SOCIOLOGICAL RELATIVISM: ITS NATURE,

DEVELOPMENT AND DIRECTIONS

by

JIMMIE M. WEBB, B.A.

A THESIS

IN

SOCIOLOGY

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillraent of the Requirements for

the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS r\ V.

August, 1973

.0. TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF SOCIOLOGICAL

RELATIVISM 6

Bolton's Typology 7

Perspectives on the Limits of Relativism in Sociology 12

III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGICAL

RELATIVISM 19

Introduction 19

Cultured Relativism 20

The Sociology of Knowledge 35

Symbolic Interactionism 48

IV. SOCIOLOGICAL RELATIVISM AND CURRENT

DIRECTIONS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 62

The Phenomenological Approach 62

The Comparative Approach 67

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 77

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 80

ii

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Relativistic perspectives have been basic to socio-

logical endeavor since the founding of the discipline.

Indeed, certain varieties of relativism are fundamental to

the philosophy of science upon which the discipline of

sociology is based. However, concommitant with the growth

of the discipline of sociology has been a growth in rela-

tivism. And, while sociology has certainly not been the

only "catalyst** involved in the growth of relativism during

the present century, it has contributed to the development

of a particular type of relativism which has been viewed

as threatening, at times, to undermine the philosophical

underpinnings upon which empirical sociology, itself, rests.

One writer has labeled this type "sociological relativism'*

(Bolton, 1958) , even though he points out that the basic

perspectives of sociological relativism pre-date the devel-

oproent of sociology as a social science discipline, and

derive a good deal of reinforcement from endeavors which

are not always considered to be within the boundauries of

the discipline of sociology. Sociological relativism in

its extreme form, has created something of a conceptual

dilemma in sociology which has not yet been resolved (see

1

2

page 4). The nature, development, and directional headings

of sociological relativism provide the focus for the ex-

ploratory review of literature which this paper presents.

Relativism comes in many forms and has been vari-

ously defined and analyzed. Even a standard, concise

dictionary definition includes several related perspectives

on the concept, as for example:

la: a theory that knowledge is relative to the limited nature of the mind and the conditions of knowing b: a view that ethical truths depend upon the individuals and groups holding them 2: RELATIVITY defined as 1: the quality or state of being relative 2: the state of being dependent for existence on or determined in nature, value or quality by relation to something else (Webster, 1963:723).

The last of these four perspectives, or more spe-

cifically the second definition of relativity, is one of

the most fundaunentad assumptions in the philosophy of

science. It provides the outlook necessary to the develop-

ment of scientific theory—the conceptualization of certain

types of phenomena as dependent upon or caused by other

types of phenomena. But, the first definition of relativism

listed above has also been basic to scientific thinking, as

a number of philosophers and scientists have pointed out.

Auguste Comte, the "founding father** of sociology, was among

the philosophers holding such a position. Contrasting

scientific, or in his terminology "positive** with meta-

physical knowledge-seeking endeavors, Comte states:

All investigation into the nature of beings, and their first and final causes, must always be ab-

solute; whereas the study of the laws of phenomena must be relative, since it supposes a continuous process of speculation subject to the gradual improvement of observation without the precise reality ever being fully disclosed (Comte, 1896, Vol. 11:213).

Comte laid the foundations for sociology squarely

upon the epistemology and methodology of the natural

science model. And, while as Lewis Coser (1971:5) points

out "Comte's oft repeated insistence that nothing is ab-

solute but the relative lies at the very core of his teach-

ing,** Comte's relativism does not appear to be as thorough-

going as some of the later varieties developing within the

discipline of sociology. For Comte appears, at least, to

have considered some of his own conceptions, particularly

his " law of human progress** or " law of the three stages,**

as êd>solutes. And, Coser (1971) describes Comte's view

of the **major tasks** of sociology as being the development

of explanations of progress and order in society.

According to Coser (1971), Comte's formulation

of the methodology for the new science of society was based

on the observation, experimentation and comparison which

were used in the natural sciences. Comte particularly

emphasized comparison. He viewed compcirison as the chief

scientific method of sociological inquiry, partially, at

least, because he saw historical as well as synchronic

cross-cultural comparisons as allowing a rather complete

view of the stages through which society passes in its

evolutionary development. He also urged that the compar-

ative method serves as a guard against absolutism in the

formulation of sociological concepts.

Comte was not alone among the early sociologists

who emphasized the comparative method as essential to soci-

ological inquiry. Others, including Emile Durkheim (1950)

and Max Weber (1958) '*cooperated'* with Comte in firmly

establishing what Amitai Etzioni and Frederic L. DuBow

(1970) call **the comparative perspective*' as one of the

most basic tools of sociological inquiry. And, as Etzioni

and DuBow (1970:viii) point out, **the comparative perspec-

tive is more than a scientific technique—it provides a

basic intellectual outlook that helps one to overcome the

natursd inclinations to view the world through egocentric

or ethnocentric lenses.** However, they also note that the

compaorative perspective has not only been a **liberating**

perspective in social science, but a •*relativizing** per-

spective as well. And, that **when pushed too far it opens

the door to bottomless relativism. . . •** (Etzioni and

DiiBow 1970:viii).

By **bottomless relativism, ** Etzioni and DuBow refer

to relativism which calls into question the concept of com-

mitroent to any frame of reference. Thus, relativism in

social science can be pushed f ar enough to call into

question commitment to the frame of reference within which

the social sciences operate. In fact, it is the pushing

of the relativistic perspectives (fostered by the comparative

perspective) to an extreme, which threatens to undermine the

empirical foundations of social science, and which this

writer aees as the focus of a conceptucû. dilemma in con-

temporary sociology.

CHAPTER II

THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF SOCIOLOGICAL RELATIVISM

One sociologist, Charles D. Bolton (1958), has

presented an ancú.ysis of the relativism in contemporary

sociology which will be summarized here (as Bolton*s ty-

pology) in order to explicate the focus for this paper's

exploration of the dilemma in sociology with regard to

relativism. Some points of divergence from Bolton's views,

as iraplicit in the writings of other sociologists will be

dealt with in the second section of this chapter (see page

12) in order to make explicit the issue vrtiich this writer

sees as basic to the problem of relativism in sociology and

which Bolton avoids. That issue involves the controversy

over the extent to which the sociologist must keep his

analyses of social phenomena at the level of •*social facts

as things,'* in the Durkheimian sense, or, phrased differ-

ently, the extent to which sociology must include the socio-

psychological dimensions of *'social facts.** For in this

writers view, this issue is involved in attempts to discover

the limits to which **sociological relativism** applies to

understanding human social behavior.

6

Bolton's Typoloqy

In his amalysis of %^at he calls **the theory of

sociological relativism** Charles D. Bolton (1958) presents

a perspective which, while not **bottomless relativism,**

is in his own words 'an extreme position which might êdso

be referred to as sociological determinism'* (Bolton, 1958:

15), a position which he notes that many sociologists would

not accept. However, Bolton (1958:11) states: **There is

little use in sociologists trying to escape the onus of

relativism for it is undoubtedly steadily becoming a more

sdl-pervasive aspect of sociological theory.** And, while

he points out that sociological relativism is only one of

the many varieties which have emerged during the present

century, he asserts that it is a particularly ^ revolutionary**

variety—"perhaps the type which undercuts absolutism most

disillusioningly"(Bolton, 1958:11).

Bolton presents sociological relativism in its

extreme form in order "to make clear the position and to

make possible the inferring of philosophical and ethical

implications from a logical type of idea" (Bolton, 1958:15).

While he admittedly blurs the boundary between erapiric

social science and philosophy, he justifies his doing so by

taking the position that "the real task of sociology in our

tiroe is not the production of techniques and prescriptions

but the task of intellectual clarification" (Bolton, 1958:

8

26). And, even though he does not completely overlook the

empirical evidence upon which many of the sociologicêd

propositions he discusses are based, his êmalysis of the

perspectives of sociological relativism is decidedly pre-

sented more in terms of a philosophical position derived

from sociological concepts than as an empirically derived

theory.

Bolton (1958:13) describes the extreme position of

sociological relativism as holding "that human beings in

each society, and to a much more limited extent in each

well-delineated sub-group, live in a world of their own

creation." He stresses that the basic difference between

sociological relativism and such other varieties as exis-

tentialism and the "relational" perspectives of Gestalt

psychology is that the creation of reality it postulates is

a decidedly collective or social creation. Bolton urges

that sociological relativisra does not suggest anything other

than sensory experience as the "raw material" from which

human reality is constructed. However, from the perspective

of sociologicaú. relativism, "a selective transformation

and organization of the sensations of experience" (Bolton,

1958:13) takes place within the individuals making up each

society and/or sub-group which gives that society and/or

sub-group its own "peculiar" perspective on reality.

According to Bolton (1958:13), "sociological rela-

tivism applies to every area of human experience and be-

havior" and definitely implies that the personality of the

individual is "determined" by the social context within

which it develops.

The motives, emotions, sentiments, mentsd per-spectives and attitudes of the individual are shaped in the same process which creates and maintains objective social worlds. Of course the biopsychological potentialities must be present, but these potentials acquire their specific form in the social process (Bolton, 1958:13).

This position, Bolton asserts, is not qualified by the

recognition that certain socio-psychologically universal

characteristics exist. Rather, in his view, these uni-

versals do not imply that individuals are "in some way

inherently alike," but rather that "the universal forms

of social interaction . . . appear to arise from the func-

tional requirements of social organization" (Bolton, 1958:

13).

As stated earlier, Bolton's reason for presenting

sociological relativism in its extrerae form, is to draw

out the philosophical and ethical implications of such a

position. In this regard, his basic contention, notwith-

standing the criticisms of "both conservatives and lib-

erals" (Bolton, 1958:11) to the contrary, is that rather

than undermining the basis of scientific activity and the

quest for ethical truths, sociological relativism enhsuices

the possibility of creating scientifically valid knowledge

and "humane" ethics. For Bolton sees sociological rela-

tivism as having the potential "to free man from his greatest

w W

10

delusion, the cú^solutizing of his own creations" (Bolton,

1958:22).

