The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 7 | Issue 33 | Number 4 | Article ID 3206 | Aug 17, 2009

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Singapore: The Past in the Present

Geoffrey Gunn

Singapore: The Past in the Present

Geoffrey Gunn

Unquestionably, Singapore has economicallythrived in the space created by its independentstatus as an island Republic. The Federation ofMalaysia, from which Singapore was expelledin 1965, has also levered itself into the highestranks of developing countries. Nevertheless,separation has not healed the wounds on eitherside of the boundary exposed by the failedmerger (1963-1965). To be sure, atavisms fromthe past continue to feed Singapore's siegementality, just as Singapore's astute politicalleadership reads lessons from a history of localradica l i sm, ethnic chauvin ism, andinternational influences including the pull ofglobal Islam and its influence upon localMuslim minorities. No less, in the officialnarrative, a sense of China-centeredness on thepart of the majority population has survived thebirth of the Republic and presents the contoursof an enduring challenge around identityformation.

Economists cite Singapore along with Taiwan,South Korea and Hong Kong (the four littledragons) as models of third world economicsuccess, yet it is Singapore alone which hasfailed to match economic success with the kindof political, intellectual, and social freedomscommensurate with the sophisticated inheritedsocial organization forming the basis of thestate and civil society. Ruled over by ahegemonic party ever since British powerconnived with Singapore strongman (todayMinister Mentor) Lee Kuan Yew to eliminatethe left, tolerance of autonomous civil societyruns very thin. This has led some to describe

Singapore under the decades-long rule of thePeople's Action Party (PAP) as an exemplar of“illiberal democracy.” [1]

A broad scholarly and popular literature hasemerged on the state in Singapore, nowconventionally hyphenated as the PAP-state. [2]To wit, the subordinate role of the opposition,the inclination of government leaders to filedefamation suits against critics, periodiccrackdowns or writs against foreign media, anda petty side of administrative controls whichhas gained Singapore the reputation of a“nanny state.” Neither has a modern version ofneo-Confucianism been neglected. [3] Up frontinternationally with its “Asian” views onindividual rights, modern Singapore hasat t racted cr i t i c i sm f rom a range o finternational civil society organizations,including the European Parliament, as well asgovernments, including measured noticesfound in annual U.S. State Department reportson human rights.

The passing of a long-time lone parliamentaryopposition politician and secretary-general ofthe Workers' Party, J.B. Jayaratnam in October2008, who was literally crippled by lawsuits,seems to symbolize official allergy to dissent ofany kind. Earlier in November 2006, Dr CheeSoon Juan, Secretary-General of the oppositionSingapore Democratic Party was convicted ofspeaking in public without a permit. He hasalso been bankrupted by defamation suits bythe Lees and other PAP worthies. Although PAPhas long maintained an official strangleholdover the print and electronic media alongside arange of dissuasive measures and controls usedto muzzle critics, the new electronic media, asdiscussed below, has opened a new space for

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discussion on a range of Singapore/Malaysianissues by webloggers and others. Also, as thefollowing examples reveal, memory of recenthistory is obviously deeply ingrained in thepsyche of the ruling party.

None of this would appear to be exceptional inthe former colonial world, nor in a good fewWestern countries. Singapore, however, hasmade an art form of its colonial-inflectedlegislation. Today's draconian Internal SecurityAct (ISA), the Societies Act, the Newspapersand Printing Act, and the Sedition Act (revised1985) all have colonial analogues. Statecontrols over housing, environment, youthincluding compulsory military service formales, and education coupled with stateinterventions into the realm of familisticideologies and even eugenics, along withcorporativized controls over labor translatesinto a sweeping social engineering of thepopulation. Malaysians, who have more spacein which to operate than their formercompatriots also chafe under colonial-erarepressive legislation, though the victims –running from a former deputy prime minister,to lawyers, teachers, journalists, andcommunity leaders and “terrorists” - would seethe Malaysian variant of the ISA as less of an“art form” than a blatant political tool.

Contested Identities/Crisis Discourse

Blood Debt

Japan's occupation of Singapore and Malayawas obviously a wrenching experience for bothvictims and survivors.

English troops marching in Singapore

Many accounts have been written in Englishand Japanese of the bloody events whichtranspired in Singapore following the Britishsurrender to invading Japanese forces on 15February 1942, known locally in Hokkien assook ching or purge. Basically, Japanesecommanders screened and purged Chinesemales aged between 18 and 50. Forced toassemble at screening centers, those identifiedas anti-Japanese or pro-communist or fallinginto other categories, were transported tomostly coastal locations where they werebayoneted or machine gunned to death.Standard accounts suggest that the numberkilled in this way was of the order of 50,000,although Hayashi Hirofumi strikes a minimumfigure of 5,000 dead with an upper thresholdunknown. He also notes that the purge wasplanned even before the Japanese arrived inSingapore. [4]

Not all in Singapore were satisfied with thejustice meted out by British war crimesinvestigators. In fact, a popular sense ofinjustice especially on the part of the Chinesecommunity has simmered on to the present. Ina study on the 1947 Chinese massacres trialconducted by British war crimes investigatorsin Singapore, Wai Keng Kwok [5] explains that,immediately after the trials, local Chinesesentiment truly sought a debt of blood or payback from Japan especially for those involved in

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the sook ching screenings who had otherwiseescaped justice. However, it was only in 1962,with the discovery of mass graves of severalhundred people killed during the occupation,that “blood debt” claims were actively pursued.Only by the 1960s was the debt seen inmonetary terms, as opposed to criminalindictment and justice.

