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RUSSELL SHEN EVHS DebateResolved: The United States is justified in intervening in the internal political processes of other countries to attempt

to stop human rights abuses.

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I negate.

1. Aff has the burden of proving the resolution to be true, as the definition of affirm is to assert

the truth of something1. Conversely, neg has the burden of proving the resolution to be false, asthe definition of negate is to deny or contradict

2.

2. There are no words in the resolution that imply that we should compare the aff world and the

neg world and see which world looks better. This means that it is not enough for aff to prove that

intervention leads to a better world, because that does not mean that it is justified for the US to

do so. Aff needs to have a logical reason for why US intervention is justified if it leads to a better

world.

3. Like any logical statement, if any part of the resolution is false, then the resolution as a whole

is false.

I contend that nations cannot have justified actions.

Nations lack moral agency.

Gerson3

explains the nature of moral agency,

We typically and rightly distinguish nonmoral agents, which are responsible for what they do,

although not morally responsible, from moral agents who are morally responsible, except when

they are acting merely as nonmoral agents. The errant attack dog that is tried by the military for

mauling its handler is, presumably, responsible but not morally responsible for its deed.

Thus, moral agents must possess the quality of intentionality, meaning they must intend for their

actions to occur. A hurricane cannot be held morally accountable even it causes destructionbecause it does not intend its action. Insofar as morality values the guiding of action, it must

assign some value to the intentions of agents. Only one who is self-aware and capable of doing

something purposefully can be held truly accountable for that action. Also, deontology says thatwe do things according to universal maxims, which assumes we act based on a maxim at all. But,

absent the ability to be intentionalto act in accordance with a single ruleagents cannot be

moral agents. Gerson 2 explains that even though nations have deliberative bodies and enact

policy, they do not have intentionality,

Having said this, I still think that the argument that seeks to include nations within the class of

moral agents on the basis of intentionality is a weak one. Here is why. There is an ambiguity in

1http://www.thefreedictionary.com/affirmation

2http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate

3Lloyd Gerson. The Morality of Nations: An Aristotelian Approach. Published inAristotles

Politics Today, compiled by Lenn E. Goodman and Robert B. Talisse. Albany: SUNY Press,

2007.


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the term intentionality that this argument exploits. In the sense in which nations have

intentionality, the attribution of moral agency does not follow. In the sense of intentionalityaccording to which moral agency does follow, this argument does not show that nations have that.

Intentionality in the first sense can characterize any goal-directed behavior and can also be

applied to any behavior that is understandable in the light of that goal. For example, it is

perfectly reasonable to say that a squirrel is gathering nuts for the purpose of eating throughoutthe winter, or that the rattle of the snakes tail shows that it intends to strike, or that the field

mouse is trying to get into the house in the autumn in order to keep warm, or that the chess-

playing robot is trying to pin down my knight. But the sense of intentionality that applies to suchgoal-directed behavior by agents obviously does not indicate moralagency. Intentionality in the

second sense, the sense according to which its applicability does imply moral agency, is

something else. In this sense, intentionality refers first and foremost to the self-awareness of the

presence of the purpose and the self-awareness of the mental states leading to its realization. Thatis, of course, precisely why we refrain from claiming that someone is responsible for her actions

when she is unaware of what she is doing, especially when she could not have been aware. The

acknowledgement of self-awareness is necessary for the attribution of moral agency. I would in

fact argue that all and only nondefective human beings have this ability to be self-aware. But thatis not my point here. There may be agents other than human beings that are moral agents. My

present point is that agroup of human beings, such as the group that comprise a nation, cannotbe self-aware in this way and therefore cannot be a moral agent.

Thus, while individual members of a nations deliberative body can possess self-awareness about

their own and their groups actions, the group itself cannot. Just because all members of thegroup are self-aware about what they are doing does not mean that the group is self-aware.

Gerson 3 continues,

As a member of the group, I can deliberate about whether my nation should declare war, and I

can decide for or against that proposition. But whatever I (and my colleagues) each decide to do,there is not anotherdecision that arises from another intentional act of deliberation by the nation.

