social-ecological systems as epistemic objects systems as epistemic objects egon becker institute...

Social-ecological systems as epistemic objects

Egon Becker

Institute for Social-Ecological Research (ISOE), Frankfurt/Main

Abstract. In the Anthropocene a new epistemic constellation has emerged,one marked by complex societal relations to nature at its centre. Theserelations are conceptualized as symbolically mediated material-energeticpatterns of regulation and formalized as complex social-ecological systems(SES). SES are viewed as boundary objects, situated at the intersections ofindividual fields of research and disciplinary settings; and as epistemicobjects, as ‘things,’ that humans can and want to know about. Thetransformation of boundary objects into epistemic objects is analyzed. Intransdisciplinary research, SES represent real objects in abstract systemmodels, constructed as SES-networks for dealing with problems andphenomena in various fields of application. Using an analysis of a ‘simpleworld’ three approaches with different epistemic objects are distinguished:(1) ‘natural’ SES-networks for the management of ecosystems, (2) ‘hybrid’SES-networks for the analysis and the management of supply systems orsocietal metabolism and (3) ‘social’ SES-networks for studies of sustainabledevelopment or environmental politics.

Keywords. Anthropocene, social-ecological systems, boundary object,epistemic object, societal relations to nature, resilience, constructivistrealism, mental models

Introduction

During the last decade, the concept of social-ecological systems (SES) hasbecome central to an increasingly widespread international discourse onhuman/nature interactions. In this discourse, the Resilience Alliance, aStockholm-based research association that includes several importantinstitutes, has played a leading role, in defining both the concepts and theaims of research on social-ecological systems. This research focuses mainlyon the adaptive management of ecosystems from the perspective ofresilience. Resilience is understood here as the capability of a system toretain similar structures and functioning after disturbances, thus ensuringcontinuous development (Folke 2006).

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Still, the SES-concept has been used in other research areas as well, oneswith different theoretical backgrounds, and different aims and objects. All ofthese share the conviction, however, that human activities have a strong andformative impact on the earth’s ecosystems, climate and hydrosphere – aclaim encapsulated in the notion that we have entered a new geologicalepoch, the so-called Anthropocene. The various participants in the discourseon human/nature interactions have, moreover, all tried to translate theirgeneral convictions into goal-oriented research activities. We find here abroad spectrum of authors employing a wide variety of related concepts.

Recently, Brand and Jax (2007) have taken a critical and skeptical look atthe redefinition and extension of the concept of resilience, which has beenstretched from a descriptive-analytical term in biological ecology into avaguer and more malleable notion, one supposedly able to function as ageneral approach to systems analysis that can be used by different scientificdisciplines and research fields. In this latter sense the concept of resilience isbeing used, on the one hand, pragmatically as a communication tool linkingdifferent scientific disciplines and, at the same time, to span the gap betweenscience and practice. On the other hand, the concept is being used as a pointof reference for a redefinition within the cognitive context of individualscientific communities. Thus, referring to social-ecological systems, Brandand Jax note that resilience has been increasingly viewed as a generalperspective, as a way of thinking about complex systems. But this extendeduse of resilience provides no clear definition of the concept (Anderies et al.2006). In other words, resilience has been transformed from an epistemicobject with a well-defined meaning and use into a weakly structuredboundary object situated at the intersection of a large number of disciplinesand research fields.

A similar analysis can be made of the concept of social-ecologicalsystems (SES), still the most important object of resilience research. We canunderstand this concept from three different perspectives:1. SES as boundary objects situated at the intersections of individual fields

of research and disciplinary settings;2. SES as epistemic objects, as ‘things’ that humans can and want to know

about using well-defined methods of research and theoretical reasoning;3. SES as real objects represented in system models constructed for dealing

with problems and phenomena in various fields of application.In the following, the SES-concept will be examined from an epistemologicalpoint of view that is marked by a critical theory of societal relations tonature.1 Critical here indicates that it is necessary to take a hard look at the

1 The concept will be explained briefly in chapter 2.

Social-ecological systems as epistemic objects 3

consequences of making conceptual distinctions and of holding ontologicalconvictions. For example, in order to have an adequate understanding of SESa constitutive distinction must be made between nature and society2. Theterm ‘societal relations to nature’, on the other hand, refers to a need toadjust one’s views concerning the patterns of connections betweenanalytically distinguished entities.

1. Anthropocene: The end of pristine nature and a

denaturalized society

Human activities alter and shape the planet earth, entangling localenvironments in global biogeochemical cycles and geophysical processes.Many of the earth’s ecosystems are dominated directly by humanity, and nolocal or regional ecosystem on earth’s surface is free of pervasive humaninfluence. However, the rates, scales, kinds, and combinations of changestoday are fundamentally different from those at any other time in history.“We are changing Earth more rapidly than we are understanding it.”(Vitousek et al. 1997)

Reflecting on the ever-increasing human impact on the earth’s bio-, geo-,hydro- and atmospheres, the Nobel Prize winning chemist, Paul Crutzen(2002), has suggested we have entered a new geological epoch, which hecalls the Anthropocene. Crutzen’s term has received increasing acceptance,including that of influential geologists (Zalasiewicz et al. 2008). At the sametime, both human societies and globally interconnected economiesincreasingly depend on ecosystem services3 and the maintenance ofecosystem functions. This manifold of systemic interdependencies amongnatural and social processes, occurring at different temporal and spatialscales, demands an appropriate conceptual frame.

