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    SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AS EXCHIANGE

    GEORGE C. HOMANS

    ABST RACT

    To consider social behavior as an exchange of goods may clarify the relations among four bodies of the-ory: behavioral psychology, economics, propositions about the dynamics of influence, and propositionsabout the structure of small groups.

    THE PROBLEMS OF SMALL-GROUP RESEARCH

    This essay will hope to honor the memoryof Georg Simmel in two different ways. Sofar as it pretends to be suggestive ratherthan conclusive, its tone will be Simmel's;and its subject, too, will be one of his. Be-cause Simmel, in essays such as those onsociability, games, coquetry, and conversa-tion, was an analyst of elementary socialbehavior, we call him an ancestor of whatis known today as small-group research.For what we are really studying in smallgroups is elementary social behavior: whathappens when two or three persons are ina position to influence one another, the sortof thing of which those massive structurescalled "classes," "firms,"

    "communities,"and "societies" must ultimately be com-posed.

    As I survey small-group research today,I feel that, apart from just keeping on withit, three sorts of things need to be done. Thefirst is to show the relation between the re-sults of experimental work done underlaboratory conditions and the results ofquasi- anthropological field research onwhat those of us who do it are pleased to

    call "real-life" groups in industry and else-where. If the experimental work has any-thing to do with real life-and I am per-suaded that it has everything to do-itspropositions cannot be inconsistent withthose discovered through the field work.But the consistency has not yet been demon-strated in any systematic way.

    The second job is to pull together in someset of general propositions the actual re-sults, from the laboratory and from the

    field, of work on small groups-propositionsthat at least sum up, to an approximation,

    what happens in elementary social be-havior, even though we may not be able toexplain why the propositions should takethe form they do. A great amount of workhas been done, and more appears every day,but what it all amounts to in the shape of

    a set of propositions from which, underspecified conditions, many of the observa-tional results might be derived, is not at allclear-and yet to state such a set is thefirst aim of science.

    The third job is to begin to show how thepropositions that empirically hold good insmall groups may be derived from some setof still more general propositions. "Stillmore general" means only that empiricalpropositions other than ours may also bederived from the set. This derivation wouldconstitute the explanatory stage in thescience of elementary social behavior, forexplanation is derivation.' (I myself sus-pect that the more general set will turn outto contain the propositions of behavioralpsychology. I hold myself to be an "ulti-mate psychological reductionist," but I can-not know that I am right so long as the re-duction has not been carried out.)

    I have come to think that all three ofthese jobs would be furthered by our adopt-ing the view that interaction between per-sons is an exchange of goods, material andnon-material. This is one of the oldesttheories of social behavior, and one that westill use every day to interpret our own be-havior, as when we say, "I found so-and-sorewarding"; or "I got a great deal out ofhim"; or, even, "Talking with him took agreat deal out of me." But, perhaps just be-

    1 See R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953).

    597

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    598 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

    cause it is so obvious, this view has beenmuch neglected by social scientists. So faras I know, the only theoretical work thatmakes explicit use of it is Marcel Mauss'sEssai sur le don, published in 1925, which isancient as social science goes.2 It may bethat the tradition of neglect is now chang-ing and that, for instance, the psychologistswho interpret behavior in terms of trans-actions may be coming back to somethingof the sort I have in mind.3

    An incidental advantage of an exchangetheory is that it might bring sociology closerto economics-that science of man most ad-vanced, most capable of application, and,intellectually, most isolated. Economicsstudies exchange carried out under specialcircumstances and with a most useful built-in numerical measure of value. What arethe laws of the general phenomenon ofwhich economic behavior is one class?

    In what follows I shall suggest somereasons for the usefulness of a theory of so-cial behavior as exchange and suggest thenature of the propositions such a theorymight contain.

    AN EXCHANGE PARADIGM

    I start with the link to behavioral psy-chology and the kind of statement it makesabout the behavior of an experimental ani-mal such as the pigeon.4 As a pigeon ex-plores its cage in the laboratory, it happensto peck a target, whereupon the psycholo-gist feeds it corn. The evidence is that itwill peck the target again; it has learned the

    behavior, or, as myfriend Skinner

    says,the

    behavior has been reinforced, and thepigeon has undergone operant conditioning.This kind of psychologist is not interestedin how the behavior was learned: "learningtheory" is a poor name for his field. Instead,

    he is interested in what determines changesin the rate of emission of learned behavior,whether pecks at a target or something else.

