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Social Theory and National Culture: The Case of British and American Absolute Idealism, 1860-1900Author(s): David WatsonSource: Social Science History, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Summer, 1981), pp. 251-274Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of the Social Science History AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1170902 .

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Social Theory andNational CultureThe Case of British andAmerican Absolute Idealism, 1860-1900

DAVID WATSONCrewe and Alsager College-Cheshire, England

In this essay, taking as a case study the comparative history of thetwo groups that gave absolute idealism a leading edge in latenineteenth-century intellectual debate in the United States andGreat Britain, I attempt to make a contribution to the recenttrend toward the use of sophisticated or "difficult" ideas incomparative analysis (see Moore, 1979). My intentions aretwofold: (1) to assist in the clarification of how "social theory" isdeveloped, and (2) to provide an outline of how such comparativecultural analysis can be achieved. After a preliminary discussionof the concept of "social theory" and the component parts intowhich it can be separated, I proceed to identify the two groups inquestion, locate their philosophical schemes in the developmentof contemporary thought, and finally, attempt to demonstrate thevalue of the approach in an analysis of one aspect of theirspecifically social and political theories.

Author's Note: An earlier version of this article was presented at the NinthWorldCongress of Sociology in Uppsala, Sweden, in August 1978. Partof theresearch on which it is based was supported by grants from the ResearchCommittee of Crewe and Alsager College of Higher Education, whoseassistance I gratefullj)acknowledge.

SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY, Vol. 5 No. 3, Summer 1981 251-274? 1981 Social Science History Assn.

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I.As a definition, 1 assume the field of "social theory" encom-

passes any analytical scheme for interpreting the network ofsocial relations in which the agent takes part, includingthe possi-bility of extrasocietal (perhaps divine) motivation, and thepotential for making prescriptions to change that network.Obviously, every reflectivesocial agent (that is, every participantwho interpretshis actions withinsome organisedframework,andrecognizes personal motive beyond the simplest relation ofstimulus-response) has a social theory of sorts. However, certainmore "professional" theorists will aim for a higher level ofsophistication, inclusiveness, and explanatory power. In propos-ing a social theory they will make statements with a broad rangeof analytically separable meanings. To take a crude example: anexpressed belief in Christiantheism will suggest, on one level, notonly a normative commitment to a set of universal values, butalso adherence to certain beliefs about human nature and theorigin of knowledge. On anotherlevel, given understandingof thesocial context, it may further imply a preferredform of socialorganization and motivatespecificsocial criticismor constructivepolicy. In other words, the sophisticated theorist will inevitablyassert and attempt to justify a number of different claims.I contend that there will be five such claims or component partsin a sophisticated social theory. A theory need not include allof these components, but, taken together, they will provide cate-gories for all possible types of claims. They are:

(1) Normativeclaims about the good society, includingvisions of theideal political, social, economic, cultural, and diplomatic (inter-national) systems. These normative claims establish abstractvalues as guides to the construction of an ideal society and moti-vate critical evaluation of the existing state of society.(2) Empirical claims about the presentstate of society; that is, theo-riesabout the actual natureof contemporaryor historicalsociety,including the perceived operative political, social, economic,cultural,and diplomatic systems. These theories can beaccepted,

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SOCIAL THEORY AND NATIONAL CULTUREdefended, criticized, or deplored.Essentiallythey areperceptionsof how the real world is, and how it functions.(3) Claims about human nature, including perceptions of (a) humandrives (basic, biologically determined,instinctualforces), and (b)human capacities (moral, religious, intellectual, aesthetic, eco-nomic, and so on) whetherindividualor collective, rational or ir-rational, creative or reflexive, free or determined.

(4) Policy claims, or theories which outline what can and should bedone to shift from the empiricallyperceivedpresentto the norma-tive future (if such a shift is possible). These theories can be cate-gorized accordingto their intended audience,the intendedagentsof policy execution, theirprescribedmethods, the intendedscopeand effect of policy execution, andthe perceptionandcalculationof unintended effects of policy.(5) Epistemological claims,whichexplain the originand natureof allsuch knowledge. They include claims about the content, location,potential or actual comprehensiveness of knowledge (for ex-ample, seeing genuine knowledge as deriving from "reason" orthe "senses"),andthe relationship of knowledge to true belief(asidentical, compatible, or in opposition). This broad definition ofepistemology thus subsumes such categories as metaphysicsandcosmology, and such issues as the physical structureof the uni-verse, the extent of "spiritual"participation in the processes ofthe natural world, the characteristics of time, and overarchingviews of the development of human society (as progressive, re-gressive, cyclical, or unchanging).

At the highest levels of "professional" philosophy, the episte-mological categories have generally set the terms for intellectualdebate. Questions about the sources and content of knowledge,together with considerations of its actual or potential comprehen-siveness and the relationship of knowledge to belief, have provedto be the pivotal categories for determining the character ofgeneral analysis of social development and the prescription forcorrect action. For social theorists operating at this level, thelegitimacy of their total theory (of history, of institutions, and ofethical conduct) will depend on answers to basic questions aboutthe nature of reality and our perceptions of it.

