Ailments, Struggles of 9/11 EMT Who Died Not Unique, Newsday (Sept. 4, 2005).
Dr. Thomas Cahill, professoremeritus of physics and engineering at the University of California at14
Davis, reported that his air samples showed unprec edented amb ient levels of fine particulate matter, sulfur, acidic
aerosols, heavy metals and other toxic comp ounds. His samples were taken on the roo f of a 12-story building at 201
Varick Street (W est Village), a mile north-northwest of Ground Zero. The results were higher than he had measured
at the Kuwaiti oil field fires during the 1991 Gulf Wa r. Thomas Cahill, et al., Analysis of Aerosols from the WorldTrade Center Collapse Site, New York, Oct. 2 to Oct. 30, 2001, Aerosol Sci. & Tech. 38:165-183 (2004), p. 182.
9
obstructed lung airways, results in shortness of breath, dry cough or wheezing. The authors developed11
a visual scale for the black spots that the scans revealed in the airways. (The black spots indicate that
air is trapped in the lungs, making it difficult for the patient to breathe freely.) Reportedly, they noted
that while smokers would probably fall somewhere between 0 and 4 on that scale, the World Trade
Center rescue workers averaged 10.55. The lead author observed that the most likely culprit behind this
type of airway disease was the pulverized alkaline cement released by the collapse of the towers.12
No comprehensive research on mortality related to 9/11 pollution health impacts has yet been
released, although some concerns have been raised about individual cases. A retired Emergency
Medical Technician with the Fire Department of New York, Tim Keller, passed away on June 23, 2005,
reportedly from extreme pulmonary distress. A member of the Uniformed EMTs and Paramedics Local
2507, he had suffered since September 11 from debilitating respiratory problems, yet was deniedth
workers compensation benefits and died almost penniless. Colleagues speaking to a writer for The
Chief, a newspaper for City employees, stated their belief that Mr. Kellers death was caused by the
exposures that he suffered at Ground Zero. This is a matter that should be the subject of investigation.13
New Information on Potential Future Health Impacts from 9/11: Need to Consider
Immune System Threats, Potential Impacts on Offspring, and Geographical Scope
We are still learning more about the chemical soup to which people were exposed from Ground
Zero. The fires from Ground Zero produced a mix of toxic gasses and ultra-fine particulates (a
technical term for airborne dust) never seen before. A study released in November 2004 of induced14
sputum from New York City firefighters who worked at Ground Zero, collected 10 months after the
attack, made two important findings:
S The particles in the sputum of the New York City firefighters contained titanium, zinc,
mercury, gold, tin and nickel, while those from a control group of firefighters from Tel-Aviv contained mostly particles of silica, stainless steel and clays. Thus, the particles
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See Lung Chi Chen and George Thurston, World Trade Center Cough, The Lancet Supplement360:15
s37-s38 (Dec. 2002).
Elizabeth Fireman, et al., Induced Sputum Assessment in New York City Firefighters Exposed to World16
Trade Center Dust,Envtl Health Persp. 112(15):1564-69 (Nov. 2004). Indications of inflammation also werehigher, and increased with cumulative WTC exposure (measured in number of days worked at Ground Zero).
Robert Dyer, EPA Office of Research and Developme nt, Chemical Mixtures and Health Effects at17
Superfund Sites,Intl J Hygiene & Envtl Health 205:149-53 (2002). The solvents included toluene, chlorobenzene,trichloroethylene, and mixed xylenes. The PAH mixture included benzo[ a]pyrene, benzo{b]fluoranthene,
dibenz[a,b]anthracene, 5-methylchrysene and cyclopenta[cd]pyrene. Relatively recent studies have documented
significant additive or synergistic effects from very low doses of exposure to estroge nic chemicals that mimic
hormones in the human body. These studies found that certain endocrine-disrupting compounds could produce an
effect in combination even though the individua l chemicals were below their no-observe d-effects concentrations.
Elisabeth Silva, et al., Something from Nothing Eight Weak Estrogenic Chemicals Combined at Concentrations
below NOECs Produce Significant Mixture Effects,Envtl Sci Technol. 36(8):1751-56 (2002); Nissanka Rajapakse,et al., Combining Xenoestrogens at Levels Below Individual No-Observed-Effect Concentrations Dramatically
Enhances Steroid Hormone Action, Envtl Health Persp. 110(9):917-21(2002); J. Payne, et al., Mixtures of Four
Organochlorines Enhance Human Breast Cancer Cell Proliferation, Envtl Health Persp. 109(4):391-97 (2001).
Robert Nolan, et al., Risk Assessment for Asbestos-related Cancer from the 9/11 Attack on the W orld18
Trade Center,J Occupl & Envtl Med. 47:(8):817-25 (Aug. 2005). Similarly, an evaluation of asbestos exposure
for truck drivers working at the WTC site, based on ambient air and personal mo nitors, found that exposures were
very low and short-term. The researchers predic ted that the drivers were not at an increased risk for asbestos-relateddisease. Patrick Breysse, et al., Asbestos Exposures to Truck Drivers During World Trade Center Cleanup
10
that the Ground Zero firefighter inhaled were more toxic, and the toxicity was more
complex. Also,
S Many particles that the New York firefighters inhaled were much larger, ranging from
1 to 50 microns in size rather than only the more typical 1 to 10 microns seen in the
control group. The fact that they had inhaled larger particles in addition to small onesis of concern in part because the larger ones were more caustic.15
The researchers observed, We believe the differences . . . demonstrate a unique exposure following
the WTC Collapse.16
The effects of exposure to a mixture of chemicals may be simply additive, or it may be
synergistic (the combined effect being greater than merely adding the effects of the individual
pollutants) or antagonistic (the combined effect being less than the effects of the individual pollutants).
