slightly redacted may 20, 2016 reply affidavit in opposition to ntt data, inc.'s opposition to...

8/16/2019 Slightly redacted May 20, 2016 reply affidavit in opposition to NTT Data, Inc.'s opposition to a motion to vacate a…

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CIVIL COURT FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF NEW YORK: PART 34

----------------------------------------------------------------- X

[REDACTED],

Plaintiff,

Index # CV-030955-12/NY

-against-

REPLY AFFIDAVIT IN

OPPOSITION TO

DEFENDANT’S

OPPOSITION TO

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

COMPEL DEFENDANT TO

PAY ALL ARBITRATION

COSTS

NTT DATA, INC.

Defendant.

----------------------------------------------------------------- X

STATE OF NEW YORK )

) SS:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

[REDACTED], being duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:

1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action and as such I am fully familiar with the

facts and circumstances set forth herein.

2. I make this reply affidavit in opposition to all of the following:

a. Defendant’s opposition to my motion to compel Defendant to pay all arbitration

costs;

b. Defendant’s motion for costs for expenses and attorney fees;

c. Defendant’s cross-motion for sanctions.

3. An attorney named Christopher Neff that is one of three attorneys presently representing

Defendant in this proceeding lied several times while making claims in an affirmation

that is subject to the penalties of perjury, has been submitted in this proceeding, is dated



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April 22, 2016, and is entitled “Affirmation in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to

Compel Defendant to Pay All Arbitration Costs and in Support of Cross Motion for

Sanctions” (hereinafter referred to as “Neff’s Affirmation”). In particular, Mr. Neff lied

by making the following claims in that affirmation:

a. Claiming that a federal court dismissed all of the claims in an amended complaint

on September 28, 2015. In regards to this, Mr. Neff lied by stated the following in

the second line that appears within the numbered paragraph 10 on page 3 of

Neff’s Affirmation:

“dismissed the claims in the Amended Complaint”

Mr. Neff’s remark is a lie because there were claims in that amended complaint

that were not dismissed on that date.

b. Claiming that a federal court characterized claims on September 28, 2015 as

having been “colorable” that I sought to include in a second amended complaint.

Mr. Neff lied by making the following remark at the end of the third line of the

numbered paragraph 10 that appears on the third page of Neff’s Affirmation:

“granted leave for Plaintiff to move to file a second amended complaint toallege colorable claims”

Mr. Neff’s account in regards to this is a lie because no federal court on

September 28, 2015 characterized claims as being “colorable” that I sought to

include in a second amended complaint.

c.

Suggesting within the numbered paragraph 12 on page 3 of Neff’s Affirmation

that Judge Debra Rose Samuels of the New York City Civil Court referred an

Order to Show Cause that I filed with this Court on October 6, 2015 to Judge Lisa

Sokoloff, who urged the parties in this proceeding on March 1, 2016 to try to



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reach a settlement and indicated that she would continue to be assigned to this

proceeding after that date. Since Judge Sokoloff indicated on March 1, 2016 that

she would continue to be assigned to this proceeding after that date, Mr. Neff’s

use of “Your Honor” in the remarks he made within the numbered paragraph 12

that appears on page 3 of Neff’s Affirmation is inappropriate, represents an

appalling failure by him to pay attention to details, and arguably constitutes yet

additional lies by him. Contrary to Mr. Neff’s remarks, Judge Samuels referred

the Order to Show Cause that I filed with this Court on October 6, 2015 to Judge

Jennifer Schecter instead of Judge Sokoloff.

4. An attorney named Michael Todd Parker is one of three attorneys presently representing

Defendant in this proceeding. Mr. Parker prepared a memorandum of law dated April 22,

2016 that has been submitted in this proceeding and is entitled “Defendant’s

Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant to Pay

All Arbitration Costs and in Support of Defendant’s Cross Motion for Sanctions”

(hereinafter referred to as “Parker’s Memo”). In his remarks in Parker’s Memo, Mr.

Parker failed to surprise me by continuing a pattern he has demonstrated in other legal

forums involving both Defendant and I by lying. For example, during a federal court

hearing on September 18, 2015 that he and I attended and was presided over by Judge

John Koeltl, Mr. Parker lied by suggesting to me that I would be engaging in tortious

interference if I shared information with Defendant’s business partners to help them make

independent and informed decisions about whether they should be doing business with

Defendant. Similarly, he has lied and expressed baseless contentions in Parker’s Memo.

5. Contrary to Mr. Parker’s claims, the motion I submitted in this proceeding for the



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purpose of is both deserving of equitable tolling and has merit. The reasons why it

deserves to be subject to equitable tolling is because Defendant’s patently unlawful acts

of wage-theft, retaliation, and blacklisting caused me to be deprived me of substantial

income I would have otherwise received between April of 2012 and February of 2013

that I would have used to retain an attorney to address debilitating frivolous litigation I

have been subjected to by a slumlord since 2013, additional litigation involving another

landlord that failed to make necessary repairs, litigation presided over by judges that

deprived me of my due process rights, and additional firms. While being overwhelmed by

a barrage of litigation since 2013 as a result of having no other option than to represent

myself in those sets of litigation, I have clearly had to contend with extenuating

circumstances that represent a snowball effect from NTT’s unlawful acts against me that

deprived me of substantial income. As a result of the barrage of litigation I’ve had to

contend with since 2013, it wasn’t until last year that the diligent legal research I’ve been

performing since 2012 in relation to this proceeding allowed me to discover that there

have been cases in which courts in New York State have ruled that a decision to compel a

litigant to engage in arbitration must depend on the litigant’s ability to engage in

arbitration.

6. Courts have previously expressed that in order for a litigant to be deserving of equitable

tolling, the litigant seeking equitable tolling must have faced extraordinary and

extenuating circumstances, such as being incapacitated in some way and not have been

aware of applicable law in spite of diligent legal research. As I just alluded to above, the

significant and material financial obstacles that Defendant put in my path that prevented

me from retaining legal counsel and the barrage of litigation I have faced since 2013 and



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continue to contend with have substantially deprived me of the requisite amount of time,

attention, energy, and financial resources to discover how I could have filed my motion to

compel Defendant to pay all arbitration costs and substantiate my arguments in that

motion in a timely manner. Quite simply, the unlawful acts Defendant committed against

me are analogous to someone cutting off another person’s legs and then ordering the

person whose legs have been cut off to run or be killed. In regards to this analogy, the

fact that the person whose legs have been cut off can’t run while aware of the threat is not

due to a choice that he or she has made to not run. Instead, it is the debilitating injury that

the handicapped person has suffered that is solely responsible for this.

