sixto s. brillantes, jr., et.al. vs. comelec digest

8/10/2019 Sixto s. Brillantes, Jr., Et.al. vs. Comelec Digest

1/23

G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., et.al, petitioner, VS. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondent.(Digest by Ali CarononganSourced from class digest)

FACTS :

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436

authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system

(AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and

canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local

elections. It also required the COMELEC to acquire automated

counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices andmaterials and adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.

The COMELEC initially intended to implement the said automation

during the May 11, 1998 presidential elections, particularly in

counting the votes collected from the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao (ARMM). However, the failure of the machines to

correctly read a number of automated ballots discontinued its

implementation.

Contributions for the establishment of the AES persisted that even

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172

on January 24, 2003, allocating the sum of P2,500,000,000 to

exclusively fund the AES in time for the May 10, 2004 elections. On

February 10, 2003, upon the request of the COMELEC, President

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 175 authorizing

the release of a further supplemental P500 million budget for the AES

project of the COMELEC.

The Supreme Court resolved the COMELEC to maintain the old and

manual voting and counting system for the May 10, 2004 elections

after contract negations with companies Mega Pacific Consortium

(the supplier of the computerized voting/counting machines) were

discontinued. Despite this impediment, the COMELEC nevertheless

continued the electronic transmission of advanced unofficial results


2/23

of the 2004 elections for national, provincial and municipal positions,

also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioner contends that the respondent COMELEC committed grave

abuse of discretion amounting to excess of Jurisdiction in the

issuance of Resolution No. 6712. Respondent COMELEC contends

that its advancement in tabulation procedures is allowed within the

statutory confines of section 52 (i) of the Omnibus Election Code

that:

Prescribe(s) the use or adoption of the latest technological and

electronic devices, taking into account the situation prevailing in the

area and the funds available for the purpose. Provided, That theCommission shall notify the authorized representatives of accredited

political parties and candidates in areas affected by the use or

adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty

days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 issued by the

COMELEC in authorizing the use of election funds in consolidating

the election results for the May 10, 2004 elections should be declaredVOID, as it is unconstitutional.

HELD:

YES. For violating section 4 of Article VII. The said Resolution No. 6712

preempts the sole authority of the Congress to canvass the votes of

the election returns for the President and the Vice-President.

REASONS:

Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the 1987: Resolution Preempts the sole and exclusive

authority vested in the Congress to canvass the votes for the election

of President and Vice-President. It is a grave error on the part of the

respondent to have ignored the misapprehensions addressed by


3/23

Senate President Franklin M. Drilon to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin

Abalos during the 2004 saying that such act would be in violation of

the Constitution (section 4 of Article VII):

"any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said

positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the votes of thePresident and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive

of the authority of Congress, but would also be lacking of any

constitutional authority."

The existence of an accredited Citizens arm: Under Section 27 of

Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and

reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, the accredited citizens

arm - in this case, NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use a copy

of the election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial" counting of

the votes, whether for the national or the local elections. No other

entity, including the respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized to use

a copy of the election returns for purposes of conducting an

"unofficial" count.

In addition, the second or third copy of the election returns, while

required to be delivered to the COMELEC under the said laws, are

not intended for undertaking an "unofficial" count. The said copies

are archived and unsealed only when needed by to verify election

results in connection with resolving election disputes that may beestablished.

Inapplicability of Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code: The

Court contends that Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code,

which is cited by the COMELEC as the statutory basis for the assailed

resolution, does not cover the use of the latest technological and

election devices for "unofficial" tabulations of votes. Moreover, the

COMELEC failed to notify the authorized representatives of

accredited political parties and all candidates in areas affected by

the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less

than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices,

after failing to submit any document proving that it had notified all

political parties of the intended adoption of Resolution No. 6712.


4/23

Lim vs. Pacquing [G.R. No. 115044. January 27, 1995]

16 Aug

Ponente: PADILLA,J.

FACTS:

The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18

June 1949 (R.A. No. 409).

On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued

transferring the authority toregulatejai-alais from local

government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).

On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of

Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled An

Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The

Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain

And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain

Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes.

