smart grid security challenges
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Smart Grid Security Challenges. Ahmad Alqasim. Agenda. Problem Statement Power system vs. smart grid Background Information Focus Point Privacy Attack Privacy Attack Countermeasures Jamming attack Jamming Attack Countermeasures Conclusion Discussion Time. Problem Statement. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Smart Grid Security Challenges
Ahmad Alqasim
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Agenda Problem Statement Power system vs. smart grid Background Information Focus Point Privacy Attack Privacy Attack Countermeasures Jamming attack Jamming Attack Countermeasures Conclusion Discussion Time
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Problem Statement Analyze smart grid security challenges Focus on:
Privacy attack: Aims to illegally reach to the customer’s load profile (CLP)
Jamming attack: Aims to cause a denial of service to the wireless system in home area network (HAN)
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Traditional System vs. Smart GridTraditional Power system One-way Interaction Unable to meet the new
energy demand Customers only have a
physical access to their electrical devices
Depends on complex distribution scheme and manual switching
Smart Grid System Two-way Dialogue More Efficient, Reliable,
Secure and Greener Allow customers to
manage electricity usage and bill over the web
Automatically rerouting and restoring power delivery
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IT Systems and Power Systems Integration
IT Systems Power Systems
Smart Grid System
Integration
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IT Systems and Power Systems Integration
IT Systems Power Systems
Smart Grid
Operating Systems
WAN
TCP/IP
ICCP/DNP3
EMS
SCADA
SCADA
EMSWAN
Operating Systems
TCP/IP
ICCP/DNP3
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Conceptual Model
Market Operations Service Provider
Customer Distribution Transmission Bulk Generator
Electrical FlowSecure Communication FlowDomain
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Focus Point
HAN
Distribution Service Provider
Smart Meter
Jamming Attack
Privacy Attack
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Home Area Network (HAN)
ZigBee Wireless
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Privacy Attack Customer’s Load Profile (CLP) stored in the
smart meter Represent the reading figures by different
appliances during different periods of time The service provider use the CLP to calculate
the electricity price A behavioral information about customer can be
extracted from the CLP For example: waking up or sleeping time The motivation to use these information can be:
spying, burglary or business benefits
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Privacy Attack
Wake up time – 8:00 am Evening Activities– 7 pm-10 pm
Reference : [Molina-Markham et al., 2010]
Customer’s Load Profile Graph
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Privacy Countermeasures Trusted Third Party (TTP) High Frequency Encryption De-Pseudonymization Non-Intrusive load Levelling (NILL)
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Trusted Third Party (TTP) The TTP Will not
access to the smart meter. Rather, it will receive the reading figures and send them to the service provider
Smart Meter
Service Provider
Trusted Third Party (TTP)
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High Frequency Encryption The service
provider can access to the LF in order to calculate the electrical bill
Customer’s Load Profile
High Frequency
(HF)
Low Frequency
(LF)
Unencrypted LF
Encrypted HF
Service Provider
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De-Pseudonymization
Customer Information
DB1Load Profile
DB2Personal Profile
Aims to store customer personal information and load information in two different databases
Address, name and phone
television, electrical consumption
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Non-Intrusive load Levelling (NILL)
Aims to mask the actual load profile without affecting the actual data
Actual CLPMask CLP
Masked CLP
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Actual CLP
Masked CLP
Final Load
Profile
Battery
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Jamming Attack Performed against ZigBee wireless in HAN Hacker usually aims to prevent the smart
meter from communicating with different appliances
In smart grid, the priority for availability, then integrity and confidentiality
Jamming attack affects the availability of data
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Jamming Techniques and TypesTechniques Spot Jamming Sweep Jamming Barrage Jamming Deceptive Jamming
Types Constant Jammer Deceptive Jammer Random Jammer Reactive Jammer
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pseudorandom Sequence Pseudorandom
sequence is a key that only known by the sender and receiver
And aims to hide the SFD
Start of Delimiter Frame (SFD)
pseudorandom Sequence
Packet
Mask the SFD
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Frequency Hopping
Smart Meter
The packet jumps between different frequencies. So, the jammer does not know exactly which frequency to jamWashing
Machine
Wormhole-based Anti-jamming
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Jammed Area
The wire cable is used in case the wireless range is jammed
Node 2
Node 2Wireless Range
Wire Cable
Node 1
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Conclusions Smart grid provide more reliable, efficient and
greener energy than power system Privacy attack aims to develop a behavioral
pattern about customers in order to perform a future action
Jamming attack aims to affect the availability of data and wireless communication in HAN
Current security tools are not completely suitable for smart grid. So, new tools have to be developed
And, the cost of security system has to be justified to fit with the business requirement
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Discussion Time
Questions and Answers