sinclair,soldat 1997

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BASIC AND APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1997,19(2), 163-182Copyright 1997, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Development and Validation ofVelten-like Image-Oriented Anxiety andSerenity Mood InductionsRobert C. Sinclair and Alexander S . Soldat

Department of PsychologyUniversity of AlbertaCarol A. Ryan

Department of PsychologyCentral Michigan University

Great interest has been shown in the effects of both naturally occurring and inducedaffective states on self-perception and judgment. However, mood inductions oftenunderrepresent the construct mood and often cotitain confounds because inductiotisdo not m ap onto orthogonal V alence x Arousal dimensions. It also is important thatresearchers in the area of the effects of affective states devise and use a more d iversearray of mood indtiction techniques. Two studies were conducted in order to developand validate Velten-like serenity and anxiety mood inductions. In Study 1, partici-pants were randomly assigned to evaluating the valence or arousal content ofself-referent statements designed to represent anxiety and serenity. The 59 statemen tsrated as lowest on valence and highest on arousal were selected as atixiety statements.Th e 59 statements rated as highest on valence and lowest on arousal were selected asseretiity statements. In Study 2, the atixiety and serenity statements were organizedso that they became progressively m ore representative ofthe mood they w ere intendedto induce. Anxiety and serenity incubation instructions w ere developed. Pa rticipants,in a single group, were randomly assigned to mood induction conditions in a 2(Valence: Positive vs. Negative) x 2 (Arousal: Active vs. Passive) factorial design.Modified Velten elation and depression inductions served as the active-positive and


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164 SINCLAIR, SOLDAT, RYANing the mood represented by the statements. Participants then read incubation instruc-tions and focused, for 2 min, on events in their own lives that made them feel like themood represented by the statements. The valence and arousal components of partici-pants' affective states were measured. Results indicated that the anxiety and serenityinductions were effective. Furthermore, the use ofthe anxiety and serenity inductions,in conjunction with the modified Velten depression and elation inductions affords theopportunity to induce moods mapping onto 2 (Positive vs. Negative) x 2 (Active vs.Passive) orthogonal dimensions. Therapeutic implications, implications in terms ofa new tool for research, and methodological cotisiderations are discussed.

Affective states have great impact on our self-perceptions, our perceptions of theworld, and our judgmental processes. A great deal of interest has been shown inthe effects of naturally occurring affective states, for example, in the areas ofdepression and perceptions of control (e.g., Abramson, Alloy, & Rosoff, 1981;Alloy & Abramson, 1979, 1982; Alloy, Abramson, & Viscusi, 1981), worry andcognition (e.g., Borkovec, 1986; Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & D upree, 1983),depression and social perception (e.g., Gleicher & W eary, 1991; Marsh & W eary,1989; Weary, Elbin, & Hill, 1987; Weary, Jordan, & Hill, 1985), remediation ofdepressive affect (e.g.. M orrow & Nolen-H oeksem a, 1990), and depressive realism(e.g., Ruehlman, West, & Pasahow, 1985). In addition, a number of researchershave attempted to study the effects of laboratory analogues of naturally occurringaffective states. Throu gh the use of mo od indu ction proced ures, researchers haveaddressed the effects of happiness and sadness on responses to persuasion (e.g..Bless, Bo hner, S chwarz, & Strack, 1990; Sinclair, M ark, & Clore, 1994), incubation(e.g., Bo rkovec et al., 1983; Sinclair, M ark, Enzle, Borkovec, & C umbleton, 1994),affective states on mood-congruent processing (e.g.. Bower, 1981; Kwiatkowski& P arkinson, 1994; M athews & Brendan, 1983; Schwarz & Clore, 1 983; Snyder& White, 1982), and mood on judgment (e.g., Isen, 1984, 1987; Martin, Ward,A chee ,&W yer, 1993;Schwarz, 1990; Sinclair, 1988; Sinclair & Mark, 1 991,19 92,1995; Sinclair, Mark, & Clore, 1994).

Methods of inducing affective states may have implications in understandingnaturally occurring affective states, as well as therapeutic implications in terms ofthe use of imaging techniques for the treatment of affective disorders. One of them ost com mo n m ethods of inducing mo ods is through the use of the Velten (1968)elation, neutral, and depression inductions. Indeed, according to our count from theSocial Sciences Citation Index (1981-1993), the Velten procedure received 333citations in the years 1981 to 1993 . Althoug h the Velten procedure is not without


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ANXIETY AND SERENITY 1 6 5creating relatively long-lasting induced moods (i.e., 35 m in) that arefreeof demandcharacteristics on subsequent judgm ents (see Sinclair, Mark, Enzle, et al., 1994).