Between 1991 and 1993, EPAs own Office of Research and Development conducted a small study of
the health impacts of mixtures of chemicals typically present at Superfund sites. A report on the results
of the study, published many years later, indicated that additive effects were most common, but thatboth synergistic and antagonistic impacts could occur.17
Mere consideration of individual chemicals, in isolation from the multiple exposures that
occurred, can lead to conclusions that exposures to 9/11 pollution will not cause certain health effects.
A recent study, for example, estimates that the risk of cancer from outdoor exposure to airborne
asbestos released by the World Trade Center attack would be less than one case over the lifetime of the
residential population of Lower Manhattan (57,514 residents) using one calculation, and 12 excess
cancers using EPAs traditional risk assessment model. This could be somewhat encouraging news18
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Operations, J Occupl & Envtl Hygiene 2(8):400-05 (Aug. 2005).
G. S. Berkowitz, et al., The World Trade Center Disaster and Intrauterine Growth Restriction (letter)19
JAMA (290(5):595-96 (2003).
Lioy (2002);Health and Environmental Consequences, p. 17.20
Calculated estimate by David Newman, NYCOSH Industrial Hygienist, presented at Sierra Club forum21
on Ground Zero environmental issues, Dec. 17, 2003.
U.S. Agency for Toxic Substances and Diseases Registry (ATSDR), ToxFAQs for Polycyclic22
Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs) (Sept. 1996), pp. 2-3.Christopher Sommers, et al., Reduction of Particulate Air Po llution Lowers the Risk of Heritable
23
Mutations in Mice, Science 304:1008-1010 (May 14, 2004); Research Links Air Pollution to Genetic Mutations,USA Today (Sept. 13, 2004).
Frederica Perera, etal., DNA Damage from Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons Measured by24
Benzo[a]pyrene-DNA Adducts in Mothers and Newborns from Northern Manhattan, the World Trade Center Area,
Poland, and China, Cancer Epid Bioma rkers & Prev. 14:709-14 (Mar. 2005). See also Frederica Perera, et al.,
Biomarkers in Maternal and Newborn Blood Indicate Heightened Fetal Susceptibility to Procarcinogenic DNADamage,Envtl Health Persp. 112(10): 1133-36 (July 2004).
11
for many residents and area employees. The study is based on estimates of exposure and is limited in
part because, as the authors note, EPAs air monitoring for asbestos generated by the terrorist attack
was not based on health benchmarks or on acquiring data for a risk assessment. More importantly,
the study did not take into account the potential impacts of multiple chemical exposure.
While no new health risk studies have emerged on the potential combined impact of the multiplechemical exposures that people experienced from the World Trade Center attack, studies of individual
pollutants indicate important areas of concern. Also, a study of one type of health impact indicates the
need to expand the geographical scope of 9/11-related health screenings and cleanup.
Impacts on the Newborns. A 2003 study of 187 pregnant women who were either in or near
the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 had found that 8.2 percent were born with a birth
weight below the tenth percentile for gestational age, compared to 3.8 percent in a control group. It was
suggested that the impact might be caused by exposure to polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs).19
PAHs are a group of chemicals commonly formed by incomplete combustion of oil, plastics, and many
other substances. The 9/11 attack released an estimated 200,000 to 2 million pounds of PAHs within
half a kilometer of Ground Zero, and at least 8,000 to 80,000 pounds of it probably became easily20inhalable by becoming attached to tiny dust particles. Some PAHs may reasonably be expected to21
cause cancer.22
New evidence supports further concern regarding the exposure of pregnant women to PAHs
from the World Trade Center disaster. A 2004 study had found that male mice exposed to higher levels
of PAH air pollution passed on genetic mutations at a rate 52 percent higher than that for male mice
exposed to rural levels. Now, a new study of non-smoking mothers and their newborns has found that23
babies exposed to PAHs while in the womb are susceptible to pro-carcinogenic DNA damage from
PAHs that is, damage that makes one more susceptible to cancer. Using a biomarker for
procarcinogenic genetic damage, it found that 57.5 percent of mothers exposed to the World Trade
Center dust cloud had detectible levels of the biomarker, and 60.6 percent of the newborns also wereaffected. There is reason to be concerned, therefore, that exposure to PAHs may pose a risk to24
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Transgenerationa l impacts of pollution in some cases may extend ove r several generations. A new study25
in rats of two pesticides that cause male infertility found that exposure of a pr egnant rat caused fertility reductions
not only in the first generation but also in the second generation. M. D. Anway, et al., Epigenic Transgenerational
Actions of Endocrine Disruptors and Male Fertility, Science 308:1466-69 (2005).
Jean C. Pfau, et al., Assessment of Autoimmune Responses Associated with Asbe stos Exposure in26
Libby, Mondana, USA,Envtl Health Persp. 113(1):25-30 (2005).
Juan Gonzalez, A Toxic Nightmare at Disaster Site: Air, Water Soil Contaminated, New York Daily27
News (Oct. 26, 2001); EPA Daily Summary, October 14, and EPA Daily Summary, October 15. In an attempt to
persuade the Daily News publisher that hazards were minimal, former EPA Administrator Whitman argued that the
elevated levels of benzene were not a significant risk to the workers because EPA has more c onsistently found low
levels of contaminants in the breathing zone - five to seven feet above the debris pile. M emorandum from C hristieWhitman, EPA Administrator to Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Chairman & Co-Publisher, Daily News and Edward
Kosner, Editor in Chief,Daily News , re Oct. 26, 2001 Front Page News Story (undated), p. 2. Her memorandum did
not acknowled ge the fact that workers were removing materials from the pile by hand.
EPA Response to September 11, EPA M onitoring Site: WTC - South Tower Benzene Air Monitoring28
Data (< http://oaspub.epa.gov/nyr/benzene_air_monitoring?p_addr_id=9 >) .
EPA Office of Inspector General,EPAs Response to the World Trad e Center Collapse: Challenges,29
Successes and Areas for Improvement(Aug. 21, 2003)(hereafter,IG Report), p. 47.