    The more hungry the pigeon, the lesscorn or other food it has gotten in the re-cent past, the more often it will peck. By thesame token, if the behavior is often re-inforced, if the pigeon is given much cornevery time it pecks, the rate of emission willfall off as the pigeon gets satiated. If, on theother hand, the behavior is not reinforcedat all, then, too, its rate of emission willtend to fall off, though a long time may passbefore it stops altogether, before it is ex-tinguished. In the emission of many kinds ofbehavior the pigeon incurs aversive stimula-tion, or what I shall call "cost" for short,and this, too, will lead in time to a decreasein the emission rate. Fatigue is an exampleof a "cost." Extinction, satiation, and cost,by decreasing the rate of emission of a par-ticular kind of behavior, render more prob-able the emission of some other kind ofbehavior, including doing nothing. I shallonly add that even a hard-boiled psycholo-gist puts "emotional" behavior, as well assuch things as pecking, among the uncondi-tioned responses that may be reinforced inoperant conditioning. As a statement of thepropositions of behavioral psychology, theforegoing is, of course, inadequate for anypurpose except my present one.

    We may look on the pigeon as engagedin an exchange-pecks for corn-with thepsychologist, but let us not dwell upon that,for the behavior of the pigeon hardly de-

    termines the behavior of the psychologistat

    all. Let us turn to a situation where the ex-change is real, that is, where the determina-tion is mutual. Suppose we are dealing withtwo men. Each is emitting behavior re-inforced to some degree by the behavior ofthe other. How it was in the past that eachlearned the behavior he emits and how helearned to find the other's behavior re-inforcing we are not concerned with. It isenough that each does find the other's be-

    havior reinforcing, and I shall call the re-inforcers-the equivalent of the pigeon'scorn-values, for this, I think, is what we

    2Translated by I. Cunnison as The Gift (Glen-coe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954).

    8 In social anthropology D. L. Oliver is workingalong these lines, and I owe much to him. See alsoT. M. Newcomb, "The Prediction of InterpersonalAttraction," American Psychologist, XI (1956),575-86.

    'B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior(New York: Macmillan Co., 1953).

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    SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AS EXCHANGE 599

    mean by this term. As he emits behavior,each man may incur costs, and each manhas more than one course of behavior opento him.

    This seems to me the paradigm of ele-mentary social behavior, and the problem ofthe elementary sociologist is to state prop-ositions relating the variations in the valuesand costs of each man to his frequency dis-tribution of behavior among alternatives,where the values (in the mathematicalsense) taken by these variable for one mandetermine n part their values for the other.5

    I see no reason to believe that the prop-ositions of behavioral psychology do not ap-ply to this situation, though the complexityof their implications in the concrete casemay be great indeed. In particular, we mustsuppose that, with men as with pigeons,an increase in extinction, satiation, or aver-sive stimulation of any one kind of behaviorwill increase the probability of emission ofsome other kind. The problem is not, as itis often stated, merely, what a man's valuesare, what he has learned in the past to findreinforcing, but how much of any one valuehis behavior is getting him now. The morehe gets, the less valuable any further unit ofthat value is to him, and the less often hewill emit behavior reinforced by it.

    THE INFLUENCE PROCESS

    We do not, I think, possess the kind ofstudies of two-person interaction thatwould either bear out these propositions orfail to do so. But we do have studies of

    larger numbers of persons that suggest thatthey may apply, notably the studies byFestinger, Schachter, Back, and their associ-ates on the dynamics of influence. One ofthe variables they work with they call co-hesiveness, defined as anything that attractspeople to take part in a group. Cohesive-ness is a value variable; it refers to the de-gree of reinforcement people find in the ac-

    tivities of the group. Festinger and his col-leagues consider two kinds of reinforcingactivity: the symbolic behavior we call "so-cial approval" (sentiment) and activityvaluable in other ways, such as doing some-thing interesting.