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SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORYIn this article I take two groups and attempt to follow a pairof

philosophical schemes, both based on a sophisticated idealistepistemology, throughto theircomponents of social and politicalprescription. The groups are the St. Louis Hegelians, aroundWilliam Torrey Harris (1835-1909), the St. Louis School Super-intendent and Federal Commissioner of Education, and theOxford Idealists,who, following Thomas Hill Green(1836-1882),created the so-called "Anglo-Hegelianism" that dominated thephilosophy teaching and the moral atmosphere of Oxford Uni-versity until well into the twentieth century.The context within which both sets of theory are formulated isthe late nineteenth-century debate over the relative claims ofreligion and science. In their reaction to the apparently antihis-toricist and narrowly empiricist developments of contemporaryscience, as well as to the naive materialism of several of thepopular adjustmentsto the crisis that Darwinism promptedfor afixed world-view, Harris and Green shared a common, idealistconcern for the demonstration that reality and meaning wereessentially spiritual and transcendent. For both, the key to thisdemonstration was a critical readingof idealist philosophy, fromPlato to Kant and Hegel. For both, the enemies were the empiri-cism of Locke, Hume, the Scottish school of realism, and Mill,as well as the evolutionary materialism of Herbert Spencer andG. H. Lewes that enjoyedsucha vogue in mid-nineteenth-centuryBritain and America.

There was also much that they did not share; not only inepistemological nuance (Green's philosophical apparatus, forexample, was more complex and subtle than that of Harris or hisimmediate associates), but also in their outlines of those institu-tional forms that would best preserve and cultivate permanentspiritual values. Consequently, my analysis proceeds along twomain lines: the reconstruction of the "technical"philosophies ofHarris, Green, and their circles, and the comparative culturalexamination afforded by study of the "social"philosophy (par-ticularly in regardto education) that these technical philosophiesdetermined in the contemporary fields of American and Britishsocial life.

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SOCIAL THEORY AND NATIONAL CULTUREII

The St. Louis Hegelians saw themselves as the agency thatintroduced genuinely "speculative" philosophy, by which theymeant an adapted Hegelian dialectic, to the United States.Modern investigation, in particularthe study by L. Easton of theOhio Hegelians (John B. Stallo, Peter Kaufmann, MoncureConway, and August Willich)between 1848and 1860,has placedthis claim in the perspective of a growing interest in Germanphilosophy during the early nineteenthcentury(Easton, 1966:2-27). Nevertheless, the group that formed the St. Louis Philoso-phical Society in 1866 can legitimately be regarded as the mostintenseand effectivepopularisersof absolute idealismin America.Of the 59 charter members of the Society, a surprising numberwere to add national prominence to their local reputations asmembers of the city'sculturalelite: Harris,the Secretary,as U.S.Commissioner of Education; George Holmes Howison, as thearchitect of the Berkeley Philosophical Union; Thomas David-son, as a founder and instructor of schools in New England andNew York, notably the famous "Breadwinners'College" on thelower East Side, as well as creatorof the group ("TheFellowshipof the New Life") that eventually became the London FabianSociety; Denton J. Snider, the historian of the group, as thefounder of LiterarySchools in St. Louis, Chicago, and Milwau-kee, chairman of the Association for Universal Culture, and aprolific author; Judge J. Gabriel Woerner, as an authority onprobate law, a novelist and playwright; Alfred Kroeger, as thetranslator of Fichte; James Kendall Hosmer, as the author of thebest-selling Short History of German Literature;Louis Soldan,as Harris'ssuccessor in the posts of St. Louis School Superinten-dent and President of the National Education Association; andHenry C. Brokmeyer,the Presidentof the Society, as GovernorofMissouri. Meanwhile, the list of auxiliary members reveals aninternationalcast of contemporarythinkers: Alcott and Emersonin America, together with Stallo, Willich, Frederick Hedge (thefirst American translator of Hegel), General Ethan Allen Hitch-cock, and Henry James, Sr.; J. Hutchinson Stirling from Scot-

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SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORYland; and Karl Rosenkranz, Jacob Bernays, Ludwig Feuerbach,and J. H. Fichte from Germany. (For general information on thesociety see Pochmann, 1957:257-294; Forbes, 1930-1931;Riedl,1973; Snider, 1910: 294-446, and 1920; Schuyler, 1904; Flowerand Murphey, 1977, Vol. 2: 463-516.)All accounts agree that Brokmeyer provided the core ofinspirationfor the group. His is anextraordinarystory, beginningwith the creation and loss of a large fortune between 1844,whenhe immigrated from Prussia, and 1854, when he retired to asolitary homestead in WarrenCounty, Missouri, with the worksof Hegel. Eventually, after his reemergenceinto society (looselydocumented in a book he called A Mechanic's Diary [1910]), ameetingwith Harris,and resuminga social and political careerinSt. Louis, he returnedagain to the wildernessto teach philosophyto Oklahoma Indians (Pochmann, 1957:274-281; Forbes, 1930:90-91; Goetzmann, 1973:3-4).The development of a national and international audience forthe St. Louis Movement was, however, uniquelythe achievementof Harris. His foundation of the Journal of Speculative Philoso-phy in 1867,after Charles Eliot Norton and the North AmericanReview (on the advice of Chauncey Wright)had turneddown hisarticle on Spencer that appearedin its first number,providedthefirst American periodical devoted to "professional"philosophy(Leidecker, 1946: 324-325; Snider, 1910:326). It rapidly becamean outlet for a number of contemporary philosophers, amongthem Charles Sanders Peirce andJohn Dewey. TheJournal, from1867until 1893,played a majorrole in presentingtranslation andcriticism of contemporary European philosophy, but Harris wasnot able to convert his editorial eminence into academic status.Despite a brief interlude as the leading light of a successful NewEngland summer school (the Concord School of Philosophy)from 1880to 1887,and his tentative consideration for a Harvardchair in philosophy, Harris'sprofessional careerwas dedicatedtothe "realworld"of elementaryand secondary education: first asSuperintendent of the St. Louis Schools (1868-1880), where hebuilt a system nationally andinternationallyrecognizedas a pace-

