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Enron Corporation Enron Corporation

Type Jenis Defunct / Asset-less Shell Mati / Aset-

kurang Shell

Industry

Industri formerly Energy sebelumnya Energi

Founded

Didirikan

Omaha, Nebraska , 1985 Omaha,

Nebraska , 1985

Headquarters

Markas besar

Houston , Texas , United States Houston ,

Texas , Amerika Serikat

Key people

Tokoh penting

Kenneth Lay , Founder, former Chairman

and CEO Kenneth Lay , Pendiri, mantan

Ketua dan CEO

Jeffrey Skilling , former President, CEO

and COO Jeffrey Skilling , mantan

Presiden, CEO dan COO

Andrew Fastow , former CFO Andrew

Fastow , mantan CFO

Rebecca Mark-Jusbasche , former Vice

Chairman, Chairman and CEO of Enron

International Rebecca Mark-Jusbasche ,

mantan Wakil Ketua, Ketua dan CEO

Enron Internasional

Stephen F. Cooper, Interim CEO and CRO

Stephen F. Cooper, CEO Sementara dan

CRO

John J. Ray, III, Chairman John J. Ray, III,

Ketua

Revenue

Pendapatan

$101 billion (in 2000) $ 101.000.000.000

(tahun 2000)

Website Website http://www.enron.com/

http://www.enron.com/

The Enron scandal , revealed in October 2001, eventually led to the bankruptcy of the Enron Corporation , an American energy company based in Houston, Texas , and the dissolution of Arthur Andersen , which was one of the five largest audit and accountancy partnerships in the world. Skandal Enron, mengungkapkan pada bulan Oktober 2001, akhirnya mengarah pada kebangkrutan dari Enron Corporation , seorang Amerika energi perusahaan yang berbasis di Houston, Texas , dan pembubaran Arthur Andersen , yang merupakan salah satu dari lima terbesar audit dan akuntansi kemitraan di dunia . In addition to being the largest bankruptcy reorganization in American history at that time, Enron was attributed as the biggest audit failure. [ 1 ] Selain menjadi reorganisasi kebangkrutan terbesar dalam sejarah Amerika pada saat itu, Enron disebabkan sebagai kegagalan audit terbesar. [1]

Enron was formed in 1985 by Kenneth Lay after merging Houston Natural Gas and InterNorth . Enron dibentuk pada tahun 1985 oleh Kenneth Lay setelah penggabungan Houston Gas Bumi dan InterNorth . Several years later, when Jeffrey Skilling was hired, he developed a staff of executives that, through the use of accounting loopholes, special purpose entities , and poor financial reporting, were able to hide billions in debt from failed deals and projects. Beberapa tahun kemudian, ketika Jeffrey Skilling dipekerjakan, ia mengembangkan staf eksekutif yang melalui penggunaan lubang akuntansi, entitas tujuan khusus , dan pelaporan keuangan yang buruk, mampu menyembunyikan miliar di atas hutang dari transaksi gagal dan proyek. Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow and other executives not only misled Enron's board of directors and audit committee on high-risk accounting practices, but also pressured Andersen to ignore the issues. Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow dan eksekutif lainnya tidak hanya menyesatkan's Enron dewan direksi dan komite audit atas risiko akuntansi praktek-tinggi, tetapi juga menekan Andersen untuk mengabaikan masalah.

Shareholders lost nearly $11 billion when Enron's stock price, which hit a high of US$ 90 per share in mid-2000, plummeted to less than $1 by the end of November 2001. Pemegang Saham kehilangan hampir $ 11000000000 ketika harga saham Enron, yang mencapai tinggi US $ 90 per saham pada pertengahan tahun 2000, turun menjadi kurang dari $ 1 dengan akhir November 2001. The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an investigation, and rival Houston competitor Dynegy offered to purchase the company at a fire sale price. The Securities and Exchange Commission AS (SEC) mulai melakukan investigasi, dan saingan Houston pesaing Dynegy ditawarkan untuk membeli perusahaan pada api penjualan harga. The deal fell through, and on December 2, 2001, Enron filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code . Kesepakatan itu gagal, dan pada tanggal 2 Desember 2001, Enron bangkrut di bawah Bab 11 dari Amerika Serikat Kode Kepailitan . Enron's $63.4 billion in assets made it the largest corporate bankruptcy in US history until WorldCom 's bankruptcy the

following year. [ 2 ] Enron $ 63400000000 aset membuat kebangkrutan perusahaan terbesar dalam sejarah Amerika Serikat sampai WorldCom kebangkrutan s 'pada tahun berikutnya. [2]

Many executives at Enron were indicted for a variety of charges and were later sentenced to prison. Banyak eksekutif di Enron Telah didakwa atas berbagai tuduhan dan kemudian dijatuhi hukuman penjara. Enron's auditor, Arthur Andersen, was found guilty in a United States District Court, but by the time the ruling was overturned at the US Supreme Court , the firm had lost the majority of its customers and had shut down. 's auditor Enron, Arthur Andersen, ditemukan bersalah dalam Pengadilan Distrik Amerika Serikat, tetapi pada saat putusan itu dibatalkan di Mahkamah Agung AS , perusahaan telah kehilangan mayoritas pelanggan dan telah menutup. Employees and shareholders received limited returns in lawsuits, despite losing billions in pensions and stock prices. Karyawan dan pemegang saham menerima kembali terbatas pada tuntutan hukum, meskipun kehilangan miliaran pensiun dan harga saham. As a consequence of the scandal, new regulations and legislation were enacted to expand the accuracy of financial reporting for public companies. [ 3 ] One piece of legislation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act , expanded repercussions for destroying, altering, or fabricating records in federal investigations or for attempting to defraud shareholders. [ 4 ] The act also increased the accountability of auditing firms to remain unbiased and independent of their clients. [ 3 ] Sebagai konsekuensi dari skandal itu, peraturan baru dan perundang-undangan yang berlaku untuk memperluas keakuratan pelaporan keuangan perusahaan publik. [3] Salah satu bagian dari legislasi, Sarbanes-Oxley Act , memperluas dampak untuk menghancurkan, mengubah, atau catatan fabrikasi dalam federal investigasi atau karena berusaha untuk menipu para pemegang saham. [4] tindakan ini juga meningkatkan akuntabilitas perusahaan audit untuk tetap tidak bias dan independen terhadap klien mereka. [3]

Contents Isi

[hide]

1 The rise of Enron 1 Bangkitnya Enron 2 Causes of downfall 2 Penyebab kejatuhan

o 2.1 Revenue recognition 2.1 Pengakuan pendapatan o 2.2 Mark-to-market accounting 2.2 Mark-to-pasar akuntansi o 2.3 Special purpose entities 2.3 entitas tujuan khusus

2.3.1 JEDI and Chewco 2.3.1 JEDI dan Chewco 2.3.2 Whitewing 2.3.2 Whitewing 2.3.3 LJM and Raptors 2.3.3 LJM dan Raptors

o 2.4 Corporate governance 2.4 Corporate governance 2.4.1 Executive compensation 2.4.1 Eksekutif kompensasi 2.4.2 Risk management 2.4.2 Manajemen Risiko 2.4.3 Financial audit 2.4.3 Audit Keuangan 2.4.4 Audit committee 2.4.4 Komite Audit

o 2.5 Other accounting issues 2,5 isu akuntansi lainnya 3 Timeline of downfall 3 Garis waktu kejatuhan

o 3.1 Investors' confidence declines Investor keyakinan menurun 3.1 o 3.2 Restructuring losses and SEC investigation 3.2 Restrukturisasi kerugian dan

investigasi SEC o 3.3 Liquidity concerns 3.3 Likuiditas keprihatinan o 3.4 Credit rating downgrade 3.4 Kredit downgrade rating o 3.5 Proposed buyout by Dynegy 3.5 Usulan pembelian oleh Dynegy o 3.6 Bankruptcy 3.6 Kepailitan

4 Trials 4 Trials o 4.1 Enron 4.1 Enron o 4.2 Arthur Andersen 4.2 Arthur Andersen o 4.3 NatWest Three 4.3 NatWest Tiga

5 Aftermath 5 Sesudahnya o 5.1 Employees and shareholders 5.1 Karyawan dan pemegang saham o 5.2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 5.2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act

6 See also 6 Lihat juga 7 Notes 7 Catatan 8 References 8 Referensi 9 Further reading 9 Bacaan lebih lanjut 10 External links 10 Pranala luar

[ edit ] The rise of Enron [ sunting ] Bangkitnya Enron

Kenneth Lay in a July 2004 mugshot Kenneth Lay dalam Mugshot Juli 2004

In 1985, Kenneth Lay merged the natural gas pipeline companies of Houston Natural Gas and InterNorth to form Enron. [ 5 ] In the early 1990s, he helped to initiate the selling of electricity at market prices and, soon after, the United States Congress passed legislation deregulating the sale of natural gas . Pada tahun 1985, Kenneth Lay menggabungkan pipa gas alam perusahaan dari Houston Gas Bumi dan InterNorth untuk membentuk Enron. [5] Pada awal 1990-an, ia membantu untuk memulai penjualan listrik pada harga pasar dan, segera setelah itu, Kongres Amerika Serikat berlalu undang-undang dideregulasi penjualan gas alam . The resulting markets made it possible for traders such as Enron to sell energy at higher prices, thereby significantly increasing

their revenue. [ 6 ] After producers and local governments decried the resultant price volatility and pushed for increased regulation, strong lobbying on the part of Enron and others, was able to keep the free market system in place. [ 6 ] [ 7 ] Pasar yang dihasilkan memungkinkan bagi para pedagang seperti Enron untuk menjual energi dengan harga yang lebih tinggi, sehingga secara signifikan meningkatkan pendapatan mereka. [6] Setelah produsen dan pemerintah daerah mengecam resultan volatilitas harga dan mendorong peningkatan regulasi, kuat melobi pada bagian dari Enron dan lainnya, mampu menjaga pasar bebas sistem di tempat. [6] [7]

As Enron rose to become the largest seller of natural gas in North America by 1992, its gas contracts trading earned earnings before interest and taxes of $122 million, the second largest contributor to the company's net income. Sebagai Enron naik menjadi penjual gas alam terbesar di Amerika Utara pada tahun 1992, kontrak perdagangan gas memperoleh laba sebelum bunga dan pajak sebesar $ 122 juta, penyumbang terbesar kedua's laba bersih perusahaan. The November 1999 creation of the EnronOnline trading website allowed the company to better manage its contracts trading business. [ 8 ] The November 1999 penciptaan EnronOnline situs perdagangan memungkinkan perusahaan untuk lebih baik mengelola bisnis kontrak perdagangan. [8]

In an attempt to achieve further growth, Enron pursued a diversification strategy. Dalam upaya untuk mencapai pertumbuhan lebih lanjut, Enron mengejar strategi diversifikasi. The company owned and operated a variety of assets including gas pipelines, electricity plants, pulp and paper plants, water plants, and broadband services across the globe. Perusahaan ini dimiliki dan dioperasikan berbagai aset termasuk pipa gas, pembangkit listrik, pabrik-pabrik pulp dan kertas, tanaman air, dan layanan broadband di seluruh dunia. The corporation also gained additional revenue by trading contracts for the same array of products and services it was involved in. [ 9 ] Korporasi juga mendapat penghasilan tambahan dengan kontrak perdagangan untuk array yang sama produk dan jasa yang terlibat masuk [9]

As a result, Enron's stock rose from the start of the 1990s until year-end 1998 by 311% percent, a significant increase over the rate of growth in the Standard & Poor 500 index . Akibatnya,'s saham Enron meningkat dari awal tahun 1990-an sampai akhir tahun 1998 oleh 311% persen, peningkatan signifikan atas tingkat pertumbuhan dalam Poor 500 indeks & Standar . The stock increased by 56% in 1999 and a further 87% in 2000, compared to a 20% increase and a 10% decline for the index during the same years. Saham meningkat sebesar 56% pada 1999 dan 87% lagi pada tahun 2000, dibandingkan dengan peningkatan 20% dan penurunan 10% untuk indeks selama tahun yang sama. By December 31, 2000, Enron's stock was priced at $83.13 and its market capitalization exceeded $60 billion, 70 times earnings and six times book value , an indication of the stock market's high expectations about its future prospects. Hingga 31 Desember 2000,'s saham Enron adalah harga $ 83,13 dan kapitalisasi pasar telah melebihi $ 60 miliar, 70 kali pendapatan dan enam kali nilai buku , merupakan indikasi dari ekspektasi pasar yang tinggi itu saham tentang prospek masa depannya. In addition, Enron was rated the most innovative large company in America in Fortune' s Most Admired Companies survey . [ 10 ] Selain itu, Enron dinilai besar perusahaan yang paling inovatif di Amerika dalam Fortune 's survei Perusahaan Paling Dikagumi . [10]

[ edit ] Causes of downfall [ sunting ] Penyebab kejatuhan

Enron's nontransparent financial statements did not clearly depict its operations and finances with shareholders and analysts. [ 11 ] [ 12 ] In addition, its complex business model and unethical practices required that the company use accounting limitations to misrepresent earnings and modify the balance sheet to portray a favorable depiction of its performance. [ 13 ] According to McLean and Elkid in their book The Smartest Guys in the Room , "The Enron scandal grew out of a steady accumulation of habits and values and actions that began years before and finally spiraled out of control." [ 14 ] In an article by James Bodurtha, Jr., he argues that from 1997 until its demise, "the primary motivations for Enron's accounting and financial transactions seem to have been to keep reported income and reported cash flow up, asset values inflated, and liabilities off the books ." [ 15 ] Teman-transparan Enron laporan keuangan tidak secara jelas menggambarkan operasi dan keuangan dengan para pemegang saham dan analis. [11] [12] Di samping itu, kompleks model bisnis dan praktik yang tidak etis diperlukan bahwa akuntansi menggunakan keterbatasan perusahaan untuk menggambarkan pendapatan dan memodifikasi neraca untuk menggambarkan gambaran yang menguntungkan kinerja. [13] Menurut McLean dan Elkid dalam buku mereka The Guys paling pintar di Ruang, "Skandal Enron tumbuh dari sebuah akumulasi stabil kebiasaan dan nilai-nilai dan tindakan yang dimulai tahun sebelum dan akhirnya berputar keluar dari kontrol. " [14] Dalam sebuah artikel oleh James Bodurtha, Jr, ia berpendapat bahwa dari 1997 sampai kehancurannya, "utama untuk motivasi Enron akuntansi dan keuangan tampaknya transaksi tersebut telah dilaporkan untuk menjaga pendapatan dan dilaporkan arus kas Facebook, aset nilai inflasi, dan kewajiban dari buku ". [15]

The combination of these issues later led to the bankruptcy of the company, and the majority of them were perpetuated by the indirect knowledge or direct actions of Lay, Jeffrey Skilling , Andrew Fastow , and other executives. Kombinasi dari masalah ini kemudian menyebabkan kebangkrutan perusahaan, dan mayoritas dari mereka diabadikan oleh pengetahuan langsung atau tindakan langsung Lay, Jeffrey Skilling , Andrew Fastow , dan eksekutif lainnya. Lay served as the chairman of the company in its last few years, and approved of the actions of Skilling and Fastow although he did not always inquire about the details. Lay menjabat sebagai ketua perusahaan dalam beberapa tahun terakhir, dan menyetujui tindakan Skilling dan Fastow meskipun ia tidak selalu menanyakan tentang rincian. Skilling, constantly focused on meeting Wall Street expectations, pushed for the use of mark-to-market accounting and pressured Enron executives to find new ways to hide its debt. Skilling, terus-menerus berfokus pada pemenuhan ekspektasi Wall Street, mendorong untuk penggunaan -ke-pasar akuntansi tanda dan ditekan Enron eksekutif untuk menemukan cara-cara baru untuk menyembunyikan hutangnya. Fastow and other executives "...created off-balance-sheet vehicles, complex financing structures, and deals so bewildering that few people can understand them even now." [ 14 ] Fastow dan eksekutif lainnya "... dibuat off-balance-sheet kendaraan, struktur pembiayaan yang kompleks, dan transaksi sehingga membingungkan yang sedikit orang dapat memahami mereka bahkan sekarang." [14]

[ edit ] Revenue recognition [ sunting ] Pengakuan pendapatan

Main article: Revenue recognition Artikel utama: Pengakuan pendapatan

Enron and other energy suppliers earned profits by providing services such as wholesale trading and risk management in addition to building and maintaining electric power plants, natural gas

pipelines, storage, and processing facilities. [ 16 ] When taking on the risk of buying and selling products, merchants are allowed to report the selling price as revenues and the products' costs as cost of goods sold . Enron dan pemasok energi lainnya memperoleh keuntungan dengan menyediakan jasa seperti perdagangan grosir dan manajemen risiko di samping membangun dan memelihara pembangkit tenaga listrik, jaringan pipa gas alam, penyimpanan, dan fasilitas pengolahan. [16] Ketika mengambil risiko membeli dan menjual produk , pedagang diperbolehkan untuk melaporkan harga jual sebagai pendapatan dan produk 'biaya sebagai beban pokok penjualan . In contrast, an " agent " provides a service to the customer, but does not take on the same risks as merchants for buying and selling. Service providers , when classified as agents, are able to report trading and brokerage fees as revenue, although not for the full value of the transaction. [ 17 ] Sebaliknya, seorang " agen "menyediakan layanan kepada pelanggan, tetapi tidak mengambil risiko yang sama sebagai pedagang untuk membeli dan menjual. Penyedia layanan , ketika diklasifikasikan sebagai agen, dapat melaporkan dan broker biaya perdagangan sebagai pendapatan, meskipun tidak untuk nilai penuh transaksi. [17]

