social interaction and psychological pathways to political engagement and extremism

European Journal of Social Psychology, Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 15–22 (2014)Published online 4 October 2013 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.1988

Fast track report

Social interaction and psychological pathways to political engagement andextremism

EMMA F. THOMAS1*, CRAIG MCGARTY1 AND WINNIFRED LOUIS2

1School of Pyschology & Exercise Science, Murdoch University, Perth, Australia2School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia

Abstract

Although psychology has recently witnessed a burgeoning interest in the predictors of social and political action generally, littleresearch has considered the psychological mechanisms by which people come to choose extreme or radical forms of action. Howand why do groups come to favor radical or extreme solutions (radicalization) over conventional political pathways(politicization)? Theory in both political science and psychology suggests that social interaction plays an important role, but thishas never been demonstrated experimentally. Results (N= 114) show that social interaction can lead to both politicized andradicalized solutions but that radicalization rests on the perception that extreme action is legitimate. The findings provide thefirst experimental analog of the group-based dynamics that underpin political engagement and political extremism. Copyright© 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

SOCIAL INTERACTION AND PSYCHOLOGICALPATHWAYS TO POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND

EXTREMISM

When do supporters of a cause decide to forego traditionalpolitical action and take extreme, perhaps illegal, forms ofaction? Although there are detailed accounts of the drivers ofboth conventional political (e.g., Simon & Klandermans, 2001)and radicalized actions (e.g., Ginges & Atran, 2009a; Hogg,Meehan, & Farquharson, 2010; McCauley & Moskalenko,2008; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2011) and someexcellent field studies (e.g., Della Porta, 1995; Ginges &Atran, 2009b), experimental demonstrations of the psycholog-ical processes that lead to radical action are rare. In thispaper, we focus on the processes by which action strategiesbecome agreed upon and accepted. In particular, we addressthe role of social interaction in creating the conditions forboth conventional political engagement (politicization) andextremism (radicalization).

PATHWAYS TOWARD SOCIAL ACTION:POLITICIZATION AND RADICALIZATION

Research on both conventional political action and politicalviolence suggests that stronger forms of action are usuallypreceded by milder forms of support. For example, in thesocial movement literature, Klandermans (1997) identified

*Correspondence to: Emma F. Thomas, School of Psychology & Exercise SciencE-mail: [email protected]

Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

four distinct stages of social movement engagement, fromsympathizing with a cause to becoming an active participantin a cause. Similarly, in the political violence literature,scholars have emphasized the incremental nature of engagementwith violence, variously utilizing a staircase (Moghaddam,2005) or conveyer-belt metaphor (Moskalenko & McCauley,2009). Indeed, in both the social movement and politicalviolence literatures, there has been a well-articulated need tounderstand commitment to collective efforts to bring aboutsocial change as a process (Horgan, 2008). For the currentpurposes, there are two points of transformation relevant tounderstanding commitment to political action generally andpolitical extremism more specifically: the shift between sympa-thy and active support (Klandermans, 1997) and the shiftbetween support for conventional political pathways and moreextreme methods. The distinction between politicization andradicalization may be particularly useful for locating thesetipping points.

The influential analysis of Simon and Klandermans (2001)argues that politicization occurs when an actor becomesconsciously involved in a power struggle in a system ofunequal intergroup power relations. The underlying powerstruggle is proposed to unfold as “a sequence of politicizingevents that gradually transform the group’s relationship to itssocial environment” (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p. 324).The politicization process is composed of three separateelements. In the first step, the collective actors develop a sharedgrievance. In the second step, an external adversary is blamedfor the grievance, with the group developing adversarial

e, Murdoch University, Perth, Western Australia, Australia.

Received 19 June 2013, Accepted 9 September 2013

16 Emma F. Thomas et al.

attributions of blame. In the final step, triangulation, thecollective actors widen their focus from the opponent group toa third party, such that influencing society becomes an importantpriority in the battle for influence (Simon, 2011). Consistentwith their theoretical analysis, research has shown that politi-cized identities predict engagement in collective action betterthan nonpoliticized identities (van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears,2008) and are linked to mainstream political forms of protest butnot to extreme or violent action (Simon, 2011; Simon &Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008).