Commencing in 1962, the Singapore ChineseChamber of Commerce (SCCC) launched avigorous campaign for reclaiming the “blooddebt” in the form of a cash payment fromJapan, arousing strong anti-Japanesecommunity sentiment. The Prime Minister,today Minister Mentor, Lee Kuan Yew alsopressed Japan on the reparations questionduring a visit to Tokyo in May 1963. With theinauguration of the Federation of Malaysia andthen Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman’s sendorsement of the claims, the campaignextended to Kuala Lumpur. Lee's expressedconcerns were that, unless Tokyo made somekind of gesture as in the form of educationalsupport, then the atmosphere would neverbecome conducive to Japanese investment. AJapanese offer of about $5 million was declinedas “unrealistic, unimaginative and inadequate.”Tokyo answered that it would not negotiate ifconfronted with a “threatening attitude.” ASCCC-organized rally on 25 August attractedbetween 50,000-150,000 protesters. Tradeunions and representat ives from al lcommunities joined in. Seeking to head off theleft, especially as the left-wing oppositionBarisan Front had made capital out of the issueby calling the PAP soft on Japan, Lee himselfdelivered the keynote speech. As Australiandiplomats interpreted the situation, Lee was ina bind. On the one hand, he threatened Japan“to come to terms with us or lose the Malaysianmarket.” On the other hand, he was obviouslyaware of the importance of Japan's managerialassistance and investment necessary to launchSingapore's industrialization. With no responsefrom Tokyo by 23 September, an imposeddeadline, a Working Committee endorsed a

five-day boycott on Japanese shipping andairlines. With Lee calling for the transfer of theJapanese Ambassador in Singapore,negotiations shifted to Kuala Lumpur and therethe matter temporarily rested. [6]

The Blood Debt was officially settled on 26October 1966 when Japan pledged $25 millionin grants and a similar amount in special loansas quasi-reparations. Even so, according toWai, [7] the SCCP remained indignant as theyhad not been consulted. While the Japanesebusiness profile in Singapore would soar overthe years, the PAP-state continues to micro-manage memory of the war, through textbooks,monuments and museums. Singaporeans of allcommunities are rather well apprised of mostaspects of the Japanese wartime occupation.Most Singaporean school children can point tobattle sites and execution grounds. They canalso name heroes of various races lost indefense of the island, though probably few areaware of the role of communist youth workingalongside the British.

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Civilian war monument

At the same time, the state keeps a tight lid onany overt public expressions of anger at Japansuch as transpired in 1963. Nor does the stateraise vexing war memory issues with Tokyo asdoes China and Korea. For example, communityindignation in Singapore against Japan'swartime actions never reached the heights ofChina when, in April 2005, mobs attackedJapanese property in Shanghai and other citiesin protest at the then Japanese Prime Minister'scontroversial visit to a shrine honoring warcriminals. Nevertheless, on that occasion,Chinese community organizations in bothSingapore and Malaysia rallied in solidarity. Bythe 1990s, as Wai [8] explains, public sentimenthad shifted towards seeking an official apology.

The Demise of Nanyang University

The Nanyang University story nicelyencapsulates the role of the ascendant PAP-

state in shifting identities of the majorityChinese population away from engagementwith the politics of homeland to a Singaporeanidentity in the making. Nantah as the universityis known locally, was conceived in the early1950s in part to create a learning space forstudents denied the possibility to study inChina. While Nantah's debut in 1956 as thefirst and only Chinese-medium university inSoutheast Asia had been contested by theBritish, its end in 1980 was at the hands of thePAP-state.

As the former Malaysia-based writer Han Suyin[9] related, Nantah and its students andgraduates were exposed to considerable“prejudice and discrimination” under theBritish during its 25 year history. Its degreeswere only given official recognition in 1966.Notably, the Special Branch routinely censoredand confiscated books and magazinesemanating from China. Their possession was acrime. When China became “red” all contactswere forbidden and student returnees weredenied re-entry into Malaya or Singapore.These years also witnessed considerable pro-China activism on the part of Chinese middleschool students. The status of unregulatedChinese private schools was tolerated up until1949, but thereafter the government soughtcontrol. While the British promoted the Englishmedium University of Singapore, two-thirds ofchildren in early postwar Singapore attendedChinese schools. Careers in administrationmassively favored the English educated and theChinese resented this discrimination. Even theshort-lived appointment of Lin Yutang, an anti-communist (pro KMT) chancellor for Nantah,did not appease British opinion – inherited bythe PAP-state – that Nantah was a hotbed ofboth Chinese chauvinism and communism. By1974, Nantah was pushed to become anEnglish medium university and fully convertedto English in 1978 prior to its eventualabsorption in 1980 as the National Universityof Singapore with its campus at Bukit Tinggi.By 1978, if not earlier, however, the ratio of

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enrollment in English versus Chinese mediumschools in Singapore had been reversed. Whilethe Singapore government ascribes thisremarkable shift to parental preference, thetruth of the matter is that the very existence ofNantah subverted the PAP-state's vision ofSingaporean identity. But Nantah was notalone in being targeted. One by one theChinese schools were merged or closed andjobless Chinese school teachers emigrated orwent into business. More than a few Nantahgraduates fell foul of the ISA. Chinese languagenewspapers were equally emasculated. Nantahand what it stood for – namely huaqiao pride –was undoubted ly seen by PAP as anembarrassment in the campaign for mergerwith Malaya.