7. Although I could reiterate the remarks I expressed in the motion I filed in this proceeding

to compel NTT to pay all arbitration costs or grant me the alternative relief I requested in

that motion here, I won’t and will instead say that I fully stand behind my statements in

that motion.

8. Contrary to Mr. Parker’s claims that I negotiated a contract, the terms of that contract

were established by Defendant and were largely non-negotiable. The arbitration provision

in the contract Mr. Parker refers to was an example of a term within that contract that was

non-negotiable.

9. In addition, though the terms of the contract that Mr. Parker refers to in Parker’s Memo

undeniably required Defendant to issue payments for work I performed at Credit Suisse

in New York City according to an hourly rate that was based upon a daily rate of $478

per day that was listed in an Exhibit A that was included with that contract, Defendant

willfully and unlawfully refused to comply with that requirement and additional

requirements set forth in that contract.



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10. Contrary to Mr. Parker’s claims, I don’t seek to now re-write the terms of the contract

that Defendant issued that allowed me to work at Credit Suisse in 2012. In regards to this,

the content of the three e-mail messages dated April 10, 2012 that appear within the

annexed Exhibit A confirms not only that Defendant previously did not allow the

contract being discussed here to be re-written in 2012 following valid requests I made to

Defendant for that purpose that constituted protected activity, but also that Defendant

elected to illegally conspire to retaliate against me for having strenuously and rightfully

insisted upon Defendant making changes to that contract because Defendant had

breached that contract.

11. Although Mr. Parker has claimed in Parker’s Memo that the relief I seek is not authorized

by law even if my motion were timely, that claim is entirely without merit and is instead

merely indicative of his deceit, ignorance, and/or wishful thinking. The decisions that

were issued in the case of Brady v. Williams Capital (928 N.E.2d 383, 14 N.Y.3d 459,

902 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2010)) by the New York State Court of Appeals and the Appellate

Division, First Department of the Supreme Court of the State of New York clearly

confirm that the relief I seek is authorized by law. Accordingly, the motion I submitted in

this proceeding for the purpose of compelling Defendant to pay all arbitration costs or

vacating this Court’s previous decision to compel arbitration if it were to decline to

compel Defendant to pay all arbitration costs should be granted.



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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

12. Prior to the commencement of this proceeding, I diligently filed complaints against

Defendant and Credit Suisse on October 10, 2012 with the Wage and Hour Division of

the United States Department of Labor by visiting its office located at 26 Federal Plaza in

Manhattan. However, the complaints that I filed with that agency were neither accurately

recorded nor investigated. The United States Government Accountability Office has

discovered through undercover audits it conducted of the Wage and Hour Division of the

United States Department of Labor that it has mishandled complaints from other people

in this same way. Instead, the Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department

of Labor wrongfully closed my complaint on October 10, 2012 and falsely informed me

on that date that I would need to file a private lawsuit in order to have my complaints

against Defendant and Credit Suisse addressed.

13. While Mr. Parker has chosen to focus strictly on the arbitration provision within the

contract Defendant issued to [redacted] on January 13, 2012, he failed to mention in

Parker’s Memo the other provisions in that contract that Defendant chose to willfully

violate and negligently fail to prevent Credit Suisse from interfering with. Additional

terms in that same contract that Mr. Parker failed to mention in Parker’s Memo include

the following:

a.

I was to work as an independent contractor at Credit Suisse in New York City.

However, Defendant and Credit Suisse did not allow me to act independently to

decide how I worked at Credit Suisse, the hours I worked at Credit Suisse, and

how Defendant was billed for the hours I worked at Credit Suisse. For these

reasons, I was misclassified as an independent contractor by Defendant and was



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actually a common-law employee of both Defendant and Credit Suisse in 2012.

b. Both Defendant and Credit Suisse were prohibited by the terms in that contract

from firing me, disciplining me, controlling me, supervising me, and directing

me about the method, manner, and sequence in which I performed my work at

Credit Suisse. Although Defendant was responsible for ensuring that neither it

nor Credit Suisse violated these restrictions, Defendant and Credit Suisse

violated all of these restrictions.

c. Defendant was required to notify me at least two weeks before it made any

decision on its own accord to terminate its contract with [redacted]. However,

when my job to work at Credit Suisse in 2012 was terminated on April 27, 2012,

Defendant gave me no advance notice of that and it did not result from

Defendant having terminated its contract with [redacted]. Instead, Defendant

fired me personally, which the contract it issued to [redacted] indicated

Defendant did not have a right to do.

14.

Although Mr. Parker made the baseless, deceitful, and self-serving claim on page 3 of

Parker’s Memo that I have brought frivolous actions, I have never engaged in frivolous

litigation nor made frivolous claims in litigation. Such reprehensible behavior is

something Mr. Parker has shown he engages in. Also, it’s quite possible that Mr. Parker

shares Mr. Neff’s lack of attention to detail and in some confused state mistook me for a

former slumlord of mine that has filed multiple frivolous lawsuits against me that I can’t

retain an attorney for because of Defendant’s unlawful acts.

15. In addition, though Mr. Parker discusses a valid federal lawsuit I filed against Defendant

and Credit Suisse, he unsurprisingly failed to acknowledge the fact that claims in that



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lawsuit include independent claims that are not subject to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

16. Furthermore, in the remarks Mr. Parker made in Parker’s Memo, he failed to mention that

Defendant is part of a huge global organization comprised of many subsidiary companies

and that Defendant and some of those other subsidiary companies have government

contracts with the following entities that require the subsidiaries to comply with

applicable laws and periodically certify that they are a responsible vendor:

a. The United States Department of Labor

b. The New York State Attorney General’s Office.

c.

The New York State Comptroller’s Office.

d. The United States Securities and Exchange Commission.

e. The United States Department of Justice.

f. The United States Department of Defense.

g. The United States Department of Homeland Security.

17. Contrary to Mr. Parker’s patently fraudulent and despicable claim on page 4 of Parker’s

Memo, I asserted both in this proceeding and the valid federal lawsuit I commenced

against it that it has not been possible for me to engage in arbitration with Defendant

because I have not had sufficient finances to do so and have not been able to obtain

sufficient finances to do so largely because of Defendant’s unlawful acts against me.

Those assertions are neither equivalent to nor to be mistaken for an assertion in which

someone claims that he or she cannot afford to engage in arbitration because such an

assertion suggests that the person making it has sufficient finances to engage in

arbitration, but chooses not to do so.

18. Contrary to remarks Mr. Parker made on page 5 of Parker’s Memo, the federal court did



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not dismiss all of the claims in the Amended Complaint on September 28, 2015.

