SIMPROSA VDA. DE ESPINA, RECAREDO ESPINA, TIMOTEO ESPINA, CELIA ESPINA, GAUDIOSA ESPINA and NECIFORA ESPINA, petitioners, vs.THE HON. OTILIO ABAYA and SOFIA ESPINA and JOSE ESPINA, respondents.

Marcos Espina died on February 14, 1953 and was survived by his spouses, Simprosa Vda. de Espina and their children namely, Recaredo, Timoteo, Celia, Gaudiosa, Necifora, Sora and Jose, all surnamed Espina. Decedent's estate comprises of four (4) parcels of land located at the Municipality of Barobo Province of Surigao del Sur.

On August 23, 1973 an action for partition of the aforementioned parcels of land was filed by petitioners Simprosa and her children Recaredo, Timoteo, Celia, Gaudencia and Necifora.

The complaint alleges that parcel No. 1 is the exclusive property of the deceased, hence the same is owned in common by petitioners and private respondents in eight (8) equal parts, while the other three (3) parcels of land being conjugal properties, are also owned in common, one-half (1/2) belongs to the widow Simprosa and the other half is owned by her and her children in eight (8) equal parts.

It also alleges that parcel No. 1 has been subdivided into two lots. Lot No. 994 PL8-44 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 5570 in the name of one of the heirs, Sofia Espina, who acquired the title as a trustee for the beneficiaries or heirs of Marcos Espina, while lot No. 1329 PCS-44 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3732 issued in the name of one of the heirs, Jose Espina as trustee for the heirs of Marcos Espina. Said parcel of land is in the possession of petitioners and private respondents who have their respective houses thereon.

Simprosa presently occupies parcel No. 2 while parcel No. 3 is occupied by Timoteo, although the same is actually titled in the name of Sofia. Parcel No. 4 is occupied by Recaredo.

Petitioners have several times demanded the partition of the aforementioned properties, but notwithstanding such demands private respondents refused to accede.

Private respondents alleged in their answer that in or about April, 1951, the late Marcos Espina and his widow, Simprosa, together with their children made a temporary verbal division and assignment of shares among their children. After the death of Marcos, the temporary division was finalized by the heirs. Thereafter the heirs took immediate possession of their respective shares on April 20, 1952. Private respondents took actual physical possession of their respective shares including the portions ceded to them by Simprosa upon their payment of P50.00 each per quarter starting April, 1952 until the latter's death pursuant to their contract of procession The assignment of shares was as follows:

(a) To the surviving spouses, (sic) Simprosa Vda. de Espina, herein plaintiffs, one-half (1/2) of the parcel of land adjudicated to each of said plaintiffs-heirs and defendants;

(b) To each of the following compulsory heirs, to wit:

1. To Recaredo (sic) Espina, one-half (1/2) portion which contains an area of one and three-fourths (1 3/4) hectares and which forms part of Parcel 4 whose description is given in paragraph III of the complaint, the said Parcel IV has been in the possession of both Recaredo Espina and plaintiff Simprosa Vda. de Espina from April 20, 1952 until the present time;

2. To Timoteo Espina, one half (1/2) portion which contains an area of not less than one-half (1/2) hectare and which forms part of Parcel 3 whose description is given in paragraph III of the complaint, the said Parcel III was originally assigned by Marcos Espina who thereupon obtained an Original Certificate of Title in her (sic) name but was finally adjudicated to said Timoteo Espina in April, 1952, the other half (1/2) portion of which parcel III was the share of the surviving spouses (sic), Simprosa Vda. de Espina, and said Parcel III has been in the possession of said Timoteo Espina and Simprosa Vda. de Espina from April, 1952 until the present time as their share;

3. To Cecilia (sic) Espina, Gaudiosa Espina and Necifora Espina, one-half (1/2) portion, share and share alike which contains two (2) hectares and which forms part of Parcel II

whose description is given in paragraph III of the complaint, the other half (1/2) of said Parcel III (sic) is the share of the surviving spouses (sic) Simprosa Vda. de Espina, and said Parcel III (sic) has been in the possession of said Cecilia. (sic) Espina, Gaudiosa Espina and Necifora Espina and Simprosa Vda. de Espina from April, 1952 until the present time;

4. To Sofia Espina, one-half (1/2) portion of the parcel of land included in the deception of Parcel 1 in paragraph III of the complaint, the other half (1/2) of said parcel being the share of the surviving spouses (sic) Simprosa Vda. de Espina and having been ceded by said Simprosa Vda. de Espina to said Sofia Espina for a valuable consideration payable quarterly at the rate of P50.00 beginning April, 1952 until her death, and said Sofia Espina has been regularly paying to said Simprosa Vda. de Espina quarterly from April, 1952 the said amount of P50.00 until the present time, and by virtue of said agreement, Sofia Espina obtained Original Certificate of Title in her name of said parcel of land which is included in the description of said parcel 1, as her exclusive property;

5. To Jose Espina, one-half (1/2) portion of the other parcel of land included in the description of Parcel 1 in paragraph 1 of the complaint, the other half (1/2) of said parcel being the share of the surviving spouses (sic) Simprosa Vda. de Espina and having been coded (sic) by said Simprosa Vda. de Espina to said Jose Espina for a valuable consideration payable quarterly at the rate of P50.00 beginning April, 1952 until her death, and said Jose Espina has been regularly quarterly paying to said Simprosa Vda. de Espina from April, 1952 until the present time, the said amount of P50.00, and by virtue of said agreement, Jose Espina obtained Original Certificate of Title in his name of said parcel of land which is included in the description of said Parcel 1 as his exclusive property.

