significance of june 12, 1945 (land registration)

7/27/2019 Significance of June 12, 1945 (Land Registration)

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G. R. No. 179987 HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN,petitioners,

versus THE REPUBLICOF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent

Promulgated: April 29, 2009

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CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

BRION,J.:

I concur with theponencias modified positions on the application of

prescription under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree (PRD), and

on the denial of the petition of the Heirs of Mario Malabanan.

I dissent in the strongest terms from the ruling that the classification of a

public land as alienable and disposable can be made after June 12, 1945, in

accordance with this Courts ruling inRepublic v. Court of Appeals and

Naguit(Naguit).[1] Effectively, what results from this decision is a new law,

crafted by this Court, going beyond what the Constitution ordains and beyond the

law that the Legislature passed. Because the majority has not used the standards

set by the Constitution and the Public Land Act (PLA),[2] its conclusions are based

on a determination on what the law ought to be an exercise in policy formulation

that is beyond the Courts authority to make.

The discussions of these grounds for dissent follow, not necessarily in the

order these grounds are posed above.
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Prefatory Statement

Critical to the position taken in this Dissent is the reading of the hierarchy of

laws that govern public lands to fully understand and appreciate the grounds for

dissent.

In the area of public law, foremost in this hierarchy is thePhilippine

Constitution, whose Article XII (entitledNational Economy and Patrimony)

establishes and fully embraces the regalian doctrine as a first and overriding

principle.[3] This doctrine postulates that all lands belong to the State,[4]and that no

public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or

implied, from the State.[5]

In the statutory realm, the PLA (Public Land Act) governs the classification,

grant, and disposition of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and,

other than the Constitution, is the countrys primary law on the matter. Section

7of the PLA delegates to the President the authority to administer and dispose of

alienable public lands. Section 8 sets out the public lands open to disposition or

concession, and the requirement that they should be officially delimited and

classified and, when practicable, surveyed. Section 11, a very significant section,

states that

Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed ofonly as follows

and not otherwise:

(1)

For homestead settlement;(2) By sale;

(3) By lease;(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title;

(5) By judicial legalization;

(6) By administrative legalization (free patent)
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Section 48 covers confirmation of imperfect title, and embodies a grant of title to

the qualified occupant or possessor of an alienable public land. This section

provides:

SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,

occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an

interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may applyto the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for

confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,

under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to

the United States have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of

grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in forceand have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but

have, with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received

title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied andcultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their applications.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest

have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession andoccupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of

acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-

sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or forcemajeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the

conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of

title under the provisions of this chapter.

Significantly, subsection (a) has now been deleted, while subsection (b) has been

amended by PD 1073as follows:

SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter

VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions

shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession andoccupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a

bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.

Complementing the PLA is the PRD (Property Registration Decree).[6] It was

enacted to codify the various laws relating to property registration. It governs
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the registration of lands under the Torrens System,

as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages. Section 14 of

the PRD provides:

SECTION 14. Who May Apply. The following persons may file in the

proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,

whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interesthave been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and

occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain

under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription

under the provisions of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned riverbeds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.

Right of Accession

Coming into possession of a right or office; increase; augmentation; addition.

The right to all that one's own property produces, whether that property be movable or immovable; andthe right to that which is united to it by accession, either naturally or artificially. The right to own things

that become a part of something already owned.

A principle derived from theCivil Law,by which the owner of property becomes entitled to all that itproduces, and to all that is added or united to it, either naturally or artificially (that is, by the labor or skillof another) even where such addition extends to a change of form or materials; and by which, on theother hand, the possessor of property becomes entitled to it, as against the original owner, where theaddition made to it by skill and labor is of greater value than the property itself, or where the changeeffected in its form is so great as to render it impossible to restore it to its original shape.

Generally, accession signifies acquisition of title toPersonal Propertyby bestowing labor on it thatconverts it into an entirely different thing or by incorporation of property into a union with other property.

The commencement or inauguration of a sovereign's reign.

For example, a person who owns property along a river also takes ownership of any additional land thatbuilds up along the riverbank. This right may extend to additions that result from the work or skill ofanother person. The buyer of a car who fails to make scheduled payments cannot get back his new sparkplugs after the car is repossessed because they have become a part of the whole car. The principle ofaccession does not necessarily apply, however, where the addition has substantially improved the valueand changed the character of the property, as when by mistake someone else's grapes were made intowine or someone else's clay made into bricks. In such cases, the original owner might recover only thevalue of the raw material rather than take ownership of the finished product.
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Civil+Lawhttp://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Civil+Lawhttp://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Civil+Lawhttp://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Personal+Propertyhttp://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Civil+Lawhttp://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Personal+Property


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In the context of a treaty, accession may be gained in either of two ways: (1) the new member nation maybe formally accepted by all the nations already parties to the treaty; or (2) the new nation may simply binditself to the obligations already existing in the treaty. Frequently, a treaty will expressly provide that certainnations or categories of nations may accede. In some cases, the parties to a treaty will invite one or morenations to accede to the treaty.