Qing Lan, et al., Hematotoxicity in Workers Exposed to Low Levels of Benzene, Science30
306(5702):1774-76 (Dec. 3, 2004); University of California at Berkeley, Press Release, New Study LinksOccupational Exposure to Low Levels of Benzene with Decreased White Blood Cell Counts (Dec. 2, 2004).
12
offspring whether the father becomes exposed before conception or whether the mother becomes
exposed during pregnancy.25
Potential Impact on the Immune System. While most concerns raised about exposure to
asbestos have focused on cancer, it may also have an impact on the immune system. New research from
the Center for Environmental Health Sciences at the University of Montana has documented a linkbetween asbestos and the production of antinuclear antibodies that attack tissues, organs and cells.
The researchers found that these antinuclear antibodies occurred a surprising 28.6 percent more
frequently in a group of 50 residents from Libby, Montana a town heavily contaminated by asbestos
than in a control group in Missoula, Montana. Because the study was small, the researchers have
urged that a larger study is needed, but they noted that the study results support the hypothesis that
asbestos exposure is associated with autoimmune responses.26
For workers at or near Ground Zero, another immune system issue may be of concern. EPA
found levels of benzene at the pile that were significantly higher than OSHAs workplace health limit
several times in October 2001. Results from some air samples taken directly at Ground Zero were27
dramatically higher (up to 4000 times) than those taken in the surrounding streets. Some high levels28of benzene occurred as late as January and February 2002, when fires flared up during removal
operations. Now, a new study has linked exposure to low levels of benzene with lowered white blood29
cell counts. Benzene has long been known as a human carcinogen. Although the OSHA worker safety
standard for benzene is set at one part per million (ppm) averaged over eight hours, this study found
decreased white blood cell and platelet counts even with exposure below one ppm. Also, it found that
benzene exposure reduces the number of progenitor cells, including stem cells, that are precursors to
blood cells, and that people with certain genetic traits were more susceptible to these effects. The30
http://oaspub.epa.gov/nyr/dioxin_nd_air_monitoring?p_addr_id=16http://oaspub.epa.gov/nyr/dioxin_nd_air_monitoring?p_addr_id=16http://oaspub.epa.gov/nyr/dioxin_nd_air_monitoring?p_addr_id=16 -
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See Testimony of Brooklyn resident Jenna Orkin to the WTC Expert Technical Review Panel (Mar. 31,31
2004).
Victoria Wagner, et al., Asthma in Medicaid Managed Care Enrollees Residing in New York City:32
Results from a Post-World Trade Center Disaster Survey, J Urban Health 82(1):76-89 (2005), p. 84 (Table 3).
E-mail communications from the Mount Sinai WTC Medical Monitoring Program in response to request33
for data (Sept. 2, 2005).
13
significance of this study for Ground Zero workers who in some cases received higher exposures but
possibly for shorter periods than the subjects of this benzene study has not been evaluated.
Need for Health Monitoring of Brooklyn Residents. City Council member David Yassky
and Brooklyn resident Jenna Orkin have for years raised concerns about World Trade Center dust
deposition in the borough of Brooklyn. A newly released study reveals that asthma-related health31
impacts occurred in Western Brooklyn after the September 11 attack. A survey of Medicaid Managed
Care enrollees having persistent asthma found that residence in both Lower Manhattan and Western
Brooklyn (Brooklyn zip code regions directly across the East River from Lower Manhattan) were
associated with self-reported worsened asthma, and that residents of Western Brooklyn had an elevated
odds ratio for emergency department/inpatient hospitalizations with diagnoses of asthma between
September 11 and December 31, 2001. While the survey response was small, the results suggest that32
residents of Western Brooklyn were subject to respiratory irritants from Ground Zero. More
investigative research should be conducted to evaluate the extent of that impact.
II. Why All Americans Should Demand Strong Policies to Protect the Public Against HealthRisks in National Disasters
People from Many States Came to Help New York
All Americans should be concerned about what happened at Ground Zero, not only because
were all in this together, but also because the effects of the governments failures in the aftermath
of Ground Zero have had an impact on people throughout the country who really believed in that moral
value -- the generous people who volunteered to help in the disaster. No concerted program exists to
identify and track the health of the many volunteers and workers who came to New York from
throughout the nation to help at Ground Zero. Still, some information is available.
- The Mount Sinai School of Medicine worked with the Association of Occupational and
Environmental Clinics to ensure the provision of 9/11 health services in other states.
While health effects statistics are not available, they have screened 846 response
workers from other states, including 363 from New Jersey, 88 from Massachusetts, 79
from California, 77 from Ohio, 66 from Illinois, and 30 from Florida.33
The Workforce Medical Clinic in Redwood, California, for example, is monitoring
health problems suffered by members of a search and rescue team who worked for 13
days on the pile, laboring for approximately 20 hours each day. The leader of that 67-
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Malaika Fraley, Ailments Still Plague 9/11 Search and Rescue Team: Local Clinic to Test Those with34
Health Problems as Part of Study, San Mateo County Times (Sept. 11, 2004).
Kenneth R. Feinberg, Esq., Special Master, et al.,Final Report of the Special Master for the September35
11 Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Vol. I (Nov. 17, 2004)(hereafter,Feinberg Report on September 11 V ictimth
Compensation Fund), p. 102, Table 5a. Some of these injuries probably occurred as a result of the attack on the
Pentagon, but most were World Trade Center injuries.
In New Yor k City, for example, 84 percent of tall office buildings and 64 perce nt of short office36
buildings harbor asbestos. EPA, Guidelines for Catastrophic Emergency Situations Involving Asbe stos (EPA 340/1-
92-010)(Feb. 1992), p. 24.