1.1. A new epistemic constellation

If we take the idea of an Anthropocene seriously, then we must recognizethat a new epistemic constellation has emerged, one marked by complex

2 Other distinctions such as those between human and nature or between nature

and culture can be derived from this basic distinction between nature and society.3 Ecosystem services are the benefits people obtain from ecosystems. These

include provisioning services such as food and water; regulating services such asflood and disease control; cultural services such as spiritual, recreational, andcultural benefits; and supporting services such as nutrient cycles that maintainthe conditions for life on Earth. (Daily 2000; MEA 2005)

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human/nature relations at its center. Such complex relations have played acritical role in numerous studies and reports on global change and climateresearch (IPCC 2007), in earth system analyses (Schellnhuber et al. 2004),and in sustainability science (Kates et al. 2001). The conclusion seemsunavoidable: in the Anthropocene, it is impossible to understand naturewithout society, and society without nature, as the German sociologist UlrichBeck (1986, 1992) pointed out persuasively more than twenty years ago.Moreover, if we accept this point, then both the idea of a pristine nature anda denaturalized society are outdated, and the academic separation of sciencefrom the humanities, and, within science, the social sciences from thenatural, proves to be a serious obstacle to the progress of science and to therelevance of science for solving urgent social-ecological problems.

1.2. A new description of the world

In the last two decades, concerned scientists in quite different fields ofresearch have come to agree more and more on a few general principles togovern a new description of the world we are living in (Liu et al. 2007):• The planet earth as a whole is a crisis ridden self-organizing complex

system.• Mankind is an integrated part and a powerful driver of the earth’s

systems-dynamics.While this seems straightforward enough, two consequences of thisemerging new worldview are less obvious, and science has only very rarelyseemed aware of the epistemic abyss these ideas open up:• If mankind is an integrated part of the complex system earth so is the

scientific observer, which means: observations are only possible frominside the system, made by a participant observer.

• If human action is guided by divergent values, and by everyday andscientific descriptions of problems and phenomena, these are also part ofthe observed reality: the system is self-describing and self-referential.

With a few exceptions such as Niklas Luhmann’s (1995) theory ofautopoietic social systems, the theoretical implications of recognizing that anobserver is a part of the system observed, a participant observer, and thatsystem processes are necessarily self-referential, has rarely been an issue ofdebate in mainstream science. Yet if general principles of the newworldview are also to be available to the environmental sciences and tohuman ecology, theory building there requires a transfer of ideas, concepts,


methods and models of systems from general systems theory, complexitytheory, autopoiesis theory4, actor-network-theory, and network topology.

These avant-garde fields of research and modes of thinking are disruptingthe accepted discourse on human-nature relations. In these fields, science ismoving from things to relations, from structures to processes, and fromidentity to difference. These shifts in basic categories of thinking andunderstanding have infiltrated the academic world, and also art andliterature. Hans-Peter Dürr (2001) summarizes the new worldview in theaphorism: “A stone is a coagulated pattern of dynamic relationships.” Forthe theory of societal relations to nature they provide a general orientationfor thinking and a guideline for concept formation (Becker and Jahn 2003;2006).

2. Societal relations to nature

The new description of the world mentioned above, together with thecentrality of human/nature interactions and the shift in general categories oftheoretical thinking, call for a theoretical concept that comprises a mediationbetween natural and social entities. In the 19th century, Karl Marx argued ina radical fashion against any kind of reification of social relationships intofixed things: “Society does not consist of individuals but expresses the sumof interrelations, the relations within which these individuals stand.” (Marx1857:176) In an analogous way we can describe the various interactions thattake place between natural and social entities as constituting ‘societalrelations to nature.’ Such relations must be regulated in every society in sucha way so as to sustain the cross-generational continuation of societalprocesses necessary for life; without such regulation, these processescollapse. The regulation of material and energy flows, however, is linked toa multiplicity of cultural symbolizations and embedded thereby in societalstructures and processes of communication.

Societal relations to nature, therefore, are symbolically mediated,material-energetic patterns of regulation. This general definition does not tellus, however, at which level the nexus of regulated relations is to be located,or where research is to be carried out. Here we can just say that societalrelations to nature take form both directly through the interaction ofindividual human actions and at the level of institutions and differentiatedfunctional systems. With this as a start let us now examine them moreclosely.

4 See, for example the articles by Beate Ratter as well as Felix Tretter and Andrew

Halliday in this volume.

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2.1. A definition of societal relations to nature

The concept of societal relations to nature stands in opposition to themainstream tradition in European philosophical thinking that is centered onthe category of substance. Instead it opts for an “ontology of relations andprocesses”, to quote Alfred North Whitehead (1929). Societal relations tonature are the historically and culturally specific patterns and practices bymeans of which societies attempt to materially regulate, and culturallysymbolize, their various relationships to nature. They emerge from a nexusof causal effects (“Wirkungsgefüge”) embedded in a field of symbolicmeaning (“Deutungszusammenhang”). Therefore they always exist asintertwined physical and symbolic forms.

Following the discussion of ‘core basic needs’ within the sustainabilitydiscourse we will call work and production, sexuality and reproduction,nutrition and water supply, mobility and housing basic societal relations tonature because they are relations that are indispensable for both individualsand societies. If these relations are not secured permanently the reproductionand development of societal life will fail.

