silence of the scams: progress, practice and prevention

Brunel University London

Silence of the Scams: Progress,

Practice and Prevention29th September 2016

Newton Room, Hamilton Centre, Brunel University London

Hosted by the Ageing Studies Theme, Institute of

Environment, Health & Societies, Brunel University London

Silence of the Scams: Progress, Practice and Prevention


Morning Chair

Professor Mary Gilhooly

Professor of Gerontology and Health Studies




Welcome

Professor Christina Victor

Theme Lead, Ageing Studies and Vice Dean - Research




The Health Impact of Scams

Dr Jan Bailey and Dr Louise Taylor

University of Chester



Financial Exploitation Closer to Home

Dr Gillian Dalley and Professor Mary Gilhooly



Financial exploitation

closer to home

Dr Gillian Dalley

Visiting Research Fellow

Prof Mary Gilhooly

Ageing Studies Theme

Institute of the Environment, Health

and Societies

CONFERENCE

Silence of the scams: progress,

practice and prevention

29th September 2016


The project

Background

Funded by The Dawes Trust – a charity set up to further the prevention of crime

Project Aims - general

Investigating the nature and extent of the financial abuse of individuals

lacking mental capacity (relating to acquired brain injury, dementia,

learning disabilities, mental health problems)

Aims - this presentation

To present some findings from the project relevant to today’s conference

‘Silence of the scams: progress, practice and prevention’ and in

particular focusing on exploitation within the family context


Research approach

Mix of methods, composite picture-building;

including

• literature and knowledge review

• national and local statistics analysis; expert interviews

• individual case studies from professionals

• case study (a London borough)

• Court of Protection (CoP) case analysis


Challenges associated with capacity issues

• Hidden nature of abuse which takes place in the

domestic setting, especially intra-family abuse

• When is abuse not abuse?

• Who has capacity and who does not?

• The poison of intra-family disputes

• Lack of data – e.g. survey data


In absence of a prevalence rate, what are the sources

of expert knowledge?

• Understanding capacity: Court of Protection, Office of the Public Guardian – mental capacity, human rights, best interests, protection

• Safeguarding: Safeguarding Chairs and teams –protection, best interests, managing risk

• Criminal justice: Police – evidence, protection and prosecution

• Support and help: Voluntary organisation advice lines and support, campaigning against disadvantage and exploitation

10


Sources of expert knowledge (cont.)

• Health and social care: Health and social care

professionals - diagnosis, care

• Policy analysis: policy leads – analysis, campaigning for

change

• Custodianship of assets: lawyers – managing property

affairs, assets; Banks & building societies – oversight,

customer relations

11


Possible sources of statistics on financial abuse of people lacking capacity

• National and local safeguarding statistics (Health & Social Care Information Centre -HSCIC)

• Voluntary sector statistics

• Office of the Public Guardian

• Court of Protection

• Crime statistics


HSCIC Statistics on financial abuse: England

2013-

14

%

Numbers 2014-15

%

Numbers

Physical (2) 27 32,775 27 34,385

Sexual 5 6,440 5 6,255

Psychological

& emotional

15 18,700 15 19,760

Financial & material (3) 18 22,270 17 21,935

Neglect & omission (1) 30 36,090 32 40,885

Discriminatory 1 1,230 1 870

Institutional 4 4,750 3 3,965

Total number of

referrals

122,140 128,060

Concluded referrals by type of risk (%), 2013-14 and 2014-15, England


HSCIC Statistics on financial abuse: regional

Region Physical Psychological

& emotional

Financial

& material

Neglect &

omission

Other

types

East Midlands 24 15 17 32 11

East of England 30 15 16 31 8

London 24 17 20 32 7

North East 23 15 21 34 7

North West 28 13 16 33 9

South East 27 15 16 34 8

South West 27 17 16 28 12

West Midlands 27 16 18 31 8

Yorkshire & the

Humber

26 15 16 32 11

England 27 (2) 15 17 (3) 32 (1) 9

Types of abuse by Region (%) 2014-15


HSCIC Statistics on abuse of all types

Location of abuse

2013-14 2014-15

Care home 36 36

Hospital 6 6

Own home 42 43

Service within the

community

5 4

Other 11 11


HSCIC Statistics on financial abuse 2014-15 England

Allegations of financial & material abuse - source of risk

(the individual alleged to be abusing)