As we becam e more sophisticated in the study of the effects of affective states,we realized that the concept mood often is preoperationalized poorly, with mostresearchers discussing the effects of broadly defined "goo d" versus "bad " m oods(see Sinclair & Mark, 1992). Thus, the construct mood has inadequate constructvalidity, which can threaten the construct validity of cause (Cook & Campbell,1979); that is, our inferences about the true causal construct may not be valid.Consider the Velten (1968) mood induction technique. The elation induction resultsin both increased positive affect and increased arousal relative to the neutralinduction. The depression induction results in decreased positive affect and de-creased arousal relative to the neutral induction (see Sinclair, 1988). Thus, valenceand arousal are confounded. Consider viewing films about the H olocaust (see Isen& Daubman, 1984); this type of induction may involve both negative affect andhigh arousal. Indeed, with most mood induction procedures, the confounding ofthe valence and arousal componen ts of the induced m oods can lead to alternativeexplanations for mood effects (e.g., Sinclair & Mark, 1995). If mood effects areadditive, both valen ce and arousal (or one or the other) could explain the effects ofmuch research. Indeed, it is unclear whether effects in most mood research couldbe arousal based because valence and arousal are not factorially manipulated (cf.Easterbrook, 1959; Kahnem an, 1973; Yerkes & Dodson , 1908; Zajonc, 1965).

Furtherm ore, as we gain m ore knowledge about the effects of affective states,we realize it is important to develop new methods of inducing different moodsmapping onto the diverse circumplex of affective states experienced in our lives(Russell, 1980). Th us, the need for such man ipulations is of impo rt because it isunclear whether, for example, induced depression leads to effects similar to thoseresulting from induced anxiety, or whether induced elation leads to effects similarto those resulting form induced serenity. Finally, inductions of well-defined affec-tive states that adequately m ap onto naturally occurring affective states are neces-sary if studies of induced affect are, in fact, going to h ave implications in therapyand in understanding affective disorders.The purpose of this research was to develop Velten-like mood inductions thatcould be used in conjunction with the Velten elation and depression inductions tofactorially manipulate the valence and arousal components of induced moods.Developing such inductions would afford researchers the opportunity to address

whether the effects of affective states are a result of valence, arousal, their additive,or interactive effects. This is relevant because even early conceptualizations of


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1 6 6 SINCLAIR, SOLDAT, RYANto map well onto Russ ell's circumplex m odel of affect. The choice of anxiety andserenity appears to be sensib le and to have face validity because such affect wordsand phrases as serene, content, at ease, satisfied, relaxed, and calm represent thelow-arousal-positive-valence quadrant o fthe circum plex and such affect words astense, afraid, alarmed, and (/wfrewed represent the high-arousa l-negative-valencequadrant. Because affect words such as depressed, sad, gloomy, droopy, andmiserable represent the low-arousal-negative-valence quadrant and affect wordssuch as aroused, excited, delighted, and happy represent the high-arousal-po sitive-valence quadrant, it appears that inductions involving elation, depression, anxiety,and serenity would adequately represent all quadrants of the circumplex. Further-more, the development of such inductions is a step toward a multioperationaliza-tional approach to the understanding ofthe effects of induced m oods on judg m ents.

STUDY 1Method

Participants. The participants w ere 188 undergraduate psychology studentsenrolled in introductory, developmental, or social psychology classes at CentralMichigan University. All were volunteers who received extra credit toward theirfinal grade for participation.

Item construction. A total of 118 sentences were designed to relate to anxietyand worry (e.g., "I cou ldn 't relax or calm down now if I had to" and "A sense offoreboding and dread fills me with fear"; see Andrews & Bo rkovec, 1988). Eightysentences were designed to relate to serenity (e.g., "I'm calm and content^I feellike I could doze off any time" and "I feel a wave of tranquillity over me rightnow"). The sentences w ere compiled so that there were four lists of 198 items , eachwith a different randomized order of items.Procedure. Participants were run in groups of 10 to 50. They were told theexperimenter was attempting to validate stimuli for future research. Participantswere assigned randomly to one of two rating conditions in blocks of two withingender. Half the participants read instructions asking them to rate the valence of

each of 198 self-referent sentences on a 5-point Likert scale. The anchors were 1{extremely negative), 2 {negative), 3 {neutral), 4 {positive), and 5 {extremely


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ANXIETY AND SERENITY 1 6 7of the sentences on a 5-point scale. The anchors w ere at 1 {extremely passive), 2{passive), 3 {neutral), 4 {active) and 5 {extremely active). After completing theratings, participants w ere debriefed and thanked for participating.