The Indian Point Nuclear Power Plants proximity to dense population areas, including New York City,37
makes it a serious risk. In a study commissioned by Riv erkeeper, Inc., the Union of Concern ed Scientists found that
an attack resulting in a large radiological release could c ause as many as 44,000 near-term de aths from acute
radiation syndrome or 518,000 long-term deaths from cancer among people within 50 miles of the plant. Edwin
Lyman, Ph.D., Chernobyl on the Hu dson? Th e Health and Econo mic Impacts of a Terrorist Attack at the Indian
Point Nuclear Plant(Sept. 2004) ( ).
See, John Mintz, U.S. Called Unprepared for Nuclear Terrorism, Washington Post(May 3, 2005); John38
Mintz and Susan Schmidt, Dirty Bomb Was Major New Years Worry, Washington Post(Jan. 7, 2004); JeremyOlshan, City Scrambling to Handle Nuke Strike, New York Post(Sept. 21, 2004).
14
member team reports that about 70 percent of them became ill from the work. Some still
suffer from World Trade Center cough and other symptoms.34
- The final report issued on the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund further
highlights the problem. While most of the 2,680 people who applied to the Fund for
physical injuries were from New York, several were from other states, including:
New Jersey 182 applicants
Virginia 53 applicants
Pennsylvania 24 applicants
Florida 22 applicants
Maryland 22 applicants (most or all may have been Pentagon-related)
Connecticut 12 applicants
Other states 24 applicants35
Clearly, long-term health impacts from a national disaster cannot simply be viewed as a local problem.
Americans from all over the country respond. It is a national issue.
Security Concerns and Potential Targets
All Americans should be further concerned about our governments failed response to Ground
Zero pollution because a future disaster releasing toxic contaminants could happen in any state.
Louisiana and Mississippi currently face unknown levels of contamination as a result of the Katrina
hurricane. Any emergency involving the destruction of a large building is likely to cause a release of
hazardous substances. Industrial chemical facilities, chemical rail cars and nuclear power plants36
nationwide present inherent hazards that could put public health in jeopardy from a terrorist attack or
a disastrous accident. The potential risk from terrorist use of a nuclear device also cannot be ignored.37 38
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GAO, Hom eland Security: Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way at Chemica l Facilities, but the Extent
39
of Security Preparedness Is Unknown (GAO-03-439)(Mar. 2003)(hereafter, GAO C hemical Facilities Report), pp.
6 and 9.
Linda-Jo Schierow, Congressional Research Service, CRS Repo rt for Congress: Chemical Facility40
Security (updated July 29, 2005), p. 4.
Carl Prine, Chemical Sites Still Vulnerable, Pittsburgh Tribune-Review (Nov. 16, 2003) (available at41
).
Carolyn Merritt, chair and CEO of the United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board,42
Opinion Editorial, Despite Pr ogress, Chemical Spills Persist, Christian Science Monitor(Jan. 6, 2005).
USPIRG, The Dangerous Dozen: A Look at How 12 Chemical Companies Jeopardize Millions of43
Americans (June 2004).
Anne Be lli, BP Must Fix Its Safety Culture, Board Says: Saying Lapses Pose Imminent Da nger, Feds44
Issue an Urgent Call for an Outside Inquiry, Houston Chronicle (Aug. 18, 2005).
Clean Air Act, 112(r). The statute impo ses a general duty on owners and op erators of facilities to45
prevent or minimize accidental releases and to provide prompt emergency response action if a release occurs.
GAO Ch emical Facilities Report, p. 4.46
In New York, both City and State law require companies storing large amounts of hazardous chemicals to47
develop a risk-managem ent plan that City law states must at least consider using less toxic substances, but the city
reportedly has never pena lized a facility for filing a weak plan or for failing to adopt the use of safer alternative
substances. See Philip Weinb erg and Joel Shufro, Opinion E ditorial, Cut the Use of Toxics in the City,New York
Daily News (Sept. 30, 2003) ().
15
For one major category of risk chemical plant safety no federal security system is in place
despite warnings of hazards. The Department of Justice states that the risk of terrorists attempting to
cause an industrial chemical release is both real and credible. In the late 1990s, criminals at least39
twice tried to cause releases from chemical facilities in our country at a large propane storage facility
and a gas refinery. A General Accounting Office report in 2003 declared that voluntary efforts to40
ensure chemical facility security were inadequate, and the Philadelphia Tribune and CBS newsmagazine 60 Minutes identified poor security at more than 60 plants in the Pittsburgh area, Chicago,
Baltimore, and Houston, finding open rail lines, unlocked gates and broken fences. Carolyn Merritt,41
chair of the federal Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, observes that when a 48,000-
pound chlorine gas release occurred at a chlorine repackaging plant near St. Louis in 2003, neither the
community nor the plant had emergency sirens or automated alert systems, and firefighters had to go
door to door to alert residents to evacuate. A 2004 report by the U. S. Public Interest Research Group42
(USPIRG) highlighted 12 companies with facilities that could endanger millions of people. In August43
2005, the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board urged BP Global to investigate safety at its
five refineries in our country after an explosion and fire at its Texas City refinery killed 15 workers and
caused 170 injuries.44
EPA rules under the Clean Air Act require chemical facilities that manage certain hazardous
chemicals in larger amounts to have a risk management plan describing its accident prevention
measures and emergency response program. The rule does not, however, specifically require such45
plans to address the threat of terrorism. Although one could interpret this section of the law to give EPA
authority to adopt rules on security from terrorism, the agency is waiting instead for action by
Congress which has not yet come. Without uniform, enforceable standards and oversight, it cannot46 47
be said that a security program is in place to protect the public.
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Eric Lipton, Administration to Seek Antiterror Rules for Che mical Plants,New York Times (June 15,48
2005). The e ffectiveness of any legislation may be at risk given the House leaderships decision to leave chemicalsecurity issues under the jurisdiction of the Energy and Commerce Committee, where chairman Joe Barton of Texas
is seen as a long-time ally of chemical industries, rather than in the Homeland Security Committee. See Manu Raju,
Chemical Security Review by Homeland Department May Undercut EPA Assessment, Inside EPA (Jan. 6, 2005).
