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Silk roads of the twenty-first centuryDellios, Rosita

Published in:Asia & The Pacific Policy Studies

DOI:10.1002/app5.172

Published: 24/03/2017

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Recommended citation(APA):Dellios, R. (2017). Silk roads of the twenty-first century: The cultural dimension. Asia & The Pacific PolicyStudies, 4(2), 225-236. https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.172

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Original Article

Silk Roads of the Twenty-first Century: The Cultural Dimension

Rosita Dellios*

Abstract

Much has been written about China’s grandproject of the twenty-first century, the Silk RoadEconomic Belt and the 21st Century MaritimeSilk Road—or the Belt and Road Initiative. Itis set to lift living standards through the provi-sion of infrastructure and better connectivitywhere these are lacking. While economic re-sources are enumerated, and the maps of roadsand corridors have been drafted, the culturaldimension is understudied. Beijing has nothelped in this regard. Apart from vague slo-gans like ‘win–win cooperation’, ‘mutual re-spect’ and ‘community of common destiny’,there has been no concerted effort to showcaseChina’s thought culture that is eminently suitedto precisely this type of venture. If collabora-tion, even more than connectivity, is the neces-sary glue for bringing the regions of the Beltand Road together, then China needs to heedthe advice of its own great philosophers.

Key words: silk roads, Belt and RoadInitiative, Chinese philosophy, China’sforeign policy, Bandung spirit

1. Introduction

China’s plans for building new silk roads ofdevelopment are impressive in their sheerphysical scope. Less appreciated is their poten-tial impact in the ideational domain. Indeed,China risks missing an opportunity to deployits vast cultural capacity towards human andecological security. This would make the dif-ference between being associated with the en-gineering feats of building ports, railways andpipelines across the Indo-Eurasian hemisphereand being embraced for a thought culture thatis particularly adept at addressing contempo-rary challenges in the human and naturalworld. The new silk roads when viewed as aConfucian–Daoist–Buddhist construct wouldtransform the whole enterprise into a more gen-uinely collaborative undertaking. These threephilosophies represent the main spiritual tradi-tions informing Chinese culture. Their foun-ders were great teachers whose ideas live onand have a role to play as a spiritual compassfor the new silk roads initiative. Before elabo-rating on this grand project of twenty-firstcentury China, an introduction to the ancientteachers who proved so influential in the devel-opment of Chinese culture is in order.

2. China’s Thought Culture: A BriefSurvey

Confucius stands out as the leading ancientphilosopher of China. Latinised from KongFuzi, meaning Great Master Kong,1 ‘Confu-cius’ (whose actual name was Kong Qiu) livedfrom 551 to 479 BCE during a time of

* Faculty of Society and Design, Bond University,Gold Coast, QLD 4229, Australia; email:<rdellios@bond.edu.au>

1. In Chinese, ‘zi’ (or ‘tzu’ in the older Wade-Gilestransliteration system) is an honorific that means ‘master’.

Received: 5 December 2016 | Accepted: 9 February 2017Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 225–236doi: 10.1002/app5.172

© 2017 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studiespublished by JohnWiley& Sons Australia, Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University.This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License,which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercialand no modifications or adaptations are made.

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prolonged upheaval with the decline of theZhou dynasty. This occurred during the pe-riods known as ‘Spring and Autumn’ (circa770–476 BCE) and the subsequent ‘WarringStates’ that only ended when China was uni-fied in 221 BCE. It was an era that gave riseto numerous schools of thought as to how todeal with the problems of the day. Like today’sthink tanks, each sought the ear of government.Though the morally upright Confucian school(or rujia: school of scholars) was not particu-larly successful at the time of constant warfare,it was officially adopted by later imperial rulersand was responsible for the intellectual basis ofChina’s sophisticated bureaucracy.Confucius’ key concepts are to be found in

an anthology of his sayings in the form of dia-logues with his followers: The Analects. Thistext shows that Confucius sought harmoniousorder in the way society is governed (a themeelaborated in the following texts). He repre-sented himself as a ‘transmitter’ of wisdomfrom the ancient Zhou sages, when in realityhe was also an innovator. For example, he in-troduced ‘an aristocracy of learning and merit,rather than family background’ so that ‘Chinaexcelled as a bureaucratic polity that was ableto survive intact over the millennia’ (Dellios& Ferguson 2013, p. 82). Yet his role as ‘trans-mitter’ of the classical canon—by helping tocompile, edit and comment on the five classicsof Poetry, History, Rites, Changes and theSpring and Autumn Annuls—was also highlyconsequential in providing the contours ofChinese thought culture. Confucianism wasadvanced by Mencius (Meng Ke) in the fourthcentury BCE and later by Xunzi. The formerwith his concerns for peace and unity may beviewed as the philosophical father of China’s‘peaceful development’ policy in today’sworld. The latter, Xunzi, warned against whathe believed to be a natural tendency for peopleto be self-seeking and conflictual. He saw thisas cause for educating them on the norms ofappropriate conduct (li) so that they couldbecome ‘civilised’.Daoism (Taoism), by comparison, is more

