silencing the guns: strengthening governance to prevent ... · may 2015 silencing the guns:...

MAY 2015

Silencing the Guns: StrengtheningGovernance to Prevent, Manage, andResolve Conflicts in Africa

GILBERT M. KHADIAGALA

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

GILBERT M. KHADIAGALA is Jan Smuts Professor of

International Relations at the University of the

Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa.

Email: [email protected]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This publication is the outcome of a joint collaboration

between the African Union Commission and the

International Peace Institute. Special thanks go to

International IDEA for their partnership in this endeavor.

Thanks also to the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale

Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the United Nations

Development Programme’s Regional Service Centre for

Africa for their support. The report draws from the

outcomes of a regional workshop on “Effective and

Inclusive Governance in Africa: Bridging the Gap between

Norms and Performance” organized by the African Union

Commission’s Department of Political Affairs, the

International Peace Institute, the United Nations

Development Programme’s Regional Service Centre for

Africa, and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale

Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), which took place on August 5–6,

2014, in Accra, Ghana. This report was prepared as the

background thematic paper for the African Union High

Level Dialogue on Democracy, Human Rights and

Governance in Africa, which focused on “Silencing the

Guns: Strengthening Governance in Resolving Conflicts in

Africa,” held on October 30–31, 2014, in Dakar, Senegal.

The author is grateful to the team at the AU Department of

Political Affairs (DPA) that spearheaded the conception

and completion of this project. Special thanks go to Aisha

L. Abdullahi, Commissioner for Political Affairs; Khabele

Matlosa, Director of Political Affairs; and George Mukundi,

Ibrahim Sanusi, and Lucy Dunderdale of the African

Governance Architecture (AGA). The author also wishes to

acknowledge the support from GIZ. The staff of the

International Peace Institute provided critical comments

that enriched the report.

Cover Photo: An ex-combatant holds

up munitions in Attécoubé, Abidjan,

Côte d'Ivoire. He is one of several to

have participated in a Disarmament,

Demobilization and Reintegration

(DDR) operation conducted in the area

by the UN mission, UNOCI. February 8,

2012. UN Photo/Patricia Esteve.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this

paper represent those of the author

and not necessarily those of the

International Peace Institute. IPI

welcomes consideration of a wide

range of perspectives in the pursuit of

a well-informed debate on critical

policies and issues in international

affairs.

IPI Publications

Adam Lupel, Director of Research andPublications

Marie O’Reilly, Editor and ResearchFellow

Marisa McCrone, Assistant ProductionEditor

Suggested Citation:

Gilbert M. Khadiagala, “Silencing the

Guns: Strengthening Governance to

Prevent, Manage, and Resolve Conflicts

in Africa,” New York: International

Peace Institute, May 2015.

© by International Peace Institute, 2015

All Rights Reserved

www.ipinst.org

CONTENTS

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Governance for the Prevention,Management, and Resolution of Conflicts . . . . . . . . . 3

African Achievements in ConflictManagement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Obstacles to Building Governancefor Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Opportunities for Silencing the Gunsthrough Governance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Conclusion and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

1

Executive Summary

In the lead-up to the African Union (AU) High-Level Dialogue on Democracy, Human Rights, andGovernance in Africa held in Dakar, Senegal, onOctober 30–31, 2014, this background report wascommissioned by the Department of PoliticalAffairs (DPA) at the AU Commission to shape andframe the discussions about silencing the guns inAfrica by 2020. Within the framework of theAfrican Governance Architecture and the AfricanGovernance Platform, the DPA has spearheaded theadvocacy and promotion of democraticgovernance, constitutionalism, human rights,credible and transparent elections, participatoryand inclusive development, the mitigation ofhumanitarian crises, and the search for durablesolutions to forced displacement in Africa. Inmeeting these goals, the DPA has responded to theMay 2013 Solemn Declaration of the AU heads ofstate and government to lead focused discussionson how Africa can leverage democratic governanceto end wars and silence the guns. This backgroundreport is a modest contribution to these debates.

The report proposes that the management ofpublic affairs for the common good throughgovernance is fundamentally about creating institu-tions that prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts innational, regional, and continental contexts. In thisbroad perspective of conflict transformation,therefore, effective governance provides a widerange of institutional mechanisms that are criticalto this end. Specifically, African states have, singlyor collectively, made tremendous strides in buildinginstitutions of governance that have, over the lastfifty years, laid the foundation for mechanisms thatmanage diversity, foster participation, and promoteparticipatory and inclusive development. Theseefforts ought to be captured and highlighted in thetask of ending wars in the next five years. The reportargues that harnessing the successes of the past fiftyyears of state- and nation-building and thepostcolonial efforts toward building competitivedemocratic processes should be the starting pointfor galvanizing initiatives and energies in silencingthe guns. In the same vein, however, many

countries in Africa are characterized by profounddemocratic and development deficits that havefostered violent conflicts, despair, desperation, andmarginalization. Confronting these deficits is thecollective enterprise of Africans and should proceedfrom an acknowledgement and ownership of theseproblems, which must propel frank and honestdialogues about ways to overcome them by drawingon past national, regional, and continental experi-ences and strengths.

Methodologically, the report is based on extensivedesk research, particularly of AU and UnitedNations (UN) documents, plus a wealth of literatureby think tanks, leading nongovernmental organiza-tions, and academics. These sources provided bothhistorical and contemporary perspectives of Africaninitiatives and institutions. In addition, AU officialsand leading African scholars knowledgeable onquestions of democratic governance and conflicttransformation were interviewed. Of critical signifi-cance to this research and the report was an expertmeeting in Accra, Ghana, in August 2014, organ -ized jointly by the DPA and the International PeaceInstitute (IPI) that addressed effective governancemechanisms for ending conflicts in Africa.1 Equallypertinent was the youth forum that was convenedby DPA and held in Nairobi in September 2014, andthe gender forum in Kigali in October 2014, whichhelped enrich this report significantly with inputsfrom youth and women. Participants at the finalmeeting in Dakar also made useful contributions tothe report. The conclusions and policy recommen-dations offered herein have been informed andshaped by the insights from these meetings.

Introduction

The African Union (AU) heads of state andgovernment gathered in Addis Ababa in May 2013and adopted the 50th Anniversary SolemnDeclaration in which they pledged to silence theguns and end all wars by 2020 as part of efforts topromote an integrated, prosperous, and peacefulAfrica.2 Silencing the guns in Africa by 2020 is thecollective responsibility of African states thatshould ultimately culminate in states that can

1 A separate report emanating from this meeting has been published by DPA and IPI. See Mireille Affa'a Mindzie, George Mukundi Wachira, and Lucy Dunderdale,“Effective Governance in Challenging Environments,” New York: International Peace Institute, December 2014.

2 African Union, “50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration,” Addis Ababa, May 2013. See also “Towards Effective Implementation of the African Charter onDemocracy, Elections, and Governance,” press statement by H.E. Dr. Aisha L. Abdullahi, Commissioner for Political Affairs, June 23, 2014.

2 Gilbert M. Khadiagala

enhance dignity, prosperity, and security innational, regional, and continental domains. Thepeaceful resolution of wars will contribute signifi-cantly to the goals of the Common African Positionon the Post-2015 Development Agenda and theAfrica Agenda 2063, both of which seek to reclaimAfrica’s ownership and leadership of its owndevelopment trajectory and reinvigorate the spiritof pan-Africanism and the African Renaissancethat has, thus far, inspired Africa’s politicaldevelopment and integration.

Since independence, African states have maderemarkable attempts to build sturdy institutions ofstatehood and nationhood for managing diversity,encouraging participation, promoting equitabledevelopment, and encouraging regional integra-tion. Furthermore, Africa has made profoundstrides to establish systems of democraticgovernance that have broadened competitivepolitics, induced leadership turnovers, invigoratedcivic action, and resuscitated economies for growthand development. Yet some parts of Africa remainsaddled by violent conflicts and instabilities thatare linked to competition over power and resourcesand the mismanagement of diversity. Conflicts inAfrica are driven by governance and developmentdeficits that reflect the inability to find institutionsand mechanisms that can address the strains andpressures of pluralism and poverty. Widespreadstate fragility and national fragmentationcombined with socioeconomic inequities continueto fuel violence and social discontent in manyAfrican countries. Democratization in the face ofethnic, sectarian, and religious fissures has exacer-bated conflicts that have further strained bids tobuild effective, legitimate, and representative states.

This report argues that silencing the guns by2020 is an urgent imperative given the limited timeframe and the enormity of the tasks. Yet thechallenges should not distract from African states’renewed determination to end conflicts throughimproved governance. Instead, the limited timeframe should inspire confidence in African states’abilities and resilience to marshal the energies thatwould end conflicts. This inspiration, aspiration,and optimism stem from two explanations. First,the resolve to silence the guns must build on thepast and present collective successes for buildingstable nation-states and regional institutions that

have established the foundations for conflicttransformation. These successes underscore theability of African states, societies, and communitiesto promote collective initiatives for sustainablelivelihoods. Thus, African states need to harnessthe successes and opportunities that have led to theprevention and resolution of conflicts throughdemocratic governance and problem solving initia-tives at national, regional, and continental levels. Inthis optimistic reading, states in Africa already havesufficient templates, formulas, platforms, and thepolitical determination to end conflicts through thepromotion of rule of law, human rights anddignity, popular participation, and the manage-ment of diversity. Second, ongoing conflicts andcivil wars are grounded in the underlying problemsof ineffective statebuilding, sectarianism, anddysfunctional economic systems that preventeconomic growth, poverty reduction, and equality.In ending these conflicts, there is a need to drawlessons from how African states, societies, andregions have created stable governance systemsthat address political participation, constitution-alism and the rule of law, constructive managementof diversity, and equitable, just, and inclusivedevelopment. Effective governance encompassesmultiple variables that have, in many ways,contributed to the regeneration of Africa sinceindependence. The task in ending wars is tounderscore the forms of governance that have beencritical in creating political and economic systemsthat promote peace, security, and sustainabledevelopment.

This report also suggests that analyses of aconflict-free Africa in five years must be groundedin frank and honest dialogues on the prevalenceand persistence of conflicts. While appreciating thedeep-seated nature of most African conflicts, thesalient puzzle is why, despite considerable invest-ment in preventive diplomacy, peacebuilding, andpostconflict reconstruction and development,some states and regions remain engulfed in endlesswars. Despite the proliferation of normativeframeworks on democratic governance, popularparticipation, and the management of publicresources, parts of the continent are mired inconflicts stemming from dual democratic anddevelopment deficits. For this reason, a critical andinstructive part of honest dialogues should be the

SILENCING THE GUNS 3

3 Joseph S. Himes, Conflict and Conflict Management (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia, 1980); and John Paul Lederach, Preparing for Peace: ConflictTransformation Across Cultures (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995). This theme informs major UN policy documents such as United NationsSecretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, June 17, 1992. See also William J.Durch et al., The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003).

4 For wide-ranging analyses of governance, see Dele Olowu and Soumana Sako, eds., Better Governance and Public Policy: Capacity Building and DemocraticRenewal in Africa (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2002); G. Shabbir Cheema, Building Democratic Institutions: Governance Reform in Developing Countries(Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2005); United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Reconceptualizing Governance,” discussion paper, New York,UNDP, 1997; and World Bank, “Governance and Development,” Washington, DC, 1992.

acknowledgement and ownership of theseweaknesses as the preliminary step to find means tosilence the guns and end all wars. African statesshould learn from their failures as they embark onpositive steps to overcome them. Normativeframeworks have, in part, been insufficient inending ongoing wars because they are not fullyimplemented. In some other cases, theseframeworks have faced difficulties of sequencingamong forms of governance; for instance, thepromotion of competitive politics in the context ofstate fragility has deepened conflicts and compro-mised state- and nation-building processes.Silencing the guns entails learning from bestpractices around balancing the objectives of statecapacity building, national cohesion, participation,and inclusive development.