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setter; and subsequently as Federal Commissioner (Leidecker,1946: 366-367, 397; Kuklick, 1977: 135-136).The effect of this career pattern was that Harris became moreof a propagandist than the "speculative" hinkerwhose image hetriedto presentto his contemporaries.The vast bulk of hiswork isof the type that his friendSnider dismissedas "magazine"articles:145 speeches to the NEA, the preparation of Johnson's Cyclo-paedia and Webster's Dictionary, the Appleton's School Read-ers, together, of course, withthe translations and commentaryforthe Journal of Speculative Philosophy. In contrast,there areonlytwo works of mature reflection: the critical account of Hegel'sLogic (1890)andthe Psychologic Foundationof Education(1898).The former is self-consciously a commentaryand exposition. Tileonly major adjustment to Hegel's original scheme involves arestatement of the latter's view of "the relation of Nature to theAbsolute Idea," ensuring that Hegel escapes the charge ofpantheism (Harris, 1890:xiv-xv). The latter, a systematic state-ment of epistemology, historical philosophy, and educationaltheory, based on classically idealist premises, appeareda curiousanachronism eight years afterthe publication of WilliamJames'sPrinciples of Psychology. After the initial impact of the Journalas a medium, the internal debates of institutionally affiliatedphilosophy had proceeded without Harris's active participation.The practical, nonacademic bent of the professional lives ofmembers of the St. Louis Movement is in fact one of their chiefcollective characteristics. Of the core set, outlined above, onlyHowison obtained and held a prestigious academic position.After a decade of attemptsto enterthe circle at Harvard,and theeventual choice of Josiah Royce to fill a temporary position in thePhilosophy Department, he left for the West Coast in 1884, totake up the Mills Professorshipin Philosophy at the UniversityofCalifornia. Not surprisingly,he was also the only memberof thegroup to develop a significantly modified version of the right-Hegelian views stated by Harris and Brokmeyer. Howison(echoed in some of these respects by Thomas Davidson) came toreject all suspicions of monistic absolutism, developing an

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SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORYalternativewhich he called "personalism"or "personalidealism"(see Buckham and Stratton, 1934: 1-122; Knight, 1907).The majority concern was with what might be called prescrip-tive social theory. Harris's career and outlook typified thisorientation. He proceeded directlyfrom an account of the correctsources and modes of knowledge to an historical and socialanalysis of how those modes might be realized. This secondendeavor, the evaluation and criticism of social institutions,consumed the major part of his working life, drawinghimfurtherandfurtherawayfrom"technical"philosophical pursuits.In 1890he claimed that he had reached his "finaland present standpointin regard to the true outcome of the Hegelian system" as earlyas 1879 (Harris, 1890:xiv).These emphases were in direct contrast to the preoccupationsof an influential generation of academic American idealists whoturned to post-Kantian and Hegelian schemes between the late1870sand the end of the century.Inthis period, as has beenamplydocumented by Herbert Schneider and others, a number ofleading university departments developed distinctive schools ofidealism (Schneider, 1963: 383, 400; Reck, 1975). The mostprestigiouswas that led by Josiah Roycewho, withthe encourage-ment of William James and George Herbert Palmer at Harvard,provided in his The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (1885) aproof for the existence of the Absolute that was not seriouslychallenged for a decade (Kuklick, 1972). Ironically, given theirgenerally aloof attitude toward the western "amateurs,"suchprofessionals owed a considerable debt to the translations andcommentary of Harris and his group, not least for the Journal ofSpeculative Philosophy. More importantlyfor the purposeof thisanalysis, the "academics" tended to rely more on Kant thanHegel, and stopped well short of an historicist teleology ofindividuals, institutions, and societies. It is interestingto comparethe rather abstract ethical imperative of Royce's "loyalty toloyalty," and its extension into the idea of the "GreatCommun-ity," with the concrete historical and sociological projectionsmade by Harris and the St. Louis Group (see Watson, 1980).

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SOCIAL THEORY AND NATIONAL CULTUREThe chosen careers of almost all of the members of the St.Louis Philosophical Society ensured that a large portion of theirpersonal and collective resources were directed toward theestablishment and execution of public policy. Apart fromHowison, only J. K. Hosmer (at Washington University)pursuedan exclusively academic career. Most of the others were profes-sionals (lawyers, physicians, civil servants), while a significantnumber shared Harris'senthusiasm for educational institutionsas the guarantorsof the progressivetraditions of civilization, and

worked as teachersor educationaladministrators.Theydedicatedthemselves to such movements as the standardizationof elemen-tary and secondary education, the introduction of the kindergar-ten, universityextension, adult education in general,and the edu-cation of women. The breadth and apparent arrogance of theirclaims about social development, portraying all intermediatephenomena as incomplete moments in the progress of AbsoluteMind, should not be allowed to conceal their precise andextensive interestin the minutiae of organizationandadministra-tion. Given the prior belief in the Hegelian scheme of institutionsas the progressiveembodiment of the Idea, it remaineda task ofgreat importanceto discover how these institutions workedin the"State-producing State" (Snider's term for the federal system)and how to ensure that they functioned at their best.

