simon schuster text spam lawsuit

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LACI SATTERFIELD, individually,and on behalf of others similarlysituated, No. 07-16356Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No.v. CV-06-02893-CWSIMON & SCHUSTER, INC., a New OPINIONYork corporation; IPSH!NET, aDelaware corporation aka IPSH,

Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of CaliforniaClaudia Wilken, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and SubmittedFebruary 11, 2009—San Francisco, California

Filed June 19, 2009

Before: John T. Noonan, David R. Thompson andN. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge N.R. Smith

7329

Case: 07-16356 06/19/2009 Page: 1 of 16 DktEntry: 6961885

COUNSEL

John G. Jacobs, The Jacobs Law Firm, Chtd., Chicago, Illi-nois, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Peter L. Winik and Barry J. Blonien, Latham & Watkins LLP,Washington, DC, for the defendants-appellees.

OPINION

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Laci Satterfield, individually and on behalf of those simi-larly situated, appeals the district court’s grant of summary

7332 SATTERFIELD v. SIMON & SCHUSTER, INC.


judgment in favor of Simon & Schuster, Inc. and ipsh!net Inc.(“ipsh!”).1 Satterfield alleges a violation of the TelephoneConsumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, arisingafter Satterfield received an unsolicited text message. Wehold that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerningwhether the equipment used by Simon & Schuster has thecapacity to both (1) store or produce numbers to be calledusing a random or sequential number generator and (2) to dialsuch numbers. Giving deference to the Federal Communica-tions Commission (“FCC”), see Chevron v. Natural Res. Def.Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984), we hold that it isreasonable to interpret “call” under the TCPA to include bothvoice calls and text messages. We also conclude that Simon& Schuster is not an affiliate or brand of Nextones and there-fore Satterfield did not expressly consent to receive this textmessage from Simon & Schuster. Accordingly, we reverse thedistrict court and remand.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Satterfield brought this action against Simon & Schuster fortext messaging an advertisement to a cellular phone sheowned in violation of the TCPA. Satterfield received this textmessage after she became a registered user of Nextones.com(“Nextones”) (not a defendant in this case). Satterfield joinedNextones at the request of her minor son in order to receivea free ringtone. In order for Satterfield to get the free ringtonefor her son, she had to fill out a form which read:

Nextones Member Sign Up

Sign up to become a registered user of Nextones

1When referred to collectively, Simon & Schuster and ipsh! are referredto as “Simon & Schuster.”

7333SATTERFIELD v. SIMON & SCHUSTER, INC.


today, for free! There is absolutely no cost involvedin registering!

Satterfield then provided her son’s initials and first threeletters of his last name, her email address, zip code, phonenumber, and account information. The form also provided acheck box that was followed by:

Yes! I would like to receive promotions from Nex-tones affiliates and brands. Please note, that bydeclining you may not be eligible for our FREE con-tent.

By checking Submit, you agree that you have readand agreed to the Terms and Conditions.

Satterfield checked the box opposite the “Yes!” and pressedthe submit button.

Subsequently, on January 18, 2006 at 12:30 a.m., Satter-field received a text message (on the phone registered withNextones.com) from Simon & Schuster advertising its publi-cation of a novel by Stephen King. The message stated:

“The next call you take may be your . . . Join the StephenKing VIP Mobile Club at www.cellthebook.com. RplyS-TOP2OptOut. PwdByNexton.”

Simon & Schuster sent the text message as part of its pro-motional campaign for the Steven King novel Cell. Simon &Schuster outsourced the promotional campaign to ipsh!, whoobtained a list of 100,000 individuals’ cell phone numbersfrom Mobile Information Access Company (MIA). MIA wasNextones’ exclusive agent for licensing the numbers of Nex-tones subscribers.

MIA provided ipsh! with electronic plain text or Excel filescontaining the list of 100,000 mobile numbers of Nextones



subscribers. ipsh!’s programmers then imported the list into adatabase and entered the relevant information for the promo-tional messages into the database, where they were storeduntil they were programmed to be sent to the intended recipi-ents. ipsh! then sent the file to mBlox, Inc., an “aggregator,”or mobile transaction networking services company. mBloxhandled the actual transmission of the text messages to thewireless carriers. After receiving some complaints about thepromotional text message, mBlox refused to send out anymore messages on ipsh!’s behalf.