19. On page 5 of Parker’s Memo, Mr. discussed a decision Judge Jennifer Schecter issued on

or about October 6. 2015 in this proceeding that contain the following remarks by her:

“There is no basis for granting the relief sought. Nothing was overlooked by theCourt and there is no basis for vacating the Decision issued over a year ago.”

Contrary to her remarks in that decision, Judge Schecter never engaged in a case-by-case

analysis focused on my ability to pay the fees and costs associated with arbitration, the

expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation in court, and whether the cost

differential is so substantial as to effectively deprive me of the ability to bring an

arbitration claim against Defendant that the New York State Court of Appeals discussed

in its March 25, 2010 decision in the case of Brady v. Williams Capital (928 N.E.2d 383,

14 N.Y.3d 459, 902 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2010)).

20. Contrary to Mr. Parker’s assertion that is discussed at the bottom of page 5 of Parker’s

Memo, my claims in this proceeding against Defendant included a claim that Defendant

had failed to pay wages that I was owed. This point is confirmed by the following remark

that appears in the middle of the first paragraph on the third page of Judge Schecter’s

April 11, 2014 decision in this proceeding:

“The arbitration provision clearly applies to Mr. Komatsu's claims for unpaid wagesand breach of contract”

21.

Mr. Parker’s contention that I had ample opportunity in 2014 to challenge the

enforceability of the arbitration clause is entirely baseless for several reasons. First, the

unlawful acts Defendant has been committing against me since 2012 and continues to

commit against me has been a major reason why I have not been able to retain an

attorney to properly challenge the enforceability of the arbitration clause. Similarly,



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throughout 2014, I was besieged by frivolous litigation that a former slumlord

commenced against me that significantly diminished my ability to conduct more even

more exhaustive and diligent legal research to challenge the enforceability of the

arbitration clause. An additional reason why I could not challenge the enforceability of

the arbitration clause stems from the fact that Judge Schecter clearly was unwilling to

consider the possibility that both my financial circumstances and the overly broad nature

of the arbitration clause rendered the arbitration clause unenforceable. This last point is

substantiated by the following remark that appears at the top of page 3 in Judge

Schecter’s April 11, 2014 decision in this proceeding:

“It is well settled that courts must enforce contractual arbitration provisions.”

22. Since Judge Schecter’s April 11, 2014 decision in this proceeding and while not being

represented by an attorney primarily because of Defendant’s unlawful acts, I have had to

continue contending with frivolous litigation against me, flagrant judicial misconduct,

and exercise my rights as a worker and tenant in litigation I commenced. Contrary to

claims Mr. Parker made about me in violation of New York State Judiciary Law § 487

between the bottom of page 5 and top of page 6 in Parker’s memo in which he expressed

that each of the complaints, motions and orders to show cause that I brought in a variety

of forums within the two years that followed April 11, 2014 have been found to be

without merit, all of the complaints, motions, and orders to show cause that I have

brought in a variety of forums have been with merit and have been responsible for the

following five significant outcomes in my favor:

a. A Queens Housing Court Judge who has been biased against me issued a

decision in July of 2014 in a case assigned the index number of 81232/2013 in



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which she expressed that I would not have to pay any use or occupancy fees to a

slumlord because of the existence of a housing maintenance code violation in the

apartment building I was living in at that time.

b. Judges assigned to an appellate court located in Brooklyn twice grant appeals in

my favor in August of 2014 that pertained to a frivolous lawsuit that a former

slumlord of mine commenced against me and was assigned the index number of

81232/2013 by the Queens Housing Court.

c. Supervising Judge John Lansden of the Queens Housing Court granted me a rent

abatement against my former landlord due to issues pertaining to repairs in a

case that was assigned the index number of 75694/2014.

d. A lawsuit that I commenced at the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York led to a settlement agreement being reached.

e. A legal proceeding I commenced at the New York State Supreme Court in

Manhattan led to the judge assigned to that proceeding appointing me to act as a

co-guardian for my mother.

23. The pending motion to compel Defendant to pay all arbitration costs, vacate Judge

Schecter’s irresponsible decision to compel arbitration, or grant such other, further, and

different relief that this Court deems just and proper is an entirely appropriate challenge

to this Court’s April 11, 2014 decision that was issued in defiance of the process

discussed in the case of Brady v. Williams Capital (928 N.E.2d 383, 14 N.Y.3d 459, 902

N.Y.S.2d 1 (2010)) for the purpose of determining whether a litigant even has the ability

to engage in arbitration.

24. Since I have never had an ability to engage in arbitration with Defendant and continue to



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lack such an ability due to my lack of sufficient finances to do so, Mr. Parker’s

suggestion that an arbitration of my claims against Defendant is inevitable is utterly

baseless. Similarly, Mr. Parker’s assertion that my pending motion to compel Defendant

to pay all arbitration costs, vacate Judge Schecter’s irresponsible decision to compel

arbitration, or grant such other, further, and different relief that this Court deems just and

proper was filed to harass Defendant is without merit. Instead, I filed that motion strictly

for the purpose of being granted the ability to vindicate my statutory rights as they pertain

to my claims against Defendant because being compelled to engage in arbitration with

Defendant deprives me of that ability. Accordingly, this Court should grant my motion,

issue sanctions against Mr. Parker for having engaged in acts to my detriment that violate

New York Judiciary Law § 487 in the ways that I have discussed herein, and deny

Defendant’s cross-motion.

ARGUMENT

25. My motion to compel Defendant to pay all arbitration costs, vacate Judge Schecter’s

irresponsible decision to compel arbitration, or grant such other, further, and different

relief that this Court deems just and proper is indisputably authorized by the following

findings that were issued on March 23, 1970 by the United States Supreme Court in the

case of Goldberg v. Kelly (397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970)):

“The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstancesof those who are to be heard.”

26.

In accordance with the case of Brady v. Williams Capital (928 N.E.2d 383, 14 N.Y.3d

459, 902 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2010)), this Court has a duty to ensure that I am granted the ability

to be heard in a meaningful way in an adequate legal forum that is tailored to my

particular financial circumstances for the purpose of vindicating my statutory rights, as



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they pertain to my claims against Defendant.

27. Although Mr. Parker has claimed that my motion is not authorized by law and is

procedurally improper, those remarks do not apply here and instead are true about the

unlawful acts Defendant committed against me that prompted the litigation I commenced

against it.