On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by

then President Marcos. The decree, entitled Revoking All

Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant

Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By

The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota,

And Other Forms Of Gambling,in Section 3 thereof, expressly

revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local

governments.

In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried tooperate a Jai-Alai. The government through Games and

Amusement Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree No.

771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to

operate all forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local

governments. ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.


5/23

ISSUE:

Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and

non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.

HELD:

NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.

RATIO:

Presumption against unconstitutionality.There is nothing on record to

show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or

amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the

executive still exercised legislative powers).

Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued

existence of ADCs franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of

PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the

Courts First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot

have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only

the Court En Banchas that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of

the Constitution.

And on the question of whether or not the government

is estopped from contesting ADCs possession of a valid franchise,

the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by

the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents. (Republic v.

Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)

Board of Optometry v. Colet

a.Facts: 1995Congress enacted R.A. No. 8050 Revised

Optometry Law.Private respondents prayed before RTC Manilaa petition for declaratoryrelief and for prohibition and

injunction of R.A. No. 8050. They claimed thatR.A. 8050 was

unconstitutional on the grounds of derogation in thelegislative

process and vitiation of legislative consent; undue delegation

of legislative power and vitiation in the legislative process of the

said act. RTCManila granted the writ of preliminary injunction. In


6/23

their efforts to seekannulment of the said order, petitioners

Board of Optometry et al alleged thatthe respondents did not

have any legal existence or capacity to sue exceptfor

Acebedo Optical Co., Inc.b.

b.

Issue: WON private respondents have locus standi to questiontheconstitutionality of R.A. 8050.c.

c.Ruling: No. Private respondents have no legal standing to

question theconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8050. SC cited Art. 44 of

the Civil Code that anassociation is considered a juridical

person if the law grants it a personalityseparate and distinct

from its members. Otherwise, it cannot be a real partyin interest

in any civil action. When the private respondents failed to

provethe juridical personality of their associations and chose to

keep mum on thatissue, they have grossly disregarded Sec. 4Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.Thus, without juridical entity demerits

the private respondents to becomereal parties in interest.

Petitionersprayer for the writ of preliminary injunctionto be

annulled and set aside was granted

Fernandez v. Torres ||

J. Feliciano GR No. 102940 November 6, 1992

Doctrine:

Mere speculation/apprehension does not constitute a justiciable

controversy. Courts do not sitto adjudicate mere academic questions to

satisfy scholarly interest.

Facts:

There was a public agitation for a total ban on deployment of Filipino

entertainers abroad due tothe growing number of complaints from

entertainers and relatives about the exploitative workingconditions,

harassment, forcible detention, physical injuries, rape and even deathsuffered by female performing artists and entertainers abroad. The First

National Tripartite Conference for the Protection ofOverseas

Entertainers, attended by representatives from the government and the

labor sectors, was heldon November 18, 1991. The outcome of such

was the DOLE Circular No. 01-91 (dated November 20,1991) entitled


7/23

PrescribingAdditional Requirements, Conditions and Procedures for the

Deployment ofPerforming Artists

. Petitioners Fernandez, et.al. wish to prohibit and restrain the DOLE and POEA

fromenforcing and implementing Item No. 1 of the aforementioned circular,

citing it to be arbitrary, oppressiveand discriminatory against performingartists ages 18-22, who would otherwise be qualified for

overseasemployment, hence it violates the equal protection clause and

due process clause of the Constitution.

*For reference, Item No. 1 of the aforementioned circular states: "

1. No Filipino entertainer shall be deployedoutside the Philippines

except for legitimate performing artists consisting of musicians,

singers and members ofdance troupes. In all cases, the performing

artists must have a track record of legitimate and reputable

performancein the Philippines for at least one year. In no case shallthe performing artist be below 23 years old. The Secretaryof Labor

and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt performing

artists from coverage hereof .

Issue:

Whether or not the petition at bar presents a justiciable controversy

Ruling:

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the petition does not present

a justiciablecontroversy. Petitioners have failed to show the first requisite ofjudicial inquiry (i.e. the existence ofactual case or controversy) hence

the Court is resolved to DISMISS the petition.