attuned to nature as the ultimate instructor ofhow to live life and seeks to ground the humanin a wider ‘cosmic order’. Its legendary

teacher, Laozi (or Lao Tzu, meaning Old Mas-ter) is popularly depicted as riding an ox awayfrom the artificial world of human intrigue anddisturbance that characterised the times—a dis-appointment he shared with Confucius. Ratherthan persisting, as Confucius did, in trying toconvince the power brokers to heed his adviceand training a new generation of thinkers tolead China back to civilisational norms, Laozisimply withdrew to the wilderness. Beforeleaving, however, he committed his thoughtsto the written word and thereby acquired acertain kind of immortality. Laozi, the teacher,who became Laozi the text, was more of aLazarus (to use a Western referent) than a dili-gent Confucian transmitter. In encoding thewisdom of a culture almost lost to its genera-tion, Laozi revived from the dead the mysteriesthat made China spiritually active.The Laozi is also called the Daodejing (Tao

Te Ching), which means the Book of the Wayand Its Power. Power has many meanings,and in this case, the word (de/te) also translatesas virtue. It is associated with following thedao (the Way). The dao itself is described aseternal and nameless and is accessed by anattitude of wuwei or non-action. According tothe Daodejing (I.37): ‘The way never acts[wuwei] yet nothing is left undone’.Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu, 369–286 BCE) is

another great Daoist philosopher who broughtfurther insights into the nature of the dao,showing by way of numerous examples the im-portance of seeing situations from differentperspectives. He used parables such as hisdream that he was a butterfly and upon wakingdid not know whether he was a man dreaminghe was a butterfly or the other way round (TheZhuangzi, ch. 2). Another example concerns alarge leafy tree in the mountains, which man-aged to survive the woodcutter’s axe. WhenZhuangzi asked the reason, the woodcutter toldhim: ‘There’s nothing it could be used for!’Zhuangzi concluded: ‘Because of its worth-lessness, this tree is able to live out the yearsHeaven gave it’ (The Zhuangzi, ch. 20). Themoral of the story is clear:

. . . if you were to climb up on the Way and itsVirtue and go drifting and wandering, neither

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praised nor damned, now a dragon, now a snake,shifting with the times, never willing to hold toone course only. Now up, now down, takingharmony for your measure, drifting andwandering with the ancestor of the ten thousandthings, treating things as things but not lettingthem treat you as a thing – then how could youget into any trouble? This is the rule, the methodof Shen Nung and the Yellow Emperor. [ChuangTzu 1968, ch. 20]

The third great teaching of traditional Chinawas Buddhism. Unlike the other two, Confu-cianism and Daoism, it was not Chinese inorigin but actually came from India. With itsmessage of non-violence and respect for allsentient beings, Buddhism was localised andwas occasionally adopted as the ruling imperialideology (Ferguson & Dellios 2017, p. 87).Buddhism offers the concept of ‘skilful means’(Sanskrit: upāya), which entails selecting thebest strategy for communicating the dharmaor teaching. Also notable is ‘codependent orig-ination’ and its related idea of ‘emptiness’ (Skt:sunyata). This holds that all phenomena arisenot of themselves but interdependently; there-fore, they are ‘empty’ of their own existenceand remain contingent.

Although distinctive in their own way, eachof the three great teachings came together in acomplementary fashion to mould Chinese cul-ture. This is well represented in the famousdepiction of Confucius, Laozi and the Buddhastanding together under a tree in friendlyfellowship (Figure S1). Their messages arephilosophically grounded in following a paththat does not veer to extremism or militancy.Their spiritual styles are not of theproselytising variety, but seek instead to en-courage an inner cultivation or awareness.They are not religions in the Western sense,but their spiritual dimension can be discerned,albeit within a wide spectrum from philosoph-ical principles to faith-based dispositions:

Buddhism may be viewed as both a philosophyand a religion. Daoism, too, bifurcates intophilosophical and religious branches. Evenphilosophical Daoism has its mysticalconnotations when considering the unfathomabledao. Confucianism is concerned with ethics butit, too, acquired an ineffable quality when it came

to the spiritual fruits of cultivating a moralcharacter – that is, the prize of self-realisation.[Ferguson & Dellios 2017, p. 206]

Whatever is said of Confucian hierarchy (incontradistinction to egalitarianism), Daoiststrategy (‘all warfare is based on deception’—Sunzi’s The Art of War, I:18) and Buddhism’sdetachment from life (an Indic ‘otherworldli-ness’), these are but selected prisms from alarger body of thought through which theteachings are seen. When seeking ethicalguidance, each has much to say about compas-sion and helping rather than hindering the well-being of others. This suggests that elements ofall three can be coordinated in new silk roadsthinking. Foremost in such thinking is avoid-ance of China pursuing the role of the newparamount power or hegemon in global affairs.