The reinvention of Nantah in the early 2000swith the creation of a namesake hardlyredeems the legacy of the former University. Asone blogger aptly stated the matter, thenamesake would fail a DNA test on lineage.Neither would backhanded compliments toNantah graduates for their “Chinesesness andConfucianist values“ echo the vision of theChinese guilds and clan associations whosponsored the original. It is not the place of thisessay to trace the rise of a new multiculturaland multi-lingual Singapore with English as thelanguage of professional esteem, but suffice itto mention that the “Chineseness” of the past –as symbolized by Nantah and the ChineseMiddle schools – has been relegated to history,stripped of their militant anti-colonialism and,with some qualification, their Chinesechauvinism and pro-China orientation as well.

The Marxist Plot Affair of 1987

Also revealing of shifting identities in a sociallyengineered space, as much as a sense ofmanufactured crisis, was the arrests under theISA on 21 May 1987 of 16 individuals, men andwomen, accused of plotting to overthrow thegovernment and, vaguely, using communistunited front tactics to establish a Marxist state.

Six more were subsequently arrested includingteachers and students of Singapore Polytechnicunconnected with the former group. At theheart of the former group were members of theCatholic church. Others swept up includedaffiliated members of Third Stage, an English-language social theater group active in supportof the plight of Filipina domestics, while theleading conspirator fingered was the owner of aso-called Marxist book shop. Even theAmerican Embassy was targeted as part of thisChristian-Marxist conspiracy under the chargeof “foreign interference.” Incredibly, in a statewhere even unauthorized assemblies of peopleare strictly prohibited, a demonstration outsidethe American Embassy railing againstAmerican “interference” was allowed to run itscourse. The Home Minister went further inseeking to link the principal suspect, formerSingapore student leader living in exile in theUK, Tan Wah Piow, with a Marxist professor,the Khmer Rouge, the Viet Cong, and otherliberation fronts and Marxist regimes. [10]

Marxist plot revealed

If the charges and consequences were not soserious, then the representation of the “Marxistplot” in the city-state's controlled media couldalso be lampooned as risible in its crudeattempt to concoct a conspiracy. The principalconspirator, for example, was subject to atelevised confession, while the full panoply of

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the print media demonized the allegedconspirators as if no other news mattered. Evenupon release in September 1987 after sevenmonths in detention, all but one of the groupwere re -arres ted in Apr i l 1988 andincarcerated for recanting their confessions.More than that, they claimed to have beentortured. [11]

The case also cast light upon Singapore's mediamanagement including the international media.The Home Affairs Ministry claimed that themedia, including three Hong Kong publications,had conducted a “hysterical campaign” againstthe Singapore government, blaming foreignersfor orchestrating the dissident Singaporeans toissue the torture statement. In reprisal, thegovernment issued circulation restrictions onthe Far Eastern Economic Review, formerAsiaweek magazine, and the Asian Wall StreetJournal. [12] Defamation suits would followagainst foreign news magazines and theireditors over the years. Tan Wah Piow [13]chose Malaysia to launch a rebuttal, statingthat he never sought to effect change inSingapore by means that were unlawful.

The story is also told by the former AttorneyGeneral, Francis Seow [14] in a kiss and tellbook. One of a clutch of high flying PAP-defectors, the Attorney-General, ex-President ofthe Law Society turned opposition candidate,was himself arrested under the ISA andinvestigated for alleged foreign interference inSingapore's internal affairs at the criticalmoment he was offering legal aid to the“plotters.” All that was missing in thisegregious case of judicial overkill were thesevered heads. Another PAP giant fallen fromgrace was former President C.V. Devan Nairwho began to go public with “scathing”denunc ia t ions o f the government ' sauthoritarian political style in a speech tograduates at the National University ofSingapore on 23 June 1987. Rare in publicdiscourse in the island republic, he assertedthat “public disenchantment seems to have

been growing in direct proportion to what areseen as attempts to acquire monopoly controlover the formation of public opinion andresponses on a variety of issues.” [15] Anembittered Nair would subsequently followSeow into “exile” in North America.