Ratio:

Requisites for judicial review/judicial inquiry:

In actions involving constitutional issues, the firmlysettled rule is that a

constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the courts unless

thefollowing requirements of judicial inquiry are met:[1]

the existence of an actual case or controversy;[2]

the party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial

interest in theresolution thereof;[3]


8/23

the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and[4]

that the resolution of the constitutional issue must, be indispensable for the

finaldetermination of the controversy

the DOLE circular does not establish an absolute and comprehensive

prohibition of the deploymentabroad of entertainers below 23 years of age.

Item No.1 provides that the Sec. of Labor &employment may exempt

someone from the coverage of this law for justifiable reasons. Grounds

forsuch exemption are provided for in a set of Administrative Guidelines

Implementing Dept. Circular No. 01-91

The Court is not compelled to indulge in speculation that public respondent

would deny any and allapplications for exemption for coverage of DOLE

circular No. 01-91. It is presumed thatadministrative orders and

regulations are entitled to the presumption of constitutionality and,

that official duty has been or will be regularly performed.

"Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the lawwithdraw the permit of oneof petitioners does not constitute a

justiciable controversy.

(Phil. Association of Colleges and

Universities v. Secretary of Education)

Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly

interest therein, however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is

especially true where the issues reach constitutional dimensions, for thenthere comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of

constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion.' (Rice vs. Sioux City)


9/23

La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Assn vs Ramos Case Digest

G.R. No 127882

Facts :

On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive

Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept,

consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations

or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either

technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,

development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate

recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with

the foreign proponent.

On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No.

7942 to "govern the exploration, development, utilization and

processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes

of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure

for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal,

and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical

assistance agreements.

On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995

in Malaya and Manila Times, two newspapers of general circulation,

R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No.

7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an

FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South

Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.

On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued

DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known

as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was

later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on


10/23

December 20, 1996.

On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR

Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A.

No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from

receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or

act on petitioners' letter.

Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess

of jurisdiction.

They pray that the Court issue an order:

(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any

application for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements;

(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No.

7942 as unconstitutional and null and void;

(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the

Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative Order No. 96-

40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional

and null and void; and

(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement

issued to Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal

and null and void.

Issue :

Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional.

Ruling :

The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be

violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution and hereby

declares unconstitutional and void:


11/23

(1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to

wit:

Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall

be deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting an

exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or

mineral processing permit.

(2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an

exploration permittee, insofar as said section applies to a financial or

technical assistance agreement,

(3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a

financial or technical assistance agreement;

(4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every

financial or technical assistance agreement;

(5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and

technical assistance agreement to convert the same into a mineral

production-sharing agreement;

(6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing

permit to a contractor in a financial and technical assistance

agreement;

The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are

dependent on the foregoing provisions and cannot stand on their

own:

(1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it

applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement.

Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a


12/23

financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical

assistance agreements;

Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation

of financial or technical assistance agreement proposals;

Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance

agreements;

Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or

technical assistance agreements;

Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA;

The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for

the Government's share in a financial and technical assistance

agreement; and

Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs

insofar as it applies to said contractors;

When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and

connected as conditions, considerations, inducements, or

compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the

legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be

carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue

independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the

provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected,

must fall with them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.


13/23

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE

MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI,

respondents.

FACTS: A petition for prohibition and declaratory relief against R.A.

No. 7854, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly

Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati," was filed by

petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay,

Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang,

Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto

Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The

others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as

taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of

R.A. No. 7854.

ISSUES: Whether sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 are

unconstitutional.

RULING: The court finds no merit in the petition. Section 2 of R.A. No.

7854 clearly stated that the city's land area "shall comprise the

present territory of the municipality." Section 2 did not add, subtract,

divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. Hence, theterritorial bounds need not be made in metes and bounds with

technical description and does not violate sections 7 and 450 of the

Local Government Code. Also, at the time of the consideration of

R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of

Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out

of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of

government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the

courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute bymaking a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. The

contention on the constitutionality of section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 was

not entertained by the court since it did not comply the

requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of

a law which are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2)


14/23

the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;