ISSUE:

1. Whether an action for partition prescribes.2. Whether an oral partition among co-heirs is valid

HELD:

1. In the case at bar, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition cannot be invoked because two of the co-heirs, namely private respondents Sora and Jose Espina possessed the property as exclusive owners and their possession for a period of twenty one (21) years is sufficient to acquire it by prescription. Hence, from the moment these co-heirs claim that they are the absolute and exclusive owners of the properties and deny the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership.

2.Anent the issue of oral partition, We sustain the validity of said partition. 1âwphi1 "An agreement of partition may be made orally or in writing. An oral agreement for the partition of the property owned in common is valid and enforceable upon the parties. The Statute of Frauds has no operation in this kind of agreements, for partition is not a conveyance of property but simply a segregation and designation of the part of the property which belong to the co-owners." (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 Edition, 182-183 citing Hernandez v. Andal, et. al., G.R. No. L275, March 29, 1957)

Time and again, the Court stresses that the hearing of a motion for reconsideration in oral argument is a matter which rests upon the sound discretion of the Court. Its refusal does not constitute a denial of due process in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion. 

IRENE TAC-AN-DANO, FELIPE G. TAC-AN, DIOSDADO G. TAC-AN and SOCORRO TAC-AN GENOBATEN,petitioners, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and ALFONSO G. TAC-AN, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners Irene Tac-an Dano, Felipe G. Tac-an, Diosdado G. Tac-an and Socorro Tac-an Genobaten, and private respondent ALFONSO G. Tac-an, are brothers and sisters, children of the deceased spouses Pio Tac-an and Luisa Guzman. Upon the demise of Pio Tac-an on March 12,

1948, his wife, Luisa, managed the entire estate, including an agricultural land of approximately 89 hectares at San Isidro, Misamis Occidental, until her death on April 18, 1971.

On September 28, 1971, intestate proceedings for the settlement of Luisa's estate were instituted by petitioner Diosdado Tac-an before the Court of First instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 615. ALFONSO opposed the petition contending that one-half of the new 6,159 coconut trees at the San Isidro property belonged to him in accordance with his agreement with his late mother. Ultimately, on January 29, 1973, partition was ordered by the intestate Court pursuant to a Compromise Agreement arrived at among the heirs. ALFONSO claimed, however, that the partition was without prejudice to the prosecution of his claim in a separate suit.

On January 31, 1975, ALFONSO filed a complaint for Recovery of Ownership of Coconut Trees and Damages against petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III, Oroquieta City, docketed as Civil Case No. 3092, which he amended on April 3, 1975. He alleged that sometime in 1944, upon the request of his late mother, and with the consent of petitioners, he planted coconut trees on an agricultural land of their late father at San Isidro Señor Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental, with an area of 89.7033 hectares: that part of the land was planted with sugar cane which he gradually replaced with coconut trees, completing the work in 1957; that he and his mother, during her lifetime, agreed, without objection from petitioners, that the coconut trees including the fruits and produce thereof, would be equally divided between them; that their equal sharing continued for fifteen (15) years; that upon the death of their mother, petitioner Diosdado Tac-an filed in September 1971, Special Proceeding No. 615 with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III, for the partition of the real and personal properties left by their parents, which he opposed.

Petitioners, in their Answer, stated that ALFONSO's claim for improvements is barred by prior judgment in Special Proceedings No. 615 rendered by the intestate Court on the basis of the amicable compromise agreement entered into by the parties after concessions were given to respondent for the settlement of said claim; that by virtue of said Decision, the land in San Isidro was subdivided and adjudicated in equal shares among them; that the claim of respondent for one-half (½) of the produce of the coconut trees was denied by the intestate Court in its Order of April 18, 1972, which had already became final; that the complaint states no cause of action; that the claim is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and is barred by the Statute of Limitations and/or prescription.

ISSUE:

Whether the suit for recovery of ownership of coconut trees is barred by prior judgment.

Whether prescription can be invoked as against Alfonso by reason of that reservation in his favor

HELD:

1. Petitioners contend that ALFONSO's suit for recovery of ownership of coconut trees is barred by prior judgment in Special Proceedings No. 615. While it may be that the said intestate proceedings did attain finality, it was subject to the clarificatory Order, dated April 24, 1973, issued by Judge Melecio Genato reading:

The decision dated January 29, 1973, rendered by this Court based on the amicable settlement of the heirs in this case is amended to be without prejudice to whatever claim oppositor Alfonso Tac-an has over the improvements he had personally introduced or caused to be introduced into the estate situated at Señor Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental.

In his Order, dated June 19, 1973, resolving petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the same Judge held that there was "no amendment" to the Decision dated January 29, 1973. 2

Those Orders were elevated on certiorari to this Court in G.R. No. L-37298 entitled Irene Tac-an Dano, etc. vs. Hon. Melecio Genato, et al., which petition this Court dismissed for lack of merit on February 12, 1974. 3

Premised on the foregoing, the defense of res judicata must fail and it has to be held that the right was reserved to ALFONSO to pursue his claim for recovery of ownership of coconut trees.

2. Prescription can neither be invoked as against ALFONSO by reason of that reservation in his favor. He filed suit two years after the Decision in the intestate proceedings had been rendered. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, he had ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrued within which to file suit upon a judgment.

The sharing in the Compromise Agreement submitted before the intestate Court with respect to the partition of the cows should also be maintained. The Courts, as a rule may not impose upon the parties a judgment different from their Compromise Agreement.

AURORA DEL BANCO, EVELYN DEL BANCO, FEDERICO TAINO, SOLEDAD TAINO, JOVENCIO TAINO, SAMSON TAINO, NOE TAINO, SOCORRO TAINO and CLEOFAS TAINO, petitioners, vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Second Civil Cases Division), ALEJANDRA PANSACOLA, LEONILA ENCALLADO, VEDASTO ENCALLADO, JOSE YEPES, et al., respondents.