It is notable, however, that the number ofSingapore citizens describing themselves asChristians doubled from 10 to 19 per centbetween 1980 and 1988. New converts aremostly Chinese drawn from white-collaroccupations. While Protestant churches inSingapore generally come under the umbrellaof the National Council of Churches ofSingapore, some youth have been attracted toevangelical and/or charismatic churches.Around one third of parliamentarians areChristian. But what appeared to be anathemato the authorities in the “Marxist plot” case wasthe professed liberation theology of the smallgroup of Catholic Christians from theminuscule, albeit historically rooted communityrepresenting just 4 percent of Singapore'spopulation. Across the causeway, the Malaysianauthorities also – incredulously – claimed tohave uncovered “Marxist and Christian” groupssubscribing to liberation theology and, onanother front, church groups seeking toChristianize Malays. [16] If there was aconvergence of understanding betweenSingapore and Malaysia on the nature of thethreat then it would not be surprising givenrevelations that, up until a pact was drawn upin 1978, each side actively penetrated eachother's intelligence services. [17] With itstransnational connections and its universalistictheology, the lay Catholic activists in the fieldof labor rights for exploited domesticsunquestionably challenged the PAP-state’ssense of its proprietary ownership of state andcivil society, echoing the French Sun King'sepigrammatic declaration l’état c'est moi.

One sequel to the 1987 plot combined with asense that rising religious revivalism wascommon to all the major faiths represented in

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Singapore was passage of the Maintenance ofReligious Harmony Act (March 1992). As Khun[18] explains, for very good reason the Actdisallowed ill-will or hostility between differentreligious groups but, additionally, it buttressedthe determination of the government – no doubtwith the “liberation theologists” in mind – tofirmly separate church and state.

Capital Punishment/Global Cop

Capital punishment is frequently justified aspunishment in the case of heinous crimes, butalso as a deterrent to crime. How this hasplayed out in Singapore and throughout Asia?In the East Asia region only two legaljurisdictions have historically eschewed thedeath penalty, namely the former Portuguesecolonies of Macau and East Timor. Portugalabolished the death penalty in 1867. OtherAsian countries joining the abolitionist campare Cambodia (1989), Hong Kong (1993),Bhutan (2004), and, in 2006, the Philippines,with another group of Asian countriesabolitionist in practice in line with the globaltrend towards abolition. The retention bySingapore (and Malaysia) of colonial eralegislation relating to the death penalty thenshould not surprise, but it does. [19] Murder,kidnapping, treason, and certain firearms casesare all capital offenses in Singapore. Whileopiate use among especially elderly Chinesehad a long history in Singapore and, whileopium divans operated semi-legally throughuntil the mid-1970s, tolerance turned tointolerance with the rapid passage of theMisuse of Drugs Act of 1973 [revised editions].Under the Act, the death sentence was mademandatory for possession of, for example, morethan 15 grams of heroin, 30 grams of cocaine,or 500 grams of marijuana. The Act thuscreates a presumption of trafficking. The Act[Part II 8A] also places a heavy burden on theaccused to prove innocence. Even Singaporecitizens consuming a drug outside the countrycan be held liable “as if that offense had beencommitted within Singapore.” This is all the

more remarkable given the complex valuesystems regarding opiate use in colonial andeven early post-colonial Singapore. NoormanAbdullah [20] is one who has exposed theactive construction of illicit drug use inSingapore as a social problem.

It was not until the 2005 execution of aVietnam-born Australian drug smuggler thatvital statistics relating to capital punishment inSingapore reached public knowledge. Notably,the hangman in the employ of the state let it beknown that, over 46 years, he had carried out850 hangings. Earlier, in reply to a questionasked in parliament, it became known that 340people were executed between 1991 and 2000[420 between 1991 and 2009]. It is believedthat 70 percent of hangings are for drugoffenses, with 22 hung for drug smuggling in2001 and 17 the year before. But not allsentences and executions are reported publicly.It would appear from a range of media reportsthat, as with the Australian hung in 2005, asignificant percentage of the executed wereforeigners apprehended in transit at Changiairport. Clemency appeals have seldom beenheeded and diplomatic campaigns haveinevitably stalled.

In 1968, the execution of two Indonesianmarines deemed “saboteurs” who infiltratedthe city-state during the “war of confrontation”sparked anti-Chinese race riots acrossIndonesia. But drug cases have also arousedinternational indignation. For example, in 1995,the President of Portugal, Mario Soares,unsuccessfully sought clemency for a 25-yearold Singaporean woman executed for drugsmuggling (then one of three women executedfor drug offenses including two aged 18 at thetime of their crimes). Even non-drug cases havesparked emotions. In 1994, the Philippinesgovernment called for retaliatory actionsagainst Singapore for failing to grant a stay ofexecution for a Filipina convicted in a murdercase.

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According to Amnesty International, [21Singapore leads the world in executions puttingto death more people than Saudi Arabia, China,and Sierra Leone on a per capita basis. Thegrim statistics appear to belie the official claimthat capital punishment serves as a deterrent,especially in drug cases. In any case, debate oncapital punishment has largely been drivenunderground in the era of the “war onterrorism”.

The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests of 2002 Whilethe PAP-state was defensive over the retentionof the ISA in the wake of the Marxist Plot affair,local and international responses to the 2001“September 11” terror attacks in the UnitedStates has seen more than one Western countryintroduce forms of preventive detention thatrival or exceed those of Singapore. The U.S.-run Guantanamo prison is one that readilycomes to mind. No doubt the announcement inDecember 2001 that 15 members o fSingapore's Islamic community had beendetained under the ISA for plotting to bombstrategic targets in Singapore, followed by thedetention of a further 21 persons in August2002, was greeted with satisfaction by the U.S.and its allies in the war on terror. Domestically,the arrests were described as exposing themost serious threat posed to Singapore'ssecurity since the days of the MalayanCommunist Party (although that is a chimera aswell, especially as the distant rural-basedguerrillas offered no demonstrable threat tourban Singapore).