The report begins with a section that identifiessome of the core concepts around democraticgovernance and its linkages to conflict preventionand management. This section aims to establish acommon vocabulary for understanding theingredients of governance such as state- andnation-building, constitutionalism, participation,and economic inclusion. The second section buildson the conceptual framework by providing anoverview of landmark trends that have influencedgovernance in Africa since the 1950s. This sectionreveals that past practices and experiences ofovercoming governance challenges are instructiveto discussions about renewed bids to end theremaining wars. In the third section, the reportidentifies the causes and sources of ongoingconflicts in their national and regional dimensions.This analysis forms the backdrop for section fourthat focuses on the opportunities and prospects forgovernance in helping end the ongoing conflicts.The conclusion offers recommendations in light ofthe analysis furnished in the report.

Governance for thePrevention, Management,and Resolution of Conflicts

Attempts to silence the guns must be anchored inideas around the contribution of governance toprevent, manage, and resolve conflicts. Weemphasize these three elements to make a simplepoint: the best way of silencing guns is to preventconflicts, but once conflicts erupt, the challengeshifts from prevention to either management orresolution. Unlike prevention, the managementand resolution of conflict denote the transforma-tion of conflicts into peace.3 These links are criticalbecause they emphasize the significance of institu-tional rules and frameworks for building peacefuland prosperous states and societies. Since the1990s, governance has been popularly conceived asthe rules and mechanisms by which states seek topromote participation, representation, accounta-bility, and probity for the fulfillment of commonobjectives.4 From this view, governance denotes themechanisms that states and societies adopt to reachcollective compromises about the distribution andallocation of resources. As states and societiesgrapple with the competitive pressures of scarceresources, governance institutions provide order,predictability, and neutrality. For this reason,governance is, at heart, the array of institutions andframeworks that routinely aim to prevent, manage,and resolve conflicts.

As core components of governance, participationand representation speak primarily to theexpansion of public voices in decisions about whogoverns and to what ends. Participation andrepresentation are central to democraticgovernance because they focus on the rules thatfoster inclusiveness, manage political competition,


and minimize conflicts. Overall, the quality ofparticipatory and representative institutionscontributes to their legitimacy, that is, the ability oflarge segments of society to accept and buy intoexisting rules and norms.5 Accountable andtransparent processes ensure institutions fulfill theexpectations and mandates that the public endowsthem with. As the windows through which toexamine the performance of public institutions,mechanisms for accountability and transparencyare thus inseparable from participation andrepresentation since the latter mirror the policy-making arena and shape the quality of overallgovernance. Ideally, in most democratic systems,policymaking institutions are expected to besufficiently open and transparent, to reflect publicinput, and to be constantly under public surveil-lance. All these aspects guarantee that the publicroutinely holds these institutions and actorsaccountable.6

Institutions of governance are negotiated inbroad territorial, spatial, and cultural domains ofstates, nations, and peoples. This is the relevance ofstate- and nation-building processes that under -lines how states as territories organize identitiesand permit the creation of a common sense ofbelonging. States are territorial organizations thatdefine national cultural boundaries, politicalmemberships, and the space for addressingquestions about resource allocation. Hence, statesembody governance institutions that provideorder, security, and prosperity.7 In Africa, modernstates are colonial creations characterized byheterogeneous political and social compositionsthat have often compromised the tasks of state- andnation-building. In most instances, statebuilding,as the territorial extension of authority, had toaddress nation-building, the creation of commoncitizenship and common political membership.These objectives were also accompanied by the

creation of institutions that tried to promote theproduction of goods and services to achieveeconomic growth and equity. Since questions ofresource endowments and scarcities heighten thestakes around participation and representation,some African states have been frequently forced toestablish narrow priorities in building institutions,paying more attention to strengthening statecapacities and economic development rather thanexpanding participation and representation.Sequencing between statebuilding and democracybuilding has been typically pronounced incountries recovering from civil wars.8

Scholars analyzing African conflicts at the onsetof the re-democratization processes in the early1990s established useful linkages betweengovernance and conflicts through the notion ofgovernance as conflict management.9 In a compar-ative study of politics and violence in West Africa,I. William Zartman and his colleagues suggestedthat governance involves the prevention of violentconflicts and the continual efforts to manageordinary conflicts among groups who makedemands in the conduct of normal politics. In thisrespect, conflicts arise when groups bringcompeting demands to public authorities orgovernments, forcing these authorities to step inand manage these demands. According toZartman, “Resolution of these conflicts is often outof the question, since they are normally ongoing,recurrent, and inherent. But unmanaged, theythreaten to escalate, leading to a variety of debili-tating outcomes: blockage of the governingprocess, a widening split between state and society,outbreaks of violence, and collapse of the state.”10

As Zartman further contends:Although governance has been analyzed from manydifferent angles—as institutionalization, legitimation,lawmaking, problem solving, nation building,integration and allocation, to name a few—all these

5 Department for International Development (DFID), “Governance, Development, and Democratic Politics: DFID’s Work in Building More Effective States,”London, DFID, 2005; Daniel Kaufmann, “Rethinking Governance: Empirical Lessons Challenge Orthodoxy,” Washington, DC, The World Bank, 2003.

6 World Bank, “Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: A World Bank Strategy,” Washington, DC, World Bank, 2000; and Merilee Grindle,“Good Enough Governance Revisited,” Development Policy Review 25, no. 5 (2007): 553–574.

7 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons inAuthority and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

8 Herbst, States and Power in Africa. See also Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, eds., Governance and Politics in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992);Thandika Mkandawire, “Thinking about Developmental States in Africa,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 25, no. 3 (2001): 289–313.

9 See, for example, I. William Zartman, ed., Governance as Conflict Management: Politics and Violence in West Africa (Washington, DC: Brookings InstitutionPress, 1997).

10 I. William Zartman, “Governance as Conflict Management in West Africa,” in Governance as Conflict Management: Politics and Violence in West Africa, edited byI. William Zartman (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), p. 10.


can be related to the process of handling conflictingdemands in a way that retains the allegiance andparticipation of the demanders in the nationalpolitical system. Thus conceived, state buildingbecomes a matter of establishing the institutions forthis task; legitimation becomes a matter of buildingreliable support for those who carry out the task;lawmaking becomes the formulation and implemen-tation of rules for managing conflicting demands;problem solving becomes a matter of creating thepower and procedures for providing appropriateanswers to the groups’ demands; nation buildingmeans transferring a sense of belonging from thegroup to the managing state unit; integration andallocation means bringing such groups into nationalinteraction in such a way as to provide and distributereturns to them; and so on.11

The multiple functions that governanceembraces are thus normally associated with theprocesses of building institutions for order andstability, citizenship, constitutionalism, anddevelopment, questions that are handled primarilyin national contexts but also, increasingly, inregional and continental arenas.12 The managementof claims and demands around these objectiveswithout recourse to war or violence often depictsthe effectiveness and robustness of governancesystems. Routine politics expressed in functionalgovernance systems, therefore, denotes theavoidance of violent means to manage conflicts aspublic authorities (governments or states)negotiate with groups in society to induce compli-ance, forge consensus, and build reciprocitiesaround common objectives and priorities.

Governance as institution-building is alsoinextricably linked to questions of capacity. Thisidea encompasses the often gradual process ofaccumulation, accretion, and acquisition of experi-ences and skills to better handle the tasks involvedin governance. Capacity building is incremental

because of the trade-offs and sequencing that statesand societies have to make in learning to effectivelymanage various demands and priorities.13 Butcapacity building also requires that, for states, thecumulative experiences of successful managementof conflicts in certain aspects, such as state- andnation-building, should be transformed creativelyto manage other emerging priorities such as consti-tutionalism and inclusive growth. This incrementalview of institutional change recognizes that theevolution of governance capacities for conflictmanagement occurs in small yet significant stepsthat permit both state and society to acquire theconfidence, respect, and resources for collectiveproblem solving.14

The links between governance and conflictmanagement in Africa are important for threereasons. First, wars are attempts by groups to useviolence to settle disputes over political power,ethnic and sectarian differences, and societalinjustices, inequities, and poverty.15 By thisargument, violence obliterates (or diminishes thecapacity) of governance institutions to mediateroutine conflicts. For this reason, ending wars isessential to the revival of governance as conflictmanagement. African countries’ determination toend wars needs to be seen as part of efforts torebuild and reconstruct core governance institu-tions for order, sustenance, stability, and develop-ment. Second, in the context of the militarizationthat has arisen from the legacies of civil wars andconflicts in Africa over the past two decades,silencing the guns is partly about demilitarizingpolitics and societies. At one level, therefore,ending wars may contribute to buttressing civilianinstitutions of governance, restoring a healthybalance between civil and military institutionsconsistent with democratic governance, and, inparticular, civilian democratic control over the

11 Ibid.12 Donald Rothchild, “Conclusion: Management of Conflict in West Africa,” in Governance as Conflict Management:Politics and Violence in West Africa, edited by I.

William Zartman (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), pp. 197–241; and Chandra Lekha Sriram and Zoe Nielsen, eds., Exploring SubregionalConflict: Opportunities for Conflict Prevention (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004).

13 Dele Olowu, “Governance, Institutional Reforms, and Policy Processes in Africa: Research and Capacity-Building Implications,” in Better Governance and PublicPolicy, edited by Dele Olowu and Soumana Sako (Kumarian Press, 2003), pp. 53–71; Seth Kaplan, “Building Inclusive Societies in Fragile Societies,” August 18,2014.

14 Pierre Englebert and Gailyn Portelance have emphasized the phenomenon of incrementalism by capturing the “baby steps” in governance that have made a bigimpact on growth in some African countries since the 1990s. See Pierre Englebert and Gailyn Portelance, “The Growth-Governance Paradox in Africa,” AfricaPlus(blog), January 6, 2015, available at https://africaplus.wordpress.com/2015/01/06/the-growth-governance-paradox-in-africa/ .

15 Frances Stewart, “Root Causes of Violent Conflict in Developing Countries,” The BMJ, February 2002; Frances Stewart, “Crisis Prevention: Tackling HorizontalInequalities,” Oxford Development Studies 28, no. 3 (2000): 245–262; Frances Stewart, “Development and Security,” Conflict, Security, and Development 4, no. 3(December 2004): 261–288; and Abdalla Bujra, “African Conflicts: Their Causes and Their Political and Social Environment,” Occasional Paper No. 4, AddisAbaba: Development Policy Management Forum, 2002.

https://africaplus.wordpress.com/2015/01/06/the-growth-governance-paradox-in-africa/


security forces. Where societies are heavily milita-rized, silencing the guns involves returning the useof force to lawful and legitimate authorities withthe capacity to control their use and guarantee theiraccountability to democratic institutions. Giventhe spillovers of arms and weapons into regionalneighborhoods, ending wars should also entailsome level of regional demilitarization. Third, itwould be self-defeating to end wars withoutcorresponding measures to address societalgrievances that ignite violent conflicts in the firstplace. This is the critical preventive roles ofeffective and capable states that can deliverservices, manage public resources, and permit theparticipation of many voices in the articulation ofsocietal priorities and objectives. From this view,ending wars is the start of reclaiming Africandignity and identity through collective collabora-tion to manage adversities and overcome vulnera-bilities.