Ill

In several important respects the Oxford Idealists occupied adifferent world from that of the St. Louis Hegelians. In the firstplace, they instituted a confident and successful academictradition that survived beyond the realist attacks of BertrandRussell (1903) and G. E. Moore (1903) well into the twentiethcentury; for example, in the works of John M.E. McTaggart, J.H. Muirhead, Michael Oakeshott, and R. G. Collingwood.Antony Quinton (1971: 304) comments aptly on the durabilityof

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SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORYthis orientation and its survivallong after alternativephilosophi-cal schemes had been effectively championed:

Until well into the 1920's dealists held nearlyall the leadingpositionsin the philosophydepartments f Britishuniversities,and continuedto be the largest group in the philosophicalprofessoriate until 1945. . . . Nothing shows the anachronisticcharacter f thisstateofaffairsmorepoignantlyhan heveryhighlevel of technological unemploymentof idealists within thephilosophical rofession.A number f themnimblyovercame hismisfortuneby becomingvice-chancellors.The achievements of British absolute idealism were thus madeand evaluated in an academic, institutional context, a factreflected in the lives of the major figures. Green was a fellow ofBalliol from 1860,the College'sfirstnonclericaltutor from 1870 o1878, and thereafterthe Whyte'sProfessor of Moral Philosophyin the University (Richter, 1964). F. H. Bradleyalso remainedat

Oxford for life, retaining the fellowship at Merton to which hewas elected in 1870(Wollheim, 1959: 13-15).BernardBosanquettook his undergraduatedegree from Balliol and spent a decade(1871-1881) as a fellow of University College before going toLondon to work with the Ethical Society, Charity OrganisationSociety, and various adult education initiatives. He returned,however, to an academic position, holding the chair in MoralPhilosophy at St. Andrew's from 1903 until 1908 (Bosanquet,1924). The University of St. Andrew's, in fact, became animportant satellite, hiring Oxford-trained idealists for its chairsof Moral Philosophy and Logic and Metaphysics.EdwardCaird,Professor of Moral Philosophy from 1866until 1893,had been afellow and tutor of Merton College (1864-1866) and returned toBalliol, his undergraduateCollege, as Master (1893-1907). Hiscolleagues and successors at St. Andrew's included not onlyBosanquet but also D. G. Ritchie (formerlyat Jesus College, andLecturerat Balliol).Not only did the institutional base that made this an academictradition determineprioritiesfor the workingtime of its members(concentrated, as it was, on the "technical" fields of logic,

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epistemology, and metaphysics), but the educational aims of theinstitutions themselves were also characteristicallyreshaped byidealist social philosophers, assisted by some sympathetic ad-ministrators. The ideal of public service associated with Oxfordafter Green and his Master, Benjamin Jowett, had made theirmark at Balliol (which saw, at one point, one-sixth of the IndianCivil Service and three consecutive Governors-General as Balliolmen) exercised a potent, if indirect, influence on English publicaffairs toward the end of the Victorian era (Richter, 1964: 52;Harvie, 1976: 12, 63, 104-114;compare Freeden, 1978: 16-19).Furthermore, the longevity of absolute idealism in Britainmeans that the homogeneity of the idealist school (a strongfeatureof the St. Louis group)must not be overstressed. Not onlywere the British dealists inclined to groundtheirtheories ina moresubtle appreciationof Kant,a morecriticalreadingof philosophi-cal tradition, and a more complex treatment of various internalpremises of idealist theory such as the intelligibility of theAbsolute, in contrast to the literal, expository Hegelianism ofHarrisand Brokmeyer,but, especially after the prematuredeathof Green, they were more inclined to disagreewith each other ontechnical grounds. Certainly, as the technical theories advancedby the idealists became integratedinto generalintellectual debatearound the turn of the century, the legacy of Green becomesconfused and hard to trace, while a number of disparate groupsqueued up to acknowledge the influence of the pioneer. Indeed,one recent commentator has suggested an ingenious division intoright- and left-Greenians led respectively by Bosanquet and thesociologist L. T. Hobhouse (Collini, 1976).In at least the first two decades of the BritishHegelian revival,however, certain unifying themes stand out which justify thecomparative perspective I have adopted here. First, there is ageneral tendency to acknowledge intellectual debts to Green forhis demonstration of the flaws in the materialist or "naturalist"tradition that had dominated British philosophy for a century.Despite, for example, Bradley's and Bosanquet's long and in-tense disagreements over issues of logic and metaphysics, theycontinued to acknowledge the breakthroughseffected by Green.

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SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORYA similar measure of this influence can be derived from thememorial volume for Green, Essays in Philosophical Criticism,published in 1883.As Edward Caird explains in the Preface, thenine authors

agree n believinghat the line of investigationwhichphilosophymust follow, or in which it may be expectedto make mostimportantcontributions o the intellectual ife of man, is thatwhichwasopenedupbyKant,andforthesuccessfulprosecutionof which no one has done so muchas Hegel[Sethand Haldane,1883:2].

Thus Green and his followers at Oxford solidified and extendedthe achievement of James Hutchison Stirling (the author of TheSecret of Hegel [1865], the first complex Britishaccount of post-Kantian German idealism) at almost exactly the same time asHarrisand his Journal of Speculative Philosophy were perform-ing a similar task for American philosophy.Second, Oxford idealism came to be clearly associated with aform of social philosophy well toward the liberal pole of thepolitical spectrum. Green, again, was the pioneer, as his workwith the Oxford School Board and Town Council, on the RoyalCommission on Endowed Schools of 1865-1866,his lobbies forreform legislation, and his association with figures such as JohnBright inspired a generation of academic involvement in politics(Harvie, 1976).On certainissues, such as thriftand publiccharity,as well as the authority of the State, Bosanquet'sviews hardenedin comparison with Green's, but he too, in association with theCharity Organization Society and other London-based groups,demonstrated a distinct class-consciousness and concern for the

underprivileged (Bosanquet, 1893: v-vi; 1919: 178, 296-298).Their influence can be traced through a broad section of theircontemporaries, producing such derivative works as Ritchie'sPrinciplesof StateInterference 1891)and Muirhead'sTheServiceof the State (1908). In this direction, however, Bradleymust beacknowledged a dissenter. An out-and-out Tory, he despisedliberalismand cast his idealism more in the mould of Carlyle,but,unlike other leading idealists, left no systematic comment on

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SOCIAL THEORY AND NATIONAL CULTUREsocial or political affairs,and hence can be counted an anomaly inthis as in other aspects of his personal life (Wollheim, 1959: 13-14). In general, absolute idealism contributed to a characteristicstyle of British philosophical activity exactly contemporary tothat of Harris and the St. Louis Hegelians, and employing asimilar epistemology to combat "erroneous" endencies in philo-sophy, religion, and science.