True, there is another action. I mean that, say, the declaration of war is an action over and abovemy voting for or against it. But that declaration of war is not a declaration by a self-aware agent,

the nation.

Gerson 4 continues,

Another way to look at this point is to consider that in cases of genuine self-awareness, thesubject who has the intentional object, say, a purpose must be identical with the subject who is

aware of having that intentional object. But when the nation has a purpose, as expressed, say, in

a resolution of a governing body, it is not the nation that is self-aware but the persons whocomprise it. And that self-awareness is not of each individuals own purpose, since ones ownpurposes may be in conflict with those of the nation. Even if they are not in conflict, that is, even

if there is 100 percent support for a motion, the awareness of the nations purpose as expressed in

the motion occurs in the individual persons and not in the nation. Unless you can put purpose andself-awareness of purpose in the identical subject, you cannot have a moral agent. And in the

case of group action, you can never have the identical subject that both has the purpose and is

self-aware of having it. Knowing that my nation has declared war is different from the act of


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declaring war and occurs in a different subject. Indeed, the nation or the nonmoral agent that

declares warcannotknow that it declares war anymore than the chess-playing robot can knowthat it won (Rovane 1994; Rovane 1998).

So, while the individuals within the group can be aware of their own decisions, a nation cannot

be self-aware and thus is not a moral agent.

Moral agency is necessary to have justified actions.

Gerson 5 explains,

If nations are not moral agents, then it is a sort of category mistake to suppose that nations have

moral obligations or rights or duties, or that they can bear moral guilt or blame. Many peoplewho would concede this claim strictly conceived would maintain that, nevertheless, it is

desirable or even inevitable that we adopt the fiction that allows us to make moral judgments

about the citizens of the community of nations. I suppose that this fiction is not entirely

insidious, so long as it is agreed that all the claims about moral duties, obligations, rights, and soforth, made in regard to nations are fictions, too. Thus, for example, to claim that one nation has

an obligation to ameliorate the circumstances of another nation (or its members) is to implicateoneself in a fiction. The truth of this assertion is not, so far as I can see, affected by the

hypothetical truth of another assertion; namely, that each and every human being has an

obligation to ameliorate the circumstances of every other being insofar as possible. It is not

affected even if we concede that nations, like other groups, can have interests. If, for example,one acknowledges in oneself an obligation to serve the interests of the Jewish people, it does not

follow from this that ones own nation has an obligation to support Israel. Indeed, more to the

point, in my view the latter claim is unintelligible.

Thus, because the resolution claims that the US is justified in intervening in other countries, theresolution is false.

Even if aff proves that the aff world is better than the neg world, if I prove that nations cannot

have justified actions, then you still negate, because aff will not be meeting my second

framework argument.

Now, on the AC.

Interventionism makes things worse.

Conry4

explains,

U.S. intervention can be especially counterproductive, since it often intensifies smaller, less

powerful countries' (the very nations most likely to be involved in regional conflicts) fears of

America's hegemonic intentions. Militarily, too, the United States is ill suited to suppress

4Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 209: The Futility of U.S. Intervention in Regional Conflicts

May 19, 1994


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regional conflicts, in which warring forces frequently rely on guerrilla warfare, street fighting,

and other tactics that are not easily met by America's high-tech war machine. The United Statesshould also avoid military intervention in regional conflicts because, in the vast majority of

cases, it does not work. In fact, it usually aggravates the situation.(25) Even if a consensus were

to develop that global stability or any other objective should be pursued by all viable means,

military intervention would remain an unwise course in most cases. It rarely achieves its purposeand often has the perverse effect of obstructing, rather than advancing, what it seeks to achieve.

