SOCIAL COMPETENCE: A COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH

Frederick T. Bail and Lisa M.l. Pang

Introduction

Social skills are important. Everyday decisionmaking requires thinking about problems within a social context. Permitting the woman with a crying child to slip ahead in the teller's line at the bank requires making choices involving both a knowledge of the woman's embarrassment and an awareness of the five other customers, who, also, impatiently await their turn. In social interactions, successful communication often depends upon the ability to take the other's perspective. Failure to do so often results in misunderstanding. For example, someone might make the assumption that the other person is submissive or lacks intelligence-based only on his reticence. Likewise, the decision to share scarce resources, as opposed to assuring self-satisfaction, involves recognition of others' needs, as well as a judgement of others' worth.

The schools, recognizing their role as a dominant socializing agent, have stressed the importance of social skills by placing social competence objectives in curriculum guidelines. The Hawaii State Depart­ment of Educationt lists the acquisition of several social skills as performance expectations appearing throughout elementary and secondary school programs. Socialization of the child by encouraging positive social behaviors is listed as a developmental objective for early childhood education.2 An evaluation of several preschool programs stressed the primary emphasis given to social and emotional development in "traditional" preschools.3 Edward Zigler, former head of the Office of Child Develop­ment, has argued that indicators of social competence should replace IQ as the primary measure of success of early childhood intervention programs.4

Despite the obvious importance of social skills to educational concerns, the implementation of programs for the development of social competence appears to be less than systematic. Teachers use fragmented or unsystematic approaches to teaching

social skills-when they use them at all. For example, teaching young children to say "please" and "thank you" in specific school situations does not necessarily indicate that the child has grasped the concept of consideration for others. Drilling children in courtesies is of questionable value if there is no generalization to other situations. Likewise, attempts to teach tolerance of different viewpoints is not valuable if such attempts take place before the child is cognitively able to represent perspectives different from his own.

There is no comprehensive organizing framework outlining the sequence of emerging social abilities and defining the processes which mediate and contribute to these abilities. Too little is known about the development of social skills over time. In addition, the relationship between cognitive abilities and social behavior is not clear. The primary assumption of this article is that an understanding of the developmental nature of valued social behaviors and their relation­ships with developing cognitive abilities is a prerequisite for the systematic inclusion of social competence objectives in the school curriculum.

Definitions and Limitations

This article is limited to a discussion of cognitive developmental research as it relates to social competence. Social competence, as defined by O'Malley,s is the productive and mutually satisfying interaction between a child and his peers or adults. The concept of social competence includes, but is not restricted to, prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior is that behavior which is valued and encouraged by a particular society and which is not motivated by anticipation of external reward.6 In restricting this review to cognitive developmental approaches, the assumptions are made that: (1) There are systematic developmental changes in social understanding, and (2) developmental changes in social understanding

13

are related to increasing levels of social competence. Consequently, several promising approaches to

studying social interaction are excluded because they have not used a developmental approach. Ethological approaches7 stress the adaptiveness of behavior to the particular environment in which it occurs. Since no attempt has been made to show how this adaptiveness changes over time, such approaches will not be considered here. Attribution theory, the study of people's causal explanations8 including how they know and alter their attitudes toward them­selves, 9 has obvious importance for anyone concerned with social understanding. Unfortunately, research to ascertain whether there are systematic changes in attribution related to changes in cognitive growth has not yet been reported. Most personality theories have largely ignored developmental perspectives. Both Erikson to and Loevingert t have suggested sequential stages of personality develop­ment with clear implications for social interaction. Yet, neither theory has been empirically tied to the sequential development of social understanding.

A much larger area of research that has been excluded is that spawned by social learojng tbeory.12 Aronfreedn oytljned a twg.:§tage Tirocess of conditjonjng whereb)' rnes prigina y associated with direct, external rewards become aired with overt 6ehaviors, incluaTn ose ca e rosoc1a . esearch on the effec s 0 modeling on imitative ehavior in children has shown that relatively stable and eneralizable behavior ch e in observers can be

y air rief ex osure to i I sa 1ent mo es. owever, none o t is researc as attempted to relate the effects of the model's perceived power and nurturance to cognitive or social development.