The very nature of Confucian–Daoist–Buddhist thought culture precludes the ideaof one civilisation imposing itself on another.Far from it, the process is dependent on mutu-ality and ‘infinite game’ dynamics (discussedin the succeeding paragraphs). The ‘commu-nity of common destiny’—a favoured formu-lation by thwe Chinese Communist Party(CCP) general secretary, China’s presidentand ‘core’ leader, Xi Jinping—takes on aricher meaning when seen in this light. If thenew silk roads project is not to be ‘derailed’by incompetence and corruption, a scenariothat would have an equally damning impacton its initiator, the CCP, much work needs tobe done to bring slogans to life. But first, whatis this ‘silk roads’ project?

3. Silk Roads of the Twenty-first Century

Formally called the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’and the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’,President Xi Jinping announced the first inthe Central Asian state of Kazakhstan andthe second in the archipelagic nation ofIndonesia, in September and October 2013, re-spectively. They became known as One BeltOne Road (OBOR), and later as the Belt andRoad Initiative (BRI), in due recognition that—like the old silk road—there was more thanone. Indeed, the network of old caravan trade

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routes was immortalised by the evocative term‘silk road’ because Chinese silk was a muchsought after trading commodity. The termwas coined in 1877 by Prussian geographer,Ferdinand von Richthofen, though the traderoutes themselves go back 2000 years. Thenew silk roads of the twenty-first century crossthe continents of Asia, Europe and Africa, aswell as the seas that wash upon them.The authoritative Vision and Actions on

Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (NationalDevelopment and Reform Commission—NDRC 2015), identifies five ‘roads’,‘connecting the vibrant East Asia economiccircle at one end and developed European eco-nomic circle at the other, and encompassingcountries with huge potential for economicdevelopment’ (NDRC 2015, III. Framework,para 2). Two of the five are land and sea routesconnecting China and Europe: one throughCentral Asia and Russia; the other via theSouth China Sea and Indian Ocean. A thirdroad connects China to the Middle East viaCentral Asia; while a fourth takes in China,Southeast Asia, South Asia and the IndianOcean. The fifth route branches out fromChina through the South China Sea and intothe South Pacific (Figure S2). Then there arethe six economic corridors (NDRC 2015, III.Framework, para 3): the Eurasian Land Bridge;China–Mongolia–Russia; China–CentralAsia–West Asia; China–Indochina Peninsula;China–Pakistan; and Bangladesh–China–In-dia–Myanmar.Covering 65 countries, 4.4 billion people

and approximately 40% of global GDP(Hofman 2015), the scale of the BRI is impres-sive, and it is growing. In 2015, the Interna-tional Department of the CCP CentralCommittee and the National Developmentand Reform Commission assured a gatheringof diplomats and business leaders that theBRI was not restricted to any particular geo-graphic region or economic profile: ‘The initia-tives are open to all and countries that areinterested in the initiatives can participate inthem. What China has offered is only the vi-sion’ (China Daily 2015). It has, however, alsoset up the resources to bring the vision to life,

including the US$40 million Silk Road Fundto encourage private sector investment and ini-tiated the Asian Infrastructure InvestmentBank (AIIB) with its registered capital of US$100 billion and membership of 57 countries(including Australia). Another recently createdmultilateral bank, the BRICS New Develop-ment Bank, can be called on for funds. ButChina’s own ‘policy banks’ are responsiblefor much of BRI’s funding; the Export–ImportBank of China is an even bigger lender than theAsian Development Bank (ADB), having lentover US$80 billion in 2015 compared withthe ADB’s US$27 billion (Kynge 2016); theChina Construction Bank has invested morethan US$300 billion in 176 Belt and Roadprojects in the power, mining and transportsectors (Hui 2016); while the China Develop-ment Bank is investing over US$890 billionin a variety of such projects from infrastructureto agriculture (He 2015). Moreover, the wholeBRI enterprise has attracted the attention of‘international pension funds, insurance compa-nies, sovereign wealth funds, private equityfunds and others’ in their quest for ‘long-termreturns of 6 to 8 per cent’ (investment bankerHenry Tillman quoted in Kynge 2016).The BRI goes beyond infrastructure and