Radicalization, on the other hand, can be understood as “achange in beliefs, feelings and behaviors in directions thatincreasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrificein defense of the ingroup” (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008,p. 416). Radicalized groups are already politicized (in thesense that they have a shared grievance and attribute blameto an opponent) but emphasize intergroup conflict and illegaldirect action or violence as the solution to social inequalityrather than legal forms of political protest. Although engagingin illegal activity is quite different to actively perpetrating harmon other people (combatants or noncombatants), both can beconsidered aspects of a more radical—in its literal sense, “ex-treme”—orientation toward addressing social change problems(see also Tausch et al., 2011; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam,1990). Conceptually, radicalization involves increasing justifi-cation of the use of extreme measures (including violence) andthe ideology that “the means justify the ends” (van Stekelenburg& Klandermans, 2011). Whereas politicized action involves abattle for the hearts and minds of third parties (the voting publicand authorities), radicalization strategies do not involve directlyconvincing third parties or bystanders to support the cause(Becker, Tausch, Spears, & Christ, 2011; Della Porta, 1995).

What are the key features of groups that become radicalizedand adopt extreme courses of action? Although recent socialpsychological field studies have demonstrated that conven-tional and extreme social actions can be predicted by differentemotions (anger vs. contempt) and efficacy beliefs (Tauschet al., 2011), experimental research on this topic is relativelyrare. Existing experimental research identifies group-baseddynamics of threat and uncertainty (Hogg et al., 2010) andappeals to instrumental (versus sacred) values to increasedsupport for violent extremism (Ginges, Atran, Medin, &Shikaki, 2007). Consistent with calls to consider extremismfrom a variety of perspectives (e.g., Kruglanski & Fishman,2009), the current research explores the role of social interac-tion as an important but hitherto underexplored mechanismof both politicization and radicalization.

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL INTERACTION

The dynamics of discussion and debate are central to accountsof both politicization and radicalization. For example, inSimon and Klandermans’ (2001) terms, it is impossible torealize the sharedness of one’s views and agree on strategiesfor targeting third parties without communicating with othersupporters (Hardin & Higgins, 1996; see also Thomas,McGarty, & Mavor, 2009). Intragroup dynamics have alsobeen emphasized in theories of the radicalization process.


For example, the terrorism literature specifies an importantrole for the group-based dynamics of small groups in the rad-icalization process (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Sageman,2008; Silke, 2008), and, consistent with this, van Stekelenburgand Klandermans (2011, p. 182) have argued that “People donot radicalize on their own but as part of a group and throughthe socially constructed ‘reality’ of their group.”

Research from the social psychological and politicalviolence literatures also points to an important role for socialinteraction. For example, crowd researchers have pointed tothe escalation to conflict and violence in otherwise peacefulcrowd events as a function of the dynamics and conditionsof the group, relating to changes in social context and identity(e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1984). In a laboratorysetting, the transformative power of interacting groups hasbeen demonstrated in experiments on attitude change inthe group polarization phenomenon (Moscovici, 1991;Myers & Lamm, 1976). More recently, research on theinteractive model of identity formation (Postmes, Haslam,& Swaab, 2005) has emphasized the ways in which peopleconstruct and negotiate a sense of “who we are” and “whatwe do” through social interaction in ways that areconsequential for prosocial (Thomas & McGarty, 2009) anddiscriminatory social action (Smith & Postmes, 2009, 2011).However, this tradition has not hitherto demonstrated theconsequences of interaction for producing strong politicalactions or extremism.

The terrorism literature also specifies an important role forthe dynamics of small groups in the radicalization process.Sageman (2004, 2008) revealed that a large proportion(approximately 66%) of the 172 Salafi terrorists that com-prised his sample joined in small groups. The analysis of vanStekelenburg, Oegema, and Klandermans (2011) of web con-tent showed how group members can radicalize through onlineinteraction, in response to changing intergroup dynamics. Allof this research converges to show that people can, and oftendo, behave in quite different ways after they have engaged insocial interaction. The current research links the energizingeffects of group interaction with frameworks of politicizationand radicalization.