As identified in a government White Paper, [22]the plotters comprised the Singapore chapterof the Al Qaeda-linked Southeast Asia-basedJemaah Islamiyah (JI), the group blamed for the2002 Bali bombing and other outrages. Asconfirmed by evidence seized in Afghanistan,even before the 9/11event, the clandestinegroup had identified strategic targets inSingapore, including the crucial water pipelinefrom Johor state in Malaysia along withWestern embassies and other interests. Albeit

without elaboration or documentation, theWhite Paper also traced the roots of JI back tothe Darul Islam movement in Indonesia in the1940s, its revival in the 1980s, and regroupingof exiles in Malaysia. Altogether, thosedetained offer a mixed group of local Muslims,reflecting the complex ethnic-linguisticpatterning of Singaporean society. Led byTaliban-trained Ibrahim Maidin, they wereidentified as, variously, Malay, Pakistani,Indian, Arab, Javanese and Boyanese, andMalayalee. The majority had grown up inSingapore and had gone through compulsory“national service” or military training. Theywere also seen to have deviated from majorityMuslim community norms by embracing asense of brotherhood transcending ethnicityand national boundaries in a way that wouldhave been unthinkable even for the fiercely“nationalistic” Malayan communists with theirfocus on reclaiming the “Malayan” state.

Be that as it may, the Singapore JI chapter wasdescribed as owing its existence to complexnetworks ranging from Afghanistan to thesouthern Philippines, to Aceh and southernThailand. In this account, the language of jihadand the propensity for violence separated thisgeneration of Islamic activists from itsforebears. For Singapore, the JI is seen as notonly threatening communal harmony at a timewhen Islamic concerns have deepened amongthe 15 percent of the community who identifythemselves as Muslim, but also threaten tocompromise relations between Malaysia andSingapore, testy at the best of times sinceseparation. As then Singapore Prime MinisterGoh Chok Tong lectured Washington in 2004,the war against Islamic terrorism is anideological struggle even more complex thanthat against the communists because itengages not only reason but faith. [23]

Besides the Darul Islam allusion, the WhitePaper also observed that the outlawed“terrorist” group extolled a vision of a DaulahIslamiya Nusantara or an archipelago-wide

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Islamic state. While short on analysis and, evenunderstanding, the question may reasonably beasked whether JI plausibly harks back to earlierversions of Islamic pan-Malayanism andwhether a call for restoration of the Caliphatelinking all Islamic communities globally is notwithout local historical precedent. The answeris not so straight forward given the primaryhistorical loyalty of Malay Muslims to theirSultans and their negeri or sense of specificbounded cultural space. First, the world ofrajas and Sultanates such as characterized theSoutheast Asian region, seldom accepted an all-embracing caliphate. Second, while there aremany who would place ummat over state inways that fit the apparent JI vision, still othersseek to reclaim Islamic notions of stateotherwise lost to the modernizing secularistelites who came to dominate post-colonialSingapore, Malaysia and Indonesia alike. [24]

The Great JI Escape and Recapture of2008-2009

Visitors to Singapore through most of 2008-early 2009 would have been struck by theubiquitous presence of wanted posters ofenemy number one, the escaped JI/Al Qaedaleader, Mas Selamat Kastari. A Singaporean ofIndonesian origin, Selamat was alleged to haveplotted to hijack a plane with the intention ofcrashing it into Singapore's internationalairport . Head of JI in Singapore, andcommanding a five-man cell, Selamat wasoriginally apprehended by Indonesianauthorities in east Java and deported toSingapore in 2006. Pending investigations,Selamat escaped from a high security detentioncenter in Singapore in February 2008 bywriggling out of a bathroom window.“Bathroom break” humor and other ribaldresponses at government ineptness became apopular staple, as weblogs and other internetsources demonstrate. A matter of highembarrassment for the Republic of Singapore,recriminations reached the person of the HomeMin i s te r . He surv i ved , bu t no t the

superintendent of the prison and other flunkies.The general public also had good reason to beconcerned at the lapse of state securityincluding the failure on the part of securityforces to capture the fugitive in the largestsuch exercise ever mounted in the islandRepublic. Adding to these concerns, even ifSelamat's escape was not an inside job, heevidently found good cover among his co-religionists in Singapore before crossing intoMalaysia's Johor state and going underground.

Almost one year later, on 1 April 2009, Selamatwas arrested in Johor under the Malaysian ISA,which allows for detention without trial for upto two years (extendable). Although Singaporerequested his extradition, Malaysia hasdeclined ostensibly owing to ongoinginvestigations into his terrorist networks. On 25June 2009, Malaysian police detained a furtherthree terror suspects under the ISA allegedlyfor conniving with Mas Selamat to revive JI'sactivities in Malaysia. [25] The final fugitive ofSelamat's original Singapore-based cell,Husaini Ismail, was arrested in central Java inJune 2009 by the Indonesian authoritiesreportedly acting upon information supplied bythe Singaporeans.