    The other variable they work with theycall communication and others call interac-tion. This is a frequency variable; it is ameasure of the frequency of emission ofvaluable and costly verbal behavior. Wemust bear in mind that, in general, the onekind of variable is a function of the other.

    Festinger and his co-workers show thatthe more cohesive a group is, that is, themore valuable the sentiment or activity themembers exchange with one another, thegreater the average frequency of interactionof the members.6 With men, as with pigeons,the greater the reinforcement, the moreoften is the reinforced behavior emitted.The more cohesive a group, too, the greaterthe change that members can produce n thebehavior of other members in the directionof rendering these activities more valuable.7

    That is, the more valuable the activitiesthat members get, the more valuable thosethat they must give. For if a person is emit-ting behavior of a certain kind, and otherpeople do not find it particularly rewarding,these others will suffer their own productionof sentiment and activity, in time, to fall off.But perhaps the first person has found theirsentiment and activity rewarding, and, ifhe is to keep on getting them, he must makehis own behavior more valuable to the

    others. In short, the propositions of behav-ioral psychology imply a tendency towarda certain proportionality between the valuetn AthArc .of the. hAhn%;1'ir n mnn CilyPc

    5Ibid., pp. 297-329. The discussion of "doublecontingency" by T. Parsons and E. A. Shils could

    easily lead to a similar paradigm (see Toward aGeneral Theory of Action [Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1951], pp. 14-16).

    6K. W. Back, "The Exertion of Influence throughSocial Communication," in L. Festinger, K. Back, S.Schachter, H. H. Kelley, and J. Thibaut (eds.),Theory and Experiment in Social Communication(Ann Arbor: Research Center for Dynamics, Uni-versity of Michigan, 1950), pp. 21-36.

    'S. Schachter, N. Ellertson, D. McBride, and D.Gregory, "An Experimental Study of Cohesivenessand Productivity," Human Relations, IV (1951),229-38.

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    600 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

    and the value to him of the behavior theygive him.8

    Schachter also studied the behavior ofmembers of a group toward two kinds ofother members, "conformers" and "devi-ates."9 I assume that conformers are peoplewhose activity the other members ind valu-able. For conformity is behavior that co-incides to a degree with some group stand-ard or norm, and the only meaning I canassign to norm is "a verbal description ofbehavior that many members find it valu-able for the actual behavior of themselvesand others to conform to." By the sametoken, a deviate is a member whose behavioris not particularly valuable. Now Schachtershows that, as the members of a group cometo see another member as a deviate, theirinteraction with him-communication ad-dressed to getting him to change his behav-ior-goes up, the faster the more cohesivethe group. The members need not talk to theother conformers o much; they are relative-ly satiated by the conformers' behavior: theyhave gotten what they want out of them.But if the deviate, by failing to change hisbehavior, fails to reinforce the members,they start to withhold social approval fromhim: the deviate gets low sociometric choiceat the end of the experiment. And in themost cohesive groups-those Schachter calls"high cohesive-relevant"-interaction withthe deviate also falls off in the end and islowest among those members that rejectedhim most strongly, as if they had given himup as a bad job. But how plonking can weget? These findings are utterly in line witheveryday experience.

    PRACTICAL EQUILIBRIUM

    At the beginning of this paper I suggestedthat one of the tasks of small-group researchwas to show the relation between the resultsof experimental work done under labora-tory conditions and the results of field re-search on real-life small groups. Now the

    latter often appear to be in practical equi-librium, and by this I mean nothing fancy.I do not mean that all real-life groups arein equilibrium. I certainly do not mean thatall groups must tend to equilibrium. I donot mean that groups have built-in antidotesto change: there is no homeostasis here.I do not mean that we assume equilibrium.I mean only that we sometimes observe it,that for the time we are with a group-andit is often short-there is no great changein the values of the variables we choose tomeasure. If, for instance, person A is inter-acting with B more than with C both at thebeginning and at the end of the study, thenat least by this crude measure the group isin equilibrium.