2.2. Forms of regulation

Taking a closer look at the forms and practices in which and through whichhumans and societies attempt to materially regulate and culturally symbolizetheir relationships to nature ‘societal relations to nature’ can be furtherrefined. Specific forms of the regulation of basic relationships take shape atdifferent levels:• Micro-level: Regulation of the cultural forms of individual satisfaction of

needs and provisioning activities;• Meso-level: Regulation of supply systems, resource utilization in

institutional contexts;• Macro-level: Regulation of societal reproduction and social integration as

congealed into production, property and gender relations.The concept of ‘societal relations to nature’ emphasizes the differencebetween material regulations and cultural symbolizations, and it alsounderlines the importance of ‘hybrid objects,’ objects that are both naturaland cultural (Latour 2005).


3. A contested terrain: worldviews and the

transformation of boundary objects

If we look at the academic world and ask: “In which domain are studies onhuman/nature interactions carried out?” we obtain a long list of coexistingand competing disciplines, multi- and interdisciplinary research fields,human ecological areas and international programmes, all of which operatemore or less in isolation within different scientific cultures and professionalworlds, working parallel to one another with divergent points of view, withlittle exchange of concepts and methods, and with a confusing jumble ofterminology. Anyone peeking over the fence of his or her own discipline orresearch field soon comes to realize that no stable convention exists withregard to the meaning or definition of the term ‘human/nature interactions’.

Given this situation, it won’t do to advocate a royal road of building ageneral theory of everything; rather, what is needed are concrete proposalsfor building, linking and activating scholarly networks. Using financialincentives and the evaluation of projects, science policy and researchfunding agencies have tried again and again to bring together researchersfrom different fields in problem and goal-oriented research associations.Although burdened with a widespread feeling that the situation is stillunsatisfactory, these practical activities nevertheless direct scientificattention to common topics and interests in miscellaneous fields of research.But there remains, for the most part, no consensus over concepts, methodsand objects. Yet the extent to which and the manner in which differentprofessional groups collaborate in scholarly networks, and how researchresults arising from often radically different worldviews and theoreticalorientations are incorporated into a coherent ensemble remains a criticalissue; for without such translation and integration of research results,information from one study may not be available for or transferable to otherstudies.

3.1. Social and cognitive function of boundary objects

The conditions governing success in multi- and interdisciplinary researchhave been investigated in numerous case studies within the history andsociology of science. These studies have produced several analytic tools thathave enabled a better understanding of the transfer of concepts betweenheterogeneous scientific groups and discourses, as well as cooperationamong these groups. For example, Susan Leigh Star and James R. Griesemer(1989) have shown that standardization of methods and the development ofboundary objects are major factors in efficient cooperation among

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heterogeneous scientific communities and between the latter and non-scientific actors.

Standardization of research methods is directed against an unprincipledeclecticism. It serves to ‘discipline’ the information and results coming fromdifferent researchers, making them compatible with and translatable intodifferent scientific communities. Boundary objects, on the other hand, areobjects, either concrete or conceptual, that are situated and developed in theborderlands between heterogeneous discourses. Given their divergent aims,interests and practical and theoretical orientations, boundary objects aredefined only loosely and generally. Moreover, they are multifunctional.They have a social function as a tool for communication and cooperationamong different scientific communities, who can all agree that they aretalking about the same thing, and yet still attach different meaning to thisthing. At the same time, boundary objects also have a cognitive function,acting as ‘trading zones’ for a transfer of concepts and methods (Galison1991).

According to Star and Griesemer (1989:393) boundary objects are “bothplastic enough to adapt to the local needs and constraints of the severalparties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identityacross sites. They are weakly structured in common use, but becomestrongly structured when used at individual sites.” They may be abstract orconcrete and, although they may have different meanings in different socialworlds, their structure is common enough to more than one world to makethem recognizable across borders, thus functioning as a means of translation.“The creation and management of boundary objects is a key process indeveloping and maintaining coherence across intersecting social worlds.”

3.2. Social-ecological systems as boundary objects

The question now is whether there is a common object (concrete orconceptual) to be found within the border zones connecting the wide areas ofresearch on environmental issues, one that can serve research activitieswithin individual disciplinary areas as well. In human ecology, the concepthuman/nature interactions suggests itself as an appealing candidate. In theFrankfurt version of social ecology, this concept has been reworked andrefined in terms of societal relations to nature (Becker and Jahn 2006);while in the Vienna version it has been developed into a concept of societalmetabolism (Fischer-Kowalski and Weisz 1999), with other conceptualreformulations appearing elsewhere. But as a possible boundary objecthuman/nature-interaction is obviously too general and too abstract. Adaunting epistemic task faces anyone wishing to conceptualize ‘interaction’and ‘relation’ as objects, and it is difficult to imagine how an effective


ordering and centralization of heterogeneous discourses would be possible inthis way.

Global change and sustainable development might seem to be strongcandidates as well. Both are used in science, politics and public debates, andboth have a strong potential for consensus building. As concepts they refer toboth qualities of processes and normative options. However, neither refers toa subject of change or development; therefore in research on global changethe earth system takes on the role of a boundary object, and one studies howthe earth system can and will develop within corridors of sustainability(Schellnhuber et al. 2004). But here the emphasis is on research at a globalsystem level and thus the concept of the earth system is only of restricted usefor research at local or regional levels.