Cyberwars in Singapore (and Malaysia)

One party and one party-dominant states, ofwhich there are numerous examplesthroughout East-Southeast Asia, have much tofear of the subversive potential of the Internet,just as the new technology is indispensable inthe present age. To wit, while researching thisarticle, the following news item swam intoview: “Malaysia tells media to ignore onlinenews sites.” [26] Reading on, it appears that aMalaysian government security ministrycircular of 15 March 2007 instructed topeditors of a dozen newspapers and fivete lev is ion s ta t ions not to “g ive anyconsideration whatsoever” to anti-governmentmaterial posted online. Apparently, theMinistry’s circular was first exposed by the

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i n d e p e n d e n t o n l i n e m a g a z i n eMalaysiakini.com, just as a Minister hadlabeled bloggers as purveyors of ceritadonggeng (myths). So, just who is leading andwho is lagging in this cyber arena? Accordingto Reporters without Borders, in Singapore,“The Internet is censored along with thetraditional media, but the government was oneof the f irst in the world to real ize i tsimportance as a means of dissent by civilsociety. It began regulating Internet activity in1999 and the 11 September 2001 attacksspeeded up an already advanced process.” [27]

More or less, this is the ground staked out byCherian George in his Contentious Journalismand the Internet. [28] George places cybermedia management in Singapore and Malaysiaunder the microscope, describing state-mediarelations in these two countries, especiallyafter the arrival of the Internet. In Malaysia,the arrest at the outset of the Asian financialcrisis of then deputy prime minister, AnwarIbrahim sparked frenetic cyber forum activityin that country. No such reformasi or reformmovement touched Singapore where cyberdevelopments took other form. [29] InIndonesia, we observe, cyber activism did makea difference in the events surrounding thedownfall of the Indonesian New Ordergovernment of President Suharto as the Asianfinancial crisis started to bite. George describessuch Internet-based alternative media as“contentious journalism.” Joining the publicdebate on contemporary issues, they arecontentious because they challenge nationalelites.

The first case from Singapore discussed byGeorge is Sintercom, a website which straddledthe pre- and post-regulation periods,transforming itself from a newsgroup forum onSingapore issues to a website. Mildlycontentious, and at first hosted offshore by agroup of U.S.-based graduate students, themigration of the site to Singapore saw itsunregulated space suddenly subject to the first

regulations beginning in July 1996. Eventhough this group built networks with thegovernment, within a year the site had closed.The second case he examined was ThinkCenter-turned website founded by a “colorfulactivist” whose style went further than theother cases in actually practicing alternativejournalism, such as in publicizing policeinvestigations into their role. “Watching thewatchers,” as Think Center conceived its role,was undoubtedly a significant phase in the lifeof this circle of socially concerned activists and,indeed, in recent Singapore media history.Think Center, too, quickly fell foul of theauthorities as it sought to confront a gamut ofnew regulations restricting web content. [30]

Needless to say, since George conducted hisresearch, the Singapore globosphere hasmoved on. New audiences have swum intoview, and new technology has arrived includingpodcasts and 3G mobiles (Singapore boasts99.8 percent cellular penetration), just as newlines of attack have presented themselves. Astracked by such international organizations asReporters Without Borders, the cyber warcontinues unabated with the screws beingtightened on the regulatory environment.Drawing comparison with the infamous ISA, inNovember 2002, the Computer Misuse Act waspassed by parliament to authorize completesurveillance of all Internet users through real-time software and legalizing arrest before anyoffense is committed. “Cyber-criminals” cannow be imprisoned for up to three years.Ominously, on 6 September 2003, the onlineforum Singapore Review, which carriedcriticism of the government, was hacked. AsReporters without Borders sums up, theInternet in Singapore today is virtually devoidof political content and dissent only occurs onwebsites and discussion forums hosted outsidethe country. [31]

The first case from Malaysia discussed byGeorge is that of Harakah, the cyber version ofthe leading opposition party Parti Islam’s (PAS)

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big-selling newspaper. The second Malaysiancase is that of Malaysiakini.com, as mentionedabove, perhaps the best known of the“contentious journalism” sites in these twocountries. Ultimately, George finds greaterspace in Malaysia for contentious journalism(after all Malyasia.kini survives and flourishesin impressive four-language format). [32] Thisassessment should not be surprising givenSingapore's entrenched one-party dominantsystem in contrast to Malaysia's increasinglyvulnerable ruling coalition government, albeit asystem in which one party has managed todominate (also through state management ofthe media). Even so, Malaysian bloggers suchas UK-born Raja Petra bin Raja Kamarudin,scion of the royal house of Selangor, have notbeen immune to the application of repressivelegislation. Editor of Malaysia Today newsportal, a website advocating transparency andaccountability in government, Raja Petra hasbeen twice detained under the ISA (mostrecently between September-November 2008allegedly for defaming Islam) although alsoreleased by a high court ruling calling intoquestion the scope of the ISA law under whichhe was detained. In October 2008 Raja Petraalso faced sedition charges for allegedlyimplying on his website that the person whowas the then deputy prime minister of Malaysia(current prime minister) and his wife wereinvolved in the murder of a Mongolian model invery murky circumstances. This was one of thefirst criminal cases against a blogger inMalaysia. Also facing defamation charges, the“royal blogger” has gone into hiding to avoidwhat he apparently fears is another arrestunder the ISA. [33]