THE CURRENT RESEARCH

The current research considers processes of politicization andradicalization in the context of animal welfare, specifically,opposition to the battery farming of chickens. Animal welfareactivists oppose the cruel mistreatment of animals perpetratedby humans and emphasize the inherent worth of all creatures(Scarce, 2006). Mainstream political action by opponents ofbattery farming has been successful in convincing legislaturesto produce new laws, most recently in Europe (Andrews,2012). However, most legislative frameworks are voluntary,and the vast majority of consumers continue to purchase cagedeggs (No caged eggs, 2006). More radical forms of socialaction such as forced entries to farms to conduct clandestineinvestigations, releases of chickens from cages, and vandalismare also frequently taken by animal rights activists. It is thus acontext in which it is possible to study the emergence of

Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 15–22 (2014)

Pathways to political engagement and extremism 17

shared, conventional politicized grievance and also the emer-gence of more radical and extreme actions.

Our manipulations were designed to test the preconditionsneeded for the emergence of support for politicized and/orradicalized action. Following work by Tausch et al. (2011; seealso Louis, 2009) that emphasizes the important role of a lackof efficacy in political process in the strategic use of politicalviolence, we gave participants information that primed thelegitimacy of either lawful political protest or unlawful directaction for combating the mistreatment of chickens. After receiv-ing this information, participants either engaged in discussionabout strategies to prevent the suffering of chickens or did not.

We expect that discussing action strategies with like-minded others will bolster support for conventional politicalactions by creating the preconditions for politicization (senseof shared grievance, adversarial attributions for blame, andtriangulation by involving society in the solutions; Simon &Klandermans, 2001), in turn, increasing support for mainstreampolitical action. That is, we expect the effect of discussion onpolitical actions to be mediated by the markers of politicization.Radicalization, on the other hand, should go further thanpoliticization so that the group comes to endorse more extremesolutions: In order to radicalize, a group must first politicize.We hypothesize that, where discussions have been primed withthe belief that extreme action is legitimate (so that the “endsjustify the means”), participants will be more willing to takeradical forms of action. That is, we expect the effects of radical-ization to be shown as (statistical) interactions between thediscussion and strategy manipulations such that radical intentionis greatest where participants have been primed with thelegitimacy of extreme actions and have engaged in discussion.The effect of radicalized discussion will be mediated by in-creased willingness to break the law.

METHOD

Design

The study employed a 2 (group discussion: present vs.absent) × 2 (action strategy: political vs. radical) design.1

There were 16 interacting groups (eight in each of theinteracting cells). One of these groups had six people, threegroups had five people, eight groups had four people, and fourgroups had three people. The sessions were conducted by eightdifferent experimental assistants who worked in groups of twoto recruit participants and conduct the research.

Participants

Participants were university students recruited on campus(n= 72) or members of the community (n = 50) recruitedthrough snowballing.2 Psychology students received course

1Although we use the term “social interaction” elsewhere, in the Results andDiscussion sections, we refer to this as “discussion” to avoid confusion be-tween our manipulations and reporting of statistical interaction.2Each discussion group was mixed so that it contained both student andgeneral community members. Sample (student or general community) was notassociated with the dependent variables ( ps> .25) although students tended to havestronger attributions of blame for battery farming to the public ( β = .64, p= .04).


credit for participation, and some members of the communitywere paid $A10 to compensate them for costs associated withparticipation. Altogether, 122 participated of whom 47weremaleand 74 were female (one person did not specify their gender),with a mean age of 29.48 years (standard deviation (SD) = 13.77).

Procedure

Participants arrived at the lab and were randomly allocated toone of the four experimental conditions. Participants in thegroup discussion conditions were formed into small groupsof three to six, whereas participants in the control conditionscompleted the task individually. All participants read informa-tion about the practice of battery farming and the mistreatmentof chickens on these farms (adapted from http://animal-lib.org.au/). Participants read that, despite years of campaigning,Australians continue to buy caged eggs. All participants weretold that “In order to effect change we must take steps thatwork.” The following sentences then constituted the strategymanipulation (following van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears,2011). Participants in the political strategy conditions read that

collective action expert Professor Doug Aldrin recently statedthat “taking lawful steps to convince the public is the bestway to overcome the suffering of battery hens”. This meansthe most effective solutions rest on political methods(methods that involve appeals to the political process andpublic opinion) to prevent the suffering of chickens.

Conversely, participants in the radical strategy conditionsread the following:

collective action expert Professor Doug Aldrin recentlystated that “taking strong direct actions is the best way toovercome the suffering of battery hens, even if it meansbreaking the law”. This means the most effective solutionsrest on more direct methods (methods that don’t involveappeals to the political process and public opinion) toprevent the suffering of chickens.