economic calculations, as important as theseare in creating markets and improving peo-ple’s standard of living. Its principles arealigned to the United Nations Charter andChina’s own foreign policy foundations, theFive Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (mu-tual respect for each other’s sovereignty andterritorial integrity, mutual non-aggression,mutual non-interference in each other’s inter-nal affairs, equality and mutual benefit andpeaceful coexistence). As Vision and Actions(NDRC 2015, II. Principles) elaborates, theBRI is ‘open for cooperation’ beyond thecountries of the ancient Silk Road; it is ‘har-monious and inclusive’, advocating inter-civilisational tolerance; it abides ‘by marketrules and international norms’, and it ‘seeksmutual benefit’ so that ‘the wisdom and crea-tivity, strengths and potentials of all parties’can flourish.This theme has been repeated in other

venues and projects. For example, on the

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60th anniversary of the Asian–African Con-ference in Bandung in 1955—commemoratedfor the spirit of solidarity among newly inde-pendent nations in Asia and Africa that didnot want to be part of the Cold War contest—President Xi Jinping called for carryingforward the Bandung Spirit. He put forwarda three-pronged approach: (i) deepeningAsian–African cooperation (which ‘is not aclosed and exclusive pursuit, but an open andwin-win endeavour’); (ii) expanding South–South cooperation (through ‘more effective in-stitutions and mechanisms’ and increasing ‘therepresentation and voice of the developingcountries’); and (iii) advancing North–Southcooperation ‘From the strategic perspective ofbuilding a community of common destiny formankind, North–South relations are not merelyan economic and development issue but onethat bears on the whole picture of world peaceand stability’ (Xi 2015).

A similar approach was evident in China’sannual regional security conference, theXiangshan Forum. At its October 2016 meet-ing, there was a call for ‘partnership’ in main-taining security in the region (as distinct froman alliance system), adhering to the ‘familyspirit’ in Asian culture, being inclusive (theUnited States and its allies were welcome),and avoiding a formal structure but insteadencouraging a ‘comprehensive, multi-leveland multilayered network’ (Chinese officialsquoted in Ekman 2016). There is no formalregionalism in the manner of the EuropeanUnion. Respect for state sovereignty is main-tained, as is cultural and political diversity.Chinese-style trans-regionalism encouragescommon efforts—including ‘policy coordina-tion’, ‘unimpeded trade’ and ‘financial integra-tion’ (NDRC 2015)—but remains aware ofenvironmental and societal needs (NDRC2015, IV. Cooperation Priorities, paras 13, 14):

We should promote ecological progress inconducting investment and trade, increasecooperation in conserving eco-environment,protecting biodiversity, and tackling climatechange, and join hands to make the Silk Road anenvironment-friendly one.We welcomecompanies from all countries to invest in China,and encourage Chinese enterprises to participate

in infrastructure construction in other countriesalong the Belt and Road, and make industrial in-vestments there. We support localized operationand management of Chinese companies to boostthe local economy, increase local employment,improve local livelihood, and take social respon-sibilities in protecting local biodiversity and eco-environment.

Meanwhile, the Asian Infrastructure Invest-ment Bank states on its website (2014–2016)that it ‘will put in place strong policies ongovernance, accountability, financial, procure-ment and environmental and social frame-works’. Objectives within its Environmentaland Social Framework (AIIB 2016, p. 2)include the need to

• Ensure the environmental and social sound-ness and sustainability of projects.

• Support integration of environmental andsocial aspects of projects into the decision-making process by all parties.

• Provide a framework for public consultationand disclosure of environmental and socialinformation in relation to projects.

• Improve development effectiveness andimpact to increase results on the ground,both short term and long term.

Beyond a commitment to internationalnorms, institutional best practice with regardto sustainable development and improving thelives of working people, it is the ideationalcomponent that keeps recurring in the new silkroads narrative. The Vision and Actions docu-ment (NDRC 2015, III. Framework, para 1)states that BRI is based on ‘win-win coopera-tion that promotes common development’ andincludes ‘cultural inclusiveness’. This has be-come a favoured formulation in Beijing’s artic-ulations about its relationship with the world,both near and far. Though appearing blandand repetitive, its philosophical lineage is an-cient. At the same time, it is of different stockto that of the Western world order, with itsroots in Greco–Roman, Judeo–Christian andEnlightenment values. This is where Chinahas failed to explain itself, if it is indeed willingto do so—lest the ancient philosophies provetoo radical for Communist party rule which,ironically, is also of Western philosophical