(3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible

opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must

be necessary to the determination of the case itself. The petition is

premised on the occurrence of many contingent events which thisCourt has no jurisdiction and nor are they proper parties to raise this

abstract issue. On the constitutionality of section 51 of R.A. 7854,

which declares the addition of another legislative district in Makati,

the court refers to the case of Tobias vs. Abalos. In said case, the

court ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made

through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The

Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not

more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixedby law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress

from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a

general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done

by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase

in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment

can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a

review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local

government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situationwhere a new city or province created by Congress will be denied

legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. Even

granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood

at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still

be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement

of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). There is also no merit in the

contention of the title of the bill that it should expressly state the

addition of a legislative district. The Constitution does not command

that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely

catalogue all its details so as not to impede legislation. Hence, the

court ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title

expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to

such general subject." WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.


15/23

Summary of City of Los Angeles v Lyons

S. Ct. 1983

Facts: Adolph Lyons was stopped by LA police for a traffic violation,

and without any resistance, he was subdued by a choke hold. The

application caused damage to Mr. Lyons larynx. He subsequentlyfiled an action. Count V requested injunctive relief against the City

barring use of the control holds.

Issue:Whether Lyons satisfied the prerequisites for seeking injunctive

relief in the Federal Court?

Holding: No

Procedure: District Court granted judgment for City. Ct of App

reversed. Reversed by S. Ct.

Rule: Ripeness arises when an actual case has ripened or maturedinto a controversy worthy of adjudication.

Ct. Rationale: Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show

a present case or controversy. Lyons request depended upon

whether he was likely to suffer future injury from the use of

chokeholds by LA police officers for traffic stops. Lyons would have

to assert either the all police perform this way or that the City orders

them to perform.

Lyons case is not ripe because of the speculative nature of his

claim. Predictions of future behavior are beyond the courtsfunctions.

DISSENT: Whether Lyons can show that the Citys chokehold policy is

unconstitutional?

Lyons claim for damages gives him standing to sue, success therein

depends on his proving whether the conduct was

unconstitutional. Standing under Article III is established by an

allegation of threatened or actual injury. Lyons suffered an actual

past injury, as the findings of the District Ct show.

Pl A: Lyons should argue the actual injury and damages sufficient to

determine Case and Controversy.

Def A:The City should argue the policy is not aimed at all traffic

stops, only those where the officers safety is in question.


16/23

Professor Randolf S. David., et. Al vs Macapagal-Arroyo., et., al

G.R. No. 171396 03 May 2006 Ponente:

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

OVERVIEW:

This is a case of seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and

prohibition alleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017

and General Order No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse

of discretion.

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a

State of National Emergency invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the

1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also issued GO no. 5 AFP

and PNP to immediately carry out appropriate actions to suppress

and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of

the same. She did so citing the following bases:

The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left (NDF-CPP-

NPA) and Extreme Right are now in alliance threatening to

bring down the President;

Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely

affecting the economy thus representing clear and present

danger to the safety and integrity of the State

A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021. It must be

noted that before the said proclamations, the following course of

events ensued:

February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled

Oplan Hackle I detailing the plans for bombing more

particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecomingin Baguio City which the President was to attend.

February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist

safehouse where 2 flash disks containing information that

Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the

20thAnniversary of Edsa I.


17/23

February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted information

that members of the PNP-SAF were planning to defect. Also, it

was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col. Ariel Querubin

were plotting to break the AFP chain of command for a

movement against the Arroyo administration. The two werelater taken into custody by Gen. Senga. However, statements

were being released from the CPP-NPA and NDF on the

increasing number of anti-Arroyo groups within the police and

military.

The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in

Bulacan and Bataan.

The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows:

Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of

programs and activities for the 20thcelebration of Edsa I as well

as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal of

the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf

David and Ronald Llamas.

Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and

confiscation of news stories and various documents

Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis Party) by the

police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime andattempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al.

The petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987

Constitution have been violated, thus the case at hand.

ISSUES:

1. Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the petitions moot

and academic;

2.

Whether the Court may review the factual bases of PP1017 on

the petitioners contention that the said proclamation has none

of it;

3.

Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are unconstitutional for their

insofar as it allegedly violates the right of the people against

unreasonable search and seizures, the right against warrantless


18/23

arrest, the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and

to peaceably assemble.

HELD:

1.