The situation does indeed seem to improve if human/nature interactionsare conceptualized in terms of systems, for ‘system’ seems to be moreconcrete than ‘relations.’ Systems, in fact, include relations, emphasizing thepatterns among them, thus referring also to their boundaries. Given theseadvantages, it is not surprising that one finds many – too many, in fact –good system concepts vying as candidates to play the role of a boundaryobject. In each instance, a constitutive distinction between nature and society(or nature/culture, etc.) is made and the system is endowed with specificproperties (complex, self-organized, adaptive, etc.).

The results have so far not been encouraging. A disorderly diversity ofnames and concepts has been produced, and yet it is not clear whether theone name is being used to refer to the same thing, or whether the same thingis being given different names. In my view, the concept of social-ecologicalsystem (SES) has proven itself the strongest and most convincing candidatein the contest for a boundary object relevant both to sustainability scienceand to the study of the manifold of interdependencies among natural andsocial processes along different temporal and spatial scales. One powerfuladvantage of the SES concept is that it can assimilate the other strongcandidates (e.g. earth system, world system, human/environment system,managed ecosystem) thus providing translation possibilities across manydivergent discourses.

Human ecology, cultural ecology, social ecology, environmental science,sustainability research, and research on human dimensions of global changeshould be able to reach a working agreement on social-ecological system asa common boundary object without major conflicts. Such an agreementwould mark more than just a superficial terminological accord, since SES asa boundary object would possess a weak structure, thus making varied usespossible.

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3.3. Transformation of boundary objects into epistemic objects

In the history and sociology of science, the idea of a boundary object hasbeen used for the reconstruction of completed and successful researchprocesses. However, research on social-ecological systems is still in itsinfancy. Therefore it needs a boundary object that can function as apragmatic tool, one capable of stimulating cooperation and communicationamong separate areas of research. In addition to this social function, SES asa boundary object must have a cognitive function for the research process aswell. To achieve this cognitive function SES as a boundary object must berestructured into an epistemic object that is capable of being used atindividual sites.

The concept of ‘epistemic object’ derives from the history of science(Rheinberger 1997; 2006). It refers to a ‘thing’ that humans can and want toknow. Conceptual distinctions, experimental set-ups, fields of applications,methods of observation, mathematical models, and forms of data-presentation all constitute epistemic objects. The transformation of aboundary object into an epistemic object is guided, explicitly or implicitly,by pre-analytic ideas, general worldviews and ontological convictions (oftenrepresented in the form of simple mind maps).

Within the broad discourse on human/nature interactions, social-ecological systems can be characterised as boundary objects by severalgeneral properties:1. As systems, they consist of elements, the relations between them, and the

borders delimiting the system.2. As social-ecological units, their elements (and their relations) are

classified as either ‘social’ or ‘natural’ or ‘hybrid’.3. Additionally, they get marked as complex systems: that is, they behave

non-linearly; they have positive and negative feedback loops; they mayform hierarchies, thus displaying emergence and self-organization; andfinally they depend strongly on their context and history (see Ratter, thisvolume).

If such a complex social-ecological system is transformed into an epistemicobject, these general properties are reformulated as hypotheses about specificunits of research.

Social-ecological systems as epistemic objects also embody the non-knowledge related to them. In this way, they are linked to problemsconcerning knowledge or action, and therefore they require methods andinstruments for bridging the gap between knowledge that is available andknowledge that is needed. Knowledge, problems and methods are theconstitutive components of an epistemic object. Research on social-


ecological systems involves the case-by-case transformation of thesecomponents (Becker 2006).

Figure 1: Transforming boundary objects into epistemic objects

When a boundary object is strongly structured for individual site use itscomponents become defined within the cognitive frame and the socialconditions of a specific scientific or professional community. In Figure 1, thevertical arrow on the left side symbolizes the redefinition of the concept‘human/nature interaction’ into the weakly structured general boundaryobject ‘social-ecological system,’ while the horizontal arrows mark (in thisexample) the transformation of this boundary object into an epistemic objectwithin the context of (Frankfurt) social ecology by means of a strongrestructuring. Thus, first, the concept of ‘human/nature interaction’ istransformed into the concept ‘societal relations to nature’; second, this latterconcept then is exemplarily restricted to the concept ‘supply system’formulated as a social-ecological system (Hummel, in this volume).

4. A world of complex systems

It is a commonplace that complex systems are difficult to imagine and todescribe. Describing complex systems centered on human/nature interactionsis difficult therefore not only because the effort is relatively new; it is aninherently challenging task. To begin with, a distinction must be madebetween nature and human society (or nature and culture). Without such adistinction, the interaction between them is unthinkable.

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An analytical distinction between nature and culture, between a physicalworld and a mental world, has, of course, been fundamental to the Europeanworldview since ancient times. Here one must be careful, however, not toturn an analytical distinction into an ontological separation, as did Descartesand his successors. Rather, the distinction marks a semantic difference; it is aprerequisite of rational thinking (Habermas 2005: 155ff). Though analytic,this distinction still represents a deep conceptual division. Attempts atreducing complexity following this initial cut come with a high price.