In the ethical vein^ Bolton urges that relativism

can be accepted as the freedora to create the "significant"

aspects of culture in accordance with the values men want

to achieve. "Of course," Bolton concedes, . . . "men can

create only by virtue of the base built by their predeces-

sors" (Bolton, 1958:24). But, within this framework, he

argues that we can now, because of our knowledge of the

workings of social processes, consciously control the social

processes that produce the meanings raen live by. Bolton

warns, however, that this control "can be the manipulative

power of the few or . . . by and for the raany" (Bolton,

1958:24), depending largely upon whether "the raany" can

develop a philosophy which will allow thera to recognize and

accept their own creativeness "with responsible raotivation"

(Bolton, 1958:24).

Of central concern to this study however, are the

implications which Bolton depicts sociological relativism

as having for scientific endeavor. Again contrary to the

view of the critics of relativisra, Bolton maintains:

• . . relativisra does not question the validity of scientifically checked propositions. Properly understood, scientific propositions are predictions about the relationships or occurences of erapirical events or constructs having erapirical correlates. . . . Sociological relativisra holds only that these events are always interactions between a huraan ob-server and external reality . . . and hence always involve the cultural perspectives of the observer (Bolton, 1958:16).

11

Bolton asserts that even though sociological rela-

tivism denies the possibility that the effects of this

interactive process can ever be entirely factored out, it

neither denies that external reality exists nor that the

observer's experience is "necessarily" misleading. "Socio-

logical relativism holds only that the field of experience

may be sliced up in innumerable ways" (Bolton, 1958:16).

Furthermore, this perspective "in no way denies that the

objects of this interactive experience the human observer

and external reality do not bear determinate and predict-

able relations to one another" (Bolton, 1958:16). For,

Bolton maintains: "The acceptance of the assumption that

nature (including the social process) is orderly underlies

the sociological quest for knowledge as much as it does

any other science" (Bolton, 1958:17). And, Bolton contends

that while sociological relativisra recognizes that there are

"innumerable" socio-culturally ordered ways of experiencing

reality, it does not imply that all of these ways result

in equally "useful" bodies of knowledge about reality.

"Some systeros of units of knowledge seera to permit pre-

dictions of a higher degree of probability than do others"

(Bolton, 1958:17).

Both ethical truths and scientific knowledge are,

in Bolton's view, based on the socio-culturally produced

"meaning orders" of men, and he points out that "the prop-

ositions of sociological relativism refer only to the realm

12

of human meanings" (Bolton, 1958:17). The thrust of these

propositions is that "without exception all huroan roeanings

are relative to soroe socio-cultural frame of reference and

coroe into being in a process which inevitably roakes that

frame of reference one of their dimensions" (Bolton, 1956:

17). And, since there is no possibility of eliminating the

socio-culturally relative diroension, there is no absolute

basis "for choosing aroong conflicting philosophical, re-

ligious, ethical auid scientific systems . . . only in the

scientific reôLlm is there even the pragmatic test of accu-

racy of prediction" (Bolton, 1958:17). Therefore, Bolton

concludes:

. . . no one conceptual scheme can be used as a stsmdard against which to judge others. In our own Western science, the fall of classical physics before the theory of relativity gives stark evi-dence of the thin ice of making an absolute of our own scientific perspectives of the moment. Ironically, opponents of relativisra raay take heart from this very implication of relativisra: raayhap relativisra too will pass away in time (Bolton, 1958:13).

Perspectives on the Liraits of Relativisra in Socioloqy

As pointed out in the beginning of the presentation

of Bolton's analysis of "the theory of sociological rela-

tivism," Bolton's typology, while extreme, is not unbounded

relativisra. There are two major factors that put limits

upon the relativistic perspectives he presents. First,

Bolton's propositions rest, as he states, upon the assumption,

which is basic to the philosophy upon which sociology is

13

founded, that social phenomena are not rêuidom or chaotic

occurences—they are ordered. Second, while Bolton's

analysis of sociologicaO. relativisro emphasizes the "peculi-

arity" of the meaning orders of particular societies and/or

sub-groups, he nevertheless bases his views upon the obvi-

ous assximption that meaning orders are universally present

in huroan societies.

The "peculiarity" of the raeaning orders of societies

is a fundamental ingredient in sociological relativism.

And Bolton, like many other sociologists before hiro, re-

frains froro placing any of his emphasis upon the subjective

side of the roeaning orders guiding human social behavior.

He does this by his contention that the socio-psychological

universals existing among men are based on "the functional

requirements of social organization" (Bolton, 1958:13).

Nevertheless, the problem of relativisra seeras to be insep-

arable from conceptions of the subjective, as well as the

objective, side of the evaluatively charged raeanings which

give order and direction to human social behavior.

Arnold Rose (1956) is araong the contemporcury sociol-

ogists who have strongly criticized sociologists for their

unwillingness to delve into value-laden meaning orders in

their studies of various aspects of human society. Rose

particularly criticizes American sociologists for their

failure to explicitly recognize the culturally relative

value preroises underlying their own scientific endeavors.

14

He points out that the basis for this "weakness" in Aroerican

sociology derives from a reaction in the earlier part of the

present century to the social reforro bias of the sociology

of the nineteenth century—"a reaction toward a 'pure'

science position** (Rose, 1956:2) which emphasized value-

neutrality in sociological endeavor. However, in Rose's

estimation this reaction pushed value-neutrality to the

extreme. As an example of this extreme Rose states:

• • . the relative prestige of the study of social problems went down in relation to the study of more abstract, seemingly more 'value free' behavior. . . . It now seems eilraost in-conceivable, but even teachers of social prob-lems courses in universities sought to avoid all reference to values (Rose, 1956:3).

More recently, Dennis Wrong (1961) has accused

modern sociologists of presenting an "over-socialized"

view of man as a part of their reaction against "the partial

views of man" (Wrong, 1961:128) contained in many of the

social philosophies of the nineteenth century. Wrong

suggests that the "over-socialized" conception has persisted

in modern sociology as a result of sociologists' being

"taught to foreswear psychology, and to look with sus-

picion on what are called 'psychological variables'"

(Wrong, 1961:131). He contends that certain "psychological

variables" must be considered, because they are assumed by

sociologists in the context of their views of man. Wrong

states:

I do not see how, at the level of theory, sociol-ogists can fail to make assumptions about human

15

nature. If our assumptions are left implicit, we will inevitably presuppose a view that is tailor-made to suit our special needs. . . . (Wrong, 1961:131).

However, many sociologists have attempted to define

the "boundaries" of sociology broadly enough to include the

study of such "psychological" variables as subjective mean-

ings and values. Max Weber perhaps began this tradition,

and he described sociology in the following raanner.

Sociology • . • is a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action • • • In "action" is included all human behavior when and in so far as the acting individual attaches roeaning to it^ • • • Action is social in so fêu: as, by virtue of the subjective raeaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course (Weber, 1969: 248) •

W. I. Thomas (1966) was another "ecurly" sociologist

who emphasized both the overt and subjective sides of humaui

behavior as being cruciêú. to the development of knowledge

about the workings of society. Thomas maintains that "two

kinds of data" should be utilized in the construction of

sociological, or in his terminology, "social" theory,

"namely the objective cultural elements of social life and

the subjective characteristics of the members of the social

group" (Thomas, 1966:258). Thoraas called these two kinds

of data "social values" and "attitudes" respectively, and

emphasized that they should be treated as correlated, since

in his view attitudes were the individual "counterparts"

of social values.

16

In a similar vein, the contemporary theorist,

Talcott Parsons (1961) contends that cultural "value orien-

tations" operate to produce motivational systeras in the

individual members of societies which are "isomorphic" to

the social systems in which they participate. According to

Parsons, as an individual is socialized, he internalizes

the value orientations of his culture. Those same value

orientations cú.so have a constraining effect upon the

social system through the process of institutionalization.

It is Parsons' type of relativism however, emphasizing

the close relationship between the individual's motivational

system and the social structure, which Wrong (1961) partic-

ularly criticized as presenting an "oversocialized" con-

ception of man, and which Bolton presents as fundaraental

to sociological relativisra.

In his treatraent of the problems in contemporary

sociological theory and methodology, Derek L. Phillips (1971)

asserts that the meaning of social action has become a cen-

tral concern in recent years. Like Wrong (1961), Phillips

urges that psychological factors are crucial in the develop-

ment of knowledge of the meaning of social action. Phillips

also emphasizes the iraportance of the huraan nature question

to sociology when he states:

Whether they adrait it or not, sociologists— like all other men—view the behavior of them-selves cuid others in terms of certain assumptions about man, about society and cúsout men in inter-action . . . but little of what we think we know about the nature of man and society is based upon

17

empirical research (Phillips, 1971:52-53).

Phillips points out that this lack of empirical

knowledge poses a dual and "fundamental" problem for sociol-

ogists. "What we know about social behavior is dependent

on our methods for studying it while our raethods for study-

ing it are dependent on what we know about social behavior"

(Phillips, 1971:53). Like Wrong (1961) and Rose (1956),

Phillips criticizes sociologists for leaving iraplicit their

views about man "both in regêurd to his nature and the way

he operates as a social actor" (Phillips, 1971:53). And,

again like Wrong, Phillips asserts that "while there is a

good deal of concern with such concepts as 'significant

others,' 'reference groups,' 'values' and 'social norms'"

(Phillips 1971:55), answering the question of "how" these

exert influence on human behavior is hindered, in Phillips

view, by the avoidance of such psychological concepts as

"needs," "motives" and "drives" in sociological explanations

of social behavior.

The unresolved human nature question has been basic

to the development of extreme relativism in sociology. How-

ever, Etzioni and DuBow (1970) contend that the relativism

evidenced in social science, while fostered by "the compar-

ative perspective" is being curbed by developments in

comparative research which relate to the question of human

nature^ They particularly note that relativism has been

"nourished" by the view of human nature as extremely plastic.