    Many of the Festinger-Schachter tudiesare experimental, and their propositionsabout the process of influence seem to me toimply the kind of proposition that empiri-cally holds good of real-life groups in prac-tical equilibrium. For instance, Festinger etal. find that, the more cohesive a group is,the greater the change that members canproduce in the behavior of other members.If the influence is exerted in the directionof conformity to group norms, then, whenthe process of influence has accomplished allthe change of which it is capable, the propo-sition should hold good that, the more co-hesive a group is, the larger the number ofmembers that conform to its norms. And itdoes hold good.10

    Again, Schachter found, in the experimentI summarized above, that in the most co-

    hesive groups and at the end, when the ef-fort to influence the deviate had failed,members interacted little with the deviateand gave him little in the way of sociometricchoice. Now two of the propositions thathold good most often of real-life groups inpractical equilibrium are precisely that themore closely a member's activity conformsto the norms the more interaction he re-ceives from other members and the moreliking choices he gets from them too. FromSkinner, op. cit., p. 100.

    'S. Schachter, "Deviation, Rejection, and Com-munication," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psy-chology, XLVI (1951), 190-207.

    0 L. Festinger, S. Schachter, and K. Back, SocialPressures in Informnal Groups (New York: Harper& Bros., 1950), pp. 72-100.

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    SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AS EXCHANGE 601

    these main propositions a number of othersmay be derived that also hold good.-'

    Yet we must ever remember hat the truthof the proposition linking conformity to lik-

    ing may on occasion be masked by the truthof other propositions. If, for instance, theman that conforms to the norms most close-ly also exerts some authority over the group,this may render liking for him somewhatless than it might otherwise have been.12

    Be that as it may, I suggest that the labo-ratory experiments on influence mply prop-ositions about the behavior of members ofsmall groups, when the process of influencehas worked tself out, that are identical withpropositions that hold good of real-lifegroups in equilibrium. This is hardly sur-prising if all we mean by equilibrium s thatall the change of which the system is, underpresent conditions, capable has been ef-fected, so that no further change occurs.Nor would this be the first time that staticshas turned out to be a special case of dy-namics.

    PROFIT AND SOCIAL CONTROL

    Though I have treated equilibrium as anobserved fact, it is a fact that cries for ex-planation. I shall not, as structural-func-tional sociologists do, use an assumed equi-librium as a means of explaining, or tryingto explain, why the other features of a socialsystem should be what they are. Rather,I shall take practical equilibrium as some-thing that is itself to be explained by theother features of the system.

    If every member of a group emits at theend of, and during, a period of time muchthe same kinds of behavior and in much the

    same frequencies as he did at the beginning,the group is for that period in equilibrium.Let us then ask why any one member's be-havior should persist. Suppose he is emit-

    ting behavior of value Al. Why does he notlet his behavior get worse (less valuable orreinforcing to the others) until it stands atAl - AA? True, the sentiments expressedby others toward him are apt to decline invalue (become less reinforcing to him), sothat what he gets from them may be Si- AS. But it is conceivable that, sincemost activity carries cost, a decline in thevalue of what he emits will mean a reduc-tion in cost to him that more than offsetshis losses in sentiment. Where, then, doeshe stabilize his behavior? This is the prob-lem of social control.'3

    Mankind has always assumed that a per-son stabilizes his behavior, at least in theshort run, at the point where he is doing thebest he can for himself under the circum-stances, though his best may not be a "ra-tional" best, and what he can do may notbe at all easy to specify, except that he isnot apt to think like one of the theoreticalantagonists in the Theory of Games. Beforea sociologist rejects this answer out of handfor its horrid profit-seeking mplications, hewill do well to ask himself if he can offer anyother answer to the question posed. I thinkhe will find that he cannot. Yet experimentsdesigned to test the truth of the answer areextraordinarily rare.