Social care

support %

Known to

Individual %

Unknown

%

19 63 19


Case study area

• Victims of financial abuse lacking capacity: 69%

• Allegations of financial & material abuse - source of

risk (the individual alleged to be abusing):

Known to individual – 59%

Social care support – 21%

Not known to individual – 29%

• Location:

Care home 17%; own home 58%; other 25%


Court of Protection cases

• Analysis of 34 cases – out of 63 cases (27 rejected –

about DOLS and continuation/withdrawal of medical

treatment; 2 missed out) heard and published between

January – November 2015

• Analysed by following categories: LPA/EPA revocation,

grounds/reason, appointment of deputy, applicant (e.g.

Public Guardian, council, relative), respondent, intra-

family dispute, possible financial abuse, outcome.


Relevant case characteristics

• Potential financial abuse present by applicant to the CoP

Public Guardian 13

Family 4

Council 1 Total 18

• Cases characterised by intra-family disputes by applicant

Public Guardian 13

Family 9

Council 1 Total 23

In 14 cases there were indications of financial misbehaviour and

intra-family disputes co-occurring


Some CoP findings

• Types of financially abusive behaviour:

o gifting to self and others

o spending on property

o using funds as if ones own

o incompetence


Some CoP findings (cont.)

• Suspicion triggers

ocare home fees arrears and failure to provide

personal allowance

ofailure to keep and/or submit accounts to OPG

oco-mingling of funds


Case examples

Gifting

“These gifts [£75,000] far exceeded the limited authority to make gifts which conferred by section 12 (2) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and in this respect GB (the attorney) contravened her authority as attorney. SG (the brother, also attorney) was a party to the transaction and he also contravened his authority as attorney,” para 32, c 6.

“CS (the daughter) had received £22,553.31 and PL (the son) had received £19,925.63 from the account…. Both attorneys regard the money in their mother’s account as their inheritance and consider that they are entitled to dip into it during her lifetime,” para 16.

Brunel University London 23

“The Public Guardian believes the amount of £117,289 is

an excessive amount to claim for out of pocket expenses. I

would put it more strongly than that. I believe that charging

one’s elderly mother a daily rate of £400 for visiting her and

acting as her attorney is repugnant” para 41, c 68.

Co-mingling

“contravened her duty to keep her money separate from the

donor’s. She had defiantly opened an account in her and

[her mother] D’s joint names soon after her brother Martyn

assumed overall control of the management of D’s property

and financial affairs” para 43, c 72.


Intra-family hostility

“As regards the appointment of ES as OL’s deputy for property and

affairs, I do not believe he has sufficient detachment or impartiality

to manage his mother’s affairs and to ensure that her interests and

position are properly considered. I sense that he is motivated partly

by a desire to salvage his own inheritance and partly by a craving

for revenge against his sister and brother,” para 38, c 41.

“In response to my enquiry about his and Julian’s relationship with

their sister Lisa, Gary said “My sister and myself can’t abide each

other. If she was dying in the street, I’d leave her there.” He thought

that Julian’s relationship with her may be marginally better,” c 66

para 25.


Incompetence

“what concerns me however is that Audrey has no intention

or desire to learn about the principles ….. or best interests

decision-making or her fiduciary duties as an attorney. One

of her personality traits is inflexibility or rigidity in thought and

behaviour. …..” para 40, c 70.

“the striking feature of this case was that neither the

applicant nor the respondents had any idea about the

fiduciary duties and practical responsibilities that a deputy is

expected to undertake and the roles of the Court of

Protection and the Office of the Public Guardian in ensuring

his compliance,” para 24, c 1.