The area encompassing the constructs of self­concept and self-esteem also deserve mention here. Positive self-concept is a primary educational goal and is also hypothesized to affect social behavior and academic achievement. In fact, Combs, Richards and Richardsts assume that the purpose of all behavior is to maintain or enhance one's perception of self. However, there are definition and measurement problems that have so far limited the theoretical and practical implications of research in the areas of self-concept and self-esteem.1° Although Cooper­smitht7 and others have attempted to isolate the factors leading to higher levels of self-esteem, no one has attempted to relate changes in self-concept or self-esteem to sequential aspects of cognitive or social development. Furthermore, O'Malley111 has !Peculated that self-esteem mi ht be treated more meaning u y as a y-pr uct o soc1a compe ence~

14

Social Cognition

Jean Piaget was the first person to systematically study the responses of children to a social situation. He posited two major stages in the development of moral reasoning- moral realism and moral relativisiu-with a transitory stage beFween.20 thildren in the stage of moral realism (typically, below age seven or eight} consider rules as infle'.*ible extensions of some omniscient authority; trans· gressions as bringing inevitable consequences, and intention as being unimportant in determining those consequences. By the transitory stage, anticipated punishment is less severe and more likely to match the perceived seriousness of the trangression. By the age of 11 or 12, most children operate within the relativist stage; judgements about transgressions are influenced heavily by perceived intention. Egalitarian conceptions of justice replace authoritarian ones and rules are seen as an outcome of social interaction and, therefore, mutable. Hoffman21 found that, as children grew older, there were increases in both the relativism of the child's moral perspective and the use of intentions in their moral judgements. How­ever, other studies reviewed by Shantz22 indicate that by age six most children do, in fact, use perceived intention in making moral judgements-at least under some circumstances.

Current attem ts to cial co nition often focus on socia inference. The area o socia in erence refers to how children characterize other people and how the children make inferences about others' covert processes. Analysis of the research will be divided into inferences about what the other person is seeing, feeling, thinking, and what the other person is like. The cognitive skills analyzed will then be tied to measures of social behavior. This summary follows Shantz' work closely. Much of the research reported is based on studies of the child's increasing ability to take the role of another person.

Using a landscape of three mountains, Piaget and Inhelder23 asked young children to identify the perspective of "another" (actually a doll) who was seated at a different point relative to the landscape.

They found three major stages in the development of perspective. In general, preschool children attributed their own viewpoint to the doll. Children around age six or seven knew the doll's viewpoint was different, but failed to specify the difference correctly. Usually, by age eight or nine, children were able to identify the correct viewpoint. However, Flavell24 reviewed subsequent research using a simplified array of objects and requiring fewer verbal skills. He found evidence that the typical three-year-old is able to infer that another sees some object that the child does not, and by five years of age is able to infer another's visual perspective for a single object. Ability to recognize another's perspective for several objects usually occurs around age seven, and stabilizes-especially with respect to interobject relations-over the following year or two. Flavell's analyses do not contradict Piaget's conceptions, only further elucidate the skills involved and the conditions under which those skills will appear.

Much of the research on what the "other" is feeling has concerned the growth of empathy in the child. This work has been problemabc because of two 'ii"iifesolved issues: (1) Whether empathx; is considered an affective res onse, a cognitive response, or ot ; an (2) w et er t e response is to the other's situation, the other's eK ressive cues-ot an emo 1ona state. or ot . e most comprehensive

iiloClel of empathy was developed by Feshbachzs and contains two cognitive components and one affective. According to this model, empathy requires the ability to discriminate and label affective states of others, the ability to assume the perspective of another, and emotional responsiveness. In two separate studies, the percentage of children who reported e:rperien(ing the depicted emotion was considerably lower than the percentage of children who correctly identified the emotion depicted.26

Their conclusion standin o

n genera ,t ree- an our-year-o c i ren are aware that particular familiar situations regularly elicit certain basic emotional responses, such as happiness or fear. For the next four to five years, children grow in their ability to recognize and share the emotions of story characters. But it is not until

middle or late childhood that children are able to recognize reliably the emotions of dissimilar people in unfamiliar situations.