FACTS:

In a document executed in the Municipality of San Rafael, Bulacan, on February 11, 1859, three brothers, Benedicto Pansacola, Jose Pansacola and Manuel Pansacola (known as Fr. Manuel Pena) entered into an agreement which provided, among others:

(1) That they will purchase from the Spanish Government the lands comprising the Island of Cagbalite which is located within the boundaries of the Municipality of Mauban, Province of Tayabas (now Quezon) and has an approximate area of 1,600 hectares;

(2) That the lands shall be considered after the purchase as their common property;

(3) That the co-ownership includes Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo, minors at that time represented by their father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena) who will contribute for them in the proposed purchase of the Cagbalite Island;

(4) That whatever benefits may be derived from the Island shall be shared equally by the co-owners in the following proportion: Benedicto Pansacola-1/4 share; Jose Pansacola-1/4 share; and, Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo-2/4 shares which shall be placed under the care of their father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena).

On August 14, 1866, co-owners entered into the actual possession and enjoyment of the Island purchased by them from the Spanish Government. On April 11, 1868 they agreed to modify the terms and conditions of the agreement entered into by them on February 11, 1859. The new agreement provided for a new sharing and distribution of the lands, comprising the Island of Cagbalite and whatever benefits may be derived therefrom, as follows:

(a) The first one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to Don Benedicto Pansacola;

(b) The second one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to Don Jose Pansacola;

(c) The third one-fourth(1/4) portion shall henceforth belong to the children of their deceased brother, Don Eustaquio Pansacola, namely: Don Mariano Pansacola,- Maria Pansacola and Don Hipolito Pansacola;

(d) The fourth and last one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to their nephews and nieces (1) Domingo Arce, (2) Baldomera Angulo, (3) Marcelina Flores, (4) Francisca Flores, (5) Candelaria dela Cruz, and (6) Gervasio Pansacola who, being all minors, are still under the care of their brother, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena). The latter is the real father of said minors.

About one hundred years later, on November 18, 1968, private respondents brought a special action for partition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, under the provisions of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, including as parties the heirs and successors-in-interest of the co-owners of the Cagbalite Island in the second contract of co-ownership dated April 11, 1968. In their answer some of the defendants, petitioners herein, interposed such defenses as prescription, res judicata, exclusive ownership, estoppel and laches

ISSUE:

Whether a co-owner can acquire by prescription the share of other co-owner even such was not repudiated by other co-owners.

HELD:

It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive possession of their respective portions in the plan and titles issued to each of them accordingly (Caro vs. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 [1982]). The mechanics of actual partition should follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Maganon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282 [1986]).

Neither can such actual possession and enjoyment of some portions of the Island by some of the petitioners herein be considered a repudiation of the co-ownership. It is undisputed that the Cagbalite Island was purchased by the original co-owners as a common property and it has not been proven that the Island had been partitioned among them or among their heirs. While there is co-ownership, a co-owner's possession of his share is co-possession which is linked to the possession of the other co-owners (Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 [1977]).

Furthermore, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (Valdez vs. Olonga, 51 SCRA 71 [1973], Tero vs. Tero, 131 SCRA 100 [1984]). Co-owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership clearly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]).

An action for partition does not prescribe. Article 403 of the Old Civil Code, now Article 497, provides that the assignees of the co-owners may take part in the partition of the common property, and Article 400 of the Old Code, now Article 494 provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property, a provision which implies that the action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches (Budlong vs. Pondoc, 79 SCRA 24 [1977]). An action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co- owner

JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST, petitioner, vs.PR BUILDERS, INC., respondent.

FACTS:

Jacobus Bernhard Hulst (petitioner) and his spouse Ida Johanna Hulst-Van Ijzeren (Ida), Dutch nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell with PR Builders, Inc. (respondent), for the purchase of a 210-sq m residential unit in respondent's townhouse project in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas.

When respondent failed to comply with its verbal promise to complete the project by June 1995, the spouses Hulst filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for rescission of contract with interest, damages and attorney's fees.

Meanwhile, spouses Hulst divorced. Ida assigned her rights over the purchased property to petitioner.4 From then on, petitioner alone pursued the case.

On August 21, 1997, the HLURB Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution addressed to the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas directing the latter to execute its judgment.5

On April 13, 1998, the Ex-Officio Sheriff proceeded to implement the Writ of Execution. However, upon complaint of respondent with the CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the levy made by the Sheriff was set aside, requiring the Sheriff to levy first on respondent's personal properties.6 Sheriff Jaime B. Ozaeta (Sheriff) tried to implement the writ as directed but the writ was returned unsatisfied.7

On January 26, 1999, upon petitioner's motion, the HLURB Arbiter issued an Alias Writ of Execution.8

On March 23, 1999, the Sheriff levied on respondent's 15 parcels of land covered by 13 Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)9 in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas.10

Two days before the scheduled public auction or on April 26, 2000, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Levy with the HLURB on the ground that the Sheriff made an overlevy since the aggregate appraised value of the levied properties at P6,500.00 per sq m is P83,616,000.00, based on the Appraisal Report12 of Henry Hunter Bayne Co., Inc. dated December 11, 1996, which is over and above the judgment award.13

At 10:15 a.m. of the scheduled auction date of April 28, 2000, respondent's counsel objected to the conduct of the public auction on the ground that respondent's Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Levy was pending resolution. Absent any restraining order from the HLURB, the Sheriff proceeded to sell the 15 parcels of land. Holly Properties Realty Corporation was the winning bidder for all 15 parcels of land for the total amount ofP5,450,653.33. The sum of P5,313,040.00 was turned over to the petitioner in satisfaction of the judgment award after deducting the legal fees.14

At 4:15 p.m. of the same day, while the Sheriff was at the HLURB office to remit the legal fees relative to the auction sale and to submit the Certificates of Sale15 for the signature of HLURB Director Belen G. Ceniza (HLURB Director), he received the Order dated April 28, 2000 issued by the HLURB Arbiter to suspend the proceedings on the matte

ISSUE:

Whether the HLURB Arbiter and Director gravely abused their discretion in setting aside the levy conducted by the Sheriff for the reason that the auction sale conducted by the sheriff rendered moot and academic the motion to quash the levy.