Results and DiscussionM eans w ere computed for each of the items. The 59 items lowest on valence andhighest on arousal were identified as anxiety items . The 59 items highest on valenceand lowest on arousal w ere identified as serenity items.^ Scale scores were createdfor the 59 anxiety and 59 serenity items based on the mean of both the valence andarousal ratings. These scores were subjected to a 2 (Rating: Valence v s. Arousal)X 2 (Sentence: Anxiety vs. Serenity) mixed-model analysis of variance (AN OV A).Rating served as the between-group factor, and sentence served as the w ithin-sub-jects factor. There was a significant Rating x Sentence interaction, F(l, 186) =143.98, p < .0001. Analyses of simple effects indicated that the anxiety sentences(M - 2.08) were rated as more negative than the serenity sentences (M = 3.69), atthe/? < .01 level. Furthermore, the anxiety sentences were rated as more active (M= 3.31) than the serenity sen tences (Af - 2.62), at the/? < .01 level.The results suggested the anxiety and serenity sentences represented active-negative and passive-positive moods, respectively. Based on these results, modifiedVelten-like anxiety and serenity inductions were created. They were designed tobe similar to the Sinclair, Mark, En zle, et al. (1994) modified Velten elation anddepression inductions with incubation. Participants were exposed to either themodified Velten elation, serenity, anxiety, or modified Velten depression induc-tions to assess whether these inductions were effective in inducing Positive versusNegative x A ctive versus Passive mood states. Thus, Valence (Positive vs. Nega-tive) and Arousal (Active vs. Passive) mood induction procedures were factoriallymanipulated, and participants' moods were measured.

STUDY 2IVletiiod

Participants. Participants were 51 introductory psychology students at Cen-tral Michigan University. All were volunteers who received extra credit toward


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1 6 8 SINCLAIR, SOLDAT, RYANConstruction of the serenity and anxiety inductions with incubation. Themood statements were typed individually on 3.67-in. x 8.00-in. cards that werestapled together to form a booklet. The first page of the booklet indicated whichmood induction condition was represented in the booklet (i.e., "These statementsare designed to make you feel serene " and "These statements are designed to m akeyou feel anxious" for the serenity and anxiety inductions, respectively). For boththe serenity and anxiety inductions, the initial statement, marked Card I, was"Today is neither better nor worse than any other day" (Velten, 1968). Theremaining 59 statements, marked Card 2 to Card 60, were organized to becomeprogressively representative of the mood the booklet was designed to induce

(based on the data from Study 1). In the serenity packet, the second statem ent was"I feel mentally alert and calm," and the last statement was "I feel so calm, sohappy, so serene, so relaxed, so nice." In the anxiety packet, the second statementwas " I'm an incredibly anxious person ," and the last statement was "My life is sofull of things that make me worried that I can't handle it. I feel like I'll explodewith tension." The complete lists of statements and mean valence and arousalratings for the serenity and anxiety inductions are presented in Table 1 and Table2, respectively.The final page of the packet contained incubation instructions similar to thosedeveloped for the modified Velten elation and depression inductions (Sinclair,Mark, Enzle, et al., 1994). The incubation instructions for the serenity inductionwere:Now that you're feeling very serene, concentrate on this feeling. Feel itgetting stronger and stronger; more and more peaceful. Let it continue tobuild. Think about things that have happened in your life that have made youfeel very, very serene; like listening to soothing m usic, or wa lking along thebeach on a warm summer day, or sitting by a fire sipping hot chocolatewithout a care in the world. Concentrate on it. Let yourself feel very calm,tranqu il, very peaceful, very laid-back. As you do, yo u'll feel the mood build.It'll become m ore and m ore serene. This in turn will make you think of otherthings in your life that have made you feel very, very serene. The mood w illcontinue to build. Feel it become more serene. Feel it get stronger andstronger. It will happen. Do and think whatever you can to build this veryserene mood . Feel very, very serene. Close yotir eyes. Begin now.

The incubation instructions for the anxiety induction were:


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TABLE 1Mean Ratings on Valence and Arousal for the Serenity Staten^entsValence Arousal

Statement M sd M sd1. Today is neither better nor worse than any other

day.2. I feel mentally alert and calm.3 . I'm pleased to be in college I'm leam ing a great

deal.4. Sometimes it feels good to g et away from the

noise by going to a park.5. Mistakes I make d on't bother m e, I leam fromthem, I'm human.6. I usually feel at ease when I meet new peop le.7. I like to take my time doing things.8. This is one of those days when I'm not feeling

bogged down with schoolwork.9. I feel that I maintain a hopeful, optimistic attitude.