Notions of governance as conflict managementand capacity building dovetailed with the fivepriorities of the AU High-Level Dialogue in Dakar:(a) strengthen state institutions and advanceservice delivery to achieve sustainable humandevelopment; (b) enhance constitutionalism andthe rule of law; (c) deepen decentralization andlocal governance to foster popular participation;(d) manage diversity in a constructive manner toachieve nation-building, reconciliation, and socialharmony; and (e) consolidate democratic andparticipatory governance through credible andtransparent elections. These themes touched onhow African states have gradually built the capaci-ties to manage conflicts around power andresources and how these institutions have endowedthe space for the amelioration and mitigation ofconflicts. In addition, the Dakar deliberationssought prescriptions for strengthening theseinstitutions to improve their capacity to fulfilldiverse mandates, broaden their legitimacy, andcontribute to ending wars by 2020. The keymessage of this report, therefore, is that all the coreelements of democratic governance are, singly or incombination, critical to further the objectives ofending conflicts. Although African states havemade choices and compromises in meeting these

objectives depending on their national political andsocioeconomic conditions, institutional capacities,and leadership influence, the collective efforts bythe AU are geared to mobilize consensus ondemocratic governance as a common African good.This is the essence of debates initiated during theAU heads of state and government summit inJanuary 2011 on “Strengthening RegionalIntegration through Shared Values.”

African Achievements inConflict Management

Success in silencing the guns and ending wars mustdraw from the vast African experiences ofmobilization and organization, as well as thevarious political, economic, and social platformsthat have, for more than fifty years, informedpolitics and influenced the trajectories of states andsocieties. Learning from the past invariably necessi-tates drawing from critical practices that haveadvanced the collective resilience of African statesand societies in managing the challenges that haveconfronted them in promoting identity, dignity,participation, and equity. Furthermore, theseexperiences are salient in the contemporary debatesabout reinvigorating the African spirit for endingwars. PAN-AFRICANISM AND THE SEARCHFOR IDENTITY, DIGNITY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION

Initially conceived and bred in the diaspora, theevolution of the pan-Africanist movementexemplified the search for an African identity thatsought to overcome the legacies of subjugation,slavery, and colonialism. For most of the formativefounders of pan-Africanism, such as W. E. B. DuBois, Marcus Garvey, and Edward Blyden, thereclamation of African identity was the means toachieve dignity so people of African origins couldrecapture their humanity and self-respect thatoppression had sought to extinguish.16 Althoughthe pioneers differed about whether the ideals ofidentity and dignity could be realized on theAfrican continent or beyond it, these disagree-ments never overshadowed the singular determina-

16 For excellent analysis of pan-Africanism, see Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (New York: International Publishers, 1957); ColinLegum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide (New York: Praeger, 1962); V.B. Thompson, Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan-Africanism (London:Longman, 1969).


17 Hollis R. Lynch, Edward Wilmot Blyden: Pan-Negro Patriot 1832–1912 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).18 Adekunle Ajala, Pan-Africanism: Evolution, Progress, and Prospects (New York: St. Martin’s, 1973); and Claude Welch, Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and

Political Unification in West Africa (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967).19 Opoku Agyeman, “The Osagyefo, the Mwalimu, and Pan-Africanism: A Study in the Growth of a Dynamic Concept,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 13,

no. 4 (1975): 653–75; Z. Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU (New York: Africana, 1977).

tion about the regenerative spirit that would beunleashed by the reaffirmation of racial identityand dignity. Blyden, for instance, repudiated thefalse comforts of the Americas and returned toLiberia and Sierra Leone where he established keyeducational institutions because of his abidinginterest in the liberating power of education forAfricans. He also used the education pulpit toadvocate for political integration in West Africa,one of the first voices on the imperatives of region-alism in Africa.17 In later years, the icons of whatbecame the Négritude literary movement, thecultural renaissance, deployed the power of the pento articulate powerful ideas around the strength ofAfrican cultures. Aimé Césaire, Léopold Senghor,and Alioune Diop invoked the pan-African ideas ofNegritude and the African Personality to lendideological inspiration to the struggles for self-determination and decolonization.

The African leaders who gathered at the FifthPan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945 wereproducts of a durable movement that foundstrength in the power of the human spirit toovercome adversity and advocated ideas ofcontentious and organizational politics for socialand political change. Thus inspired, the nationalistleaders in Manchester—Kwame Nkrumah, JomoKenyatta, Nnamdi Azikiwe, George Padmore, T. R.Makonnen, and others—embraced the notions oforganization and agitation to underwrite theproject of self-determination and decolonization.But these leaders were simply carriers of ideas thatactually reflected the praxis around decolonization,witnessed in the Algerian and Kenyan armedstruggles that later found further elaboration in theliberation struggles in Southern Africa. Africanleaders had the opportunity to celebrate the firstfruits of self-determination at the All-AfricanPeople’s Congress in Accra in 1958 followingGhana’s independence. The Accra meeting alsobecame a forum for mapping out the politicalcontours of African unity on the eve of the decadeof decolonization. Like before, while deep divisionsemerged about the territorial and politicaldelineation of African unity, the broad consensus

centered on transforming the idea of self-determi-nation into continental institutions that wouldrealize the aspirations of pan-Africanism.18

THE CONSTRUCTION OFCONTINENTAL UNITY

The establishment of the Organization of AfricanUnity (OAU) in 1963 was the culmination of yearsof yearning for dignity, identity, and self-determi-nation, ideas at the heart of the pan-Africanmovement. Although a compromise between thegrand vision of a United States of Africa and theminimalist one of a union based on the existingnation-states, the OAU reflected the realities of theimmediate postcolonial period, particularly theemphasis on sovereign equality and respect forinherited boundaries.19 With independencepresent ing enormous opportunities for reversingthe legacies of slavery and colonialism, it wasunlikely that few states would have countenancedceding sovereignty to a supranational body.Limited as it was, however, the OAU became theframework for continental problem solving,beginning the creation of institutions thatcontributed to order, peace, and stability in theAfrican interstate system. Furthermore, as itembraced the banner of decolonization, the OAUcontinued to anchor the aspirations around theindivisibility of African freedom: all of Africawould remain chained without the liberation of allcolonial territories. This idea sustained the OAU’sthree-decade relentless mobilization for self-determination that ended with the demise ofapartheid in South Africa in 1994.

In the broad scheme of building institutions forAfrica, the OAU, despite its many weaknesses, laidthe foundations for an incremental process ofconsensus-building on issues that mirrored thepriorities of the first three decades of Africa’sindependence. Thus, aside from decolonization,the questions that mattered most to African statesduring this period were: secure borders to enhancestate- and-nation-building; the absence of subver-sion to enable the consolidation of power by thenew states; the promotion of African unity andsolidarity in line with the spirit of pan-Africanism;


20 For analyses of the achievements of the OAU, see David B. Meyers, “Intraregional Conflict Management by the Organization of African Unity,” InternationalOrganization 28, no. 3 (1974): 345–74; and Kassim Mohammed Khamis, Promoting the African Union (Washington, DC: Lilian Barber, 2008).

21 Economic Commission for Africa, ECA and Africa: Fifty Years of Partnership (Addis Ababa: ECA, 2008).22 For all these initiatives, see ibid., pp. 45–70. See also, Adebayo Adedeji, “The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa,” in From Global Apartheid to

Global Village: Africa and the United Nations, edited by Adekeye Adebajo (Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009).23 Khamis, Promoting the African Union; and ECA, ECA and Africa, p. 47.

and the galvanization of African voices in theglobal arena to prevent the continent’s entangle-ment in the Cold War. Where border conflictsflared in Algeria and Morocco, the Horn of Africa,and parts of West Africa, the OAU intervenedeffectively to mediate amicable solutions. Similarly,where state disintegration arose, as in the case ofthe Biafran war in Nigeria, the OAU stoodalongside the Nigerian government in reaffirmingthe principle of territorial integrity. While self-determination battles raged in Sudan and Ethiopia,the policy of non-interference managed to keepneighboring countries at bay. In addition, theannual meetings of the OAU and Africa’s collabo-rative participation in multilateral institutionshelped forge the sense of identity that has remainedcritical to addressing subsequent challenges.20

THE SEARCH FOR CONTINENTALECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Although nominally committed to the objectives ofAfrica’s economic development through self-reliance and local mobilization of resources, theOAU did not have robust programs to address thesequestions until the economic crises of the 1970s and1980s put considerable pressures on member states.Prior to this period, the bulk of debates aroundeconomic development were left largely toindividual states, regional economic communities,and their international partners. To overcome thesecrises, the OAU, alongside the United NationsEconomic Commission for Africa (UNECA), led aseries of conversations that culminated in the LagosPlan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos in1980, a long-term vision for Africa’s economicregeneration. Both the LPA and the Final Act ofLagos set the principles, objectives, stages,measures, and priorities for achieving nationalautonomy and collective self-reliance, as well as forestablishing the African Economic Community toensure integration in Africa.21

Although the LPA faced opposition from theBretton Woods institutions because of its pan-Africanist orientation and attempts to reducedependence on external actors, the OAU and

UNECA made further attempts to address thedeteriorating economic situation in Africa in themid-1980s through the adoption of Africa’sPriority Programme for Economic Recovery. Theprogram was based on the LPA and sought topromote agricultural transformation as a means tofoster industrial progress and improved economicinfrastructure, and it proposed ways of developinghuman resources and responding to drought anddesertification. These policies were presented to aspecial session of the UN General Assembly in1985, which adopted the UN Programme of Actionfor African Economic Recovery and Development(UN-PAAERD). Even as most African countriesbowed to donor pressures and bought intoStructural Adjustment Policies (SAPs), in the spiritof African voices and agency, the OAU andUNECA forced debates on an alternativeframework, called the “African AlternativeFramework to Structural Adjustment Programmesfor Socio-Economic Recovery and Transform -ation” (AAF-SAP) in 1989. The AAF-SAPprovided evidence about the debilitating effects ofSAPs on African economies and made proposalsfor the transformation of African economies as themeans to tackle the cause of the crises. Specifically,the AAF-SAP sought the restoration of economicgrowth, the transformation of productionstructures, and equitable development through thedemocratization of development.22

The next significant opportunity to focusattention on Africa’s collective vision for economicintegration was the passage of the Abuja Treatyestablishing the African Economic Community bythe OAU in 1991. Mandated by the LPA, theAfrican Economic Community was drawn upthrough the collaboration of the OAU, UNECA,and the African Development Bank. Coming intoforce in 1994, the African Economic Communitycommitted the continent to the path of economicintegration and established the timetable for fulleconomic union by 2027, building on the synergiesand experiments of the regional economiccommunities.23 The articulation of current andongoing initiatives, such as the proposed African


24 For analyses of the CSSDCA, see the Africa Leadership Forum, “The Kampala Document: Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development, andCooperation in Africa,” Kampala: Africa Leadership Forum, 1991; and Francis M. Deng, “African Policy Agenda: A Framework for Global Partnership,” inAfrican Reckoning: A Quest for Good Governance, edited by Francis M. Deng and Terrence Lyons (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1998), pp. 164–171.

25 Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman, A Strategic Vision for Africa: The Kampala Movement (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2002).26 Gilbert M. Khadiagala, “Two Moments in African Political Thought: Ideas in Africa’s International Relations,” South African Journal of International Affairs 17,

no. 3 (2010): 375–86.27 Khamis, Promoting the African Union.