Although trading firms such as Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch used the conventional "agent model" for reporting revenue (where only the trading or brokerage fee would be reported as revenue), Enron instead elected to report the entire value of each of its trades as revenue. Meskipun perdagangan perusahaan-perusahaan seperti Goldman Sachs dan Merrill Lynch menggunakan "konvensional agen" model untuk pelaporan pendapatan (dimana hanya broker perdagangan atau biaya akan dilaporkan sebagai pendapatan), Enron malah terpilih untuk melaporkan nilai seluruh perdagangan masing-masing sebagai pendapatan . This "merchant model" approach was considered much more aggressive in the accounting interpretation than the agent model. [ 17 ] Enron's method of reporting inflated trading revenue was later adopted by other companies in the energy trading industry in an attempt to stay competitive with the company's large increase in revenue. Ini "pedagang model" pendekatan dianggap jauh lebih agresif dalam interpretasi akuntansi dari model agen. [17] 's metode Enron pelaporan pendapatan perdagangan meningkat kemudian diadopsi oleh perusahaan lain dalam industri perdagangan energi dalam upaya untuk tetap bersaing dengan perusahaan besar peningkatan pendapatan. Other energy companies such as Duke Energy , Reliant Energy , and Dynegy joined Enron in the top 50 of the Fortune 500 mainly due to their adoption of the same trading revenue accounting approach as Enron. [ 18 ] perusahaan-perusahaan energi lain seperti Duke Energy , Reliant Energy , dan Dynegy bergabung Enron di 50 puncak Fortune 500 terutama karena mereka adopsi dari pendekatan pendapatan perdagangan akuntansi yang sama dengan Enron. [18]

Between 1996 to 2000, Enron's revenues increased by more than 750%, rising from $13.3 billion in 1996 to $100.8 billion in 2000. Antara tahun 1996 hingga 2000, pendapatan Enron meningkat lebih dari 750%, naik dari $ 13,3 miliar di tahun 1996 menjadi $ 100.800.000.000 pada tahun 2000. This extensive expansion of 65% per year was unprecedented in any industry, including the energy industry which typically considered growth of 2-3% per year to be respectable. Ekspansi luas 65% per tahun itu belum pernah terjadi sebelumnya dalam industri apapun, termasuk industri energi yang biasanya dianggap pertumbuhan 2-3% per tahun untuk dihormati. For just the first nine months of 2001, Enron reported $138.7 billion in revenues, which placed the company at the sixth position on the Fortune Global 500 . [ 19 ] Hanya untuk sembilan bulan pertama tahun 2001, Enron melaporkan 138700000000 $ pendapatan, yang menempatkan perusahaan pada posisi keenam pada Fortune Global 500 . [19]

[ edit ] Mark-to-market accounting [ sunting ]-untuk-pasar akuntansi Mark

Main article: Mark-to-market accounting Artikel utama: Mark-to-pasar akuntansi

In Enron's natural gas business, the accounting had been fairly straightforward: in each time period , the company listed actual costs of supplying the gas and actual revenues received from selling it. Dalam bisnis gas alam's Enron, akuntansi telah cukup jelas: dalam setiap periode waktu , perusahaan mencatatkan biaya yang sebenarnya penyediaan gas dan pendapatan yang diterima dari penjualan itu. However, when Skilling joined the company, he demanded that the trading business adopt mark-to-market accounting, citing that it would reflect "... true economic value." [ 20 ] Enron became the first non-financial company to use the method to account for its complex long-term contracts. [ 21 ] Mark-to-market accounting requires that once a long-term contract was signed, income was estimated as the present value of net future cash flows. Namun, ketika Skilling bergabung dengan perusahaan, ia menuntut bahwa bisnis perdagangan mengadopsi-untuk-pasar akuntansi tanda, dengan alasan bahwa hal itu akan mencerminkan "... nilai ekonomis sesungguhnya." [20] Enron menjadi perusahaan non-finansial pertama yang menggunakan metode untuk account untuk jangka panjang kompleks kontrak nya. [21] Mark-ke pasar akuntansi-mensyaratkan bahwa sekali-kontrak jangka panjang ditandatangani, pendapatan diperkirakan sebagai nilai sekarang atas arus kas masa depan. Often, the viability of these contracts and their related costs were difficult to judge. [ 22 ] Due to the large discrepancies of attempting to match profits and cash, investors were typically given false or misleading reports. Seringkali, kelangsungan hidup ini kontrak dan biaya terkait mereka sulit untuk menilai. [22] Karena perbedaan besar mencoba untuk mencocokkan keuntungan dan kas, investor biasanya diberikan atau menyesatkan laporan palsu. While using the method, income from projects could be recorded, which increased financial earnings. Ketika menggunakan metode, pendapatan dari proyek-proyek bisa dicatat, yang meningkatkan pendapatan keuangan. However, in future years, the profits could not be included, so new and additional income had to be included from more projects to develop additional growth to appease investors. [ 20 ] As one Enron competitor pointed out, "If you accelerate your income, then you have to keep doing more and more deals to show the same or rising income." [ 21 ] Despite potential pitfalls, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved the accounting method for Enron in its trading of natural gas futures contracts on January 30, 1992. [ 20 ] However, Enron later expanded its use to other areas in the company to help it meet Wall Street projections. [ 23 ] Namun, dalam tahun-tahun mendatang, keuntungan tidak dapat dimasukkan, baru dan tambahan penghasilan sehingga harus dimasukkan dari proyek yang lebih untuk mengembangkan pertumbuhan tambahan untuk menenangkan investor. [20] Sebagai salah satu pesaing Enron menunjukkan, "Jika Anda mempercepat pendapatan Anda, maka Anda harus tetap melakukan transaksi dan lebih banyak untuk menunjukkan atau meningkat pendapatan yang sama ". [21] Meskipun perangkap potensial, Securities and Exchange Commission AS (SEC) menyetujui metode akuntansi untuk Enron dalam perdagangan kontrak berjangka gas alam 30 Januari 1992. [20] Namun, Enron kemudian diperluas penggunaannya untuk area lain di perusahaan untuk membantu memenuhi proyeksi Wall Street. [23]

For one contract, in July 2000, Enron and Blockbuster Video signed a 20-year agreement to introduce on-demand entertainment to various US cities by year-end. Untuk satu kontrak, pada bulan Juli 2000, Enron dan Blockbuster Video menandatangani perjanjian 20 tahun untuk

memperkenalkan-demand hiburan ke berbagai kota di AS pada akhir tahun. After several pilot projects , Enron recognized estimated profits of more than $110 million from the deal, even though analysts questioned the technical viability and market demand of the service. [ 22 ] When the network failed to work, Blockbuster pulled out of the contract. Setelah beberapa proyek percontohan , Enron keuntungan yang diakui diperkirakan lebih dari $ 110.000.000 dari kesepakatan itu, meskipun analis mempertanyakan kelayakan teknis dan permintaan pasar layanan. [22] Ketika jaringan gagal bekerja, Blockbuster menarik diri dari kontrak. Enron continued to recognize future profits, even though the deal resulted in a loss. [ 24 ] Enron tetap mengakui keuntungan masa depan, meskipun kesepakatan itu mengakibatkan kerugian. [24]

[ edit ] Special purpose entities [ sunting ] entitas tujuan khusus

Main article: Special purpose entity Artikel utama: entitas bertujuan khusus

Enron used special purpose entities—limited partnerships or companies created to fulfill a temporary or specific purpose—to fund or manage risks associated with specific assets . Enron menggunakan entitas bertujuan khusus kemitraan terbatas atau perusahaan diciptakan untuk memenuhi sementara atau tujuan tertentu-untuk mendanai atau mengelola risiko yang berkaitan dengan spesifik aset . The company elected to disclose minimal details on its use of special purpose entities. [ 25 ] These shell firms were created by a sponsor, but funded by independent equity investors and debt financing. Perusahaan terpilih untuk mengungkapkan rincian minimal penggunaan entitas tujuan khusus. [25] Ini perusahaan shell diciptakan oleh sponsor, tapi didanai oleh independen investor ekuitas dan pembiayaan hutang. For financial reporting purposes, a series of rules dictates whether a special purpose entity is a separate entity from the sponsor. Untuk tujuan pelaporan keuangan, serangkaian aturan menentukan apakah suatu entitas bertujuan khusus adalah entitas yang terpisah dari sponsor. In total, by 2001, Enron had used hundreds of special purpose entities to hide its debt. [ 22 ] Secara total, pada tahun 2001, Enron telah menggunakan ratusan entitas tujuan khusus untuk menyembunyikan hutangnya. [22]

The special purpose entities were used for more than just circumventing accounting conventions. Entitas tujuan khusus digunakan untuk lebih dari sekedar menghindari konvensi akuntansi. As a result of one violation, Enron's balance sheet understated its liabilities and overstated its equity , and its earnings were overstated. [ 25 ] Enron disclosed to its shareholders that it had hedged downside risk in its own illiquid investments using special purpose entities. Sebagai hasil dari satu pelanggaran, neraca's Enron understated nya kewajiban dan dilebih-lebihkan yang ekuitas , dan laba perusahaan adalah terlalu dibesar-besarkan. [25] Enron diungkapkan kepada pemegang saham bahwa itu lindung nilai risiko downside di sendiri tidak likuid investasi menggunakan entitas bertujuan khusus. However, the investors were oblivious to the fact that the special purpose entities were actually using the company's own stock and financial guarantees to finance these hedges. Namun, investor menyadari fakta bahwa entitas bertujuan khusus yang benar-benar menggunakan saham sendiri perusahaan dan jaminan keuangan untuk membiayai lindung nilai tersebut. This setup prevented Enron from being protected from the downside risk. [ 25 ] Notable examples of special purpose entities that Enron employed were JEDI, Chewco, Whitewing, and LJM . Pengaturan ini dicegah Enron dari dilindungi dari resiko downside. [25] Contoh penting dari entitas tujuan khusus yang dipekerjakan Enron JEDI, Chewco, Whitewing, dan LJM .

[ edit ] JEDI and Chewco [ sunting ] JEDI dan Chewco

Main article: Chewco Artikel utama: Chewco

In 1993, Enron set up a joint venture in energy investments with CalPERS , the California state pension fund, called the Joint Energy Development Investments (JEDI). [ 26 ] In 1997, Skilling, serving as Chief Operating Officer (COO), asked CalPERS to join Enron in a separate investment. Pada tahun 1993, Enron mendirikan perusahaan patungan dalam investasi energi dengan CalPERS , negara California dana pensiun, yang disebut Bersama Pengembangan Energi Investasi (JEDI). [26] Pada tahun 1997, Skilling, menjabat sebagai Chief Operating Officer (COO), bertanya CalPERS Enron untuk bergabung dalam investasi yang terpisah. CalPERS was interested in the idea, but only if they could be removed as a partner in JEDI. [ 27 ] However, Enron did not want to show any debt from taking over CalPERS' stake in JEDI on its balance sheet. Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Fastow developed the special purpose entity Chewco Investments LP which raised debt guaranteed by Enron and was used to acquire CalPER's joint venture stake for $383 million. [ 25 ] Because of Fastow's organization of Chewco, JEDI's losses were kept off of Enron's balance sheet. CalPERS tertarik pada ide, tetapi hanya jika mereka bisa dihapus sebagai mitra dalam JEDI. [27] Namun, Enron tidak ingin menunjukkan utang apapun dari mengambil alih 'saham CalPERS di JEDI pada neraca. Chief Financial Officer ( CFO) Fastow mengembangkan entitas khusus tujuan Chewco Investasi LP yang diajukan utang dijamin oleh Enron dan digunakan untuk mengakuisisi perusahaan saham patungan's CalPER sebesar $ 383.000.000. [25] Karena itu organisasi Fastow dari Chewco,'s kerugian JEDI disimpan off neraca's Enron.

In fall 2001, CalPERS and Enron's arrangement was discovered, which required the discontinuation of Enron's prior accounting approach for Chewco and JEDI. Pada musim gugur 2001, pengaturan CalPERS dan Enron ditemukan, yang mengharuskan penghentian pendekatan akuntansi sebelum Enron untuk Chewco dan JEDI. This disqualification revealed that Enron's reported earnings from 1997 to mid-2001 would need to be reduced by $405 million and that the company's indebtedness would rise by $628 million. [ 28 ] diskualifikasi ini mengungkapkan bahwa Enron melaporkan pendapatan dari tahun 1997 sampai pertengahan tahun 2001 perlu dikurangi dengan $ 405.000.000 dan bahwa hutang perusahaan akan naik sebesar $ 628.000.000. [28]

[ edit ] Whitewing [ sunting ] Whitewing

The White-winged Dove is native to Texas, and was also the name of a special purpose entity used as financing vehicle by Enron. [ 29 ] In December 1997, with funding of $579 million provided by Enron and $500 million by an outside investor, Whitewing Associates LP was formed. The -bersayap Dove Putih adalah asli ke Texas, dan juga nama entitas bertujuan khusus yang digunakan sebagai kendaraan pembiayaan oleh Enron. [29] Pada bulan Desember 1997, dengan pendanaan sebesar $ 579.000.000 yang diberikan oleh Enron dan $ 500 juta oleh investor luar, Whitewing Associates LP dibentuk. Two years later, the entity's arrangement was changed so that it would no longer be consolidated with Enron and be counted on the company's balance sheet. Dua tahun kemudian, pengaturan entitas diubah sehingga tidak lagi dikonsolidasikan dengan Enron dan dihitung di neraca perusahaan. Whitewing was used to purchase Enron assets,

including stakes in power plants, pipelines, stocks, and other investments. [ 30 ] Between 1999 and 2001, Whitewing bought assets from Enron worth $2 billion, using Enron stock as collateral . Whitewing digunakan untuk pembelian aset Enron, termasuk saham di pembangkit listrik, jaringan pipa, saham, dan investasi lainnya. [30] Antara tahun 1999 dan 2001, Whitewing membeli aset dari Enron senilai $ 2 miliar, dengan menggunakan saham Enron sebagai jaminan . Although the transactions were approved by the Enron board, the assets transfers were not true sales and should have been treated instead as loans. [ 31 ] Meskipun transaksi yang telah disetujui oleh dewan Enron, transfer penjualan aset tidak benar dan seharusnya diperlakukan bukan sebagai pinjaman. [31]

[ edit ] LJM and Raptors [ sunting ] LJM dan Raptors

Main article: LJM (Lea Jeffrey Michael) Artikel utama: LJM (Lea Jeffrey Michael)

In 1999, Fastow formulated two limited partnerships : LJM Cayman. Pada tahun 1999, Fastow dirumuskan dua kemitraan terbatas : LJM Cayman. LP (LJM1) and LJM2 Co-Investment LP (LJM2), for the purpose of buying Enron's poorly performing stocks and stakes to improve its financial statements. LP (LJM1) dan LJM2 Co-Investment LP (LJM2), dengan tujuan untuk membeli saham Enron berkinerja buruk dan wilayah untuk memperbaiki laporan keuangan. LJM 1 and 2 were created solely to serve as the outside equity investor needed for the special purpose entities that were being used by Enron. [ 28 ] Fastow had to go before the board of directors to receive an exemption from Enron's code of ethics (as he held the title of CFO) in order to run the companies. [ 32 ] The two partnerships were funded with around $390 million provided by Wachovia , JP Morgan Chase , Credit Suisse First Boston , Citigroup , and other investors. Merrill Lynch , which marketed the equity, also contributed $22 million to support the entities. [ 28 ] LJM 1 dan 2 diciptakan semata-mata untuk melayani sebagai luar investor saham yang diperlukan untuk entitas tujuan khusus yang digunakan oleh Enron. [28] Fastow harus pergi sebelum dewan direksi untuk menerima pembebasan dari Teman-kode Enron etik (sebagai dia memegang gelar CFO) untuk menjalankan perusahaan. [32] Kedua kemitraan didanai dengan sekitar $ 390.000.000 yang disediakan oleh Wachovia , JP Morgan Chase , Credit Suisse First Boston , Citigroup , dan investor lainnya. Merrill Lynch , yang dipasarkan ekuitas, juga memberikan sumbangan $ 22 juta menjadi mendukung entitas. [28]

Enron transferred to "Raptor I-IV", four LJM-related special purpose entities named after the velociraptors in Jurassic Park , more than "$1.2 billion in assets, including millions of shares of Enron common stock and long term rights to purchase millions more shares, plus $150 million of Enron notes payable " as disclosed in the company's financial statement footnotes. [ 33 ] [ 34 ] [ 35 ] The special purpose entities had been used to pay for all of this using the entities' debt instruments . Enron dipindahkan ke "Raptor I-IV", empat terkait khusus tujuan entitas-LJM dinamai velociraptors di Jurassic Park , lebih dari "$ 1,2 miliar pada aset, termasuk jutaan saham Enron saham biasa dan hak jangka panjang untuk membeli jutaan lebih banyak saham , ditambah $ 150 juta dari Enron wesel bayar "seperti yang diungkapkan dalam laporan keuangan perusahaan catatan kaki itu. [33] [34] [35] The entitas bertujuan khusus telah digunakan untuk membayar semua ini dengan menggunakan entitas ' instrumen hutang . The footnotes also declared that the instruments' face amount totaled $1.5 billion, and the entities notional amount of $2.1 billion had been used to enter into derivative contracts with Enron. [ 34 ] Catatan kaki juga

menyatakan bahwa 'wajah jumlah instrumen yang mencapai $ 1,5 miliar, dan entitas jumlah nosional $ 2,1 miliar telah digunakan untuk masuk ke dalam kontrak derivatif dengan Enron. [34]