Much of the research investigating the child's inference of another's thought proceS&es has clarified and elaborated Pia et'szs n tion of e ocentrism the

1inabi1 t is <mot er s view oint rom ones ow,n. Selmanz9 argues t at, at a out age six, the Child was capable of realizing that another child's thoughts and guessing strategies might be different from his own. This was seen as the sequential result of four prior levels of understanding. In a competitive situation, measuring behavioral rather than verbal responses, DeVrieslo found a similar sequence of ability, though emerging at a somewhat earlier age. One of the more ingenious game situations used to study inferential abilities was devised by Flavel1.J1 Given a nickel hidden in a box marked "Ser" or a dime hidden in one marked "10¢," the child tries to predict which box the opponent will pick, gives a rationale for the prediction, then hides the money in the other box. Flavell found evidence for an age-related sequence in the level of predicting. At the lowest level, the child makes no prediction or gives no rationale. Later, the child attributes a financial motive to the opponent, predicts the 10¢ box will always be chosen, and hides the money in the 5¢ box. The third level adds an awareness that the opponent may be able to predict the child's move; the coins are consequently hidden in the 10¢ box. The final level incorporates the possibility that the opponent is making inferences about the child's strategy and the child, consequently, hides the coins in the 5¢ box. Flavell found the second level typical of seven- to ten-year-olds, and the third level typical from age 11. Level four was rarely used by anyone.

Livesley and BromleyJ2 asked English boys and girls from seven to 15 years of age to write free descrip­tions of liked and disliked adults and children of both sexes. Surprisingly, they found larger differences between the seven-year-olds and eight-year-olds than between the latter group and the 15-year-olds. The youngest children reported more overt and concrete qualities, such as appearance and posses­sions, fewer and more diffuse psychological traits or inferential concepts, and less internally consistent descriptions.

Though most of the above research outlines definite sequences in the development of various types of social inference, Shantz' reviewlJ concludes that there is onl a low fO mOdl'iJLE degree of re a 10ns 1 amon measures o s 1 ogm ion or e ween measures o soda cognition an o er

cogmbve abilities, such as intelhgence._Aftempts

15

to find one or more organizing principles underlying the development of these inferential abilities will be discussed in the next section of this article.

But the validity of the ·cognitive developmental approach to social competence ultimately rests on the strength of relationshjps between measures of social cognition and measures of social behavior. In this area, the evidence is a little clearer and more conclusive. Rubin and Schneiderl• found correlations of .29 and .64 between communicative role-taking skills of seven-year-olds and two separate measures of altruism, generosity and helpfulness. lannoti3S found a correlation of .68 between role-taking ability and willingness to share candy with a needy child. Krebs and SturrupJ6 found significant correlations between measures of role-taking, on the one hand, and behavioral measures of altrusim (r = .46) and

16

teachers' independent ratings of prosocial behavior, patience and cooperativeness (r not reported), on the other. More direct measures of social competence, initiative in social interactions, and personal competence were also found to be related to helping and donating behavior.l?

There have also been a few training studies, which makes causal explanations more plausible. StaubJ11 found that giving kindergarten boys role-playing and induction training increased sharing with a needy boy; giving kindergarten girls the role-playing training increased helping another girl. Working with delinquent adolescents, ChandlerJ9 reported a ·so percent decrease in known delinquencies during the 18 months following a 10-week .mle-playing ,!!.aming pro~ran;t. Feshbach and Feshbach~o found an inverse relationShip between role-taking ability and

antisocial behavior for six- and seven-year-old boys. The most extensive attempt to influence social

behavior through training in related cognitive skills was undertaken by Spivack and Shure.n They contend that social maladjUstment stems, in part, from deficient interpersonal problemsolving skills. Though they have not traced the development of these skills, they haye shown that systematic training

l in these skillS"auring the preschool and ki 0 dergarten years affects behavioral r tin s of adjustment.

er t ree years of refining t eir trammg program, they identified sensitivity to human problems, ability to imagine alternative courses of actjpn, abMity to conceptualize means to solve a problem, a.!l­sensltl vlty to consequences and cause-and-effect rM'auonsh1ps ih human behavior, as four problem­solvlrig skills having relevance across a wide age span

of all socioeconomic groups. They hypothesize that these skills are differentially important at different ages. However, the ability to perceive alternatives and the ability to conceptualize both means and obstacles in moving toward a goal are critical abilities across all ages. It is interesting to note how similar these are to the last two of the three components Weinstein42 feels are the basis of interpersonal competence: (1) Role-taking ability; (2) trfssession of many alternat-roe COufses, and (3) abi ity fO use

ro na e situations. t ough there are a ew stu ies m w ich no

relationship between social cognition skills and social behavior is found, the weight of the evidence is clearly in the opposite direction. Furthermore, there are a few indications that this relationship may be causal in nature; that is, improving one's social cognition skills

17

may lead to higher levels of socially-valued behavior.