Both countries, as mentioned, enforcepreventive detention laws and journalists havebeen victims in both countries. George seesMalaysia as more overtly coercive, at leastclumsy (as in the Anwar Ibrahim affair),although Singapore and Malaysia both practicesignificant behind-the-scenes prior restraintover website content. Above all, George

confirms what governments also know, thatcyber space as such is not without bounds butis rooted in real-world communities, at least forpractitioners of alternative journalism. Georgealso makes the case that all sides, whether“hypocrites or heretics,” purport to believe indemocracy. He is optimistic that Internetculture has strengthened media diversity andthat pluralism will prevail. Well, maybe not forindividual practitioners, but for the collectivegood, even if only incrementally. [34] On theother hand, expatriated Singaporean JamesGomez, writing from insider knowledge on theuse of the internet by opposition parties inSingapore, is dubious as to their ability to gainelectoral advantage from the new mediabeyond a certain “outreach.” [35]

Envoi

A tour of west Malaysia in June 2009 byMinister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew, the first in adecade, had pundits and bloggers wonderingabout his real agenda; whether buttering upthe Malaysian opposition, including thespiritual leader of the Islamist PAS along withthe leader of the Democratic Action Party oncetwinned with Singapore's PAP, or just makingcourtesy calls on Sultans and ruling figures.This was no “trip down memory lane,” as billed,but called up a long agenda of outstandingissues between the two countries, from waterto landfill, possibly also including the terrorquestion. Some media comment also ran to thescurrilous, with former Malaysian primeminister Mahathir Mohamad, who declined ameeting with Lee, comparing the elderstatesman to a visiting Chinese emperor andlikening Singapore to a “modern MiddleKingdom.” [36] Those with longer memorieswill recall that, back in 1963-65, PAP's electoralmeddling in Malaysia was one of the factorsthat led to Singapore's expulsion from theFederation.

Pro-active as ever, between 6-18 July 2009,Singapore staged an anti-terror drill involving

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2,000 participants from 15 state agenciesincluding the Armed Forces simulating thedeadly Mumbai attacks of November 2008. Nodoubt such prudence was confirmed by the 17July 2008 terror bombings of the J.W. Marriottand Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta, just as closerregional cooperation appears to be the key toeliminating the terror scourge. While fewoutside of a fringe group would wish to see arevival of JI, a larger and larger chorus ofvoices on both sides of the causeway separatingMalaysia from Singapore reject the premise ofbeing hostage in perpetuity to outdatedcolonial-era ISA legislation under whichlegitimate voices have also been silenced. [37]Better intelligence sharing, better policing is nodoubt in order in the quest to neutralize JI andtheir ilk. But, equally urgent is the need formore responsive and accountable governancein line with popular aspirations across theregion to build stronger and more open civilsociety and social fabric.

Geoffrey Gunn is author of Singapore and theA s i a n R e v o l u t i o n s(http://www.selectbooks.com.sg/getTitle.aspx?SBNum=045001), 2008 and an Asia-PacificJournal coordinator.He wrote this article for The Asia-PacificJournal.

Recommended citation:Geoffrey Gunn,"Singapore: The Past in the Present," The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 33-4-09, August 17, 2009.

In countries where there are treatment centersdedicated to helping out drug addicts, it isgenerally understood that a rehab program isthe third part of the addiction rehabilitationprocess (http://www.rehabs.com/).

Notes

[1] Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, KanishkaJayasuriya, and David M. Jones, TowardsIlliberal Democracy in Pacific Asia, St. Martin'sPress, New York, 1985.[2] For example, see Garry Rodan, The Political

Economy of Singapore’s Industrialisation:National State and International Capital(Macmi l lan , London 1988) , and h i sTransparency and Authoritarian Rule inSoutheast Asia: (Singapore and Malaysia,RoutledgeCurzon, London, 2004). See alsoTerence Chong, “Embodying Society’s Best:Hegel and the Singapore State,” Journal ofContemporary Asia, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2006, pp.283-304.[3] Terence Chong, “Asian Values andConfucian Ethics: Malay Singaporeans'Dilemma,” Journal of Contemporary Asia,Vol.32, no.3, 2002, pp.394-406.[4] For a Japanese literature survey, seeHayashi Hirofumi, “The Battle of Singapore,the Massacre of Chinese and Understanding ofthe Issue in Postwar Japan,” The Asia-PacificJournal, Vol. 28-4-09, July 13, 2009. For anofficialized Singapore view of the occupation,see anon, The Japanese Occupation: Singapore1942-1945, National Archives/FederalPublications, Singapore 1985. See my,“Remembering the Southeast Asian ChineseMassacres of 1941-1945,” Journal ofContemporary Asia, Vol. 37, No. 3, August2007, pp. 273-291. Also see Vivienne Blaxell,“New Shonan and Asianism in Japanese-eraSingapore” The Asia-Pacific Journal, January23, 2008.[5] Wai Keng Kwok, “Justice Done? Criminaland Moral Responsibility Issues in the ChineseMassacres Trial Singapore 1947,” YaleUniversity Genocide Studies Program WorkingPaper No.18, Yale University, New Haven,2001.[6] National Archives of Australia (NAA) A18383024/11/89 Part 1 P.J. Curtis to Depart. ofExternal Affairs, Canberra, 4 October 1963.[7] Wai, Justice Done?[8] Wai, Justice Done?[9] Han Suyin, My House has Two Doors,Jonathan Cape, London, 1980.[10] S. Jayakumar cited in Straits Times 6 July1987.[11] Bangkok Post, 19 April 1998.[12] South China Morning Post, 30 April 1986.