Monetary Fund and the Continental Free TradeArea, feeds into the gradual and incremental logicthat has marked the building of collective institu-tions on the continent. BUILDING NORMS OF AFRICANRENEWAL

A coalition of nonstate actors from across Africaemerged in the late 1980s to forge alternativeperspectives on Africa’s future. Led by OlusegunObasanjo’s Africa Leadership Forum, this seminalmovement tried to undo the dominance of govern-ments and the OAU in shaping the parameters ofcontinental affairs. Its debates were wide-rangingand were not just confined to civic actors; Uganda’sPresident Yoweri Museveni gave a strongimprimatur to the meeting that led to the finaldeclaration in Kampala in 1991 known as theKampala Document, which established theConference on Security, Stability, Development, andCooperation in Africa (CSSDCA).24 The CSSDCAemphasized African renewal through enhancementof security, stability, development, and cooperation.More pertinent, debates leading to the CSSDCA aresignificant because they brought questions to theAfrican arena of notions of governance that havesince become common in policy discourses: thecentrality of democratic participation, accounta-bility, inclusion, and transparency. The CSSDCAalso started a chapter in continental conversationsabout African responsibility and ownership of theenormous challenges around governance.Furthermore, the CSSDCA transcended thepessimism that often intruded in the discussionsabout Africa’s abilities and capacities to managethese challenges, contending poignantly that Africa’sfuture was in the hands of Africans.25 Its articulationof African agency and ownership was central to theOAU reforms in the mid-1990s that created theMechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management,and Resolution (the Cairo Declaration) andsubsequent policies concerning non-indifferenceand sovereignty with responsibility. To underscorethe power of the priorities embraced by the Kampala

movement, the OAU heads of state and governmentin July 2000 adopted the Solemn Declaration on theConference on Security, Stability, Development, andCooperation in Africa with a plan of action tostrengthen democratic governance and build peace,security, and stability.THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE AND THECREATION OF THE AU

The optimism exuded by the CSSDCA coincidedwith the end of colonial and apartheid regimes inSouthern Africa, helping to complete the decolo-nization process and set the stage for newbeginnings in Africa. As president of South Africasucceeding the nationalist icon, Nelson Mandela,Thabo Mbeki resurrected the pan-African ideals ofrenewal and rejuvenation to propel continentalinstitution-building and transformation.26 ToMbeki, the African Renaissance was a vital chapterdemonstrating that Africans had the ability to shapetheir destinies unencumbered by external andinternal constraints. The renewal of these idealsacknowledged that barely fifty years after independ-ence, African states had made solid progress inundoing the constraints of state weakness and thedearth of economic resources, embarking on theroad to self-determination with courage, convic-tion, and confidence. Yet the Renaissance had to bean opportunity for collective mobilization of newenergies to create strong but responsible continentalinstitutions, frank acknowledgements of theobstacles bedeviling national and continentalrenewal, and new partnerships with internationalactors who would contribute to Africa’s develop-mental priorities. The African Renaissance coalitionof Mbeki, Obasanjo, Senegal’s Abdoulaye Wade,and Algeria’s Abdelaziz Bouteflika was critical in re-igniting the momentum toward new vistas forcontinental change. Although these leaders differedfrom Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi on the shape, pace,and content of continental institutions, Qaddafiprovided significant resources that contributed tothe elaboration of the emerging continental institu-tional matrix.27


The formation of the African Union (AU) in2002 was the culmination of these pan-Africanistrenewal initiatives, lending shape and vision to thedetermination for new rules that are conducive tothe political, economic, and social imperatives ofthe late twentieth century. In the Constitutive Actof the AU, African leaders pledged to maintain thepan-African spirit that had allowed Africancountries to weather the storms of decolonizationand the Cold War and to reinvigorate the search fornew programs to strengthen unity and promoteaccountability.28 The AU seeks to speed upcontinental political and socioeconomic integra-tion, the promotion and defense of commonpositions, and the creation of favorable conditionsfor Africa to play a major role in the globaleconomy.29 Cognizant of the substantive shifts ininterstate relations and the emergence of newthreats to African security, the AU establishedmuch stronger institutions than the OAU toprevent, manage, and resolve conflicts. As KhabeleMatlosa suggests, this new era presaged thereplacement of the culture of non-interference withthe doctrine of non-indifference, and the replace-ment of “sovereignty as impunity” with “sove -reignty as responsibility.”30 Of equal significance isthe proliferation of normative frameworks inAfrica since the early 2000s that have contributedto the shared values that underpin integration. Forthe most part, these frameworks seek to securesovereignty through democratic governance andcollective restraints. Among the key normativeframeworks is the African Charter on Democracy,Elections, and Governance, which is Africa’scommitment to nurture and consolidatedemocratic and participatory governance.31

ECONOMIC RENEWAL THROUGHOWNERSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITY

A key part of Africa’s renewal in the early 2000swas the formation of the New Partnership forAfrica’s Development (NEPAD) and the AfricanPeer Review Mechanism (APRM). Both programs

balance demands for renewal and responsibility,vital paradigm shifts in African approaches todevelopment. The AU conceived NEPAD in 2001as the blueprint for Africa’s ownership of itsdevelopment path, and it enjoins donors to forgegenuine partnerships with African countries.Among the programmatic aims of NEPAD aredemocracy, governance, infrastructure, informa-tion technology, human resource development,agriculture, and market access. Ultimately, NEPADis committed to reducing poverty, putting Africaon the path of sustainable development, andhalting Africa’s global marginalization. In adoptingthe NEPAD 2002 Declaration on Democracy,Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance,African leaders stressed that sustainable develop-ment is inconceivable without democracy.32Similarly, the APRM was adopted in 2003 to createa regime of responsibility whereby member statespledged to be voluntarily assessed on policies,standards, and practices that promote politicalstability, economic growth, and acceleratedregional and continental economic integration. Asa mechanism that reinforces best practices and peerlearning in broad governance, the APRM hascontributed to deepening shared values and collec-tive experiences through evidence-based assess-ments.33

BUILDING GOVERNANCE THROUGHCOMPETITIVE ELECTORAL PROCESSES

African states have made competitive elections afundamental part of the re-democratization agendaover the last twenty-five years. These experimentsarose from a combination of national and interna-tional pressures for change. They signaled deepshifts away from decades of authoritarianism andmilitary regimes that had dominated the postcolo-nial era. Competitive electoral processes alsorecognized that most African countries hadrealized meaningful progress in state- and nation-building, progress that would guarantee theexpansion of participatory and representative

28 African Union, Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000, available at www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf .29 Ibid.30 Khabele Matlosa, “Democratization and Peace-Building: Policy Reflections and Prospects,” Background Paper for the OAU/AU Golden Jubilee and the Draft AU

Agenda 2063, Addis Ababa: UNDP/AU, November 2013, 49–50.31 Khabele Matlosa, “Pan-Africanism, the African Peer Review Mechanism and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance: What Does the

Future Hold?” SAIIA Occasional Paper no. 190, Johannesburg, South African Institute of International Affairs, June 2014, pp. 17–20.32 AU, “NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance,” Addis Ababa: AU, 2002; Matlosa, “What Does the Future Hold?”33 Edward McMahon, Kojo Busia, and Marta Ascherio, “Comparing Peer Reviews: The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council and the African

Peer Review Mechanism,” African and Asian Studies 12 (2013): 266–289.

www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ConstitutiveAct_EN.pdf

institutions.34 Instead of the fears of ethnic andregional convulsions that elites conjured up inprevious years to prevent pluralism, African peopleembraced democracy because they sought newstate-society relations that would restore accounta-bility and transparency in governance. Moreover,most perceived elections as essential to the rotationin leadership that would, in turn, herald genera-tional changes in power and responsibility.Twenty-five years are not sufficient to yield consol-idated democracies, but Africa has learned consid-erably from managing competitive politics, partic-ularly as many countries have held violence-freeelections and reined in political and economicmonopolies that had strengthened the power ofauthoritarian regimes. Surveys conducted byAfrobarometer and the Mo Ibrahim Foundationincreasingly show that democratization, despitewide variations in its forms and practices, hasgained popularity in the majority of Africancountries, particularly electoral processes.35

The competitive pressures of the 1990s unleasheddemocratic systems of governance that were notoften fully participatory as some leaders continuedto perpetuate their rule through fraudulentelections. Nor has democracy led to peacefulmanagement of diversities in all countries.Nonetheless, the general momentum for competi-tive politics is gaining traction as many countriespass new constitutions to stabilize politicalcompetition. Since elections are perceived to be theprimary means through which power is legiti-mated, countries have attempted to guarantee theindependence of electoral bodies and constitu-tional courts to reduce political violence andinstability. In addition, lessons from failed electoralprocesses in Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Zimbabwehave demonstrated the disastrous consequences ofweak electoral administrative rules for nationalstability. For the majority of African states,democratic consolidation through elections hasbeen recognized as part of forging new social

contracts necessary for order and progress. Duringthe Thirteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly ofthe AU held in Sirte, Libya, in July 2009, the AUadopted the Panel of the Wise report on “Election-Related Disputes and Political Violence:Strengthening the Role of the African Union inPreventing, Managing, and Resolving Conflict.”The recommendations of the report are instructivein ending wars by 2020. The report emphasizedthat it is the responsibility of all African actors toaddress the root causes of electoral violence,whether they are election-related causes stemmingfrom within the electoral cycle or are from systemicstructural factors. It further highlighted the needfor the AU to invest more resources in preventivemeasures, early warning, and early response.36

Also, while some have regarded democraticcompetition as the precursor to economic chaos,there has been growing recognition that economicquestions are better negotiated within the widerspaces that democracy affords to citizens. AsThandika Mkandawire has noted, the remarkableeconomic growth in Africa in recent years is partlyattributable to greatly improved governance,particularly the broad trend of democratization.

A case can be made that political changes have had apositive impact on economies. The end of militarismand the greater democratization of African countrieshave placed economic performance at the core of thestates’ source of legitimation. The success of a leader,even in the remaining authoritarian strongholds, isno longer measured by the longevity of his reign, andeven less so by the number of self-awarded medalson his chest, but by the performance of the economyand the stability of the political order . . . In addition,democratization—bringing greater accountability tolocal constituencies—over the years has made itharder for external actors to impose their preferredpolicies. These political changes are no small mattergiven the fact that Africa has had many leaderswhose political aspirations never rose beyondsatisfying local clients and the external masters whounderwrite their rule.37


34 For broad analyses of democratization trends and themes, see Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitionsin Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); E. Gyimah-Boadi, ed., Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress (Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004); and Leonardo Villalón and Peter VonDoepp, eds., The Fate of Africa’s Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions (Bloomington,IN: Indiana University Press, 2005).

35 For a summary of these surveys and indices, see the Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2011: Democracy Under Stress (London: EIU, 2011), p. 26; andMo Ibrahim Foundation, “2014 Ibrahim Index of African Governance,” London: Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2014, available atwww.moibrahimfoundation.org/interact/ .

36 African Union Panel of the Wise, “Election-Related Disputes and Political Violence: Strengthening the Role of the African Union in Preventing, Managing, andResolving Conflict,” The African Union Series, New York: International Peace Institute, July 2010.