28. Defendant’s unlawful and atrocious acts against me have prevented me from adequately

asserting my rights in a variety of legal forums, including this one by having prevented

me from having sufficient finances in order to be able to pay for an attorney to represent

me. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful acts against me, I have been besieged by

frivolous litigation and additional litigation since 2013 while also having to contend with

flagrant judicial misconduct that prevented me from having the ability to adequately

assert my rights in this proceeding and within the standard deadlines that apply to it. In

light of this, the following remarks by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth

Circuit that pertain to equitable tolling clearly indicate that my motion in this proceeding

deserves to be subject to equitable tolling:

a. “For instance, equitable tolling may be appropriate where a plaintiff has been

‘lulled into inaction by her past employer, state or federal agencies, or the

courts.’!” Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1984) (quoting Carlile

v. South Routt School Dist. RE 3-J, 652 F.2d 981, 986 (10th Cir.1981)).

b. “Likewise, if a plaintiff is ‘actively misled,’ or ‘has in some extraordinary way

been prevented from asserting his or her rights,’ we will permit tolling of the

limitations period.” Martinez, 738 F.2d at 1110 (quoting Wilkerson v. Siegfried

Ins. Agency, Inc., 683 F.2d 344, 348 (10th Cir.1982)).



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29. Similarly, due to having been besieged by all of the following 15 sets of litigation since

April 11, 2014, while being unable to be represented by an attorney primarily because of

Defendant’s unlawful acts against me, the volume and persistence of all of that litigation

have taken an extreme toll on my mental state by subjecting me to extreme duress and

caused me to function in a diminished capacity that warrants equitable tolling pursuant

CPLR 208:

a. A frivolous holdover lawsuit that a former slumlord of mine named 65-60 Realty

Company LLC (referred to hereinafter as “65-60”) filed against me at the Queens

Housing Court and was assigned the index number of 81232/2013. After having

been deprived of my due process right to have the trial in that case scheduled for a

date and time when I could be heard in a meaningful way and at a meaningful

time, Judge Inez Hoyos unlawfully issued a default judgment against me less than

three days after I moved into a new apartment on August 2, 2014 and while my

belongings (including court papers) were still in moving boxes. Prior to her

issuing an unlawful default judgment against me on August 5, 2014 that failed to

satisfy the prerequisites for CPLR 3215 that defines the circumstances in which

default judgments can be issued, I told her during a court hearing on June 10,

2014 that I would be moving out of what was my apartment at that time on July

31, 2014. Since my following landlord needed two days to paint and clean in my

new apartment after the existing tenant moved out on July 31, 2014, my new

apartment was not available for me to move into it until August 2, 2014. In

addition, prior to her issuing the default judgment, she denied a motion I filed in

the case assigned the index number of 81232/2013 for the purpose of having her



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recuse herself from it because of misconduct she demonstrated previously in a

lawsuit that was assigned the index number of 6018/2013 and I was a party in. In

that earlier case, though I attended a court hearing for that case on February 13,

2013, she committed misconduct by dismissing that case while claiming that I had

not been present at that court hearing. After judges from an appellate court twice

granted appeals in my favor in August of 2014 in regards to the unlawful default

judgment Judge Hoyos issued against me on August 5, 2014 in the case assigned

the index number of 81232/2013, Judge Hoyos refused to reverse or modify her

August 5, 2014 decision in a related decision she issued in that case on January 5,

2015. Instead, she chose to make patently false statements about me in her

January 5, 2015 decision that I plan to discuss during a court hearing that has yet

to be scheduled for an appeal in that case. In the meantime, my former slumlord’s

attorney has fraudulently gained access to my bank accounts through that

frivolous lawsuit and as a result of Judge Hoyos’ misconduct.

b.

A frivolous turnover lawsuit that former slumlord indirectly filed against me at

the Queens Civil Court and that stems from the frivolous lawsuit that was

assigned the index number 81232/2013 that slumlord filed against me. In the

turnover case, the last hearing of that active case was presided over by a judge

who was quite rude to me during the court hearing and was a judge who was

previously censured.

c. A frivolous defamation lawsuit 65-60 filed against me that was assigned the index

number of 7780/2014 by the Queens Supreme Court. In that lawsuit,

representatives of 65-60 fraudulently claimed that I committed defamation against



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it and also claimed that I told someone that I had a gun and would shoot someone

in the knees with it. In spite of the fact that I submitted the following to the judge

presiding over that case sworn, the judge has refused to dismiss it:

1) Sworn affidavits that senior representatives of 65-60 completed in April

of 2014 in which they acknowledged having made piecemeal,

ineffective, and costly repairs to a defective elevator in my former

apartment building and that they had been receiving complaints about

that elevator from tenants for over 1.5 years

2)

A copy of a violation 65-60 was issued by the New York City

Department of Buildings about that elevator in April of 2014 with

photographs of that elevator while it was malfunctioning in 2013 and

2014.

3) A copy of a $1,000 fine 65-60 was issued in June of 2014 about that

elevator because of the violation 65-60 was issued in April of 2014

about it.

4) A record of complaints from the New York City Department of

Buildings’ web site that tenants had filed about that elevator

malfunctioning and being out of service between 2007 and 2014.

d.

A frivolous lawsuit for waste that 65-60 filed against me at the Queens Supreme

Court and has been assigned the index number of 19905/2013.

e. A lawsuit I commenced against 65-60 for harassment at the Queens Housing

Court that was assigned the index number of 6273/2013 in which the judge

wrongfully refused to accept that a slumlord’s refusal to properly maintain a



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defective elevator constituted harassment.

f. A lawsuit against my previous landlord that was assigned the index number of

75694/2014 by the Queens Housing Court in which I was granted an insufficient

rent abatement by the Supervising Judge of the Housing Court, after he

acknowledged having not based the amount of the rent abatement on the severity

of defective housing conditions in my apartment that were preventing me from

being able to sleep, study, and relax in it.

g. A lawsuit I subsequently commenced against that same landlord, was assigned the

index number of 6104/2015 by the Queens Housing Court, and was presided over

by Judge Clifton Nembhard. In that lawsuit, Judge Nembhard deprived me of my

fundamental due process right to present evidence in court, after he visited my

apartment on July 10, 2015 and I recorded him on audio in my apartment while he

made the following remarks to me:

1) “I’m not here to hear what you’re trying to say.”

2)

“I didn’t come here to listen to you today.”

3) “I’m not here to hear you speak today, sir.”

4) “I’m sorry if you were under the impression that I came here to listen to

your arguments today, you’re sorely, sadly mistaken.”

Quite understandably, I am appealing the outcome of that lawsuit.

h. A lawsuit my previous landlord commenced against me while it was refusing to

make necessary repairs in my apartment and other areas of my apartment

building for defective conditions that were responsible for causing excessively

loud flushing noises and vibrations to consistently to spread into and throughout



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my apartment through my apartment building’s plumbing system from other

apartments in that building while the plumbing in my apartment was not in use.