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[13] Tan Wah Piow, Let the People Judge:Confessions of the most wanted person inSingapore, Institut Analisa Social (INSAN),Kuala Lumpur, 1987.[14] Francis T. Seow, To Catch a Tartar: ADissident in Lee Kuan Yew's Prison, Monograph42, Yale Southeast Asia Studies, New Haven,1994.[15] Straits Times, 24 June 1987.[16] cf. Straits Times, 24 March 1998, p.9.[17] Straits Times, 24 August 1988.[18] Khun Eng Kuah, “Maintaining ethnicreligious harmony in Singapore,” Journal ofContemporary Asia, Vol.28, no.1, March, 1998,pp.103-21.[19] On the Malaysian case, see “Death and theS t a t e i n M a l a y s i a ”(http://books.google.com/books?id=55mXS56nMPkC&pg=PA115&lpg=PA115&dq=%22death+and+the+state%22+malaysia+gunn&source=bl&ots=aupdZaHBi2&sig=ACzTold8Ffhnyy4VvhplMyeN_3Y&hl=en&ei=LolmStihBqbW6gPWwbUt&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2) in author's New World Hegemony in theMalay Wor ld (Red Sea Press , 2005 ,pp.115-128).[20] Noorman Abdul lah, “Explor ingConstructions of the 'Drug Problem' inHistorical and Contemporary Singapore,” NewZealand Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.7, No.2,December 2005, pp.40-70.[21] For example, see Amnesty International,“Document: Singapore executions sinceDecember de fy g l oba l t r end , ” ASA36/002/2009, 13 January 2009.[22] White Paper: The Jemaah IslamiyahArrests and the Threat of Terrorism, Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Phoenix Park, Singapore, 2003.[23] Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong's Speech tothe Council on Foreign Relations in WashingtonDC on 6 May 2004 at 12 Noon, “BeyondMadrid: Winning the War Against Terrorism”(http://mfa.gov.sg/sanfrancisco/cfr6may.html)downloaded 26 October 2005.[24] The complexities of translating MiddleEastern Islamic idiom into local Indonesian-Malay Islamic parlance is well explained by

M i c h a e l L a f f a n(https://apjjf.org/http/www.anu/edu.au.asianstudies/mcp/mmp/laffan_apc.html), ”DispersingGod's Shadows: Reflections on the Translationof Arabic political concepts into Malay andIndonesian.”[25] “Malaysia arrests 3 JI militants,” StraitsTimes, 3 July 2009.[26] South China Morning Post, 19 March2007.[27] For the Reporters Without Borders site,c l i c k h e r e(http://arabia.reporters-sans-frontieres.org/article.php3?id_article=10771).[28] Cherian George, Contentious Journalismand the Internet: Towards DemocraticDiscourse in Malaysia and Singapore,(Singapore University Press, Singapore, 2006),reviewed by the author in Journal ofContemporary Asia (vol.38, no.4, November2008, pp.656-57), offered here in paraphraseonly.[29] For analysis on the early days of Internetmanagement in Singapore, see Gary Rodan,"The Internet and Political Control in Singapore(pdf file)" Political Science Quarterly 113(Spring 1998). For the website of the officialSingapore regulatory Media DevelopmentAuthority, click here (http://www.mda.gov.sg).[30] George, Contentious Journalism. The ThinkC e n t r e s i t e c a n b e f o u n d h e r e(http://www.thinkcentre.org).[31] The online forum Singapore Review can bef o u n d h e r e(http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Sg_Review).[32] George, Contentious Journalism.[33] For the Wikipedia entry telling of thist o r t u r e d s t o r y , c l i c k h e r e(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raja_Petra_Kamarudin).[34] George, Contentious Journalism.[35] James Gomez, “Online Opposition inSingapore: Communications Outreach WithoutElectoral Gain,“ Journal of Contemporary Asia,vol.28, no.4, November 2008, pp.591-612.[36] Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, “The ModernMiddle Kingdom,”

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[37] At least that is the case in Malaysia wherea rally against the ISA on 1 August 2009attracted some 20,000 people, the largestmobilization since 2007 when members of theIndian community demonstrated againstdiscrimination. Attracting civil libertariansalong with opposition party members, PASincluded, the rally led to the arrests for “illegalassembly” of some 600 amidst a heavy-handed

police crackdown. It appeared to some thatincoming Malaysian Prime Minister NajibRazak had backtracked on pledges to reviewthe ISA legislation. See Thomas Fuller,“Malaysia Arrests Put in Question Vow ofR i g h t s , ”(http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/03/world/asia/03malaysia.html) The New York Times, 2August 2009.

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