HELD:

The HLURB Arbiter lost jurisdiction to act on the motion to quash the levy by virtue of the consummation of the auction sale. Absent any order from the HLURB suspending the auction sale, the sheriff rightfully proceeded with the auction sale. The winning bidder had already paid the winning bid. The legal fees had already been remitted to the HLURB. The judgment award had already been turned over to the judgment creditor. What was left to be done was only the issuance of the corresponding certificates of sale to the winning bidder. In fact, only the signature of the HLURB Director for that purpose was needed58 – a purely ministerial act.

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-76216 September 14, 1989

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO GERNALE, respondents.

FACTS:

Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 square meters and covered by TCT No. 50023 of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued on September 11, 1980 which canceled TCT No. 56762/ T-560. The land was originally registered on August 5, 1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted by the President of the Philippines on July 27, 1948, under Act No. 141.

On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop their property covered by TCT No. 50023 into a residential subdivision. Consequently, petitioner on February 9,1983 obtained Development Permit No. 00424 from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of the property was occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons, petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents.

Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal and members of the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association; that they have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some twelve to fifteen years prior to the promulgation of P.D. No. 27; that during the first week of August 1983, petitioner, under a permit from the Office of the Provincial Governor of Rizal, was allowed to improve the Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal at its expense, subject to the condition that it shag secure the needed right of way from the owners of the lot to be affected; that on August 15, 1983 and thereafter, petitioner deprived private respondents of their property without due process of law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of private respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and (3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject private respondents from their respective farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028.

ISSUE:

Whether private respondent are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner

HELD:

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private respondents were already in possession thereof . There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents' peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of destroying their crops.

Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. 9 Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

EDUARDO CUAYCONG, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.RAMONA BENEDICTO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

FACTS:

The issues in this case relate to the right of plaintiffs to make use of two roads existing on the Hacienda Toreno, a tract of land in the municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental, the property of the defendants, Blasa Benedicto and Ramona Benedicto. One of these roads is referred to in the proceedings as the Nanca-Victorias road and the other as the Dacuman — Toreno road. The Court of First Instance held that those of the plaintiffs who claimed to be entitled to make use of the Dacuman — Toreno road had failed to establish the asserted right, and dismissed the action as to them. From this decision they appealed to this court but, their brief not having been filed within the time prescribed by the rules, their appeal was dismissed, on motion of defendants, by resolution dated February 14, 1916. Consequently, the issues presented on this appeal are limited to those which relate to the rights of the parties with respect to the Nanca-Victorias road, and the determination of the correctness of the decision of the court concerning that part of the controversy submitted to its decision.

The allegations in the complaint with respect to the Nanca-Victorias road are that the appellees, Eduardo Cuaycong, Lino Cuaycong, and Eulalio Dolor, are the owners of a group of haciendas situated between the southern boundary of the Hacienda Toreno and the barrio of Nanca, of the municipality of Seravia, and that the appellees Silverio Ginoo, Gervasio Ascalon, and Juan Ledesma, are the lessees of part of said haciendas; that more than twenty years the appellees and their predecessors in interest have made use of the Nanca-Victorias road, which crosses the Hacienda Toreno, openly, publicly, and continiously, with the knowledge of the owners of the said hacienda, for the purpose of conveying the products of their haciendas to the town of Victorias and to the landing place there situated, and for the purpose of transporting supplies from those points to their haciendas, making use of the said road by means of carts, carabaos, and other usual means of transportation; that there is no outlet to a public road from the hacienda occupied by these plaintiffs, the only road and way by which the products of the plaintiffs' property can be taken to the town of Victorias and to the landing place there being across the Hacienda Toreno by the road marked on the plan attached to the complaint; that on the fifteenth day of November, 1912, the defendants closed the road in question at the point at which it crosses the Hacienda Toreno, and refused to permit plaintiffs to continue using it; that plaintiffs were about to commence to grind their crop of sugar cane, and that, if prevented from transporting their sugar across the Hacienda Toreno to their point of embarkation, would suffer damages difficult to estimate. Upon these averments of fact the plaintiffs prayed for a judgment that they are entitled to use the road in question as they have been using it in the past, and that a perpetual injunction be issued against plaintiffs restraining them from impending such use. Upon the filing of the complaint, plaintiffs moved the court to issue a preliminary injunction restraining defendants from interfering with the use of the road during the pendency of the suit, which motion was granted by the court

ISSUE:

Whether the plaintiffs proven their acquisition of an easement of way over the Hacienda Toreno at the point traversed by the road in question.

HELD:

There is admittedly no evidence to show that the land occupied by the road here in question was any time conveyed to the general government or any of its political subdivisions by the present or any of the former owners of the Hacienda Toreno. There is no evidence, even remotely, tending to show that the road existed prior to the time when the property now known as the Hacienda Toreno passed from the State into private ownership. The record fails to disclose any evidence whatever tending to show that the Government has at any time asserted any right or title in or to the land occupied by the road, or that it has incurred any expense whatever in its upkeep or construction. The Civil Code defines as public roads those which are constructed by the State (art. 339), and as provincial and town roads those "the expense of which is borne by such towns or provinces." (Civil Code, art. 344.) While it is not contended that this definition is exclusive, it does show that during the Spanish

regime, under normal conditions, roads which were public were maintained at the public expense, and that the fact that at no time was any expense incurred by the Government with respect to the road here in question tends strongly to support the contention of the defendants that it is private way.