(American peacekeepers in Lebanon in 1983, for example, were an aggravating rather than a

stabilizing force.) Intervention usually harms American interests as well. The most compellingarguments against American intervention are its ineffectiveness and the harm it causes all parties

involved. The ability of military action to achieve political objectives in the modern era is very

limited. "Beware of the facile assumption that wars are fightable and winnable again. Beware of

the illusion that there is a military solution to every geopolitical problem," warns journalist TheoSommer.(26) Many deeply rooted political and economic problems are impervious to military

solutions. Intervention in regional wars is a distraction and a drain on resources. Diverting time,

money, and manpower from areas that have a significant impact on national security to

peripheral nonsecurity interests is never desirable. But in the event of a crisis that affects U.S.vital interests, it is downright dangerous. It is difficult for the United States to be well prepared

to protect national security when its military resources are diffused all over the globe and areconfigured to participate in nebulous peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations.

Unnecessary interventions also waste another very important and readily depleted resource:

public support for U.S. military operations. Failed military missions engender tremendous public

skepticism about future operations. Although that caution may serve a useful purpose in keepingtroops out of other regional conflicts, it may be dangerous in the event of a genuine threat to

national security. The American people's support is essential to the success of military

operations. Lack of public support when vital interests are at stake could weaken Americanresolve--and therefore jeopardize our ability--to protect those interests.(39)

This turns the AC and destroys all of their solvency, because US intervention actually worsens

the situation. They don't get access to any of their impacts, because Conry short circuits theirarguments by showing that interventionism doesn't work.


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AT: Individuals have justified actions, thus nations have justified actions.

This does not logically follow. Gerson 6 explains,

The principle insight gleaned from Aristotle in this regard is that much if not all of the discussion of international

relations today rests on a serious mistake. The mistake is to suppose that nations are moralagents. If one supposes this, then whatever theory of morality one wishes to defend, one

will assume that the theory applies to nations. Thus, if one, say, defends a version of

utilitarianism or some sort of deontological theory, one will then go on to claim its

applicability to nations, treating them as if they were moral agents.

AT: This is a bad moral system

Gersons argument is not a moral system at all, is ontological in nature. His argument is that NO

moral theory makes sense unless we understand what a moral agent is. Gerson 7 writes,

This seems to me a very bad argument, indeed. Unless it can be established that nations are moral agentsover and above the moral agents that comprise them, the very idea of a normative basis for

international relations is unintelligible.It bears emphasizing thatthe accusation of unintelligibility

should not be watered down into a rejection of one particular moral theory in favor of

another. The point I am making is not, say, utilitarianism is wrong whereas some

deontological theory is right.Nor am I making the point that that the correct moral theory at the international level is different

from the correct one at the individual level. The problemI see is more radical than that of sorting out thepros and cons of moral theories. The problem is that nomoral theory makes any sense

unless we can understand what a moral agent is. If nations are not moral agents, then the

application of moral theory to international relations hardly makes more sense than it does

as applied to the jungle.

AT: This justifies state-led genocide.

Individuals can still be justified in ameliorating genocide and other human rights violationsthis

justification simply cant be placed upon nations as an agent. Gerson 8 writes,

Another way of framing the objection is to insist that justice and human rights are transnational concepts and that the members of nations ought to

promote these internationally through the instrumentality of their own nations. Nothing that I have already said

contradicts the notion that of moral theories that include a concept of human rights, one

might maintain that persons in nations other than their own have had their rights violated.

And nothing precludes the notion that the moral theory requires its adherents take steps to

ameliorate their condition. But I what I have said is true, then there is no logical connectionbetween what is required of an individual person to do and what that persons nation

should do.

AT: Nations are just the people who comprise them.

Nations are agents distinct from the individuals who comprise them. Gerson writes,


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First, let me say what part of this line of thinking I agree with. I agree that a nation, in doing the above, is some sort of agent distinct from the

moral agents who are the persons who make up the deliberative or legislative body. I have no wish to contest the existence of group dynamics or

collective action or agency. I agree that a nation is an agent when it votes in an international assembly. After all,since a nation can,for example, declare war when some members of the legislative body are opposed to such a

declaration, we can hardly maintain that there is no difference between the agency of thelegislative and that of the individuals who comprise it. Similarly, I have no ontological

scruples about holding that, say, Germany (notGermans) can defeat Italy (not Italians) in

football.

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