Attempts at Organizing Principles

Two attempts to define the structural and develop­mental relationships among the child's various social concepts are briefly reviewed here.

Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development almost exclusively focuses on properties of judgements made by people at different stages of development. He hypothesizes three sequential levels of moral development from elementary school to adulthood, with two stages at each level.4J At the preconventional level, the child interprets cultural labels of "right" and "wrong" in terms of physical or hedonistic consequences of action. The conven­tional level of moral reasoning is aimed at conforming to and actively supporting the expectations of the individual's family, social group, and nation. The highest level of moral reasoning, the postconven­tional, shows evidence of holding to moral principles independent of the authority of any social group or of the individual's identification with such a group. Results from the United States, Taiwan, Mexico and Turkey support the notion that the sequence of moral reasoning stages is universal, though there is some indication that most people in remote villages may not reach the postconventional level.

Kohlberg also indicates that the I?,rinciple o( ·usbce or anizes all moral reasonin . In fact, he r \argues t at t e concept 0 justice is the basic

t organizer of all thought about social relations and institutions and that all nonmoral social orientations are ultimately subordinate to the justice structure

1 during development.•• I,w:itl•s argues that the

/,.'JI! or anizational · · les underl in some social-

conventiona thinkin no inc ude a ·u · componen . 1 ew1se, ·sen erg•6 found that the reasonin :behind children s prosocial "ud ements was

ore a vance t eas ortm t eir mora JU ~ements. A muc more extensive effort to discover a set of

organizing principles for all social thinking has been made by pamon.•1 He explored the domains of positive justice (moral reasoning), friendship, authority, sex-role and other societal conventions. He concluded that there were at least three general organizin rin · les underl in all social reasoning: c ass1 1cation, compensation recikocity, an social perspective-takm (role-takin ). e proposed tha't t ese ree genera prmctp es are a partial explanation of the development of social knowledge; that is, increased understanding of these principles is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for such

18

development. Furthermore, these three principles may not be separated to explain social knowledge­though any given social concept may have one or more unique principles in addition to these more general ones.

Damon's hypothesis of several organizing principles, rather than one, seems sound-given the conceptual differences in social areas studied and research reported.

Implications for Research

The major premise of this article is that increasing levels of social competence may be contingent upon systematic developmental changes in social cognition. Two research approaches were summarized: (1) Attempts to isolate sequential stages in the development of social cognition, and (2) conceptuali­zation of broad organizing principles hypothesized to mediate all social cognition.

There are at least four research directions that would seem uSeful to pursue."F1rst, as Shantz•a has pointed btif, much more 1s known about the different stages of social cognition than about the mecha­nism(s) underlying changes from one stage to the next. Longitudinal studies are needed to understand the development of social cognition more clearly. Second, the generalizability and stability of social skills, such as helping behavior, need to be esta­blished. Third, several areas of research more typically associated with social psychology might be usefully investigated from a developmental perspective. For example, no one would question the importance of observational learning from models in the acquisition of both positively- and negatively­valued social skills. But it is not known whether certain cognitive skills lead to more effective modeling behaviors, or if different skills are important at different stages of development. Likewise, some conditions under which people make various causal explanations have been investigated using attribution theory models. Yet it would seem fruitful to explore the nature of attributions developmentally. For example, the relative impor­tance attached to factors like luck, effort and task difficulty may depend, in part, upon the particular cognitive skills available for perceiving the social situation. Finally, this paper has not touched on ~ J~ socializing variables like child-rearing practices or ll/9£)"1 family size. Clearly, the interaction between such se~ ~ socializing variables and the development of social • • cognition must be taken into account in order to better understand the development of positively-valued social behavior.