Following this distinction between nature and culture, physical world andmental world, social-ecological systems are situated in a no-man’s landbetween two analytically separated domains and also between the academiccultures of natural and social sciences. Thus they have come to be classifiednot as either natural or social but rather as both natural and social. In theview of Bruno Latour (2005) they are always hybrids.

4.1. Formal definition of a system

Simply re-naming the separated domains ‘natural system’ and ‘socialsystem’ won’t do because qualifying both as a ‘system’ carries a heavylogical burden. Even if we define (with Liu et al. 2007) social-ecologicalsystems as coupled human/social and natural systems, the meaning of theterm ‘system’ still has to be explained; otherwise ‘system’ is just a metaphorfor a compound of things. For the moment, however, we can simply notethat construing social-ecological systems as epistemic objects requiresmaking a distinction between nature and society that refers either to elementsof a whole complex system or to coupled natural and social systems. In thefirst case, nature/society relations are internal; in the second case they areexternal. In either case, however, the crucial question is whether the bindingrelations represent a weak or a strong coupling. Weakly coupled systems arelinear, while strongly coupled systems are non-linear and display complexbehavior.

Returning now to the concept of ‘system,’ it is clear that the meaning ofthe term ‘social-ecological system’ (SES) depends on our understanding of‘system.’ As a first approach, we might try using for our construction andanalysis of SES conceptual and methodological tools drawn from theories ofsystems, complexity or graphs. To do this, we need a mathematicallyoriented definition of the term ‘system.’ Here we could follow the classicaldefinition of ‘system’ given by Hall and Fagen (1956), which still findsbroad acceptance today among the community of systems thinkers: “Asystem is a set of objects together with relationships between the objects andbetween their attributes.”


Such a formal definition does not refer to any real object. Instead,systems are defined as sets of related elements, that is, as mathematicalobjects and classes of abstraction (Becker and Breckling 2010). In research-oriented definitions of ‘system,’ on the other hand, the set-theoretical entitiesare reinterpreted empirically: here element is replaced by thing, object,component or part, and relationship by coupling, interaction, binding,connection or linkage. Though helpful for empirical research this remainsunsatisfactory from a theoretical point of view; the structure of suchempirically interpreted systems continues to be defined mathematically,independent of any semantic interpretation of the elements and relations.

4.2. Restrictions on the formal definition

Thus the formal definition has serious shortcomings. Mathematically, thenotion of ‘system’ is too general and indistinguishable from ‘structured set’,‘structure’ or ‘topological space.’ Therefore the definition is incomplete.Two additional restrictions to the general definition are necessary:• definition of the spatial or functional boundaries at different levels;• identification of the patterns between the relations, expressed as

topological structures (e.g. networks, causal chains, feed-back loops).Without these restrictions, the notion of a ‘system’ remains merely ametaphorical way of talking.

4.3. General properties of systems

Morphologies of special systems have been constructed in General SystemsTheory (GST) using pairs of opposing properties (closed/open,static/dynamic, deterministic/stochastic, simple/complex, linear/non-linear,back-coupled/non-back-coupled). Following this guidance, various generalproperties have been emphasized in social-ecological systems discourse:open, dynamic, non-linear, back-coupled, complex, adaptive. These generalproperties have been further condensed in the by now well-known notion ofsocial-ecological systems as complex and adaptive systems (Berkes et al.2003).

In this way, the study of complexity has become the central theoreticalchallenge of social-ecological systems analysis. In the scholarly networkResilience Alliance, this challenge has been taken up by employing theconcept of resilience. In research practice, resilience is conceived more orless as a collection of ideas about how to interpret complex adaptive systemsand how to use these interpretations as a source for the generation ofhypotheses for concrete case studies. Of course, this is one way of

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transforming the general boundary object ‘social-ecological system’ into anepistemic object, one strongly structured by the resilience theory.

However, as Janssen et al. (2006) have noted, the work in this directionhas so far lacked a clear framework, that is, a clear formal description ofstructural changes, although the latter is supposed to be one of the keyaspects of resilience research. Therefore, they propose a network perspectivefor the study of resilience in social-ecological systems. They represent suchsystems, using the analytical tools of graph theory and network topology ascomprising dynamic networks with nodes and links. Nodes may representnot only social actors at different levels, such as individuals, farmers,conservationists, communities, organizations, etc. but also ecological entitiessuch as arable land, lakes, rivers, forests, or paddy fields. The links cansymbolize flows of physical units such as water or raw material, andorganisms such as seed dispersals or cattle; they can also symbolize theexchange and management of information between social actors.

The concept of social-ecological systems as networks, as introduced byJanssen et al. (2006), is applied to ecosystems that have been affected byhuman activities and those have undergone quantitative and qualitativechange in both nodes and links, and therefore have also undergone changesin network structure and topology. On the basis of their comparative analysisof several case studies, Janssen et al. (2006) distinguish three archetypicalsocial-ecological networks:1. ecosystem networks that are connected by people through the flow of

information or materials,2. ecosystem networks that are disconnected and fragmented by the action

of people,3. artificial ecosystem networks that are created by people, such as

irrigation systems or supply systems.Janssen et al.’s (2006) study is one of the rare examples of a formallydemanding analysis of social-ecological systems. However, besides networktopology there are several other advanced tools for the formal modeling ofcomplex adaptive systems: non-linear dynamics, adaptive landscapes, multi-agent modeling, neuronal networks, fuzzy logic, genetic algorithm, cellularautomata, theory of fractals and chaos. These tools have been forged, testedand applied mostly in the field of complexity studies, but they are slowlytrickling into the discourse on human/nature interaction. If we view social-ecological systems as epistemic objects (having as their componentsknowledge, problems and methods), the use of these advanced and powerfulmodeling techniques indicates the possibility of the strong structuring of aformerly weakly structured object.