Enron capitalized the Raptors, and, in a similar matter to when a company issues stock at a public offering , then booked the notes payable issued as assets on its balance sheet while increasing the shareholders' equity for the same amount. [ 36 ] This treatment later became an issue for Enron and its auditor Arthur Andersen as removing it from the balance sheet resulted in a $1.2 billion decrease in net shareholder equity . [ 37 ] Enron dikapitalisasi Raptors, dan, dalam hal serupa ketika sebuah perusahaan isu saham pada penawaran umum , maka membukukan wesel bayar diterbitkan sebagai aktiva perusahaan neraca sementara meningkatkan ekuitas pemegang saham dengan jumlah yang sama. [36] Perlakuan ini kemudian menjadi masalah bagi Enron dan auditor perusahaan Arthur Andersen sebagai mengeluarkannya dari neraca mengakibatkan penurunan $ 1,2 miliar bersih ekuitas pemegang saham . [37]

Eventually the derivative contracts worth $2.1 billion lost significant value. Swaps were established at the point the stock price hit its high points. Akhirnya kontrak derivatif bernilai $ 2,1 miliar hilang nilai yang signifikan. Swap didirikan pada titik harga saham mencapai titik tinggi. Over a year the value of the portfolio under the swaps fell by $1.1 billion as the stock prices dropped (the loss in value meant that the special purpose entities technically now owed Enron $1.1 billion under the contracts). Selama satu tahun nilai dari portofolio bawah swap turun $ 1100000000 sebagai harga saham turun (kerugian dalam nilai berarti bahwa entitas bertujuan khusus teknis sekarang berutang Enron $ 1100000000 bawah kontrak). Enron, which used a "fair value" accounting method, claimed a $500 million gain on the swap contracts in its 2000 annual report . Enron, yang menggunakan "nilai wajar" metode akuntansi, mengklaim keuntungan $ 500 juta pada kontrak swap pada tahun 2000 yang laporan tahunan . The gain was responsible for offsetting its stock portfolio losses and was attributed to nearly a third of Enron's earnings for 2000 (before it was properly restated in 2001). [ 38 ] Laba tersebut bertanggung jawab untuk mengimbangi kerugian portofolio sahamnya dan disebabkan hampir sepertiga dari yang pendapatan Enron untuk 2000 (sebelum disajikan kembali baik pada tahun 2001). [38]

[ edit ] Corporate governance [ sunting ] Tata kelola perusahaan

Main article: Corporate governance Artikel utama: Tata kelola perusahaan

Healy and Palepu write that a well-functioning capital market "creates appropriate linkages of information, incentives, and governance between managers and investors. This process is supposed to be carried out through a network of intermediaries that include assurance professionals such as external auditors; and internal governance agents such as corporate boards." [ 10 ] On paper, Enron had a model board of directors comprising predominantly outsiders with significant ownership stakes and a talented audit committee. Healy dan Palepu menulis bahwa pasar modal yang berfungsi dengan baik "menciptakan hubungan yang sesuai informasi, insentif, dan tata pemerintahan antara manajer dan investor Proses ini seharusnya dilakukan melalui jaringan perantara yang mencakup keyakinan profesional seperti auditor eksternal;. Dan agen pemerintahan internal seperti papan perusahaan ". [10] Di atas kertas, Enron memiliki model dewan direksi yang terdiri dari sebagian besar orang luar dengan kepemilikan saham yang signifikan dan komite audit berbakat. In its 2000 review of best corporate boards, Chief

Executive included Enron among its top five boards. [ 39 ] Even with its complex corporate governance and network of intermediaries, Enron was still able to "attract large sums of capital to fund a questionable business model, conceal its true performance through a series of accounting and financing maneuvers, and hype its stock to unsustainable levels." [ 40 ] Dalam review 2000 dari dewan perusahaan terbaik, Chief Executive termasuk Enron antara puncaknya lima papan. [39] Bahkan dengan tata kelola perusahaan yang kompleks dan jaringan perantara, Enron masih bisa "menarik sejumlah besar modal untuk mendanai sebuah model bisnis yang dipertanyakan , menyembunyikan kinerja sejati melalui serangkaian manuver dan pendanaan akuntansi, dan hype sahamnya ke tingkat yang tidak berkelanjutan. " [40]

[ edit ] Executive compensation [ sunting ] kompensasi Eksekutif

Main article: Corporate Governance#Remuneration/Compensation Artikel utama: Tata Kelola # Remunerasi / Kompensasi

Although Enron's compensation and performance management system was designed to retain and reward its most valuable employees, the setup of the system contributed to a dysfunctional corporate culture that became obsessed with a focus only on short-term earnings to maximize bonuses. Meskipun's kompensasi Enron dan manajemen kinerja sistem dirancang untuk mempertahankan dan penghargaan yang paling berharga karyawan, pengaturan sistem berkontribusi pada disfungsional budaya perusahaan yang menjadi terobsesi dengan fokus hanya pada laba jangka pendek untuk memaksimalkan bonus. Employees constantly looked to start high-volume deals, often disregarding the quality of cash flow or profits, in order to get a higher rating for their performance review. Karyawan selalu tampak untuk memulai transaksi bervolume tinggi, seringkali mengabaikan kualitas arus kas atau laba, dalam rangka untuk mendapatkan peringkat yang lebih tinggi untuk meninjau kinerja mereka. In addition, accounting results were recorded as soon as possible to keep up with the company's stock price. Selain itu, hasil akuntansi dicatat sesegera mungkin untuk bersaing dengan harga saham perusahaan. This practice helped ensure deal-makers and executives received large cash bonuses and stock options. [ 41 ] Praktek ini membantu memastikan kesepakatan-pembuat dan eksekutif menerima bonus kas yang besar dan opsi saham. [41]

The company was constantly focusing on its stock price. Perusahaan ini terus-menerus berfokus pada harga sahamnya. Management was extensively compensated using stock options , similar to other US companies. Manajemen kompensasi ekstensif menggunakan opsi saham , sama dengan perusahaan-perusahaan AS lainnya. This setup of stock option awards caused management to create expectations of rapid growth in efforts to give the appearance of reported earnings to meet Wall Street's expectations. Ini setup penghargaan opsi saham disebabkan manajemen untuk menciptakan ekspektasi pertumbuhan yang cepat dalam upaya memberikan tampilan laba yang dilaporkan untuk memenuhi harapan Wall Street. The stock ticker was located in lobbies, elevators, and on company computers. [ 42 ] At budget meetings, Skilling would develop target earnings by asking "What earnings do you need to keep our stock price up?" Ticker saham tersebut berlokasi di lobi, lift, dan pada komputer perusahaan. [42] Pada rapat anggaran, Skilling akan mengembangkan target laba dengan menanyakan "Apa penghasilan yang Anda butuhkan untuk menjaga harga saham kami Facebook?" and that number would be used, even if it was not feasible. [ 23 ] At December 31, 2000, Enron had 96 million shares outstanding under stock option

plans (approximately 13% of common shares outstanding). dan nomor yang akan digunakan, bahkan jika itu tidak layak. [23] Pada tanggal 31 Desember 2000, Enron memiliki 96 juta saham yang beredar di bawah rencana opsi saham (sekitar 13% dari saham biasa yang beredar). Enron's proxy statement stated that, within three years, these awards were expected to be exercised. [ 43 ] Using Enron's January 2001 stock price of $83.13 and the directors' beneficial ownership reported in the 2001 proxy, the value of director stock ownership was $659 million for Lay, and $174 million for Skilling. [ 39 ] proxy pernyataan's Enron menyatakan bahwa, dalam waktu tiga tahun, penghargaan ini diharapkan dapat dieksekusi. [43] Menggunakan Enron Januari 2001 harga saham sebesar $ 83,13 dan 'menguntungkan kepemilikan direksi yang dilaporkan di dalam proxy 2001, nilai kepemilikan saham direktur adalah $ 659.000.000 untuk Lay, dan $ 174.000.000 untuk Skilling. [39]

Skilling believed that if employees were constantly cost-centered, it would hinder original thinking. [ 44 ] As a result, extravagant spending was rampant throughout the company, especially among the executives. Skilling percaya bahwa jika karyawan terus-menerus berpusat biaya, akan menghambat berpikir asli. [44] Sebagai hasilnya, pengeluaran boros merajalela di seluruh perusahaan, terutama di kalangan para eksekutif. Employees had large expense accounts and many executives were paid sometimes twice as much as competitors. [ 45 ] In 1998, the top 200 highest-paid employees earned $193 million from salaries, bonuses, and stock. Karyawan memiliki akun beban besar dan banyak eksekutif dibayar terkadang dua kali lebih banyak sebagai pesaing. [45] Pada tahun 1998, 200 top-dibayar karyawan tertinggi diperoleh $ 193000000 dari gaji, bonus, dan saham. Two years later, the figure jumped to $1.4 billion. [ 46 ] Dua tahun kemudian, angka itu melonjak menjadi $ 1,4 miliar. [46]

[ edit ] Risk management [ sunting ] Manajemen risiko

Main article: Risk management Artikel utama: Manajemen Risiko

Before its fall, Enron was lauded for its sophisticated financial risk management tools. [ 47 ] Risk management was crucial to Enron not only because of its regulatory environment, but also because of its business plan . Sebelum kejatuhannya, Enron telah dipuji karena keuangan yang canggih alat manajemen risiko. [47] Manajemen risiko sangat penting untuk Enron bukan hanya karena lingkungan peraturan, tetapi juga karena yang rencana bisnis . Enron established long-term fixed commitments which needed to be hedged to prepare for the inevitable fluctuation of future energy prices. [ 48 ] Enron's bankruptcy downfall was attributed to its reckless use of derivatives and special purpose entities. Enron didirikan tetap komitmen jangka-panjang yang harus dilindung nilai untuk mempersiapkan fluktuasi harga yang tak terelakkan energi masa depan. [48] kebangkrutan kejatuhan's Enron ini disebabkan untuk menggunakan sembrono atas derivatif dan entitas tujuan khusus. By hedging its risks with special purpose entities which it owned, Enron retained the risks associated with the transactions. Dengan lindung nilai risiko dengan entitas tujuan khusus yang dimiliki, Enron mempertahankan risiko yang terkait dengan transaksi. This setup had Enron implementing hedges with itself. [ 49 ] Pengaturan ini telah Enron menerapkan lindung nilai dengan dirinya sendiri. [49]

Enron's aggressive accounting practices were not hidden from the board of directors, as later learned by a Senate subcommittee. agresif praktek akuntansi Enron tidak tersembunyi dari

dewan direksi, karena nanti dipelajari oleh subkomite Senat. The board was informed on the rationale for using the Whitewing, LJM, and Raptor transactions, and after approving them, received status updates on the entities' operations. Dewan itu informasi tentang alasan untuk menggunakan transaksi Whitewing, LJM, dan Raptor, dan setelah menyetujui mereka, menerima update status pada operasi entitas '. Although not all of Enron's widespread improper accounting practices were revealed to the board, the practices were dependent on board decisions. [ 50 ] Even though Enron extensively relied on derivatives for its business, the company's Finance Committee and board did not have comprehensive backgrounds in derivatives to grasp what they were being told. Meskipun tidak semua luas yang tidak benar itu praktek akuntansi Enron diturunkan ke papan, praktek bergantung pada keputusan dewan. [50] Meskipun Enron ekstensif bergantung pada derivatif untuk bisnis, perusahaan Komite Keuangan dan dewan tidak memiliki latar belakang komprehensif dalam derivatif untuk memahami apa yang mereka diberitahu. The Senate subcommittee argued that had there been a detailed understanding of how the derivatives were organized, the board would have prevented their use. [ 51 ] Subkomite Senat berpendapat bahwa seandainya pemahaman rinci tentang bagaimana derivatif diorganisir, dewan akan mencegah penggunaannya. [51]

[ edit ] Financial audit [ sunting ] Audit Keuangan

Main article: Financial audit Artikel utama: Audit Keuangan

Enron's auditor firm, Arthur Andersen , was accused of applying reckless standards in their audits because of a conflict of interest over the significant consulting fees generated by Enron. Enron auditor perusahaan, Arthur Andersen , dituduh menerapkan standar sembrono dalam audit mereka karena konflik kepentingan atas biaya konsultasi signifikan dihasilkan oleh Enron. In 2000, Arthur Andersen earned $25 million in audit fees and $27 million in consulting fees (this amount accounted for roughly 27% of the audit fees of public clients for Arthur Andersen's Houston office). Pada tahun 2000, Arthur Andersen memperoleh $ 25 juta biaya audit dan $ 27 juta dalam biaya konsultasi (jumlah ini menyumbang sekitar 27% dari biaya audit klien publik untuk Arthur Andersen Houston kantor). The auditors' methods were questioned as either being completed solely to receive its annual fees or for their lack of expertise in properly reviewing Enron's revenue recognition, special entities, derivatives, and other accounting practices. [ 52 ] auditor 'metode yang ditanyai sebagai diselesaikan semata-mata untuk menerima biaya tahunan atau karena kurangnya keahlian mereka dengan benar mengkaji pengakuan pendapatan's Enron, khusus entitas, derivatif, dan praktik akuntansi lainnya. [52]

Enron hired numerous Certified Public Accountants (CPA) as well as accountants who had worked on developing accounting rules with the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Enron mempekerjakan banyak Akuntan Publik Bersertifikat (BPA) serta akuntan yang bekerja pada pengembangan aturan akuntansi dengan Dewan Standar Akuntansi Keuangan (FASB). The accountants looked for new ways to save the company money, including capitalizing on loopholes found in Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), the accounting industry's standards. Akuntan mencari cara baru untuk menghemat uang perusahaan, termasuk memanfaatkan celah ditemukan dalam Prinsip Akuntansi yang berlaku umum (GAAP), akuntansi's industri standar. One Enron accountant revealed "We tried to aggressively use the literature [GAAP] to our advantage. All the rules create all these opportunities. We got to where

we did because we exploited that weakness." [ 53 ] Satu akuntan Enron mengungkapkan "Kami mencoba untuk agresif menggunakan literatur [GAAP] untuk keuntungan kita.. Semua aturan menciptakan semua kesempatan Kita harus ke tempat kita lakukan karena kita dieksploitasi kelemahan." [53]

Andersen's auditors were pressured by Enron's management to defer recognizing the charges from the special purpose entities as their credit risks became clear. Andersen's auditor's ditekan oleh manajemen Enron untuk menunda mengakui biaya dari entitas bertujuan khusus sebagai mereka risiko kredit menjadi jelas. Since the entities would never return a profit, accounting guidelines required that Enron should take a write-off , where the value of the entity was removed from the balance sheet at a loss. Karena entitas tidak akan pernah kembali keuntungan, pedoman akuntansi yang diperlukan bahwa Enron harus mengambil write-off , dimana nilai dari entitas tersebut telah dihapus dari neraca bingung. To pressure Andersen into meeting Enron's earnings expectations, Enron would occasionally allow accounting firms Ernst & Young or PricewaterhouseCoopers to complete accounting tasks to create the illusion of hiring a new firm to replace Andersen. [ 54 ] Although Andersen was equipped with internal controls to protect against conflicted incentives of local partners, they failed to prevent conflict of interest. Untuk tekanan Andersen ke pertemuan laba Enron harapan, Enron kadang-kadang akan memungkinkan kantor akuntan Ernst & Young atau PricewaterhouseCoopers untuk menyelesaikan tugas-tugas akuntansi untuk menciptakan ilusi menyewa sebuah perusahaan baru untuk menggantikan Andersen. [54] Walaupun Andersen dilengkapi dengan kontrol internal untuk melindungi terhadap insentif yang konflik mitra lokal, mereka gagal untuk mencegah konflik kepentingan. In one case, Andersen's Houston office, which performed the Enron audit, was able to overrule any critical reviews of Enron's accounting decisions by Andersen's Chicago partner. Dalam satu kasus, Andersen kantor Houston, yang melakukan audit Enron, mampu menolak setiap tinjauan kritis terhadap keputusan akuntansi Enron oleh mitra Chicago Andersen. In addition, when news of SEC investigations of Enron were made public, Andersen attempted to cover up any negligence in its audit by shredding several tons of supporting documents and deleting nearly 30,000 e-mails and computer files. [ 52 ] [ 55 ] [ 56 ] Selain itu, ketika berita tentang SEC investigasi Enron dibuat publik, Andersen berusaha untuk menutupi setiap kelalaian dalam audit dengan memotong-motong beberapa ton dokumen pendukung dan menghapus hampir 30.000 e-mail dan file komputer. [52] [55] [56 ]