37 Thandika Mkandawire, “Can Africa Turn from Recovery to Development?” Current History 113, no. 763 (May 2014): 174.

www.moibrahimfoundation.org/interact/


Further strengthening the democratic trendsover the last two decades has been the normativeshift of the OAU/AU against unconstitutionalchange of government, once a prevalent feature ofAfrican politics. Since the OAU adopted theDeclaration on the Framework for an OAUResponse to Unconstitutional Changes ofGovernment in Lomé, Togo, in 2000, this principlehas been captured variously in subsequentdocuments and platforms. The constant reiterationof the principle has been critical in the markeddecline of military coups.38 Popular uprisings inNorth Africa in 2011 challenged the solidity ofunconstitutional changes of government, but in theaftermath, the AU has made alterations thataccommodate popular aspirations to politicalchange, and it is gradually refining the normativeframework on unconstitutional changes of govern-ment. The appreciable decline of unconstitutionalchanges of government through military coupsmay be attributed to the OAU/AU normsdeveloped since the late 1990s. Norms alone,however, cannot deter egregious behavior. Asdemonstrated by recent cases of unconstitutionalchanges of government by militaries, the AU andregional economic communities have exertedtremendous pressure on these countries to restoreconstitutional legality.39

GOVERNANCE FOR EQUITABLE ANDINCLUSIVE GROWTH

Africa has started to move away from decades ofnegative growth that were popularly depicted as the“lost economic decades.” In recent years, theseoptimistic perspectives of changing Africa’seconomic fortunes have been captured in the factthat six of the world’s ten fastest-growingeconomies are in Africa.40 The explanations for thesharp surge include: improvements in governance

and democratization; improved earnings fromexports because of better terms of trade; increasesin foreign direct investment in extractive industriesand information, communication, and techno -logy.41 Despite the persistence of economicinequities, Africa also has witnessed a fall inabsolute poverty rates measured by the one-dollar-a-day limit. Attempts by many governments tomanage socioeconomic inequalities have revolvedaround the idea of inclusive growth that seeks toimprove investments in agriculture, education,industry, and infrastructure to jump-start growthand equity. Many countries, such as Kenya,Ethiopia, and Uganda, have launched impressiveplans to propel them to middle-income status inthe next twenty-five years. Some states, such asMauritius and South Africa, also have experi-mented with social protection and welfareprograms that target the poor and vulnerablegroups.42

The global financial crisis of 2008 led to theweakening of the Washington Consensus, a free-market doctrine that had dominated economicdiscourse and shaped the engagement of donorswith many African countries. Broadly, theWashington Consensus tilted economic reformsmore toward markets as institutions for the alloca-tion of resources rather than states and govern-ments as the drivers of public policy. Thus, theweakening of the Washington Consensus has beena blessing in disguise for Africa, because it hasrecreated a healthy balance between states andmarkets in meeting the fundamental objectives ofeconomic governance.43 Recognition that bothmarkets and states are critical in resource allocationhas allowed governments to be more proactive inforging industrial and employment policies; publicinvestment to correct the errors of previous

38 Matlosa, “Democratization and Peace-Building,” pp. 49–51.39 Some of the recent cases are Madagascar (2009), Mali (2013), and Egypt (2013). See Michael Vunyingah, “Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa: An

Assessment of the Relevance of the Constitutive Act of the African Union,” Policy Brief no. 44, Pretoria, Africa Institute of South Africa, March 2011; and UlfEngel, “Unconstitutional Changes of Government: New AU Policies in Defense of Democracy,” Working Paper no. 9, Leipzig, University of Leipzig GraduateCenter of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2010.

40 “Africa Rising: A Hopeful Continent,” The Economist, March 2, 2013, available at www.economist.com/news/special-report/21572377-african-lives-have-already-greatly-improved-over-past-decade-says-oliver-august ; and Karin Strohecker, “The ‘Africa Rising’ Narrative Rings True Despite Headlines,” Business Day(Johannesburg), November 11, 2014, available at http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africanbusiness/2014/11/11/the-africa-rising-narrative-rings-true-despite-headlines . For critics of the narrative, see Rick Rowden, “The Myth of Africa’s Rise: Why the Rumors of Africa’s Explosive Growth have been GreatlyExaggerated,” Foreign Policy, January 4, 2013.

41 Mkandawire, “Can Africa Turn from Recovery to Development?”42 Francis Chigunta, “Inclusive Growth and Poverty Reduction in Africa: The Experience of Zambia,” n.d.; Steven Kayizzi-Mugerwa, “Inclusive Growth in Africa,”

presentation at the Global Development Network Conference, Manila, June 19, 2013, available atwww.gdn.int/admin/uploads/editor/files/2013Conf_Papers/SteveKayizzi-Mugerwa_ppt.pdf .

43 Mkandawire, “Can Africa Turn from Recovery to Development?”

www.economist.com/news/special-report/21572377-african-lives-have-already-greatly-improved-over-past-decade-says-oliver-august

www.economist.com/news/special-report/21572377-african-lives-have-already-greatly-improved-over-past-decade-says-oliver-august

http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africanbusiness/2014/11/11/the-africa-rising-narrative-rings-true-despite-headlines

http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africanbusiness/2014/11/11/the-africa-rising-narrative-rings-true-despite-headlines

www.gdn.int/admin/uploads/editor/files/2013Conf_Papers/SteveKayizzi-Mugerwa_ppt.pdf


decades; and social policies that redress severeinequities. By the same token, governments are nowable to engage private actors in policy dialoguesabout all facets of development. Although thecheerleading about Africa’s economic growth spurtneeds to appreciate the many obstacles to thereduction of inequalities, many countries are on thepath to harnessing their human and naturalresources to build strong economies, large middleclasses, and democratic societies.REBUILDING STATES AND SOCIETIESAFTER CIVIL CONFLICTS

Civil wars that engulfed many African states in the1990s often arose from the mismanagement ofdiversity, authoritarian political leadership, andeconomic marginalization. At the heart of manycivil conflicts was a crisis of governance as a largenumber of weak and impoverished states failed tocontain the fissures of state- and nation-building.In a majority of these states, competing politicalidentities surged in importance just as the formalstructures of government were least prepared tomanage them. Structural violence stemming fromethnic and regional competition lent ferocity toAfrican conflicts, because states failed to bemediators of these conflicts. Yet civil wars aredeclining, testimony to the international andregional investments in peace processes andpostconflict reconstruction strategies.44 Often lostin the analysis of conflicts in Africa is that the trackrecord of stabilizing fragile states over the past twodecades has yielded a number of relative successes,including in Angola, Burundi, Mozambique, SierraLeone, Liberia, Uganda, and Rwanda.45 Althoughmanifesting various levels of fragility, most of thesecountries have improved immeasurably because ofregional and international stabilization efforts. Forcountries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, it maytake a long time to shed off the label of fragility,particularly with the health threat of Ebolacompromising recovery efforts. Angola, Rwanda,Uganda, and Mozambique have, however,graduated remarkably from postconflict countries

to relative stability and have been on the path ofsustainable development.

Reconstruction initiatives offer many lessonslearned, including the sequencing of theirobjectives. Initially, postconflict reconstruction washampered by multiple ambitious goals such asdemocracy-building, security sector reforms,gender equity, and service delivery. In recent years,the most frequent measures that are given priorityare security sector reforms, programs for disarma-ment, demobilization, and reintegration, andprograms against the proliferation of small andlight arms. With the establishment of suchmeasures, postconflict societies are able to build theconfidence to undertake political and economicreforms.46 African countries have accumulatedsufficient experiences in ending wars. Learningfrom the wealth of these experiences is importantto find effective and efficient means of informingfuture efforts to end wars. Overall, althoughpostconflict countries face difficulties in the transi-tion from state failure to recovery, successfulreconstruction has entailed the rebuilding of bothphysical and institutional infrastructure. Further,reconstruction requires both sustained globalinterventions and local leadership initiatives.REGIONALISM FOR ECONOMICINTEGRATION AND PROBLEM SOLVING

In postcolonial Africa, regional cooperation andintegration has offered tremendous opportunitiesto negotiate collective approaches to economic andsecurity needs. For African countries, too manyproblems are beyond the scope of any individualcountry to resolve, especially given weak institu-tions and limited resources. Even before the AbujaTreaty of 1994, regional economic communitiesunderlined the commitment to economic coopera-tion and integration. Regional economiccommunities and other intergovernmental organi-zations have proliferated to exploit geographical,cultural, and political proximities as a means toleverage economic exchanges for the commongood.47 Before the civil conflicts of the 1990s,

44 Scott Straus, “Wars Do End! Changing Patterns of Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa,” African Affairs 111, no. 443 (2012); and Jakkie Cilliers and JuliaSchunemann, “The Future of Intrastate Conflict in Africa: More Violence or Greater Peace?” ISS Paper no. 246, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, May 2013.

45 Devon Curtis and Gwinyayi Dzinesa, eds., Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2012); Kenneth Omeje and TriciaRedeker Hepner, eds., Conflict and Peacebuilding in the African Great Lakes Region (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013).

46 Robert Muggah and Christian Altpeter, “Peacebuilding and Postconflict Recovery: What Works and What Does Not?” New York: International Peace Institute,June 2014.

47 Gilbert M. Khadiagala, “Institution Building for African Regionalism,” ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, no. 85, Manila: AsianDevelopment Bank, August 2011.


regional economic communities, such as the EastAfrican Community (EAC), the EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS),and the Common Market for Eastern and SouthernAfrica (COMESA), had made significant advance-ment toward enhancing trade and labor mobilitythrough customs unions, free trade areas, and,increasingly, monetary arrangements.

In East and West Africa, the adoption of freemovement protocols is a testimony to the politicalwill to strengthen integration. For instance, theEAC is leading the way by relaxing work permitrestrictions for citizens of member states, allowingfreer movement across borders and minimizingcross-border tariffs. Common EAC passports nowallow citizens of member states to travel and—inthe future—work freely in the region. Kenya andRwanda have already removed requirements forwork permits for all EAC citizens. In West Africa,the ECOWAS protocol on free movement is inforce, allowing citizens to freely enter and establishthemselves in member states. The protocol hassubstantially increased regional labor mobility,which has boosted investment and trade amongWest African states.48 However, the recent outbreakof the Ebola crisis has put enormous strains onregional integration in West Africa as many statesseek to close their borders with Guinea, SierraLeone, and Liberia to prevent infections. Newborder closures are reversing the gains from freemovement of peoples and continental attempts tobuild a borderless Africa.

Many regional economic communities still faceconsiderable obstacles, highlighted in the fact thatintegration has not boosted intraregional trade,which still accounts for only about 10 percent ofAfrican countries’ overall trade.49 Moreover, whilesome regions such as East, West, and SouthernAfrica have managed to establish fairly functionalinstitutions, other regions, such as the Maghreband Central Africa, still lag behind. But if regionalintegration is going to be at the center of endingwars, lessons can be learned from past experiencesin political and economic collaboration forstimulating regional energies to promote economicand security needs. Building a greater sense of

regional identity is one of the first steps in creatingproblem-solving institutions to promote integra-tion for ending wars.

Obstacles to BuildingGovernance for Peace

In the annals of political development, fifty years ismerely a point in the momentous and protractedjourney of building durable states with soundcapacities to meet the multiple tasks of democraticconsolidation, integration, and development.Africa has made noteworthy strides in creatingnational and continental structures that providefuture vistas and visions to strengthen governancefor conflict management. Thus, silencing the gunsby 2020 should be inspired by the accumulatedknowledge and experiences undergirding the past.