EPA,Homeland Security Strategy (Oct. 2004), p. xi-xiv.49
16
On June 15, 2005, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff finally acknowledged
publicly the need for federal standards to protect chemical plants from terrorism. Any such legislative48
efforts should focus, as recommended in the USPIRG report, both on strengthening physical security
and reducing chemical inventories or substituting safer chemicals (which would reduce the impact of
a terrorist assault if security fails.)
Even if significant progress in security measures occurs, the opportunities to create
environmental disasters will remain numerous. For this reason, all Americans should be concerned
about our federal governments improper assurances of safety after the 9/11 attack, its failure to change
those assurances even when information on health effects from Ground Zero pollution began to emerge,
its resistance to calls for a proper cleanup of contamination, and its abandonment of the patriotic
citizens who responded to the disaster caused by the terrorist attack. Such colossal governmental
failures must not be repeated in a future terrorist attack or national disaster.
III. Why It Is Reasonable to Worry that the Federal Administration Will Not Meet Its Duty
to Assess Fully the Severity and Extent of Contamination.
Most terrorist attacks are designed to have an impact on areas frequented by large numbers of
people. Such areas also have important economic or political significance. The conflict between
protecting the public and restoring or regaining access to areas hit by terrorist attacks raises important
issues that must be aired publicly.
EPAs new Homeland Security Strategy, released in October 2004, states as a Homeland
Security Objective, that the agency will use best available environmental information from internal
and external sources to ensure informed decision-making and appropriate response. This would be49
a significant improvement over EPAs performance at Ground Zero, documented in the 2004 Sierra
Club report, when it ignored its own vast knowledge about the chemicals released from combustion anddemolition, issued assurances of safety based on inadequate testing, and failed to carry out its
responsibilities under federal environmental law. Unfortunately, the public has no assurance that this
will occur, because the kinds of political pressures that were placed on EPA after the World Trade
Center attack may become part of a new goal-setting process for cleanup after future emergency
incidents. In this context, the public needs to know more about a new Department of Homeland Security
proposal to use an optimization process to make decisions about responses to toxic hazards from
terrorist attacks and other national emergencies.
Need for Public Debate on Optimization Policy. The reasoning behind the optimization
policy initiative first surfaced publicly in a 2003Inside EPA report about plans to develop cleanup goals
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As noted in Sierra Clubs 2004 report, Inside EPA had reported that the White House Office of Science50
and Technology Policy had established a high-level steering group of federal agencies to develop new chemical
cleanup standards. Administration to Draft Emergency Toxic Cleanup Standard Different than Superfund, Inside
EPA (Oct. 30, 2003). The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, a political appointee, reports
directly to the White Ho use Chief of Staff. See James Glantz, At the Center of the Storm Over Bush and Science,
New York Times (Mar. 30, 2004).
While the federal limit for maximum radiation exposure to the public at the proposed Yucca Mountain51
nuclear waste site is 15 millirems per year, 40 C.F.R. 197, one benchmark under consideration would allowexposures of 100 millirems and higher. See, H. Josef Hebert, Planned Cleanup for Dirty Bombs Called Lax,Seattle Post-Intelligencer(Dec. 2, 2004). For the draft proposed guidelines, see Department of Homeland Security,
Protective Action Guides and Operational Guidelines for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and ImprovisedNuclear Devise (IND ) Incidents, Interim Final For Official Use Only, in The Inside EPA Environmental
NewsStand(Nov. 2003)()
(hereafter,DHS Draft Interim Final Protective Action Guides).
See Letter from Daniel Hirsch, Committee to Bridge the Gap, et al., to Secretary Tom Ridge, Department52
of Homeland Security (Dec. 2, 2004).
Statement of Brooke Buddemeier, a radiation specialist for the Department of Homeland Security, as53
quoted in Matthew Wald, U.S. Plans to Offer Guidance for a Dirty-bomb Aftermath, New York Times (Sept. 27,2004)(as corrected by the newspaper, Sept. 29, 2004).
Matthew Wald, Pending U.S. Advice on Dirty Bomb Exposure Is Under Fire, New York Times (Dec.54
8, 2004).
17
for chemical and radiological contamination in the event of a terrorist attack or national emergency that
would be weaker than the cleanup standards that already exist under the Superfund Law. The50
Administration did draft proposed new radiological cleanup guidelines that, as disclosed by media
sources in late 2004, would allow radiation levels posing cancer risks much higher than is allowed at
commercial nuclear reactors or even at nuclear waste dumps. The Committee to Bridge the Gap, the51
Nuclear Information and Resource Service, the Union of Concerned Scientists, Sierra Club and over50 other organizations sent a strong letter of concern to Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge
objecting to the proposal. Ironically, a radiation specialist for the Department of Homeland Security52
asserted that goals for cleanup after terrorist attacks should be weaker when the attack occurs in a
prominent location where the need to resume using the site would be higher. This, of course, provoked53
criticism that such attacks would most likely also threaten larger populations.54
As it turns out, this research scientist was voicing what appears to be the theme behind a new
policy initiative at the Department of Homeland Security. A few years ago, the Radiation Advisory
Committee of EPAs Science Advisory Board offered to analyze and provide comments on this
initiative, an offer that has not yet been accepted by EPA. The background statement for the
Committees proposal states:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has proposed the use of
optimization as the endpoint for final cleanup actions during recovery
from a radiological or nuclear emergency. In this context, optimization
implies a process whereby societal values and needs are integrated with
science-based risks and benefits to develop action options that can be
evaluated for their acceptability to the public . . . . In lieu of the threshold
approach, a process termed optimization was proposed that considers
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EPA Radiation Advisory Committee, Science Advisory Board, Agency Request Project # 05-25:55
Optimization of Radiological Emergency Cleanup Decisions (expected fiscal year activity is to begin: 2005)(projectin queue for planning phase)(, click on Advisory Projects).