Had it been shown that the road had been maintained at the public expense, with the acquiescence of the owners of the estates crossed by it, this would indicate such adverse possession by the government as in course of time would ripen into title or warrant the presumption of a grant or of a dedication. But in this case there is no such evidence, and the claims of plaintiffs, whether regarded as members of the public asserting a right to use the road as such, or as persons claiming a private easement of way over the land of another must be regarded as resting upon the mere fact of user. It is a fundamental principle of the law in this jurisdiction concerning the possession of real property that such possession is not affected by acts of a possessory character which are "merely tolerated" by the possessor, or which are due to his license (Civil Code, arts. 444 and 1942). This principle is applicable not only with respect to the prescription of the dominium as a whole, but to the prescription of right in rem.

Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de dueno), or use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of a possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en concepto de dueño, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription.

We are, therefore, of the opinion, and so hold, that upon the facts established by the evidence it does not appear that the road in question is a public road or way. We are also of the opinion that plaintiffs have failed to show that they have acquired by prescription a private right of passage over the lands of defendants. The supreme court of Spain has decided that under the law in force before the enactment of the Civil Code, the easement of way was discontinous, and that while such an easement might be acquired by prescription, it must be used in good faith, in the belief of the existence of the right, and such user must have been continuous from time immemorial. (Judgment of December 15, 1882.) In the appealed decision the court below says that the plaintiffs and their predecessors made use of the road in question "from time immemorial," but there is no evidence whatever in the record to sup[port this finding, although it is true that the evidence shows the existence of the road and its use by the plaintiffs and their predecessors for thirty-five or forty years.

ANDREA TABUSO and RENATO BISMORTE, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF ESTEBAN ABAD represented by Nemesio Abad and Ana Abad Paghubasan, respondents.

FACTS:

"This case involves declaration of ownership filed before the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Leyte, [in] Biliran, Leyte, of an unregistered parcel of land at Antipolo, Naval, Leyte with an area of 3,267 square meters.

"The plaintiffs' evidence consists of the following:

"a) A tax declaration No. 3705 (Exh. A) in the name of Ignacio Montes for the year 1912. However, the land taxes thereon for the years 1944 to 1947 were paid only in 1981 (Exh. F and series).

"b) Plaintiff Andrea Tabuso claims to be the owner as successor in interest (granddaughter) of one Andrea Elaba, daughter of Maria Montes and Borja Elaba, Maria Montes appears to be a sister of Ignacio Montes, in whose name the tax declaration for the property in question was issued for the year 1912 (Exh. A).

"c) The property in question has been in the possession of the defendants (heirs of Esteban Abad), although the house standing thereon appears to have been constructed by Marcelo Tabuso, father of plaintiff Andrea Tabuso.

"On the other hand, evidence for the defendants tends to establish the following:

"a) The land in question originally owned by Maria Montes was donated to Isabel Elaba through an ancient document executed on September 24, 1923 (Exh. F). Isabel in turn sold the land to Esteban Abad on May 5, 1948 (Exh. 4).

"b) The original tax declaration in the name of Ignacio Montes (Exh. A) was superseded by Tax Declaration Nos. 6422 and 1450 both in the name of Isabel Elaba (Exh. 6-D; 6-E)[;] Declaration No. 1450 for the year 1948 was superseded by Tax Declaration No. 6959 for 1960 (Exh. 6-C) in the name of Esteban Abad; and the latter was superseded in 1969 by Tax Declaration No. 1661 (Exh. 6-B) in the name of Esteban Abad. In 1974 a new tax declaration No. 19 (Exh. 6-A) was issued in the name of Esteban Abad with Nemesio Abad and his co-heirs as administrators. The last tax declaration No. 22 (Exh. 6) for 1982 was in the name of Esteban Abad. The land taxes due thereon for the years 1947 to 1982 were paid by Isabel Elaba[,] Esteban Abad and Nemesio Abad (Exhs. 7 to 7-W).

"c) The land in question is tenanted by one Valentin Poblete in accordance with a lease contract executed by defendant Nemesio [Abad], one of the heirs and co-owners of the land.

ISSUE:

Whether the private respondents are in possession and owners of the land in dispute are contradicted by the evidence in record.

HELD:

Obviously, the claim of private respondents that they are the owners of the land is supported by a letter in which they were asking petitioners to vacate the property. Moreover, considering its size, which is 11,927 square meters as found by the court-appointed commissioner, the fact that petitioners' house is only a barong-barong or make-shift shanty lends support to private respondents' claim that the former's presence on the property was merely tolerated.

It must be stressed "that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. xxx. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. Possessors in the concept of owners may be the owners themselves or those who claim to be so. On the other hand, those who possess as mere holders acknowledge in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong." 13

In this case, the evidence shows that the occupation of the property by petitioners is not in the concept of owners, because their stay is merely tolerated. This finding is bolstered by the fact that Petitioner Andrea Tabuso is the daughter of Marcelo Tabuso, who was merely allowed by the previous owner, Esteban Abad, to construct a small house on the lot. As held in Caniza v. Court of Appeals, 14 "an owner's act of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free[,] does not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor." 15

Lastly, the claim of petitioners that private respondents are not in actual possession of the land is unsubstantiated. Besides, it is not necessary that the latter actually stay on the property in order to prove ownership of the same. As found by both the trial and the appellate courts, since the acquisition of the subject property by private respondents, they had religiously paid the taxes due thereon. Further, one of the co-owners executed a lease contract over it in favor of a tenant. These acts are clearly consistent with ownership

CATHOLIC BISHOP OF BALANGA, respresented by CRISPULO TORRICO, petitioner, vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AMANDO DE LEON, respondents.