Satterfield filed suit, alleging a violation of the TCPA forSimon & Schuster’s transmission, of this unsolicited text mes-sage to her and other class members’ cell phones, by an Auto-matic Telephone Dialing System (“ATDS”). Simon &Schuster moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) ithad not used an ATDS, (2) Satterfield had not received a“call” within the meaning of the TCPA, and (3) Satterfieldhad consented to the message and had not been charged forits receipt. The district court granted the summary judgmentholding that (1) Simon & Schuster and ipsh! had not used anATDS and (2) Satterfield had consented to receiving the mes-sage. The district court did not rule on Simon & Schuster’sargument that a text message is not a “call” under the TCPA.Accordingly, judgment was entered for Simon & Schuster.Satterfield timely filed this appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

[1] Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine anddisputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing theevidence most favorably to the nonmoving party, the movantis clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.P. 56.

The TCPA provides:



It shall be unlawful for any person within the UnitedStates, or any person outside the United States if therecipient is within the United States—

(A) to make any call (other than a call made foremergency purposes or made with the prior expressconsent of the called party) using any automatic tele-phone dialing system or an artificial or prerecordedvoice—

. . .

(iii) to any telephone number assigned to a pagingservice, cellular telephone service, specializedmobile radio service, or other radio common carrierservice, or any service for which the called party ischarged for the call;

47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).

(a) Definitions

As used in this section—

(1) The term “automatic telephone dialing system”means equipment which has the capacity—

(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be cal-led, using a random or sequential number generator;and

(B) to dial such numbers

47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).

Reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgmentde novo, Nolan v. Heald College, 551 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9thCir. 2009), we hold that the district court erred, because (A)



there was a disputed issue of material fact as to whether thesystem Simon & Schuster used was an ATDS; (B) the textmessage was a “call” within the meaning of the TCPA; and(C) Satterfield did not consent to the receipt of such a mes-sage, because Simon & Schuster is not an affiliate or brand ofNextones.

A. The ATDS

The district court erred in holding that there was no genuineand disputed issue of material fact as to whether the systemSimon & Schuster used was an ATDS. The district courtfocused its analysis on whether the equipment used by Simon& Schuster stored, produced, or called numbers “using a ran-dom or sequential number generator.” The district court evennoted that “the parties’ dispute centers on the phrase ‘using arandom or sequential number generator.’ ” With this as itsfocus, the district court held that “the equipment here does notstore, produce or call randomly or sequentially generated tele-phone numbers, the Court grants summary judgment in theDefendants’ favor: the equipment at issue is not an automatictelephone dialing system under the TCPA.” We find that thedistrict court focused its analysis on the wrong issue in itsdetermination of what constitutes an ATDS.

In construing the provisions of a statute, we first look to thelanguage of the statute to determine whether it has a plainmeaning. McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 780 (9thCir. 2008). “The preeminent canon of statutory interpretationrequires us to presume that [the] legislature says in a statutewhat it means and means in a statute what it says there. Thus,our inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there aswell if the text is unambiguous.” Id. (quoting BedRoc Ltd.,LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (internal quo-tation marks omitted)). Reviewing this statute, we concludethat the statutory text is clear and unambiguous.

[2] When evaluating the issue of whether equipment is anATDS, the statute’s clear language mandates that the focus



must be on whether the equipment has the capacity “to storeor produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random orsequential number generator.” Accordingly, a system need notactually store, produce, or call randomly or sequentially gen-erated telephone numbers, it need only have the capacity to doit. Since the district court did not focus its decision on thisissue, we must then review the record to determine if sum-mary judgment may issue. At the hearing, counsel for the par-ties suggested that the record was not clear regarding thatissue. We agree.

Reviewing the record, we find that there is a genuine issueof material fact with regard to whether this equipment has therequisite capacity. Satterfield’s expert, Randall A. Snyder,opined that this telephone system “stored telephone numbersto be called and subsequently dialed those numbers automati-cally and without human intervention . . . [t]he use of storednumbers, randomly generated numbers or sequentially gener-ated numbers used to automatically originate calls is a techni-cal difference without a perceived distinction . . . .” He lateropined that “[t]his is the primary automated function withinthe platform that constructs text messages and individuallyenters them into a message queue for subsequent delivery tothe cellular networks . . . . The cellular phone numbers resid-ing in the cellular phone number database for the specificapplication are applied in sequence, as they are stored in thedatabase, to serve as the destination cellular phone number foreach individual text message.” However, Snyder never specif-ically declared that this equipment had the requisite capacity.On the other hand, Jay Emmet, President of mBlox (companyresponsible for the actual transmission of the text messagesand a nonparty in this case), testified that the system used wasnot capable of sending messages to telephone numbers not fedto the system by mBlox, nor was it capable of generating ran-dom or sequential telephone numbers.