Self-interest

“I see no need to replace myself [by a panel

deputy]. I am the sole heir and because of my

mother’s dementia and current poor health, there

is no need to protect the estate’s financial

interests, which are effectively mine….….I am

the sole beneficiary of the estate and restitution I

made [of money he had already

misappropriated] would come straight back to

me on my mother’s death which considering her

present state of health is likely to occur sooner

rather than later,” c 68, para 28.


Failure to pay care home fees

“As I have said elsewhere “with almost unerring monotony in cases of

this kind, a failure to pay care fees and a failure to provide a personal

allowance are symptomatic of more serious irregularities in the

management of an older person’s finances,” ” para 28, c 19.

“As is frequently observed in cases of this kind, failure to pay care

home fees, a failure to provide an adequate personal allowance, a

failure to visit, and a failure to produce financial information to the

statutory authorities, go hand in hand with the actual misappropriation of

funds,” para 38, c 55.


Some emerging questions/issues from CoP

cases

• is IFD always an indication of abuse?

• lack of supervision

• lack of redress

• lack of punishment


The role of the OPG and Court of Protection

• Need for more information about their work

• Lack of clarity about the role of attorneys

• Lack of supervision of attorneys

• Cases dealt with by CoP are important source of

information about financial abuse – they reveal the range

of abusive behaviour found in family situations

• Case analysis show that intra-family disputes play a

significant part in financial abuse


Some findings from expert knowledge sources

(national and local)

• widespread awareness of financial abuse especially

within families, between ‘mates’, by informal carers – but

difficulties in taking action

• sometimes family carers involved in defrauding council by

deliberately running up debts – difficulties in seeking

redress against them

• concern that banks and other institutions don’t always

exercise diligence in responding to suspicions (or aren’t

even aware of possible abusive situations)

30


Expert knowledge (cont)

• different professionals apply different thresholds for triggering

alerts and different standards of proof; leading to:

o tensions in relations between agencies (e.g. safeguarding

teams in local authorities, OPG, DWP and the police)

o pressure of workloads, long-term involvement in

family/domestic situations where financial exploitation may be

going on in order to prevent it

o assessment of capacity not always straightforward - best

interests; right to make unwise decisions; undue influence all

combine to complicate decisions to intervene or not


Recommendations

• More knowledge-sharing across agencies

• Joint training

• Auditing of cases to learn lessons

• More information (and instructions) for families about their roles and

responsibilities as well as sources of support

Public policy issues

• Lack of redress – few prosecutions

• Lack of restitution – abuse may be stopped but assets are gone, loss

is not compensated for

Thank you

Gillian [email protected]

Mary [email protected]

Brunel University London Silence of the Scams: Progress, Practice and Prevention

Coffee and Tea Break

11.30am – 11.50am


East Renfrewshire Prevention Team: Working in Collaboration to Empower

Residents to Avoid Personal and Financial Harm

Paul Holland

East Renfrewshire Council



Tackling Mass Marketing Fraud (MMF) from a Multi-Disciplinary

Approach

Professor Monica Whitty

University of Warwick


Tackling MMF from a Multi-Disciplinary Approach

Monica Whitty

DAPM: Detecting and Preventing Mass Marketing Fraud

EPSRC funded project

Project Vision

The proposed project will develop novel techniques to detect and prevent ‘online’ mass marketing fraud (MMF). The project will establish new foundations for (a) detecting assumed identities and persuasive messaging used by fraudsters and (b) delivering much needed insights into the psychological and technical factors that lead to poor decision-making on the part of existing and prospective victims of such frauds. Through its multi-disciplinary approach and close focus on co-designing the solutions with its project partners and testing them in-the-wild during live MMF-detection settings, the project will generate not only new scientific understanding of the anatomy of MMF but also tools and techniques that can form the basis of practical interventions in tackling MMF.

Research Hypothesis and Objectives: Although MMF can initiate and take place solely offline, our focus is on MMFs that initiate online. The overall objective of this project is to develop ethical and usable methods that demonstrably detect and prevent MMF.