10. I enjoy inviting m y friends over for tea and quietconversation.

11. Today is fine.12 . Whether I 'm with others or alone, I can feelrelaxed and content.13 . I find that I'm most creative when I'm in this

mood.14. This might just tum out to be an easy day for m e.15 . I'm satisfied with my life right now.16. This spring should b e a relaxing time for me.17. The warmth of summ er will be approaching soon;

I can almost feel the calm.1 8 .1 feel like humm ing quiet music to myself and

taking a long walk.19. The m oming hours are the quietest time for m e.20. Everything seems to just naturally fall into place.

No w orries.21. My parents are proud of me, and I feel secure and

comfortable with this.22. I have a fresh outlook on life. I'm secure in my

optimism.23 . My friends hav e remarked on how calmly I cope

with life's pressures.24. I feel know ledgeable and wise today.

3.664.063.753.653.533.413.254.013.733.583.673.533.483.763.663.753.693.293.384.124.033.483.84

0.760.830.750.930.940.761.130.800.850.810.890.870.920.730.910.950.860.871.160.941.071.070.91

2.933.352.972.822.772.612.533.182.882.792.812.722.562.872.662.82111lyi2.433.082.95

2.532.78

0.941.051.191.111.081.091.221.091.171.161.160.951.021.091.081.311.241.151.051.171.151.121.05


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TABLE 1 (Cont inued)Valence Arousal

Statement M sd M sd30. I feel a certain quiet sureness in everything that I

do.31 . I feel like I know myself well, I feel w ise.32. What can I say . . . I'm just so calm.33. I do feel serene and calm today.34. My mo tto is to take it o ne day at a time^no rush.35 . I'm an accepting and honest person.36. I feel free and unencumbered.37. I can almost imagine a sea breeze blowing gentlythrough my hair.38. I feel calm and sure of m yself right now .39. The smell of spring blossoms soothes me.40. Life is to be enjoyed, not worried about.41 . I like to savor these quiet mom ents.42. I could jus t slip off my shoes and sit back and

relax.43 . My m uscles feel loose and heavyso relaxed.44. I feel that I have a certain inner peace.45 . I'm glad that I can take it easy today.46. I could really go for a lazy day at the beach.47. I'm relaxed and clearheaded.48 . This has been a really peaceful day for me.49. I have confidence that life will go well for me.50. With each passing day, I feel m ore relaxed and

sure of my life.51 . If your attitude is relaxed, then things are relaxed .

I am relaxed.52. I'm calm and content^I feel like I could doze off

any time.53. Neve r have I felt as content as I feel at this

moment.54. Nothing can mak e me feel anxious today.55. I'm feeling quite peaceful now.56. It fills me w ith a quiet irmer peace to know that I

am appreciated by such wonderful friends.57. I feel like I have n o cares in the world.58. I'm feehng wonderfully calm and pleased today.59. I do n't think I've ever felt so peaceful as I do right

now.60. I feel so calm , so happy, so serene, so relaxed, so

3.573.913.413.493.554.213.623.773.773.853.953.942.473.373.663.673.873.713.474.173.783.793.353.563.423.554.283.233.753.53

1.010.870.970.970.930.730.990.930.920.920.770.841.100.930.800.880.940.901.200.871.000.870.981.381.320.950.941.341.031.39

2.552.862.312.412.503.162.592.682.662.642.862.793.542.212.512.512.742.502.293.042.522.412.112.222.122.253.011.932.312.08

1.031.151.161.091.141.241.181.211.171.271.261.271.251.100.921.071.591.161.001.261.011.191.091.080.991.001.330.960.951.03


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TABLE 2Mean Ratings on Valence and Arousal for the Anxiety StatementsValence Arousal

Statement M sd M sd1. Today is neither better nor worse than any

other day.2. I'm an incredibly anxious person.3 . I'm haunted with thoughts about myself and

how I com e across to others.4. I feel d istressed by thou ghts that disturb me .5. I'm worried that the potential for nuclear war

may get a lot worse.6. School makes me fret with concem in general.7. I feel needled and badgered with racing

thoughts.8. It takes too much effort to try to relaxI feel

too agitated.9. I think about the same aggravating things day

after day.10. I'm afraid that the potential for disaster may

get a lot worse . I am afraid for my life.11 . I'm edgy and very worried.12 . My mind is troubled and harried.13 . I feel incredibly vexed and concemed today.14. I wish that I could stop thinking about thing s

that make my blood run cold.15 . My mind is sometimes racingI couldn 't

relax if I wanted to.16. I can 't comm unicate because I'm too confused

in my m ind.17. I'm plagued by my racing mind.18. There have been days when I felt unnerved

and anxious and unable to do anything.19. It seems like my body may start to shake and

tremble.20. I feel like I'm on pins and needles today.21. Even when I try to relaxI'm always worded.22. I feel hounded by my own thoughts.23 . I have too many concems I don't know w hat

to do.24. I'm so tense that I'm having trouble

remembering things.25.