Accretion:

accretion/ krSHn/

Noun

The process of growth or increase, typically by the gradual accumulation of

additional layers or matter.A thing formed or added by such growth or increase.

Synonyms

increase - increment - growth - augmentation - gain

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other mannerprovided for by law.

Subsection (1) of Section 14 is a copy of, and appears to have been lifted from,

Section 48(b) of the PLA. The two provisions, however, differ in intent and legal

effect based on the purpose of the law that contains them. The PLA is a

substantive law that classifies and provides for the disposition of alienable

lands of the public domain. The PRD, on the other hand, specifically refers to

the manner of bringing registerable lands, among them alienable public lands,

within the coverage of the Torrens system. Thus, the first is a substantive law,

while the other is essentially procedural, so that in terms of substantive content, the

PLA should prevail.[7]

Significantly bearing on the matter of lands in generalis the Civil Code and

its provisions on Property[8]and Prescription.[9] The law on property assumes


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importance because land, whether public or private, is property. Prescription, on

the other hand, is a mode of acquiring ownership of land, although it is not one of

the modes of disposition mentioned in the PLA.

Chapter 3, Title I of Book II of the Civil Code is entitled Property in

Relation to the Person to Whom it Belongs. On this basis, Article 419 classifies

property to be property of public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420

proceeds to further classify property of public dominion into those intended for

public use, for public service, and for the development of the national

wealth. Article 421 states that all other properties of the State not falling under

Article 420 are patrimonial property of the State, and Article 422 adds thatproperty of public dominion, no longer intended for public use or for public

service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. Under Article 425,

property of private ownership, besides patrimonial property of the State, provinces,

cities and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons,

either individually or collectively.

Prescription is essentially a civil law term and is not mentioned as one of the

modes of acquiring alienable public land under the PLA, (Significantly, the PLA

under its Section 48 provides for its system of how possession can ripen into

ownership; the PLA does not refer to this as acquisitive prescription but as basis

for confirmation of title.) Section 14(2) of the PRD, however, specifies that

[t]hose who have acquired ownership ofprivate lands by prescription under the

provisions of existing laws as among those who may apply for land

registration. Thus, prescription was introduced into the land registration scheme

(the PRD), but not into the special law governing lands of the public domain (the

PLA).

A starting point in considering prescription in relation with public lands is

Article 1108 of the Civil Code, which states that prescription does not run against


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the State and its subdivisions. At the same time, Article 1113 provides that all

things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription,

unless otherwise provided; property of the State or any of its subdivisions not

patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. The provisions ofArticles 1128 to 1131 may also come into play in the application of prescription to

real properties.

In light of our established hierarchy of laws, particularly the supremacy

of the Philippine Constitution, any consideration of lands of the public domain

should start with the Constitution and its Regalian doctrine; all lands belong

to the State, and he who claims ownership carries the burden of proving his

claim.[10] Next in the hierarchy is the PLA for purposes of the terms of the

grant, alienation and disposition of the lands of the public domain, and the

PRD for the registration of lands. The PLA and the PRD are special laws

supreme in their respective spheres, subject only to the Constitution. The

Civil Code, for its part, is the general law on property and prescription and

should be accorded respect as such. In more concrete terms, where alienable

and disposable lands of the public domain are involved, the PLA is the

primary law that should govern, and the Civil Code provisions on property

and prescription must yield in case of conflict.[11]

The Public Land Act

At the risk of repetition, I start the discussion of the PLA with


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a reiteration of the first principle that under the regalian doctrine, all lands of the

public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right

to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

Otherwise expressed, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within privateownership are presumed to belong to the State.[12] Thus, all lands that have not

been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to

the State as part of the inalienable public domain. [13] We should never lose

sight of the impact of this first principle where a private ownership claim is being

asserted against the State.

The PLA has undergone many revisions and changes over time, startingfrom the first PLA, Act No. 926; the second public land law that followed, Act No.

2874; and the present CA 141 and its amendments. Act No. 926 was described in

the following terms:

The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It

prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing ofportions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms

and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in

the Islands. It alsoprovided for the issuance of patents to certain native settlersupon public lands, for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for

the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of

Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands. In short, the Public Land Act

operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands

remained in the government; and that the governments title to public

land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between

Spain and the United States. The term public land referred to all lands of the

public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open

to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of

the government and the friar lands.[14]

This basic essence of the law has not changed and has been carried over to

the present PLA and its amendments. Another basic feature, the requirement for

open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the

alienable and disposable public land under a bona fide claim of ownership also


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never changed. Still another consistent public land feature is the concept that once

a person has complied with the requisite possession and occupation in the manner

provided by law, he is automatically given a State grant that may be asserted

against State ownership; the land, in other words, ipso jurebecomes private land.[15] The application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title shall then follow,

based on the procedure for land registration.[16] It is in this manner that the PLA

ties up with the PRD.