That lawsuit was assigned the index number of 63837/2015 by the Queens

Housing Court and was also presided over by Judge Clifton Nembhard. In that

lawsuit, Judge Nembhard also deprived me of my fundamental due process right

to present evidence in court, after he visited my apartment on July 10, 2015. As a

result of an unlawful order of eviction Judge Nembhard issued in that

proceeding, all of the following occurred:

1)

I was unlawfully evicted from my former apartment on October 22, 2015.

2) I became homeless on that date.

3) A New York City Marshall visited my apartment on that date for the

purpose of conducting an inventory of personal property I left behind there

for my landlord to have temporarily put into storage for later retrieval by

me. The New York City Marshall failed to record a full and accurate

inventory of that property and failed to safeguard property of mine I left

behind in violation of explicit rules set forth by the New York City

Department of Investigations.

4) A moving company that has had numerous complaints filed against it for

theft and damage to property was retained by my former landlord to pack

and temporarily store my property.

5) More than $4,000 of my property was not returned to me when I met with

that moving company on November 23, 2012 to reclaim my property.

Quite understandably, I am also appealing the outcome of that lawsuit.



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i. An order to show cause that I filed at the Queens Supreme Court that was

assigned the index number of 012669/2015 and was filed for the purpose of

having a judge from that court investigate allegations I submitted against Judge

Nembhard pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, the judge who reviewed the

order to show cause I submitted, refused to sign it and refused to listen to the

audio recording I recorded of Judge Nembhard while he was in my apartment on

July 10, 2015.

j. Four valid lawsuits that I filed at the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York between 2014 and 2015 that were assigned the

following case numbers and include one that I am likely to appeal:

1) 1:15-cv-04448-PGG. This is a lawsuit I filed against a company named

Eden Technologies Corporation that I’m not permitted to discuss in

detail because of terms of a settlement agreement.

2) 1:14-cv-00167-PAE-JCF. This is a lawsuit that I filed on January 7,

2014 against a company named Bernard Nickels Inc. that was closed on

October 22, 2014 strictly because frivolous lawsuits filed against me by

65-60 caused me to have insufficient time to deal with the lawsuit that I

filed against Bernard Nickels Inc.

3) 1:14-cv-00454-LAP. This is a lawsuit that I filed on January 23, 2014

against the Naval Criminal Investigative Service of the United States

Navy that was closed on May 30, 2014. I filed that lawsuit primarily to

recover property that belonged to me prior to my enlistment in the U.S.

Navy in 2003 and was wrongfully seized by the Naval Criminal



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Investigative Service in response to false accusations that were made

about me while I served in the Navy in Japan. After having been

exonerated of those false accusations, the property that had been sized

that belonged to me was never returned to me in violation of my due

process rights.

4) 1:15-cv-07007-LGS. This is a lawsuit that I filed against Defendant and

Credit Suisse on September 4, 2015 that was based upon independent

claims and was improperly adjudicated and terminated on May 17,

2015 in violation of my due process rights and the provisions of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

k. A legal proceeding I commenced at the New York State Supreme Court in

Manhattan last year that was assigned the index number of 500380/2015. I

commenced that legal proceeding for the purpose of trying to have a legal

guardian appointed for my mother and was appointed as a co-guardian for her

last month.

l. A valid legal proceeding I commenced with OSHA in October of last year

pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s whistleblower protections against

Defendant and Credit Suisse. That proceeding is pending a decision by an

Administrative Law Judge of the United States Department of Labor.

30. On page 6 of Parker’s Memo, Mr. Parker’s discusses CPLR 5015. In remarks Judge

Schecter expressed in her April 11, 2014 decision in this proceeding, Judge Schecter

made a misrepresentation by making the following statement:

“It is well settled that courts must enforce contractual arbitration provisions.”



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Contrary to that remark by Judge Schecter, it is clear from the findings that were issued

in the case of Brady v. Williams Capital (928 N.E.2d 383, 14 N.Y.3d 459, 902 N.Y.S.2d

1 (2010)) that it is not well settled that courts in the State of New York must enforce

contractual arbitration provisions. It was not until late last year that the diligent legal

research I have engaged in since 2012 enabled me to learn about the case of Brady v.

Williams Capital (928 N.E.2d 383, 14 N.Y.3d 459, 902 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2010)).

31. Based on what I have just stated, sufficient cause exists for this Court to equitably toll the

one-year deadline that ordinarily applies to obtaining relief through CPLR 5015. In

addition, since Judge Schecter engaged in misrepresentation in her April 11, 2014

decision in the manner I have described that is confirmed by the case I cited above and

discovered late last year, two of the five statutory considerations that pertain to

misrepresentation and newly-discovered evidence for obtaining relief through CPLR

5015 apply.

32. In regards to Mr. Parker’s remarks about CPLR 2221, equitable tolling is also warranted

for the reasons I have discussed above. In addition, my motion to compel Defendant to

pay all arbitration costs in this proceeding was based upon matters of fact and law

overlooked by Judge Schecter in determining the prior motion in October of 2015 that

she chose not to acknowledge and arguably constitutes fraud by her.

33.

Contrary to Mr. Parker’s contention on page 8 of Parker’s Memo, it is entirely clear that

this Court was not fully apprised of the facts of the case and of the law governing

arbitration provisions when it stayed this matter in favor of arbitration. This stems

primarily from the fact that a law firm representing Credit Suisse indicated that Credit

Suisse would not comply with the terms of a subpoena that was served upon Credit



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Suisse, after that subpoena had been signed by a judge in this proceeding and was then

served upon Credit Suisse. This conclusion can also be inferred from the following

remarks Judge Schecter made at the end of the first paragraph on page 3 of her April 11,

2014 decision in this proceeding:

“there is no prejudice alleged or demonstrated as a result of the limited proceedingsthat have taken place in Civil Court”

34. By claiming that “nothing has changed in the intervening months on page 8 of Parker’s

Memo, Mr. Parker further exhibited his reckless pattern of deceit. Contrary to Mr.

Parker’s asinine assertion, the 15 sets of litigation I have been involved in between 2014

and 2016 and discussed earlier within this Reply Affidavit unequivocally confirm that my

particular circumstances have adversely changed in a substantial and material way since

April 11, 2014 and have made it even more impossible to engage in arbitration with

Defendant. Accordingly, my motion to compel Defendant to pay all arbitration costs or

vacate this Court’s previous decision to compel arbitration if it were to decline to compel

Defendant to pay all arbitration costs constitutes appropriate equitable relief in light of

my circumstances that should be granted.