Participants in the control conditions then completed thequestionnaire and behavioral measure, whereas participantsin the discussion conditions were told that their task for thenext 30minutes was to discuss strategies that could beimplemented to prevent the suffering of chickens. The 30-minuteinteractions were un-facilitated and audio-recorded. Participantsthen completed the questionnaire and behavioral measure inde-pendently. After completing the study requirements, participantswere thoroughly debriefed.

Questionnaire

Unless otherwise indicated, all items were measured on seven-point Likert-type scales anchored 1 (“strongly disagree”) and7 (“strongly agree”).

Manipulation Check

The legitimacy of radical action was measured with a singleitem: “Actions to end battery farming are justified, even if theybreak the law.”

Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 15–22 (2014)

http://animal-lib.org.au/

http://animal-lib.org.au/


Shared Grievance

Two items measured the extent to which the grievance wasseen to be shared, α= .68: “This is a position I share with otherpeople” and “Lots of other people in the community agreewith me on this issue.”

Adversarial Blame

Two items measured attributions of adversarial blame, α = .80:“People who support battery farms are to blame for this situa-tion” and “People who buy battery farmed eggs are responsiblefor this situation.”

Triangulation

A further two items measured the extent to which participantshad become aware of society as an important target of influence,α= .73. The items were as follows: “It is vital that we convincethe Australian community that battery farming is unacceptable”and “People who oppose battery farming should work to con-vince the Australian public that battery farming is intolerable.”

Willingness to Break the Law

One item, adapted from Simon and Grabow (2010), assessedwillingness to engage in violent confrontation with authorities(“I would participate in a protest action even if it involvedconfrontation with the police”).

Political Action Intentions

In keeping with previous measurement approaches (Moskalenko& McCauley, 2009; Tausch et al., 2011), five items measuredintention to engage in specific (legal) political actions, α= .86.These items were as follows: [I intend to] encourage familyand friends to stop purchasing battery farmed eggs; write letterstomy local newspaper about the cruelty of battery farming; writea letter to the Minister of Agriculture to demand a phase out ofbattery farming in Australia; join a peaceful protest; and donateto an organization that fights for an end to battery farming in alawful way.

Radical Action Intentions

Four items adapted from Moskalenko and McCauley (2009)and Tausch et al. (2011) measured specific (potentially

Table 1. Means (standard deviations) for dependent variables by exper

Noninteraction political(n= 29)

Nonintera(n

Shared grievance 4.90 (1.04) a 4.98Triangulation 5.36 (1.13) a 5.24Adversarial blame 4.29 (1.60) a 4.38Political action intentions 3.79 (1.38) a 3.74Letter signinga 12 (41%) a 14Willingness to break the law 2.17 (1.44) a 1.72Radical action intentions 2.84 (1.43) a 2.36

Means with different lowercase letters differ at p< .05 according to hierarchicalaLetter signing shows the number of people who signed the letter in each conditi


unlawful) radical actions, α= .87. These items were as follows:[I intend to] join a group that illicitly rescues chickens fromfactory farms; join protests chaining myself to farmingequipment; participate in a sit-in at a shopping outlet thatsells battery farmed eggs; and donate to an organization thatfights for an end to battery farming but that sometimesbreaks the law.

Behavioral Measure

To assess whether changes are supported by actual behavioralchange, we also gave participants the opportunity to write theirname, address, and sign a letter to a state minister expressingtheir opposition to the practice of battery farming.

RESULTS

Analytical Strategy

Because group interaction took place in two cells of ourexperimental design, the design is composed equally ofindependent and interdependent data. Analyses are thuscomposed of a series of planned comparisons by usinghierarchical linear modeling 7.0 (HLM; Raudenbush, Bryk,& Congdon, 2010). HLM is appropriate where one levelof data (individuals; level 1) is nested within another level(interacting groups; level 2). The estimated models wereas follows:

imenta

ction r= 29)

(0.93)(1.57)(1.70)(1.50)(48%)(1.41)(1.35)

linear mon and

Level 1 Y= β0 +RLevel 2 β0 = γ00 + γ01 (contrast 1) + γ01 (contrast 2)