Revelations concerning Andersen's overall performance led to the break-up of the firm, and to the following assessment by the Powers Committee (appointed by Enron's board to look into the firm's accounting in October 2001): "The evidence available to us suggests that Andersen did not fulfill its professional responsibilities in connection with its audits of Enron's financial statements, or its obligation to bring to the attention of Enron's Board (or the Audit and Compliance Committee) concerns about Enron's internal contracts over the related-party transactions". [ 57 ] Wahyu tentang kinerja keseluruhan Andersen menyebabkan pecahnya perusahaan, dan penilaian berikut oleh Komite Powers (ditunjuk oleh dewan Enron untuk melihat ke dalam akuntansi perusahaan pada bulan Oktober 2001): "Bukti yang tersedia bagi kita menunjukkan bahwa Andersen melakukan tidak memenuhi tanggung jawab profesional, dalam hubungannya dengan audit atas laporan keuangan's Enron, atau kewajiban untuk membawa ke perhatian Enron Board (atau Audit dan Komite Kepatuhan) keprihatinan tentang internal kontrak's Enron selama pihak transaksi yang terkait ". [57]

[ edit ] Audit committee [ sunting ] Komite Audit

Main article: Audit committee Artikel utama: Komite Audit

Corporate audit committees usually meet for just a few times during the year, and their members typically have only a modest background in accounting and finance. komite audit Perusahaan biasanya bertemu untuk hanya beberapa kali sepanjang tahun, dan anggota mereka pada umumnya hanya memiliki latar belakang yang sederhana dalam akuntansi dan keuangan. Enron's audit committee had more expertise than many. komite audit Enron memiliki keahlian lebih daripada banyak. It included: [ 58 ] Ini termasuk: [58]

Robert Jaedicke of Stanford University , a widely respected accounting professor and former dean of Stanford Business School ; Robert Jaedicke dari Stanford University , seorang profesor akuntansi dihormati secara luas dan mantan dekan Stanford Business School ;

John Mendelsohn, President of the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center John Mendelsohn, Presiden Universitas Texas Pusat Kanker MD Anderson

Paulo Pereira, former president and CEO of the State Bank of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil Paulo Pereira, mantan presiden dan CEO Bank Negara Rio de Janeiro di Brasil

John Wakeham , former United Kingdom Secretary for Energy John Wakeham , mantan Sekretaris United Kingdom Energi

Ronnie Chan , a Hong Kong businessman Ronnie Chan , seorang Hong Kong pengusaha Wendy Gramm , former Chair of US Commodity Futures Trading Commission Wendy

Gramm , mantan Ketua US Komoditi Futures Trading Commission

Enron's audit committee was later criticized for its brief meetings that would cover large amounts of material. komite audit Enron kemudian dikritik karena pertemuan singkat perusahaan yang akan mencakup sejumlah besar bahan. In one meeting on February 12, 2001, the committee met for an hour and a half. Dalam satu pertemuan pada 12 Februari 2001, komite bertemu selama satu jam dan setengah. Enron's audit committee did not have the technical knowledge to properly question the auditors on accounting questions related to the company's special purpose entities. komite audit Enron tidak memiliki pengetahuan teknis untuk benar pertanyaan auditor pada pertanyaan-pertanyaan akuntansi yang terkait dengan entitas khusus perusahaan tujuan. The committee was also unable to question the company's management due to pressures placed on the committee. [ 59 ] The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs ' report accused the board members of allowing conflicts of interest to impede their duties as monitoring the company's accounting practices. Komite ini juga tidak mempertanyakan perusahaan manajemen karena tekanan ditempatkan pada panitia. [59] The Subkomite Permanen Investigasi Komite Pemerintah Urusan laporan 'menuduh anggota dewan yang memungkinkan konflik kepentingan untuk menghalangi tugas mereka sebagai pemantauan praktik akuntansi perusahaan. When Enron fell, the audit committee's conflicts of interest were regarded with suspicion. [ 60 ] Ketika Enron jatuh, komite audit konflik kepentingan yang dianggap dengan kecurigaan. [60]

[ edit ] Other accounting issues [ sunting ] isu akuntansi Lain

Enron made a habit of booking costs of cancelled projects as assets, with the rationale that no official letter had stated that the project was cancelled. Enron membuat kebiasaan pemesanan biaya proyek dibatalkan sebagai aset, dengan alasan bahwa tidak ada surat resmi telah menyatakan bahwa proyek tersebut dibatalkan. This method was known as "the snowball", and although it was initially dictated that snowballs stay under $90 million, it was later extended to $200 million. [ 61 ] Metode ini dikenal sebagai "bola salju", dan meskipun awalnya menentukan bahwa bola salju tetap di bawah US $ 90 juta, itu kemudian diperpanjang menjadi $ 200 juta. [61]

In 1998, when analysts were given a tour of the Enron Energy Services office, they were impressed with how the employees were working so vigorously. Pada tahun 1998, ketika analis diberi tur ke Energi Enron Layanan kantor, mereka terkesan dengan bagaimana para karyawan bekerja begitu keras. In reality, Skilling had moved other employees to the office from other departments (instructing them to pretend to work hard) to create the appearance that the division was bigger than it was. [ 62 ] This ruse was used several times to fool analysts about the progress of different areas of Enron to help improve the stock price. Pada kenyataannya, Skilling telah pindah karyawan lain untuk kantor dari departemen lain (memerintahkan mereka untuk berpura-pura untuk bekerja keras) untuk menciptakan kesan bahwa pembagian itu lebih besar dari itu. [62] tipu muslihat ini digunakan beberapa kali untuk menipu analis tentang kemajuan daerah yang berbeda Enron untuk membantu meningkatkan harga saham.

[ edit ] Timeline of downfall [ sunting ] Garis waktu kejatuhan

Main article: Timeline of the Enron scandal Artikel utama: Timeline dari skandal Enron

"At the beginning of 2001, the Enron Corporation, the world's dominant energy trader, appeared unstoppable. The company's decade-long effort to persuade lawmakers to deregulate electricity markets had succeeded from California to New York. Its ties to the Bush administration assured that its views would be heard in Washington. Its sales, profits and stock were soaring." "Pada awal 2001, Corporation Enron, pedagang energi dominan di dunia, muncul tak terbendung upaya perusahaan dekade-panjang untuk membujuk anggota parlemen untuk deregulasi pasar listrik telah berhasil dari California ke New York.. Hubungan mereka terhadap pemerintahan Bush yakin bahwa perusahaan pandangan akan didengar di Washington Its penjualan, laba dan saham tersebut melonjak.. "

A. Berenson and RA Oppel, Jr. The New York Times , Oct 28, 2001. [ 63 ] A. Berenson dan Oppel RA, Jr The New York Times, 28 Oktober 2001. [63]

In February 2001, Chief Accounting Officer Rick Causey told budget managers: "From an accounting standpoint, this will be our easiest year ever. We've got 2001 in the bag." [ 64 ] On March 5, Bethany McLean 's Fortune article Is Enron Overpriced? questioned how Enron could maintain its high stock value, which was trading at 55 times its earnings. [ 65 ] She pointed out how analysts and investors did not know exactly how Enron was earning its income. Pada bulan Februari 2001, Chief Accounting Officer Rick dam mengatakan kepada manajer anggaran: "akuntansi sudut pandang ini, akan kami termudah yang pernah. tahun Kami Dari punya 2001 di. tas sebuah" [64] Pada tanggal 5 Maret, Bethany McLean 's Fortune artikel Apakah Enron kemahalan? mempertanyakan bagaimana Enron dapat mempertahankan nilai saham tinggi, yang diperdagangkan pada 55 kali laba perusahaan. [65] Ia menunjukkan bagaimana para analis dan

investor tidak tahu persis bagaimana Enron adalah pendapatan produktif. McLean was first drawn to the company's situation after an analyst suggested she view the company's 10-K report , where she found "strange transactions", "erratic cash flow", and "huge debt." [ 66 ] She called Skilling to discuss her findings prior to publishing the article, but he brushed her off, calling her "unethical" for not properly researching the company. [ 67 ] Fastow cited to Fortune reporters that Enron could not reveal earnings details as the company had over 1,200 trading books for assorted commodities and did "... not want anyone to know what's on those books. We don't want to tell anyone where we're making money." [ 65 ] McLean pertama kali tertarik pada perusahaan situasi setelah analis yang disarankan ia melihat perusahaan -K laporan 10 , di mana ia menemukan "transaksi aneh", "cash flow tidak menentu", dan "hutang yang sangat besar." [66] Dia memanggil Skilling untuk membahas nya temuan sebelum penerbitan artikel, tapi ia menepis nya, memanggilnya "tidak etis" karena tidak benar meneliti perusahaan. [67] Fastow dikutip kepada wartawan Fortune bahwa Enron tidak bisa mengungkapkan rincian laba perusahaan memiliki lebih dari 1.200 buku perdagangan untuk berbagai macam komoditas dan tidak "... tidak ingin seorang pun tahu apa yang ada di buku-buku lakukan. Kami tidak ingin memberitahu siapa pun mana kita menghasilkan uang." [65]

In a conference call on April 17, 2001, now- Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Skilling verbally attacked Wall Street analyst Richard Grubman, [ 68 ] who questioned Enron's unusual accounting practice during a recorded conference call. Di dalam panggilan konferensi pada tanggal 17 April 2001, sekarang- Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Skilling secara verbal menyerang Wall Street analis Richard Grubman, [68] yang mempertanyakan praktik akuntansi tidak biasa's Enron selama panggilan konferensi dicatat. When Grubman complained that Enron was the only company that could not release a balance sheet along with its earnings statements, Skilling replied "Well, thank you very much, we appreciate that ... asshole." [ 69 ] This became an inside joke among many Enron employees, mocking Grubman for his perceived meddling rather than Skilling's lack of tact, with slogans such as "Ask Why, Asshole". [ 70 ] However, Skilling's comment was met with dismay and astonishment by press and public, as he had previously brushed off criticism of Enron coolly or humorously, and many believe that this began a downward spiral that would unravel the company's deceptive practices. Ketika Grubman mengeluh bahwa Enron adalah satu-satunya perusahaan yang tidak dapat merilis neraca beserta laporan laba perusahaan, Skilling menjawab "Yah, terima kasih banyak, kami menghargai itu ... brengsek." [69] Hal ini menjadi lelucon di antara banyak Enron karyawan, mengejek Grubman untuk dirasakan campur tangan daripada's kurangnya Skilling dari kebijaksanaan, dengan slogan-slogan seperti "Tanyakan Kenapa, Bajingan". [70] Namun,'s komentar Skilling disambut dengan cemas dan heran oleh pers dan publik, seperti yang sebelumnya menepis kritik terhadap Enron dingin atau humor, dan banyak yang percaya bahwa ini mulai spiral yang akan mengungkap praktik penipuan perusahaan.

By the late 1990s Enron's stock was trading for $80–90 per share, and few seemed to concern themselves with the opacity of the company's financial disclosures. Pada akhir 1990-an saham Enron adalah perdagangan untuk $ 80-90 per saham, dan hanya sedikit tampak menyibukkan diri dengan opacity dari pengungkapan keuangan perusahaan. In mid-July 2001, Enron reported revenues of $50.1 billion, almost triple year-to-date, and beating analysts' estimates by 3 cents a share. [ 71 ] Despite this, Enron's profit margin had stayed at a modest average of about 2.1%, and its share price had dropped by over 30% since the same quarter of 2000. [ 71 ] Pada pertengahan

Juli 2001, Enron melaporkan pendapatan sebesar $ 50100000000, hampir tiga tahun-to-date, dan mengalahkan 'perkiraan analis sebesar 3 sen per saham. [71] Meskipun demikian, marjin laba's Enron telah tinggal di rata-rata sederhana dari sekitar 2,1 %, dan harga sahamnya telah turun lebih dari 30% sejak triwulan yang sama tahun 2000. [71]

However, concerns were mounting. Namun, kekhawatiran menggunung. Enron had recently faced several serious operational challenges, namely logistical difficulties in running a new broadband communications trading unit, and the losses from constructing the Dabhol Power project , a large power plant in India. Enron baru-baru ini menghadapi tantangan berat beberapa operasional, yaitu kesulitan logistik dalam menjalankan unit baru broadband perdagangan komunikasi, dan kerugian dari membangun proyek Power Dabhol , besar pembangkit listrik di India. There was also mounting criticism of the company for the role that its subsidiary Enron Energy Services had played in the power crisis of California in 2000-2001 . Ada juga meningkat kritik terhadap perusahaan untuk peran yang anak perusahaan Enron Energy Services telah bermain di krisis listrik California pada tahun 2000-2001 .

"There are no accounting issues, no trading issues, no reserve issues, no previously unknown problem issues. I think I can honestly say that the company is probably in the strongest and best shape that it has probably ever been in." "Ada beberapa isu akuntansi, tidak ada masalah perdagangan, tidak ada masalah cadangan, tidak ada masalah masalah yang sebelumnya tidak diketahui. Saya pikir saya dapat dengan jujur mengatakan bahwa perusahaan mungkin dalam bentuk terkuat dan terbaik yang mungkin telah pernah masuk"

Kenneth Lay answering an analyst's question on August 14, 2001. [ 72 ] Kenneth Lay menjawab pertanyaan seorang analis pada tanggal 14 Agustus 2001. [72]

On August 14, Skilling announced he was resigning his position as CEO after only six months. Pada tanggal 14 Agustus, Skilling mengumumkan ia mengundurkan diri posisinya sebagai CEO setelah hanya enam bulan. Skilling had long served as president and COO before being promoted to CEO. Skilling sudah lama menjabat sebagai presiden dan COO sebelum dipromosikan menjadi CEO. Skilling cited personal reasons for leaving the company. [ 73 ] Observers noted that in the months leading up to his exit, Skilling had sold at minimum 450,000 shares of Enron at a value of around $33 million (though he still owned over a million shares at the date of his departure). [ 73 ] Nevertheless, Lay, who was serving as chairman at Enron, assured stunned market watchers that there would be "no change in the performance or outlook of the company going forward" from Skilling's departure. [ 73 ] Lay announced he himself would re-assume the position of chief executive officer. Skilling dikutip alasan pribadi untuk meninggalkan perusahaan. [73] pengamat mencatat bahwa pada bulan-bulan menjelang keluar nya, Skilling telah menjual minimal 450.000 saham Enron dengan nilai sekitar $ 33 juta (meskipun ia masih memiliki lebih dari satu juta saham tanggal keberangkatan-nya). [73] Namun demikian, Lay, yang menjabat sebagai ketua di Enron, meyakinkan pengamat pasar terkejut bahwa akan ada "tidak ada perubahan pada kinerja atau prospek perusahaan maju" dari kepergian Skilling. [73 ] Lay mengumumkan ia sendiri akan kembali menganggap posisi chief executive officer.

The next day, however, Skilling admitted that a very significant reason for his departure was Enron's faltering price in the stock market. [ 74 ] The columnist Paul Krugman , writing in The New York Times , asserted that Enron was an illustration of the consequences that occur from the deregulation and commodification of things such as energy. [ 74 ] A few days later, in a letter to

the editor, Kenneth Lay defended Enron and the philosophy behind the company: [ 75 ] Keesokan harinya, bagaimanapun, Skilling mengakui bahwa yang signifikan alasan yang sangat untuk keberangkatan itu's goyah harga Enron di pasar saham. [74] kolumnis Paul Krugman , menulis di The New York Times, menegaskan bahwa Enron adalah gambaran tentang konsekuensi yang dari deregulasi dan komodifikasi hal-hal seperti energi. terjadi [74] Beberapa hari kemudian, dalam sebuah surat kepada editor, Kenneth Lay membela Enron dan filosofi di balik perusahaan: [75]

The broader goal of [Krugman's] latest attack on Enron appears to be to discredit the free-market system, a system that entrusts people to make choices and enjoy the fruits of their labor, skill, intellect and heart. Tujuan yang lebih luas serangan [Krugman] terbaru tentang Enron tampaknya untuk mendiskreditkan sistem pasar bebas, sebuah sistem yang mempercayakan orang untuk membuat pilihan dan menikmati buah, keterampilan mereka intelek tenaga kerja, dan jantung. He would apparently rely on a system of monopolies controlled or sponsored by government to make choices for people. Dia tampaknya akan mengandalkan sistem monopoli yang dikuasai atau disponsori oleh pemerintah untuk membuat pilihan bagi orang-orang. We disagree, finding ourselves less trusting of the integrity and good faith of such institutions and their leaders. Kami tidak setuju, menemukan diri kita kurang percaya pada integritas dan itikad baik dari lembaga-lembaga tersebut dan pemimpin mereka.

The example Mr. Krugman cites of " financialization " run amok (the electricity market in California) is the product of exactly his kind of system, with active government intervention at every step. Contoh Mr Krugman mengutip dari " finansialisasi "mengamuk (pasar listrik di California) adalah produk yang persis seperti nya sistem, dengan intervensi pemerintah yang aktif di setiap langkah. Indeed, the only winners in the California fiasco were the government-owned utilities of Los Angeles, the Pacific Northwest and British Columbia. Memang, para pemenang hanya di California kegagalan adalah utilitas milik pemerintah Los Angeles, Pacific Northwest dan British Columbia. The disaster that squandered the wealth of California was born of regulation by the few, not by markets of the many. Bencana yang menyia-nyiakan kekayaan California dilahirkan dari peraturan oleh beberapa, bukan oleh pasar dari banyak.