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provenance (Marxism). However, not to recog-nise more fully the imprint of an alternativethought culture limits BRI’s potential andleaves China open to the criticism that theBRI is merely an attempt by China to carveout a sphere of influence. Such a sphere wouldexclude and compete with the United States,outflank India and marginalise Japan, all thewhile acting to provide a still developingChina with resources and markets.Undoubtedly there are geopolitical and

geo-economic benefits accruing to China fromits new silk roads. As Callick (2016) noted,under the BRI, ‘many international roads,railways and flights will lead not to Rome butto Beijing’. This process, it is worth noting, isas much about movement as destinations.Eastern understandings of international andinterpersonal relations would travel too, muchas the old silk roads transmitted more thangoods across Eurasia and the Indian Ocean.Ideas, religions, art and music flowed acrossthe same networks as silk, tea, spices, fursand technologies, creating a cross-fertilisationof cultures and civilisations. So what are theideas from the twenty-first century silk roadsthat are currently exchanged like coins in abusy marketplace? The contemporary use of‘win–win’ terminology is especially instructiveas it begins as a theory of games in the Westand culminates in a Chinese discourse on mu-tual gain, but its cultural worth is little known.

4. What is Implied by China’s ‘Win–Win’Discourse?

‘Win–win’ is part of the language of gametheory that studies how players interact strate-gically to achieve their preferred outcomes.Although its insights can be found throughouthistory (Ross 2016), game theory wasformalised as a field of study in the mid-twentieth century (von von Neumann &Morgenstern 1944; and Nash 1950). It beganwith a reliance on mathematical modelling,but over time, game theory became both morerefined and more broadly based (Ross 2016),with applications to economics, politics andthe social sciences generally. Thomas D.Schelling, an economist who became a

strategist in the nuclear age, stands out in thisregard. He won the Nobel Prize (along withanother scholar) in Economics in 2005, hav-ing been recognised for ‘having enhancedour understanding of conflict and cooperationthrough game-theory analysis’ (Nobel MediaAB 2014). Schelling did this through a morecognitive approach, as evidenced by his ‘the-ory of interdependent decisions’ (Schelling1980 [1960]). This theory holds that deci-sion-makers do not operate in isolation, andtheir decisions cannot be unilateral: ‘Eventwo completely isolated individuals, who playwith each other in absolute silence and with-out knowing each other’s identity, must tac-itly reach some meeting of the minds’(Schelling 1988 [1960], p. 163). In recognisingthis, it is possible to devise strategies that takeinto account the other, persuading them not toinflict harm on oneself because of the conse-quences that would follow.An example of game theory, as told by

Schelling in his lectures at Harvard andrecalled by one of his students, Kinsley(2005), is as follows:

So you’re standing at the edge of a cliff, chainedby the ankle to someone else. You’ll be released,and one of you will get a large prize, as soon asthe other gives in. How do you persuade the otherguy to give in, when the only method at yourdisposal – threatening to push him off the cliff –would doom you both?Answer: You start dancing, closer and closer tothe edge. That way, you don’t have to convincehim that you would do something totallyirrational: plunge him and yourself off the cliff.You just have to convince him that you areprepared to take a higher risk than he is ofaccidentally falling off the cliff. If you can dothat, you win. You have done it by usingprobability to divide a seemingly indivisiblethreat. And a smaller threat can be more effectivethan a bigger one. A threat to drag both of you offthe cliff is not credible. A threat to take a 60percent chance of that same thing might becredible.

Schelling’s contribution to game theory de-pends on rational decision-making (even ifthe pretence of irrationality is used as a ruse).It also relies on the power of bargaining,

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persuasion and what Schelling calls ‘the ma-nipulation of risk’. The last of these forms achapter in its own right in his 1966 classicon nuclear deterrence, Arms and Influence(Schelling 1966, ch. 3), as does ‘the diplo-macy of violence’ (ch. 1), which capturesthe whole notion of coercive bargaining.

Game theory can be applied to a range ofreal-life situations and relationships, and notonly in negative ways for positive outcomesof survival. Whether it be parenting, commerceor global politics, the same principles can beapplied. Simply expressed, game theory speaksof zero-sum games in which there is an abso-lute winner and absolute loser (it is purely com-petitive) and non-zero sum games in whichboth sides lose or both sides win. To James P.Carse, who takes the metaphor of ‘gamelike’situations even deeper into philosophy andpsychology, the first suggests a finite gameand the second an infinite one. ‘A finite gameis played for the purpose of winning’, Carse(1986, p. 3) states from the outset, ‘an infinitegame for the purpose of continuing the play’.Finite games such as sports, chess, debates,earning an educational qualification and warhave boundaries—both spatial and temporal—in addition to the boundary represented byfixed rules. Their goal, as stated, is to win. Aninfinite game does not have boundaries, but‘horizons’. It is continuous and dynamic. Finitegames can be played within infinite ones, butthe reverse does not hold: an infinite game can-not be played within a finite one. ‘Infiniteplayers regard their wins and losses in what-ever finite games they play as but moments incontinuing play’ (Carse 1986, p. 7). Infinitegames are win–win or lose–lose insofar as theplayers are interdependent. This means ‘theyeither succeed or fail together’, as East–Westphilosopher Roger T. Ames (2007) explains.He offers the example of ‘a mother [who] isresolutely committed to strengthening the rela-tionship she has with her son so that togetherthey can manage whatever increasingly com-plex problems their lives lived together mightpresent’. This is an infinite game because ‘thesuccess and prosperity of mother and son iscoterminous and mutually entailing’ (Ames2007, para 8).