[3] Therefore, this limited record demonstrates that there isa genuine issue of material fact whether this telephone system



has the requisite capacity to be considered an ATDS under theTCPA. Given the conflicting testimony and this limitedrecord, we hold that summary judgment on this issue wasinappropriate. We therefore remand to the district court todetermine whether the equipment used by Simon & Schusterhad the requisite capacity.

B. The Call

The district court did not address Simon & Schuster’s argu-ment that sending a text message does not fall within the Act,because a text message is not a “call” within the meaning ofthe TCPA. Reviewing this issue, we hold that a text messageis a “call” within the meaning of the TCPA.

[4] The TCPA makes it unlawful “to make any call” usingan ATDS. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). While the TCPA doesnot define “call,” the FCC has explicitly stated that theTCPA’s prohibition on ATDSs “encompasses both voice callsand text calls to wireless numbers including, for example,short message service (SMS) calls . . . .” In re Rules and Reg-ulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer ProtectionAct of 1991, Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, 14115(July 3, 2003) (hereinafter “2003 Report and Order”). TheFCC subsequently confirmed that the “prohibition on usingautomatic telephone dialing systems to make calls to wirelessphone numbers applies to text messages (e.g., phone-to-phoneSMS), as well as voice calls.” In the Matter of Rules and Reg-ulations Implementing the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003; Rules andRegulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protec-tion Act of 1991, 19 FCC Rcd. 15927, 15934 (FCC August12, 2004). In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking of the CAN-SPAM Act, the FCC also noted “that the TCPA and Commis-sion rules that specifically prohibit using automatic telephonedialing systems to call wireless numbers already apply to anytype of call, including both voice and text calls.” Id. at 15933.Therefore, the FCC has determined that a text message falls



within the meaning of “to make any call” in 47 U.S.C.§ 227(b)(1)(A).2

In Chevron, the Supreme Court set forth a two-step test forjudicial review of administrative agency interpretations offederal law. We give broad deference to an agency’s interpre-tation meeting this test. First, we must determine “[i]f theintent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; forthe court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unam-biguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S.at 842-43. Second, if a statute is silent or ambiguous withrespect to the issue at hand, we must defer to the agency solong as “the agency’s answer is based on a permissible con-struction of the statute.” Id. at 843. An agency’s interpretationis permissible, unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestlycontrary to the statute.” Id. at 844.

[5] While Chevron only considered formal notice-and-comment rulemaking, the Supreme Court in United States v.Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), clarified that “administra-tive implementation of a particular statutory provision quali-fies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congressdelegated authority to the agency generally to make rules car-rying the force of law, and that the agency interpretationclaiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of thatauthority.” Wilderness Soc. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife, 353 F.3d1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. MeadCorp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)). “Delegation of suchauthority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agen-cy’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-commentrulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable con-gressional intent.” Mead, 533 U.S. at 227. Those administra-

2The FCC’s website also indicates that the use of an ATDS may not beused to contact numbers assigned to: “a paging service, wireless phoneservice (including both voice calls and text messages), or other commer-cial mobile radio service.” Unwanted Telephone Marketing Calls, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/tcpa.html.



tive decisions not meeting these standards may still be givendeference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134(1944). Mead, 533 U.S. at 228.

[6] Congress has delegated the FCC with the authority tomake rules and regulations to implement the TCPA. See 47U.S.C. § 227(b)(2). Pursuant to this authority, the FCC stated,“We affirm that under the TCPA, it is unlawful to make anycall using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artifi-cial or prerecorded message to any wireless telephone num-ber. Both the statute and our rules prohibit these calls, withlimited exceptions, ‘to any telephone number assigned to apaging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobileradio service, or other common carrier service, or any servicefor which the called party is charged.’ This encompasses bothvoice calls and text calls to wireless numbers including, forexample, short message service (SMS) calls, provided the callis made to a telephone number assigned to such service.”2003 Report and Order at 14115. This interpretation has theforce of law and is therefore entitled to Chevron deference if(1) “call” is not defined by the TCPA and (3) if the FCC’sinterpretation of the statute is reasonable. Chevron, 467 U.S.at 843-44.