DHS Draft Interim Final Protective Action Guides, p. 10.56
It further stated, The issue of cleanup actions during the recovery phase of an emerge ncy is not unique to57
the radiation protection discipline, but the use of an optimization framework, rather than a numeric threshold
cleanup standard is a new and critical feature. EPA Radiation Advisory Committee, supra.
DHS Draft Interim Final Protective Action Guides, p. 1.58
DHS Draft Interim Final Protective Action Guides, p. 10.59
18
all data inputs in the context of societal objectives and needs, and results
in multiple response options.55
In other words, decisions about how much risk to tolerate will be conducted on a case-by-case basis,
rather than being based on across-the-board public health standards. The Department of Homeland
Securitys draft interim final guidance document on response to radiological emergencies, disclosedinInside EPA, insists that, Optimization (broadly defined) is a concept that is common to many State,
Federal and International risk management programs that address radionuclides and chemicals, although
it is not always identified as such The Radiation Advisory Committees background statement,56
however, clearly states:
DHSs proposed approach represents a significant change in
radiation protection guidance. The Radiation Advisory
Committee (RAC) therefore proposes to develop a commentary
to advise the EPA on the conceptual framework of a formal
method of optimization as the endpoint for final clean-up actions
during recovery from such emergencies. (Emphasis added)57
In other words, while optimization is a well-known statistical methodology used in a variety of
circumstances to weigh different databases and determine optimal allocation of limited resources, the
scientists felt that this was a new and different use of the term that required careful review and analysis.
The Department of Homeland Securitys draft document on radiological guidelines states that
the protective action guides for responding to a radiological dispersal device or improvised nuclear
device incident are not intended to define safe or unsafe levels of exposure or contamination, but
rather they represent the approximate levels at which the associated protective actions are justified.
Nevertheless, they do constitute advice by the Department of Homeland Security to State and local
decision-makers, and presumably would be used in major disaster responses orchestrated by the58
federal government.
It is not clear what societal objectives and needs would be included in this new approach, but
the Department of Homeland Security plans to include the potential severity of economic impact.59
An abstract presented at a July 2005 meeting of the Health Physics Society by researchers from the
Argonne National Laboratory proposed a model pursuant to the Department of Homeland Securitys
proposed optimization process that included the ability to estimate the direct and indirect business
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B.M. Biwer, et al(Argonne National Laboratory), RISK-RDD, a Radiological Incident Risk60
Management Tool (abstract for presentation, 50 Annual Meeting of the Health Physics Society held in Spokane,th
Washington, July 10-14, 2005) ().
Id.61
The DH S draft document states, In some cases, examining risk management options ma y help refine a62
risk analysis. DHS Draft Interim Final Protective Action Guides, p. 16.
19
disruption impacts from the loss of use of land and property due to a radiological incident. Other60
political or social considerations could potentially enter into the analysis as well.
It also is not clear how far this policy would extend. The Committees document suggests that
the optimization process could be directly applicable to other contaminants. The 2003Inside EPA
article similarly suggested that there was an intention to promulgate new emergency standards for otherchemicals. Nothing in the Department of Homeland Securitys draft document suggests that the policy
would only be used with regard to radiation.
It does appear that EPA would not have the last word on environmental safety if this policy
is implemented. The decision-making process about whether or not to allow or encourage the public
to re-enter an area, as described by the Radiation Advisory Committees background statement, would
be made by a decision-making team headed by the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
and the Governor of the state in which the incident occurred. This would be consistent with new61
national disaster response policy documents, described further below.
Several important questions about the full implications of this new optimization initiativedeserve thorough investigation and disclosure:
S Will this new policy differentiate between a critical need to reenter an area and the need
to disclose and enforce protection against health risks? In other words, will an area be
declared safe simply because there is a need to gain access to it or a desire to reoccupy
it?62
S Will this new policy result in weaker cleanup guidelines overall, as the recent activity
on a special radiological pollution guideline for terrorist attacks and emergencies
appears to indicate?
S Will this policy instead result in a lack of either guidelines or standards, so that
decisions about tolerable levels of safety for children and adults will vary depending on
such factors as the economic or political significance of the area in which they live,
work or attend school?
As the Sierra Clubs 2004 report noted, there was heavy pressure from the White House
to re-open the New York Stock Exchange quickly after the 9/11 attack, and this appears
to have been a motivating factor in the efforts made to reassure the public that the area
was safe despite lack of test data to prove the assertion.
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Most of the asbestos in WT C dust was chrysotile asbestos, which typically has many thin (less than 0.25
63
micrometers) fibers that the older analysis method called Polarized Light Microscopy (PLM) cannot detect. Also,
the force of the collapse pulverized a sbestos-based insulation released fibers mostly less than five micrometers inlength, which the PLM metho d generally cannot detect. B. Lippy , C.I.H., Safety and Health of Heavy E quipment
Operators at Ground Zero, Am J Indl Med42:539-542, 541(2002), p. 541. An analysis of 11 samples collected in
buildings near Ground Zero revealed that 95% of the asbestos fibers were below the width that the PLM method
could detect. R. H. Granger, et al., Preliminary Health Hazard Assessment: World Trade Center (submitted to
American Indl Hygiene Assn)(Oct. 2, 2001). Newer electron microscope methods, -- Transmission Electron
Microscopy (TEM) and Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) -- are far superior in detecting thin and shortasbestos fibers. B. Lippy, J. Boggs, and C. Lambesis, Controversy: The Small Fiber ,Asbestos Issues (Mar. 1989).
20
S Would implementation of this optimization policy mean that children and adults will
no longer have any right to a particular level of environmental safety if their community
becomes the target of a terrorist attack?
S Does the Department of Homeland Security plan to adopt this new policy in the form
of regulations, so that the public has the right to comment on it before it takes effect?
Such questions about the overall principle of the Department of Homeland Securitys new
optimization initiative must be examined in an open, public forum. The public needs to know exactly
what its federal government has in mind.