On August 15, Sherron Watkins , vice president for corporate development, sent an anonymous letter to Lay warning him about the company's accounting practices. Pada tanggal 15 Agustus Sherron Watkins , wakil presiden untuk pengembangan perusahaan, mengirim surat kaleng untuk Lay peringatan tentang Teman praktik akuntansi perusahaan. One statement in the letter said "I am incredibly nervous that we will implode in a wave of accounting scandals." [ 76 ] Watkins contacted a friend who worked for Arthur Andersen and he drafted a memo to give to the audit partners over the points she raised. Salah satu pernyataan dalam surat itu mengatakan "Saya sangat gugup bahwa kita akan meledak dalam gelombang skandal akuntansi." [76] Watkins dihubungi seorang teman yang bekerja untuk Arthur Andersen dan ia merancang sebuah memo untuk diberikan kepada mitra audit atas titik-titik dia terangkat. On August 22, Watkins individually met with Lay and gave him a six-page letter further explaining Enron's accounting issues. Pada tanggal 22 Agustus, Watkins individual bertemu dengan Lay dan memberinya surat enam halaman yang menjelaskan lebih lanjut isu-isu akuntansi Enron. Lay questioned her as to whether she had told anyone outside of the company and then vowed to have the company's law firm, Vinson & Elkins , review the issues, although she argued that using the firm would present a conflict of interest. [ 77 ] [ 78 ] Lay consulted with other executives, and although they wanted to

fire Watkins (as Texas law did not protect company whistleblowers ), they decided against it to prevent a lawsuit. [ 79 ] On October 15, Vinson & Elkins announced that Enron had done nothing wrong in its accounting practices as Andersen had approved each issue. [ 80 ] Lay menanyainya, apakah ia telah memberitahu siapa pun di luar perusahaan dan kemudian bersumpah untuk memiliki's firma hukum perusahaan, Vinson & Elkins , meninjau isu, meskipun dia berpendapat bahwa menggunakan perusahaan akan menyajikan konflik kepentingan. [77] [ 78] Lay berkonsultasi dengan para eksekutif lainnya, dan walaupun mereka ingin api Watkins (sebagai hukum Texas tidak melindungi perusahaan pelapor ), mereka memutuskan untuk mencegah tuntutan hukum. [79] Pada tanggal 15 Oktober, Vinson & Elkins mengumumkan bahwa Enron telah dilakukan ada yang salah dalam praktek akuntansi sebagai Andersen telah menyetujui setiap masalah. [80]

[ edit ] Investors' confidence declines [ sunting ] kepercayaan menurun 'Investor

Something is rotten with the state of Enron. Ada yang busuk dengan keadaan Enron.

The New York Times , Sept 9, 2001. [ 81 ] The New York Times, 9 September 2001. [81]

By the end of August 2001, his company's stock still falling, Lay named Greg Whalley, president and COO of Enron Wholesale Services and Mark Frevert, to positions in the chairman's office. Pada akhir bulan Agustus 2001, saham perusahaannya masih jatuh, Lay bernama Greg Whalley, presiden dan COO Enron Layanan Grosir dan Mark Frevert, untuk posisi di kantor ketua itu. Some observers suggested that Enron's investors were in significant need of reassurance, not only because the company's business was difficult to understand (even "indecipherable") [ 81 ] but also because it was difficult to properly describe the company in financial statements. [ 82 ] One analyst stated "it's really hard for analysts to determine where [Enron] are making money in a given quarter and where they are losing money." [ 82 ] Lay accepted that Enron's business was very complex, but asserted that analysts would "never get all the information they want" to satisfy their curiosity. Beberapa pengamat menyarankan itu investor Enron yang membutuhkan signifikan diyakinkan, bukan hanya karena bisnis perusahaan itu sulit dipahami (bahkan "terbaca") [81] tetapi juga karena sulit untuk benar menggambarkan perusahaan dalam laporan keuangan. [82] Seorang analis menyatakan "itu benar-benar sulit bagi analis untuk menentukan di mana [Enron] membuat uang dalam kuartal tertentu dan di mana mereka kehilangan uang." [82] Lay diterima itu urusan Enron sangat kompleks, tapi menegaskan bahwa analis akan "tidak pernah mendapatkan semua informasi yang mereka inginkan "untuk memuaskan keingintahuan mereka. He also explained that the complexity of the business was due largely to tax strategies and position-hedging. [ 82 ] Lay's efforts seemed to meet with limited success; by September 9, one prominent hedge fund manager noted that "[Enron] stock is trading under a cloud." [ 81 ] The sudden departure of Skilling combined with the opacity of Enron's accounting books made proper assessment difficult for Wall Street. Dia juga menjelaskan bahwa kompleksitas usaha ini terutama disebabkan oleh strategi pajak dan posisi-lindung nilai. [82] upaya-upaya Lay tampaknya untuk bertemu dengan keberhasilan yang terbatas; oleh tanggal 9 September seorang manajer terkemuka hedge fund mencatat bahwa "[Enron] saham perdagangan di bawah awan ". [81] Keberangkatan tiba-tiba Skilling dikombinasikan dengan opacity dari akuntansi buku's Enron membuat penilaian yang tepat sulit bagi Wall Street. In addition, the company admitted to repeatedly using "related-party transactions," which some feared could be too-easily used to transfer losses that might otherwise appear on Enron's own balance sheet. Selain itu, perusahaan mengakui berulang kali menggunakan "transaksi pihak-pihak terkait," yang beberapa

dikhawatirkan dapat terlalu-mudah digunakan untuk mentransfer kerugian yang mungkin muncul pada neraca Enron sendiri. A particularly troubling aspect of this technique was that several of the "related-party" entities had been or were being controlled by CFO Fastow. [ 81 ] Sebuah mengganggu aspek terutama dari teknik ini adalah bahwa beberapa dari "pihak-pihak terkait" entitas telah atau sedang dikendalikan oleh CFO Fastow. [81]

After the September 11, 2001 attacks , media attention shifted away from the company and its troubles; a little less than a month later Enron announced its intention to begin the process of shearing its lower-margin assets in favor of its core businesses of gas and electricity trading. Setelah , 11 September 2001 serangan , perhatian media bergeser jauh dari perusahaan dan masalah tersebut; sedikit kurang dari sebulan kemudian Enron mengumumkan niatnya untuk memulai proses geser margin yang lebih rendah-aset yang mendukung bisnis inti gas dan listrik perdagangan. This move included selling Portland General Electric to another Oregon utility, Northwest Natural Gas , for about $1.9 billion in cash and stock, and possibly selling its 65% stake in the Dabhol project in India. [ 83 ] Langkah ini termasuk penjualan Portland General Electric utilitas lain Oregon, Northwest Natural Gas , untuk sekitar $ 1,9 miliar pada kas dan saham, dan mungkin menjual 65% sahamnya di proyek Dabhol di India. [83]

[ edit ] Restructuring losses and SEC investigation [ sunting ] kerugian Restrukturisasi dan investigasi SEC

Enron announced on October 16 that restatements to its financial statements for years 1997 to 2000 were necessary to correct accounting violations. Enron mengumumkan pada 16 Oktober bahwa penyajian kembali laporan keuangan untuk tahun 1997 sampai 2000 diperlukan untuk memperbaiki pelanggaran akuntansi. The restatements for the period reduced earnings by $613 million (or 23% of reported profits during the period), increased liabilities at the end of 2000 by $628 million (6% of reported liabilities and 5.5% of reported equity), and reduced equity at the end of 2000 by $1.2 billion (10% of reported equity). [ 25 ] Additionally, Enron asserted that the broadband unit alone was worth $35 billion, a claim also mistrusted. Penyajian kembali untuk periode dikurangi pendapatan sebesar $ 613.000.000 (atau 23% dari keuntungan yang dilaporkan selama periode berjalan), meningkatkan kewajiban pada akhir tahun 2000 oleh $ 628.000.000 (6% dari kewajiban yang dilaporkan dan 5,5% dari ekuitas dilaporkan), dan ekuitas berkurang di akhir tahun 2000 sebesar $ 1,2 miliar (10% dari ekuitas dilaporkan). [25] Selain itu, Enron menegaskan bahwa unit broadband saja sudah bernilai $ 35 miliar klaim juga tidak dipercaya. An analyst at Standard & Poor's said "I don't think anyone knows what the broadband operation is worth." [ 84 ] Seorang analis di Standard & Poor's mengatakan "Saya tidak berpikir ada yang tahu apa operasi broadband bernilai." [84]

Enron's management team claimed the losses were mostly due to investment losses, along with charges such as about $180 million in money spent restructuring the company's troubled broadband trading unit. tim manajemen Enron mengklaim kerugian umumnya disebabkan kerugian investasi, bersama dengan tuntutan, sekitar $ 180 juta uang yang dihabiskan broadband bermasalah restrukturisasi perusahaan unit perdagangan. In a statement, Lay revealed, "After a thorough review of our businesses, we have decided to take these charges to clear away issues that have clouded the performance and earnings potential of our core energy businesses." [ 84 ] Some analysts were unnerved. David Fleischer at Goldman Sachs , an analyst called previously

'one of the company's strongest supporters' asserted that the Enron management "... lost credibility and have to reprove themselves. They need to convince investors these earnings are real, that the company is for real and that growth will be realized." [ 84 ] [ 85 ] Dalam sebuah pernyataan, Lay mengungkapkan, "Setelah dilakukan penelaahan secara menyeluruh bisnis kami, kami telah memutuskan untuk mengambil biaya tersebut untuk membersihkan isu yang mendung kinerja dan potensi penghasilan energi inti bisnis kami." [84] Beberapa analis terkesima. David Fleischer di Goldman Sachs , analis yang disebut 'sebelumnya' satu perusahaan terkuat pendukung menegaskan bahwa manajemen Enron "... kehilangan kredibilitas dan harus menegur mereka. Mereka perlu meyakinkan investor penghasilan ini adalah nyata, bahwa perusahaan adalah untuk nyata dan pertumbuhan yang akan direalisasikan ". [84] [85]

Fastow disclosed to Enron's board of directors on October 22 that he earned $30 million from compensation arrangements when managing the LJM limited partnerships. Fastow diungkapkan untuk Enron direksi pada 22 Oktober bahwa ia memperoleh $ 30 juta dari pengaturan kompensasi ketika mengelola kemitraan terbatas LJM. That day, the share price of Enron fell to $20.65, down $5.40 in one day, following the announcement by the SEC that it was investigating several suspicious deals struck by Enron, pronouncing "some of the most opaque transactions with insiders ever seen". [ 86 ] Attempting to explain the billion-dollar charge and calm investors, Enron's disclosures spoke of "share settled costless collar arrangements," "derivative instruments which eliminated the contingent nature of existing restricted forward contracts ," and strategies that served "to hedge certain merchant investments and other assets." Hari itu, harga saham Enron jatuh ke $ 20,65, turun $ 5,40 dalam satu hari, setelah pengumuman oleh SEC itu menyelidiki transaksi mencurigakan beberapa dipukul oleh Enron, mengucapkan "beberapa buram kebanyakan transaksi dengan orang dalam yang pernah dilihat". [ 86] Mencoba untuk menjelaskan dolar biaya dan tenang investor miliar,'s pengungkapan Enron berbicara tentang "saham diselesaikan pengaturan kerah tanpa biaya," "instrumen derivatif yang menghilangkan sifat kontingen yang ada dibatasi kontrak berjangka , "dan strategi yang berfungsi" untuk melindungi pedagang tertentu investasi dan aset lainnya. " Such puzzling phraseology left many analysts feeling ignorant about just how Enron ran its business. [ 86 ] Regarding the SEC investigation, chairman and CEO Lay said, "We will cooperate fully with the SEC and look forward to the opportunity to put any concern about these transactions to rest." [ 86 ] ungkapan membingungkan tersebut meninggalkan banyak analis merasa bodoh tentang bagaimana menjalankan bisnis Enron. [86] Mengenai penyelidikan SEC, Ketua dan CEO Lay berkata, "Kami akan bekerja sama sepenuhnya dengan SEC dan berharap untuk kesempatan untuk menempatkan setiap kekhawatiran tentang ini transaksi untuk beristirahat. " [86]

[ edit ] Liquidity concerns [ sunting ] keprihatinan Likuiditas

Concerns about Enron's liquidity prompted Lay to participate in a conference call on October 23, in which he attempted to reassure investors that the company's cash resources were ample and no further "one-time charges" loomed. Kekhawatiran tentang Enron likuiditas Lay diminta untuk berpartisipasi dalam panggilan konferensi pada tanggal 23 Oktober, di mana ia berusaha untuk meyakinkan investor bahwa uang tunai sumber daya perusahaan itu cukup dan tidak ada "lebih satu kali" tuduhan menjulang. Secondly, Lay adamantly insisted there were no improprieties regarding Enron's transactions with partnerships run by Fastow and emphasized his support for the CFO. [ 85 ] David Fleischer, the analyst at Goldman, was again skeptical, telling Lay and

Fastow, "There is an appearance that you are hiding something." Kedua, Lay tegas bersikeras tidak ada kejanggalan mengenai's transaksi Enron dengan kemitraan yang dijalankan oleh Fastow dan menekankan dukungannya bagi CFO. [85] David Fleischer, analis di Goldman, sekali lagi skeptis, mengatakan Lay dan Fastow, "Ada penampilan bahwa Anda menyembunyikan sesuatu. " Nevertheless, Fleischer persisted in recommending the stock, arguing that he didn't "think accountants and auditors would have allowed total shenanigans." [ 85 ] Lay also attempted to reassure the conferees by stressing that all of Enron's financial and accounting maneuvers had been scrutinized by their auditor, Arthur Andersen. Namun demikian, Fleischer bertahan dalam merekomendasikan saham, dengan alasan bahwa dia tidak "berpikir akuntan dan auditor akan mengizinkan total shenanigans." [85] Lay juga berusaha untuk meyakinkan peserta konferensi dengan menekankan bahwa semua keuangan dan akuntansi manuver Enron telah diteliti oleh auditor mereka, Arthur Andersen. After several questioners pressed the issue, Lay stated Enron management would "look into providing" more detailed statements for the end of better understanding the company's relationship with the special entities as those run by Fastow. [ 85 ] Setelah beberapa kuesioner menekan masalah, Lay lain manajemen Enron akan "melihat ke dalam menyediakan" laporan yang lebih rinci untuk akhir pemahaman yang lebih baik hubungan perusahaan dengan entitas khusus yang dijalankan oleh Fastow. [85]

Two days later, on October 25, despite his reassurances days earlier, Lay removed Fastow from his position, citing "In my continued discussions with the financial community, it became clear to me that restoring investor confidence would require us to replace Andy as CFO" [ 87 ] However, with Skilling and Fastow now both departed, some analysts feared that shedding light on the company's practices would be made all the more difficult. [ 87 ] Enron's stock was now trading at $16.41, having lost half its value in a little over a week. [ 87 ] Dua hari kemudian, pada 25 Oktober, meskipun hari-harinya kepastian sebelumnya, Lay dihapus Fastow dari jabatannya, mengutip "Dalam diskusi lanjutan saya dengan komunitas keuangan, menjadi jelas bagi saya bahwa memulihkan kepercayaan investor akan mengharuskan kita untuk menggantikan Andy sebagai CFO" [87] Namun, dengan Skilling dan Fastow sekarang kedua berangkat, beberapa analis khawatir bahwa cahaya shedding pada perusahaan praktek akan membuat semua lebih sulit. [87] Teman-saham Enron sekarang diperdagangkan pada $ 16,41, setelah kehilangan setengah nilainya dalam sedikit lebih dari seminggu. [87]

On October 27 the company began buying back all its commercial paper , valued at around $3.3 billion, in an effort to calm investor fears about Enron's supply of cash. Pada tanggal 27 Oktober perusahaan ini mulai membeli kembali semua perusahaan surat berharga , bernilai sekitar $ 3,3 miliar, dalam upaya untuk menenangkan kekhawatiran investor tentang Enron's suplai uang tunai. Enron financed the re-purchase by depleting its lines of credit at several banks. Enron membiayai pembelian kembali oleh perusahaan menguras jalur kredit di beberapa bank. While the company's debt rating was still considered investment-grade , its bonds were trading at levels slightly below, making future sales problematic. [ 88 ] Sementara perusahaan rating utang masih dianggap investasi-grade , perusahaan obligasi diperdagangkan pada tingkat sedikit di bawah, membuat penjualan masa depan bermasalah. [88]

As the month came to a close, serious concerns were being raised by some observers regarding Enron's possible manipulation of accepted accounting rules; however, analysis was claimed to be impossible based on the incomplete information provided by Enron. [ 89 ] Industry analysts openly

feared that Enron was the new Long-Term Capital Management , the hedge fund whose collapse in 1998 threatened systemic failure in the international financial markets. Sebagai bulan datang untuk menutup, keprihatinan serius sedang diangkat oleh beberapa pengamat tentang kemungkinan manipulasi's Enron aturan akuntansi yang berlaku;, analisis diklaim tidak mungkin didasarkan pada lengkap yang diberikan informasi oleh Enron. Namun [89] analis industri secara terbuka khawatir bahwa Enron adalah baru Long-Term Capital Management , dana lindung nilai yang runtuh pada tahun 1998 terancam gagal sistemik dalam pasar keuangan internasional. Enron's tremendous presence worried some about the consequences of the company's possible collapse. [ 63 ] Enron executives were tight-lipped, accepting questions in written form only. [ 63 ] luar biasa kehadiran's Enron khawatir beberapa tentang konsekuensi dari mungkin runtuh perusahaan. [63] Enron eksekutif membisu, menerima pertanyaan-pertanyaan dalam bentuk tertulis saja. [63]