A feature that has changed over time has been the period for reckoning the

required occupation or possession. In the first PLA, the required

occupation/possession to qualify for judicial confirmation of imperfect title was 10years preceding the effectivity of Act No. 926 July 26, 1904 (or since July 26,

1894 or earlier). This was retained up to CA 141, until this law was amended by

Republic Act (RA) No. 1942 (enacted on June 22, 1957),[17] which provided for a

simple 30-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. This

period did not last; on January 25, 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1073 (PD

1073) [18]changed the required 30-year possession and occupation period

provision, to possession and occupation of the land applied forsince June 12,

1945, or earlier. PD 1073 likewise changed the lands subject of imperfect title,

from agricultural lands of the public domain to alienable and disposable lands of

the public domain. PD 1073 also extended the period for applications for free

patents and judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to December 31, 1987.

The significance of the date June 12, 1945 appears to have been lost to

history. A major concern raised against this date is that the country was at this

time under Japanese occupation, and for some years after, was suffering from the

uncertainties and instabilities that World War II brought. Questions were raised on

how one could possibly comply with the June 12, 1945 or earlier

occupation/possession requirement of PD 1073 when the then prevailing situation

did not legally or physically permit it.
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Without the benefit of congressional records, as the enactment of the law (a

Presidential Decree) was solely through the Presidents lawmaking powers under a

regime that permitted it, the most logical reason or explanation for the date is thepossible impact of the interplay between the old law and the amendatory

law. When PD 1073 was enacted, the utmost concern, in all probability, was how

the law would affect the application of the old law which provided for a thirty-year

possession period. Counting 30 years backwards from the enactment of PD 1073

on January 25, 1977, PD 1073 should have provided for a January 24, 1947 cut-

off date, but it did not. Instead, it provided, for unknown reasons, the date June 12,

1945.

The June 12, 1945 cut-off date raised legal concerns; vested rights acquired

under the old law (CA 141, as amended by RA 1942) providing for a 30-year

possession period could not be impaired by the PD 1073 amendment. We

recognized this legal dilemna inAbejaron v. Nabasa,[19] when we said:

However, as petitioner Abejarons 30-year period of possession and

occupation required by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran

from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the

requirement of said P.D. that occupation and possession should have started

on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to him . As the Susi doctrine holdsthat the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes place by operation of law, then

upon Abejarons satisfaction of the requirements of this law, he would have

already gained title over the disputed land in 1975. This follows the doctrine

laid down in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., that

the law cannot impair vested rights such as a land grant. More clearlystated, "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest

have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of

agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of

acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24,

1947" may apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete

title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.


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From this perspective, PD 1073 should have thus provided January 24,

1947 and not June 12, 1945 as its cut-off date, yet the latter date is the express

legal reality. The reconciliation, as properly defined by jurisprudence, is that

where an applicant has satisfied the requirements of Section 48 (b) of CA 141, asamended by RA 1942,prior to the effectivity of PD 1073, the applicant is entitled

to perfect his or her title, even if possession and occupation does not date back

to June 12, 1945. For purposes of the present case, a discussion of the cut-off

date has been fully made to highlight that it is a date whose significance and

import cannot be minimized nor glossed over by mere judicial interpretation

or by judicial social policy concerns; the full legislative intent must be

respected.

In considering the PLA, it should be noted that its amendments were not

confined to RA 1942 and PD 1073. These decrees were complemented

by Presidential Decree No. 892 (PD 892)[20] - issued on February 16, 1976 -

which limited to six months the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land

registration proceedings.[21] Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered

lands shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as

amended by Act No. 3344. Section 3 of PD 1073 totally disallowed the judicial

confirmation of incomplete titles to public land based on unperfected Spanish

grants.

Subsequently, RA 6940[22] extended the period for filing applications for free

patent and judicial confirmation of imperfect title to December 31, 2000. The law

now also allows the issuance of free patents for lands not in excess of 12 hectares

to any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than 12

hectares and who, for at least 30 years prior to the effectivity of the amendatory

Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his


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predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to

disposition.

Congress recently extended the period for filing applications for judicial

confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of

the public domain under RA 9176 from December 31, 2000 under RA 6940

to December 31, 2020.[23]

Read together with Section 11 of the PLA (which defines the

administrative grant of title to alienable and disposable lands of the public

domain through homestead settlement and sale, among others), RA 6940 and

RA 9176 signify that despite the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 that the

Legislature has provided, ample opportunities exist under the law for the

grant of alienable lands of the public domain to deserving beneficiaries.

Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the

Property Registration Decree

As heretofore mentioned, PD 1529 amended Act No. 496 on June 11,

1978 to codify the various laws relative to registration of property. Its Section 14

describes the applicants who may avail of registration under the Decree, among

them -

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have

been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of

alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim ofownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription

under the provision of existing laws


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These subsections and their impact on the present case are separately discussed

below.

Section 14(1)

Section 14(1) merely repeated PD 1073 which sets a cut-off date of June 12,

1945 and which, under the conditions discussed above, may be read to be January

24, 1947.

Theponencia discussed Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation with Section

14(1) of the PRD and, noted among others, that under the current state of the law,

the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of only

until December 31, 2020. This is in light of RA 9176, passed in 2002,[24] limiting

the filing of an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title to December

31, 2020. The amendatory law apparently refers only to the use of Section 14(1) of

the PRD as a mode of registration. Where ownership right or title has already

vested in the possessor-occupant of the land that Section 48(b) of the PLA grants

by operation of law, Section 14(2) of the PRD continuous to be open for purposes

of registration of a private land since compliance with Section 48(b) of the PLA

vests title to the occupant/possessor and renders the land private in character.

Theponencia likewise rules againstthe position of the Office of the

Solicitor General that the public land to be registered must have been classified as

alienable and disposable as of the cut-off date for possession stated in Section

48(b) - June 12, 1945. In doing this, it cites and reiterates its continuing support

for the ruling inRepublic v. Court of Appeals and Naguitthat held:[25]

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable

character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or

earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June


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12, 1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a

bonafide claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or

modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, andnot those distantly or remotely located.Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation

nisi impediatur sentencia.

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt

petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting

the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declaredalienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original

registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.

Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and

even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides toreclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The

unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that

before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent

state.

Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it

merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and

disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed . If the

State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to releasethe property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government

is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its

ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in

good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable anddisposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the

State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

x x x

This case is distinguishable fromBracewell v. Court of Appeals,

wherein the Court noted that while the claimant had been in possession since

1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified as

alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not

succeed. InBracewell, the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine

(9) years before the property was declared alienable and disposable. Thus, in

this case, where the application was made years after the property had been

certified as alienable and disposable, theBracewellruling does not apply.

As it did inNaguit, the presentponencia as well discreditsBracewell. It

does the same withRepublic v. Herbieto[26] that came afterNaguitand should have

therefore overtaken theNaguitruling. In the process, theponencia cites with


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approval the ruling inRepublic v. Ceniza,[27] penned by the sameponente who

wroteBracewell.

While theponencia takes pains to compare these cases, it howevercompletely misses the point from the perspective of whether possession of public

lands classified as alienable and disposable afterJune 12, 1945 should be credited

for purposes of a grant under Section 48(b) of the PLA, and of registration under

Section 14(1) of the PRD. These cases, as analyzed by theponencia, merely

granted or denied registration on the basis ofwhether the public land has been

classified as alienable and disposable at the time the petition for registration was

filed. Thus, except forNaguit, these cases can be cited only as instances whenregistration was denied or granted despite the classification of the land as alienable

after June 12, 1945.

The ruling inNaguitis excepted because, as shown in the quotation above,

this is one case that explained why possession prior to the classification of public

land as alienable should be credited in favor of the possessor who filed his or her

application for registration after the classification of the land as alienable and

disposable, but where such classification occurred after June 12, 1945.

Closely analyzed, the rulings inNaguitthat theponencia relied upon are its

statutory construction interpretation of Section 48(b) of the PLA and the observed

ABSURDITY of using June 12, 1945 as the cut-off point for the classification.

Five very basic reasons compel me to strongly disagree withNaguitand its

reasons.

First. The constitutional and statutory reasons. The Constitution classifies

public lands into agricultural, mineral, and timber. Of these, only agricultural

lands can be alienated.[28] Without the requisite classification, there can be no basis


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to determine which lands of the public domain are alienable and which are not;

hence, classification is a constitutionally-required step whose importance

should be given full legal recognition and effect. Otherwise stated, without

classification into disposable agricultural land, the land forms part of the mass ofthe public domain that, not being agricultural, must be mineral or timber land that

are completely inalienable and as such cannot be possessed with legal effects. To

allow effective possession is to do violence to the regalian doctrine; the ownership

and control that the doctrine denotes will be less than full if the possession that

should be with the State as owner, but is elsewhere without any authority, can

anyway be recognized.

From the perspective of the PLA under which grant can be claimed

under its Section 48(b), it is very important to note that this law does not

apply until a classification into alienable and disposable land of the public

domain is made. If the PLA does not apply prior to a public lands classification

as alienable and disposable, how can possession under its Section 48(b) be claimed

prior such classification? There can simply be no imperfect title to be confirmed

over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable because, in the absence of

such classification, the land remains unclassified public land that fully belongs to

the State. This is fully supported by Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of CA 141.[29] If the

land is either mineral or timber and can never be the subject of administration and

disposition, it defies legal logic to allow the possession of these unclassified lands

to produce legal effect. Thus, the classification of public land as alienable and

disposable is inextricably linked to effective possession that can ripen into a claim

under Section 48(b) of the PLA.