Infinites games come closest to conveyingthe Chinese cultural understanding of ‘win–win’ cooperation. As deployed in affairs ofstate, it creates an impression of being aborrowed or recently learned concept. WhenChina began using the ‘win–win’ formulationin its security discourse in 1997, it did sowithin a multilateral body sympathetic to col-lective security: that of the ASEAN RegionalForum. China was seen as having beensocialised into this modality (for example, byJohnston 2008, pp. 172–3). However, ‘win–win’ and the associated ‘new security concept’that appeared in China’s defense white papersfrom 1998 were not new; nor was China’schoice of friends with whom to share such aconcept. In the ideologically riven age of thenewly emerged People’s Republic of China(PRC), there was a commitment to a foreignpolicy of mutuality. As noted earlier, therewere the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexis-tence, and they were incorporated in the finalcommuniqué of the 1955 Bandung Confer-ence. The Five Principles were also includedin the PRC Constitution in 1982.

What was new about China’s choice ofslogans and the occasions for their employ-ment was the threat-assessed environment.Deng Xiaoping—whose leadership was re-sponsible for introducing China’s reforms—saw no major threat brewing, but rather a greatopportunity for China to develop. It needed thecooperation of others and a period of peace forthis undertaking. Adopting the language(though not the mathematical abstractions) ofgame theory, China sought to emphasise thatit did not favour an international system inwhich there were winners and losers. Such asystem, it noted, was unsuited to a globalisedinterdependent world and harked back to a‘Cold War mentality’. Although such amindset had indeed become outmoded, thecriticism from a game theory perspective, asdeveloped by Schelling and his colleagues,does not hold for the logic of nuclear deter-rence. Far from being a zero-sum game, thedeterrent effect of nuclear weapons was suchthat survival or destruction was mutuallyassured. (Adapting Zhuangzi, the ‘usefulness’of nuclear weapons was their non-use.) This

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describes a non-zero-sum game. What Beijingis really saying is that this is not a game—atleast not of the finite variety. The new securityconcept, articulated in the PRC’s first defencewhite paper of 1998, and later as a positionpaper, expressed the need ‘to rise aboveone-sided security and seek common securitythrough mutually beneficial cooperation …on the basis of common interests’ (Ministryof Foreign Affairs, PRC 2002).By the twenty-first century, the policy slo-

gan of a ‘new type of major-country relations’sought to ensure that China would be seen asrising or developing peacefully, not as a con-tender for power at the expense of the UnitedStates. Whatever Beijing’s intentions, it didnot need a cloaked containment policy. The2012 US ‘pivot to Asia’ was widely seen tobe nothing less. While the BRI of 2013 maybe viewed as China’s pivot westward, it none-theless goes beyond the finiteness of a gamewon or lost, or the prospect of an opponentcontained or deterred within an establishedperimeter. At its most expansive, the BRImanifests the deeply ingrained Chinesephilosophy of correlativity. Unlike the West’sfocus on the autonomous individual, thesolitary ‘one’, Chinese thought gravitates to amutually regarding ‘two’. The key Confucianconcept of ren (benevolence, humaneness) ismade up of the character for person (⋏) andthe character for two (二); thus two people.The qualities of benevolence and humaneness,that make us human, come about through ourexperience of interacting with another. Thisis why the Confucian rites (li) are meant tobe more than socially sanctioned ritual. Asthe outer expression of one’s inner ren (themethod of showing ren), li represents consid-erate behaviour towards others (Dellios &Ferguson 2013, p. 109). Like good manners,the intent is a display of thoughtfulness to-wards the other person. In Confucianism, this‘other-regarding’ attitude is also related toshu (reciprocity): ‘What you would not wantfor yourself, do not do to others’ (The Analects15:23). It is not a self-sacrificing posture, nor aself-referential one in deciding another’s treat-ment but more the case of using one’s judge-ment in evaluating another’s perspective.