18

a view which was encouraged by the emphasis, upon cultural

variability during the first half of the present century«

Since World War II however, Etzioni and DuBow point out:

• • • there developed an increased emphasis upon the limits of these variations and a rising rec-ognition of the universal facets of the hviraan and social condition^ • • • More recently there has been a growing recognition—especially in anthro-pology and, to a lesser extent, in sociology—of a fundaraental huracUi nature \^ich seeras to reappear with considerable regularity and specificity in a universe of societies (Etzioni and DuBow, 1970:3)•

Even with the liraits to variations in "the human

and social condition" suggested by Etzioni and DuBow, soci-

ological relativism appears to be broad in scope aná ap-

plicable to all manifestations of human and social behavior

including, as Rose (1956) and other writers have noted,

to the behavior of social scientists^ The effects of, and

the liraits upon the view that raan relates to his world in

a socio-culturally conditioned raanner will be dealt with in

Chapter IV. However, this writer sees a review of the

literature with regard to the development of sociological

relativism as a necessary prerequisite to an analysis of

its "effects" and "limits": Chapter III presents such a

review.

CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGICAL RELATIVISM

Introduction

Undoubtedly there are many philosophical precursors

to what is being referred to here as sociological relativism.

Some of these will be dealt with in the upcoraing section

dealing with the sociology of knowledge (see page 35),

since this specialized branch of sociology has its roots

nore fundaraentally in social philosophy than in erapiric

social science. However, it is the "objective," "scientific"

quality of sociological relativism that gives it its par-

ticularly "revolutionary" potency. For this reason the

analysis of its development, here presented, deêLls mainly

with endeavors within the realra of social science which

have encouraged the growth of relativism in sociology.

Bolton (1958:13) states, and this writer concurs

with his assertion, that:

The emerging picture of sociological relativism is a growing intertwining of these three lines of thought: cultural relativism, the sociology of knowledge and symbolic interactionist theory.

The raajor "connecting link" which serves to integrate these

three lines of thought has been—albeit their different

approaches to the subject—their concern with the meauiing

19

20

orders which give direction to human social behavior^ There-

fore, this chapter presents a survey of the major tenets

which, developing within these intellectual streams, appear

to have converged to produce sociological relativism as

Bolton presents it^ Particular attention is given to the

role of "the comparative perspective" in the development of

each of these lines of thought, following the assertion of

Etzioni and DuBow (1970) that this perspective has had a

tendency to "relativize" the viewpoints of social scientists,

Cultural Relativisra

One of the major themes in both conteraporary soci-

ology and anthropology is the concept of cultural rela-

tivisra* While certain aspects of this concept can be seen

in the writings of a nuraber of nineteenth century sociolo-

gists as well as anthropologists, several writers who have

dealt with this concept, including Redfield (1967) and

Bolton (1958) point out that the clearest stateraent of the

concept is that of the contemporary anthropologist Melville

J, Herskovits^ Herskovits (1972:15) briefly summarizes the

basic principle of cultural relativism in the following man-

ner: "Judgeraents êore based on experience, and experience is

interpreted by each individual in terms of his own encultur-

ation^"

Herskovits (1972) points out that many writers deal-

ing with the concept of cultural relativism urge that the

perspectives of cultural relativism are not new, but rather,

21

that they can be traced back to the Sophists of ancient

Greece or, at the very least, to the English philosopher

David Hume^ However, Herskovits roaintains that the similar-

ities between these early varieties of relativism and that

variety which is characteristic of twentieth century cul-

tural relativists is misleading,

What is new is the massive documentation that derives from the great body of comparative data bearing on variations in custom, and the implications of these data when they are con-sidered in the light of older theories (Herskovits, 1972:51)•

He also notes that most of the writers who have

criticized the concept of cultural relativism including

anthropologist Redfield (1967), tend to restrict cultural

relativism to "morals," "ethics" and "values." In

Herskovits (1972:52) view, this tendency "has the unfor-

tunate result of throwing the problera at issue out of

focus, since it undercuts the enculturative factor in

cultural learning in general." Herskovits points out that

what is notably raissing from many conceptions of cultural

relativism is the fact that the concept applies to the cogni-

tive as well as the normative aspects of the process of

enculturation^ The non-ethical dimensions of cultural

relativism (as well as the sociology of knowledge aná sym-

bolic interactionist theory), stressing that human beings

interpret "reality"—what "is" as well as what "ought to

be"—in a socio-culturally biased manner, are in fact the

most significant in terms of the implications relativism

22

has for "scientific" activity.

Herskovits (1972:51) further points out that neither

did this perspective "leap full-blown from the head of an

anthropological parent" nor did it develop overnight in

anthropology* Rather, it developed through the gradual

accumulation of data relating to the diversity of human

behavior in different cultural settings. And, while there

were numerous predecessors %^o docuraented and attempted to

explain this diversity of behavior, anthropology, as a

systeraatic social science discipline, did not corae into

existence until the nineteenth centiiry.

Lowell D. Holraes (1965) points out that during the

earlier stages of its developraent, anthropology developed

a number of divergent theoretical approaches to the study

of culture. Certain forms of cultural relativisra can be

traced frora the earliest of these "schools of thought" up

to Herskovits "full-blown" cultural relativism. Of the

various theoretical approaches, the early "social and cul-

tural evolutionist," "historical-diffusionist." and "func-

tionalist" thinkers, along with their "counterparts" in

sociology, havé all made contributions to the growth of

relativism, through their endeavors to explain the evi-

dence availsible to them.

Social and cultural evolutionary thinkers were prom-

inent in both the disciplines of anthropology and sociology

during the early years of each discipline. Like Auguste

23

Comte and Herbert Spencer in sociology, Edward B. Tylor and

Henry Morgan in anthropology tended to view the differences

in social and cultural patterns among human societies, as

evidence of their different stages of evolutionary develop-

ment. While Comte (1896, Vol^ 11:307) insisted that "intel-

lectual evolution is the preponderant principle" guiding

humêui progress, Spencer that human societies followed the

same "natural laws" which governed the evolution of physical

organisros (Coser, 1971:96-97), and Tylor auid Morgan that

technological development was the principle mechanisro under-

lying cultural growth (Timascheff, 1967:51-52), all shared

the belief that social and cultural development involved a

process of sequential development through certain fixed

stages^ And, despite the differences in their specific theo-

retical formulations, the concepts of social and cultxiral

evolution which they employed irôply that the custoros, values,

beliefs and all other significant aspects of culture are

relative to a society's paurticular stage of development.

While later auithropologists and sociologists re-

jected the specific evolutionary principles set forth by

these eatrly theorists, both disciplines have retained their

concern for analyzing the changes which occur in societies

over tiroe, and numerous theoretical and empirical endeavors

have been raade to discover and explain the processes involved

in social cuid cultural change« Two late nineteenth-early-

twentieth century social scientists, both of whom engaged in

24

empirical research to a much greater extent than earlier

theorists, emphasized the importance of the particular his-

torical development of societies in providing the directions

for social and cultural change. These men, anthropologist

Pranz Boas and sociologist Max Weber, also dealt with cross-

cultural differences in the raeaning of social action in

society^ In this vein, Herskovits (1963) views Boas' work

as laying the psychological groundwork for the coraparative

study of values^ Weber is often credited with doing the

sane for sociology^

Boas was one of the eêurliest anthropologists to

emphasize the interplay between biopsychological and

cultural factors in huraan behavior (Herskovits, 1963)•

In his The Mind of Primitive Man (1938), while he analyzes

the numerous biological variations cunong the "races" of

man, he emphcisizes that differences in the "general status"

of their cultures "as measured by their inventions and

knowledge" (Boas, 1938:23), have not been established as

"racial" differences on the basis of erapirical evidence^

In fact, Boas urges that racial differences do not reflect

differences in the potential for cultural achieveraents.

Rather, he stresses the importêuice the role of geographic

and historical factors, particularly as they influence the

degree of cultural contact and, therefore, the interchange

of cultural elements through these contacts^

Although he undoubtedly contributed to the develop-

25

ment of anthropological theory, Boas emphasized research and

contributed to the development of research methods in several

areas of anthropology including ethnography and linguistics^

He was one of the f irst anthropologists to utilize statis-

tics in his research as well as one of the first to eropha-

size the importance of language in culture, explicitly

recognizing the unconscious aspect of linguistic phenomena

(Krober and Kluckholn, 1963)• While Herskovits notes these

multiple achieveroents of Boas, he particularly stresses the

contribution Boas made in deroonstrating in his studies

"how, in human culture, the plurality of forms represents

an overlay of the unities which exist in the endowments,

needs and aspirations of all men" (Herskovits, 1963:10)•

And he adds that in doing this, Boas "adumbrates what we

have come to call cultural relativism" by emphasizing

"the devotion all peoples have for their particular way

of lif^(Herskovits, 1963:10)^

Like Boas in anthropology, Weber approached his

studies in sociology from an historical perspective^ The

comparative perspective also looms large in Weber's sociol-

ogy^ And, as Tiraascheff (1967:184) points out, "he made

penetrating studies of what we today call culture." His

roost notable "contribution" to cultural relativism lies in

what Coser (1971:217) describes as the "priroairy focus" of

Weber's sociology—"the subjective meanings people attach

to their actions in their mutual orientations within spe-

26

cific social-historical contexts." In his studies of

religion, froro The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of

Capitalism (1958) to his studies of other major religions

of the world, he evidenced a concern not only with the role

of religious values in shaping historical development, but

with relationships existing between religion and other as-

pects of social life, particularly the econoroic aspect.

His work, based on historical and synchonic coroparisons of

data, emphasizes that variations in religious values and

beliefs, like other meaning-orders are related to vari-

ations in other areas of culture^

While Weber's work in the sociology of religion

can be considered, in some respects as an attempt to

demonstrate the relationships among the "parts" of culture,

other social scientists have more explicitly focused upon

the line of endeavor raost commonly referred to as "func-

tionalism" in both sociology and anthropology^ Timascheff

(1967:216) points out that this theoretical appraoch can

be traced back to the "founding fathers" of the discipline

of sociology, but that it "achieved a definite status in

sociology" during the second quarter of the present century,

"under the influence of cultural anthropology." While a

review of the Vcurious functional theories forraulated in

these two disciplines is beyond the scope of this paper,

a summary of the main tenets of certain of the function-

alist theories, as they relate to the developraent of cul-

27

tural and sociological relativism, is in order.