Second. The Civil Code reason. Possessionis essentially a civil law term

that can best be understood in terms of the Civil Code in the absence of any

specific definition in the PLA other than in terms of time of possession. [30] Article

530 of the Civil Code provides that [O]nly things and rights which are


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susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of possession. Prior to the

declaration of alienability, a land of the public domain cannot be appropriated;

hence, any claimed possession cannot have legal effects. This perspective fully

complements what has been said above under the constitutional and PLAreasons. It confirms, too, that the critical difference theponenciasaw in

theBracewellandNaguitsituations does not really exist. Whether an application

for registration is filed before or after the declaration of alienability becomes

immaterial if, in one as in the other, no effective possession can be recognized

prior to the declaration of alienability.

Third. Statutory construction and the cut-off date June 12,1945. Theponencia assumes, based on its statutory construction reasoning and its

reading of Section 48(b) of the PLA, that all that the law requires is possession

from June 12, 1945 and that it suffices if the land has been classified as alienable at

the time of application for registration. As heretofore discussed, this cut-off date

was painstakingly set by law and should be given full significance. Its full import

appears from PD 1073 that amended Section 48(b), whose exact wordings state:

SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), ChapterVIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions

shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession andoccupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a

bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.

Under this formulation, it appears clear that PD 1073 did not expressly state

what Section 48(b) should provide under the amendment PD 1073 introduced in

terms of the exact wording of the amended Section 48(b). But under the PD 1073

formulation, the intent to count the alienability toJune 12, 1945 appears very

clear. The provision applies only to alienable and disposable lands of the public

domain that is described in terms of the character of the possession required

since June 12, 1945. This intent seen in the direct, continuous and seamless


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linking of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain to June 12,

1945 under the wording of the Decree is clear and should be respected.

Fourth. Other Modes of Acquisition of lands under thePLA.Naguits absurdity argument that theponencia effectively adopted is more

apparent than real, since the use of June 12, 1945 as cut-off date for the declaration

of alienability will not render the grant of alienable public lands out of reach. The

acquisition of ownership and title may still be obtained by other modes under the

PLA. Among other laws, RA 6940, mentioned above, now allows the use of free

patents.[31] It was approved on March 28, 1990; hence, counting 30 years

backwards, possession since April 1960 or thereabouts may qualify a possessor toapply for a free patent. The administrative modes provided under Section 11 of the

PLA are also open, particularly, homestead settlement and sales.

Fifth. Addressing the wisdom the absurdity of the law. This Court acts

beyond the limits of the constitutionally-mandated separation of powers in giving

Section 48(b), as amended by PD 1073, an interpretation beyond its plain

wording. Even this Court cannot read into the law an intent that is not there even

your purpose is to avoid an absurd situation. If we feel that a law already has

absurd effects because of the passage of time, our role under the principle of

separation of powers is not to give the law an interpretation that is not there in

order to avoid the perceived absurdity. We thereby dip into the realm of policy a

role delegated by the Constitution to the Legislature. If only for this reason, we

should avoid expanding throughNaguitand the presentponenciathe plain

meaning of Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by PD 1073.

In standing byNaguit, theponencia pointedly discredits the ruling

inHerbieto; it is, allegedly, either an incorrect ruling or an obiter dictum. As to

legal correctness,Herbieto is in full accord with what we have stated above; hence,

it cannot be dismissed off-hand as an incorrect ruling. Likewise, its ruling on the


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lack of effective legal possession prior to the classification of a public land as

alienable and disposable cannot strictly be obiterbecause it responded to an issue

directly raised by the parties. Admittedly, its ruling on jurisdictional grounds could

have fully resolved the case, but it cannot be faulted if it went beyond thisthreshold issue into the merits of the claim of effective possession prior to the

classification of the land as alienable and disposable.

To be sure,Herbieto has more to it than theNaguitruling that

theponencia passes off as the established and definitive rule on possession under

Section 14(1) of the PRD. There, too, is the undeniable reason that no

definitive ruling touching on Section 14(1) can be deemed to have beenestablished in the present case since the applicant Heirs could only prove

possession up to 1948. For this reason, theponencia falls back on and

examines Section 14(2) of the PRD.In short, if there is a perfect example of a

ruling that is not necessary for the resolution of a case, that unnecessary

ruling is theponencias ruling thatNaguitis now the established rule.

Section 14(2)

Section 14(2), by its express terms, applies only to private lands. Thus,

on plain reading, it does not apply to alienable and disposable lands of the

public domain that Section 14(1) covers. This is the difference between

Sections 14(1) and 14(2).