2.31 0.94 3.36 1.212.262.382.212.472.212.102.212.162.082.272.102.242.492.072.152.472.032.152.062.062.152.02

1.060.920.920.941.000.800.941.070.941.030.890.981.100.850.981.100.920.780.930.891.020.82

3.213.313.213.513.183.163.273.203.163.463.183.213.633.113.313.543.093.343.243.163.313.17

1.281.171.210.961.301.191.161.311.351.191.341.301.191.261.331.251.421.331.281.281.271.29


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TABLE 2 (Cont inued)Valence Arousal

Statement M sd M sd29. There have been days that I have worried so

much about things that I seemed to do littleelse.

30. I feel so alone and scared.31 . r m m uch more anxious than when I was

youngerI seem to be getting worse.32 . Too often I have found myself filled with a

sense of dread, thinking worrisome thoughtswhen I definitely should have been studying.33. My m ind is troubled and full of dread abou tmy future.

34. I'm beginning to feel so uptight that I'mgetting more and m ore worried thoughts.

35. I'm horribly concemed about my family life.36 . All of my fears and nightmares seem to be

taking possession of me.37 . It has occurred to me more than once that

studying is basically useless because I feel toorestless and agitated to concentrate.38 . I'm an incredibly uptight person.

39 . I'm terribly tense and annoyed by mythoughts^I can't work.

40. I'm so worried that I can't concentrate onanything.

41 . I worry so much that I can't stand it.42. I'm getting nervous and anxious, I can feel the

muscles in my body getting more and moretense.

43. I'm too scaredI don 't know what to do.44. W hen I feel this anxious, I fear that I mayhave a heart attack. My health may not be asgood as it's supposed to be.

45 . Every now and then I feel so worried that Ican't sit still or get anything accomplished.

46. I can't think of anything except my worries.47. I couldn't relax or calm down now if I had to.48. At times I'v e been so fearful and scared that I

ran away from important problems rather thanface them.

49. No matter how hard I try, I can't stop this

2.241.912.39

1.110.991.06

3.352.983.54

1.69

2.082.062.00

0.92

0.960.890.96

2.98

3.313.313.31

1.83 0.88 3.19

1.321.401.06

2.382.182.022.06

1.120.920.950.97

3.553.323.273.30

1.241.151.371.291.49

1.331.321.33

2.031.83

2.111.91

0.911.05

1.000.99

3.303.21

3.453.26

1.471.47

1.441.45

1.492.311.902.02

2.00

1.010.950.98

1.01

3.533.333.38

3.33

1.121.401.43

1.36


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ANXIETY AND SERENITY 1 7 3TABLE 2 (Continued)

Statement

52. I can't stop worryingmy whole life makesme feel like I'm going to burst.

53 . I'm so scared that I feel like my hair isstanding on e nd.

54. Sometimes I feel like I might have a panicattack.

55. I'm so afraidmy whole life makes me feeltense and worried. I feel like I have no control.56. A sense of foreboding and dread fills me with

fear.57. At times I've been so worried that I've had

trouble sleeping and facing pro blems.58. My life is so full of thing s that fill me with

dread that I can't stand it.59. I feel paralyzed with fearsome very

important decisions are almost impossible tomake.60. My life is so full of things that make m eworried that I can't handle it. I feel like I'llexplode with tension.

Valence

M

1.901.781.981.851.822.051.63

1.71

1.87

sd

1.090.891.030.980.871.200.B8

0.99

0.94

Arousal

M

3.433.263.433.383.343.713.32

3.45

3.68

sd

1.441.611.401.451.301.171.49

1.45

1.20

it. Let yourself feel very jittery, worried, very anxious, very terrified. As youdo, yo u'll feel the mood build. It'll become more intense, more anxious. Thisin turn w ill make you think of other things in yotir life that have made youfeel very, very anxious. The m ood w ill continue to build. Feel it become moreintense. Feel it get stronger and stronger. It will happen. Do and thinkwhatever you can to build this very anxious mood. Feel very, very anxious.Close your eyes. Begin now .