    I shall review one that seems to me toprovide a little support for the theory,though it was not meant to do so. The ex-periment is reported by H. B. Gerard, amember of the Festinger-Schachter team,under the title "The Anchorage of Opinionsin Face-to-Face Groups."''4 he experiment-er formed artificial groups whose membersmet to discuss a case in industrial relationsand to express their opinions about its prob-able outcome. The groups were of two kinds:high-attraction groups, whose members weretold that they would like one another verymuch,

    and low-attraction groups, whose

    " For propositions holding good of groups inpractical equilibrium see G. C. Homans, The Hu-mnan Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.,1950), and H. W. Riecken and G. C. Homans,"Psychological Aspects of Social Structure," in G.Lindsey (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology(Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley PublishingCo., 1954), II, 786-832.

    2See Homans, op. cit., pp. 244-48, and R. F.Bales, "The Equilibrium Problem in Small Groups,"in A. P. Hare, E. F. Borgatta, and R. F. Bales(eds.), Small Groups (New York: A. A. Knopf,1953), pp. 450-56.

    '3 Homans, op. cit., pp. 281-301.Human Relations, VII (1954), 313-25.

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    602 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

    members were told that they would not findone another particularly likable.

    At a later time the experimenter calledthe members in separately, asked themagain to express their opinions on the out-come of the case, and counted the numberthat had changed their opinions to bringthem into accord with those of other mem-bers of their groups. At the same time, apaid participant entered into a further dis-cussion of the case with each member, al-ways taking, on the probable outcome ofthe case, a position opposed to that takenby the bulk of the other members of thegroup to which the person belonged. The

    TABLE 1

    PERCENTAGE OF SUBJECTS CHANGING TOWARDSOMEONE IN THE GROUP

    Mild StrongAgree- Disagree- Disagree-ment ment ment

    High attraction.... 0 12 44Low attraction... . 0 15 9

    TABLE 2

    PERCENTAGE OF SUBJECTS CHANGING TOWARDTHE PAID PARTICIPANT

    Mild StrongAgree- Disagree- Disagree-ment ment ment

    High attraction.... 7 13 25Low attraction. .. . 20 38 8

    experimenter counted the number of per-sons shifting toward the opinion of the paidparticipant.

    The experiment had many interesting re-sults, from which I choose only thosesummed up in Tables 1 and 2. The threedifferent agreement classes are made up ofpeople who, at the original sessions, ex-pressed different degrees of agreement withthe opinions of other members of theirgroups. And the figure 44, for instance,means that, of all members of high-attrac-tion groups whose initial opinions werestrongly in disagreement with those of other

    members, 44 per cent shifted their opinionlater toward that of others.

    In these results the experimenter seems

    to have been interested only in the differ-ences in the sums of the rows, which showthat there is more shifting toward the group,and less shifting toward the paid partici-pant, in the high-attraction than in the low-attraction condition. This is in line with aproposition suggested earlier. If you thinkthat the members of a group can give youmuch-in this case, liking-you are apt togive them much-in this case, a change toan opinion in accordance with their views-or you will not get the liking. And, by thesame token, if the group can give you littleof value, you will not be ready to give itmuch of value. Indeed, you may change youropinion so as to depart from agreement evenfurther, to move, that is, toward the viewheld by the paid participant.

    So far so good, but, when I first scannedthese tables, I was less struck by the differ-ence between them than by their similarity.The same classes of people in both tablesshowed much the same relative propensitiesto change their opinions, no matter whetherthe change was toward the group or towardthe paid participant. We see, for instance,that those who change least are the high-attraction, agreement people and the low-attraction, strong-disagreement ones. Andthose who change most are the high-attrac-tion, strong-disagreement people and thelow-attraction, mild-disagreement ones.

    How am I to interpret these particular re-sults? Since the experimenter did not discussthem, I am free to offer my own explana-tion. The behavior emitted by the subjects

    is opinion and changes in opinion. For thisbehavior they have learned to expect twopossible kinds of reinforcement. Agreementwith the group gets the subject favorablesentiment (acceptance) from it, and the ex-periment was designed to give this reinforce-ment a higher value in the high-attractioncondition than in the low-attraction one.The second kind of possible reinforcementis what I shall call the "maintenance of one'spersonal integrity," which a subject gets by

    sticking to his own opinion in the face of dis-agreement with the group. The experimenterdoes not mention this reward, but I cannot

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    SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AS EXCHANGE 603

    make sense of the results without somethingmuch like it. In different degrees for differ-ent subjects, depending on their initial posi-tions, these rewards are in competition with

    one another: they are alternatives. They arenot absolutely scarce goods, but some per-sons cannot get both at once.