Theponencia, as originally formulated, saw a way of expanding the

coverage of Section 14(2)via the Civil Code by directly applying civil

law provisions on prescription on alienable and disposable lands of the public


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domain. To quote the obiter dictum inNaguitthat theponencia wishes to enshrine

as the definitive rule and leading case on Sections 14(1) and 14(2):[32]

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil

Code. There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified asalienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open,

continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. With such

conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of privatelands under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have

acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the

alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such

possession being open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have theright to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration

Decree.

Theponencia then posits that Article 1113 of the Civil Code should be considered

in the interpretation of Section 14(2). Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides:

All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of

prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its

subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

The application of Article 1113 assumes, of course, that (1) the Civil Code fully

applies to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; (2) assuming that

the Civil Code fully applies, these properties are patrimonial and are therefore

private property; and (3) assuming that the Civil Code fully applies, that these

properties are within the commerce of men and can be acquired through

prescription.

I find theNaguitobiterto be questionable because of the above assumptions

and its direct application of prescription under Section 14(2) to alienable or

disposable lands of the public domain. This Section becomes relevant only once

the ownership of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain vests

in the occupant or possessor pursuant to the terms of Section 48(b) of the


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PLA, with or without judicial confirmation of title, so that the land has

become a private land. At that point, Section 14(2) becomes fully

operational on what had once been an alienable and disposable land of the

public domain.

Hierarchy of Law in Reading PRDs Section

14(2)

The hierarchy of laws governing the lands of the public domain is clear from

Article XII, Section 3 of the Constitution. There are matters that the Constitution

itself provides for, and some that are left for Congress to deal with. Thus, under

Section 3, the Constitution took it upon itself to classify lands of the public

domain, and to state that only agricultural lands may be alienable lands of the

public domain. It also laid down the terms under which lands of the public domain

may be leased by corporations and individuals. At the same time, it delegated to

Congress the authority to classify agricultural lands of the public domain according

to the uses to which they may be devoted. Congress likewise determines, by law,

the size of the lands of the public domain that may be acquired, developed, held orleased, and the conditions therefor.

In acting on the delegation, Congress is given the choice on how it will act,

specifically, whether it will pass a general or a special law. On alienable and

disposable lands of the public domain, Congress has, from the very

beginning, acted through the medium of a special law , specifically, through the

Public Land Act that by its terms shall apply to the lands of the public domain;but timber and mineral lands shall be governed by special laws. Notably, the Act

goes on to provide that nothing in it shall be understood or construed to change or

modify the administration and disposition of the lands commonly called friar

lands and those which, being privately owned, have reverted to or become


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property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, which administration and

disposition shall be governed by laws at present in force or which may hereafter be

enacted.[33] Under these terms, the PLA can be seen to be a very specific act

whose coverage extends only to lands of the public domain; in this sense, it is aspecial law on that subject.

In contrast, the Civil Code is a general law that covers general rules on the

effect and application of laws and human relations; persons and family relations;

property and property relations; the different modes of acquiring ownership; and

obligations and contracts.[34] Its general nature is best appreciated when in its

Article 18, it provides that: In matters which are governed by the Code ofCommerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of

this Code.

The Civil Code has the same relationship with the PRD with respect to the

latters special focus land registration and fully applies civil law provisions in

so far only as they are allowed by the PRD. One such case where the Civil Code is

expressly allowed to apply is in the case of Section 14(2) of the PRD which calls

for the application of prescription under existing laws.

As already explained above, the PLA and the PRD have their own specific

purposes and are supreme within their own spheres, subject only to what the higher

Constitution provides. Thus, the PRD must defer to what the PLA provides when

the matter to be registered is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Application of the Civil Code

In its Book II, the Civil Code has very clear rules on property, including

State property. It classifies property as either of public dominion or of private

ownership,[35] and property for public use, public service and those for the


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development of the national wealth as property of the public dominion. [36] All

property not so characterized are patrimonial property of the State[37] which are

susceptible to private ownership,[38] against which prescription will run.[39]

In reading all these provisions, it should not be overlooked that they refer to

the properties of the State in general, i.e., to both movable and immovable

properties.[40] Thus, the Civil Code provisions on property do not refer to land

alone, much less do they refer solely to alienable and disposable lands of the

public domain. For this specie of land, the PLA is the special governing law

and, under the Civil Code itself, the Civil Code provisions shall apply only in

case of deficiency.[41]

This conclusion gives rise to the question can alienable and disposable

lands of the public domain at the same time be patrimonial property of the State

because they are not for public use, public purpose, and for the development of

national wealth?

The answer to this question can be found, among others, in the interaction

discussed above between the PLA and PRD, on the one hand, and the Civil Code,

on the other, and will depend on the purpose for which an answer is necessary.