IVBriefly, the American and Britishschools substantially agreedon several crucialtenets, directly dependenton Hegel'sresolutionof problems left by Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. First, they allfound a core value in the concept of individuality or "self-activity"; where the actions of individuals are free and morallyresponsible in so far as they are self-prescribedor rational, andpersonal fulfillment is found within the system of inner relationsthat constitutes the Absolute. Second, building on this insight,an essentially social base was constructedfor morality (followingHegel's Sittlichkeit), where genuine, free personality is achievedonly in recognition of the equal individualityof others and of theethical requirementsof an organic community. Finally, religioustruth (more precisely, the truths of Christiantheism) was seen asthe guardian and guarantor of these freedoms, in at least threesenses; in its symbolic representationof the Absolute, historicalalliance with the rise of individual freedom, and provision of auniform ethical code.Despite their varying interestin, or graspof, complex logic and

metaphysics (in which Bradley, Bosanquet, and to a lesserextent,Howison, led the way), their leanings toward a monistic (Harris)or pluralist (Howison and Davidson) construction of the universeof free souls, and the variability of their vigor in defendingtraditional Christianity (with only Snider marching toward theideal of a fully syncreticworld religion, based, nonetheless, on theChristian principle of the Trinity), these normative and episte-mological theories representbedrockfor the two schools. Against

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SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORYthe broad reliefof middle and late nineteenth-centuryphilosophi-cal controversy, they clearly mark their expositors as neo-Hegelians firmly opposed to certain other powerful themes incontemporary discourse. The rejectedtheories included not onlythose of the standard opposing "realistic" schools-Locke'sempiricism, Mill's utilitarianism,the "mechanical"and material-ist adaptation of Darwin in the work of Spencerand Lewes-butalso certain primitive, and by their lights, underdevelopedformsof Kantian idealism. The latter encompassed both the Scottishschool of realism (the "intuitionist" adaptation of Locke'spsychology that had become philosophical orthodoxy in Ameri-can colleges) and the development of pragmatism(by PeirceandJames) as one form of idealist reaction to the problem of scienceand religion posed by Darwin (Murphey, 1968).Certain members of both groups correctly identified thesethemes as transatlantic in scope, uniting the western(American)"amateur"group (American academic idealism came later andsurvived less well) and the British academic school in "animmense religious movement"(Harris, 1867: 1). For the partici-pants, as well as several subsequent critics, the adoption ofabsolute idealism, once the American schools had caught on inthe 1880s,was an Anglo-Saxon movement, based on transatlan-tic cooperation. Howison, for example, sharedGreen'shope for aperfecting of the Hegelian system, and held no nationalistic brieffor the origin of the solution:

He [Hegel]haslet us, I ampersuaded,n his Logic,a permanentinheritance,which despitehismetaphysicalabusesof it, anddespiteits sundryslipsandgaps, onlyawaitsthe laboursof some sufficientlypowerful successor to become a complete system of our experien-tial ascent out of inadequateto adequate categories.Onemight yethope that this servicemay yet beperformedforus bythe MasterofBalliol [Edward Caird] or by our own National Commissioner ofEducation [Harris] [Howison, 1901:xxvi; see also Cunningham,1933:vi, and Muirhead, 1931: 13-16].There was, however, another task besides the generation ofclear exposition of idealist doctrine. Correct knowledge deter-

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SOCIAL THEORY AND NATIONAL CULTUREmines correct action, and the two groups were equally concernedto prescribe social and institutional forms and functions thatwould assist in the realization of the Absolute. Despite thisidentity of epistemological premises and abstract normativegoals, the differing conditions of two contemporary nationalcultures resulted in dramatically dissimilar contents for thiscomponent of their social theories-the policy prescriptions. Ishall now try to demonstrate this divergence, using as examplesthe two leaders and their views on education.

VHarris, once he had established his somewhat dogmaticphilosophical base, made a career out of the establishment andprescription of a "course of study for culture"or "thetraining ofthe individual for social institutions" (Harris, 1898c: 148, 1905:

18). His educational programwas built on an unlimited belief inprogress. Against the claims of the "socialists"(a camp in whichhe located a number of quite disparate theorists, from Marxthrough Henry GeorgeandJane Addams to EdwardBellamy),heasserted that industryand technology underthe capitalist systemcould so far elevate man's material condition that 99% of thepopulation "would find ample employment in the higherorderofemployments, which provide means for luxury, protection andculture"(Harris, 1887, 1889, 1897, 1898b: 236).Against the backdrop of this process of universal socialelevation, it was the task of the school (an intermediarybetweenthe family and civil society in the Hegelianscheme of institutions)to educate the individual into correct internal consciousness, inpreparationfor the actualizationof thatconsciousnessinexternal,institutional life. This was to be achieved both by appealingto theself-activity of the individual soul (here the Hegelians crossedswords violently with the American Herbartianmovement, andits denial of the individual capacity to make genuinely indepen-dent moral choices), and by developing appreciation of the truenature of human intercommunication (Wesley, 1957: 185-192).