Procedure. Participants were run in a single group and were randomlyassigned to mood induction conditions, in a 2 (Valence: Positive vs. Negative) x 2(Arousal: Active vs. Passive) factorial design, in blocks of four w ithin gender. The


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1 7 4 SINCLAIR, SOLDAT, RYANdevelopmental stages and that participants should respond very honestly on themood m easure they would later complete so as to preven t future use of an ineffectivemood induction that the experimenter mistakenly believed to be effective (seeSinclair, Mark, Enzle, et al., 1994).'

Participants were given oral instructions indicating they would read self-refer-ent, mood-related statements at the rate of one per 15 sec. They were asked toconcentrate on the mood associated with each statement and to think of things intheir own lives that refiected the mood represented by each statement. Furthermore,they were told that after they had read the last statement, they would read a set ofincubation instructions designed to build the m ood even m ore, and that they w ouldsit for 2 min concentrating on building the mood. Finally, they were told that if themood induction became too uncomfortable, they could raise their hands, and theexperimenter w ould terminate the procedure. Participants then read written instruc-tions like the standard Velten (1968) instructions. These differed slightly from thestandard instructions because the incubation period was discussed (see Sinclair,M ark, Enzle, et al., 1994).

Participants read a set of 60 mood-related statements at the rate of one card per15 sec."* Then participants sat for 2 min with their eyes closed while concentratingon building the mood (Sinclair, Mark, Enzle, et al., 1994). After the incubationperiod, participants completed a 20-item mood measure. They were asked toindicate the degree to which they agreed that each item described how they felt"right now, today" on 5-point Likert scales anchored at 1 {strongly disagree), 2{disagree), 3 {neither agree nor d isagree), 4 {agree), and 5 (strongly agree). Theitems were (1) very bad, (2) very sedate, (3) very good, (4) very aroused, (5) verynega tive, (6) very active , (7) very pos itive, (8) very passive , (9) very alert, (10) veryhappy, (11) very sad, (12) very tired, (13) very m iserable, (14) very quiet, (15) veryactivated, (16) very glad, (17) very inac tive, (18) very unhappy, (19) very pleased.

One aspect of the Study 2 procedures should b e discussed in terms of its possible impact on demandcharacteristics. The oral instructions to the mood induction indicated that we were developing the moodinduction for use in future research and that we did not know whether the group induction was effective.Participants also were told that it would be obvious to them w hat type of mood w e we re attempting toinduce and, thus, that it was important for participants to respond honestly on the mood measure (i.e.,"the way that you really feel") they completed later because if we believed the induction was effectivewhen, in fact, it was not, our future res earch would be in jeop ardy . These instmctions we re included tocreate a demand for honesty when reporting mood. Thus, we believe these instructions created acounterdemand characteristic and reduced the impact of demand on self-reported mood.

The statement "T oday is neither better nor worse that any other day" serves as the first statement in


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ANXIETY AND SERENITY 1 7 5and (20) very stimulated. Finally, participants were debriefed, and those in eithernegative mood induction condition were exposed to the elation induction p rior toleaving the laboratory.

Results and DiscussionIn a factor analytic study, Sinclair and Mark (1995) dem onstrated that items 1, 3,5 ,7 ,10,11,13,16,18, and 19 load on a valence factor, and that the remaining itemsload on an arousal factor. Items 1, 2, 5, 8, 1 1, 12, 13, 14, 17, and 18 were reversescored, and valence and arousal scale scores were computed based on the m ean ofthe items previously shown to load on the respective factors. High valence scores(5) indicated po sitive affect; low scores (1) indicated negative affect. H igh arousalscores (5) indicated active states; low scores (1) indicated passive states. Thevalence and arousal scales had internal consistency estimates of .97 and .93,respectively.

A 2 (Induction-Valence) x 2 (Induction-Arousal) x 2 (Scale: Valence andArousal) mixed-model ANOV A w as conducted. Induction-valence and Induction-arousal were between-group factors and Scale was the within-subject factor. Therewas an Induction-Valence x Scale interaction, F ( l , 47) = 56.64,/? < .0001. On thevalence scale, participants in the positive induction conditions reported morepositive affect (Af=4 .26) than did participants in the negative induction conditions(M = 2.02), at the /7 < .0001 level, based on an analysis of simple main effects.How ever, the positive (M = 3.02) and negative (M = 2.69) induction conditions didnot differ on arousal. There also was an Induction-Arousal x Scale interaction, F ( l ,47) = 18.36, p < .0001. Participants in the active conditions (M = 3.53) reportedmore active mood states than did participants in the passive conditions (M = 2.27),p < .0001. How ever, the active (M = 3.23) and passive (M = 3.09) conditions didnot differ on the valence scale. The three-way interaction was not significant.