The term "functionêú.isra," itself, both in sociology

and in anthropology has a variety of raeanings, but it has

most frequently been used to designate an suialytical ap-

proach to the study of society and/or culture (depending

on the frame of reference of the theorist utilizing the

approach) which emphasizes the interrelationships araong the

"parts" of society or culture, or with a slightly different

emphasis, the integration of these parts into a functioning

whole^ "Functional analysis" refers to the study of social

and/or cultiiral phenomena as "operations or effects of

specific social structures or systems" (Tiraascheff, 1967:

216-217)• In this regard Tiraascheff (1967:216) notes that

functionalisra "displays conspicuous affinity with some

characteristics of systematic sociology^"

Functional analysis is older in biology, as well as

in cultural anthropology, than it is in sociology^ The bio-

logical conception "that each organ or part of the system

called an orgauiism, performs a function or functions es-

sential for the survival of the organisra or species or both"

(Timascheff, 1967:217) was, however, used in early socio-

logical theory, particularly by Spencer^ However, over-

application of the analogy between biological organisms and

society or culture, that, viewing society or culture "as

distinctive substance or actual superorganisra" (Kroeber and

Kluckholn, 1963:290) has been viewed by a number of social

28

scientists as "reification" of the concepts of culture

and/or society^ Kroeber and Kluckholn (1963:291) point out

that "Kroeber has been flatly charged" with this "error,"

"by Benedict, Boas and Bidney^ ..." The major point made

by this sort of criticisra is that when carried too far, the

functional approach can lead to a too severe separation

of culture frora its huraan "carriers."

Wrong's (1961) criticisra of the "oversocialized"

conception of raan and "over-integrated" view of society in

sociology has a similsu: tone. Wrong does not specificsdly

charge functionalisra with the responsibility for these con-

cepts. He does however point out that his views are in

opposition to those of Talcott Parsons (1937), perhaps the

foremost structural-functionalist theorist in conteraporary

sociology. Wrong's principle objection to these conceptions

of man and society is that they have come about as a result

of sociologists avoidance of psychological variables and

their failure to make explicit their basic assuraptions

concerning human nature.

However, in cultural anthropology, the function-

alist theorists to which Timascheff (1967) points as in-

fluencing the development of functionalism in sociology,

A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Bronislaw Malinowski and Ralph

Linton, emphasize the psychological side of the inter-

relationships between the parts of culture each in a sorae-

what different manner. Radcliffe-Brown (1969), who makes

29

the analogy between organic and social life explicit, and

credits Durkheim as being the first social scientist to

systematically formulate the concept of structure and

function in the study of society, urges that there are

"necessary conditions of existence for human societies"

(Radcliffe-Brown, 1969:624). The social relationships,

which form the structure of society, cure integrated to form

a whole. The custoroary activities, based on the structure

of social relationships, function to maintain the structure,

and the combined activities involved in the social life

reflect the total functioning of the social structure.

With regard to the individual Radcliffe-Brown (1969:629)

states:

The "functionalist" point of view . . . does therefore imply that we have to investigate as thoroughly as possible all aspects of social life, considering them in relation to one another, and that an essential part of the task is the in-vestigation of the individual and the way in which he is moulded or adjusted to the social life.

While Radcliffe-Brown emphasizes the influence of

social factors on personality, Malinowski (1969), like

Boas, emphasizes the interrelationships between cultural

and biopsychological phenoraena. He describes the func-

tioncúL analysis of culture as aiming at explaining anthro-

pological facts at their various levels of development,

de-emphasizing the concepts of the early "evolutionists"

and "historical-diffusionists" as well. These "facts"

consisting of customs, material objects, ideas, beliefs

30

and all other cultural "traits" of a people, are to be

analyzed in terms of the part they play within the inte-

grated culture. But, he urges that functionalism

keeps always in mind the biological basis of huraan civilization, the correlation of culture to human wants, hence to human instincts and emotional dis-positions . . . Psychology is, therefore, indis-pensable for due understanding of culture (Malinowski, 1969:632).

Linton's (1936) functionalisra also has a psycholog-

ical tone, but like Radcliffe-Brown, Linton strongly empha-

sizes the role of culture in shaping the personality of the

individual. While Linton also emphasizes the "rautucú. ad-

justments" between the parts of culture, and applies the

term "integration" to this adjustment, his main emphasis

is on integration as a process—the continual readjust-

ments of existing traits and new eleraents. He also points

out that there are different "degrees" of integration but

that, "presumably there is a point below which it cannot

sink without the paralysis of the culture and the conse-

quent destruction of the society as a functioning unit"

(Linton, 1936:357). Unlike Radcliffe-Brown, Linton opposes

the society-organism anailogy êuid stresses that "culture is

a socio-psychological . . . phenomenon" (Linton, 1936:358)•

In terms of integration he states:

A society, as distinct from the aggregate of individuals which is its physical foundation, is an organization of mutually adapted person-alities. Its integration takes place at the psychological level (Linton, 1936:94)•

Bringing the perspectives of these various theo-

31

retical approaches—evolutionary, historical auid func-

tional—together in their description of cultural rela-

tivism or, in their terrainology, "cultural relativity"

Kroeber and Kluckholn (1963) point out that the focal point

of culturôú. relativity is values^ However, their use of

the terra "values" is broader thsui the meaning that this

term usually connotes^ For, as they point out, in cUialyses

of culture, meanings and values are difficult to keep

sepcurate and are, perhaps, no raore than different aspects

of the same thing^ In other words, Kroeber and Kluckholn

suggest that culturally shared raeanings, or knowledge system:

have an evaluational dimension^ They also point out that

each culture's value system is not unitary in character, but

represents an "'antagonistic' equilibrium between values"

(Kroeber and Kluckholn, 1963:343). With this conception

of value systems in mind, Kroeber and Kluckholn (1963:345)

describe cultural relativity as raeaning

. . . that cultures are differently weighted in their vsdues, hence au:e differently structured, auid differ both in part-functioning and in total-functioning; and that true understanding of cul-tures therefore involves recognition of their particular value systeras.

Kroeber and Kluckholn contend that cultural rela-

tivity deraands that the study of cultures raust reraain idio-

graphic in the sense that there must be ain awaureness that

"every culture is a precipitate of history" (Kroeber and

Kluckholn, 1963:312) and that "a culture described in terms

of its own structure is in itself idiographic rather than

32

nomothetic" (Kroeber and Kluckholn, 1963:345). However,

in their view, while cultural understanding begins with

this premise, the comparative study of cultures is aimed

at understanding cultural development similar to the under-

standing biology has attained regarding the sequentiaa

development of organic forms. And, they point out, "the

'naturaa classification' of plants and aniraals which under-

lies and supplements evolutionary development, is basically

relativistic" (Kroeber and Kluckholn, 1963:345) since

biologists group these orgauiisms by the degree of resem-

blance in their structures which usually corresponds with

their sequential developraent.

Despite the emphasis here upon the theoretical

endeavors which have contributed to the growth of cultural

relativism, it should be pointed out that social as well as

"natural" science, has emphasized the developraent of theory

based on the evidence available about the phenomena being

explained. And, as Herskovits (1972) points out, cultural

relativism like other concepts derived from scientific in-

quiry, has developed in social science as evidence accu-

mulated, in this case, evidence as to the treraendous vari-

aU ility of human behavior. However, the formulation of

scientific theory not only develops out of reseaurch; it

guides research as well.

In this regard, Milton Singer (1961) points out

that much of the research carried out in anthropology

33

during the earlier part of this century was approached,

in part at least, as a result of a conscious reaction on

the paurt of anthropologists to what they considered to be

absolutistic tenets in the psychoanalytic theory of the

day. Singer contends that the "general stauice" toward such

psychoanalytic theories as those conceming dream syro-

bolisro, stages of personaú.ity development, and differences

in male and feraale psychology was: "It's not huraan natiure,

but only our culture" (Singer, 1961:17). Singer illustrates

the cliraate of opinion in anthropology by quoting from the

preface of Margaret Mead's 1939 reissue of her South Seas

studies, as follows:

It was a simple—a very simple—point to which our materiaú.s were organized in the 1920's, merely the documentation over auid over of the f act that human nature is not rigid and unyielding. • • but that it is extraordinarily adaptable • • . We had to present evidence that huraan character is built on a biological base which is capaú le of enormous diversification in terras of social standards (p^ x) (Singer, 1961:16).

That they were successful in achieving the desired

results is evidenced by the increasing recognition of cul-

tural factors as iraportant in all areas of social science

today. The concept "culture," which serves as the central

focus of cultiirakl anthropology, has becorae a reference

point in social science generally, despite the fact that

raany of the raore quantitatively oriented social scientists

have considered rauch of the work carried out in anthro-

pology as being "inconclusive" insofar as establishing

34

"how" cultvure influences behavior. Niles Newton, for

example, states: "Unfortunately most anthropological mate-

rial caui suggest, but it cannot prove a point" (Newton,

1970:75).

Nevertheless, some social scientists have explained

culture as the raain cause of the diversity of human be-

havior. Leslie A. White (1947:688), has stated: "In

consideration of the differences of behavior between

peoples . . . we may regaurd man as a constant, culture as

a variable." Herskovits states this viewpoint even more

pointedly, and labels it cultural relativism.