    Since the rewards are alternatives, let meintroduce a familiar assumption from eco-nomics-that the cost of a particular courseof action is the equivalent of the foregonevalue of an alternative'5-and then add thedefinition: Profit = Reward - Cost.

    Now consider the persons in the corre-sponding cells of the two tables. The be-havior of the high-attraction, agreementpeople gets them much in the way of accept-ance by the group, and for it they must giveup little in the way of personal integrity, fortheir views are from the start in accord withthose of the group. Their profit is high, andthey are not prone to change their behav-ior. The low-attraction, strong-disagreementpeople are getting much in integrity, andthey are not giving up for it much in valu-able acceptance, for they are members oflow-attraction groups. Reward less cost ishigh for them, too, and they change little.The high-attraction, strong-disagreementpeople are getting much in the way of in-tegrity, but their costs in doing so are high,too, for they are in high-attraction groupsand thus foregoing much valuable accept-ance by the group. Their profit is low, andthey are very apt to change, either towardthe group or toward the paid participant,from whom they think, perhaps, they will getsome acceptance while maintaining some in-tegrity. The low-attraction, mild-disagree-ment people do not get much in the way ofintegrity, for they are only in mild disagree-ment with the group, but neither are theygiving up much in acceptance, for they aremembers of low-attraction groups. Their re-wards are low; their costs are low too, andtheir profit-the difference between the two-is also low. In their low profit they re-semble the high-attraction, strong-disagree-

    ment people, and, like them, they are proneto change their opinions, in this case, moretoward the paid participant. The subjectsin the other two cells, who have medium

    profits, display medium propensities tochange.If we define profit as reward ess cost, and

    if cost is value foregone, I suggest that wehave here some evidence for the propositionthat change in behavior s greatest when per-ceived profit is least. This constitutes no di-rect demonstration that change in behavioris least when profit is greatest, but if, when-ever a man's behavior brought him a balanceof reward and cost, he changed his behavior

    away from what got him, under the circum-stances, the less profit, there might well comea time when his behavior would not changefurther. That is, his behavior would be sta-bilized, at least for the time being. And, sofar as this were true for every member ofa group, the group would have a social or-ganization in equilibrium.

    I do not say that a member would stabil-ize his behavior at the point of greatest con-ceivable profit to himself, because his profitis partly at the mercy of the behavior ofothers. It is a commonplace that the short-run pursuit of profit by several persons oftenlands them in positions where all are worseoff than they might conceivably be. I do notsay that the paths of behavioral change inwhich a member pursues his profit under thecondition that others are pursuing theirs tooare easy to describe or predict; and we canreadily conceive that in jockeying for posi-tion they might never arrive at any equi-librium at all.

    DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

    Yet practical equilibrium is often ob-served, and thus some further condition maymake its attainment, under some circum-stance, more probable than would the indi-vidual pursuit of profit left to itself. I canoffer evidence for this further conditiononly in the behavior of subgroups and notin that of individuals. Suppose that thereare two subgroups, working close togetherin a factory, the job of one being somewhat

    1" G. J. Stigler, The Theory of Price (rev. ed.;New York: Macmillan Co., 1952), p. 99.

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    604 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

    different rom that of the other. And supposethat the members of the first complain andsay: "We are getting the same pay as theyare. We ought to get just a couple of dol-lars a week more to show that our work ismore responsible." When you ask themwhat they mean by "more responsible,"they say that, if they do their work wrong,more damage can result, and so they areunder more pressure to take care.16 Some-thing like this is a common feature of indus-trial behavior. It is at the heart of disputesnot over absolute wages but over wage dif-ferentials-indeed, at the heart of disputesover rewards other than wages.

    In what kind of propostion may we ex-press observations like these? We may saythat wages and responsibility give status inthe group, in the sense that a man who takeshigh responsibility and gets high wages isadmired, other things equal. Then, if themembers of one group score higher on re-sponsibility than do the members of another,there is a felt need on the part of the firstto score higher on pay too. There is a pres-sure, which shows itself in complaints, tobring the status factors, as I have calledthem, into line with one another. If they arein line, a condition of status congruence issaid to exist. In this condition the workersmay find their jobs dull or irksome, but theywill not complain about the relative positionof groups.