FACTS:

The parties do not dispute that the Roman Catholic Archbishop [sic] of Manila was the owner of a parcel of land (Lot No. 1272, Balanga Cadastre) situated in the Barrio of Puerto Rivas, Municipality of Balanga, Bataan, having an area of 3,368 sq. m., more or less covered by OCT No. 14379 of de Registry of Deeds for the province of Bataan. With respect to its rights over its properties in Bataan (inclusive of Lot No. 1272), the said church was succeeded by the Roman Catholic Bishop of San Fernando, Pampanga which was, likewise, succeeded by . . . Catholic Bishop of Balanga — registered as a corporation on 15 December 1975.

Prior thereto, or on 23 August 1936, by virtue of the authority given him by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila to donate a portion of Lot No. 1272, the then parish priest and administrator of all the properties of the said church in the Municipality of Balanga Bataan, Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili, executed an Escritura De Donacion donating an area of 12.40 meters by 21.40 meters or 265.36 sq. m (the subject property) of Lot No. 1272 to Ana de los Reyes and her heirs, as a reward for her long and satisfactory service to the church. Her acceptance of the donation, as well as her possession of the subject property, is indicated in the deed of donation, which deed, for unknown reasons, was refused registration by the Register of Deeds. Six (6) years later, or in 1939, Ana de los Reyes died without issue.

Nevertheless, before her death, she had given the subject property to her nephew who had been living with her, the herein defendant-appellant [private respondent]. The latter immediately took possession of the property in the concept of owner, built his house thereon and, through the years, declared the land for taxation purposes as well as paid the taxes due thereon.

His possession of the subject property was never disturbed by anybody until plaintiff-appellee [petitioner] filed the instant complaint against him on 5 November 1985, or more than 49 years after the deed of donation was executed, alleging, among others, that: (1) during the Japanese occupation of the country, defendant-appellant [private respondent], without the knowledge and prior consent of the plaintiff-appellee [petitioner], and its predecessors-in-interest, entered and occupied the subject property, and (2) despite requests by plaintiff-appellee [petitioner], defendant-appellant [private respondent] refused to vacate the property in question. In support of the above contention, Crispulo Torrico, the sole witness and authorized representative of plaintiff-appellee [petitioner] testified, among others, that: the subject property is situated at the corner of Lot No. 1272, and defendant-appellant [private respondent] has, on the strength of the deed of donation, publicly claimed ownership and occupied the same as early as before the 2nd World War and has built his store thereon.

As his defense, defendant-appellant [private respondent] maintains that by virtue of the deed of donation of 23 August 1936 executed in favor of his predecessor-in-interest, he is the lawful owner of the subject property and the complaint states no cause of action as it was filed only to harass him

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner can claim nullity of the donation as an excuse to avoid the consequences of its own unjustified inaction and as a basis for the assertion of a right on which they had slept for so long.

HELD:

In this case, petitioner filed its complaint in court only after forty nine (49) years had lapsed since the donation in its behalf of the subject property to private respondent's predecessor-in-interest. There is nary an explanation for the long delay in the filing by petitioner of the complaint in the case at bench, and that inaction for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time constitutes laches. As such, petitioner cannot claim nullity of the donation as an excuse to avoid the consequences of its own unjustified inaction and as a basis for the assertion of a right on which they had slept for so long. 50 Courts cannot look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and inaction, knowingly induce

another to spend time, effort, and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon for an unreasonable period only to spring an ambush and claim title when the possessor's efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at their own expense. 51 Considerable delay in asserting one's right before a court of justice is strongly persuasive of the lack of merit of his claim, since it is human nature for a person to enforce his right when same is threatened or invaded; thus, it can also be said that petitioner is estopped by laches from questioning private respondent's ownership of the subject property. 52 At any rate, petitioner's right to recover the possession of the subject property from private respondent has, by the latter's long period of possession and by petitioner's inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand. Such passivity in the face of what might have given rise to an action in court is visited with the loss of such right, and ignorance resulting from inexcusable negligence does not suffice to explain such failure to file seasonably the necessary suit.

While petitioner is admittedly still the registered owner of the donated property, and jurisprudence is settled as to the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens Title, there is equally an abundance of cases in the annals of our jurisprudence where we categorically ruled that a registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of leaches .

EDGARDO DE JESUS, REMEDIOS DE JESUS, JUANITO DE JESUS, JULIANA DE JESUS, JOSE DE JESUS, FLORDELIZA DE JESUS, REYNALDO DE JESUS, ERNESTO DE JESUS, PRISCILO DE JESUS, CORAZON DE JESUS, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and PRIMITIVA FELIPE DE JESUS, respondents.

FACTS:

The property in dispute is a parcel of residential land situated in Dampol 2nd, Pulilan, Bulacan, bounded on the North by a Vereda: on the South, by the Provincial Road; on the East, by Catalino Tayag (Tayao); on the West, by Macario de Leon.

Respondent appellate court found the above-described parcel of land to be the same parcel of land which was —

. . . the subject of the Kasulatang-Biling-Mabibiling-Muli (Exh. 1) executed on November 25, 1932, by Emilia Camacho (surviving widow of Catalino Esguerra), Jose C. Esguerra and Socorro Esguerra, conveying or selling this land to the spouses, Victoriano Felipe and Guillerma de la Cruz, with right to repurchase the same within a period of five years, but that the vendors-a-retro failed to repurchase the land. The vendors-a-retro were the heirs of the deceased Catalino Esguerra. Since the date of the sale the spouses Victoriano Felipe and Guillerma de la Cruz, possessed and lived on this land. The appellant [herein private respondent] was living with her parents on the land, and upon their deaths, she continued to live on and possess the same. (pp. 33-34, Rollo.)

On November 29, 1961 private respondent executed a sworn statement declaring herself the only heir of the deceased Victoriano Felipe and adjudicating to herself the ownership of the land in question (Exh. "4").