If, as in the present case, the purpose is to determine whether a grant or

disposition of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain has been

made, then the PLA primarily applies and the Civil Code applies only

suppletorily. The possession and occupation that the PLA recognizes is based on

its Section 48(b) and, until the requirements of this Section are satisfied, the

alienable and disposable land of the public domain remains a State property that

can be disposed only under the terms of Section 11 of the PLA. In the face of this

legal reality, the question of whether for purposes of prescription an alienable

and disposable land of the public domain is patrimonial or not becomes
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immaterial; a public land, even if alienable and disposable, is State property and

prescription does not run against the State.[42] In other words, there is no room

for any hairsplitting that would allow the inapplicable concept of prescription

under the Civil Code to be directly applied to an alienable and disposable landof the public domain before this land satisfies the terms of a grant under

Section 48(b) of the PLA.

Given this conclusion, any further discussion of the patrimonial character of

alienable and disposable public lands under the norms of the Civil Code is

rendered moot and academic.

From the prism of the overriding regalian doctrine that all lands of the public

domain are owned by the State, an applicant for land registration invoking Section

14(2) of the PRD to support his claim must first clearly show that the land has been

withdrawn from the public domain through an express and positive act of the

government.[43]

A clear express governmental grant or act withdrawing a particular land

from the mass of the public domain is provided both in the old and the prevailing

Public Land Acts. These laws invariably provide that compliance with the

required possession of agricultural public land (under the first and second PLAs) or

alienable and disposable land of the public domain (under the prevailing PLA) in

the manner and duration provided by law is equivalent to a government

grant. Thus, the land ipso jurebecomes private land. It is only at that point that the

private land requirement of Section 14(2) materializes.[44]

Prescription

In my original Dissent (in response to the originalponencia), I discussed

ordinary acquisitive prescription as an academic exercise to leave no stone


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unturned in rejecting theponencias original conclusion that prescription directly

applies to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under Section 14(2)

of the PRD. I am happy to note that the presentponencia has adopted, albeit

without any attribution, part of my original academic discussion on the applicationof the Civil Code, particularly on the subjects of patrimonial property of the State

and prescription.

Specifically, I posited assuming arguendo that the Civil Code applies

that the classification of a public land as alienable and disposable does notper

se signify that the land is patrimonial under the Civil Code since property, to be

patrimonial, must not be for public use, for public purpose or for the developmentof national wealth. Something more must be done or shown beyond the fact of

classification. Theponencia now concedes that [T]here must also be an express

government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer

retained for public use or the development of the national wealth, under Article

422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can

the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public domain begin

to run.

I agree with this statement as it describes a clear case when the property has

become private by the governments own declaration so that prescription under the

Civil Code can run. Note in this regard that there is no inconsistency between this

conclusion and the hierarchy of laws on lands of the public domain that I

expounded on. To reiterate, the PLA applies as a special and primary law

when a public land is classified as alienable and disposable, and remains fully

and exclusively applicable until the State itself expressly declares that the land

now qualifies as a patrimonial property. At that point, the application of the

Civil Code and its law on prescription are triggered. The application of

Section 14(2) of the PRD follows.


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To summarize, I submit in this Concurring and Dissenting Opinion that:

1. The hierarchy of laws on public domain must be given full application in

considering lands of the public domain. Top consideration should be accorded tothe Philippine Constitution, particularly its Article XII, followed by the

consideration of applicable special laws the PLA and the PRD, insofar as this

Decree applies to lands of the public domain. The Civil Code and other general

laws apply to the extent expressly called for by the primary laws or to supply any

of the latters deficiencies.

2. The ruling in thisponencia and in Naguitthat the classification of publiclands as alienable and disposable does not need to date back to June 12, 1945 at the

latest, is wrong because:

a. Under the Constitutions regalian doctrine, classification is a

required step whose full import should be given full effect and recognition;

giving legal effect to possession prior to classification runs counter to the

regalian doctrine.

b. The Public Land Act applies only from the time a public land is

classified as alienable and disposable; thus, Section 48(b) of this law and

the possession it requires cannot be recognized prior to any classification.

c. Under the Civil Code, [O]nly things and rights which are

susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of possession. Prior to

the classification of a public land as alienable and disposable, a land of the

public domain cannot be appropriated; hence, any claimed possession cannot

have legal effects.


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d. There are other modes of acquiring alienable and disposable lands

of the public domain under the Public Land Act; this legal reality renders

theponencias absurdity argument misplaced.

e. The alleged absurdity of the law addresses the wisdom of the law

and is a matter for the Legislature, not for this Court, to address.

Consequently,Naguitmust be abandoned and rejected for being based on legally-

flawed premises and for being an aberration in land registration jurisprudence. At

the very least, the presentponencia cannot be viewed as an authority on the

effective possession prior to classification since this ruling, by theponencias ownadmission, is not necessary for the resolution of the present case.