+ γ01 (contrast 3) + u0

R and u represent the individual and group-level errors,respectively, and β and γ are regression coefficients at theindividual and group levels, respectively. Contrast 1 comparesthe group discussion conditions (+1) with individual condi-tions (�1). Contrast 2 compares the radical action conditions(+1) with the political action conditions (�1). Contrast 3 teststhe interaction and was the cross product of contrasts 1 and 2.As a test of primary hypotheses, we report the level 2coefficients γ and p in Table 2. Table 1 displays the meansand standard deviations for the dependent variables byexperimental condition.

l condition

adical Interaction political(n= 31)

Interaction radical(n= 26)

a 5.69 (0.80) b 5.25 (1.24) ba 5.93 (0.81) b 5.92 (1.21) ba 3.82 (1.44) a 4.00 (1.44) aa 4.08 (1.19) b 4.53 (1.41) ba 24 (77%) b 23 (88%) bb 2.13 (1.31) a 3.19 (1.90) ca 2.59 (1.28) a 3.76 (1.51) b

odeling.percentage in brackets.

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Figure 1. Mediation of the effect of discussion on political actionintentions through shared grievance and triangulation. The numbersto the left of the backslash indicate β values when variables areentered separately; the numbers to the right indicate β values whenvariables are entered as level 1 (block 2) predictors together. † denotessignificance at p= .06, * denotes significance at p< .05, ** denotessignificance at p< .01, and *** denotes significance at p< .001


Manipulation Check

The audio recordings revealed that participants in two groupshad received additional guidance from one experimentalassistant after receiving the prime, and these two groups (bothin the radicalized discussion condition) were excluded fromthe analyses (n = 8). It made no material difference to theresults that produced the same significance levels with andwithout exclusion, but to avoid the possibility of experimenterinfluence, only groups whose discussion was independent ofthe experimenter were retained (N= 114; n = 26 in the radical-ized discussion condition).

Hierarchical linear modeling analyses of the effect ofstrategy manipulation on perceived legitimacy revealed asignificant effect such that those in the radical strategy condi-tions (M = 4.35, SD = 1.96) agreed that illegal action was morelegitimate than did those in the political strategy conditions(M= 3.18, SD = 1.75), γ= 0.58, p< .001.

Main Analyses

Politicized Group Discussion

Tables 1 and 2 show that, as expected, group discussion pro-duced stronger political action intentions, greater awarenessof shared grievance, and triangulation, although not greateradversarial blame. We explored the mediation of the effectof discussion on political activism intentions through the twosignificant proposed mediators entered as level 1 predictorsas shown in Figure 1. Considering each mediator in isolation,bootstrapping (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) is consistent withboth triangulation (IE = 0.19, SE= 0.08, 95% CI= 0.04, 0.34)and shared grievance being mediators (IE= 0.14, SE= 0.06,95% CI= 0.03, 0.28). This suggests that the effect of discus-sion exerted its effect on political activism intentions througha heightened awareness of shared grievance, as well as theneed to involve and convince society (triangulation). Whenthe two proposed mediators were entered together, the effectof shared grievance becomes marginally significant (atp= .06; Figure 1 values to the right of the backslash), whereastriangulation remained significant, and the effect of discussionwas fully mediated. This pattern is consistent with Simon andKlandermans (2001) theorizing that triangulation is the proxi-mal driver of political activism, mediating a more distal impactof shared grievances. Bootstrapping testing the indirect effect

Figure 2. Mediation of the effect of discussion on behavior (lettesigning) through shared grievance and triangulation. The numbersto the left of the backslash indicate β values when variables areentered separately; the numbers to the right indicate β values whenvariables are entered as level 1 (block 2) predictors together. * denotes significance at p< .05, ** denotes significance at p< .01, and *** denotessignificance at p< .001

Table 2. Hierarchical linear modeling effects of level 2 independentvariables on level 1 γ dependent variables

Effect ofdiscussion

Effect ofstrategy

Interactionterm

Shared grievance .24* .09 .14Triangulation .28* .05 �.009Adversarial blame �.23 �.05 �.07Political action intentions .26* �.10 �.12Letter signing .92*** �.27 .13Willingness to break the law .36** �.15 .38**Radical action intentions .27 �.16 .40**

*denotes significance at p< .05, **denotes significance at p< .01, ***denotessignificance at p< .001.

Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 15–22 (2014

of shared grievance on activism intentions through triangula-tions also supports this interpretation (IE= 0.31, SE= 0.08,95% CI= 0.16, 0.47).

The results for the behavioral measure in Table 1 show thatthe proportion of participants who signed the letter was muchgreater in the discussion conditions (77% political and 88%radical) than in the control conditions (41% political and48% radical), and this was confirmed by HLM using theBernoulli distribution (as appropriate for a dichotomousdependent measure; Raudenbush et al., 2010). We thenconducted similar analyses by using bootstrapping adaptedfor testing dichotomous dependent variables (Preacher &Hayes, 2008). Results are shown in Figure 2. Considered inde-pendently, triangulation (IE= 0.15, SE= 0.09, 95% CI= 0.02,0.36) and shared grievance (IE = 0.12, SE= 0.09, 95% CI=0.01, 0.35) are both significant mediators of the effect ofdiscussion on behavior. When the two proposed mediatorswere entered together, shared grievance again became nonsig-nificant (Figure 2 values to the right of the backslash), andtriangulation remained significant. The effect of discussionremained significant. The results provide evidence of media-tion of the effect of discussion on the political actionbehavioral measure through increased triangulation and (moretentatively) shared grievance.

Radicalized Group Discussion

Table 1 shows that, as expected, radicalized discussion had noeffect on any of the proposed drivers of political action or on

r

-

)


political action intentions over and above that of politicizeddiscussion. However, significant interaction terms in Table 2suggested that radicalized political discussion increased bothradical action intentions and willingness to break the law.Because radicalization is envisaged as an extension of politici-zation, we tested mediation of the (simple) effect of radicalizeddiscussion on radical intentions through willingness to breakthe law. As expected, bootstrapping results were consistentwith willingness to break the law, mediating the effect ofradicalized discussion on intentions (IE= 0.22, SE= 0.10,95% CI= 0.04, 0.45; Figure 3).

DISCUSSION

The current research uses psychological experimental methodsto consider a problem of considerable social significance:When do people go beyond mainstream political action tochoose more extreme, potentially illegal, forms of action?The results show that social interaction can contribute toboth political engagement and conventional political actions(politicization) and also to more extreme forms of social action(radicalization). Although other research has considered anumber of factors that lead to both paths, the current researchis among the first to experimentally demonstrate evidenceconsistent with politicization and radicalization and to testtheoretically relevant mediators.

The results showed that politicized interaction producedstronger action intentions and actual political behavior and thatthe drivers of these were the emergence of shared grievanceand a triangulation of intergroup relations such that thebystander public became an important target of influence. Inthese data, adversarial attributions do not play a key role,perhaps because the battery chicken context focuses partici-pants on helping the victimized animals rather than on farmersor consumers as problems. Nevertheless, the study providesbroad empirical support for Simon and Klandermans’ (2001)model in identifying the underlying processes of politicization.It is also the first to experimentally demonstrate one of the keymechanisms underpinning processes of politicization, namelygroup interaction. Although research on the group polarizationphenomenon has demonstrated consistent effects on socialattitudes (e.g., Isenberg, 1986), the processes underpinningthat phenomenon remain unclear (Postmes, Spears, Lee, &Novak, 2005). This research is the first to link social interac-tion to frameworks of politicization and radicalization and isamong the first to demonstrate an effect on actual behavior.

Moreover, the study also demonstrates that radicalizationcan also emerge from social interaction in context, and

Figure 3. Mediation of the effect of political versus radical discus-sion on radical action intentions through willingness to break thelaw. * denotes significance at p< .05, ** denotes significance at p< .01,and *** denotes significance at p< .001


identifies a critical mediating process for this.Where participantshad been primed to accept the legitimacy of more extrememeasures, radicalized interaction produced stronger radicalintentions, mediated through a willingness to break the law.Importantly though, neither the priming of radical strategies(an intergroup factor) nor social interaction (an intragroupfactor) in isolation was sufficient for the emergence of radicali-zation. Rather, it was the combination of these factors thatcreated the conditions from which support for extreme actionclearly emerged. This research thus provides an experimentalanalog of crowd processes observed in the field (e.g., Drury &Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1984). A broader implication is thatgroup interaction is not inevitably linked to extremism. Earlyresearch on the group polarization phenomenon showed thatgroup interaction promoted attitude polarization. These datashow that even a short interaction among community andstudent samples in the laboratory can evoke changes in radicalintentions but only if the external prompts for legitimizingbeliefs are present. As such, findings emphasize the importanceof attending to both intragroup and intergroup factors indeveloping accounts of social phenomena (Dovidio, 2013;also Thomas, Smith, McGarty, & Postmes, 2010).