Differences in huraan behavior . . . that have been revealed by the cross-cultural cultural approach, have led us to a concept technicaJLly called "cultural relativisra." This concept holds that there is absolutely no vadid raoral systera auiy more than there is aui absolutely vaú.id mode of perceiving the natural world. The traditions of a people dictate for them what is right and wrong, how they are to interpret what they see auid feel and hear, and they live according to these iraperatives (Herskovits, 1972:101)•

Thus, as anthropological and sociological research

was Ccurried out, the ac curaulated data pointed more and more

toward a view of'human sociad behavior as relative to the

socio-cultural settings in which it occurs^ With the

anthropological studies of the vauriability of cultural

patterns, and explanations that each culture is uniquely

structured in terms of its raeauiing orders, both in the

norraative and cognitive sense, and therefore unique in its

functioning, principles explaining human sociaÚL behavior

35

seem to be limited to idiographic explanations^ The basic

general principle that seeras applicable to huraan social

behavior from this standpoint, is the principle of cultural

relativism^ And, if indeed this general principle holds,

then the viewpoints and methods of social science must also

be socio-culturally relative raodes of perceiving and con-

ceiving of humaui social behavior^

The Socioloqy of Knowledqe

The basic tenets of the sociology of knowledge aure

along the same lines as those of cultural relativisra^ How-

ever, these two intellectual strearas developed aaong dif-

ferent lines^ The sociology of knowledge, since its "for-

mal" beginnings in the 1920 decade, has been directly con-

cerned with only one aspect of the variability of human

behavior, the variability of cognitive behavior^ And, rather

tham aurising out of "massive scientific documentation" of

this vauriation, it developed out of a philosophical tra-

dition of concern with the problem of validating knowledge^

The sociology of knowledge, as such, came into

existence during the 1920 decade, developing out of the

works of two German social philosophers, Max Scheler auid

Karl Mannheim. Its basic concern has been with the problem

of analyzing the relationship of man's sociad life to his

intellectual life, a concern which dates back in philosophy

for numerous generations. One writer has suggested that

the sociology of knowledge is basically a theory of knowl-

36

edge which places raan's intellectual life squarely within

his social context (Taylor, 1956). Another points out

that even though it has becorae a speciadized field of

sociologicaú. endeavor, it has reraained more philosophicaú.

in its approach thaui sociological (Wolff, 1959 )• Never-

theless, the sociology of knowledge exists today as a

sub-brauich of the discipline of sociology, and it has been

of concern to sociologists in recent years, partially at

least, because of its implications with regard to the

discipline of sociology itself•

Stanley Taylor (1956) suggests that the sociology

of knowledge is basically a theory of knowledge conceptual-

izing knowledge as a product of group life^ Taylor con-

trasts this theoretical conception with what he calls the

"classical" theory of knowledge "common to that series of

theories of knowledge having its origin in the individualism

of Locke and tending to culrainate in the Kantian Critigue

of Pure Reason" (Taylor, 1956:131). He describes the

classical theory of knowledge as detaching the knowing

subject from the social context and yet seeking to vali-

date knowledge from an analysis of the subject. However,

as Mannheim points out, "the subjective unity of the

absolute subject of the Enlightenment . . • is not a con-

crete individual. It is rather a fictitious 'consciousness

in itself'" (Mannheim, 1936:66).

While other writers have sought to trace the

37

origins of the sociology of knowledge back to its remote

historical prototypes, Mannheira (1936) and Taylor (1956)

have viewed Francis Bacon as being one of the earliest

philosophers to express, in a clear and intelligible

form, the relationship between social life auid thought.

According to Taylor, Bacon associated nature with an

ontological reality, and felt that raan was capable of

gaining a dear iraage of that reality through sensory

experience. However, Bacon pointed to a nuraber of obstacles

to gaining an "objective" image of nature which he called

"the idols." Of Bacon's four "idols," "the idols of the

market place," brought about by men in social intercourse,

were the most perverse, particularly as a result of raen's

reliance upon language, substituting words for their

ideas (Taylor, 1956:15-20). Mannheira (1936:62)calls Bacon's

"theory of idola" "a direct anticipation of the socio-

logicail point of view," since Bacon recognized that sociail

life and tradition could be sources of bias in thought.

While Taylor sees a "direct link" between the

philosophy of Bacon, and at a later date, Locke, aná the

revolutionary thought of the Enlightenraent philosophers,

Mauinheim (1936:63) credits Machiavelli with developing the

"intellectual orientation which led directly to the rationaúL

and calculating mode of thought characteristic of the

Enlightenraent." Despite this difference, both Mannheim and

Taylor point to the Enlightenment philosophers as beginning

38

the dissolution of the medieval-Christian view of the world

as an objective reality "existing independently of us in a

fixed and definite form" (Mannheira, 1936:66).

To discuss each of the philosophers who contributed

to the development of "wissenssoziologie" would be an ara-

bitious undertaking, to say the least, and this paper is

less concerned with prototypes to the sociology of knowledge

than with the sociology of knowledge itself. However, two

primary and imraediate antecedents to the sociology of knowl-

edge, Maurxism and Durkhemian sociology, do warrant attention

here because of their more direct influence on the sociology

of knowledge today. Marxism has been credited with giving

the sociology of knowledge its critical or "debunking" motif

as well as with its philosophy of history orientation, v^ile

Durkheimian sociology is viewed as giving it its emphasis on

the relationships between forms of social organization and

forms of thought (Wolff, 1959). However, Coser (1971)

points out that Maurx too, showed a concern for establishing

the relationship between social structures and thought styles,

particularly in terms of the social class positions of the

thinkers in question.

As eaurly as 1847 Marx, in association with Frederich

Engles, made his views explicit with regard to the relation-

ship of thought to the life experiences of the thinker.

Marx and Engels (1947:15) state:

The phantoms formed in the human brain aure • • • necessarily subliraates of the raaterial life

39

process, which is empirically verifiable and Dound to material premises^ Morality, religion metaphysics and all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness thus no longer retain their semblance of independence^ . • . Life is not determined by consciousness but consciousness by life^ '

In 1859, Marx reiterates this view and adds the

social ingredient as a deterraining factor of "conscious-

ness^"

The raode of production of raaterial life con-ditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general^ It is not the con-sciousness of men that determines their being, but • . . their social being that determines their consciousness (Marx and Engels, 1951:328).

With regard to the sociology of knowledge, Franz

Adler (1957) points out that Marxist thinkers can be dis-

tinguished as either positivist" or "anti-positivist" in

orientation. The positivist approach basically views ex-

perience itself as reliable, but its interpretation as

subject to social influence. The interprelations on the

part of the "ruling" class are considered as biased by

virtue of their interests, and thus as forming an ideology.

The positivists view the working class as having a more

objective view of "reality" since they have a more material-

istic view of the universe as consisting of "force and

matter." If the working class manages to perceive the

ideological nature of the view imposed on them frora those

in power, it not only destroys the ideology but also over-

throws the ruling class (Adler, 1957:399-400). The anti-

positivists view the working class as having the potential

40

for an "adequate" view of social reality, but the working

class can only achieve this "realization" when it develops

its own "class-consciousness" in the "world" revolution.

Adler cites George Lukacs as the chief proponent of the

antipositivist approach, which Adler (1957:401) describes

as "a poetic sort of wish fulfillment for frustrated

Marxists." Adler further points out that what is consid-

ered an "adequate" view of reality rests upon the normative

judgement of the theorist.

Mannheira (1936) views Marxist thought as having

the basic viewpoint necessaury for the beginnings of a

sociology of knowledge, since the Marxists recognized the

relationship between thought and the socio-historical

position of the thinker. However, Mannheira points out that

Maurxism was never really able to formulate a concept to

apply to raen "in general." The reason for this, Mauinheira

suggests, is that the relationship between social life and

thought was, "fully perceived only in the thought of the

opponent" (Mannheim, 1936:277).

Several writers have pointed to a sociology of

knowledge orientation in the work of Emile Durkheim^

Coser (1971:139) points out that this orientation was

"intimately tied to his sociology of religion^" Taylor

however, maintains that Durkheim's earlier work led him to

question whether thinking, like other forms of human be-

havior, was determined by the institutional relationships

41

of society, and thus, to a consideration of "the structural

beams of thought—the categories" (Taylor, 1956:90)•

Coser points out that Durkheim saw the basic cate-

gories of thought as originating, particularly araong priroi-

tive peoples, from the sociaú. orgauiization of society. For

Durkheim, "society is decisive in the genesis of logical

thought by forraing the concepts of which thought is raade"

(Coser, 1971:140)• Durkheira (1954) describes thinking as

the aurranging and classifying of ideas, and since clas-

sifying involves naming, language becoraes a crucial element

in the ways in which "things" become classified and sub-

sequently thought of. Since he also describes language

as "a product of social elaboration" (Diurkheim, 1954:434)

auid words as "collective representations," thought comes

under the influence of the social context through language.

Noting Durkheim's influence upon the sociology of

knowledge today, Adler (1957:397) states:

Following the master's lead there is in present day sociology of knowledge an ethnological auid socio-psychological eraphasis. Both trends are based on the motion of collective representations— group determination of concepts, thought ways and even the categories of perception in the individual.

Of the two leading figures in "wissenssoziologie,"

Mannheim has become the raost widely recognized, particularly

in America, despite the fact that Scheler is viewed as its

originator^ Adler (1957) points out that Mannheim's out-

standing position in the field is partially due to the fact

that his Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Soci-

42

oloqv of knowioHq.> (1936) was the first work published in

English which employed the term "the sociology of knowl-

edge" as a part of its title. Adler (1957:410) also notes

that Louis Wirth's preface to the book "promised that the

book would make important contributions to theory, research

and the solution to many of the practical ills of our tirae."

Wolff (1959) views Scheler's work in the sociology

of knowledge as an attempt to incorporate the sociology of

knowledge into a philosophicaa anthropology. Adler (1957:

406) points out that Scheler approached his study "with the

definite intention of overcoming Marxisra as well as posi-

tivism," and that his work was based upon "philosophical and

organismic assumptions." Mannheim (1971:79) viewed Scheler's

approach as a religious-conservative reaction to the Marxist

theory of ideology, in which Scheler atterapts to reinforce

the older conception of "supra-temporally valid truths"

through "essential intuition."

According to Adler (1957), Scheler distinguishes

two factors in knowledge which he termed "factual" or "real"

factors, and "essential" or "ideal" factors. The real

factors are the social conditions which provide the fraune-

work within which thought is possible. The ideaú. factors

are eternally valid truths, ideas and values. The ideal

factors determine possible thoughts, but the real factors

determine actual thoughts. The aira of the sociology of

knowledge is to discover the "laws of succession" according

43

to which the real and ideal factors interact in historicaa

situations. Scheler postulates a sequence of types of inter-

action in society based on the motivations prevaling in

society during given historical stages. The first stage is

chauracterized as dorainated by kinship ties, the second by

an emphasis upon political power and power over nature,

auid the third by the increasing iroportance of econoroic rooti-

vations. Scheler depicts this sequence as aui "aging process"

of society derived froro related changes in the individual

human being. Adler notes: "The similaurity of these stages

to those of Comte is fairly obvious" (Adler, 1957:406).