Footnotes

•Department of Education, Office of Instructional Resources. Ustr"s G11idt for Ptrformanu Ezpttlalions of tht Foundation Program Ob1tdivrs, Honolulu: Author, 1977.

2Butler, A.L., E.E. Gotts and N.L. Quizenberry Early Childhood Programs: Dtvtlopmrntal Objtctim and Thtir Ust, Columbus, Ohio; Merrill, 1975.

JMiller, L.B. and J.L. Dyer. ''four Preschool Programs: Their Dimensions and Effects'' in Monographs of tht Socrt/y for Rmarrh rn Chrld Dt11rlopmtnl, 1974, 40, (5·6, Serial No. 162).

•Zigler, E. and P.K. Trickett. "IQ, Social Competence and Evaluation of Early Childhood Intervention Programs," in Amtriran Psychologist, 1978, JJ (9). pp. 789-798.

'<?'Malley, J.M. "Research Perspective on Socral Competence.'' tn Mtrrill·PAlmtr Quarttrly, 19?7, .!J, pp 29-44.

•Mussen, P. and N. Eisenberg-Berg. Roets of Camrg, Shnmrg nnd Ht/ping, San Francisco; Freeman. 1977

70'Malley, 1p. cit. •Kelley, H.H. "The Process of Causal Attribution," in AmtricRn

Psychologist, 1973, .Z8(2), pp. 107-128. •Bern, D.J. "Self-perception Theory,8 in L. Berkowitz, ed.,

Adoanm in EzptrimrntRI S« iRl Psychology, Vol. 6, New York· Academic Press, 1972.

10Erikson, E.H. Chi/dhocd Rnd Socitly, New York: Norton, 1950. 11Loevinger, J. and R. Wessler. Mruuring Ego Dt11tlopmt11/:

Construction Rnd Ust of a Stnltnrt Compltlion T111, San Francisco Jossey-Bass, 1970.

12Bandura, A. and R.H. Walters. Sacral l.tarnrng and Pmonal1ly Drotlopmtnt, New York: Hoh, Rinehart and Winston, 1963.

UAronfreed, J.M. Conduct and Conicitnct: Tht SocialiZS1//on of lnlrrnRliud Conlrol o-ctr 8tha11ior, New York: Academic Press, 1968.

14Rushton, J.P. "Socialization 'and the Altruistic Behavior of Children," in Psychological Built/in, 1976, SJ, pp. 898-913.

uCombs, A.W., A.C. Richards and F. Richards. Ptrctplual Psychology, New York: Harper & Row, 1976.

••Sha~els~n, R.J., J.J. Hubner and G.C. Stanton. "Self-Concept. Validation of Construct Interpretations," in RtvitW of EducRhona/ RtstRrch, 1976, 46(3), pp. 407-441. Wells, LE. and G. Marwell. Stlf-Estttm, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976.

17Coopersmith, S. Tht Anltctdtnls of Stlf-Estttm, San Francisco: freeman, 1967.

UO'Malley, op. "' ••Piaget, J. Si:r Psy.holcgwil Stullin, New York: Random House, 1967. 20P1aget, J. Tht Moral }ullgrmrnt of /ht Chi/J, New York· Free Press

1965. ' 21Hoffman, M.L. "Moral Development," in P.H. Mussen, ed.,

CRnnichRtl's Manual of Child Psychology, Vol. 2, 3rd edition, New York: Wiley, 1970.

22Shantz, C.U. "The Development of Social Cognition," in E M. Hetherington, ed., Rt11itw of Child Dt11tlopmrnl Thtory and ~tstar<h, Vol. 5, Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1975.

nP1aget, J. and B. lnhelder. Tht Chi/J's Conetplion of Spart, London: Routledge and Paul Kegan, 1956.

24 FlaveU, J.H. "The Development of Inferences About Others" in T. Michael, ed., Undmtanding Dlhtr Pmons, Oxford: Blackw;ll, Basil, Mott, 1974.

n feshbach, in Mussen and Eisenberg-Berg, op. crt. 26Feshbach, N.D. and K. Roe. "Empathy in Six and Seven Year

Olds.'' in Child Dttttlo,.mrnl, 1968, 39, pp. 133-145. Mood, Johnson and Shantz, in Shantz, op. cit.