The resu lts indicate that the anxiety and serenity inductions led to the affectivechanges they we re designed to induce. These inductions, in conjunction with theVelten elation and depression indu ctions, afford the opportunity to induce m oodsmapping onto 2 (Valence: Positive vs. Negative) x 2 (Arousal: Active vs. Passive)orthogonal dimensions (Osgood et al., 1957; Russell, 1980; Tanaka & Huba, 1984a,1984b; Wundt, 1907).


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1 7 6 SINCLAIR, SOLDAT, RYANGENERAL DISCUSSION

Through the use of inductions such as those developed in the two studies reportedhere, researchers should be able to address which affective states and whichcomponents of affective states (e.g., valence vs. arousal) contribute to the effectsof affect on judgments (see Sinclair & Mark, 1992). In related work, using theinductions developed here (in conjunction with an unrelated second study para-digm), Sinclair and Mark (1995) showed that the valence component of inducedmoods affects differential accuracy on estim ates of correla tion coefficients fromscatterplots (people in negative moods, regardless of arousal level, were mostaccurate ; Sinclair & Mark, 1995, also showed similar effects with only the modifiedelation and depression inductions). Furthermore, aroused participants were mar-ginally less accurate than were unaroused participants (cf. Easterbrook, 1959;Kahnem an, 1973; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908; Zajonc, 1965). How ever, valence andarousal did not interact. Thus, the inductions can be used effectively to study theeffects of affective states on judgments.* Of course, as Sinclair and Mark (1992,1995) noted, one must expect the relative contributions of the valence and arousalcomponents of affective states to effects on judgment to vary as a function of theaffective state and the task. Cons istent with this logic and with the suggestion thatmore diversity is needed in operationalizing affective states (Sinclair & M ark, 1992,1995), Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer (1994) showed that induced anger andinduced sadness differentially impact on social judgments, with angry individualsmaking m ost use of stereotyped information; in this case, it appears that the arousalcomponent of affective states had its effect. Future research might develop andaddress the effects of other image-oriented m ood inductions on judgm ental proc-esses (e.g., jealously, anger, worry, guilt, mirth, etc.); however, the developmen tof the inductions described here is a step toward the multioperationalizationalapproach to understanding the effects of mood. Further research also might addressthe psychophysiological correlates of our anxiety and serenity inductions to assesswhether the inductions result in differential perceptions of somatic arousal, true

It is difficult to see how the mood induction instmctions would create demand characteristics forthe correlation estimation task. It seems unlikely that participants would infer that we expected (andfound) negative m ood subjects to be more accurate on their estimates (see Sinclair & Mark, 1992,1995,for details). The effectiveness of the manipulated mood on the correlation estimation task also rendersimplausible another potential criticism. It might be argued that drawing participants' attention to their


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ANXIETY AND SERENITY 1 7 7differences in somatic arousal, or both. However, Friedman and Thayer (1991)showed that serene versus anxious imagery inductions (similar to our incubationinstructions) result in differential psychophysiological responses, such as electro-encephalogram (EEG) and electromyogram (EM G) activity.

The two major advantages ofthe serenity and anxiety inductions developed hereare that the inductions provide (a) the ability to induce a more diverse array ofaffective states and (b) the ability to test for individual, additive, and interactiveeffects of the valence and arousal components of affective states (when the anxietyand serenity inductions are used in conjunction with the modified Velten elationand depression inductions). However, these inductions provide some additionaladvantages. First, as illustrated, the inductions can be administered to large groupswith all conditions represented in the same group. This eliminates the problemsencountered when groups of participants are exposed to one mood inductioncondition and then are i-eatedas the unit of analysis (e.g., inflated probability ofcommitting a Type-I error, violation of assumptions of independence, etc.; seeSinclair, M ark, Enzle, et al., 1994, for an extended discussion of this issue). Second,group administrations with all conditions represented greatly reduce the likelihoodof experim enter bias effects because (a) all participants are exposed to identical oralinstructions across conditions, and (b) the experimenter remains blind to conditions.Third, group administrations are more economical because numerous people canparticipate in a single session. Finally, as Sinclair, Mark, Enzle, et al., noted,carefully designed studies using mood inductions with reverse demands in the oralinstructions, and using m ood inductions in conjunction with unrelated second studyparadigms and suspiciousness probes, can reduce greatly the likelihood that demandcharacteristics can account for effects on critical outcome measures (see Sinclair,Mark, Enzle, et al., 1994, for an extended discussion).