5. Constructions of social-ecological systems

The construction of a social-ecological system in the strict sense begins withthe general properties of such a system mentioned above, and goes on with adefinition of the unit of analysis.

5.1. A working definition of social-ecological systems

Glaser et al. (2008) and Glaser (this volume) have given a working definitionof the concept of social-ecological system:

“A social-ecological system consists of a bio-geo-physical unit and itsassociated social actors and institutions. Social-ecological systems arecomplex and adaptive and delimited by spatial or functional boundariessurrounding particular ecosystems and their problem context.”

We can find similar definitions in the publications issued by the ResilienceAlliance (Berkes et al. 2003). It is an open question, however, whether theterm complex adaptive system is used there as a formalized analytic-descriptive concept suitable for system analysis using advanced tools, or if itis merely being employed as a narrative and heuristic metaphor for theinterpretation of case studies. In any case, boundaries are defined empiricallyas forming the periphery of a particular unit of analysis, thereby delineatingit. Characterizing this unit as a bio-geo-physical unit or ‘ecosystem’ involvesa strong operation of structuring since the knowledge, problems and methodsimplicated in this structuring depend crucially on ecosystem theory. Thussocial-ecological systems are conceptualized mainly with reference toecosystems affected or managed by human activities.

In my view, the working definition is embedded too deeply in resilienceresearch on managed ecosystems to function as a pragmatic tool for use by awider range of researchers. The definition of the boundary as boundarysurrounding particular ecosystems depends too strongly on the units ofecosystems research. We must, then, in order to make the definitionavailable for a broad spectrum of research activities, first remove thisspecific determination of the boundary and change the unit of analysis. Oneshould remember here that as long as their boundary is not determined, theseunits are not systems in the strict sense. Therefore I propose to call such aconceptually undetermined unit of analysis an entity and suggest three typesof units, defining three possible levels of analysis:(a) natural entities in a social context, such as managed local or regionalecosystems – studied in resilience research;(b) social entities in an ecological context, such as climate politics or natureconservation – studied in environmental sociology or ecological economics;

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(c) hybrid entities, such as humans-in-action, supply systems for water orfood in a social and ecological context – studied in human and socialecology.

Humans are hybrids in that they are both natural and cultural beings. Tointroduce human action into ecosystem analysis implies the acceptance ofhybrid entities.

To define a unit as a system , the boundary should be defined assurrounding a particular problem context within a unit. The structure and thedynamics of social-ecological systems (SES) depend strongly on theirboundary conditions and their problem context. This means that SES-analysis is a form of transdisciplinary research (Jahn 2008). Here it is crucialwhether the boundary is created and maintained by internal system activities,or is just a demarcation made for the convenience of analysis. In any case,the definition of a spatial or functional boundary introduces empiricalconditions into formal systems analysis.

5.2. The reality of social-ecological systems

In Glaser et al.’s (2008) working definition cited above, social-ecologicalsystems are understood to be concrete units in the real world of spatial-temporal phenomena. This is obviously a realistic ontological position. Butwithin the ecological discourse, as well as in other disciplines, realisticontological assumptions have often been criticized, with this criticismusually employing strong constructivist arguments – social-ecologicalsystems are, it is argued, only scientific constructions. Various versions ofboth ‘realist’ and ‘constructivist’ positions can be found in ecology andhuman ecology as well (Becker and Breckling 2009), while within thediscourse on social-ecological systems that centers on the concept ofresilience, the controversy is sharpened by adherence to a hard-coreempiricism, leaving realistic positions de facto dominant, withepistemological discussions of alternatives being the exception.

Now any strict definition of the term ‘system’ will hold that, from anepistemic point of view, systems are mathematical objects – i.e., classes ofabstraction. At the same time, we have to recognize that there exist social-ecological phenomena in the real world. Therefore I advocate a model-oriented constructivist realism that combines a realistic ontology with aconstructivist epistemology. From this point of view social-ecologicalsystems appear as models of knowledge about real-world phenomena.

As with any realistic ontology, this position is in danger of falling prey tothe “fallacy of misplaced concreteness” as analyzed by Alfred NorthWhitehead:


“The ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’ consists in neglecting thedegree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is consideredmerely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought.“

(Whitehead 1929: 20)

The term ‘complex social-ecological system’ is a concept, a category ofthought, an abstraction from reality, and not an actual entity. The danger ofthe fallacy of misplaced concreteness arises whenever this category ofthought is confused with a real object like an oasis in the Sahara desert –when, for example, the empirical properties of the ‘oasis’ are attributedwithout conceptual restrictions to the formal attributes of ‘complex social-ecological systems’.

Constructivist realism is only meaningful if we distinguish between the‘real world’ of concrete things and processes in space and time and an ‘idealworld’ of abstract objects. Such abstract objects may be logical-mathematical in nature (equations, mathematical spaces, topologies, etc.),capable of being modeled, at least in principle, by a computer program. Theymay also be verbal, graphic, metaphorical or conceptual descriptions, whichaim at representing knowledge about complex networks of interaction. Wecan define systems, then, as abstract objects in an ideal world.