Mannheim (1936) views Marxisra as raaking a signif-

icant contribution to the sociology of knowledge through

the forraulation of what Mannheira calls the "total conception

of ideology." This conception differs frora the eaurlier

"psychology of interests" approach to knowledge character-

istic of Machiavelli and later of the Enlightenraent, which

Mannheim refers to as the "particular conception of ide-

ology." The Marxist conception, in Mannheira's view repre-

sents a "functional analysis" approach, concerned with an

"objective description of the structural differences in

minds operating in different social settings" (Mannheim,

1936:58). This approach recognizes not only the interest-

bound aspects of specific ideas of an opponent, but views

his whole conceptual framework as distorted by his socio-

historical position. However, Mannheim points out that

44

even "the totaO. conception of ideology" never develops a

generalized viewpoint that would inclúde all thought.

Hannheira (1936) atterapts to raake this step in his

sociology of knowledge, even though he exempts certain

types of thinking, such as those found in the natural

sciences from his "relational " scheme. The term "re-

lational" is preferred by Mauinheira to "relativistic"

since he views relativisra as denying the possibility of

"true" knowledge adtogether, by viewing all knowledge as

relative to the perspectives of its holders. The relationaú.

viewpoint, on the other hauid, sees sorae views as less naur-

rowly circumscribed than others and thus, superior in

their "truth value."

Mauinheim (1936) develops two types of thought which

he views as particularly "perspectivad." and thus limited in

their aúDÍlity to conceive of the reality within which they

operate. "Ideologicaú." thought is so limited by its rela-

tionship to the existing power, or political, structure of

society, whereas "utopian" thought is related to some future

social structure which it envisions as raore or less in-

evitaO^le. Both types are viewed by Mannheim as related to

social class, religious or other social variables. On the

other hand, the thought of the "free-floating intelligensia"

who are not comraitted to any paurticular ideologies or

utopias, is less narrowly perspectival.

The validity of any given systera of thought, or

45

"weltanschauung," in Mannheim's view, lies therefore in its

ability to conceptuaú.ize the actual social structure within

which it functions. The task of the sociology of knowledge

is to analyze the structure and function of specific socio-

historicaú. thought systems in an atterapt to assess the

adequacy of their conceptions of the "real" society within

which they exist. "Thought should contain neither raore nor

less than the reality in whose raediura it operates" (Mannheira,

1936:98).

There have been nuraerous criticisras of Mauinheim's

work. Adler (1957) points out that many of these criticism

derive from Mauinheim's prominence in the field of the sociol-

ogy of knowledge—making him the "likely target" for crit-

icisras of the field in general. Sorae of the raost frequent

types of criticisras have been of the variety listed by Adler,

in describing the criticisras of specific writers^ Adler

(1957:411) states:

Merton finds, among other things, that by leaving the relationship of existential factors and thought undefined, Mannheim has virtually precluded the possi-bility of formulating problems for empirical investi-gation^ Mandlebaum feels that in spite of his efforts, Mannheira was unable to escape relativism. Becker makes the saune chaurge. • . •

Since Mannheim, Pitirim Sorokin's Social and Cul-

tural Dynamics (1937-1941) stands out as perhaps the most

"monumental" attempt to develop a general theory of knowl-

edge^ As Maquet (1951) points out, Sorokin's sociology of

knowledge is an integral part of his forraulation of a theory

46

of structural and dynaraic sociology. Maquet also observes

Sorokin's emphasis upon the raeaning of sociaú. interaction^

To Sorokin "all phenomenon of huraan interaction becorae

simply physical or biologicaú. if they are deprived of their

hiuaan raeaning" (Maquet, 1951:113) •

Sorokin sees the prevaling culture in a given

spacio-temporal society as determined by certain major

premises or, "first principles," concerned with the nature

of reaú-ity In this regard, there are three major cultural

forras Two are polar extreraes and the third is an inte-

grated type interraediate between them. Sorokin identifies

the polau: forms as "sensate" and "ideationaú." and the inter-

mediate forra as "idealistic." Sensate cultvures view reality

in terras of that which can be sensually experienced, whereas

ideational cultures view reality as transcending the material

world^ While there are a variety of mixed types, Sorokin

views only the idealistic as integrated, so that reality

is seen as something of a duality, with certain aspects

transcending sensory experience^ These culture forras have

corresponding systems of truth or knowledge^ In sensate

cultures knowledge is viewed in terms of "sensate-empirico"

or "scientific" truths, whereas in ideational culture knowl-

edge is seen as derived from "revealed" truths^ In the

roixed idealistic form, a "rationalisra" or inconsistent view

of knowledge exists, based on faith, reason and sensory

experience (Summary derived from Adler, 1957:408).

48

Symbolic Interactionism

Symbolic interactionisra, in Bolton's (1958) view

has contributed to sociological relativism in that it has

formulated the "connections" between the individual and his

socio-cultural environment^ "The unique perspective of this

line of thought is that • . . the socially evolved symbolic

functioning of human beings involves a radicaú. transfor-

mation of experience and behavior which actually brings

into being objects in their meaningful sense" (Bolton,

1958:12). Thus, as Bolton sees it, syrabolic interaction

theory explains "how" huraan beings come to view reality in

a socio-culturally specific manner.

As Rose (1962) points out, the symbolic inter-

actionist approach to understanding huraaui social behavior

is not represented by a unified, well integrated body of

theory. The perspectives it offers grew, as Rose expresses

it, "with an idea here, a raagnificent but paurtiad forrau-

lation there . . . " (Rose, 1962:vii)« He also notes that

there are a variety of terras used to designate this approach,

including "action theory," "role theory" and "the Chicago

tradition," in addition to a nuraber of related approaches

designated by other labels^ However, its raajor tenets are

viewed by Rose, Maurtindale (1960) and other writers as

having their Araerican origins in the forraulations of three

pragmatist philosophers, William James, John Dewey and

George Herbert Mead, as well as those developed by sociol-

49

ogists Charles Horton Cooley and W. I. Thomas. Mead's

Hind. Self and Society (1934) has been viewed by most

witers as the raost coraprehensive forraulation of the

symbolic interactionist approach.

Martindale (1960:340) points out that the work of

William Jcunes (1948) "opened up new possibilities for re-

examining the relations of the individuaú. to society" by

his exaroination of the concept of "habit" and his recon-

ceptualization of "consciousness." To Jaraes, haúDit is the

source of relatively stable behavior in individuaúLs and

thus, the basic raeans by which social order is preserved.

Martindale views James "habit" concept as a principle which

could explain conforraity behavior without having to appeal

to externaú. forces. James saw "consciousness" as a process

rather than as a "fixed" state of mind. "In this manner,"

Martindale states, "James eliminated consciousness as a

kind of metaphysical substance" (Martindale, 1960:341)•

Jaunes viewed consciousness as always involving sorae

degree of self awareness. In his formulation, the self

includes two raajor coraponents, the "I," or the "knower,"

and the "rae," or the "known," with the "me" representing

"in its widest sense all the person can call his" (Martin-

dale, 1960:341). The "rae" includes a nuraber of eleraents

including the "material," the "social," and the "spiritual"

aspects of the self, with the social "me" referring to the

recognition accorded the individual by other individuals.

51

formulation, since a rivaú.ry exists between the raultipli-

city of "me's." A relative state of equilibrium is attained,

however, by virtue of a hierarchical arrangement of the

selves, with the materiaa aspects at the lower levels, the

social aspects in an intermediate position, and the spir-

itual aspects at the highest level. In James' view the

progress of the self involves higher and higher standards

of self-judgement.

The "knower" or the "I" in James theory, is "that

which at any moraent is conscious; the 'rae' is only one of

the things it is conscious of" (Martindale, 1960:343).

It is experienced as a sort of "streaon of consciousness"

which only exists moraent by moraent, or in passing states.

According to Jaraes, what has caused philosophers to assurae

it is sorae sort of perraauient unity, such as the soul, is

based simply on a "functional" unity, since each state of

"I" remerobers, or knows, the sarae objects. The self known

by the "I" consists of a "loosely constructed" unity of the

"me's," but significant changes in this construction raay

create either mild or severe alterations of meraory, such as

those encountered in old age or pathological states.

For Charles Horton Cooley:

A separate individual is an abstraction un-known to experience, and so likewise in society when regaurded as soraething apart frora individuals. The real thing is Huraan Life, which raay be con-sidered either in an individual aspect or a social • • • aspect^ • . . (Cooley, 1902:1).

52

Cooley (1902) contends that this view applies to

any sociaú. aggregate, regardless of its complexity^ While

he concedes that there may be some system of organization

in the whole that is not apparent in the parts, it is a

"fallacy" to view the individual auid society as separate or

as aui antagonistic duality. "The iramediate social reality

is the personal idea. . . society, then is a relation among

personal ideas" (Cooley, 1902:84). And, he furthermore

urged that, "The imaginations which people have of one

another aure the solid facts of society" (Cooley, 1902:87).

Cooley formulates the self-concept of the individuaú.

in society as aurising from "a somewhat definite iraagination

of how one's self . • • appears in a particular raind; and

the kind of self-feeling one has is deterrained by the at-

titude toward this attributed to that other raind" (Cooley,

1902:152)• Thus, Cooley's "looking glass self concept"

involves:

. . . three principle eleraents: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imag-ination of his judgeraent of that appearance, and sorae sort of self-feeling such as pride or raorti-fication (Cooley, 1902:152).

The self is, in Cooley's view, an expression of both

hereditary and social factors, and cannot be understood

without relating it to "life in general." The individual

is born with a self-feeling and learns to express it through

iroagining how one appears to others and by iraitating the

particular ways it is expressed in one's group—such as

by the use of the first person pronouns, "I," "rae," "ray,"

53

"mine" and so on. The self-feeling is effected in Cooley's

view by all the conditions effecting the group to which

the individual belongs: "by the general course of history,

the particular development of nations, classes, and profes-

sions and by other conditions of this sort" (Cooley, 1902:

153). And, while each self is "special," it is not sep-

arate from the whole of the society of which the individual

is a member.