This shows that a Confucian does haveautonomy but within a relational context inwhich the values of respect, empathy and co-humanity are cultivated (Chan 2000). Add tothis the Daoist teaching of non-interferencethrough non-action (wuwei), which allows forspontaneity (ziran) in one’s responsiveness tothe other, and there arises a more profound ap-preciation of the non-interference and cooper-ation principle within the win–win statement.In reality, not doing unto others what youwould not want for yourself, and allowingfor wuwei to nourish ziran, permits a processof productive mutuality that is greater thanthe sum of its parts. This is win–win from aChinese philosophical perspective which, inits cultural embeddedness, makes it a livingphilosophy or disposition.In international relations terms, it points to

the need to build trust and to think of ‘mutualrespect and mutual benefit’ as more thandiplomatic veils for the pursuit of nationalself-interest. Under Confucian teaching, thereis no national interest, but mutual interest.What about opposition? The Analects (4:18,18:1, 19:10) advises remonstrance (jian). AsMattice (2014, pp. 79–80) explains, it is ‘anearnest and careful presentation of reasons foropposition that is structured around the rela-tionship of those involved, and which pointsout or demonstrates the problem in question’.This is similar to shu. The idea of oppositionleads to the nature of argument. According tothe Confucian philosopher, Xunzi, there is adistinction between contentiousness and coop-erative argument; one functions for its ownsake while the other pursues a matter of com-mon concern (Cua in Mattice, pp. 33–34).Thus, in Confucianism, a sense of reciprocityand common interests does not negate differ-ence and argument. Harmony in the Chinesesense includes opposition as a productiveforce. This may be compared with the institu-tion of a ‘loyal opposition’ in parliamentarydemocracy. It is a form of remonstrance that,when viewed as a non-zero-sum game, allowsthe ‘losers’ a genuine role in ensuring the‘winners’ remain accountable. Rather than aHegelian–Marxist dialectics of struggle, thereis a yinyang dialectics of harmony. One side

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needs the other to maintain the system. Morethan that, one contains an element of the other,even though they are different. This explainstheir dynamic interactive nature.

It also shows an absence of hierarchy, yin isnot better than yang, and vice-versa:

Instead, yinyang is emblematic of valuationalequality rooted in the unified, dynamic, andharmonized structure of the cosmos. As such, ithas served as a heuristic mechanism forformulating a coherent view of the worldthroughout Chinese intellectual and religioushistory. [Wang n.d.]

While hierarchy is often noted as a definingfeature of Confucianism (the ‘prism’ throughwhich it is often viewed), its associations withthe yinyang concept—which is fundamentalto Chinese philosophy and does not belong toany one school of thought—suggest that all isnot what it seems ideationally. Confucianthought is far more complex than stereotypessuggest. To be sure, it has much in commonwith Daoism, while both are distinctive in theirteachings. Both value non-interference, andwhile Confucianism is associated with ritual,its trajectory is also towards spontaneity. Con-fucius’ own life stages reflect this:

At fifteen, I set my heart on learning. At thirty, Iknow where I stand. At forty, I had no moredoubts. At fifty, I knew the will of Heaven [life’spurpose]. At sixty, my ear was attuned [that is,my moral sense is well-developed]. And atseventy, I follow my heart’s desire withoutbreaking any rule. [The Analects 2: 4]

Such internalisation of the moral universe sug-gests that one may act without imposing one’swill. In other words, the action of non-action(wei wuwei) allows for an infinite gamemodal-ity and is distinctive from its more commonlyused strategic meaning in which a particulargoal is desired—such as ‘speedy victory’ inwar employing various ways and means, in-cluding the art of deception. This is Sunzi’s ad-vice when conducting a finite game (The Art ofWar, ch. 2: ‘Waging War’). And yet, there is arelationship from one level to another. A finite

activity is not without a context of a largerplan: battles and military operations do notexist in isolation of grand strategy, whichcontinues into the peace and precedes war. Itis a case of finite games within infinite games.

5. What Does China Need to Do? WhatWould Its Cultural Sages Prescribe?

China is already doing a great deal, in trueDaoist fashion, by not appearing to be doinganything much at all. It keeps a relatively lowprofile in its global presence and massive in-vestments, except for finite contests of demon-strative actions in the South China Sea. Thesehave drawn so much attention that one mayask whether the usefulness of ‘island-building’(to enhance China’s claims) in this contestedsea has been rendered useless by fragmentingthe ‘community of common destiny’. How-ever, even if it has, lessons learned and alteredrelationships have prepared the players for anew round of possibilities. One of the possibil-ities is to turn the South China Sea into an ex-ample of ‘ecological civilisation’2 that extendsacross the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.Appropriately, water is a symbol of the dao:its softness and flexibility belie its power tochange the whole landscapes through which itflows. Chinese dredgers may have built a‘Great Wall of Sand’ in the South China Sea(Browne 2016), but a Daoist-informed geopol-itics would be longer lasting. By encouragingsustainable fishing and preserving the ecologi-cal balance of the waters in its neighbourhood,China would not only be at the forefront of en-hancing a precious resource. (On fisheries as aserious issue in South China Sea, see MaritimeAwareness Project 2016). It would also attract agenuine ‘community of common destiny’whose civilisational credentials would rely asmuch on its relationship to the environment aswith the human world.