Americans must not make the mistake of acquiescing to weak or improper emergency
measures that we dont really want to live with on a long-term basis. The federal governments
improper response to a one-day attack on two tall buildings in Manhattan has had harmful consequences
that people are still bearing today. The war on terrorism, moreover, may be with us for many decades.
There may well be times when our nation has to make hard choices, but concealing from the public
critically important information about what they are facing is not the way to manage the situation.
Need for Investigation of EPA Testing Methods. The public also needs more information
on what happened last time -- how EPA approached its assessment of pollution hazards at Ground Zero,
and how it would approach such an assessment in a future disaster. A more comprehensive, independent
investigation is needed of the controversies surrounding the methods that EPA used to measure air
pollution from Ground Zero. These controversies include EPAs use of an older method for measuring
the presence of asbestos that is reportedly less effective at identifying very thin asbestos fibers as well
as short fibers; its failure to measure ultra-fine particles as a state-of-the-art university research team63
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Dr. Thomas Ca hill, of the University of California at Davis, used a rotating monitoring unit that collected64
air samples in sizes ranging from 10 micrometers down to .09 micrometers in diameter. The heat of the W TC fire
had indicated the likely presence o f such ultra-fine particles. Testimony of Dr. Thomas C ahill, in EPA National
Ombudsman, First Investigative Hearing on WTC Hazardous Waste Contamination, hosted by U.S. Rep. JerroldNadler, Transcript (Feb. 21, 2002), p. 24. See also, Thomas Cahill, et al., Analysis of Aerosols from the World
Trade Center Collapse Site, New York Oct. 2 - Oct. 30, 2001, Aerosol Sci. & Tech. 38:165-183 (2004), p. 182.
EPAs own 1996 guidance document explained that high temperature combustion forms ultrafine particles. EPA, Air
Quality Criteria for Pa rticulate Matter(EPA/600/P-95/001af)(Apr. 1996), Vol. I, p. 6-187 to 6-188. Yet, EPA
tested only for particles 2.5 microns or more in diame ter, for which a federal standard exists, with less sensitive
equipment, even though it knew that more sensitive technolo gy was available; such technology was discussed in the1996 guideline and had been further developed since then. Id., pp. 6-187 and 6-191 to 6-192.
See, Testimony of Paul Bartlett, M.A., A.B.D., Research Associate, Center for B iology of Natural65
Systems, Queens College, to the EPA National Ombudsman, First Investigative Hearing on WTC Hazardous WasteContamination, supra, pp. 640-43. Dr. Bartlett expressed surprise at EP As inability to detect the presence of PCBs
in air samples, since the chemical is so ubiquitous, and observed that EPA was using straight GC-MS, which is gas
chromatography and mass spectrometry, while everybody else is using GCED, electron-capture detection method,
which he stated was both cheape r and far more sensitive. He testified that he only became aware of EP As limited
sampling method for toxic organic chemicals after evaluating documents obtained through a Freedom of Information
request filed by Joel Kupferman of the New York Environmental Law & Justice Project.
IG Report, App. R, p. 133.66
Id., App. R, p. 132.67
21
did; and its many findings of non-detect for measurements of chemicals that critics argue are64
ubiquitous in the environment, raising concerns about the sensitivity of its equipment.65
IV. Why It Will Be Harder to Learn the Truth About Health Risks from Future Terrorist
Attacks and National Disasters
In August 2003, the Inspector General for the EPA released a report documenting the fact that
the White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) had blocked health risk information that
EPA sought to release to the public following the September 11, 2001 attack. While EPA protested that
it had provided more careful statements in other communications, the Inspector General stated that
although EPAs subsequent communications sometimes added information or clarification to the
message presented in the press releases, the Agencys overall message of reassurance about long-term
health impacts did not change. The Inspector General observed bluntly, it appeared that EPAs best66
professional advice was overruled when relaying information to the public in the weeks immediately
following the disaster. Politics, it appears, had trumped science in the communication of risks to the67
public in a national emergency.
Picking up where the EPA Inspector Generals report left off, the Sierra Clubs 2004 report
documented that the federal government EPA and other key federal agencies failed at least a dozen
times to provide proper warnings even after it gained information about the caustic nature of the dust
and even after evidence emerged that people were getting sick from the exposures. This government
inaction in the face of new information on health risks was unconscionable. Even if the federal
administration felt that the new data might be flawed, it should have cautioned the public to use better
safety measures while it evaluated the new information. It did not.
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Henshaw, John, Assistant Secretary for OSHA , U.S. Dept. of Labor, Standard Interpretation Letter,68
Jan. 31, 2002;see also, IG Report, p. 34.
IG Report, pp. ii and 19.69
EPA,Homeland Security Strategy (Oct. 2004)(hereafter,EPA Homeland Security Strategy), p. x.70
EPA Homeland Security Strategy, p. 34.71
Id., p. 36.72
22
The centralized filtering of information after the 9/11 attack made it difficult to learn the truth
about safety. That information control system, however, was not perfectly controlled. As noted in Sierra
Clubs 2004 report, OSHA responded by letter to a query about proper management of World Trade
Center dust from a unions attorney. In that letter, OSHA stated since asbestos-containing materials
were used in building the World Trade Center towers, the settled dust from their collapse must be
presumed to contain asbestos, and any demolition or salvage activity at the site should follow federalasbestos protocols for construction activity. This warning was in sharp contrast to the lax messages68
provided by the federal administration overall regarding World Trade Center dust. If this officials
warning had been placed in a draft press release rather than an obscure interpretive letter responding
to an individual query, one wonders how the White House CEQ might have changed OSHAs text.