Even the ascetics who seek to sepaurate theraselves

from all their raaterial, farailial, friendship and other

"ray" feelings, retain the socially derived self-feelings

in Cooley's view, albeit they direct them into "unusual

channels" such as lofty ideals. Cooley (1910:155) notes

that "it has been observed that the demand for the continued

auid separate existence of the individual soul often is an

extension of the self-feeling." He also points out that

this "demauid" is itself social, since the idea is not present

ãLmong Buddhists.

Cooley (1962) uses the term "primary group" to

denote the social groups with which the individual is most

closely identified. Coser (1971) points out that Cooley

recognized that the primary group was a corapetitive as

well as cooperative group, with rivalries, and self-assertions

Nevertheless, these tendencies are "socialized" and tend to

be subsuraed within the "coraraon spirit" or "we" feeling

toward the group. For Cooley, the primary group, epito-

54

mized by the family, children's play groups and the neigh-

borhood are "practically the breeding grounds for the emer-

gence of humaui cooperation auid fellowship" (Coser, 1971:

308) , and thus basic in shaping the nature and idecú.s of

individuaúLs to their socio-culturally specific groups.

W. I. Thomas' raajor contribution to syrabolic inter-

actionist theory was his "definition of the situation"

concept. Thomas (1969) emphasizes the decision raaking

process which differentiates the higher auiiraads, and

particularly roen, froro the lower forras of aniraaú. life.

According to Thoraas, higher aniraals "have the power of

refusing to obey a stimulation which they followed at an

earlier tiroe" (Thoroas, 1969:246). Having found certain

responses to have painful consequences, the response raay

be changed. "We call this ability the power of inhibition,

and it is dependent upon the fact that the nervous systera

carries meroories or records of past experiences" (Thoraas,

1969:269). Once the inhibition of previous responses has

been accomplished, Thomas contends that raan's action is no

longer determined by outside forces alone, but has a meas-

ure of self-determination. Previous to any act of be-

havior in which self-determination is involved, "there is

always a stage of examination and deliberation which we

raay call the definition of the situation" (Thomas, 1969:

246). Not only does this "definition of the situation"

occur in relation to specific acts, but, "gradually a

55

whole life-policy and the personality of the individual

himself follow from a series of such definitions" (Thoraas,

1969:246).

Since each individual is born into a group of people

who have already developed definitions and frora these, rules

of conduct applying to general types of situations, the in-

dividual cannot make his definitions according to his own

wishes, and act accordingly, without interference from

others. And, while conflict often exists between the

definitions made by an individual and those of his society,

he must abide by the moral codes aurising out of the soci-

ety's general definitions or suffer the sanctions his

society applies to those who refuse to abide by these codes.

"The family," Thoraas asserts, "is the sraallest

social unit and the primary defining agency" (Thomas, 1969:

247). But, while inhibition of the individual's wishes be-

gins with the family, it extends to play groups, the local

community, and later, "through reading and formaú. instruction,

by informal signs of approvable and disapprovatble, the grow-

ing meraber leaurns the code of his society" (Thomas, 1969:

247). And, while Thoraas sees the influence of the local

coramunity diminishing in the modern era, he urges "it rep-

resents an important defining agency which we shall probably

have to restore in some form in order to secure a more bal-

auiced and normaú. society" (Thomas, 1969:247).

While Martindale (1960) sees Dewey as a social

56

behaviorist rather than as expressing a symbolic inter-

actionist approach, other writers, including Bolton (1958)

and Rose (1962) point out that he made contributions to

symbolic interactionist theory. Martindale (1960) does

note that Dewey was greatly influenced by William James and

that Dewey viewed the individual as constantly reconstruct-

ing the environraent as well as being deterrained by it.

However, Duncan (1962) brings out Dewey's symbolic

interactionist point of view in analyzing Dewey's contrib-

ution to what Duncan calls "the social theory of comrauni-

cation." Duncan particularly deals with Dewey's suggestion

that au:t is produced by individuals, "the content of whose

experience has been deterrained by the cultures in which

they live" (Duncan, 1962:65). Duncan eraphasizes that Dewey

saw the function of aurt as being the trauisraission of the

raeauiing of coraraunity life, "in iraaginative forras which raake

social experience possible" (Duncan, 1962:66).

More importantly however, Dewey, like Mead (1934)

placed an emphasis upon the influence of the socially

shared meauiings embodied in lauiguage upon thought. While

Dewey did not seem to view language as being as closely

related to thought as did Mead, Dewey believed that the

relationship of lauiguage to thought was a "genuine prob-

lem," since while language is crucial to thinking, it also

"conceals" and "perverts" thoughts. For Dewey, language

is necessary for thinking since thought deals with meanings.

57

not "bare things." At the same time however, language must

put limits on meanings—they must be "fixed" to some extent

in order to be comprehended (Dewey, 1933:230-31). And,

Dewey illustrates the extent to which any individual in-

fluences the language of his group by comparing this

influence with that of a child's "spontaneous modes of

speech" upon his family's vocabulary. While some of the

child's inventions may be picked up and even continued to

be used by the family, Dewey suggests that the ratio of

such words to the totaa vocabulary used by the family gives

"a fair measure" of the part played by the individual in

shaping his group's language (Dewey, 1930:59).

Language—"the significant symbol"—is the crucial

eleraent in Mead's (1934) theory. Mead views the "great

vadue" of language as giving organization to experience,

and syrabolic coramunication through the mediura of language,

arising out of man's "specialization" of gestures, as

"responsible, ultimately for the origin and growth of huraan

society auid knowledge, with adl the control over the human

environment science makes possible" (Mead, 1934:14n).

As Martindale (1960) points out, Mead begins his

Mind, Self and Society with specific criticisras of previous

attempts to explain the concept of mind and/or self.

Maurtindale suraraarizes Mead's criticisras of eaurlier writers

as follows:

(1) e i ther they presupposed the raind as ante-cedently e x i s t i n g to account for raentaú. phe-

58

nomenon (Wundt); (2) or they failed to account for specifically mental phenoraenon (Watson)* and (3) they failed to isolate the raechanism by which the mind and the self appeared (Jaraes and Dewey) (Martindale, 1960:354).

Head (1934) begins his analysis with observable

phenomenon, in the tradition of the behaviorists. Focusing

upon the "social act," which he describes as a released ira-

pulse originating with the values and attitudes developed

within the social process, Mead argues that organization

of behavior preceeds observable behavior. Overt behavior,

in Mead's analysis is only part of the process of an act,

not the whole. The organism's general attitude towaurd any

object represents "sets of connections" or an "idea" which

is also a part of the act.

In the early stages of social acts Mead asserts,

gestures preceed deliberate communication, functioning simply

as "non-deliberate" body movements which reflect inner

attitudes. Therefore, the social act (or more coraraonly,

interaction) is possible without requiring "consciousness."

Rather, in Mead's forraulation, consciousness eraerges frora

the social act. Among social animals, a gesture on the part

of one animaú. serves as a stiraulus for the response of other

amimals. The response to the gesture in turn stimulates a

response from the first aniraal, and so on, in a continuing

process•

The "mind" or "consciousness" eraerges, only when an

animal learns to adjust his response to stimuli received by

59

another animal, by taking on the attitude of the other

toward its own gestures^ A gesture becoraes a "significant

symbol," a form of language, when its meaning is rautually

understood^ The adjustive response to the "other," taking

the other's attitude towaurd one's own stirauli, gives the

gesture its raeaning^

Mead (1934) observes that "conversation in gestures"

occurs with social auiimals other than man, thus suggesting

in his view, that abstraction, the formation of a generaú.-

ized concept toward soraething to which the auiiroal responds,

takes place also^ However, only huroan, vocalized lauiguage

is highly developed enough to make it possible for an

animaúL, in this case maui, to hold onto aú^stractions of

socially shared meanings^

For Mead (1934) the "self" arises in the sarae

process as does the "raind," and he views both as "essen-

tially sociad^" The individual experiences hiraself as an

object by taking the attitude of the other toward himself•

In early childhood, "play" involves taking different

"roles," especially the "roles" of those on which the child

is dependent, such as a parent. In this way, children

organize the responses which they stimulate in others, and

also in themselves. "In the play period the child utilizes

his own responses to these stimuli which he raakes use of

in building a self" (Mead, 1934:150)• In the "garae" however

the child raust learn a number of roles, to take the at-

60

titudes of all the "others" involved^ "We get then an

'other' which is an organization of the attitudes of those

involved in the same process" (Mead 1934:154)• Finally,

the individual develops an organization of attitude which

reflects his whole comraunity—the "generalized other^"

Thê "generalized other" serves as the basis for locating

oneself within his social group or society^ "Such, in a

certain sense, is the structure of a raan's personality"

(Mead, 1934:162)•

Mead's forraulation of the objective and the sub-

jective aspects of the "self" follows Jaraes' typology of

the "I" and the "rae " Mead (1934:178) views these aspects

in terms of "essentially a social process going on with

these two distinguishable j^ases." The "I" is the respond-

ing, and in Mead's view the creative phase of the self,

while the "me" is the basically conservative, organized

set of attitudes towaurd oneself, which in Mead's description

is basically the same thing as the "generalized other."

"The 'rae' represents a definite organization of the cora-

munity there in our own attitudes. . • •" (Mead, 1934:

178) •

Society is also based on the organized attitudes

aurising out of the social process^ Mead makes explicit the

analogy between the organization of the self and the or-

ganization of society. Just as there are "generalized

social attitudes" which make an organized self possible.

61

in the comraunity there aure organized ways of acting, based

on common patterns of responses in individuals, which makes

an organized comraunity, or society, possible. Mead sees

the institutions of society as representing coraraon responses

of individuals in particular situations.

Thus Mead views the raind, the self and the society

of humaui beings as eraerging from man's unique adsility to

aú^stract and hold onto symbolically organized reality

through the medium of his vocad language. For Mead it

is this symbolic interaction between humaui beings which,

to borrow Paurson's phraseology, makes the orgauiization of

the individual's "minds" and/or "selves" "isomorphic" to

the socio-cultural settings into which they au:e born.