But harnessing the past to build the future shouldnot lead to extravagant triumphalism, becauseAfrica faces a whole host of challenges thatcontinue to prevent the solidification of past andongoing experiences. The obstacles enumerated inthis section demonstrate that, in the short tomedium terms, not all forms of democraticgovernance reduce conflicts; in fact, some stateshave been able to manage conflicts throughdampening the pressures and expectations ofdemocratic governance, particularly in deeplydivided societies. In other cases, some states havefocused on economic development and the deliveryof services at the expense of the promotion ofhuman rights and competitive electoral politics.The popularity of Africa’s developmental dictator-ships or developmental patrimonialism forregenerating conflict-prone states has beenprominently highlighted by some scholars andpolicymakers as instances of successful rebuildingof states. DEMOCRATIZATION WITHOUTCONSTITUTIONALISM

Progress on building effective institutions of partic-ipation and representation is hampered in manyAfrican states by weak elite adherence to constitu-tionalism and the rule of law. Democratic

48 For these recent attempts in East and West Africa, see Khadiagala, “Institution Building for African Regionalism.”49 African Union, “Action Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade,” available at www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Action%20Plan%20for%20boosting%20intra-

African%20trade%20F-English.pdf .

www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Action%20Plan%20for%20boosting%20intra-African%20trade%20F-English.pdf

www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Action%20Plan%20for%20boosting%20intra-African%20trade%20F-English.pdf


governance has rejuvenated many Africansocieties, but the features of democratic deficits—manipulation of constitutions, electoral polariza-tion, the absence of the rule of law, decreasingavenues of mass participation, and severedemocratic reversals—are emerging as threats tothe democratic gains of the last twenty-five years.50Fundamentally, democratic transitions in mostAfrican countries occurred in the absence ofinvestments in constitutionalism—substantivechecks on the power of states and governments—and liberal ethos and practices around civil libertiesand individual rights. While some countries haveaddressed these questions through new constitu-tional arrangements, the specter of weaklyinstituted democratization continues to hauntmost African states. Compounding these illiberalenvironments are questions of economic inequitiesthat have widened mass distrust of democraticprocesses, particularly elections.

Global comparative studies reveal that autocraticregimes are more prone to large-scale violence thandemocratic ones because democracies are betterequipped to handle challenges to the authority ofthe rulers, garner more legitimacy, and accrueadequate capacity to meet societal goals.51Throughout the democratization processes inAfrica, some states have witnessed the deteriora-tion in their capacity to manage conflicts preciselybecause of state- and nation-building cleavagesunleashed through democratic competition. Theelectoral violence that has induced fears in theelectorate of many African countries stems, in part,from this facet of democratization. But electoralconflicts are also more about insufficient institu-tions for managing diversities rather than asingular indictment of democratization.52 Incountries that have experienced electoral violence,such as Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Zimbabwe,renewed efforts at constitution-making have runagainst the ingrained cultures of ethnic intoleranceand crude majoritarianism that continue toreproduce systemic instabilities. In Lesotho,creative institutional energies to manage electoralcompetition and reduce the history of violentcontestations have been wasted in recent years by

intermittent elite squabbles that have forced themilitary to become the most significant arbiter ofpolitical conflicts.

In many African countries, democracy has failedto gain traction because elites continually invokesectarian, ethnic, and regional cleavages topostpone the evolution of institutions of participa-tory and representative governance. The outcomesare periodic elections devoid of democraticcontent. Some regimes have used similarstatebuilding arguments to discredit the popularuprisings in North Africa, contending that thegroundswell of opposition to autocratic regimeshas led to new civil wars, unstable governments,and economic downturns. Yet the ostensiblestability under undemocratic regimes that isfrequently touted is precisely what produced theuprisings in the first place. Rather than acknowl-edging the transitional pains North African statesare confronting in finding better governancesystems for the future, the critics make wholesalecondemnations of the value of popular pressures ininstitutional change.

Equally worrisome, democratization trends insome African countries have failed to yieldimportant changes in the quality of leaders. In fact,some elections in recent years have resulted ineither the emergence of demagogic leaders whothen run roughshod over the existing weakdemocratic institutions or leaders who are unableto effectively govern for a host of reasons. Since inmost competitive political systems leaders reflectthe education, the sophistication, and cosmopoli-tanism of the electorate, most African countries arestill struggling to find the right balance betweentheir leaders and the electorate. Years of invest-ment in civic education programs to createinformed citizenries have yet to consistentlyproduce outcomes whereby elections lead to moretransformational leadership in Africa. Althoughunconstitutional changes of government throughmilitary coups have declined appreciably, otherforms of constitutional abuses remain prevalentand are increasingly compromising many Africancountries’ consistent promotion of the values of

50 Bruce Baker, “Can Democracy in Africa Be Sustained?” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 38, no. 3 (2000): 9–34.51 Seth Kaplan, Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development (New York: Praeger, 2008). 52 African Union Panel of the Wise, “Election-Related Disputes and Political Violence.” See also, Khabele Matlosa, Gilbert Khadiagala, and Victor Shale, eds, When

Elephants Fight: Preventing and Resolving Election-Related Conflicts in Africa (Johannesburg: Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, 2010).

constitutional governance. In addition to regimesusing fraudulent and illegitimate means to winelections, wanton constitutional changes and novelforms of dynastic successions are rife across Africa,reflecting both the arrogance of power and theinsularity of leaders who have been in office fordecades. Democratic governance has not takenroot uniformly throughout Africa not because ofthe dearth of democratic values and practices, butbecause some leaders have remained consistentlyoblivious to them.DEVELOPMENTAL DICTATORSHIPS

The attempts to reaffirm the centrality of participa-tion and representation as African governancevalues to prevent and manage conflicts arechallenged by the patterns of governance exhibitedby developmental dictatorships or developmentalpatrimonialism. These states’ experiences aresimilar to those in Southeast Asia in the 1970s and1980s where governments focused primarily oneconomic growth, reduction of poverty, andprovision of public goods. At the same time, whilethey have nominally adhered to some basic princi-ples of procedural democracy, such as regularelections, developmental dictatorships are typicallycharacterized by the suppression of politicalchallengers and the use of draconian means tocurtail civil liberties and freedom of the press.53Similarly, most developmental dictatorships arosein the aftermath of civil conflicts. Subsequently,they made visible steps to restore state effectivenessand capacity. By the same token, developmentaldictatorships have remained essentially de factoone-party states where the military plays dispro-portionally larger political roles.

Developmental dictatorships continue to derivelegitimacy from sustained economic growth andimprovements in the standards of living, butpolitical repression and severe restrictions onalternative political voices potentially createconditions for future strife and violence. Already,some of these regimes are facing internecineconflicts among the once cohesive elites, revealingcracks that may not be overcome without transi-

tions to more open and transparent societies. Theeconomic trajectories of developmental dictator-ships also have potentially destabilizingconsequences. As they have funneled investmentsthough militarized ruling parties, they have createdeconomic monopolies that have hindered theevolution of genuine middle classes who cansupport future democratization. There are aptlessons for developmental dictatorships from theexperiences of Tunisia and Egypt, which, at somepoint, embraced some of the core features ofdevelopmental dictatorships.54 The demise ofNorth African regimes reinforces the indivisibilityof democratic governance whereby the values ofaccountability, participation, representation, andtransparency must work together for sustainabledevelopment. In the long run, the prevalence ofdevelopmental dictatorships compromises Africanstates’ pursuit of common values on democraticgovernance. Equally uncertain is also whetherdevelopmental dictatorships are creating the long-term conditions for conflict prevention.CORRUPTION AND LACK OFTRANSPARENCY

Corruption remains a scourge in Africangovernance, undermining the rule of law, sappingresources away from productive activities, anddiscouraging investment that would driveeconomic growth and reduce poverty. At its heart,corruption is a governance deficit, a problem of theprevalence of opaque accountability institutionsand entrenched political and economic monopo-lies. Weak countervailing mechanisms of participa-tion and representation worsen corruption. Inmost of Africa, corruption also epitomizeseconomic impunity whereby elites wantonly abusepublic resources without sanctions. DespiteAfrican states’ embrace of regional and interna-tional conventions on anti-corruption, reforms oncorruption legislation, and creation of numerousanti-corruption bodies, the problem of corruptionis getting worse, even in some of the bettergoverned states.55 Globally, undemocratic govern-ments frequently have corruption rankings that are


53 David Booth and F. Gooloba-Mutebi, “Developmental Patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda,” African Affairs 111, no. 444 (2002): 379–403; Hilary Matfess,“Authoritarian Resilience in Rwanda and Ethiopia,” Fragile States, available at www.fragilestates.org/2014/05/04/authoritarian-resilience-rwanda-ethiopia-hilary-matfess/ ; Lovise Aalen, “Ethiopia after Meles: Stability for How Long?” Current History 113, no. 763 (May 2014): 192–196; and Joel Barkan, “Uganda: AssessingRisks to Stability,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2011.

54 Frederic Volpi, “Revolution, Reform, and Stasis in the Maghreb?” Current History 113, no. 763 (May 2014): 185–191.55 Stefan Gilbert, “Is Africa Losing the Battle Against Corruption?” Institute for Security Studies, September 16, 2014; Philippe Le Billon, “Corrupting Peace?

Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Corruption,” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 3 (2008).

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www.fragilestates.org/2014/05/04/authoritarian-resilience-rwanda-ethiopia-hilary-matfess/


56 Oluwaseun Bamidele, “Corruption, Conflict, and Sustainable Development in African States,” The African Symposium 13, no. 1 (June 2013).57 African Development Bank and Global Financial Integrity, “Illicit Financial Flows and the Problem of Net Resource Transfers from Africa: 1980–2009,” May

2013.58 Ibid., p. 1; and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), “Former President Mbeki to Chair the High Level Talks on Illicit Financial Flows,”

June 14, 2013, available at www.uneca.org/media-centre/stories/former-president-mbeki-chair-high-level-talks-illicit-financial-flows#.VUJzKvB8u5I .59 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), “Former President Mbeki to Chair the High Level Talks on Illicit Financial Flows,” June 14, 2013,

available at www.uneca.org/media-centre/stories/former-president-mbeki-chair-high-level-talks-illicit-financial-flows#.VUJzKvB8u5I .60 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 (Berlin: Transparency International, 2013).61 Gilbert M. Khadiagala, “Global and Regional Mechanisms for Governing the Resource Curse in Africa,” Resource Insight, no.12, July 2014.62 Matthias Busse and Steffen Gröning, “The Resource Curse Revisited: Governance and Natural Resources,” Research Paper no. 106, Hamburg: Hamburg Institute

of International Economics, 2011.

40–50 percent greater than democratic systems atcomparable income levels. These trends areconfirmed in Africa where robust democraticinstitutions’ low levels of corruption contrastsharply with autocratic regimes’ higher levels ofcorruption. The annual surveys by TransparencyInternational reveal that most African countrieshave not made palpable improvements on theirrankings; these findings are also supported by localsurveys in most African countries that confirm thata majority of their populations consider corruptionas a serious public policy issue.56

The new attention on illicit financial flows out ofAfrica is recognition of the negative impact of suchflows on Africa’s development and governance. Itis also an attribute of weak state capacity and theabsence of accountable and transparent institu-tions. In 2013, the African Development Bank andGlobal Financial Integrity observed that Africa lost$1.4 trillion in illicit financial flows between 1980and 2009.57 The trend has been increasing over timeand especially in the last decade, with annualaverage illicit financial flows of $50 billion between2000 and 2008.58 The level of illicit financialoutflows from Africa far exceeds the officialdevelopment assistance to the continent, whichstood at $46.1 billion in 2012.59 TransparencyInternational continues to report on governmentleaders who have amassed wealth through illicitmeans, in the majority of cases by channelingpublic funds into their foreign private bankaccounts.60 The hemorrhaging of Africa’s publicresources guarantees that few countries will achievethe broader socioeconomic transformationenvisioned by the new Sustainable DevelopmentGoals (SDGs) of the Post-2015 DevelopmentAgenda.