35. Mr. Parker’s contention that my motion to compel Defendant to pay all arbitration costs

or vacate this Court’s previous decision to compel arbitration if it were to decline to

compel Defendant to pay all arbitration costs should be denied without reaching the

merits based on comity is entirely without merit. Contrary to his baseless contention, the

United States Supreme Court issued the following applicable remarks in a decision it

issued on March 23, 1970 in the case of Goldberg v. Kelly (397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011,

25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970)):

“The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of



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those who are to be heard.”

36. Mr. Parker’s contention that I seek reconsideration “of the federal court’s implicit

rejection of Plaintiff’s argument that” my discovery “of case law arising under the

effective vindication doctrine constitutes cause for reconsideration of Your Honor’s”

Decision and Order is yet another baseless claim by him. Contrary to his continuing

stream of asinine and deceitful remarks, the federal court mainly expressed that it did not

have jurisdiction to consider decisions that were issued in this proceeding. The federal

court neither explicitly nor implicitly rejected claims I have made in this proceeding.

Moreover, for the reasons I have discussed in this Reply Affidavit, Judge Schecter’s

April 11, 2014 decision was in no way a “well-reasoned” decision.

37. Contrary to Mr. Parker’s baseless claims, a federal court has the discretion to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction for the purpose of hearing independent claims that were not

previously considered by another court. The Amended Complaint that I filed in the

federal action Mr. Parker refers to represented a valid attempt to have that federal court

exercise its supplemental jurisdiction to determine whether I have had the ability to

engage in arbitration with Defendant. Since this Court never considered whether I had

that ability, it represented an independent claim. Also, since the transcript of a court

hearing that was held on September 28, 2015 confirms that the federal court clearly

expressed that it did not have jurisdiction to even consider whether I have had the ability

to engage in arbitration with Defendant, it did not consider my arguments about the

effective vindication doctrine. Accordingly, my due process rights and the well-settled

policy of the courts that cases should be decided on their merits whenever possible

confirm that this Court should grant my request to consider my arguments concerning the



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effective vindication doctrine.

38. Contrary to Mr. Parker’s contentions, Judge Schecter’s April 11, 2014 decision in this

proceeding confirms that this proceeding has included claims by me against Defendant

for unpaid wages. Since the Effective Vindication Doctrine undeniably is applicable to

my claims against Defendant for unpaid wages, my motion to compel Defendant to pay

all arbitration costs or grant the relief I have discussed earlier in this Reply Affidavit

succeeds on its merits and must be granted.

39. Contrary to Mr. Parker’s contentions, I can easily and overwhelmingly demonstrate that

the arbitration clause is both unconscionable and unenforceable. Due to the fact that

Defendant has unlawfully deprived me of income since 2012 that could be used to help

pay for the cost of engaging in arbitration with Defendant and I have never had nor had

the ability to obtain sufficient finances that would allow me to pay that cost, it has never

been possible for me to engage in arbitration with Defendant. As a result, the arbitration

clause is both unconscionable and unenforceable.

40.

As Mr. Parker states toward the bottom of page 9 of Parker’s Memo, section two of the

FAA allows courts to deny enforcement of an arbitration agreement “upon such grounds

as exist at law or in equity.” Due to the existence of that explicit text within the FAA and

how Defendant has been and remains largely responsible for why I cannot and have not

been able to engage in arbitration with it, it is perfectly clear that such grounds exist in

equity considering my financial circumstances and at law with respect to those Defendant

violated and have been the subject of this proceeding for this Court to act in accordance

with the terms of the FAA by issuing an order in the interests of equity that finds that the

arbitration clause Mr. Parker has referred to has been and remains both unconscionable



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and unenforceable.

41. Mr. Parker’s discussion in Parker’s Memo about how the effective vindication doctrine

applies to federal statutory rights is irrelevant and dilatory because my claims against

Defendant in this proceeding for unpaid wages naturally invoke both the federal Fair

Labor Standards Act and New York State’s labor laws.

42. While Mr. Parker has asserted that “arbitration is a creature of contract” in Parker’s

Memo, the arbitration clause that Defendant drafted and this proceeding concerns was

effectively employed by Defendant as a creature and significant element of a malicious,

fraudulent, and naked scheme to deprive me of income for work I performed at Credit

Suisse in 2012, then compel me to engage in arbitration with Defendant in order to seek

relief for unlawful acts Defendant perpetrated against me while it would be impossible

for me to engage in arbitration with Defendant because of its unlawful acts.

43. A diligent review of the explicit terms expressed within section two of the FAA, my

financial circumstances, and the effective vindication doctrine should lead this Court to

conclude that this Court is allowed by the FAA to issue an order on the merits that finds

that sufficient grounds exist at law and in equity that serve to demonstrate that the

arbitration clause in the contract Defendant issued to [redacted] is both unenforceable and

unconscionable and that Defendant primarily has itself to blame for this.

44.

Contrary to Mr. Parker’s baseless assertions, his own remarks about section two of the

FAA in Parker’s Memo confirm that it contains language that allows this Court to issue

an order on the merits and with consideration given to my financial circumstances that

finds the arbitration clause to be unenforceable and unconscionable.

45. In addition, though Mr. Parker made yet another blatant attempt to mislead this Court in



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further violation of New York Judiciary Law § 487 by fraudulently claiming in the first

sentence of the second complete paragraph shown on page 12 of Parker’s Memo that I

have asserted that “it might be difficult” for me to pay a fifty percent share of the costs

associated with arbitration in order to engage in arbitration with Defendant, I have not

made such a claim. Instead, I have repeatedly, clearly, and truthfully stated that it has

been and remains impossible for me to pay the costs associated with arbitration in order

to engage in arbitration with Defendant largely because of Defendant’s unlawful acts.

46. In regards to this point and my legal disputes with Defendant, it has never been an issue

of whether engaging in arbitration with Defendant would be worth the expense I would

have to pay in arbitration costs and related fees. Instead, it has always been an issue of

my “inability” to pay arbitration costs and related fees largely because of Defendant’s

unlawful acts that has constituted the elimination of my right to pursue the claims I raised

in this proceeding against Defendant.

47. While citing the case of Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP , 726 F. 3d 290, 299 (2d Cir.

2013) toward the end of page 12 of Parker’s Memo, Mr. Parker failed point out a clear

distinction that has existed and continues to exist between that case and my financial

circumstances. As I have repeatedly stated, I have not had an ability to engage in

arbitration with Defendant because of my financial circumstances. This is quite different

from the case of Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP , 726 F. 3d 290, 299 (2d Cir. 2013) in

which it was argued that the cost of engaging in arbitration would be cost-prohibitive to

Ms. Sutherland and suggests that she may possibly had an ability to pay the applicable

arbitration costs.