1. Call is not defined by the TCPA.

The first step under the Chevron analysis is to determine“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise questionat issue.” Id. at 842. If it has, Congress’s intent must beenforced and that is the end of the matter. “If a court, employ-ing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains thatCongress had an intention on the precise question at issue,that intention is the law and must be given effect.” Id. at 843n.9. “It is well settled that the starting point for interpretinga statute is the language of the statute itself.” Gwaltney ofSmithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49,56 (1987) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).“[U]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as tak-



ing their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Perrinv. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). Another “funda-mental canon of statutory construction [is] that the words ofa statute must be read in their context and with a view to theirplace in the overall statutory scheme.” FDA v. Brown & Wil-liamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (quotingDavis v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809(1989)). We may also read statutory terms in light of the pur-pose of the statute. Wilderness Soc’y, 353 F.3d at 1060. If,under theses canons, or other traditional means of determiningCongress’s intentions, we are able to determine that Congressspoke clearly, we need not look to the FCC’s interpretations.See id. at 1061.

[7] The precise language at issue here is what did Congressintend when it said “to make any call” under the TCPA. Uti-lizing the aforementioned canons of statutory construction, welook to the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning ofthe verb “to call.” Webster’s defines “call” in this context3 as“to communicate with or try to get into communication witha person by a telephone.” Webster’s Third New InternationalDictionary 318 (2002). This definition suggests that by enact-ing the TCPA, Congress intended to regulate the use of anATDS to communicate or try to get into communication witha person by a telephone. However, this law was enacted in1991 when text messaging was not available.

[8] We also consider the purposes of the TCPA. The TCPAwas enacted to “protect the privacy interests of residentialtelephone subscribers by placing restrictions on unsolicited,

3The word “call” has several plain and ordinary meanings. See gener-ally Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 317-18 (2002). Given that theTCPA was enacted to regulate the receipt of automated telephone calls,Congress used the word “call” to refer to an attempt to communicate bytelephone. See United States v. Amer. Trucking Assoc., 310 U.S. 534,542-43 (1940) (when words of a statute are susceptible to more than onemeaning, courts are to interpret them in a manner which is reasonablegiven the subject matter of the statute and its purpose).



automated telephone calls to the home and to facilitate inter-state commerce by restricting certain uses of facsimilemachines and automatic dialers.” S. Rep. No. 102-178, at 1(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968. The TCPA wasenacted in response to an increasing number of consumercomplaints arising from the increased number of telemarket-ing calls. See id. at 2. The consumers complained that suchcalls are a “nuisance and an invasion of privacy.” See id. Thepurpose and history of the TCPA indicate that Congress wastrying to prohibit the use of ATDSs to communicate with oth-ers by telephone in a manner that would be an invasion of pri-vacy. We hold that a voice message or a text message are notdistinguishable in terms of being an invasion of privacy.

[9] The language and purpose of the TCPA support theconclusion that the use of an ATDS to make any call, regard-less of whether that call is communicated by voice or text, isprohibited. However, we recognize that Congress could nothave spoken clearly to this issue in 1991 when the statute wasenacted. Therefore, we conclude that the statute is silent as towhether a text message is a call within the Act.

2. The FCC’s interpretation of “call” is reasonable.

“When a statute is ambiguous or leaves key terms unde-fined, a court must defer to the federal agency’s interpretationof the statute, so long as such interpretation is reasonable.”Peck v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 535 F.3d 1053, 1056 (9thCir. 2008) (citing Metrophones Telecomms., Inc. v. GlobalCrossing Telecomms., Inc., 423 F.3d 1056, 1067 (9th Cir.2005). Because the TCPA is silent to the issue at hand, wemust defer to the agency so long as the agency’s interpretation“is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chev-ron, 467 U.S. at 843. An agency’s interpretation of a statuteis permissible, unless “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestlycontrary to the statute.” Id. at 844.