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SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORYHarris's model curriculum demonstrated this twin purpcee.The five branchesof study, the five"windowson the world" basedin arithmetic, geography, history, grammar, and literature (thefirst two directedtoward Nature in its "inorganic"and "organic"phases, and the last three comprising the study of Man in hisphases of "intellect,""will,"and "sensibility")were to be repli-cated at all levels, from kindergarten o university (Harris, 1898a:340). In comparison, "industrial education" was a very lowpriority. Specialized education, in fact, was seen as a responsibil-

ity of civil society, outside the school (Harris, 1886).In the context of a heterogeneous religious population,specifically religious instruction was also excluded. "Moral"education, in the sense of the inculcation of correct social andethical habits, was seen as a legitimatefunction of pedagogy, butHarris, in contrast to Green, did not believe in the possibility ofnonsectarian religious instruction and ruled against what hetermed the "usurpation"of the prerogative of the church (seeMcCluskey, 1958:99-176; Harris, 1881).These, then, were the practicallines along which Harris set outto reconstruct and expand the school system, firstin St. Louis andthen nationally. The task involved a number of far-reachingdevelopments, including the importation and popularization ofthe kindergarten (together with the educational philosophies ofpioneers like Froebel and Rosenkranz),thedesignof anintegratedcurriculum(to which Harriscontributedbywritinga considerablevolume of materialhimself),the universaladoption of thegradingsystem, and a more sophisticated and comprehensivetraining ofteachers (see Kinzer, 1940; Butts and Cremin, 1953: 293-458;Wesley, 1957: 182-293;Cremin, 1961:14-21;Troen, 1975:48, 138,159-166).During the period of initial expansion of the modernAmericanschool system, it was Harris'sview that constituted the orthodoxy.This view, of the conservative,retentive role of school learninginemancipating the child from his isolation in the family throughself-estrangement and appreciation of the wisdom of a socialtradition, was not only an educational method but also part of ageneral theory of society. Flanking Harris'sanalysis of the school

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SOCIAL THEORY AND NATIONAL CULTUREwere views of the family, civil society, and the church,extendingthe idea of self-activityinto conservativepolicies of individualism,self-help, capitalistconsolidation, and imperialism (see Leidecker,1935).

VIGreen, unlike Harris, was only indirectly and intermittently

involved in the administration of elementary and secondaryeducation. His main preoccupation was with professional philo-sophy and the moraltrainingof a generationof potential nationalleaders. Nevertheless, he was intimately involved in late nine-teenth-century reform of both the universities and the schools,and saw education as a central vehicle for his social philosophy ingeneral.Green's work with the Royal Commission and the OxfordSchool Board, together with a number of surviving publiclectures, gives us a clearpicture of his aspirationsfor the nationaleducational system (see Taunton Commission, 1868,Vol. 1:659-661, and Vol. 8; Green, 1906-1908, Vol. 3: 387-412, 456-476;Gordon and White, 1979: 69-88). Essentially he saw a gradedhierarchy of schools and curriculum (as recommended by theCommission but not adequately provided for by the ensuingParliamentaryAct) as serving the cause of universal literacy, thespecial needs of particularclasses (like the middle-class require-ment of instruction in commercial skills), and a meritocraticscheme of promotion for the best and the brightest. Such astructure would mitigate the class specificity of its predecessors,and leaven each group of university graduates with representa-tives of interestsotherthanthe clerical and landed aristocracy.Atthe same time he participated vigorously in the solicitation ofendowments, the removal of residence requirements, and othermeasures to make the University itself more accessible.Among the obstacles to large-scale reconstruction of both theschool system and curriculumin nineteenth-centuryBritain wasthe controlling interest of the church. Given the hold of the three

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"denominations" on the educational system (particularly theirmaintenance of all but five of the teacher training colleges in thecountry in 1878),Greencompromisedon the question of freedomof conscience in moral education. He considered that theprinciple of nonsectarian Christianmoral education, in conjunc-tion with the "time-table"conscience clause (allowing parentstowithdraw their children from periods of specifically doctrinalinstruction), was at least potentially viable, once properlyoverseen by the School Boards (Green, 1906-1908, Vol. 3: 430,439-441). Meanwhile, he hoped for the kind of secular develop-ment of institutions that would allow the dissenter (the noncon-formist, in several respects his model for the virtuous citizen) theright of unhampered participation.Combining these views of Green with his theories of legalcompetence (as outlined in the Principles of Political Obligation),a paradigm can be established for his theory of individual andcollective responsibilities. The highest normative value is clearlyplaced on individual moral improvement through service andpersonalreligiouscommitment. The essential conditions for these"positive freedoms" can only be guaranteed, however, throughlegislation and other collective action designedto enact minimumstandards for equal opportunity (Green, 1906-1908,Vol. 2: 335-553). Although, for example, propertyis an expression of will, itis not an absolute right compared with those of moral self-improvement. Green advocated no fundamental social engineer-ing; for example, he did not favour the disestablishment of theChurch or immediate redistributionof wealth, and he approvedthe existing structureof the Poor Law as an appropriateconduitfor charitablegiving. But hedid placehimselffirmlyin the radicalwing of the Liberal party as well as the Evangelical tradition ofphilanthropyand humanitarianismthat he hadinheritedfrom hisfamily. Thus he became a supporterof the "ManchesterSchool"against the more cautious Gladstone, and an advocate of socialequality over absolute freedom of contract, of national recon-struction over imperialadventure,of temperance legislation overa traditional interpretationof individual freedom, and tolerance

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SOCIAL THEORY AND NATIONAL CULTUREfor the nonconformist over a traditional theory of ecclesiasticalauthority (Richter, 1964: 19, 269, 285).