48. While decorum requires that I refrain from physically attacking Mr. Parker or expressing



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abusive and profane remarks toward him, decorum also requires him to refrain from

making the entirely baseless and unfounded remarks that appear in the footnote section

shown at the bottom of page 12 of Mr. Parker’s Memo. In regards to his patently

antagonistic remarks that appear in that footnote section, Defendant’s unlawful acts

against me are the reason why I have not been able to pay for an attorney in the litigation

he refers to in that footnote. In addition, the judgments that were issued against me were

unlawfully issued following actions two judges took that deprived me of my fundamental

due process rights and are pending appeals. Moreover, while serving in the U.S. Navy

after having been made to take an oath in which I swore to protect and defend the

Constitution against all enemies, I was directed by senior military officers that unlawful

orders are not to be followed and that following unlawful orders can lead to being

punished. In addition, though I have had the ability to pay court filing fees that have

never exceeded $400 per filing fee, the costs of engaging in arbitration with Defendant

would certainly be a much significantly higher cost and one that I have never had the

ability to pay. My decisions to engage in litigation with former landlords and others were

made partly to have necessary repairs made in my apartments so I could sleep and have

the ability from a decent night’s sleep to then have the ability to perform well in jobs I

held instead of being sleep-deprived. It was my belief that if I were able to perform my

jobs well by using litigation to have necessary repairs made in my apartments that would

enable me to have a decent night’s sleep, the income that I would be able to earn from

those jobs and by prevailing in the valid litigation would enable me to pay for the costs

associated with engaging in arbitration with Defendant. However, Mr. Parker

conveniently chose not to acknowledge the fact that New York City Housing Court



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judges Inez Hoyos and Clifton Nembhard never allowed me to present evidence at trial in

flagrant violation of my due process rights in the cases assigned the index numbers of

81232/2013, 6104/2015, and 63837/2015 that they presided over and were assigned to the

Queens Housing Court. It is quite doubtful that there could have been a more glaring and

inexcusable omission of key facts by Mr. Parker.

49. Similarly, though Mr. Parker discussed in Parker’s Memo unlawful judgments Judge

Hoyos and Nembhard issued against me, he failed to discuss the provisions of CPLR

3215 that govern the prerequisites that must first be satisfied before default judgments

can be issued. CPLR 3215 includes the following provisions that serve as prerequisites

that must be satisfied before a default judgment can be lawfully issued:

“(a) Default and entry. When a defendant has failed to appear, plead or proceed totrial of an action reached and called for trial, or when the court orders a dismissal forany other neglect to proceed, the plaintiff may seek a default judgment against him. Ifthe plaintiff's claim is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation bemade certain, application may be made to the clerk within one year after the default.The clerk, upon submission of the requisite proof, shall enter judgment for theamount demanded in the complaint or stated in the notice served pursuant to

subdivision (b) of rule 305, plus costs and interest.”

“(f) Proof. On any application for judgment by default, the applicant shall file proofof service of the summons and the complaint, or a summons and notice served pursuant to subdivision (b) of rule 305 or subdivision (a) of rule 316 of this chapter,and proof of the facts constituting the claim, the default and the amount due byaffidavit made by the party, or where the state of New York is the plaintiff, byaffidavit made by an attorney from the office of the attorney general who has orobtains knowledge of such facts through review of state records or otherwise.”

Since all of the following statements are entirely true, the default judgment that Judge

Hoyos issued against me on August 5, 2014 in the frivolous lawsuit assigned the index

number of 81232/2013 that my former slumlord 65-60 filed against me was unlawfully

issued:

a.

By filing 3 frivolous lawsuits against me in 2013 and 2014, 65-60 subjected me to



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duress and harassment that reduced the value of my apartment in its apartment

building while I was forced to spend substantial time, energy, and expense

contending with those frivolous lawsuits.

b. By negligently failing to properly maintain the elevator in that same apartment

building in 2013 and 2014 during my tenancy in it that caused me and others to

get stuck in that elevator while it malfunctioned and 65-60 to finally be issued a

violation in April of 2014 about that elevator, those circumstances reduced the

value of my apartment and were responsible for 65-60 being ordered in June of

2014 by an Administrative Law Judge assigned to the New York City

Environmental Control Board to pay a $1,000 fine in regards to that elevator

having been found by a New York City Department of Buildings inspector to be

out-of-service in April of 2014 in violation of 1 RCNY § 11-02.

c. By negligently failing to access to the rear of that same apartment building to

authorized personnel and keeping the ladders attached to fire escapes in the rear

of that apartment building lowered instead of raised, 65-60 was responsible for

enabling one or more burglars to break into my apartment and two others in that

building on January 5, 2014 that caused me and two other tenants to be robbed of

substantial and valuable personal property. This fact further reduced the value of

my apartment.

d. Since 65-60 had claimed in the frivolous lawsuit assigned the index number of

81232/2013 that I had tampered with an electrical outlet in my apartment’s

bathroom in spite of the fact that no such electrical outlet ever existed in that

bathroom during my tenancy, 65-60 and its attorney were unable to prove to



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Judge Hoyos that I tampered with something that never existed. Similarly, though

65-60 claimed in that same lawsuit that I caused damage to the bedroom door in

my apartment, a New York City Department of Buildings inspector named

Thomas Mulvihill told me in that apartment on October 11, 2013 while I was

recording our conversation on audio and while he was conducting an inspection

of my apartment in his official capacity as a New York City Department of

Buildings inspector that I could not have possibly caused the damage to that door

that 65-60 had alleged. As a result, 65-60 and its attorney were unable to prove to

Judge Hoyos that I caused the damage to that bedroom door that 65-60 had

alleged.

50. Contrary to Mr. Parker’s baseless claims on page 13 of Parker’s Memo, since Judge

Schecter issued an order in this proceeding that compelled me to engage in arbitration

with Defendant without first engaging in the type of case-by-case analysis of my ability

to engage in arbitration with Defendant that is discussed in the case of Brady v. Williams

Capital (928 N.E.2d 383, 14 N.Y.3d 459, 902 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2010)), her failure to do so

confirms that she deprived me of my due process right to be heard in a meaningful way

that was tailored to my particular circumstances and ability to be heard with regards to

my claims in this proceeding against Defendant. Accordingly, my argument that Judge

Schecter deprived me of my due process rights in this manner should be accepted.