[ edit ] Credit rating downgrade [ sunting ] downgrade rating Kredit

The central short-term danger to Enron's survival at the end of October 2001 seemed to be its credit rating. Bahaya jangka pendek penting bagi kelangsungan hidup Enron pada akhir bulan Oktober 2001 tampaknya rating kredit. It was reported at the time that Moody's and Fitch , two of the three biggest credit-rating agencies, had slated Enron for review for possible downgrade. [ 63 ] Such a downgrade would force Enron to issue millions of shares of stock to cover loans it had guaranteed, a move that would bring down the value of existing stock further. Saat itu dilaporkan pada saat itu Moody's dan Fitch , dua dari tiga lembaga pemeringkat kredit terbesar, telah dijadwalkan Enron untuk ulasan untuk downgrade mungkin. [63] seperti downgrade yang akan memaksa Enron untuk mengeluarkan jutaan saham untuk menutupi pinjaman yang telah dijamin, sebuah langkah yang akan menurunkan nilai saham yang ada lebih lanjut. Additionally, all manner of companies began reviewing their existing contracts with Enron, especially in the long term, in the event that Enron's rating were lowered below investment grade, a possible hindrance in future transactions. [ 63 ] Selain itu, segala macam perusahaan mulai mengkaji kontrak yang ada dengan Enron, terutama dalam jangka panjang, dalam hal peringkat Enron yang diturunkan di bawah tingkat investasi, kemungkinan hambatan dalam transaksi masa depan. [63]

Analysts and observers continued their chorus of complaints regarding Enron's difficulty or impossibility of properly assessing a company whose financial statements were so mysterious. Analis dan pengamat paduan suara mereka terus keluhan tentang kesulitan atau ketidakmungkinan Enron dengan benar menilai sebuah perusahaan yang laporan keuangannya begitu misterius. Some feared that no one at Enron apart from Skilling and Fastow could completely explain years of mysterious transactions. Beberapa takut bahwa tidak ada seorang pun di Enron terpisah dari Skilling dan Fastow benar-benar bisa menjelaskan tahun transaksi misterius. "You're getting way over my head," said Lay in late August 2001 in response to detailed questions about Enron's business, a reaction that worried analysts. [ 63 ] "Kau mendapatkan cara di atas kepala saya," kata Lay pada akhir Agustus tahun 2001 menjawab pertanyaan rinci tentang bisnis Enron, reaksi yang khawatir analis. [63]

On October 29, responding to growing concerns that Enron might have insufficient cash on hand, news spread that Enron was seeking a further $1–2 billion in financing from banks. [ 90 ] The next

day, as feared, Moody's lowered Enron's credit rating from Baa1 to Baa2, two levels above junk status . Pada tanggal 29 Oktober, menanggapi keprihatinan bahwa Enron mungkin memiliki kas cukup di tangan, berita tersebar bahwa Enron adalah mencari lebih lanjut $ 1-2 milyar dalam pembiayaan dari bank. [90] Keesokan harinya, seperti takut, Moody's menurunkan credit rating's Enron dari Baa1 ke Baa2, dua tingkat di atas status sampah . Standard & Poor's also lowered Enron's rating to BBB+, the equivalent of Moody's rating. Standard & Poor's juga menurunkan peringkat Enron dengan BBB +, setara dengan rating Moody's. Moody's also warned that it would downgrade Enron's commercial paper rating, the consequence of which would likely prevent the company from finding the further financing it sought to keep solvent. [ 91 ] Moody's juga memperingatkan bahwa mereka akan menurunkan Enron komersial kertas rating, konsekuensi yang kemungkinan akan mencegah perusahaan dari menemukan pembiayaan lebih lanjut, berusaha untuk menjaga pelarut. [91]

November began with the disclosure that the SEC was now pursuing a formal investigation, prompted by questions related to Enron's dealings with "related parties". November dimulai dengan pengungkapan bahwa SEC sekarang mengejar penyelidikan formal, diminta oleh pertanyaan yang terkait dengan transaksi Enron dengan "pihak terkait". Enron's board also announced that it would commission a special committee to investigate the transactions, headed by William C. Powers , the dean of the University of Texas law school. [ 92 ] The next day, an editorial in The New York Times called for an "aggressive" investigation into the matter. [ 93 ] Enron was able to secure an additional $1 billion in financing from cross-town rival Dynegy on November 2, but the news was not universally admired in that the debt was secured by assets from the company's valuable Northern Natural Gas and Transwestern Pipeline. [ 94 ] Enron's board juga mengumumkan bahwa mereka akan komisi panitia khusus untuk menyelidiki transaksi, dipimpin oleh William C. Powers , dekan dari University of Texas sekolah hukum. [92] Hari berikutnya, editorial di The New York Times menyebutnya sebagai "agresif" investigasi atas masalah tersebut. [93] Enron mampu mengamankan tambahan $ 1 miliar dalam pembiayaan dari kota saingan silang Dynegy pada tanggal 2, tapi berita itu tidak dikagumi dalam bahwa utang tersebut dijamin dengan aset dari perusahaan itu berharga Utara Gas Bumi dan Transwestern Pipa. [94]

[ edit ] Proposed buyout by Dynegy [ sunting ] Usulan pembelian oleh Dynegy

Sources claimed that Enron was planning to explain its business practices more fully within the coming days, as a confidence-building gesture. [ 95 ] Enron's stock was now trading at around $7, as investors worried that the company would not be able to find a buyer. Sumber mengklaim bahwa Enron berencana untuk menjelaskan praktik bisnis yang lebih lengkap dalam beberapa hari mendatang, sebagai pembangunan sikap percaya diri. [95] Teman-saham Enron sekarang diperdagangkan pada sekitar $ 7, karena investor khawatir bahwa perusahaan tidak akan dapat menemukan pembeli.

After it received a wide spectrum of rejections, Enron management apparently found a buyer when the board of Dynegy, another energy trader based in Houston, voted late at night on November 7 to acquire Enron at a fire-sale price of about $8 billion in stock. [ 96 ] Chevron Texaco , which at the time owned about a quarter of Dynegy, agreed to provide Enron with $2.5 billion in cash, specifically $1 billion up front and the rest when the deal was completed. Setelah

menerima spektrum yang luas dari penolakan, manajemen Enron ternyata ditemukan pembeli ketika dewan Dynegy, lain pedagang energi berbasis di Houston, memilih larut malam pada tanggal 7 November untuk mengakuisisi Enron dengan harga api-penjualan sekitar $ 8 miliar di saham . [96] Chevron Texaco , yang pada saat yang dimiliki sekitar seperempat Dynegy, setuju untuk menyediakan Enron dengan $ 2,5 milyar tunai, khususnya 1000000000 $ di depan dan sisanya ketika kesepakatan itu selesai. Dynegy would also be required to assume nearly $13 billion of debt, plus any other debt hitherto occluded by the Enron management's secretive business practices, [ 96 ] possibly as much as $10 billion in "hidden" debt. [ 97 ] Dynegy and Enron confirmed their deal on November 8, 2001. Dynegy juga akan diminta untuk menanggung hampir $ 13000000000 utang, ditambah sampai sekarang hutang lainnya yang tersumbat oleh manajemen rahasia bisnis Enron praktek tersebut, [96] mungkin sebanyak $ 10 miliar dalam tersembunyi "utang". [97] Dynegy dan Enron dikonfirmasi mereka kesepakatan pada tanggal 8 Nopember 2001.

Commentators remarked on the different corporate cultures between Dynegy and Enron, and on the "straight-talking" personality of the CEO of Dynegy, Charles Watson . [ 7 ] Some wondered if Enron's troubles had not simply been the result of innocent accounting errors. [ 98 ] By November, Enron was asserting that the billion-plus "one-time charges" disclosed in October should in reality have been $200 million, with the rest of the amount simply corrections of dormant accounting mistakes. [ 99 ] Many feared other "mistakes" and restatements might yet be revealed. [ 100 ] Komentator mencatat pada budaya perusahaan yang berbeda antara Dynegy dan Enron, dan pada "lurus-bicara" kepribadian dari CEO Dynegy, Charles Watson . [7] Beberapa bertanya-tanya apakah itu masalah Enron tidak hanya merupakan hasil dari kesalahan akuntansi yang tidak bersalah. [ 98] Pada bulan November, Enron adalah menyatakan bahwa milyar-plus "waktu tuduhan satu" diungkapkan pada bulan Oktober harus dalam kenyataannya telah $ 200 juta, dengan sisa jumlah hanya koreksi kesalahan akuntansi terbengkalai. [99] Banyak takut lainnya " kesalahan "dan penyesuaian mungkin belum terungkap. [100]

Another major correction of Enron's earnings was announced on November 9, with a reduction of $591 million over the stated revenue of years 1997–2000. Lain koreksi utama pendapatan Enron diumumkan pada tanggal 9 November, dengan pengurangan dari $ 591.000.000 atas pendapatan lain dari tahun 1997-2000. The charges were said to come largely from two special purpose partnerships (JEDI and Chewco). Tuduhan itu dikatakan sebagian besar berasal dari dua kemitraan tujuan khusus (JEDI dan Chewco). The corrections resulted in the virtual elimination of profit for fiscal year 1997, with significant reductions for the other years. Koreksi mengakibatkan penghapusan virtual laba untuk tahun fiskal 1997, dengan pengurangan yang signifikan untuk tahun lainnya. Despite this disclosure, Dynegy declared it still intended to purchase Enron. [ 99 ] Both companies were said to be anxious to receive an official assessment of the proposed sale from Moody's and S&P presumably to understand the effect the completion of any buyout transaction would have on Dynegy and Enron's credit rating. Meskipun pengungkapan ini, Dynegy menyatakan masih ditujukan untuk membeli Enron. [99] Kedua perusahaan dikatakan ingin menerima penilaian resmi rencana penjualan dari Moody's dan S & P mungkin untuk memahami pengaruh penyelesaian transaksi pembelian akan di Dynegy dan peringkat kredit Enron. In addition, concerns were raised regarding antitrust regulatory hurdles leading to possible divestiture , along with what to some observers were the radically different corporate cultures of Enron and Dynegy. [ 97 ] Selain itu, kekhawatiran dibesarkan tentang

hambatan regulasi antitrust yang mengarah ke kemungkinan divestasi , bersama dengan apa yang harus beberapa pengamat adalah perusahaan budaya yang berbeda secara radikal dari Enron dan Dynegy. [97]

Both companies pushed aggressively for the deal, and some observers were hopeful; Watson was praised for his vision in attempting to create the biggest presence on the energy market. [ 100 ] At the time, Watson said "We feel [Enron] is a very solid company with plenty of capacity to withstand whatever happens the next few months." [ 100 ] One analyst called the deal "a whopper [...] a very good deal financially, certainly should be a good deal strategically, and provides some immediate balance-sheet backstop for Enron." [ 101 ] Kedua perusahaan mendorong agresif untuk kesepakatan itu, dan beberapa pengamat yang berharap; dipuji karena dalam visi mencoba membuat yang terbesar pada kehadiran energi. Pasar Watson [100] Pada waktu itu, Watson mengatakan, "Kami merasa [Enron] yang sangat perusahaan yang solid dengan banyak kapasitas untuk menahan apa pun yang terjadi beberapa bulan ke depan. " [100] Satu analis disebut kesepakatan "bohong besar sebuah [...] yang baik kesepakatan yang sangat finansial, tentunya harus banyak baik secara strategis, dan menyediakan beberapa langsung neraca backstop untuk Enron ". [101]

Credit issues were becoming more critical, however. Kredit masalah itu menjadi lebih kritis, namun. Around the time the buyout was made public, Moody's and S&P both lowered Enron's rating to just one notch above junk status. Sekitar waktu pembelian itu dibuat publik, Moody's dan S & P menurunkan peringkat kedua Enron hanya satu tingkat di atas status sampah. Were the company's rating to fall below investment-grade, its ability to trade would be severely limited if there was a reduction or elimination of its credit lines with competitors. [ 100 ] In a conference call, S&P affirmed that, were Enron not to be taken over, S&P would cut its rating to low BB or high B, ratings noted as being within junk status. [ 102 ] In addition, many traders had limited their involvement with Enron, or stopped doing business altogether, fearing more bad news. Apakah perusahaan rating untuk jatuh di bawah investasi-grade, kemampuannya untuk perdagangan akan sangat terbatas jika terjadi pengurangan atau penghapusan garis kredit dengan pesaing. [100] Di dalam panggilan konferensi, S & P menegaskan bahwa, yang Enron tidak akan diambil alih, S & P akan memangkas rating menjadi BB rendah atau B tinggi, peringkat dicatat sebagai dalam status junk. [102] Di samping itu, banyak pedagang telah membatasi keterlibatan mereka dengan Enron, atau berhenti melakukan bisnis sama sekali, takut berita buruk lagi. Watson again attempted to re-assure, attesting at a presentation to investors that there was "nothing wrong with Enron's business". [ 101 ] He also acknowledged that remunerative steps (in the form of more stock options) would have to be taken to redress the animosity of many Enron employees for management after it was revealed that Lay and other top officials had sold hundreds of millions of dollars worth of stock in the months leading up to the crisis. [ 101 ] The situation was not helped by the disclosure that Lay, his "reputation in tatters", [ 103 ] stood to receive a payment of $60 million as a change-of-control fee subsequent to the Dynegy acquisition, while many Enron employees had seen their retirement accounts, which were largely based on Enron stock, decimated as the price fell 90% in a year. Watson kembali mencoba untuk kembali meyakinkan, membuktikan pada presentasi kepada investor bahwa ada "ada yang salah dengan bisnis Enron". [101] Ia juga mengakui bahwa langkah menguntungkan (dalam bentuk opsi saham lebih) harus diambil untuk memperbaiki permusuhan karyawan Enron banyak untuk manajemen setelah terungkap bahwa Lay dan pejabat lainnya telah menjual ratusan juta dolar saham di bulan-bulan

menjelang krisis. [101] Situasi itu tidak membantu dengan pengungkapan yang Lay , "nya" reputasi compang-camping, [103] berdiri untuk menerima pembayaran sebesar $ 60 juta sebagai perubahan-pengendalian biaya-setelah akuisisi Dynegy, sementara banyak Enron karyawan telah melihat pensiun account, yang sebagian besar didasarkan pada Enron saham , hancur karena harganya turun 90% dalam setahun. An official at a company owned by Enron stated "We had some married couples who both worked who lost as much as $800,000 or $900,000. It pretty much wiped out every employee's savings plan." [ 104 ] Seorang pejabat di sebuah perusahaan yang dimiliki oleh Enron dinyatakan "Kami memiliki beberapa pasangan menikah yang keduanya bekerja yang kehilangan sebanyak $ 800.000 atau $ 900.000 cukup. Hal ini banyak dihapuskan's tabungan rencana setiap karyawan." [104]

Watson assured investors that the true nature of Enron's business had been made clear to him: "We have comfort there is not another shoe to drop. If there is no shoe, this is a phenomenally good transaction." [ 102 ] Watson further asserted that Enron's energy trading part alone was worth the price Dynegy was paying for the whole company. [ 105 ] Watson meyakinkan investor bahwa sifat sebenarnya dari bisnis Enron telah dibuat jelas baginya: "kenyamanan tidak ada lagi sepatu untuk menjatuhkan. Jika Kami tidak ada, sepatu ini adalah fenomenal transaksi. Baik memiliki" [102] Watson lebih lanjut menyatakan bahwa bagian perdagangan energi Enron sendirian adalah harga yang pantas Dynegy yang membayar seluruh perusahaan. [105]

By mid-November, Enron announced it was planning to sell about $8 billion worth of underperforming assets, along with a general plan to reduce its scale for the sake of financial stability. [ 91 ] On November 19 Enron disclosed to the public further evidence of its critical state of affairs. Pada pertengahan November, Enron mengumumkan berencana menjual sekitar $ 8 milyar aset kinerjanya, bersama dengan rencana umum untuk mengurangi skala demi stabilitas keuangan. [91] Pada tanggal 19 November Enron diungkapkan kepada bukti lebih lanjut publik yang penting keadaan. Most pressingly that the company was facing debt repayment obligations in the range of $9 billion by the end of 2002. Kebanyakan pressingly bahwa perusahaan sedang menghadapi kewajiban pembayaran utang dalam kisaran $ 9 miliar di akhir tahun 2002. Such debts were "vastly in excess" of its available cash. [ 106 ] Also, the success of measures to preserve its solvency were not guaranteed, specifically as regarded asset sales and debt refinancing. hutang tersebut telah "jauh lebih" uang yang tersedia. [106] Selain itu, keberhasilan langkah-langkah untuk menjaga solvabilitas perusahaan tidak terjamin, terutama untuk penjualan aset dianggap dan refinancing utang. In a statement, Enron revealed "An adverse outcome with respect to any of these matters would likely have a material adverse impact on Enron's ability to continue as a going concern." [ 106 ] Dalam sebuah pernyataan, Enron mengungkapkan "Suatu hasil yang merugikan sehubungan dengan hal tersebut mungkin akan memiliki dampak yang buruk pada materi kemampuan Enron untuk melanjutkan kelangsungan hidupnya." [106]