RQ1: What are the different types of online MMF and how might we cluster different types of scams, based on psychological, sociological, situational and technical variables so as to better design MMF reduction and criminal justice pursuit?RQ2: What is the anatomy of online MMF (examining psychological, sociological and technical variables) and does this differ for different types of MMFs?RQ3: What data are ethically and socially acceptable to draw upon in detection and prevention of MMF?RQ4: What variables are important in enabling us to distinguish those who have become single or repeat victims from non-victims (examining psychological, sociological and technical variables)?RQ5: What variables are important in distinguishing a criminal from a non-criminal (examining psychological, sociological and technical variables)?RQ6: What methods ‘work’ and do not work (on a spectrum) to detect and prevent MMF?RQ7: What actions could be taken by various organisations to detect and prevent MMF?

Drawing from the real world

Current prevention and detection techniques – What works and what doesn’t work.

Drawing from the real world

Scientifically evaluate known methods – statistically test effectiveness.

Understanding the psychology of the scam

Victim typology

Persuasive techniques

Anatomy of the scam

Language used

Profiles

Scammers Persuasive Technique Model (Whitty, 2013)

Development of the relationship

Living abroad: time to develop a relationship using digital technologies.Poetic emails: used to woo victimsInstant Messenger: draw the person close; made the relationship a routine part of their day.Voice: developed trust further.High levels of self-disclosureTiming of communication (late at night)

The use of media

How media is used to persuade, trick

Develop close relationships –hyperpersonal relationships

Progression of the scam via media

Computer science

Drawing from findings in psychology, media and communications, and sociology – detect scammers’ communication; detect scammers’ profiles’

HCI

Drawing from psychology and computer science – persuading victim they have been scammed.

Ethics in the art of the possible

How ethical is it to draw from personal data to protect?

Ethics – responsibility & blame

Whose responsibility is it to protect? (e.g., industry, banks, government etc.)

Who is to blame – repeat victims?

Policy Development and implementation

Re-think policy based on our findings

Inform government, industry on ways forward to prevent and detect scams.


Lunch

1.00pm – 2.00pm



Afternoon Chair

Professor Priscilla Harries

Head of Clinical Sciences Department


Safeguarding Adults at Risk from Scams: A collaborative approach


Friends Against Scams

Beki Salmon

National Trading Standards Scams Team


Beki Salmon

National Trading Standards Scams Team

29th September 2016

About the National Trading

Standards Scams Team

Five core objectives:

To IDENTIFYvictims of scams.

To INTERVENEand protect victims from

further victimisation.

To INVESTIGATE

criminal activity.

To INFORMlocal

authorities and agencies on how to work

with and support scam

victims.

To INFLUENCE

people at local, regional and national

levels to ‘Take a Stand Against Scams’.

The NTS Scams

Team has

approached over

200 Local Authority

Trading Standards

Services nationally.

Working with Local

Authorities

75%

16%

9%

Victims

Not Victims

Unknown

Identifying victimsVictim Feedback

750,000 potential victims

Average age of a scam victim is 75 years old

£30,865,637 estimated savings (£1,497 per victim).

£23,663,578 estimated detriment (£1,148 per victim).

InterventionDetriment & savings

Mail Marshals Scheme

Call Blocker projects

Royal Mail WTLL

Against Scams Partnership (WASP)

Projects & initiatives

www.friendsagainstscams.org.uk

#FriendsAgainstScams



About the National Trading Standards

Scams Team



About Friends Against Scams

‘Take a Stand Against

Scams.’



Who is who in Friends Against

Scams?

Friends

SCAMchampions

SCAMbassadors



Attend a SCAMchampion training session.

Recruit new Friends Against

Scams.

Hold Friends Against Scams

Awareness sessions.

SCAMchampions.



Why is learning

about scams

important?

ScamsWhat's the problem?

Oxford Dictionary Definition

A ‘Scam’ is a trick, a ruse,

a swindle, a racket’

Its nearest synonym is

‘FRAUD’.

“Scams make victims part

with their money and

personal details by

intimidating them or

promising cash, prizes,

services and fictitious high

returns on investment.”