Constructivist realism concentrates its attention on relationships betweenthe ideal and the real spheres. To do so it posits a model relation betweensystems as abstract objects and concrete real-world phenomena. Thereforesystem – an abstract object – can serve as a model of real-world social-ecological phenomena5. However, now the question about the relationshipbetween model and real-world phenomena arises.

5.3. The construction process of social-ecological systems

Social-ecological systems are constructed within an “epistemic circle” (seeTretter and Halliday, this volume) that connects several processes:1. The process starts with a selection of the empirical unit of analysis.

Looking at different areas of research, we have distinguished threepossible types of units above: natural, social and hybrid entities. Thesetypes correspond roughly to the natural, social and human ecologicalfields of research.

5 ‘Social-ecological phenomena’ are concrete associations of entities in a real

world. We call them social-ecological compounds (or complexes) – anddistinguish them conceptually from social ecological systems as models.

18 Egon Becker

2. In the next phase, an abstraction is necessary from empiricalobservations of real world entities and their contingent properties, andalso from the context of the unit of analysis.

3. For the construction of social-ecological systems as idealized objects, aconstitutive distinction between nature and society (or nature andculture) at different levels (element, system, subsystem, super-system) isnecessary.

4. Finally, in a move back towards concretization, an interpretation of theabstract system in empirical terms leads to the construction of a modelfor the unit in consideration. Elements and relations referring to realworld phenomena have to be identified, spatial or functional boundariesat different levels must be defined, and variables that indicate systemproperties have to be found.

5.4. Mental models as generator of epistemic objects

The transformation of a vaguely defined boundary object into a stronglystructured epistemic object is guided, explicitly or implicitly, by pre-analyticideas, general world-views, and ontological convictions. These function asmental models of the part of the world, together with its major problems, weare interested in, and generate images of relevant issues or processes. MarionGlaser (2006) has introduced the term mind map for these pre-analyticvisualizations. Examining examples of mind maps of human-nature relationswith reference to the social dimension in ecosystem management, shedistinguishes four major kinds of mind maps (with several sub-types): theecocentric, the anthropocentric, the interdisciplinary and the complex. Here,however, I wish for a moment to look at another question: how does theboundary object ‘social-ecological system’ get transformed into an epistemicobject? And in the process of transforming a boundary object into anepistemic object, what role do mental models play?

Mind maps of nature-society interactions are created by a constitutivedistinction between ‘nature’ and ‘society’ (or ‘nature’ and ‘culture’).Normally, the topology of such maps is symbolized graphically by simpleset diagrams or schemes of ontological levels (physical, chemical,biological, human, social, spiritual...). And normally the question is left openup to which ontological level the distinction is being carried out. ‘Nature’ or‘society’ may symbolize either a unified set of ‘natural’ entities (physical,chemical, biological, geological) or ‘societal’ entities (values, institutions,knowledge, social networks) respectively; or all these entities bound togetherin a hybrid system.


6. Analysis of a simplified artificial world

We have introduced above three types of units, defining three possible levelsof analysis: natural, social and hybrid entities. In case studies aboutdelimited real-world phenomena, these levels of analysis represent not onlythree different aspects of a social-ecological system, but also three differentepistemological objects with different structures. In other words, selecting alevel of analysis is a first step of transforming a boundary object into anepistemic object. In order to prove this argument, I have invented asimplified relation-oriented artificial world6 as an example of demonstration.

Normally our perception of the world emphasizes permanent things withdistinctive qualities. In contrast, in a relation-oriented world view (Bateson1972) things are never isolated; they are coagulated patterns, hardened intomore or less durable ‘objects’ at the crossing-points of flows of matter,energies and information. In ecosystems or in human societies with livingand perceiving beings, many different kinds of activities generate dynamicrelationships between distinct things, effecting weak or strong bindings, withnew relations continually arising and old ones constantly disappearing – andalong with the latter many things as well. Transformations of patterns andstructures are going on continuously.

6.1. A simple world as social-ecological network

In our normal perception of the world, we name distinguished objects, thusgiving them a meaning within the universe of language, as well as bestowingon them an ontological status. However, “the map is not the territory, and thename is not the named thing”, as Gregory Bateson (1979) noted. In Figure 2below, several identified objects are named with numbers, with any numbercapable of representing a different thing. If we think of a social-ecologicalunit such as a managed forest, these objects may represent plants and trees,foresters and woodcutters, deer and wild boars, geophysical objects, orhuman-made artefacts like wells – whatever seems to be relevant for ananalysis of the forest in consideration.

6 The graphic representation has no reference to any real things. The different lines

and their intersections were drawn arbitrarily. An intersection-free graph of atwo-dimensional web would require three dimensions. To avoid a three-dimensional graph, the lines representing the relations are interrupted if they donot intersect.