Curbing illicit resource flows is a governancematter of transparency, institutional capacity, andthe creation of strong legal frameworks. African

states will not end wars if the causes of structuralviolence persist, and corruption needs to beaccurately seen as one of its drivers. In addition,since ending wars aims, in part, to strengthen stateefficacy, corruption has corrosive effects on thecapacity of governance institutions to performeffectively.

Alongside the conclusion of civil wars in recentyears, African governments and internationalactors have made efforts to reverse the so-called“resource curse,” by using Africa’s naturalresources for the betterment of states and societies.Thus, there has been growing momentum to joininternational schemes for natural resourcegovernance such as the Extractive IndustriesTransparency Initiative, the Kimberley Process onthe certification of diamonds, and the Open BudgetInitiative. All these initiatives seek to encouragegovernments to institute accountable and trans -parent mechanisms to ensure that revenues fromextractive industries are spent for the benefit of thepeople.61 Regional and continental initiatives suchas the Africa Mining Vision also have been createdto ensure the harmonization of laws and standardson accountability, transparency, and propertyrights protection around natural resources. Giventhat the combination of resource abundance andpoor governance is lethal in resource-rich Africa,ending wars will entail a judicious mix ofgovernance measures that involve governments,communities, and the private sector in productiveuse and management of natural resources.62

PRECARIOUS REGIONALNEIGHBORHOODS

Africa contains vast territorial regions in which thereach and authority of states has not beenadequately secured. In these regions, governmentscompete for resources, legitimacy, and loyalty withgroups and movements that have diversegrievances and contest violently among one

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another. In recent years, they have been character-ized as “ungoverned” or “ungovernable” spaces tohighlight the fact that they are the breedinggrounds for criminal activities and violentconfrontations that have led to regional instabili-ties. These regions also confront the traditionalsecurity concerns of porous borders and borderdisputes that have wrought new forms of insecuri-ties. The Horn of Africa, Central Africa, the GreatLakes region, and the Sahel illustrate well thesecurity and governance dilemmas facing some ofthe core states that have been entangled in regionalconflicts. Long before the Horn of Africaconfronted threats from Islamic fundamentalistgroups, the prevalence of marginal pastoralcommunities surviving in harsh environments andneglected by central governments had been a keysource of perennial conflicts. For more than twodecades, the disintegration of the Somali state hasbeen the source of regional insecurity for Somaliaand neighboring countries. Countries such asKenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda have expendedresources to contain the fragility that has come tocharacterize the Greater Horn of Africa. In CentralAfrica, governance problems have been theexplanations for violent conflicts in Chad, theCentral African Republic, and the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo. In turn, neighboringcountries have been sucked into these conflicts.63

Endemic conflicts in the vast Sahel predate thecivil war in Mali and the emergence of Islamistmovements such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM). The combinationof large territories and sparse populations hasalways presented obstacles to the consolidation andstabilization of authorities by many of the states inthe Sahel. The travails of state- and nation-buildingin the Sahel have been magnified by abundantnatural resources, which ignite the involvement ofdiverse international actors and further strain thecapacity of states to pacify these regions.

Ending Africa’s wars requires prioritizing theseneighborhoods through rebuilding governancesystems at national and regional levels. States needto address the grievances that propel dissidence

among marginal groups though negotiations andinclusive governance. Such engagements wouldreduce the necessity of militarization strategies thatstates have typically employed in these regions.Finding regional governance mechanisms thatmeet the problems of such neighborhoods posessome dilemmas: regional institutions are neededmost in these areas because of the scale of conflicts,but by the same token, these conflicts prevent theevolution of stable institutions for managingconflicts. This explains why, despite attempts bylocal and international actors, regional institutionsremain weak in the Horn of Africa, Central Africa,the Great Lakes region, and the Sahel. THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE MEANSOF VIOLENCE

Democratic governance entails civil-militaryrelations that privilege civilian control of themilitary. In postconflict states in Africa, disarma-ment, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)programs and other security sector reforms havetried to redress the imbalance between civilian andmilitary institutions. But in most of Africa, therehas been an increase in the privatization of security,witnessed in the proliferation of securitycompanies that, in some instances, have replacedlegitimate state institutions in the provision ofbasic security. As states have abdicated the corefunctions of policing by ceding primary protectiveresponsibilities to nonstate actors, they have madetheir societies more vulnerable and insecure. Theprivatization of security yields the militarization ofsocieties, which is a major governance challenge.64Similarly, despite national and regional initiatives,the spread of small arms and light weaponsremains a key factor in militarization thatcontributes to the escalation of crimes, while alsostrengthening the hands of actors that have littlestake in peaceful approaches to managing conflicts.Silencing the guns involves diminishing the role ofprivate actors in the security arena, or, at aminimum, reversing the situation where stateinstitutions are increasingly being marginalizedfrom the security realms.


63 Thean Potgieter and Clive Schofield, “Poverty, Poaching, and Pirates: Geopolitical Instability and Maritime Insecurity Off the Horn of Africa,” Journal of theIndian Ocean Region 6, no. 1 (2010): 86–112.

64 Željko Branović, “The Privatization of Security in Failing States: A Quantitative Assessment,” Occasional Paper no. 24, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Controlof Armed Forces, April 2011; and Rita Abrahamsen, ed., Conflict and Security in Africa (London: James Currey, 2013).


TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES ANDTHREATS

Many African countries remain vulnerable toglobal actors and forces that exploit weak state andregional institutions to promote conflicts andplunder resources. As a result, transnational crimeshave dire consequences for national and regionalsecurity, economic stability, and democraticinstitutions. Threats such as terrorism, piracy, drugtrafficking, human trafficking, money laundering,and cybercrimes are increasingly taxing Africa’sscarce resources and undermining governance.The existence of large territories that haveremained marginal to the centers of power in theHorn of Africa, the Sahel, and the Maghrebprovides fertile grounds for anti-statist claims withlinks to international networks. Thus, the growthof terrorist organizations such as al-Shabaab,AQIM, and Boko Haram have tapped into transna-tional Islamist grievances and flourished in thecircumstances of statelessness and marginality. Inaddition, these movements have succeeded inrecruiting and radicalizing African youth who aremarginalized within their own societies. Withunprecedented youth unemployment in mostAfrican countries, radical movements have foundfertile recruitment grounds. Meeting in Nairobi inAugust 2014, African security and intelligencechiefs urged African governments to urgentlyaddress the lack of employment among the youthto avoid their alarming recruitment into terrorcells.65

Piracy across Africa’s eastern and westernseaboards has emanated from the combination ofweak states and the lack of credible maritimesecurity policies. In the Horn of Africa, piracy wasan outcome of the collapse of the Somali state, thegrowing youth unemployment in Somalia, and theeconomic opportunities furnished by the lucrativeIndian Ocean trading routes. International policingefforts plus the gradual resuscitation of stateauthorities in Somalia have, in recent years,curtailed piracy. Nonetheless, regional maritimeinstitutions are the long-term solutions to aproblem that is only in abeyance.66 For example, in

the Gulf of Guinea, piracy has coincided with therise in economic crimes such as oil bunkering,underscoring the glaring weaknesses in maritimesecurity. Although the increasing incidents ofpiracy have forced ECOWAS to accelerate initia-tives to prioritize cooperation in maritime security,it will take a long time for these efforts to make adifference without better coordination of resourcesby multiple state actors. An effective response tocounter maritime security threats requires humanresources, technical resources, and coordinatedsystems.

Environmental crimes have traditionallyreceived less attention in policy circles, eventhough they are a growing threat to African statesand societies. Equally vital, they constitute a newsource of exploitation in which transnational actorswith superior technologies and resources colludewith local actors to deprive indigenous communi-ties of their access to traditional means ofsustenance. Forest encroachments, illegal logging,over-fishing, bio-piracy, and poaching are some ofthe growing environmental crimes in Africa. OnAfrica’s coastlines, the most prevalent environ-mental crimes relate to fishing by foreigncompanies that use illegal fishing methods, such astrawling, that lead to overfishing and environ-mental pollution. Bio-piracy occurs when techno-logically advanced firms use illegal means toengage in the commercial development of naturallyoccurring biological materials, such as plantsubstances or genetic cell lines, without compen-sating the communities where these materials areoriginally discovered. Although the poaching ofanimals has been part of environmental crimes, itsescalation has been attributed to the increasingdemand of products such as ivory and game meatin China and Asia.67

Old and new transnational crimes have increasedbecause of the intersection of weak governancesystems and corruption in Africa. In circumstancesof weak rule of law, criminal networks haveinfiltrated and co-opted political actors and intelli-gence agencies to profit from crimes. In somecountries, such as Guinea-Bissau, the growing

65 “African Intelligence and Security Chiefs Raise Concerns about Youth Unemployment,” Daily Nation, August 21, 2014. See also Jakkie Cilliers and Timothy Sisk,“Prospects for Africa’s 26 Fragile Countries,” African Futures Paper no. 8, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, October 2013.

66 Potgieter and Schofield, “Poverty, Poaching, and Pirates.”67 PricewaterhouseCoopers, Global Economic Crime Survey 2014, available at www.pwc.com/crimesurvey .

www.pwc.com/crimesurvey

nexus between military institutions and transna-tional criminal organizations has contributed topolitical instability and undermined the building ofdemocratic institutions. Corruption fuels transna-tional crimes, but states are not innocent ascriminal agents build alliances with politicians,financial institutions, and security agencies toundermine democratic governance, free press, andjudicial institutions.