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

[1] G.R. No. 144507, January 17, 2005, 442 SCRA 445.[2] Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended (CA 141).[3] See Collado v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 107764, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 343.[4] CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Section 2.[5] SeeRepublic v. Herbieto, G. R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 182.[6] Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529,amending Act No. 496 that originally brought the Torrens system into

the Philippines in 1903.[7] Substantive law is that which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which

give rise to a cause of action, that part of the law which courts are established to administer, as opposed to

adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasion(Primicias v. Ocampo, 93 Phil. 446.) It is the nature and the purpose of the law which determines whether it is

substantive or procedural, and not its place in the statute, or its inclusion in a code (Regalado, Remedial Law

Compendium, Volume I [Ninth Revised Edition], p. 19). Note that Section 55 of the PLA refers to the Land

Registration Act (the predecessor law of the PRD) on how the Torrens title may be obtained.[8] CIVIL CODE, Book II (Property, Ownership and its Modifications), Articles 415-711.[9] CIVIL CODE, Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership), Articles 1106-1155.[10] See the consolidated cases ofThe Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap,

G.R. No. 167707 and Sacay v. The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources , G.R. No.173775, jointly decided on October 8, 2008 (theBoracay cases).

[11] CIVIL CODE, Article 18.[12] Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development v. Intermediate Appellate Court and J. Antonio Araneta,

G.R. No. 73246, March 2, 1993, 219 SCRA 339.
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[13] See the Boracay cases,supra note 8.[14] See the opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno (now Chief Justice) in Cruz v. Secretary of the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 128) quoted

in Collado (supra note 2).[15] Enunciated in the old case ofSusi v. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424 (1925); SeeAbejaron v. Nabasa,

cited on p. 10 of this Dissent.[16]

PLA, Sections 49-56; the reference to the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) should now be understood tomean the PRD which repealed Act 496.[17]An Act to Amend Subsection (b) of Section Forty Eight of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Forty

One, otherwise known as the The Public Land Act.[18]Extending the Period of Filing Applications for Administrative Legislation (Free Patent) and Judicial

Confirmation of Imperfect and Incomplete Titles to Alienable and Disposable Lands in the Public Domain

Under Chapter VII and Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141, As Amended, For Eleven (11) YearsCommencing January 1, 1977.

[19] G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001, 359 SCRA 47.[20]Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in

Land Registration Proceedings.[21] Section 1of PD 892 states:

SECTION 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is

discontinued, and all lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title

shall be considered as unregistered lands.

All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands underAct No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the

effectivity of this decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership

in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system.

Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish

Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as

amended by Act. 3344.[22]An Act Granting a Period ending on December 31, 2000 for Filing Applications for Free Patent and Judicial

Confirmation of Imperfect Title to Alienable and Disposable Lands of the Public Domain under Chapters VII

and VIII of the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended).[23] R.A. No. 9176, Section 2.[24] See pp. 14-15 of theponencia.[25] Supra note 1.[26] G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183, 201-202.[27] 440 Phil. 697 (2002); penned by Mme. Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.[28] CONSTITUTION, Article XII, Section 2.[29] SECTION 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,

shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Timber, and

(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes oftheir administration and disposition.

SECTION 7.For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable

public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall

from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.

SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been

officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public

or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those
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on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which,

having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the President may, for reasons of public

interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries

established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reason, suspend their concession or disposition until they are

again declared open to concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the NationalAssembly.

SECTION 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain

alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are

destined, as follows:

(a) Agricultural;

(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes;

(d) Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.

The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to

time make the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer

lands from one class to another.

SECTION 10.The words "alienation," "disposition," or "concession" as used in this Act, shall meanany of the methods authorized by this Act for the acquisition, lease, use, or benefit of the lands of the

public domain other than timber or mineral lands.[30] See: Article 18, Civil Code.[31] See: pp. 10-11 of this Dissent.[32] See p. 20 of theponencia.[33] CA 141, Section 2.[34] These are the Introductory Chapters and Books I to IV of the Civil Code.[35] CIVIL CODE, Article 419.[36]Id.., Article 420.[37]Id.., Article 421.[38]Id.., Article 425.[39]Id.., Article 1108.[40] Article 415 of the Civil Code defines immovable property, while Article 416 defines movable property.[41] CIVIL CODE, Article 18.[42]Id.., Article 1108.[43] Supra note 10,Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court.[44] At this point, prescription can be invoked, not by the occupant/possessor who now owns the land in his private

capacity, but against the new owner by whomsoever shall then occupy the land and comply with the ordinary orextraordinary prescription that the Civil Code ordains. This assumes that the new owner has not placed the land

under the Torrens system; otherwise, indefeasibility and imprescriptibility would set in.
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significance of june 12, 1945 (land registration)

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