[10] The FCC’s interpretation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)is consistent with the dictionary’s definition of call in that it



is defined as “to communicate with or try to get into commu-nication with a person by telephone.” It is undisputed that textmessaging is a form of communication used primarilybetween telephones. The FCC’s interpretation is also consis-tent with the purpose of the TCPA—to protect the privacyinterests of telephone subscribers. Further, nothing in therecord indicates that such an interpretation is “arbitrary, capri-cious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Accordingly, wefind that the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA is reasonable,and therefore afford it deference to hold that a text messageis a “call” within the TCPA.

C. Express Consent

[11] Finally, the district court erred in granting summaryjudgment based upon Satterfield expressly consenting toreceiving the message. While the TCPA exempts those calls“made with the prior express consent of the called party,” 47U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), no express consent was given in thiscase. Express consent is “[c]onsent that is clearly and unmis-takably stated.” Black’s Law Dictionary 323 (8th ed. 2004).Satterfield solely consented to receiving promotional materialfrom Nextones or their affiliates and brands. The term “affili-ate” carries its own, independent legal significance. “Affiliaterefers to a ‘corporation that is related to another corporationby shareholdings or other means of control . . . .’ ” DelawareIns. Guar. Ass’n v. Christiana Care Health Servs., Inc., 892A.2d 1073, 1077 (Del. 2006) (quoting Black’s Law Dictio-nary 59 (7th ed. 1999)). The plain and ordinary meaning of“affiliate”4 supports this definition as “a company effectivelycontrolled by another or associated with others under commonownership or control.” Webster’s Third New InternationalDictionary 35 (2002). The record confirms that Nextones nei-ther owns nor controls Simon & Schuster, nor can Nextones

4See, e.g., McHugh v. United Service Auto. Ass’n, 164 F.3d 451, 455(9th Cir. 1999) (unless contract terms are specifically different than com-mon usage of the terms, comman usage will be adopted.)



be considered a Simon & Schuster subisidiary. In fact, therecord shows no direct contractual relationship between Nex-tones and Simon & Schuster.5

The district court also erred in granting summary judgmentbased on Satterfield’s consent to receive promotional materi-als by Nextones’ brands. The district court found there was“no dispute of fact that the promotional text message at issuewas identified with a Nextones brand.” The district court’sconclusion is based solely on the fact that the message con-tained the phrase “PwdbyNexton.”6 We do not agree. Underthis logic, any company sending a text message could simplyinclude “PwdbyNexton” and it would be considered a “brand”of Nextones. Brand is not defined in the contract, therefore welook to its plain and ordinary meaning. Brand is commonlydefined as “a class of goods identified as being the product ofa single firm or manufacturer.” Webster’s Third New Interna-tional Dictionary 268 (2002). The message was a product ofSimon & Schuster, not Nextones. Nextones’s only role in thiscase was simply supplying the numbers to MIA, who in turnsupplied the numbers to ipsh!. The record also shows noagreement between Nextones and Simon & Schuster. There-fore, Simon & Schuster is not a Nextones Brand.

[12] Thus, Satterfield’s consent to receive promotionalmaterial by Nextones and its affilliates and brands cannot beread as consenting to the receipt of Simon & Schuster’s pro-motional material. Accordingly, the district court erred ingranting summary judgment.

5Nextones’ own website explains that its affiliates include other compa-nies who “sell mobile content such as ringtones and graphics.” Simon &Schuster does not fall within Nextones’ own definition.

6The district court assumes that, without any explanation, “PwdbyNex-ton” means “Powered by Nextones.”



III. CONCLUSION

Summary judgment was inappropriate, because there is agenuine issue of material fact concerning whether the equip-ment utilized by Simon & Schuster has the requisite capacityunder the TCPA. The FCC has reasonably interpreted “call”under the TCPA to encompass both voice calls and text calls.This interpretation is reasonable and is therefore entitled todeference. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. Satterfield didnot consent to receive the text message. We therefore reverseand remand.

REVERSED and REMANDED.



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* If more than 7 excerpts or 20 briefs are requested, a statement explaining the excessnumber must be submitted.

** Costs per page may not exceed .10 or actual cost, whichever is less. Circuit Rule 39-1.

I, , swear under penalty of perjury that the services for which costs are taxedwere actually and necessarily performed, and that the requested costs were actually expended as listed.

Signature

Date

Name of Counsel:

Attorney for:

Date Costs are taxed in the amount of $

Clerk of Court

By: , Deputy Clerk

(To Be Completed by the Clerk)


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