VIIAs a more lengthy analysis would reveal, Harris, Green, andtheir respective circles held almost antithetical views on thenature of social and economic classes, the utility of publiccharity,

the extent of the state's authority in social regulation, and theneeds of the organized church. For the Americangroup, as repre-sented by Harris, perceptions of a heterogeneous, polyglot,rapidly expanding society determined a conservative defense ofthe values of individualismand self-help. For Green, Bosanquet,and a large section of their followers (if not for Bradley),a socialand political culture based on traditional class authority, theestablished church, and a demonstrably inadequatesocial philo-sophy of laissez-faire necessitated a different series of prescrip-tions. These included some elements of radical governmentintervention and a view of national leadership that took intoaccount the realities of social stratification (see Watson, 1975:116-216).I have summarized herethe divergencethrough an assessmentof the relative educational schemes of the two leaders, on theassumption that the prescribed role of the school and theuniversity, the agencies of socialization andtechnical instruction,provides a major clue about the character of any scheme based,like the social theory of absolute idealism, on organicallyrelatedinstitutions. Harrisand the St. Louis Hegelians, as Ihavetried todemonstrate, were committed to a vision of unlimited socialprogress, dependent on the values of individualism. This visiondetermined a uniform curriculum and school system, the com-plete separation of church and state, and confidence in theuntrammeled capitalist mode of production. Green and theOxford Idealists, operating within a more explicit class structureand under the traditional authority of the established church,

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SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORYwere more inclined to promote collectivist, gradualist, andpiecemeal solutions to social problems.My suggestion is that the key to this independent developmentcan be found in reaction to the immediate social, political, andeconomic environment perceived by the two groups in theirrespective national societies; in short, to the salient features ofculture. My claim is that the St. Louis Hegelians and OxfordIdealists shared the absolute idealism of Hegelian epistemologyand derivedfrom it several important normativegoals, including"individuality," "social morality," and "Christian theism." Ifurther contend that the impact on these abstractnormative ideasof their empirical perceptions of how society works motivatedradically different types of policy prescription for each of thenational societies. More precisely, I have used a number offeatures of the national culture-the perception of modes ofsocial progress, the relevant units of social analysis, and therelative priority of social programs-as an explanation of thedifferent orientation and content of the two policy theories:classically individualist in America, guardedly collectivist inGreat Britain.

Finally, I suggest that the juxtaposition of a shared episte-mology leading to a shared set of abstract ideals, but differenttypes of social and political prescriptionin two differentnationalcontexts, justifies two further hypotheses about the internalstructure of social theory and the effect of empirical uponnormative components of that theory:

(1) that the separateevidence of each national school's agreeingon a"technical" philosophy (the idealist epistemology) and its pre-scriptive social consequences, implies in this case a causal flowfrom "technical"to "social"philosophy and the dependence ofchoice of a policy orientation upon the structure and content ofthe entire social theory;(2) that the national difference in policy theory is motivated by eachgroup's shared empirical perception of the nature of the socialand political environment, i.e., that empiricaltheory can modify

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SOCIAL THEORY AND NATIONAL CULTUREnormative heoryto the extent of requiring ntitheticalpolicytheoryin differentcontemporaryultures.

But this is as far as the analytical hypotheses can be pushed.The experiment is limited in that it is restricted to two groups,almost exactly contemporaneous, and sharinga languagethat setbounds of philosophical and political discourse (Murphey, 1973:139). Similarly, the choice of relatively sophisticated thinkersmakes generalizationabout the activity of social theorizingat thepopular level impossible, and keeps alive the possibility that mycategories for the components of social theory areself-confirmingin this case and not generally applicable. Such caveats should not,however, deter us from extending the range of comparativestudies to include the history of sophisticated ideas.

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BOSANQUET, H. (1924) Bernard Bosanquet: A Short Account of his Life. New York:Macmillan.BROKMEYER, H. C. (1910) A Mechanic's Diary. Washington, DC: E. C. Brokmeyer.BUCKHAM, J. and G. STRATTON (1934) George Holmes Howison, Philosopher and

Teacher:A Selection from his Writingswith a BiographicalSketch. Berkeley:Univ. ofCalifornia Press.BUTTS, R. F. and L. A. CREMIN (1953) A History of Education in American Culture.New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.COLLINI, S. (1976) "Hobhouse, Bosanquet and the state: philosophical idealism and

political argument in England 1880-1918."Past and Present 72 (August): 86-111.CREMIN, L. A. (1961) The Transformation of the School: Progressivismand AmericanEducation, 1867-1957. New York: Knopf.CUNNINGHAM, G. W. (1933) The IdealisticArgument in Recent Britishand American