Recent continental discussions about thecreation of the African Court of Justice and HumanRights acknowledge the threats posed by transna-tional crimes. The proposed court is supposed tohave jurisdiction over corruption, moneylaundering, human and drug trafficking, andpiracy—in addition to war crimes and crimesagainst humanity. This broad jurisdiction is inrecognition of the deep links that exist betweenconflict, corruption, terrorism, and other transna-tional crimes.68

Opportunities for Silencingthe Guns throughGovernance

Striving toward a conflict-free Africa is a clarioncall inspired by the Africa Agenda 2063, which isAfrica’s long-term development vision, and theCommon African Position on the Post-2015Development Agenda, which is the continent’smedium-term development plan. Within thecontext of this two-pronged strategic vision of theAU, the opportunities and prospects for silencingthe guns and ending all wars in Africa by 2020 lie inthe resilience of African societies and states, thegalvanization of national initiatives to buildfunctional polities and economies, and a renewedcommitment to employing collective energies inthe service of regional and continental integration.Binding all these efforts together is governance, thearray of institutions that channel the centrifugaldisintegrative dynamics of violent contestationsinto centripetal, productive, purposeful, andintegrative outcomes. Africa has surmounted thechallenges of slavery, colonization, exploitation,neocolonialism, and imperialism. It hasdemonstrated a firm determination to craft free,

just, and open societies, by rejecting unconstitu-tional changes of government, human rightsabuses, crimes against humanity, and mass atroci-ties. And it has embraced continental unity,integration, peace, and stability, which are allnecessary pre-conditions for sustained, inclusive,and equitable socioeconomic development. Thissection identifies some of the priority areas thatAfrican states and regional organizations need tofocus on in their efforts to end conflicts. ENHANCED STATE CAPACITY

As in the past, the vision for ending wars hinges onbuilding capable states that fulfill basic governancerequirements, notably inclusiveness and participa-tion; accountability and transparency; thereduction of social and economic vulnerabilities;the mobilization of public resources for productiveuses; the protection of civilians; common andcohesive national identities; and impartial and fairlegal systems that guarantee equality, propertyrights, respect for human rights, youth empower-ment, and women’s empowerment and genderequality; and the constructive prevention, manage-ment, and resolution of conflicts. Capable statesderive legitimacy and acceptance from meetingthese goals, but more critically, they strive to createsustainable institutions that can effectively respondto shocks, adversities, and future emergencies. Thisis why African states have embraced democraticgovernance as the foundation for political andeconomic institutions that also serve as preventivemeasures against conflicts and insecurities.SECULAR AND TOLERANT STATESAND SOCIETIES

Secular state institutions are the antidotes to theextremism manifested in both Christian andIslamic fundamentalism throughout Africa. Thedecline of mainstream religious organizationscoupled with despair arising from poverty andmarginalization has consigned large parts of Africato extremist traits that are compromising gains innation-building, state-building, and democraticconsolidation. But extremism goes beyondreligion, captured in the increasing ethnic, racial,gender, and regional intolerance even in societiesthat had previously made phenomenal efforts inbuilding national cohesion. Tolerance is the glue


68 Don Deya, “Is the African Court Worth the Wait?” Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, March 6, 2012; and Sonya Sceats, “Africa’s New Human RightsCourt: Whistling in the Wind?” Briefing Paper, London, Chatham House, March 2009.

that binds nations and allows for strength to bederived from diversity and difference.

The agenda of ending wars is inextricably tied toreviving forms of national and regional identitiesthat abjure fundamentalism of all forms, bigotry,narrow-mindedness, and all forms of discrimina-tion. And intolerance needs to be addressedthrough deliberate political and economicprocesses: the polarization stemming fromcontested elections, the skewed allocation of publicservices, and corruption-infected national resourcegovernance systems all sprout the politicaleconomy of intolerance. The crass materialism andopulence that minorities display amid the hungerand squalor of the majority also fuels intolerance.Democratic governance has the potential to reviveAfrica’s traditions of tolerance and accommoda-tion by offering economic and political opportuni-ties and heightening the processes for fair alloca-tion of public services and equitable distribution ofnatural resources. Spreading the economic gains ofa “rising Africa” more evenly through improvedinfrastructure, investment in agriculture, andaccess to education will eliminate the structures ofextremism and intolerance. Ultimately, nation-building to end wars will require a legitimatepolitical order based on consensus about nationalidentity, agreement about the boundaries of thepolitical community, and collective mobilization ofnational priorities. JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW

Fighting impunity is a priority of the AU, and itsmember states have pledged to end the legacy ofwidespread abuses of power by individuals. The oldOAU doctrine of non-interference in internalaffairs of member states has been replaced by thenew doctrine of non-indifference to mass abuses ofhuman and peoples’ rights within member states.These efforts coincide with new internationalnorms and strictures that are giving prominence toending mass atrocities, genocide, crimes againsthumanity, and war crimes. Since impunity is theabsence of accountability, the focus on democraticgovernance throughout Africa recognizes thatstates, societies, and communities can recover fromwars by building creative mechanisms that preventits recurrence. The national, regional, andcontinental commitments to end impunity mark asignificant phase in Africa’s democratic renewal.As governance systems in postconflict societies are

reconstructed, questions of ending impunity;encouraging accountability; promoting reconcilia-tion, national healing, and social harmony;punishing perpetrators; compensating victims ofmass atrocities; and ensuring justice are all part ofinitiatives that should contribute to silencing theguns in Africa. DEMILITARIZATION OF POLITICS

The militarization of politics is in direct contrast todemocratic governance and occurs partly wherepolitical parties and movements in some countrieshave developed strong ties with military institu-tions. This conflation of the state, party, andmilitary institutions impedes democratization andreduces military professionalism. Unresolvedconflicts and the upsurge of criminality such asterrorism have invariably forced governments toincrease the scope of military engagement indomestic politics to the detriment of democraticgovernance.

Ending wars and silencing the guns in Africa isabout the demilitarization of politics, redefiningcivil-military relations to ones where civilianauthorities play disproportionately larger roleswhile militaries remain as the core defenders of thestate from external threats. In some cases, demilita-rization may remove the opportunistic mobiliza-tion of militaries by political elites in attempts tofrustrate democratic governance, a practice thathas become common in recent years. In the past,militarization of politics has frequently led to civilwars, particularly where power and resources areconcentrated among ruling elites and groups. Forexample, in the ongoing conflict in South Sudan,the militarization of conflicts within the leadingmovements has contributed to conflict escalation,diminishing the role of a negotiated political settle-ment. Military professionalism and stable civil-military relations are some of the ways that permitrecourse to governance for conflict prevention andmanagement.REGIONAL DISARMAMENT

African regions confront unsustainable arms racesthat have decreased security. There needs to beimaginative thinking on reducing militaryspending throughout Africa with funds reorientedtoward expenditures in education, health care,employment, and strengthening of the rule of lawand administration of justice. Typically, military


expenditures consume up to 40 percent of nationalbudgets, and these resources should be channeledinto investment in efforts to prevent and manageconflict. Regional disarmament could be accompa-nied by efforts to build regional military arrange-ments within regional economic communities,along the lines of those contemplated by the AU’speacekeeping African Standby Force that can meetsome of the security threats such as terrorism andtransnational crimes. But disarmament as the startof the demilitarization of regional politics cannotsucceed without strengthening regionalmechanisms of democratic governance andcommon visions for peace, security, and develop-ment. FROM NORM-SETTING TOCONSOLIDATION AND EFFECTIVEIMPLEMENTATION

Arguably, the OAU and AU have developed arobust normative framework for silencing gunsand ending wars on the continent over the lastfifty-one years. The regional components ofsilencing guns by 2020 may not require develop-ment of new norms. Rather, efforts to end wars andsilence guns will largely depend on reinvigoratingregional and continental institutions supported byshared values, norms, and policy convergence ongovernance. Africa’s common continental commit-ment to democratic governance has flourished overthe last two decades, expressed in various instru-ments and declarations. New efforts are needed toguarantee that these instruments contribute toinstitutional regeneration through ratifications,domestication, and implementation. The broadarticulation of these norms has invariably formed alarge body of common African knowledge andexperiences that have been encapsulated within theAU shared values agenda. In addition, theestablishment of the African GovernanceArchitecture (AGA) and the African Peace andSecurity Architecture (APSA) are visible blueprintsand policy approaches that are starting to lendsteady institutional standing to these principles.Finding stronger and functional synergies betweenAGA and APSA, however, remains an ongoingexercise that requires further elaboration andthinking. To end wars, these architectures will needto work together to develop common programs,shared visions, and mutually reinforcing strategies.

Conclusion andRecommendations

Silencing the guns is the collective enterprise ofAfrican actors and institutions, supported byinternational players who have a role in theseobjectives. Collective efforts underscore theenormity of the task, but they also reinforce theshared nature of these goals. An integrated, united,peaceful, and prosperous Africa, driven by its owncitizens and playing a dynamic role in the globalarena is essential to the promotion of globalsecurity and prosperity. This report has acknowl-edged that ending conflicts is not a linear process;equally vital, it has contended that building institu-tions for democratic governance is a difficult andcontested process that often responds to distinctivenational needs, priorities, and obstacles.Nonetheless, Africa has accumulated a wealth ofexperiences and practices on how to leveragegovernance for conflict resolution that should beinstructive for ending wars. For this reason, thereport calls upon various actors and institutions toplay their respective roles in contributing to theurgent task of silencing the guns.1.African States and GovernmentsSilencing the guns and promoting goodgovernance is the responsibility of governmentsand states that prioritize people’s participation inpolitical and economic processes, promote soundand equitable livelihoods, and reduce violence at alllevels of society. Governments must remember thatthere are many normative governance frameworksat the regional and continental levels that they havesigned. Governments should take urgent measuresto domesticate these frameworks in national lawsand institutions. Those that have not signed thesemeasures should do so before 2020 as a demonstra-tion of their determination to contribute to the50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration adopted byAfrican leaders in May 2013. African states andgovernments, working closely with their citizens,must prioritize the establishment and effectivefunctioning of national infrastructures for peacethat allow early detection, prevention, manage-ment, and resolution of violent conflicts, at alllevels of the nation-state. These national peacearchitectures are essential if Africa is to play a keyrole in resolving Africa’s problems. This is where


Africa-specific and locally responsive methodolo-gies and culturally embedded strategies for conflicttransformation, such as the gacaca communitycourts in Rwanda, the ubuntu system in SouthAfrica, and the mato oput ceremony in northenUganda become extremely useful, and these shouldbe strengthened and reinforced.2.Regional Economic CommunitiesRegional economic communities are the buildingblocks of the AU. They are also a critical bridgebetween the AU and its member states. Thus, effortsto silence guns by member states and the AU maynot achieve many results if they are not comple-mented by the efforts of the regional economiccommunities. The future of a democratic andpeaceful Africa lies in solid regional economiccommunities that are taking gradual steps to buildthe African Economic Community. In specificefforts to silence guns and end wars by 2020,regional economic communities should consolidatetheir current efforts to implement regional collec-tive security and governance frameworks thatpromote peace, enshrine common democraticvalues, and foster disarmament and militaryreductions consistent with regional resources, suchas the ones existing in ECOWAS, EAC, SADC,IGAD, ECCAS, and others. The gap between norm-setting and implementation must be bridged.

3.The African UnionThe AU has established elaborate normativeframeworks around governance, conflict preven-tion, management, and resolution. In ending warsand working toward Agenda 2063, the AU shouldstep up efforts to push more vigorously for theimplementation of these normative frameworks.As stated above, the relationship between the APSAand AGA need to be markedly improved andscaled up to build synergies between the objectivesof ending wars and building a peaceful Africa.Enhanced crossover between these two frameworksmust be bolstered to demonstrate the institutionalwill to provide leadership on African governancethat is essential to silencing guns. 4.The International CommunityFew African countries manufacture guns. Efforts toend wars, therefore, need the support of the interna-tional community in cutting the sources ofarmaments that have fueled African wars. Theinternational community has a responsibility torenew attempts to clamp down on unsustainablearms flows into Africa. Africans have raised theirvoices regarding arms and conflict entrepreneurs atmany international fora. The internationalcommunity, through its diverse institutions, shouldmake a commitment to ending Africa’s wars by 2020by placing a moratorium on arms flows to Africa.


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The INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE (IPI) is an independent,international not-for-profit think tank with a staff representing more than twenty nationalities, with offices in New York, facing United Nations headquarters, and in Vienna. IPI is dedicated to promoting the prevention and settlement of conflicts between and within states by strengthening international peace and security institutions. To achieve its purpose, IPI employs a mix of policy research, convening, publishing, and outreach.

The INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE (IPI) is an independent,

international not-for-profit think tank dedicated to managing risk

and building resilience to promote peace, security, and sustainable

development. To achieve its purpose, IPI employs a mix of policy

research, strategic analysis, publishing, and convening. With staff

from more than twenty countries and a broad range of academic

fields, IPI has offices facing United Nations headquarters in New

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