Two days later, on November 21, Wall Street expressed serious doubts that Dynegy would proceed with its deal at all, or would seek to radically renegotiate. Dua hari kemudian, pada 21 November, Wall Street menyatakan keraguan yang serius yang Dynegy akan melanjutkan perjanjiannya sama sekali, atau akan berusaha untuk menegosiasikan kembali secara radikal. Furthermore Enron revealed in a 10-Q filing that almost all the money it had recently borrowed for purposes including buying its commercial paper, or about $5 billion, had been exhausted in just 50 days. Selanjutnya Enron terungkap dalam -Q pengajuan 10 bahwa hampir semua uang

yang baru saja dipinjam untuk tujuan termasuk pembelian surat berharga, atau sekitar $ 5 miliar, telah habis hanya dalam 50 hari. Analysts were unnerved at the revelation, especially since Dynegy was reported to also have been unaware of Enron's rate of cash use. [ 107 ] In order to walk away from the proposed buyout, Dynegy would need to legally demonstrate a "material change" in the circumstances of the transaction; as late as November 22, sources close to Dynegy were skeptical that the latest revelations constituted sufficient grounds. [ 108 ] Analis terkesima pada wahyu, terutama karena Dynegy dilaporkan juga telah menyadari's tingkat Enron penggunaan uang tunai. [107] Dalam rangka untuk berjalan kaki dari pembelian yang diusulkan, Dynegy perlu hukum menunjukkan "perubahan materi" di keadaan transaksi; hingga akhir 22 November sumber yang dekat dengan Dynegy yang skeptis bahwa wahyu terbaru merupakan alasan yang cukup. [108]

The SEC announced it had filed civil fraud complaints against Andersen. [ 109 ] A few days later, sources claimed Enron and Dynegy were renegotiating the terms of their arrangement. [ 110 ] Dynegy now demanded Enron agree to be bought for $4 billion rather than the previous $8 billion. SEC mengumumkan telah mengajukan keluhan penipuan perdata terhadap Andersen. [109]

Beberapa hari kemudian, sumber menyatakan Enron dan Dynegy adalah negosiasi ulang persyaratan pengaturan mereka. [110] Dynegy sekarang menuntut Enron setuju untuk dibeli untuk $ 4000000000 daripada sebelumnya $ 8 miliar. Observers were reporting difficulties in ascertaining whether or which of Enron's operations, if any, were profitable. Pengamat yang melaporkan kesulitan dalam memastikan apakah atau yang operasi Enron, jika ada, yang menguntungkan. Reports described an en masse shift of business to Enron's competitors for the sake of risk exposure reduction. [ 110 ] Laporan menggambarkan sebuah pergeseran en masse usaha untuk pesaing Enron demi pengurangan eksposur risiko. [110]

[ edit ] Bankruptcy [ sunting ] Kepailitan

Enron's stock price (former NYSE ticker symbol: ENE) from August 23, 2000 ($90) to January 11, 2002 ($0.12). Harga saham Enron (mantan NYSE simbol ticker: ENE) mulai tanggal 23 Agustus 2000 ($ 90) menjadi 11 Januari 2002 ($ 0,12). As a result of the drop in the stock price, shareholders lost nearly $11 billion. [ 2 ] Sebagai hasil dari penurunan harga saham, pemegang saham kehilangan hampir $ 11 miliar. [2]

On November 28, 2001, Enron's two worst-possible outcomes came true. Pada tanggal 28 Nopember 2001, dua Enron hasil terburuk yang mungkin menjadi kenyataan. Dynegy Inc.

unilaterally disengaged from the proposed acquisition of the company and Enron's credit rating fell to junk status. Inc Dynegy secara sepihak terlepas dari rencana akuisisi perusahaan dan rating kredit Enron jatuh ke status junk. Watson later said "At the end, you couldn't give it [Enron] to me." [ 111 ] The company, having very little cash with which to run its business, let alone satisfy enormous debts, imploded. Watson kemudian mengatakan "Pada akhirnya, Anda tidak bisa memberi itu [Enron] kepada saya." [111] Perusahaan, mempunyai sedikit uang tunai dengan yang dapat digunakan untuk menjalankan usahanya, apalagi memuaskan hutang yang sangat besar, meledak. Its stock price fell to $0.61 at the end of the day's trading. Its harga saham turun menjadi $ 0,61 pada akhir perdagangan hari itu. One editorial observer wrote that "Enron is now shorthand for the perfect financial storm." [ 112 ] Seorang pengamat editorial menulis bahwa "Enron sekarang singkatan dari badai keuangan yang sempurna." [112]

Systemic consequences were felt, as Enron's creditors and other energy trading companies suffered the loss of several percentage points. konsekuensi sistemik yang dirasakan, sebagai kreditur Enron dan perusahaan-perusahaan energi lainnya, perdagangan mengalami kehilangan beberapa poin persentase. Some analysts felt Enron's failure highlighted the risks of the post-September 11 economy, and encouraged traders to lock in profits where they could. [ 113 ] The question now became how to determine the total exposure of the markets and other traders to Enron's failure. Beberapa analis merasa's kegagalan Enron menyoroti risiko 11 September ekonomi-posting, dan pedagang didorong untuk mengunci keuntungan di mana mereka bisa. [113] Pertanyaannya sekarang menjadi bagaimana menentukan eksposur total pasar dan pedagang lain untuk itu kegagalan Enron. Early figures put the number at $18.7 billion. angka awal menempatkan angka pada $ 18700000000. One adviser stated, "We don't really know who is out there exposed to Enron's credit. I'm telling my clients to prepare for the worst." [ 114 ] Satu penasihat menyatakan, "Kami tidak benar-benar tahu siapa yang di luar sana terkena's kredit Enron. Aku memberitahu klien saya untuk mempersiapkan yang terburuk." [114]

Enron was estimated to have about $23 billion in liabilities from both debt outstanding and guaranteed loans. Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase in particular appeared to have significant amounts to lose with Enron's fall. Enron diperkirakan memiliki sekitar $ 23 miliar pada kewajiban dari kedua utang dan jaminan pinjaman. Citigroup dan JP Morgan Chase secara khusus tampaknya memiliki nilai yang signifikan kalah dengan musim gugur Enron. Additionally, many of Enron's major assets were pledged to lenders in order to secure loans, throwing into doubt what if anything unsecured creditors and eventually stockholders might receive in bankruptcy proceedings. [ 115 ] Selain itu, banyak aset utama's Enron yang dijaminkan kepada kreditur dalam rangka untuk menjamin pinjaman, melemparkan ke dalam keraguan apa jika ada kreditur konkuren dan akhirnya pemegang saham mungkin menerima dalam proses kebangkrutan. [115]

Enron's European operations filed for bankruptcy on November 30, 2001, and it sought Chapter 11 protection two days later on December 2. Eropa operasi's Enron bangkrut pada tanggal 30 November 2001, dan mencari Bab 11 perlindungan dua hari kemudian pada tanggal 2. It was the largest bankruptcy in US history (before being surpassed by WorldCom 's bankruptcy the following year), and resulted in 4,000 lost jobs. [ 2 ] [ 116 ] The day that Enron filed for bankruptcy, the employees were told to pack up their belongings and were given 30 minutes to vacate the building. [ 117 ] Nearly 62% of 15,000 employees' savings plans relied on Enron stock that was

purchased at $83 in early 2001. Ini adalah terbesar kebangkrutan dalam sejarah Amerika Serikat (sebelum dikalahkan oleh WorldCom kebangkrutan s 'pada tahun berikutnya), dan mengakibatkan 4.000 pekerjaan yang hilang. [2] [116] Hari yang Enron bangkrut, karyawan disuruh berkemas harta milik mereka dan diberi 30 menit untuk mengosongkan gedung. [117] Hampir 62% dari karyawan tabungan rencana 15.000 mengandalkan saham Enron yang dibeli di $ 83 di awal tahun 2001. By October 2001, Enron's stock later plunged to below a dollar. [ 118 ] Pada Oktober 2001,'s saham Enron kemudian turun di bawah satu dolar. [118]

In its accounting work for Enron, Andersen had been sloppy and weak. Dalam pekerjaan akuntansi Enron, Andersen telah ceroboh dan lemah. But that's how Enron had always wanted it. Tapi itu adalah cara Enron selalu menginginkannya. In truth, even as they angrily pointed fingers, the two deserved each other. Sebenarnya, bahkan saat mereka marah menunjuk jari, dua pantas satu sama lain.

Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind in The Smartest Guys in the Room . [ 119 ] Bethany McLean dan Elkind Peter dalam The Guys terpandai di kamar hotel. [119]

On January 17, 2002 Enron fired Arthur Andersen as its auditor, citing its accounting advice and the destruction of documents. Pada 17 Januari 2002 Enron dipecat Arthur Andersen sebagai auditor, dengan alasan saran akuntansi dan penghancuran dokumen. Andersen countered that they had already severed ties with the company when Enron entered bankruptcy. [ 120 ] Andersen membantah bahwa mereka telah memutuskan hubungan dengan perusahaan ketika memasuki kebangkrutan Enron. [120]

[ edit ] Trials [ sunting ] Percobaan

[ edit ] Enron [ sunting ] Enron

Main article: The trial of Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling Artikel utama: Persidangan Kenneth Lay dan Jeffrey Skilling

Fastow and his wife, Lea, both pleaded guilty to charges against them. Fastow dan istrinya, Lea, keduanya mengaku bersalah atas tuduhan terhadap mereka. Fastow was initially charged with 98 counts of fraud, money laundering , insider trading , and conspiracy, among other crimes. [ 121 ] Fastow pleaded guilty to two charges of conspiracy and was sentenced to ten years with no parole in a plea bargain to testify against Lay, Skilling, and Causey. [ 122 ] Lea was indicted on six felony counts, but prosecutors later dropped them in favor of a single misdemeanor tax charge. Fastow awalnya didakwa dengan 98 tuduhan penipuan, pencucian uang , insider trading , dan konspirasi, antara kejahatan lainnya. [121] Fastow mengaku bersalah atas dua tuduhan konspirasi dan dijatuhi hukuman sepuluh tahun dengan pembebasan bersyarat tidak ada dalam tawar-menawar permohonan untuk bersaksi melawan Lay, Skilling, dan dam. [122] Lea didakwa di enam tuduhan kejahatan, tetapi jaksa kemudian menjatuhkan mereka dalam mendukung biaya pajak pelanggaran tunggal. Lea was sentenced to one year for helping her husband hide income from the government. [ 123 ] Lea dijatuhi hukuman satu tahun untuk membantu suami menyembunyikan pendapatan dari pemerintah. [123]

Lay and Skilling went on trial for their part in the Enron scandal in January 2006. Berbaring dan Skilling ke pengadilan untuk bagian mereka dalam skandal Enron pada Januari 2006. The 53-count, 65-page indictment covers a broad range of financial crimes, including bank fraud, making false statements to banks and auditors, securities fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, conspiracy, and insider trading. District Judge Sim Lake had previously denied motions by the defendants to hold separate trials and to move the case out of Houston, where the defendants argued the negative publicity surrounding Enron's demise would make it impossible to get a fair trial. The-hitung, 53 halaman 65 surat dakwaan mencakup berbagai kejahatan keuangan, termasuk penipuan bank, membuat pernyataan palsu kepada bank dan auditor, efek penipuan, penipuan kawat, pencucian uang, konspirasi, dan insider trading. Distrik Hakim Sim Lake sebelumnya mosi ditolak oleh para terdakwa untuk mengadakan percobaan terpisah dan untuk memindahkan kasus dari Houston, di mana terdakwa berpendapat publisitas negatif yang mengelilingi kematian Enron akan membuat tidak mungkin untuk mendapatkan pengadilan yang adil. On May 25, 2006, the jury in the Lay and Skilling trial returned its verdicts. Pada tanggal 25 Mei 2006, juri dalam sidang Skilling Lay dan kembali putusan tersebut. Skilling was convicted of 19 of 28 counts of securities fraud and wire fraud and acquitted on the remaining nine, including charges of insider trading . Skilling dihukum untuk 19 dari 28 jumlah penipuan sekuritas dan penipuan kawat dan dibebaskan pada sembilan tersisa, termasuk tuduhan insider trading . He was sentenced to 24 years and 4 months in prison. [ 124 ] Dia dijatuhi hukuman 24 tahun dan 4 bulan penjara. [124]

Lay pleaded not guilty to the eleven criminal charges, and claimed that he was misled by those around him. Lay mengaku tidak bersalah atas tuntutan pidana sebelas, dan menyatakan bahwa ia disesatkan oleh orang-orang di sekitarnya. He attributed the main cause for the company's fall to Fastow. [ 125 ] Lay was convicted of all six counts of securities and wire fraud for which he had been tried, and he faced a total sentence of up to 45 years in prison. [ 126 ] However, before sentencing was scheduled, Lay died on July 5, 2006. Ia disebabkan penyebab utama perusahaan musim gugur untuk Fastow. [125] Lay dihukum semua enam hitungan efek dan penipuan kawat yang dia telah mencoba, dan ia menghadapi hukuman total sampai dengan 45 tahun penjara. [126 ] Namun, sebelum hukuman dijadwalkan, Lay meninggal dunia pada tanggal 5 Juli 2006. At the time of his death, the SEC had been seeking more than $90 million from Lay in addition to civil fines. Pada saat kematiannya, SEC telah mencari lebih dari $ 90 juta dari Lay selain denda sipil. The case surrounding Lay's wife, Linda, is a difficult one. Kasus sekitarnya istri Lay, Linda, adalah satu sulit. She sold roughly 500,000 shares of Enron ten minutes to thirty minutes before the information that Enron was collapsing went public on November 28, 2001. [ 127 ] Linda was never charged with any of the events related to Enron. [ 128 ] Dia terjual sekitar 500.000 saham sepuluh menit Enron sampai tiga puluh menit sebelum informasi yang Enron telah runtuh go public pada tanggal 28 November 2001. [127] Linda tidak pernah dibebankan dengan salah satu peristiwa yang terkait dengan Enron. [128]

Although Michael Kopper worked at Enron for over seven years, Lay did not know of Kopper even after the company's bankruptcy. Meskipun Michael Kopper bekerja di Enron selama lebih dari tujuh tahun, Lay tidak mengetahui Kopper bahkan setelah kebangkrutan perusahaan. Kopper was able to keep his name anonymous in the entire affair, as the spotlight remained on Fastow. [ 129 ] Kopper was the first Enron executive to plead guilty. [ 130 ] Chief Accounting Officer Rick Causey was indicted with six felony charges for disguising Enron's financial shape during his

tenure. [ 131 ] After pleading not guilty, he later switched to guilty and was sentenced to seven years in prison. [ 132 ] Kopper mampu menjaga namanya anonim dalam urusan keseluruhan, sebagai sorotan tetap pada Fastow. [129] Kopper adalah eksekutif Enron pertama untuk mengaku bersalah. [130] Chief Accounting Officer Rick dam didakwa dengan enam dakwaan kejahatan untuk menyamarkan Enron bentuk keuangan selama masa jabatannya. [131] Setelah mengaku tidak bersalah, ia kemudian beralih ke bersalah dan dijatuhi hukuman tujuh tahun penjara. [132]

All told, sixteen people pleaded guilty for crimes committed at the company, and five others, including four former Merrill Lynch employees, were found guilty. Semua mengatakan, enam belas orang mengaku bersalah atas kejahatan yang dilakukan di perusahaan tersebut, dan lima orang lainnya, termasuk empat mantan Merrill Lynch karyawan, ditemukan bersalah. Eight former Enron executives testified—the star witness being Fastow—against Lay and Skilling, his former bosses. [ 116 ] Another was Kenneth Rice, the former chief of Enron Corp.'s high-speed Internet unit, who cooperated and whose testimony helped convict Skilling and Lay. Delapan mantan eksekutif Enron bersaksi-saksi yang Fastow-bintang terhadap Lay dan Skilling, mantan bos. [116] lain adalah Kenneth Rice, mantan kepala Enron Corp 's Internet kecepatan unit-tinggi, yang bekerjasama dan yang kesaksian membantu narapidana Skilling dan Lay. In June 2007, he received a 27-month sentence. [ 133 ] Pada bulan Juni 2007, ia menerima hukuman 27 bulan. [133]

[ edit ] Arthur Andersen [ sunting ] Arthur Andersen

Main article: Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States Artikel utama: Arthur Andersen LLP v. Amerika Serikat

Arthur Andersen was charged with and found guilty of obstruction of justice for shredding the thousands of documents and deleting e-mails and company files that tied the firm to its audit of Enron. [ 134 ] The conviction was later overturned by the US Supreme Court due to the jury not being properly instructed on the charge against Andersen. [ 135 ] Despite the reversal, Andersen had already lost the majority of its clients and had been barred from auditing public companies. Arthur Andersen didakwa dan dinyatakan bersalah obstruksi keadilan untuk memotong-motong ribuan dokumen dan menghapus e-mail dan file perusahaan yang mengikat perusahaan untuk mengaudit Enron. [134] Keyakinan itu kemudian dibatalkan oleh Mahkamah Agung AS karena ke juri tidak benar instruksi atas tuduhan terhadap Andersen. [135] Meskipun pemulihan tersebut, Andersen telah kehilangan sebagian besar klien dan telah dilarang dari masyarakat perusahaan audit. Although only a small number of Arthur Andersen's employees were involved with the scandal, the firm was closed and resulted in 85,000 employees losing their jobs. [ 136 ] [ 137 ] Meski hanya sejumlah kecil karyawan Arthur Andersen terlibat dengan skandal itu, perusahaan ditutup dan mengakibatkan 85.000 karyawan kehilangan pekerjaan mereka. [136] [137]

[ edit ] NatWest Three [ sunting ] NatWest Tiga

Main article: NatWest Three Artikel utama: NatWest Tiga

Giles Darby, David Bermingham, and Gary Mulgrew worked for Greenwich NatWest . Giles Darby, David Bermingham, dan Gary Mulgrew bekerja untuk Greenwich NatWest . The three British men had worked with Fastow on a special purpose entity he had started called Swap Sub.