National Trading Standards Scams Team (2016)

No matter what type of

scam, it is important to

remember that ALL

scams are

CRIMES.

To get victims hooked

and responding to

scams, criminals rely

on…

Loneliness

Vulnerability

Social

isolation

Shame

and

The fact that people don’t

REPORT that they have

been scammed.

ONLY 5% of these CRIMES

are reported.

Being conned by

investment fraudsters,

intimidated by doorstep

criminals, ‘clairvoyants’

and misled by fictitious

lotteries and prize draws.

The average age of a scam

victim is 75, showing that

criminals tend to prey on

older and often more

vulnerable members of

society.

People defrauded in their

own homes are 2.5 times

more likely to either die or

go into residential care

within a year.

This problem is growing.

53% of people aged 65

plus have been targeted

by scammers.

And it’s only going to get

worse.

Once a victim has

responded to a scam…

…their personal details are

perpetually shared and

sold on to other

criminals…

…and criminals will use

this information to…

…relentlessly target the

victim with either scam

mail, multiple phone calls,

or repeat home visits…

…in order to con, mislead,

intimidate and bully the

victim into parting with

their life savings.

Scam victims

SUFFER IN SILENCE.

Victims are often lonely

and the criminal is the only

‘friend’ they have.

Leading to situations like

these…

“By the way I never have

enough cash at this time in

the month, I am really now

wondering when I will ever

have any win.”

Letter from a victim to scammer

Scam victim’s house.

“So sorry, so if I’m not too late,

PLEASE can we start again?

Will you write to me again and

I’ll send you your £30?”

Letter from a victim to scammer

Leaving the victims to feel

like this….

“I get up, I wait for the post, I sort it, I go to bed. What else have I got? I might as well be

dead.”

“I hope I win, so I can move to a home. I want someone to talk

to.”

“I don’t get out, because I'm frightened. These letters are all

the company I ever get.”

One victim was found to have been

receiving 30 pieces of mail and 10

phone calls per day.

It was later discovered

she had lost over £1

Million.

Another victim agreed to work on

her driveway, which resulted in

repeat visits over two years; each

time she was persuaded to part

with more money.

She lost over £160k.

The actual value of the

work was only £6k.

Doorstep Scams victim being

escorted to the bank.

The stress and pain of

victimisation often results

in depression, withdrawal

and isolation from family

and friends and the

deterioration of physical

and mental health.

In some cases victims

have considered,

attempted or committed

suicide.

These victims are not

going to win the Australian

lottery or receive the

millions of pounds that are

‘waiting’ for them…

(for a small fee)

the problem is immense.

As you can see,

Scams cost the UK

economy between £5-10

Billion a year.

So, what can be done to

help give a voice to these

victims?

Together we can…

Talk about scams to

highlight the scale of

the problem.

Prevent people

from becoming a

scam victim.

Take away the

shame.

Together we can…

TAKE A STAND

AGAINST SCAMS!



Five key points about scams

53%£5 – 10 billion

Anyone 5% Criminals



Postal scams

Types of scams

Telephone scams

Doorstep scams

Online scams



Trust

easily

Health

issueDementia Vulnerable

Socially

isolatedLonely Pressure

Sense of

purpose

Targeted

by

criminals

Anyone can be a scam victim.



Consequences of falling for scams…

DebtsAttempt or

commit suicide

Damaged

relationships

More likely to

end up in care

Repeat

victimisation

Poor mental,

physical or

emotional

health



Postal Scams

• Post office

• Mail

• Stamps

• Cheque books

• Products

• Free gifts

Telephone Scams

• Phone calls

• Payments

• SMS messages

• Friends

• Helpful caller

• Opportunities

Doorstep Scams

• Poor quality

• Unnecessary work

• Fearful

• Pressure

• Cash withdrawals

Online Scams

• Suspicious emails

• Final demands

• Refunds

• Online relationship

• Payments

Financial hardship and / or self neglect

How to spot a victim…



Scams are the product of organised,

predatory criminals…

…who gain trust to exploit and steal money.

