smallpox lessons learned and future challenges. 2 why smallpox bioterrorism? stable aerosol virus...
TRANSCRIPT
Smallpox
Lessons Learned and Future Challenges
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Why Smallpox Bioterrorism?
Stable aerosol Virus Easy to Produce Infectious at low doses Human to human transmission 10 to 12 day incubation period High mortality rate (30%)
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Co-Evolution
Smallpox infects humans only Could not survive until agriculture No non-human reservoir If at any point no one in the world is infected,
then the disease is eradicated Infected persons who survive are immune,
allowing communities to rebuild after epidemics
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Small Pox Vaccine History
1000 AD - China, deliberate inoculation of smallpox into skin or nares resulting in less severe smallpox infection. Vaccinees could still transmit smallpox
1796 - Edward Jenner demonstrated that skin inoculation of cowpox virus provided protection against smallpox infection
1805 - Italy, first use of smallpox vaccine manufactured on calf flank
1864 - Widespread recognition of utility of calf flank smallpox vaccine
1940’s - Development of commercial process for freeze-dried vaccine production (Collier)
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How Vaccination WorksHerd Immunity
Smallpox Spreads to the Non-immune Immunization Slows the Spread Dramatically Epidemics Die Out Naturally
Herd Immunity Protects the Unimmunized
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Smallpox Vaccine
Live Virus Vaccine (Vaccinia Virus) Not Cowpox, Might be Extinct Horsepox Must be Infected to be Immune
Crude Preparation We Have Now Prepared from the skin of infected calves Filtered, Cleaned (some), and Freeze-dried
New Vaccine is Clean, but still Live
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Complications of Vaccination
Local Lesion Can be Spread on
the Body and to Others
Progressive (Disseminated) Vaccina Deadly Like
Smallpox, but Less Contagious
Encephalitis Heart Disease?
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Historic Probability of Injury
Small Risk from Bacterial and Viral Contaminants Small Risk of Allergic Reaction 35 Years Ago
5.6M New and 8.6M Revaccinations a Year 9 deaths, 12 encephalitis/30-40%
permanent Death or Severe Permanent Injury - 1/1,000,000
Mostly among immunsupressed persons
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Global Eradication Program 1950 - Pan American Sanitary Organization initiated
hemisphere-wide eradication program 1967 - Following USSR proposal (1958) WHO initiated
Global Eradication Program Based on Ring Immunization Vaccinate All Contacts and their Contacts Isolate Contacts for Incubation Period Involuntary - Ignore Revisionist History
1977 - Oct. 26, 1977 last known naturally occurring smallpox case recorded in Somalia
1980 - WHO announced world-wide eradication
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Eradication Ended Vaccinations
Cost Benefit Analysis Vaccine was Very Cheap Program Administration was Expensive Risks of Vaccine Were Seen as Outweighing
Benefits Restatement of Torts 2nd - Products Liability
Stopped in the 1970s Immunity Declines with Time
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Post Eradication
50%+ in the US have not been vaccinated Many fewer have been vaccinated in Africa Immunity fades over time
Everyone is probably susceptible Perhaps enough protection to reduce the
severity of the disease
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Role of Medical Care
Smallpox Can Reduce Mortality with Medical Care Huge Risk of Spreading Infection to Others Very Sick Patients - Lots of Resources Cannot Treat Mass Casualties
Vaccinia VIG - more will have to be made Less sick patients - longer time
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The Danger of Synchronous Infection
The whole world may be like Hawaii before the first sailors
If everyone gets sick at the same time, even non-fatal diseases such as measles become fatal
A massive smallpox epidemic would be a national security threat
Is a massive epidemic possible?
Smallpox Vaccination Campaign
Fall 2002 - Spring 2003
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Why Did White House Wait so Long?
Key year for bioterrorism – 1993 Credible information that the Soviet Union had
tons of smallpox virus it could not account for CIA did not tell CDC Still Debating Destruction of the Virus in 1999
Should have started on a new vaccine Should have worked out a vaccination program
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Vaccinating the Military
Required of Combat Ready Troops Combat ready personnel are medically screened
and discharged if they have conditions that would complicate vaccination
All are young and healthy Not a good control group
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Vaccinating Health Care Workers
All ages Many have chronic diseases that compromise the
immune system or otherwise predispose to complications
Have not been medically screened ADA makes medical screening legally
questionable Political concerns make it impossible
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CDC Plan
Voluntary vaccinations No screening or medical records review Self-deferral
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Problems in the CDC Plan
Conflicting information on removing vaccinated workers from the workplace
No focus on who should be vaccinated - random volunteers do not produce a coherent emergency team
Assumed patients would walk into the hospital Ignored Securing ERs to prevent this No attention paid to hospital and worker concerns
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Liability for Primary Vaccine Injuries
Informed Consent Was the Patient Warned of the Risk? Is it 1/1,000,000 or is it 1/10 for the
Immunosuppressed? Negligent Screening
Is it reasonable to rely on self-screening when the clinical trials demanded medical testing and records review?
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Liability for Secondary Spread
Spread to Family Members Is a Warning to the Vaccinee Enough? Should there be investigation of the health
status of family members? Spread to Patients by Health Care Providers
Should Vaccinated Persons be in the Workplace while Healing?
Should Patients be Warned?
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Employment Discrimination Issues
What Happens When Health Care Providers and Others Refuse Vaccination?