While the Inspector General had urged EPA to ensure that future assurances about public health
and safety are adequately supported by data and analysis and are appropriately qualified, the heavy69
oversight of EPA by the White House CEQ makes any EPA efforts almost irrelevant. Also, EPA has
a new relationship with the Department of Homeland Security. EPAs Homeland Security Strategy
document, released in October 2004, states,
The Department of Homeland Security was established in early 2003 to
lead a unified national effort to secure America. The 2004 Strategy
reflects DHSs new leadership role in coordinating homeland security
activities across the government. As the new Departments roles and
responsibilities continue to evolve, it will likely further influence EPAs
homeland security strategic planning process.70
The new role of the Department of Homeland Security affects the operations of EPA in a national
disaster in ways that are not yet fully understood.
The question is, to what extent will EPA experts concerns and warnings be allowed to reachthe public in a national emergency? EPAs Homeland Security Objectives states, EPA will
effectively disseminate timely, quality information to all levels of government, industry, and the public,
allowing them to make informed decisions about human health and the environment. The first tactic71
listed under this objective calls for a structure that clearly defines roles for public communication.
The second tactic, ostensibly designed to improve EPAs ability to communicate effectively with the
public regarding incidents and threats, states only that EPA will develop tools to facilitate public
communication, create environmental outreach materials on health impacts and exposure risks, and
make various changes to its data and web-based information systems, including a repository of
exposure data used to communicate with the public. Such statements do not answer the question.72
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See, EPA, Strategic Plan for Homeland Security (Sept. 2002), p. 35.73
Department of Homeland Security,National Incident Management System (Mar. 1, 2004)(hereafter,DHS74
National Incident Management System ), p. 29.
The Precautionary Principle, which the United States endorsed when it signed the Rio Declaration on75
Environment and D evelopment, holds that when the risk of serious or irreversible damage is present, lack of full
scientific certainty must not be used as a reason to postpone cost-effective measures to preve nt harm. See Am J Pub
Health 91(3):20-21 (Mar. 2001).
DHS National Incident Management System , p. 11.76
23
Two key elements that could provide assurance that the missteps of Ground Zero will not
happen again are missing from this document.
S It contains no instruction to issue assurances of safety only after a careful assessment
of all the pollution hazards rather than merely measurements of individual chemicals,
as occurred in World Trade Center disaster.
S It contains no guidance regarding a better safe than sorry approach of reducing human
exposures to contaminants while complete information on the nature of the pollution is
pending. (Criminals should not be given the benefit of the doubt when they cause an
uncontrolled release of multiple chemical toxicants.)
This is not a substantive improvement over EPAs 2002 Strategic Plan for Homeland Security, which
stated only that EPA would improve the ability to communicate effectively with the public regarding
incidents and threats and ensure that lines of authority and communication roles are well-understood.73
The Sierra Club 2004 report had urged the Bush administration to work with Ground Zero-affected
communities, labor unions and environmental health advocacy groups to develop effective nationalpolicies and practices that promote truthfulness in the communication of health hazards and effective
response actions. Clearly, it has not done so.
Disturbingly, the Department of Homeland Securitys national emergency planning documents
itsNational Incident Management System and its new National Response Plan also fail to provide
assurance that the missteps of Ground Zero will not happen again in the event of another national
disaster. Stating that a joint information center will ensure that timely, accurate, easy-to-understand,
and consistent information is disseminated to the public is not enough. Many hundreds of people are74
sick in New York City today at least in part because of a top-down management approach to incident
communications from somewhere within the White House itself.
Simply using a precautionary approach (better safe than sorry warnings in the absence of full
information) could have prevented much of the toxic exposure that people experienced in the aftermath
of the September 11 terrorist attack. Unfortunately, neither theNational Incident Management System75
nor the National Response Plan contain precautionary language. Without an explicit statement of
precautionary policy and description of how such a policy must be implemented, theNational Incident
Management Systems call for integrated communications as necessary to maintain communications
connectivity and discipline and enable common situational awareness and interaction, and the76
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DHS National Response Plan, Public Affairs Support Annex, p. 2.77
Id., Public Affairs Support Annex, p. 8.78
Union of Concerned Scientists, Scientific Integrity in Policymaking: An Investigation into the Bush79
Administrations M isuse of Science (March 2004).
Former counter-terrorism czar Richard Clarke reports that on the evening of September 11 , the
th80
President told memb ers of his staff, including Clarke, that he wanted the stock market, banks and other businesses to
reopen by the next day, relenting after he was informed of the physical damag e but declaring that everything shouldshift to restoring economic activity as soon as rescue operations were do ne. Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies:
Inside Americas War on Terror(2004), p. 24. Repo rter Ron Suskind similarly states that Paul ONeill, the former
U.S. Treasury Secretary, was told on Septem ber 12, 2001, by the unde rsecretary for domestic finance, The
President wants to open the New York Stock Excha nge tomorrow thats the word Im getting. . . . I think he made
his wishes known to several people on the senior staff. Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bu sh, the
White House, and the Education of Pau l ONeill(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. 183. ONeill, accordingto Suskinds account, convinced the President to wait through the weekend, until Monday, September 17, arguing
24
National Response Plans statement that the Federal team must operate and speak with a unified voice
and consistent message could bode more ill than good.77
TheNational Response Plan does contain the beginnings of a more appropriate public health
policy. It states:
Public information must be correct and consistent with scientific
and medical recommendations. . . . The immediate involvement
of agency subject-matter experts is critical to ensure effective,
accurate, and timely incident communications with the public. .
. . Scientific, technical and medical experts should be identified
and available for briefings and interviews throughout the
incident. These experts are critical to ensuring that a message is
clearly transmitted into common terms and is received by the
audience with credibility.78
This emphasis on consultation with experts is important. Still, the current administration has a repeatedtrack record of ignoring any science that does not fit with its political objectives, even when public
health and safety is at risk.
Under the current federal administration, politics has trumped science again and again. The
Union of Concerned Scientists issued an in-depth report in 2004, documenting an unprecedented
pattern of behavior in the current administration to distort or undermine science. The report cited
examples of the suppression and distortion of research findings on climate change, mercury emissions
from power plants, reproductive health, and air