The court held that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did

not render the present petitions moot and academic. During

the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers

committed illegal acts implementing it. There is no question

that the issues being raised affect the publics interest involving

as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression,

of assembly and of the press. An otherwise moot case may still

be decided provided that the party raising it continues to be

prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of itsissuance(Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary)which is applicable

in the present case.

2.

Yes, the Court may do so. As to how the Court may inquire into

the Presidents exercise of power, it must be proven that the

President did not act arbitrarily. It is incumbent upon the

petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft

of factual basis as the Court cannot undertake an

independent investigation beyond the pleadings. This,

however, was something that the petitioners failed to prove.3. Since there is no law defining acts of terrorism, it is President

Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5 who has the discretion to

determine what acts constitute terrorism, without

restrictions. Certainly, the effects which may be implicated by

such violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus,

the acts of terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is

unconstitutional. The plain import of the language of the

Constitution provides that searches, seizures and arrests are

normally unreasonable without a search warrant or warrant ofarrest. A warrantless arrest shall only be done if the offense is

committed in ones presence or it has just been committed

based on personal knowledgeboth of which are not present

in Davids warrantless arrest. This being done during the

dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU, et. al. is also

violative of the right of the people to peaceably assemble. The


19/23

wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant

disregard of the principle that freedom of assembly is not to

be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear

and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a

right to prevent. Revocation of such permits may only bedone after due notice and hearing. In the Daily Tribune case,

the search and seizure of materials for publication, the

stationing of policemen in the vicinity of The Daily Tribune

offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to

media are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the

repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak

only if allowed to do so, and no more. When in implementing

its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police

committed acts which violate the citizens rights under theConstitution, the Court has to declare such acts

unconstitutional and illegal.

LA BUGAL-B'LAAN vs DENR

Dec. 1, 2004

Facts: On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its

Decision granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality

of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire

FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the

finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987

Constitution.

The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service

contracts, which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution,

were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle

of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowedforeign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the

prejudice of the Filipino nation.

Issue: Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration,

development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils


20/23

limited to technical or financial assistance only?

Ruling: Only technical assistance or financial assistance agreements

may be entered into, and only for large-scale activities. Full control is

not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor,provided that the State retains the power to direct overall strategy;

and to set aside, reverse or modify plans and actions of the

contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that which is exercised

by the board of directors of a private corporation: the performance

of managerial, operational, financial, marketing and other functions

may be delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual

entities, but the board retains full residual control of the business.

Facts.Marco DeFunis, Jr. sued the University of Washington Law

School, a state operated university. DeFunis argued that the

Universitys admissions policies and criteria were racially

discriminatory. However, DeFunis was allowed to attend the law

school during the case and was in his third year when the case was

heard by the Court. Further, the University has agreed to let him

graduate upon completion of his last year.

Issue.Does an actual controversy exist between the parties,

capable of redress by the United States Supreme Court (Supreme

Court)?

Held.The Court ordered the parties to address the issue of mootness

before they proceeded to any other claims in the petition. The Court

reasoned that federal courts are without power to decide questions

that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the cases before them.

This requirement stems from Article III of the Constitution, under which

the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case

or controversy. No amount of public interest would be sufficient to

create an actual case or controversy, and the case was rendered

moot because DeFunis was going to graduate from the law school

regardless of the Courts ruling. Thus, the case was rendered moot.


21/23

[T]he controversy between the parties has thus clearly ceased to be

definite and concrete.

Dissent.There were numerous potential litigants who would be

affected by a decision on the legal issues presented. Further, 26amici curiae briefs were filed by parties in this case. The public

interest would be best served by reviewing these issues now, as they

would inevitably find their way back into the federal court system.

There was a stronger interest in litigating these issues immediately to

avoid repetitious litigation that would inevitably occur due to the

high public interest in this issue.

Discussion.A case is considered moot if a justiciable controversy

existed when a case was filed, but circumstances after filing indicate

the litigant no longer has a stake in the controversy. In such a

situation, the Supreme Courts jurisdiction is not invoked, and the

Court will no


22/23


23/23

t even hear the other issues presented.

sixto s. brillantes, jr., et.al. vs. comelec digest

Documents