What if they Cannot be Immunized? Must they be Removed from Emergency
Preparedness Teams? What about Other Workplace Sanctions?
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Costs to Hospitals and Workers
Is a vaccine injury a worker's compensation injury? Should be, but many comp carriers baulked at
assuring they would pay Who pays for secondary spread injuries? Who pays for time off work and replacing
workers? Does the worker have to take sick leave?
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Homeland Security Act Solution
"For purposes of this section, and subject to other provisions of this subsection, a covered person shall be deemed to be an employee of the Public Health Service with respect to liability arising out of administration of a covered countermeasure against smallpox to an individual during the effective period of a declaration by the Secretary under paragraph (2)(A)."
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What Triggers This?
Secretary of HHS Must Make a Declaration Must Specify the Covered Actions
Immunity Only Extends to Covered Use of Vaccine
Does Not Apply to Unauthorized Use or Blackmarket
Includes People and Institutions
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What is Excluded?
Probably Worker’s Comp Not a Liability Claim If Included, then the Injured Worker has no
Compensation Black-market and direct person to person
inoculation Only injuries, not costs of lost time and other
hospital costs
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Effect on Injured Workers, Their Families, and Patients
No compensation beyond comp Questions about whether comp would pay Might have to use vacation and sick leave Smallpox compensation act was eventually
passed but not implemented and is too limited
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The Real ProblemLack of Information
What is the real risk of complications? Never clarified the risk to immunosuppressed
persons Why now?
Has something really changed? Is this just Swine Flu all over again?
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The End Result
Less than 35,000 vaccinated out of a target of 500,000
Many of those were reservists who were vaccinated outside the hospital setting
Smallpox vaccination has been discredited
Modeling Smallpox and the CDC, Post Smallpox Immunization Campaign
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The Dark Winter Model
Johns Hopkins Model - 2001 Simulation for high level government officials Assumed terrorists infected 1000 persons in
several cities Within a few simulated months, all vaccine was
gone, 1,000,000 people where dead, and the epidemic was raging out of control
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Response to the Dark Winter Model
Koopman – worked in the eradication campaign “Smallpox is a barely contagious and slow-
spreading infection.” Lane – ex-CDC smallpox unit director
Dark Winter was “silly.” “There’s no way that’s going to happen.”
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Decomposing the Models – Common Factors
Population at risk Initial seed Transmission rate Control measures under study
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Population at Risk
Total number of people Compartments - how much mixing?
Immunization status Most assume 100% are susceptible
Increasing the % of persons immune to smallpox Reduces the number of susceptibles Dilutes the pool, reducing rate of spread
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Transmission Rate
Mixing Coefficient X Contact Efficiency Mixing Coefficient
The number of susceptible persons an index case comes in contact with
Contact Efficiency (Infectivity) Probably of transmission from a given contact Can be varied based on the type of contact
Where do the Models Differ?
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Transmission Rate is the Key
< 1 - epidemic dies out on its own 1 - 3 - moves slowly and can be controlled without
major disruption > 5 - fast moving, massive intervention needed for
control > 10 - overwhelms the system - Dark Winter
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What is the Data on Transmission Rate?
Appendix I http://whqlibdoc.who.int/smallpox/9241561106_
chp23.pdf This is all the data that exists The data is limited because of control efforts
This data supports any choice between 1 and 10
What are the Policy Implications of the Transmission Rate?
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Dark Winter - Risk of 10
Can only be prevented by the reinstituting routine smallpox immunization
Terrible parameters for policy making Huge risk if there is an outbreak Low probability of an outbreak
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Kaplan - Risk of 5
Mass immunization on case detection Best to pre-immunize health care workers
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Metzler/CDC - Risk of 2-3
Contact tracing and ring immunization Trace each case and immunize contacts Immunize contacts of contacts Takes a long time to get the last case
What are the Politics?
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Reinstituting Routine Vaccinations
We cannot even get people to get flu shots, which is perfectly safe
No chance that any significant number of people will get the smallpox vaccine after the failure of the campaign to vaccinate health care workers
Would require a massive federal vaccine compensation program
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Mass Vaccinations Post-Outbreak
Pros Limits the duration of the outbreak to the time
necessary to do the immunizations, could be two weeks with good organization
Eliminates the chance of breakout Cons
Lots of complications and deaths from the vaccine Requires massive changes in federal vaccine plans
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Contract Tracing and Ring Immunizations
Pros Limits the vaccine complications Does not require hard policy choice to
immunize everyone Cons
Requires lots of staff Requires quarantine Requires lots of time Chance of breakout
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Contact Tracing Model and Lessons from Katrina
National Security Administration Course Problem How much do the feds depends on the states to do
their part? What is the risk if the states do not do their part? How can the feds know in time?
No one was interested Of course the states will do what they are required to
do What else can the states say when they depend on
federal money?
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Political Choices are Hidden in the Models
Federal policy is based on a low transmission rate Is that justified by the data? Is the potential upside risk too great with this
assumption? Dark Winter is based on a high rate
Do anything and pay anything to avoid bioterrorism
Convenient for bioterrorism industries
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The Problem
Smallpox is still a real threat Or is it?
The CDC plans for dealing with an outbreak are completely unrealistic Should we start vaccinating the population? Vaccinating health care workers alone is not
epidemiologically sound or politically acceptable How do we resolve the uncertainty?
What does this tell us about Pan Flu?