2. Launched by the 18th Central Committee of the CCP inNovember 2013, the term first appeared in governmentdocuments at the 17th Party Congress in 2007, and in2012, ‘ecological civilisation’ was included in the CCP’sconstitution. It is seen as the overarching vision of China’scomprehensive development so that it can balance its needsinto the future.

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From a Confucian perspective, the SilkRoad Economic Belt provides an opportunityto turn Eurasia—the site of the geopolitical‘great game’ between empires of the earlytwentieth century—into an infinite game arena.This would unfold both philosophically andstructurally (via multilateral organisations)and with ‘development’ as an expanded termto include a cultivation of the other as well asthe self, of economic benefits in the presenceof cultural and environmental awareness.With Buddhism’s contribution of codepen-

dent origination, the entire Belt and Roadnetwork can be imagined as a mandala.3 Itwould comprise many distinctive but inte-grated and interrelating cultures. Like theBandung Spirit, which Xi Jinping evoked onthe 60th anniversary of the Asian–AfricanConference, a regional consciousness of beingpart of a whole would be encouraged. More-over, the mandalic region’s noted characteristicof ‘adaptability’ suggests that it could ‘makesense of just about anything that was originally“foreign”’ (Reynolds 1995, p. 427). This isalready true of China. Having borrowedBuddhism from India, China acquired aBuddhist identity in addition to a Daoist andConfucian one. Later, it added the layer of so-cialism. Its new silk roads identity is still beingformed, but unless Beijing invests seriouseffort in deploying its cultural assets into theBRI, it risks dire criticisms—whether justifiedor not—of unleashing the dark side of globali-sation (including inequality and exploitation)into its surrounding regions, all the whilemaking a profit: a ‘win–win’ ratio (such as70/30) that favours China.On the other hand, if China does begin to

implement policies that accord with its ownbest traditions and which align with interna-tional norms of transparency and sustainability,there are risks that the BRI will still createproblems for Beijing. One risk is of anunfavourable comparison of BRI governancewith China’s own restrictive political system.There is also the risk of Beijing being accused

of seeking to resurrect the old Chinese worldorder, in which Chinese cultural conceptsprevailed in diplomacy. Neither of these needbe a source of undue consternation. The BRIwith its caveats of win–win cooperation andits involvement of partners at home andabroad, public and private, is showing theCCP’s adaptability beyond the bounds ofMarxist orthodoxy. This was always the case,from Mao to Deng to Xi. Relatedly, the con-cern of China imposing its own values as theMiddle Kingdom suggests a return to a worldorder that cannot be replicated. However,Chinese thought culture is not constrained byhistory. Far from it, it can be seen as the sourceof China’s continuity. With the new silk roadsproject, China stands to inspire an ideationaldomain of as much if not greater benefit asthe physical one of economic development.In realising the cultural dimension of the silk

roads of the twenty-first century, China needsto set up educational and cultural institutionsthat act as think tanks and temples of learningacross many languages and philosophicalsystems. Confucius Institutes, of which therewere 480 around the world in 2014 teachingChinese language and culture, need to evolveinto genuine institutes of Confucian learning.Indeed, the creation of collaborative institutesthat explore wider intellectual worlds in a morecritical fashion would serve the BRI well.Daoist and Buddhist thought systems can alsobe deployed in problem-solving when it comesto the environment and society. Somework hasbegun in these directions, including the con-cept of an ‘ecological civilisation’ that employsChinese philosophy for sustainable develop-ment; the expansion of cultural centres in theBRI countries, from 20 to 50 in 2020 (Deng2015); and domestically, there is an activeChinese cultural studies scene in universitiesand think tanks. These include affiliations withforeign institutes of Chinese or East–WestStudies. Likewise, China has initiated theUniversities Alliance of the New Silk Road asa new ‘higher education platform’, which hasbegun to engage 60 universities from 22countries (Sharma 2015). The important pointis that China and its partners will need toactively engage this knowledge and awareness

3. Sanskrit for sacred circle, with the Buddha at the centre;but can also represent a political circle of relationships. SeeDellios (2003).

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at an early stage as BRI progresses. In this way,the silk roads of the future may well resemblethose of the past in that they were multiculturaland better aligned to Confucian, Daoist andBuddhist templates of thought.

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

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Figure S1 Confucius, Laozi and the Buddhacommune.Figure S2 Routes of the China-proposed Beltand Road Initiative.

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