Use befriending and grooming techniques

HelpfulAppear legitimate

CharmingFriendly

Persuasive Persistent

Threatening IntimidatingAggressive



Congratulation

s!You are now a

Friend Against Scams.

Music: www.bensound.com

http://www.bensound.com/



What’s next?



Make a pledge and turn

your knowledge into

action.



Some example pledges

to get you thinking

about what you can do:



1. Tell five people about

scams and the Friends

Against Scams

initiative.



2. Encourage someone

you know to visit the

Friends Against Scams

website.



3. Share your Friends

Against Scams status

on social media.



4. Look out for people in

your community who

are at risk of being a

scam victim.



5. Actively support your

local fight against

scams by setting up or

taking part in a scam

awareness activity or

event in your local area.



6. Campaign for change

by writing to your local

MP asking them to

promote scams awareness.



The Friends Against

Scams team have pledged the following:



Frances and Jodie

have pledged to

become

SCAMchampions

and are now

delivering Friends

Against Scams

sessions through

their work!



Sarah has pledged

to share her Friends

Against Scams

status on social

media and to

encourage her

friends to complete

the online learning.



Jacob has pledged

to tell everyone that

he meets at

university about the

scale of the problem

with scams and

about Friends

Against Scams!



Anushka has

pledged to talk to

her friends and

family about Friends

Against Scams and

the ways that they

too can become

involved!



Sophie has pledged

to look out for her

neighbours and

others in her

community and

raise their

awareness of

scams.



Louise has pledged

to speak to anyone

who will listen (and

even those who

won’t!) about

scams and the

scale of the

problem.



Beki has pledged to

challenge people’s

attitudes about

scam victims to help

stamp out the

stigma.



So, what will be your

pledge?



Thank you for joining us today

Visit us online for all the latest news and

information about Friends Against Scams:


Any

questions??


Predicting Individual Differences in Vulnerability to Fraud

Martina Dove

Portsmouth University


Predicting

individual

differences in

vulnerability to

fraud

Martina Dove

There is a common belief

that fraud victims are

gullible, therefore

deserving of their fate

and personal fraud is

often seen as a non-

serious crime due to no

visible injuries. (Titus and Gover, 2001)

Majority of fraud

cases go

unreported and

victims are

frequently told to

pursue justice in

civil courts, for

which most have no

funds. Only victims

of ID fraud fare

better.

Fraud victims

expressed desire for

fraud prevention

advice. (Button,

Tapley and Lewis, 2013)

I

N

T

R

O

D

U

C

T

I

O

N

Research found

individual differences

to be involved in

susceptibility to

persuasion and why

people engage with

scams (Lea et. al 2009, Modic

and Lea, 2013)

Test the newly developed questionnaire on a proxy

scam situation

Develop and test a psychometric measure which may pinpoint characteristics

involved in fraud vulnerability

Interview fraud victims and explore reflections on fraud victimisation and aftermath

Quick overview of my research

Yey

• 12 semi-structured interviews with fraud victims

• Age range 19 – 55

• Amount lost £20 - £25 000

• Analysed using thematic analysis approach (Braun and

Clarke, 2006) in order to identify the sequence of

events that contribute to scam victimisation

• Each sequence implicated in scam experience was

explored as a unique yet sequential theme

• Urgency

• Dissatisfaction

with present

circumstances

• Conformity

• Lack of scrutiny

of information

• Excitement

• Persuasion techniques

• Credibility

• General strategies

• Specific strategies

Reasons for

engagement

Staying

engaged

Protection

factors

S

T

U

D

Y

1

Why is

fraud not

reported?

“I just didn’t feel that I

wanted to get involved with

the police in that way and

really are they gonna do

anything about it? They just

gonna write it in the book or

give me a number, that’s it.

They’re not gonna be able to

find the person or, they’re

not gonna be interested in

that kinda thing. That’s their

job, that’s what they should

do, but I think this is termed

low level crime and it’s not

really worth investigating.”