One caveat is that the overall levels of support for radicalizedaction were lower than those for politicized action. Thus,although we have demonstrated a relative shift toward extrem-ism, the absolute level was below the scale midpoint. In otherwords, our experimental procedure of 30minutes of radicalizedinteraction boosted commitment to extreme action, but it didnot create full-blown radicals. Indeed, the behavioral measureshowed that the highest proportion of participants taking actualmainstream political action was in the radicalized interactioncondition. On the other hand, for ethical reasons, our paradigmdid not offer participants the opportunity to take actual radicalaction. It would be ideal to include suitable alternatives in futureresearch; however, the high radical intentions in the radicalizedinteraction condition alongside near universal engagement inan overtly political act does suggest that radicalized interactionand democratic political action need not always be at odds witheach other.

LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The current research identifies one mechanism through which en-dorsement of radical actions can shift (that is, by increasing the le-gitimacy of such measures through expert endorsement), butmuch more needs to be carried out to identify the triggers of theseshifts in either direction. Determining the collective bases uponwhich moral values come to be experienced as “absolute” alsoseems like a useful next step (Ginges & Atran, 2009a, 2009b).Moreover, collective identity processes are central to theorizingabout politicization (Simon & Klandermans, 2001) and radicali-zation (Post, 2006; van Stekelenburg et al., 2011) and are boundup in the effects of social interaction (e.g. Postmes, Haslamet al., 2005; Postmes, Spears et al., 2005; Thomas et al., 2009).and thus should be considered here. Finally, an increasing demandto sacrifice in defense of the ingroup (McCauley & Moskalenko,2008) and other measures need to be explored as possible media-tors of the effects of radicalized interaction.

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It is also the case that, in the current research, the 30-minutediscussion entailed a delay in the measurement (that is, thosein the group discussion conditions completed the measures30minutes later than those in the control conditions). Giventhat research on attitude polarization suggested that merethinking can induce changes in attitudes (“the mere thoughteffect”: e.g., Tesser & Conlee, 1975), it is reasonable to askwhether the effects observed here could have been due to theeffects of time rather than due to the effects of group discus-sion. We find this highly unlikely for three reasons. First, merethought polarizes attitudes on topics about which one isconfident (Clarkson, Tormala, & Leone, 2011) and aboutwhich there is a clear positive or negative association (e.g.,Liberman & Chaiken, 1991); it seems unlikely to havecomparable effects on widely contested social and behavioralchoices such as those considered here. Second, Liu and Latane(1998) found that interaction has an effect on attitudes overand above thought listing. Finally, if it were true that merethought exerts significant effects on support for radical action(including some of moderate to large size and effects onrelated behavioral measures), then supporters of radical actionwould need to do no more than ask people to think about acause for 30minutes. If that were plausible, it would be a verypopular tactic for radical organizations, and political extrem-ism would be much more widespread than it is. We do,however, agree with Brauer, Judd, and Gilner (1995) thatsome of the effects of group discussion are attributable tocognitive changes induced by thinking about an issue.

Nevertheless, the current findings provide an importantexample of how psychological research methods can be used todevelop accounts of socially consequential actions. The currentfindings complement field studies that consider the importanceof small group dynamics in promoting engagement and extrem-ism (but see Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva, & Medin, 2011, forfurther consideration of the advantages of field as opposed to lab-oratory methodologies). The research shows that radicalizationcan be understood as a reproducible social process or pathway(Horgan, 2008) and not as a product of specific social conditionsin certain societies or religious groups, nor an aspect of psy-chopathology (Silke, 1998). In doing so, it provides a powerfulexperimental analog of the group-based dynamics that underpinpolitical engagement and extremism.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors wish to thank Sama Bruce-Cullen, LauraChisholm, Elin Döhne, Jessveen Kaur, Linanne Lech, ChareenRaja, Michael Setiawan and Kendle Smith, for their assistancewith data collection. This research was supported by theAustralian Research Council DE120101029.

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