    But there may be a more illuminating wayof looking at the matter. In my example Ihave considered only responsibility and pay,

    but these may be enough, for they representthe two kinds of thing that come into theproblem. Pay is clearly a reward; responsi-bility may be looked on, less clearly, as acost. It means constraint and worry-orpeace of mind foregone. Then the proposi-tion about status congruence becomes this:If the costs of the members of one group arehigher than those of another, distributivejustice requires that their rewards should behigher too. But the thing works both ways:

    If the rewards are higher. the costs should

    be higher too. This last is the theory of no-blesse oblige, which we all subscribe to,though we all laugh at it, perhaps becausethe noblesse often fails to oblige. To put thematter in terms of profit: though the re-wards and costs of two persons or the mem-bers of two groups may be different, yet theprofits of the two-the excess of reward overcost-should tend to equality. And morethan "should." The less-advantaged groupwill at least try to attain greater equality, as,in the example I have used, the first grouptried to increase its profit by increasing itspay.

    I have talked of distributive justice.Clearly, this is not the only condition deter-mining the actual distribution of rewardsand costs. At the same time, never tell methat notions of justice are not a strong in-fluence on behavior, though we sociologistsoften neglect them. Distributive justicemay be one of the conditions of groupequilibrium.

    EXCHANGE AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

    I shall end by reviewing almost the onlystudy I am aware of that begins to show indetail how a stable and differentiated socialstructure n a real-life group might arise outof a process of exchange between members.This is Peter Blau's description of the be-havior of sixteen agents in a federal law-enforcement agency.17

    The agents had the duty of investigatingfirms and preparing reports on the firms'compliance with the law. Since the reports

    might lead to legal action againstthe firms,

    the agents had to prepare them carefully, inthe proper form, and take strict account ofthe many regulations that might apply. Theagents were often in doubt what they shoulddo, and then they were supposed to take thequestion to their supervisor. This they werereluctant to do, for they naturally believedthat thus confessing to him their inabilityto solve a problem would reflect on theircompetence, affect the official ratings he

    16 G. C. Homans, "Status among Clerical Work-ers," Human Organization, XII (1953), 5-10.

    17 Peter M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 99-116.

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    SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AS EXCHANGE 605

    made of their work, and so hurt their chancesfor promotion. So agents often asked otheragents for help and advice, and, though thiswas nominally forbidden, the supervisorusually let it pass.

    Blau ascertained the ratings the supervi-sor made of the agents, and he also askedthe agents to rate one another. The twoopinions agreed closely. Fewer agents wereregarded as highly competent than wereregarded as of middle or low competence;competence, or the ability to solve technicalproblems, was a fairly scarce good. One ortwo of the more competent agents would notgive help and advice when asked, and soreceived few interactions and little liking.A man that will not exchange, that will notgive you what he has when you need it, willnot get from you the only thing you are, inthis case, able to give him in return, yourregard.

    But most of the more competent agentswere willing to give help, and of them Blausays:

    A consultation an be considered n exchange

    of values: both participants gain something,and both have to pay a price. The questioningagent is enabled to perform better than hecould otherwise ave done, without exposing isdifficulties o his supervisor. By asking foradvice, he implicitly pays his respect to thesuperior proficiency of his colleague. Thisacknowledgment f inferiority s the cost ofreceiving ssistance. The consultant ains pres-tige, in return or which he is willing o devotesome time to the consultation nd permit t todisrupt his own work. The following emark f

    an agent illustrates his: "I like giving advice.It's flattering, suppose, f you feel that otherscome o you for advice.'8