Peter – victim of face to face

scam

“I wouldn’t go to the police

because I would be

embarrassed to go coz I

would just say oh my

goodness me, how stupid.

Even saying it out loud to you

really is enough to say oh

goodness, I can’t believe we

did it. Why? Three intelligent

people. I can’t believe we did

it really.”

Kate - pyramid scheme victim

Effects of fraud are long

lasting; loss of self esteem,

humiliation, lasting anger and

yearning for justice

“I still have

fantasies about

getting justice

somehow and

being like Bruce

Willis, chase him

down and giving

him a smack”

Bill – face to face

street scam

“ I know it's not the same thing, I don't

even wanna pretend it's the same

thing but it is an abuse and it is a bit

like rape or something. I haven't been

raped and I haven't been physically

attacked, it's not as bad as that but

whoever you are, you feel vulnerable

and angry.”

Henry – investment scam

“ I thought that as a law

abiding taxpayer, my

money went to the police

and if anyone committed

a crime against me, the

police would be all over

it. That is not the case.

Experience suggests

otherwise.”

Rob – defrauded by a

fake company

“I now only order off the internet

of big names like John Lewis,

House of Frasier… It's a shame,

you know. There could be some

amazing small company out there

that does an incredible product

and I would never ever order off

the Internet off them now.”

Nina – internet scam

Fraud causes more than

loss of funds, it can lead

to negative view of a

society as a whole due to

erosion of trust.

Preventing fraud is

important but how

to make it relevant?

SampleN = 48

10 – never defrauded

17 – victim of fraud

21 - fraud prevention experts

(we talked to forensic accountants, cybersecurity

experts, City of London police, Trading standards,

HRMC investigators and academics in the field)

Methodology • Using the data gathered by interviewing fraud

victims, available theories and research, 61 items

were generated and administered through online

survey to different groups of participants

• Participants were asked to rate each question for

applicability to fraud and scams and invited to

comment on each question

S

T

U

D

Y

2

P

I

L

O

T

AimsThe study aimed to contribute new knowledge

regarding the personal attributes that provide

protection against scam vulnerability

Methodology • 45 chosen items were administered through

online survey along with Modic and Lea (2013)

susceptibility to persuasion scale and potential

scam scenarios

• The items were factor analysed, checked for

reliability and data analysed using statistical

procedures

SampleN = 536

Age range; 18-82422 – never defrauded

114 – victims of fraud

S

T

U

D

Y

2

Impulsivity α =.725

lack of restraint and

disregard to risk with

regards to making

purchases

Decision time α =.643

preference to take more

time and carefully

consider information

when decision-making

Belief in Justice α =.481

perception that justice

prevails and people get

what they deserve

Susceptibility

to Fraud Scale

(26 item scale)

Compliance α =.865

likely to comply with others

due to activation of social

norms or other factors, such

as time pressures, despite

awareness of the vulnerability

Vigilance α =.651

awareness of others' motives

and readiness to cross check

information given

Independent samples test

Non-victims hold higher belief that justice

prevails and people get what they deserve,

which may make them less scam aware

Sub

scale

Group Mean SD t df Sig.

CMP no 2.80 .82 -1.01 534 .315

yes 2.88 .73

VIG no 3.85 .65 -.01 534 .993

yes 3.85 .66

IMP no 3.02 .86 -1.49 534 .137

yes 3.20 .84

DNT no 3.68 .68 1.37 534 .170

yes 3.58 .70

BIJ no 2.80 .67 2.72 534 .007

yes 2.61 .64

no = never

scammed

N = 422

yes = scammed

once or more

N= 114

AGE CMP VIG IMP DNT BIJ

AGE -.286** .375** -.330** .199** -.137**

CMP -.221** .350** -.233** -.060

VIG -.173** .212** -.083

IMP -.305** .094*

DNT -.055

BIJ

Younger participants show more

compliance, impulsivity and believe in

justice more readily, whilst older

participants show more vigilance and

invest more time in decision making

Those high on

compliance are

also more

impulsive, show

less vigilance

and take less

time making

decisions

Vigilant

individuals invest

more time in

decision making

and are less

impulsive Bonferroni adjusted p < 0.01

Correlations

Fraud victims tend to be more

compliant, impulsive, invest

less time in information

processing and decision

making. They also show

lower belief in justice.