More than twelve years later or on April 27, 1973, petitioners herein filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, an action for recovery of ownership and possession and quieting of title to the abovementioned piece of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 2383, alleging among others: "that their grandfather, Santiago de Jesus during his lifetime owned the residential lot; that Santiago de Jesus died before the outbreak of World War II, leaving three (3) sons, namely: Mariano, Exequiel, and Jose, all surnamed de Jesus; that Mariano de Jesus died on September 3, 1956 leaving eight (8) surviving children, namely: Edgardo, Remedios, Juanita, Juliano, Jose, Flordeliza, Reynaldo, and Ernesto, all surnamed de Jesus and all of them plaintiffs; that Exequiel de Jesus died on April 3, 1948, survived by two (2) children — Priscilo and Corazon, both surnamed de Jesus, also plaintiffs in this case; while Jose de Jesus died before the outbreak of World War II without any issue

ISSUE:

Whether the plaintiffs have the better right to ownership and possession of the residential lot in question by virtue of hereditary succession.

HELD:

It is not disputed that petitioners are the heirs of their late grandfather, Santiago de Jesus; what is in dispute is their claim that the residential lot in question belonged to their grandfather and therefore theirs by hereditary succession (Brief for the Respondent, pp. 8-9). Neither is it contradicted that Santiago de Jesus was married to Maria Reyes, a widow with three children by a prior marriage, namely: Basilio, Violeta, and Guillerma, the last having been the mother of herein private respondent

The only documentary evidence of Santiago de Jesus' alleged ownership of the residential lot in question is Tax Declaration No. 2384 (Exh. "A") in the name of Victoriano Felipe. Therein, Felipe claimed ownership for tax purposes of a house of mixed materials and a nipa roof, valued at P190.00 and constructed on the lot or "solar" belonging to Santiago de Jesus

On the other hand, private respondent presented a contract of sale with right of repurchase, "Kasulatang-Biling-Mabibiling-Muli" (Exh. "1"), entered into in 1932 between her parents, Victoriano Felipe and Guillerma de la Cruz, and the vendors-a-retro Emilia Camacho, Socorro Esguerra, and Jose Esguerra; a "Sinumpaang Salaysay"; or an affidavit of adjudication which private respondent executed in 1961 (Exh. "4"); and tax declarations and official receipts.

On the evidentiary value of these documents, it should be recalled that the notarization of a private document converts it into a public one and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity (Joson vs. Baltazar, 194 SCRA 114 [1991]). This is so because a public document duly executed and entered in the proper registry is presumed to be Valid and genuine until the contrary is shown by clear and convincing proof (Asido vs. Guzman, 37 Phil. 652 [1918]; U.S. vs. Enriquez, 1 Phil. 241 [1902]; Favor vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 308 [1991]). As such, the party challenging the recital of the document must prove his claim with clear and convincing evidence (Diaz vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 346 [1986]).

There is no doubt that the pacto de retro deed of sale has assumed the character of a public document, having been notarized by then Justice of the Peace Francisco Makapugay, Jr. in his capacity as Notary Public Ex-Oficio. Hence, it is presumed valid and authentic until proven otherwise. Petitioners, however, challenge this presumption of validity and authenticity. They contend that private respondent's non-production of Tax Declaration No. 5096, specifically mentioned in Exh. "1" as containing the description of the piece of land subject of the "Kasulatang-Biling-Mabibiling-Muli" shattered such presumption and rendered suspect the latter document

Under the present Civil Code, the prescriptive period required for acquisition of immovable property is ten years if the possession is in good faith, and thirty years if in bad faith (South City Homes, Inc. vs. Republic, 185 SCRA 693 [1990]). Such open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of the disputed property for thirty years must be conclusively established (San Miguel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 722 [1990]).

Reckoned from the time she executed the affidavit of adjudication in 1961, eleven years after the New Civil Code had taken effect, private respondent's possession of the contested lot is far too short of the prescriptive period of thirty years considering that her possession is in bad faith. The filing of the petition for recovery of ownership and possession and quieting of title by petitioners on April 27, 1973 was well below the acquisitive prescriptive period for private respondent, which is thirty years under Article 1141 of the present Civil Code. In this case, the statutory period of prescription is deemed to have commenced when petitioners were made aware of a claim adverse to them (Coronel vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 270 [1987]), that is, when the affidavit of adjudication was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds which, at the earliest may be considered to be in 1974, when private respondent was able to secure a tax declaration in her name

Art. 1138. In the computation of time necessary for prescription the following rules shall be observed:

(1) The present possessor may complete the period necessary for prescription by tacking his possession to that of his grantor or predecessor in interest;

(2) It is presumed that the present possessor who was also the possessor at a previous time, has continued to be in possession during the intervening time, unless there is proof to the contrary;

(3) The first day shall be excluded and the last day included. (1960a

Art. 1132. The ownership of movables prescribes through uninterrupted possession for four years in good faith.

Art. 1505. Subject to the provisions of this Title, where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell.

Nothing in this Title, however, shall affect:

(1) The provisions of any factors' act, recording laws, or any other provision of law enabling the apparent owner of goods to dispose of them as if he were the true owner thereof;

(2) The validity of any contract of sale under statutory power of sale or under the order of a court of competent jurisdiction;

(3) Purchases made in a merchant's store, or in fairs, or markets, in accordance with the Code of Commerce and special laws. (n)

MAXIMO GABRITO, ROGER LIBUT, CARMELITA UY, LIZA DE VERA, thru her Attorney-in-Fact, JESUS DE LOS SANTOS, petitioners, vs.THE HON. NINTH DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. NICIAS O. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:

The spouses Roberto Tan and Benita Ching-Tan filed a complaint in the Municipal Trial Court against defendants Maximo Gabrito, et al., alleging that they are the possessors and legal owners of the property situated at No. 107 Gordon Ave., New Kalalake, Olongapo City as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 4-2046. The defendants are leasing portions of this parcel of land, each paying the corresponding monthly rentals due thereon.