20 Egon Becker

Figure 2: A simple world as social-ecological network

With the idea of a social-ecological system (SES) as boundary object, thedifferent objects under consideration have to be classified either as ‘natural’or ‘social’. This has been done arbitrarily in Figure 2. Some objects, inparticular humans-in-action, are both natural and social; they are categorizedas ‘hybrid’. Only the qualities of objects so marked are significant for furtherconsideration. These objects make up the elements of the SES. However, forthe construction of a system we also need relations between them. Inresearch practice, these relations may be the flow of matter, energies andinformation in an ecosystem, water or raw material within a landscape, thetraces of living beings, or the flow of information between social actors. Stepby step, the decisions about the relevance of particular elements andrelations for a problem under consideration transform the general boundaryobject SES into a social-ecological network, that is, an epistemic object.

The network that emerges from this analysis is a topological object – amathematical structure in an ideal world of abstractions which may beanalyzed using the tools of network or graph theory7 (Janssen et al. 2006). Itis also possible to consider the network as the starting point for a multi-agentanalysis. In the latter case, the relations sketched in Figure 2 would be theresult of rule-based actions at a selected moment. Like a snapshot, the

7 A powerful tool for such an analysis is an adjacent matrix: It is possible to condense the

entire information contained in the network graph into such a matrix (Tittmann 2003;Berge 2001)


graphic representation captures ties or relations, both material and symbolic,including relations of perception.

6.2. Creating mind maps by set-theoretical operations

Applying the set-theoretical operation ‘intersection’ with the elements of asocial-ecological system, and neglecting the relations between them, thewhole set is decomposed into sub-sets, with each class of elements forming aparticular sub-set. It turns out that the sub-set of all the hybrid elements islocated in the intersection of the ‘natural’ and the ‘social’ subsets.Obviously, humans-in-action are represented in this sub-set. This is theabstract form of a mind map of human/nature interaction (Glaser 2006) thatis very popular in human and social ecology.

Figure 3: Intersection of the ‘natural’ and the ‘social’ subsets

The mind map sketched in Figure 3 illustrates that, even at a very high levelof abstraction, there is a hybrid zone where nature and society intersect. Thisis the starting point, for example, for the mind maps used and elaborated onby Vienna social ecology, where human populations are located in thehybrid domain (Fischer-Kowalski and Weisz 1999). As a next step, relationsbetween the components are incorporated into the model, based on theinterpretation of real interactions observed between the cultural, natural andhybrid domains. But here too, the fallacy of misplaced concreteness seemshard to avoid.

The concept of social-ecological supply systems, as used in Frankfurtsocial ecology also employs a mind map of intersecting sets. Within thesupply systems, users and resources are distinguished, and several factors(knowledge, practice, institutions, technology) affecting users and resources

22 Egon Becker

are introduced (Hummel 2008). Here, the mind map remains unequivocally aconceptual model and therefore only a first step in an empirical analysis ofconcrete supply systems.

6.3. Three approaches to an analysis of social-ecological systems

The mind map of Figure 3 suggests three possible units of analysis: thenatural, the hybrid and the social domain – as already distinguished inSection 5.1. However, which relations should be taken into consideration,and how should we form the boundary of the selected unit? If we select, forinstance, the natural domain as unit of analysis and compare it with thecomplete network of Figure 2, we see that the elements of the naturaldomain have relations both to the hybrid and to the social domain8. Whetheror not the selected network shows characteristics of a complex systemdepends, on the one hand, on the patterns of relationships identified andselected and, on the other, on the borders surrounding the selected elements.

How the boundary is defined turns out to be crucial. We may include thehybrid elements into the natural domain – or not; we may include all socialelements that bridge between natural elements – or not. Depending on theform of the boundary, the internal elements and relations are defined, andtogether with this definition also the structure of the network inconsideration, for instance positive or negative feedback loops relevant forthe dynamic of the system and its resilience. With those decisions we arriveat different networks with different structures. We can call all thesestructures, somewhat fuzzily, ‘natural’ social-ecological networks. Social-ecological system theorists prefer this type of reconstruction, as does theresilience community. The above-mentioned three archetypical social-ecological networks (Janssen et al. 2006) are examples of ‘natural’ social-ecological networks.

We can reconstruct a ‘social’ and a ‘hybrid’ social-ecological network ina similar manner. The result is indisputable: the three approaches obviouslyrepresent not only three different aspects of the social-ecological network inconsideration, but also three different epistemological objects9.

Which of the three SES-networks we use depends on the issue in questionand the context of problems. If we leave the simplified world of abstraction

8 Using the adjacent matrix mentioned before as a tool we can analyze the

structure of the natural domain in a simple way.9 It is possible to integrate the different results into one structure by using the tools

of network topology, particularly the adjacent matrix mentioned above. Thethree networks are then seen to be overlapping sub-matrices.


and look at real world social-ecological phenomena, three cases presentthemselves:1. For the management of ecosystems the ‘natural’ SES-network should be

the object of study.2. If the focus of interest is on the analysis and the management of supply

systems or societal metabolism, the ‘hybrid’ SES-network becomes thepreferred object.

3. For many studies of sustainable development the ‘social’ SES-networkis the appropriate object.

Notice that every network in our simplified world has natural, social andhybrid elements and relations inside its boundary affecting its dynamics.Strictly speaking, each of them is a ‘hybrid’ SES-network withanthropogenic problems within its domain. The three cases distinguishedabove are conceptually related to (1) ecosystem theory, (2) human and socialecology and (3) environmental sociology or economics, respectively. Fromthe point of view of a theory of societal relations to nature, the hybridnetwork (2) is the preferred unit of analysis; the two other appear asreductions.

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