Analysis of

covariance

After adjusting for age, there was a

significant effect of between-subject factor

‘victim group’ and the following

subscales:

Compliance F (1,533) = 3.95, p < 0.05

Impulsivity F (1,533) = 7.22, p < 0.05

Decision time F (1,533) = 4.19, p < 0.05

Belief in Justice F (1,533) = 5.46, p < 0.05

Sub

scale

Email

type

t df Sig.

CMP real 1.32 534 .189

fake 2.98 534 .003

VIG real -1.83 534 .068

fake -3.91 534 .000

IMP real 2.99 534 .003

fake 5.34 534 .000

DNT real -1.60 534 .110

fake -2.18 534 .005

BIJ real .533 534 .594

fake 2.00 534 .046

Real email vs. phishing email by Apple results

Participants

were asked to

decide for

each whether

it is real or

fake

Only significant finding

regarding the genuine

correspondence was

connected to impulsivity.

Genuine correspondence had

some warning signs of a

phishing email, such as ‘hello’

instead of a customer’s name.

This is often pointed as a

feature of phishing emails,

which could explain why the

only significant finding was

connected to impulsivity

Individuals with higher scores on

compliance, impulsivity and with

higher belief in justice were less

able to recognise that the email

was a phishing attempt

Individuals high in vigilance and

those that invest time in

processing information and

making decisions were better at

discerning that the

communication was a phishing

attempt

Genuine email Phishing email

132 – thought it was a

genuine email

404 – thought it was phish

339 – thought it was a

genuine email

197 – thought it was phish

Phishing email Real Fake Total

Count

Real 83 49 132

Fake 161 243 404

%Real 62.9 37.1 100.0

Fake 39.9 60.1 100.0

Predicted group membership

60.8% of cases correctly classified

Genuine email Real Fake Total

Count

Real 202 137 339

Fake 88 109 197

%Real 59.6 40.4 100.0

Fake 44.7 55.3 100.0

Predicted group membership

58.0% of cases correctly classified

Genuine email

chi-square =10.91,

df = 5, p < .053

Phishing email

chi-square =40.24,

df = 5, p < .001

Discriminant

analysis of email

correspondence

By Apple

Susceptibility to

persuasion scaleModic and Lea (2013)

1. Trust and

authority

2. Social influence

3. Self-control

(lack of)

4. Need for

consistency

1 2 3 4

CMP .104 .604* .336* .159*

VIG -.194* -.298* -.198* -.137*

IMP .169* .311* .659* .167*

DNT .012 -.169* -.328* -.254*

BIJ .322* .023 .036 .018

* Correlation is significant at the Bonferroni

adjusted p < 0.0025

Susceptibility to persuasion`

Su

sc

ep

tib

ilit

y t

o f

rau

d

Related constructs denoted

by the same colour

Concurrent

validity

• Fraud vulnerability can be described as

consisting of 5 attributes; compliance,

vigilance, impulsivity, decision time and belief

in justice

• Susceptibility to fraud (STF) scale shows an

ability to distinguish between those that

report being defrauded and those that never

have been

• In addition, the STF scale has a good

predictive validity when it comes to phishing

communication

• There is evidence of agreement between STF

scale and the Susceptibility to persuasion

scale, measuring similar concepts

C

O

N

C

L

U

S

I

O

N

Predicting individual

differences in

vulnerability to fraud

@curiousshrink

[email protected]

Brunel University London Silence of the Scams: Progress, Practice and Prevention

Coffee and Tea Break

3.10pm – 3.30pm


The Dark Side of Marketing

Louise Hassan

Bangor Business School



Closing – Research Issues for the Future

Professor Mary Gilhooly




Thank you for coming

Drinks reception - 4.15pm


silence of the scams: progress, practice and prevention

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