    Blau goes on to say: "All agents likedbeing consulted, but the value of any one ofvery many consultations became deflated forexperts, and the price they paid in frequentinterruptions became inflated."19 This im-plies that, the more prestige an agent re-ceived, the less was the increment of valueof that prestige; the more advice an agentgave, the greater was the increment of cost

    of that advice, the cost lying precisely in theforegone value of time to do his own work.Blau suggests that something of the samesort was true of an agent who went to amore competent colleague for advice: themore often he went, the more costly to him,in feelings of inferiority, became any furtherrequest. "The repeated admission of his in-ability to solve his own problems ... under-mined the self-confidence of the worker andhis standing in the group."20

    The result was that the less competentagents went to the more competent ones forhelp less often than they might have done ifthe costs of repeated admissions of inferi-ority had been less high and that, whilemany agents sought out the few highly com-petent ones, no single agent sought out thelatter much. Had they done so (to look atthe exchange from the other side), the coststo the highly competent in interruptions totheir own work would have become exorbi-tant. Yet the need of the less competent forhelp was still not fully satisfied. Under thesecircumstances they tended to turn for helpto agents more nearly like themselves incompetence. Though the help they got wasnot the most valuable, it was of a kind theycould themselves return on occasion. Withsuch agents they could exchange help andliking, without the exchange becoming oneither side too great a confession of inferi-ority.

    The highly competent agents tended toenter into exchanges, that is, to interact withmany others. But, in the more equal ex-changes I have just spoken of, less compe-tent agents tended to pair off as partners.That is, they interacted with a smaller num-ber of people, but interacted often with thesefew. I think I could show why pair relationsin these more equal exchanges would be moreeconomical for an agent than a wider dis-tribution of favors. But perhaps I have gonefar enough. The final pattern of this socialstructure was one in which a small numberof highly competent agents exchanged ad-

    vice for prestige with a large number ofothers less competent and in which the less`8 ]bid., p. 108. l Ibid., p. 108. 20 Ibid., p. 109.

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    606 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

    competent agents exchanged, in pairs andin trios, both help and liking on more nearlyequal terms.

    Blau shows, then, that a social structurein equilibrium might be the result of a proc-ess of exchanging behavior rewarding andcostly in different degrees, in which the in-crement of reward and cost varied with thefrequency of the behavior, that is, with thefrequency of interaction. Note that the be-havior of the agents seems also to have satis-fied my second condition of equilibrium: themore competent agents took more responsi-bility for the work, either their own orothers', than did the less competent ones,but they also got more for it in the way ofprestige. I suspect that the same kind ofexplanation could be given for the structureof many "informal" groups.

    SUMMARY

    The current job of theory in small-groupresearch s to make the connection betweenexperimental and real-life studies, to con-solidate the propositions that empirically

    hold good in the two fields, and to show howthese propositions might be derived from astill more general set. One way of doing thisjob would be to revive and make more rigor-ous the oldest of theories of social behavior-social behavior as exchange.

    Some of the statements of such a theorymight be the following. Social behavior is anexchange of goods, material goods but alsonon-material ones, such as the symbols of

    approval or prestige. Persons that give much

    to others try to get much from them, andpersons that get much from others are underpressure to give much to them. This processof influence tends to work out at equilibriumto a balance in the exchanges. For a personengaged in exchange, what he gives may bea cost to him, just as what he gets may be areward, and his behavior changes less asprofit, that is, reward less cost, tends to amaximum. Not only does he seek a maxi-mum for himself, but he tries to see to itthat no one in his group makes more profitthan he does. The cost and the value of whathe gives and of what he gets vary with thequantity of what he gives and gets. It is sur-prising how familiar these propositions are;it is surprising, too, how propositions aboutthe dynamics of exchange can begin to gen-erate the static thing we call "group struc-ture" and, in so doing, generate also some ofthe propositions about group structure thatstudents of real-life groups have stated.

    In our unguarded moments we sociologistsfind words like "reward" and "cost" slippinginto what we say. Human nature will breakin upon even our most elaborate theories.But we seldom let it have its way with usand follow up systematically what thesewords imply.2' Of all our many "approach-es" to social behavior, the one that sees itas an economy is the most neglected, andyet it is the one we use every moment of ourlives-except when we write sociology.HARVARD TUNIVERSITY

    'The White-Collar Job (Ann Arbor: SurveyResearch Center, University of Michigan, 1953),

    pp. 115-27.