27Shantz, op. cit. UPiaget, 1965, op. cit. 29Selman, R.L. "Taking Another's Perspective: Role-Taking

Development in Early Childhood," in Chi/J Dtvtlopmtnt, 1971, 4.Z, pp. 1721·1734.

JDDeVries, R. "The Development of Role-Taking as Reflected by the Behavior of Bright, Average and Retarded Children in a Social Guessing Game," in Child Dt11tlopmtnl, 1970, 41, pp. 759-770.

Jlflavell, J.H. Tht Dt11tlopmtnl of Rolt·Tahng RnJ Communication Slci/ls in Ch1ldrtn, New York: Wiley, 1968.

HLivesly, W.J. and D.B. Bromley. Pmon Pmtpl1on in Childhood and Ado/nm1cr, London: Wiley, 1973.

JJShantz, op. cil. "Rubin, K.H. and F.W. Schneider. "The Rationale Between Moral

Judgement, Egocentrism and Altruistic Behavior.'' in Child Dm/opmtnl, 1973, 44, pp. 661-665.

Hfannoti, cited in Mussen and Eisenberg-Berg, op. crt. J•Krebs and Sturrup, in Mussen and Eisenberg-Berg, op. cit. nStaub, E. "A Child in Distress: The Effects of Focusing

Responsibility of Children on Their Attempts to Help.'' in Dt11tlopmtnlRI Psychology, 1970, .Z, pp. 152-153.

J•Staub, E. "The Use of Role-Playing and Induction in Children's Learning of Helping and Sharing Behavior," an Ch1lJ Dtt•tlopmtnl, 1971, 4.Z, pp. 805-816.

J9Chandler, M.J. " Egocentrism and Antisocial Behavior: The Assessment and Training of Social Perspective," in Drotlopmtnlal P1yrho/ogy, 1973, 9, pp. 326-332.

•°Feshbach, N.D. and S. Feshbach. "The Relationship Between Empathy and Aggression in Two Age Groups.'' in Drotlopnitnta/ Psychology, 1969, 1, pp. 102-107.

41Spivack, G. and M.B. Shure.Socrn/ Ad1uslmtnl of Ynu11g Ch1ldm1, San Francisco: Jessey-Bass, 1974.

uWeinstein, E.A. "The Development of Social Concepts," in D. Goslin, ed., Handboolc of SocialiZS1/ion Thtory and Rmarch, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969, pp. 753·775.

HKohlberg, L. "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive­Developmental Approach lo Socialization," in D. Goslin, ed., Handbook of SocialiZlltion Thtory and RtstRrrh, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969. Koh Iberg L. "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Development.'' in T. Mischel, ed., Cognilit>t Dt11tlopmtnt aml Episttmo/ogy, New York: Academic Press, 1971.

°Kohlberg, L. "From ls to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Develop­ment," in T. Mischel, ed., Cogniliot Drotlopmtnl Rnd Epislrmology, New York: Academic Press. 1971. Kohlberg, L. "The Study of Moral Development," in T. Likona, ed., Moral Drt'tlo,.mrirl a11d BthRflior, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1976.

0 Turiel, E. "The Use of Role Playing and lnductio~ in Children's Learning of Helping and Sharing Behavior," in Child Dm/opmtnt, 1971, 41., pp. 805-816.

oEisenberg, in Mussen and Eisenberg-Berg, op. cil. 0 Damon, W. Tht SociRl Wor/J o/ lht Child, San Francisco: Jossey­

Bass, 1977. oShantz, op. cit.

Frt~triclc T. Bail is Associalt ProftSsor of EJ/uca//onal Psychology al tlrt Un111tmly of HawRir. His primary acadtmlC 1t1ttrrsls Art txplorrng r:iptritn/ia/ lt11rn1ng_ forrnRI~ '.n his instruction and ltlfltstigahng lht dt11tlopmtnlRI stagts unJtrlyrng cognrllw and soclRI ab1/itm.

Lisa M.L Pang is currmlly a Doc/oral CanJiiiRlt at lht H11ro11rd Gradualt School of EJuca/ion. Htr rtSNrth inltrt•I• llrt rn lht Rrtu of childrtn's social in/traction anil nnotional Jrotlopmtnl.

19