Indeed, Velten-like procedures have been criticized as producing demand char-acteristics (Buchwald et al., 1981; Polivy & Doyle, 1980). However, we argue thatthe plausibility of a demand characteristic explanation depends on the specificprocedures used, and several procedures can be employed to reduce demand instudies involving the m odified Velten and our anxiety and serenity inductions. Forexam ple, Sinclair (1988) used the Velten elation, neutral, and depression inductionsto assess the effects of mood state on impression formation. An unrelated secondstudy paradigm was employed in which subjects thought they were participatingin two unrelated studies, one validating a new mood induction procedure and asecond designing a new teacher evaluation metric. Refinements to this p rocedurecan greatly reduce the plausibility of a demand characteristics explanation. In


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1 7 8 SINCLAIR, SOLDAT, RYANsometimes possible to design one's study such that any demand characteristicswould have an effect opposite to their predicted effects (see Mark & Sinclair, 1995,for an example). Furthermore, we advocate the use of a funnel-type debriefingprocedure to assess demand characteristics along with analyses including andexcluding suspicious participants (see Page, 1975). Sinclair employed these proc e-dures with the modified Velten elation, neutral, and depression inductions. Veryfew participants were identified as susp icious. Additional analyses conducted bothincluding and excluding suspicious participants revealed comparable effects onimpression formation. Thus, it would be difficult to argue demand characteristicsas the basis for effects found in Sinclair's study. Mark and Sinclair and Sinclair andMark (1991, 1992, 1995) similarly eliminated potential demand characteristicsexplanations for mood effects found in their studies. Thus, we suggest severalprocedures render demand explanations implausible (Mark & Sinclair, 1995;Sinclair, 1988; Sinclair & M ark, 1991 , 1992, 1995), and these should be used byresearchers interested in the effects of mood on social and cognitive processes.

CONCLUSIONSThe anxiety and serenity inductions developed in this research provide a useful too lfor those interested in the effects of an array of specific affective states. Further-more, the serenity induction may have therapeutic implications in the treatment ofanxiety. The induction invo lves a simply administered guided-imagery techniquethat may prove effective in reducing anxiety, especially if paired with progressiverelaxation. W e also note that multiple operationalizations of affective states shouldlead to a better understanding of the roles of affect in our perceptions of the world.Finally, we are not arguing that Velten-like inductions are particularly better orworse than any other induction technique. For example, Velten-like techniques

'A S Polivy and Doyle (1980) pointed out, the Velten procedure seems to provide clear demandcharacteristics. Nevertheless, Polivy and Doyle interpreted their results as indicating that, althoughdemand characteristics may contribute to the effects ofthe Velten induction, tme mood changes result.This argum ent is consistent with our own position and w ith recent evidence that the effects of V elten-likeinductions cannot be wholly accounted for by a demand characteristics explanation (Sinclair, M etzger,& B orkovec, 1990). W e attempted to reduce the role of demand in potentially inflating m ood differencesby introducing a demand for honesty. Moreover, although demand characteristics may contribute tomeasures of mood, it is difficult to explain the results of carefully designed studies, employing aconvincing unrelated second study paradigm, in which mood effects are apparent on dependent m easures


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ANXIETY AND SERENITY 1 7 9have been criticized on the basis that they may involve cognitive as well as affectiveactivation and because they do not separate som atic and self-evaluative com ponentsof mood (see Rholes et al., 1987; Riskind & Rho les, 1985a, 1985b; cf. Clark, 1983,1985). However, these arguments can be leveled against most mood inductiontechniques. Films about the Holocaust certainly involve cognition (e.g., Isen &Daub man , 1984). M usic inductions have been shown to affect cognitive processing(metaphor interpretation; W ellens, Palermo, Sinclair, & T hayer, 1992). In fact, itis likely that moods, both induced and naturally occurring, com prise both affectiveand cognitive components. In any case, we illustrate a method that can be used toexplore the effects of mood on judgm ent through the separation o fthe valence andarousal components of moods as defined by Wundt (1907), the Russell (1980)circumplex, and others (e.g., Osgood et al., 1957).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThe research was supported by S ocial Sciences and Hum anities Research C ouncilof Canada Grant 410 930122 to Robert C. Sinclair.

W e thank Amy Chm ilar, Bruce Friedman, Curt Hoffman, Kama Jamieson, DanKing, Lynda King, M el Mark, Frederick Rhodewalt, and two anonym ous reviewersfor their comm ents on a previous draft of this manuscript and Tom B orkovec forproviding the statements used to develop our anxiety induction.

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