On the leased portion, the defendants constructed buildings and have allowed other persons to sublease the same for commercial purposes.

As the spouses Tan have no other property where they could construct their residential house, the spouses Tan notified the defendants (in January 1984) that they intend to personally use the land to build their house thereon and gave defendants three (3) months to vacate the premises and remove the structures and improvements which defendants had constructed thereon.

In April 1984, defendants requested for an extension of time within which to vacate, which was granted by the spouses Tan. However, from that time on, defendants also stopped paying monthly rentals due on the land they leased.

In view of this, in July 1984, defendants were told to leave the premises and to pay rentals in arrears. As defendants refused to comply with both demands, the matter was brought to the Barangay Council for settlement. As no agreement was reached, a certification to file action was

issued to the spouses Tan. Hence, the Tans filed an action for unlawful detainer with damages against Gabrito, et al.

In answer to the complaint, defendants Gabrito, et al. denied the material allegations of the complaint and alleged that: they are builders in good faith over the land as provided in Article 448 of the Civil Code; the land where the houses of defendants were built is a public land, not yet awarded nor titled to anybody; plaintiffs's alleged predecessor-in-interest not being the owner thereof could not have passed nor transferred ownership thereof to them (plaintiffs) considering that Gloria Carillo's Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (X-4-4320) has not yet been acted upon by the Bureau of Lands; plaintiffs and their predessors-in-interest are absentee applicants over the land, hence, are disqualified to own the same; plaintiffs have never been in possession of the land while the defendants are in actual physical possession thereof; the sale of plaintiffs' alleged predecessor-in-interest in favor of plaintiffs is null and void for being in violation of P.D. No. 1517 as defendants being lessees of the land have the right of first refusal thereof.

Defendants brought a counterclaim for damages against the plaintiffs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an action for unlawful detainer is the proper action to oust petitioners from their occupation of the land in dispute

HELD:

There is no question as to the ownership of the land in litigation as both petitioners and private respondents admit that the same is a public land and owned by the government. The bone of contention is, who has a better right to possess the land which definitely falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court and the rule of summary procedure may properly be applied

In a preliminary conference held pursuant to Section 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, defendants admitted that they entered the premises as lessees and had been paying rentals for the use of the land to Gloria Carillo, private respondents' predecessor-in-interest (Order dated May 15, 1985 in Civil Case No. 2511, MTC, Olongapo City, Branch V; Rollo, pp. 72-73). <äre||anº•1àw> When requested to vacate the premises, petitioners asked for an extension of time which request was granted. However, petitioners failed to vacate the premises and also stopped paying rentals. In view of said admissions, petitioners had unquestionably recognized private respondents' prior right of possession over the questioned property.

Petitioners' allegation in their answer that they are builders in good faith over the land as provided for in Article 448 of the Civil Code is untenable. As ruled by this Court, Article 448 of the Civil Code, applies only where one builds on land in the belief that he is the owner of the land, but does not apply where one's interest in the land is that of a lessee under a rental contract (Balucanag v. Francisco, 122 SCRA 498 [1983]). More than that, it has been settled that the mere fact that, in his answer, defendant claims to be the exclusive owner of the property from which plaintiff seeks to eject him is not sufficient to divest the Municipal Trial Court of jurisdiction

DIZON V. SUNTAY- Pledge of Immovable

Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a 3-carat diamond ring valued at P5,500. She and Clarita Sison

entered into a transaction wherein the ring would be sold on commission. Clarita received the ring

and issued a receipt. After some time, Lourdes made demands for the return of the ring but the latter

refused to comply. When Lourdes insisted on the return, Clarita gave her the pawnshop ticket which

is the receipt of the pledge and she found out that 3 days after the ring was received by Clarita, it

was pledged by Melia Sison, the niece of Clarita’s husband in connivance with Clarita with the

pawnshop of Dominador Dizon for P2,600. Lourdes then filed an estafa case. She then asked

Dominador Dizon for the return of the ring pledged but refused to return the ring thus the case filed

by Lourdes.

The CFI issued a writ of replevin so Lourdes was able to have possession of the ring during the

pendency of the case. The CFI also ruled in her favor which was affirmed by the CA on appeal. Thus

the case at bar.

ISSUE:W/N the CA erred in ruling that Lourdes has a right to possession of the ring

HELD: NOIt reiterated the ruling in de Garcia v. CA, that the controlling provision is Art. 559 of the CC which

states that the possession ofmovable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.

Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it

from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner

has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain

its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.

Lourdes, being unlawfully deprived of her ring thus she has a right to recover it from the current

possessor. Dizon is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would require him

to inquire whether or not an individual who is offering the jewelry by pledge is entitled to do so. The

principle of estoppel cannot help him at all. Since there was no precaution availed of, perhaps

because of the difficulty of resisting opportunity for profit, he only has himself to blame and should be

the last to complain if the right of the true owner of the jewelry should be recognized.

Other issues raised:Principle of estoppel = has its roots in equity, moral right and natural justice.

> For estoppel to exist, there must be a declaration, act or omission by the party who is sought to be

bound.

> A party should not be permitted to go against his own acts to the prejudice of another.

Concurring opinion by J. Teehankee:

> Interpretation of the “unlawfully deprived” in Art. 559 of the CC. It is understood to include all cases

where there has been no valid transmission of ownership. If our legislature intended interpretation to

be that of the French Code, it certainly would have adopted and used a narrower term than the

broad language of Art. 559 (formerly 464) and the accepted meaning in accordance with our

jurisprudence.