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FORBES, C. (1930-1931)"TheSt. Louis school of thought." Missouri Historical Rev. 25and 26: 68-77, 83-101, 289-305, 461-473, 609-622.FREEDEN, M. (1978) The New Liberalism:An Ideology of Social Reform. Oxford:Clar-endon.GOETZMANN, W. H. (1973) The American Hegelians: An Intellectual Episode in theHistory of Western America. New York: Knopf.GORDON, P. and J. WHITE (1979) Philosophers as Educational Reformers:The Influ-ence of Idealismon BritishEducational Thought and Practice. London: Routledge &Kegan Paul.GREEN, T. H. (1969) Works of Thomas Hill Green (R. L. Nettleship, ed.). New York:Kraus. (Originally published 1906-1908;in 3 vols.)--- (1969) Prolegomena to Ethics. New York: Kraus. (Originally published 1906)HARRIS, W. T. (1867) "Editor's introduction." J. of Speculative Philosophy 1: 1-2.--- (1881) "Thechurch, the state and the school." North Amer. Rev. 133(September):215-227.--- (1886) "Industrialeducation in the common schools." Education6 (June):607-611.--- ((1887) "Henry George's mistake about land." Forum 3 (July): 435-442.---( (1889) "EdwardBellamy'svision." Forum 8 (October): 199-208.--- ((1890)Hegel's Logic: A Book on the Genesisof Categoriesof the Mind. Chicago:S. C. Griggs.---- (1897) "Statisticsversus socialism." Forum 14 (October): 186-199.---- (1898a) Psychologic Foundations of Education:An Attempt to Show the Genesis

of Higher Faculties of the Mind. New York: Appleton Century Crofts.---- (1898b) "Is there work enough for all?" Forum 25 (April): 224-236.---( (1898c) "The use of higher education." Educ. Rev. 16 (September): 147-161.- (1905) "Social culture as the form of education and religion." Educ. Rev. 29(January): 18-37.HARVIE, C. (1976) The Lights of Liberalism:University Liberalsand the Challenge ofDemocracy, 1860-1886. London: Allen Lane.HOWISON, G. H. (1901) The Limits of Evolution and OtherEssaysIllustrating he Meta-physical Theory of Personal Idealism. New York: Macmillan.KINZER, J. R. (1940) A Study of the Educational Philosophy of WilliamTorrey Harris,with Referenceto the Education of Teachers. Nashville: George Peabody College forTeachers.

KNIGHT, W. (1907) Memorials of Thomas Davidson, the WanderingScholar. Boston:Xerox.KUKLICK, B. (1972) Josiah Royce: An Intellectual Biography. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.--- (1977) The Rise of American Philosophy: Cambridge,Massachusetts, 1860-1930.New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.LEIDECKER, K. F. (1935) "Harris' heory of cultureand civilization."Int. Educ. Rev. 4:266-278.--- (1946) Yankee Teacher: The Life of WilliamTorrey Harris.New York: Philoso-phical Library.McCLUSKEY, N. G. (1958) Public Schools and Moral Education: The Influence ofHorace Mann, William Torrey Harris and John Dewey. New York: Doubleday.

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MOORE, G. E. (1903) "The refutation of idealism." Mind new series 12:433-453.MOORE, J. R. (1979) The Post-Darwinian Controversies: A Study of the ProtestantStruggle to Come to Terms with Darwin in Great Britain and America, 1870-1900.

Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge Univ. Press.MUIRHEAD, J. H. (1908) The Service of the State: Four Lectureson the Political Teach-ing of T. H. Green. London: John Murray.--- (1931) The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy: Studies in the Historyof Idealism in England and America. London.MURPHEY, M. G. (1968) "Kant'schildren:the Cambridgepragmatists."Transactionsofthe Charles S. Peirce Society 4: 3-33.--- (1973) Our Knowledge of the Historical Past. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.POCHMANN, A. (1957) German Culture in America: Philosophical and Literary In-fluences. Madison, WI: Univ. of Wisconsin Press.

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Marquette Hegel Symposium, The Hague, 1970.RITCHIE, D. G. (1891) Principles of State Interference: Four Essays on the PoliticalPhilosophy of HerbertSpencer, J. S. Mill and T. H. Green. London: Swan, Sonnen-schein.

ROYCE, J. (1885) The Religious Aspect of Philosophy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.RUSSELL, B.A.W. (1903) The Principlesof Mathematics.Cambridge:CambridgeUniv.Press.SCHNEIDER, H. W. (1963) A History of American Philosophy. New York: ColumbiaUniv. Press.SCHUYLER, W. (1904) "Germanphilosophy in St. Louis." Bull. of Washington Univ.Assn. 2 (April): 62-84.SETH, A. and R. B. HALDANE (eds.) (1883) Essaysin Philosophical Criticism.London:Longman.SNIDER, D. J. (1910) A Writer of Books in his Genesis. St. Louis: Sigma.--- (1920) The St. Louis Movement in Philosophy, Literature, Education and Psy-

chology, with Chapters of Autobiography. St. Louis: Sigma.STIRLING, J. H. (1865) The Secret of Hegel: Beingthe Hegelian System in Origin,Prin-ciple, Form and Matter. New York: Macmillan.Taunton Commission (1868) (Royal Commission on the Endowed Schools) Reportof theCommissioners.

TROEN, S. K. (1975) The Public and the Schools: Shaping the St. Louis System, 1838-1920. Columbia, MO: Univ. of Missouri Press.WATSON, D. J. (1975) "Idealismand social theory: a comparative study of British andAmerican adaptations of Hegel, 1860-1914."Ph.D. dissertation, University of Penn-sylvania.

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274 SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY--- (1980) "Theneo-Hegelian tradition in America."J. of Amer. Studies 14(August).WESLEY, E. B. (1957) NEA, The First Hundred Years:The Building of the TeachingProfession. New York: D. C. Heath.WOLLHEIM, R. (1959) F. H. Bradley. London: Penguin.

David Watson s PrincipalLecturer n Humanitiesat Creweand Alsager Collegeof HigherEducation, Cheshire, England. He has published articles on the histort of American andBritish ideas in several journals, including the Journal of American Studies, CrossCurrents, Contexts and Connections, and the Times Higher Education Supplement.

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