Ketiga pria Inggris telah bekerja dengan Fastow pada entitas bertujuan khusus ia mulai disebut Swap Sub. When Fastow was being investigated by the SEC, the three men met with the British Financial Services Authority (FSA) in November 2001 to discuss their interactions with Fastow. [ 138 ] In June 2002, the US issued warrants for their arrest on seven counts of wire fraud, and they were then extradited. Ketika Fastow sedang diselidiki oleh SEC, tiga orang bertemu dengan Inggris Financial Services Authority (FSA) pada November 2001 untuk membahas interaksi mereka dengan Fastow. [138] Pada bulan Juni 2002, AS telah mengeluarkan surat perintah penangkapan mereka pada tujuh tuduhan kawat penipuan, dan mereka kemudian diekstradisi. On July 12, a potential Enron witness scheduled to be extradited to the US, Neil Coulbeck , was found dead in a park in north-east London. [ 139 ] The US case alleged that Coulbeck and others conspired with Fastow. [ 140 ] In a plea bargain in November 2007, the trio plead guilty to one count of wire fraud while the other six counts were dropped. [ 141 ] Darby, Bermingham, and Mulgrew were each sentenced to 37 months in prison. [ 142 ] In August 2010, Bermingham and Mulgrew retracted their confessions. [ 143 ] Pada tanggal 12 Juli menjadi saksi Enron potensial dijadwalkan akan diekstradisi ke Amerika Serikat, Neil Coulbeck , ditemukan tewas di taman di London utara-timur. [139] Kasus AS menuduh bahwa Coulbeck dan lain-lain bersekongkol dengan Fastow. [140] Pada tawar-menawar pembelaan pada bulan November 2007, ketiganya mengaku bersalah untuk satu hitungan penipuan kawat sedangkan enam lainnya jumlah yang dijatuhkan. [141] Darby, Bermingham, dan Mulgrew masing-masing dihukum 37 bulan penjara. [142] Pada bulan Agustus 2010, Bermingham dan Mulgrew mencabut pengakuan mereka. [143]

[ edit ] Aftermath [ sunting ] Dampak

[ edit ] Employees and shareholders [ sunting ] Karyawan dan pemegang saham

Enron's headquarters in Downtown Houston was leased from a consortium of banks who had bought the property for $285 million in the 1990s. Markas Enron di Houston Downtown adalah disewa dari konsorsium bank-bank yang telah membeli properti itu seharga $ 285 juta di tahun 1990-an. It was sold for $55.5 million, just before Enron moved out in 2004. [ 144 ] Itu dijual untuk $ 55.500.000, tepat sebelum pindah Enron pada tahun 2004. [144]

Enron's shareholders lost $74 billion in the four years before the company's bankruptcy ($40 to $45 billion was attributed to fraud). [ 145 ] As Enron had nearly $67 billion that it owed creditors, employees and shareholders received limited, if any, assistance aside from severance from Enron. [ 146 ] To pay its creditors, Enron held auctions to sell assets including art, photographs, logo signs, and its pipelines. [ 147 ] [ 148 ] [ 149 ] Teman-pemegang saham Enron kehilangan $ 74 miliar empat tahun sebelum perusahaan kepailitan ($ 40 sampai $ 45 miliar dilakukan dikaitkan dengan penipuan). [145] Seperti Enron hampir $ 67000000000 yang berutang kreditor, karyawan dan pemegang saham diterima terbatas, jika ada, bantuan selain pesangon dari Enron. [146] Untuk membayar kreditur, Enron mengadakan lelang untuk menjual aset termasuk seni, foto, tanda logo, dan pipa nya. [147] [148] [149]

More than 20,000 of Enron's former employees in May 2004 won a suit of $85 million for compensation of $2 billion that was lost from their pensions. Lebih dari 20.000 mantan karyawan Enron Mei 2004 memenangkan gugatan sebesar $ 85 juta untuk ganti rugi sebesar $ 2 miliar yang hilang dari pensiun mereka. From the settlement, the employees each received about $3,100 each. [ 150 ] The following year, investors received another settlement from several banks of $4.2 billion. [ 145 ] In September 2008, a $7.2-billion settlement from a $40-billion lawsuit, was reached on behalf of the shareholders. Dari pemukiman, karyawan masing-masing menerima sekitar $ 3.100 masing-masing. [150] Pada tahun berikutnya, investor menerima pelunasan lain dari beberapa bank sebesar $ 4,2 miliar. [145] Pada bulan September 2008, 7,2-miliar penyelesaian $ dari 40-miliar gugatan $, adalah mencapai atas nama pemegang saham. The settlement was distributed among the lead plaintiff, University of California (UC), and 1.5 million individuals and groups. Penyelesaian didistribusikan antara penggugat memimpin, University of California (UC), dan 1,5 juta individu dan kelompok. UC's law firm Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman and Robbins , received $688 million in fees, the highest in a US securities fraud case. [ 151 ] At the distribution, UC announced in a press release "We are extremely pleased to be returning these funds to the members of the class. Getting here has required a long, challenging effort, but the results for Enron investors are unprecedented." [ 152 ] hukum perusahaan UC's Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman dan Robbins , menerima $ 688.000.000 dalam biaya, yang tertinggi dalam kasus penipuan sekuritas AS. [151] Pada distribusi, UC mengumumkan dalam siaran pers "Kami sangat senang bisa kembali dana tersebut ke anggota kelas. Mendapatkan sini telah diperlukan menantang, upaya panjang, tetapi hasil untuk investor Enron yang belum pernah terjadi sebelumnya. " [152]

[ edit ] Sarbanes-Oxley Act [ sunting ] Sarbanes-Oxley Act

In the Titanic , the captain went down with the ship. Dalam Titanic , kapten turun dengan kapal. And Enron looks to me like the captain first gave himself and his friends a bonus, then lowered himself and the top folks down the lifeboat and then hollered up and said, 'By the way, everything is going to be just fine.' Dan Enron tampak bagi saya seperti kapten yang pertama menyerahkan diri dan teman-temannya bonus, lalu menurunkan dirinya dan orang-orang top down sekoci dan kemudian berteriak dan berkata, "Omong-omong, semuanya akan baik-baik saja."

US Senator Byron Dorgan . [ 153 ] US Senator Byron Dorgan . [153]

Main article: Sarbanes-Oxley Act Artikel utama: Sarbanes-Oxley Act

Between December 2001 and April 2002, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Financial Services held multiple hearings about the collapse of Enron and related accounting and investor protection issues. Antara Desember 2001 dan April 2002, Komite Senat Perbankan, Perumahan, dan Urusan Perkotaan dan Komite House Financial Services diadakan beberapa dengar pendapat tentang runtuhnya Enron dan akuntansi terkait dan isu-isu perlindungan investor. These hearings and the corporate scandals that followed Enron led to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on July 30, 2002. [ 154 ] The Act is nearly "a mirror image of Enron: the company's perceived corporate governance failings are matched virtually point for point in the principal provisions of the Act." [ 155 ] Ini audiensi dan skandal perusahaan yang diikuti Enron menyebabkan bagian dari-Oxley Act Sarbanes pada tanggal 30 Juli 2002. [154] UU ini hampir "gambar cermin Enron: perusahaan itu dianggap kelemahan tata kelola perusahaan yang dicocokkan hampir point untuk titik dalam ketentuan pokok dari Undang-Undang ". [155]

The main provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act included the establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to develop standards for the preparation of audit reports ; the restriction of public accounting firms from providing any non-auditing services when auditing; provisions for the independence of audit committee members, executives being required to sign off on financial reports, and relinquishment of certain executives' bonuses in case of financial restatements; and expanded financial disclosure of firms' relationships with unconsolidated entities. [ 154 ] Ketentuan utama dari Sarbanes-Oxley Act termasuk pendirian Perusahaan Publik Akuntansi Pengawasan Dewan untuk mengembangkan standar untuk penyusunan laporan audit , pembatasan kantor akuntan publik dari manapun-auditing menyediakan layanan non ketika audit, ketentuan untuk kemerdekaan anggota komite audit, eksekutif dituntut untuk sign off pada laporan keuangan, dan pelepasan eksekutif tertentu bonus dalam hal penyajian kembali keuangan, dan memperluas pengungkapan keuangan perusahaan dengan tidak dikonsolidasi. entitas hubungan [154]

On February 13, 2002, due to the instances of corporate malfeasances and accounting violations, the SEC called for changes to the stock exchanges' regulations. Pada tanggal 13 Februari 2002, karena kasus malfeasances korporasi dan pelanggaran akuntansi, SEC meminta perubahan peraturan bursa saham. In June 2002, the New York Stock Exchange announced a new governance proposal, which was approved by the SEC in November 2003. Pada bulan Juni 2002, New York Stock Exchange mengumumkan sebuah proposal pemerintahan baru, yang telah disetujui oleh SEC pada bulan November 2003. The main provisions of the final NYSE proposal include: [ 154 ] Ketentuan utama dari proposal NYSE akhir meliputi: [154]

All firms must have a majority of independent directors. Semua perusahaan harus memiliki mayoritas direktur independen.

Independent directors must comply with an elaborate definition of independent directors. direktur Independen harus mematuhi definisi rumit direktur independen.

The compensation committee, nominating committee, and audit committee shall consist of independent directors. Komite kompensasi, komite nominasi, dan komite audit terdiri dari direktur independen.

All audit committee members should be financially literate. Semua anggota komite audit harus melek finansial. In addition, at least one member of the audit committee is required

to have accounting or related financial management expertise. Selain itu, setidaknya satu anggota komite audit harus memiliki keahlian akuntansi atau manajemen yang terkait keuangan.

In addition to its regular sessions, the board should hold additional sessions without management. Selain sesi reguler, dewan harus mengadakan sesi tambahan tanpa manajemen.

[ edit ] See also [ sunting ] Lihat pula

Houston portal Houston portal

The Crooked E: The Unshredded Truth About Enron - television film about the rise and fall of Enron E Bengkok: Kebenaran Unshredded Tentang Enron - film televisi tentang naik dan turun dari Enron

Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room - documentary based on a book about the scandal Enron: The Guys terpandai di Ruang - dokumenter berdasarkan buku tentang skandal itu

ENRON (play) , 2009 play by British playwright Lucy Prebble about the scandal ENRON (bermain) , 2009 bermain dengan dramawan Inggris Lucy Prebble tentang skandal itu

Fun with Dick and Jane - comedy film parodying 2000s corporate scandals, including a reference to the scandal Fun dengan Dick dan Jane - film komedi parodying 2000 skandal perusahaan, termasuk referensi untuk skandal

Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States - conviction in United States District Court subsequently overturned by United States Supreme Court Arthur Andersen LLP v. Amerika Serikat - keyakinan di Pengadilan Distrik Amerika Serikat kemudian dibatalkan oleh Mahkamah Agung Amerika Serikat

[ edit ] Notes [ sunting ] Catatan

1. ̂ Bratton, William W. (May 2002). "Does Corporate Law Protect the Interests of Shareholders and Other Stakeholders?: Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value" (PDF). Tulane Law Review (New Orleans: Tulane University Law School ) (1275): 61 . http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=301475 . ^ Bratton, William W. (Mei 2002). "Apakah Hukum Perusahaan Melindungi Kepentingan Pemegang Saham dan stakeholder lainnya Nilai?: Enron dan Dark Side Pemegang Saham" (PDF). Tulane Law Review (New Orleans: Sekolah Hukum Universitas Tulane ) (1275): 61. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=301475 . Retrieved 2010-10-12 . Diperoleh 2010/10/12.

2. ^ a b c Benston, George J. (November 6, 2003). "The Quality of Corporate Financial Statements and Their Auditors Before and After Enron" (PDF). Policy Analysis (Washington DC: Cato Institute ) (497): 12. ^ a b c Benston, George J. (6 November 2003). "Kualitas Laporan Keuangan Perusahaan dan Auditor mereka Sebelum dan Setelah Enron" (PDF) Analisis Kebijakan. (Washington DC: Cato Institute ) (497): 12. Archived from the original on 2010-10-17 . http://www.webcitation.org/5tZ00qIbE . Diarsipkan dari aslinya pada 2010/10/17. http://www.webcitation.org/5tZ00qIbE . Retrieved 2010-10-17 . Diperoleh 2010/10/17.

3. ^ a b Ayala, Astrid; Giancarlo Ibárgüen, Snr. ^ a b Ayala, Astrid; Ibárgüen Giancarlo, Snr. (March 2006). "A Market Proposal for Auditing the Financial Statements of Public Companies" (PDF). Journal of Management of Value ( Universidad Francisco Marroquín ): 1. (Maret 2006). "Sebuah Usulan Pasar untuk Audit Laporan Keuangan Perusahaan Publik" (PDF) (. Jurnal Manajemen Nilai Marroquín Universidad Francisco ): 1. Archived from the original on 2010-10-17 . http://www.webcitation.org/5tZ0THjI8 . Diarsipkan dari aslinya pada 2010/10/17. http://www.webcitation.org/5tZ0THjI8 . Retrieved 2010-10-17 . Diperoleh 2010/10/17.

4. ̂ Cohen, Daniel A.; Dey Aiyesha and Thomas Z. Lys (February 2005). Trends in Earnings Management and Informativeness of Earnings Announcements in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes Oxley Periods . ^ Cohen, A. Daniel; Aiyesha Dey dan Thomas Z. Lys (Februari 2005). Tren Manajemen Laba dan keinformatifan Pengumuman Laba dalam Pra dan Sarbanes-Oxley Periode-Post . Evanston, Illinois: Kellogg School of Management . Evanston, Illinois: Kellog School of Management . p. p. 5 . http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=658782 . 5. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=658782 . Retrieved 2010-10-13 . Diperoleh 2010/10/13.

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[ edit ] References [ sunting ] Referensi

McLean, Bethany ; Peter Elkind (2003). The Smartest Guys in the Room . McLean, Bethany ; Elkind Peter (2003) Ruang. terpintar di Guys di. New York: Portfolio Trade. ISBN 1-59184-008-2 . New York: Perdagangan Portofolio. ISBN 1-59184-008-2 .

Dharan, Bala G.; William R. Bufkins (2004) (PDF). Enron: Corporate Fiascos and Their Implications . Foundation Press . ISBN 1-58778-578-1 . http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~bala/files/dharan-bufkins_enron_red_flags.pdf . Dharan, Bala G.; William R. Bufkins (2004) (PDF). Enron: Corporate Fiascos dan Implikasi mereka . Foundation Press . ISBN 1-58778-578-1 . http://www.ruf.rice.edu/ ~ bala / files / Dharan-bufkins_enron_red_flags.pdf .

[ edit ] Further reading [ sunting ] Bacaan lebih lanjut

Bryce, Robert (December 17, 2008). Pipe Dreams: Greed, Ego, and the Death of Enron . PublicAffairs . ISBN 1-586-48201-7 . Bryce, Robert (17 Desember, 2008): Pipa. Dreams Greed, Ego, dan Kematian Enron. PublicAffairs . ISBN 1-586-48201-7 .

Collins, Denis (May 24, 2006). Behaving Badly: Ethical Lessons from Enron . Collins, Denis (24 Mei 2006):. Behaving Badly Etis Pelajaran dari Enron. Dog Ear Publishing, LLC. ISBN 1-598-58160-0 . Telinga anjing Publishing, LLC. ISBN 1-598-58160-0 .

Cruver, Brian (September 1, 2003). Anatomy of Greed: Telling the Unshredded Truth from Inside Enron . Basic Books . ISBN 0-786-71205-8 . Cruver, Brian (1 September, 2003):. Anatomi Keserakahan Menceritakan Kebenaran Unshredded dari Inside Enron. Basic Books . ISBN 0-786-71205-8 .

Eichenwald, Kurt (December 27, 2005). Conspiracy of Fools: A True Story . Broadway Books . ISBN 0-767-91179-2 .

Fox, Loren (December 22, 2003). Enron: The Rise and Fall . John Wiley & Sons . ISBN 0-471-47888-1 .

Fusaro, Peter C.; Ross M. Miller (June 21, 2002). What Went Wrong at Enron: Everyone's Guide to the Largest Bankruptcy in US History . John Wiley & Sons . ISBN 0-471-26574-8 .

Salter, Malcolm S. (June 30, 2008). Innovation Corrupted: The Origins and Legacy of Enron's Collapse . Harvard University Press . ISBN 0-674-02825-2 .

Swartz, Mary; Sherron Watkins (March 9, 2004). Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron . Broadway Business . ISBN 0-767-91368-X .

Toffler, Barbara Ley; Jennifer Reingold (April 13, 2004). Final Accounting: Ambition, Greed and the Fall of Arthur Andersen . Broadway Business . ISBN 0-767-91383-3 .

[ edit ] External links [ sunting ] Pranala luar

Enron Creditors Recovery Group