51. Although Mr. Parker made a few remarks in the footnote section shown on page 13 of

Parker’s Memo in regards to the case of Brady v. Williams Capital (928 N.E.2d 383, 14

N.Y.3d 459, 902 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2010)) and requested for this Court to grant him leave “to

brief his arguments “more fully if the Court determines that Brady remains good law and



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is controlling,” it is quite apparent that he freely chose not to fully brief his arguments in

regards to this in Parker’s Memo and is not entitled to continue to do so mainly because it

would needlessly prolong this proceeding and delay my ability to obtain appropriate legal

relief through this proceeding.

52. Similarly, though Mr. Parker submitted an additional request in that same footnote

section for this Court to grant him “an opportunity to brief fully the requirements of the

due process clause,” it is perfectly clear that though he had the opportunity to “brief fully

the requirements of the due process clause” in Parker’s Memo, he freely chose not to do

so and surrender his right to do so in the process.

53. Mr. Parker’s cross-motion for fees and costs is entirely without merit. There has neither

been frivolous conduct committed by me in this proceeding nor any intent by me to

commit such conduct in this proceeding. Instead and as I have clearly explained, I have

merely sought to have errors committed by Judge Schecter in this proceeding addressed

and corrected that would enable me have the claims I have raised against Defendant in

this proceeding for both unpaid wages and breach of contract properly adjudicated on the

merits. Being compelled to engage in arbitration with Defendant has not allowed for that

for the reasons I have described. In addition, this Court should recognize the fact that it

has actually been Mr. Parker, who went out of his way to engage in frivolous conduct by

violating New York Judiciary Law § 487 and making statements in Parker’s Memo

primarily to delay the resolution of this proceeding and harass and maliciously injure me.

Remarks Mr. Parker made in Parker’s Memo primarily to harass and maliciously injure

me include, but are in no way limited to the following outlandish assertions he made

about me:



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a. I commenced frivolous litigation or filed frivolous motions in litigation with

former landlords of mine;

b. I have claimed that it would be difficult for me to engage in arbitration with

Defendant in contrast with my actual claims that it has been impossible for me to

engage in arbitration with Defendant primarily because of Defendant’s unlawful

acts against me.

c. My claims against Defendant in this proceeding do not include claims for unpaid

wages that are subject to both New York State’s labor laws and the federal Fair

Labor Standards Act.

d. Judgments issued against me by New York City Housing Court Judges Inez

Hoyos and Clifton Nembhard were lawfully issued.

54. Similarly, Mr. Parker’s claims in the last paragraph shown on page 14 of Parker’s Memo

that my motion to compel Defendant to pay the costs of arbitration is objectively

frivolous is entirely without merit for the reasons I have discussed in this Reply Affidavit.

No court has made an attempt to determine whether I have the ability or have had the

ability in light of my financial circumstances to engage in arbitration with Defendant. In

addition, though Mr. Parker has asserted within the fourth line of the last paragraph

shown on page 14 of Parker’s Memo that I have made “efforts to avoid litigation” with

Defendant, his assertion is patently baseless and yet another instance in which he has

violated New York State Judiciary Law § 487. Furthermore, I have not ignored

precedents that Mr. Parker falsely claims are binding. Instead, I have focused on

precedents that supersede the precedents Mr. Parker refers to. Precedents that supersede

those Mr. Parker refers to in the last paragraph shown on page 14 of Parker’s Memo



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include section two of the FAA, the Effective Vindication Doctrine, and the judicial

findings that were issued in the case of Brady v. Williams Capital (928 N.E.2d 383, 14

N.Y.3d 459, 902 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2010)) by the New York State Court of Appeals and the

Appellate Division, First Department of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.

55. Contrary to Mr. Parker’s baseless claims, the many months that have passed between

legal filings I have submitted in this proceeding have been due to my having to contend

with the following:

a. 15 other sets of litigation I have been involved in since April 11, 2014 in which I

have been unable to be represented by an attorney primarily because of

Defendant’s unlawful acts against me.

b. Long periods of unemployment exacerbated by the fact that Defendant and other

firms have blacklisted me because of my decision to assert valid claims against

Defendant and other firms.

c. Theft of my property.

d.

Violations of my fundamental due process rights and additional judicial

misconduct in other litigation I have been involved in.

e. Having been homeless largely because of Defendant’s unlawful acts against me.

56. The following claim Mr. Parker made in Parker’s Memo between the end of page 14 and

top of page 15 is nothing more than yet an additional instance in which he flagrantly and

willfully violated New York Judiciary Law§ 487 and the provisions of 22 NYCRR 130-

1.1 that pertain to frivolous and deceitful conduct:

“In light of the many months that pass between each of Plaintiff’s filings, there can be little doubt that they are motivated largely by a desire to delay the inevitablearbitration of his claims.”



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57. Since it’s likely that individual taxpayers (including me) and corporate taxpayers pay for

contracts through their taxes that Defendant has with government agencies, decisions I

have made to share factual information about the unlawful acts that Defendant has

committed against me with government agencies, various businesses, investors, and

members of the general public have been an effort to help those people, government

agencies, and businesses to make independent and better informed decisions about

whether their respective policies require them not to invest in or otherwise do business

with Defendant while in no way crossing the line by engaging in tortious interference or

committing defamation against Defendant nor any other party.

58. Mr. Parker’s contention that I have sought to re-litigate issues this Court has already

decided is entirely without merit.

59. The remainder of the contentions Mr. Parker expressed in the first paragraph shown on

page 15 of Parker’s Memo is also without merit.

60. Accordingly, I respectfully move this Court for an order denying the following requests

Mr. Parker made on behalf of Defendant in the last paragraph that appears on page 15 of

Parker’s Memo:

a. To have this Court issue an order directing me to pay Defendant’s fees and costs

in this proceeding;

b.

To have this Court issue an order placing me on notice that future attempts to

litigate my claims against Defendant in any forum other than the arbitral forum

will be considered frivolous and will result in an award of fees and costs. Since

there are additional valid and independent claims I have against Defendant

pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (18 U.S.C. § 1514A) and civil Rico that



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courts and the applicable federal statutes confirm are not subject to arbitration, it

would be entirely improper for this Court to issue an order in the manner that

Mr. Parker has requested.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this application be granted in all

respects, the issuance of sanctions against Mr. Parker for having made remarks in

Parker’s Memo that violated New York State Judiciary Law § 487 and 22NYCRR § 130-

1.1, and for such other and further relief, including as to this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: May 20, 2016 New York, New York

[REDACTED]

Sworn to before me onthis 20h day of May 2016

NOTARY PUBLIC



EXHIBIT A

slightly redacted may 20, 2016 reply affidavit in opposition to ntt data, inc.'s opposition to...

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