Even though, as Rose (1962) points out, symbolic

interactionism is not a unified, well integrated body of

theory, taken as a whole the viewpoints of the theorists

discussed offers an explanation of the mechauiisras by which

aui individual organizes his own experience of the world in

accordance with the organization of the society of which

he is a raember. This theoretical perspective suggests a

universal "huraan nature" that is extremely plastic, so much

so that an individual's whole conceptual framework, in-

cluding and especially his conceptions of hiraself, is

raolded by his social experience. This view lends itself

to sociological relativism since the view of "human nature"

it assuraes is plastic enough to fit any socio-cultural mold.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIOLOGICAL RELATIVISM AND CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

Sociological relativism, as a combination of the

perspectives of cultural relativism, the sociology of knowl

edge and symbolic interactionism converging to produce a

view of reality as socially constructed, has influenced

the direction of social science research in recent years

in two ways. The first of these directions is often re-

ferred to as the phenomenologicaú. approach to social

science^ While this approach is not new, it has been

reinforced by the increased awaureness of the socio-cultural

relativity of the meaning orders underlying social behavior

in recent yeaurs The second direction in social science

research stiraulated by sociological relativisro, has been

a concern for investigating the liraits of vauriability in

"the huraaui auid social condition" utilizing a corapaurative

approach. Both approaches have been concerned with the

subjective aspects of social life, but have differed con-

siderably in theoretical and methodological orientations,

The Phenoraenoloqical Approach

Alfred Schutz (1954:257) observes that for raore

62

63

than haaf a century there has been an issue which "has

split not only logicians and methodologists but also social

scientists into two schools of thought." At the one extreme

in the controversy is the view that the methods of the

natural sciences are the only scientific methods, and that

failure to adhere to these methods has prevented the sociaú.

sciences from developing theoretical explanations comparable

to the precision of those of the natural sciences. At the

other extreme the position is held that the methods of

sociad science must be different from those of natural science,

since the world of "nature" is different frora the world of

sociaú. reality. The latter view has raaintained that the

natiural sciences are noraothetic whereas the social sciences

are idiographic, "characterized by individualizing con-

ceptions and seeking singular assertory propositions . . . "

(Schutz, 1954:257). c

Schutz focuses his concern upon a specific debate

in this continuing controversy, a debate as to the validity

of the goals and methods Mauc Weber offered for social

science. Critics of Weber, Schutz suggests, oppose his

emphasis upon the subjective meanings underlying social

action and his "verstehen" method for developing explan-

ations of social behavior. Schutz, holding the phenoraenol-

ogist point of view, defends both aspects of Weber's soci-

oiogy, urging that refusal to consider any behavior that is

not overt auid observable as social phenomena excludes sig-

64

nificant dimensions of social reality from all possible

inquiry. In addition, Schutz (1954:269) maintains that

"verstehen" refers to "comraon-sense experience of the inter-

subjective world in daily life," and that if social science

aims at explaining social reality, it must refer to these

"first level" constructions of reality involving "the

actor's action frora his, the actor's, point of view."

"Second level" construction, or social scientific theory,

raust, in Schultz view be developed to explain the "first

level" construction.

Two approaches have been developed in social science

in recent yeaurs related to the phenoroenologist view of social

reality expressed by Schutz. The first of these approaches

is caú.led ethnoscience and the second ethnoraethodology.

George Psathas (1967) explains that ethnoscience views the

task of the social scientist as being the discovery of how

individuaúLs who shaure a given culture "perceive, define and

classify, how they actually perforra their activities and

what meanings they assign to acts occurring in the context

of their culture" (Psathas, 1967:500). Psathas (1967:508)

describes ethnomethodology as "the term coined by Gaurfinkel

auid his students" which is:

• • • concerned with the practical, everyday activities of men in society as they maúce accountable, to theraselves auid others, their everyday affairs, auid with the raethods they use for producing and raauiaging those saune affairs (Psathas, 1967:509)•

Psathas views the task of the ethnoraethodologist as being

65

the discovery of the "method" used in everyday life situations

in the creation of social readity, as well as the discovery

of the "nature" of socially created re^aities^

The raajor difference between these two approaches,

according to Psathas, is that ethnoraethodology is grounded

in phenoraenology, and therefore research is aimed at "the

discovery of the essential features of the phenoraena being

studied" (Psathas, 1967:511), whereas ethnoscience is raore

closely related to linguistics, in both its airas auid its

raethods^ Psathas observes that the influence of linguis-

tics can be seen in the use of the raethod of "coraponentiaú.

auialysis^" In linguistics this raethod involves analyzing

the relationships between categories of language and ob-

jects, concepts or events^ In ethnoscience componential

analyses are made of cognitive systems, or systems used by

the subjects to classify such things as, for example,

colors, kinship ties and plant life. The use of coraponential

anaú.ysis seeks to derive the way in which people in a given

culture structure reality.

Psathas points out that despite the sirailarities

between ethnoscience and ethnoraethodology, ethnoscientists

have not explicitly acknowledged the relationship between

ethnoscience and phenomenology. However, he emphasizes

that both are involved in "the problem of cultural rela-

tivity," but in his own view at least, ethnomethodology

is less concerned with culturally specific constructions

66

of reality than with universalities or "essences" of social

processes. Psathas states:

This may appear to be a contradiction. In one sense it is but at another level it may not be • . . By taking the phenoraenological position in which one tries to discover the basic essence of the process, it is possible . . . to discover that which is raore generally true and not be limited to culturally and teraporally relative

. conclusions (Psathas, 1967:512).

The basic raethod utilized in ethnoraethodology

consists, basicadly, of participant observation of the

"taken-for-grauited" behavior in specific on-going situations

auid abstracting the "essences," or "typifications" appearing

in the process. For exaraple, Psathas cites his own study

of "how cab drivers locate addresses" (Psathas, 1967:515).

The idea was to discover how persons, in this case cáb

drivers, conceptualize locations in socio-cultural space,

that is, the "essence" of the process. Psathas first

studied the constitution of radio-dispatched addresses,

noting that these dispatches consisted of "shaured relevances."

He then followed the raodel of coraponential analysis by seek-

ing the "components" of particulau: orders, and constructing

a classification systera with reference to the vaurious cri-

teria used for denoting locations in terras of their cora-

plexity "as complexity is defined within the cab drivers

world" (Psathas, 1967:516).

Psathas maintains that both of these approaches,

ethnoscience and ethnoraethodology can offer a great deal to

social science, by focusing attention on the world of every-

67

day life. While he does not see the social scientist's

task as being "to analyze in every detail, the subjective

aspects of the actor's behavior," it is his task to ex-

plicate the "understandings that the actor and the other

have of one another" (Psathas, 1967:517). Furthermore,

Psathas contends that it is after all, not the main aim 0

of social science to understand "behavior-in-the-laboratory,

or behavior-in-the-sociologists' society, but rather be-

havior where it occurs, in every day life." (Psathas, 1967:518)

The Coraparative Approach

Perhaps the major difference in the phenomenologi-

caú. and comparative approach in social science to the

analysis of "subjective" variables, is a difference in

"philosophical" orientation. The basic, while not the

exclusive, aim of compaurative analysis in social science

is the developroent of generalized stateraents about social

phenomena, the underlying assumption being that social

science is nomothetic (Przeworski and Tuene, 1970; Etzioni

and DuBow, 1970).

While, as pointed out in Chapter II of this study,

a number of sociologists have expressed a concern for in-

quiries into the limits of the variability of "huraan na-

ture," and emphasized the iraportance of "subjective" var-

iaU les in the "human nature" problem, few comparative

studies in social science have explicitly attempted such

endeavors. However, three fairly recent comparative en-

68

deavors have directed their attention to the variability

of "subjective" factors in social behavior. All three

endeavors are based on attempts to isolate what the authors

consider to be universal categories of the "subjective"

factors with which they are concerned, auid serve as exam-

ples of Etzioni and DuBow's (1970) contention that there

has been an emphasis on the limits of cultural auid in-

dividuaúL vauriations in recent years and a growing recog-

nition of universal aspects of "the huraan and social

condition."

Evidencing a concern with the growth of relativism,

in this case cultural relativisra, Florence Kluckholn (1961)

observes that while cultural relativism "has gone far in

jarring the rainds of individuals loose frora the corafortable

but shallow moorings of aJ^solutistic thinking," it has also

"at times threatened to override all conceptions of uni-

versals . . . " (Kluckholn and Strodtbeck, 1961:1). Kluck-

holn's concern with the problera of cultural relativisra and

her belief that previous studies of the value orientations

of cultures had over-eraphasized the influence of dominant

value, prompted her to formulate her theory of "Dorainant and

Variant Value Orientations" (Kluckholn and Strodtbeck, 1961:

1-49).

Her concept, "value orientations" is defined as:

. . . complex but definitely patterned (rauik ordered) principles resulting from the trans-actionail interplay of three analytically dis-tinguishable eleraents of the evaluative pro-

69

cess—the cognitive, the affective and the directive eleraents—which give order and direction to . . . huroan acts and thoughts as these relate to the solution of 'common human' problems (Kluckholn and Strodtbeck 1961:4).

In Kluckholn's view value orientations vaury from

one culture to another only in terms of their ranking pat-

terns. The value orientations which Kluckholn contends

are both universal and crucial aure: "human nature orien-

tation," "maui nature (supernature) orientation," "time

orientation" and "relational orientation." Each of these

value orientations, in Kluckholn's theory, has a range of

variability which the theorist views as both exhaustive and

testable. For exaonple, the man-nature category ranges from:

"subjugation-to-nature" to "haurmony-with-nature" to "mastery-

over-nature." These three rank-orders are not considered

to be mutually exclusive but vary in terms of their relative

strength or dominance.

The total value systeras of cultures, groups and in-

dividuals aure viewed as structured in terras of the relation-

ships among the rank orderings. However, Kluckholn (1961:

39) points out that neither an individual or a society "can

live wholly or always in accord with the patterns which ex-

press a single profile of value orientations." The time and

interest allocated to the various "behavior spheres," are

seen as dominated by the structure of the value orientations.

This theory was used to devise a questionnaire con-

taining 22 items, which was adrainistered to samples selected

70

from five culturally distinct comrounities living near

Gallup, New Mexico. The questionnaire iteros were felt to

represent indicators of "doroinance patterns" of four of the

five value orientations postulated. The data collected

from this questionnaire was statistically analyzed and

presented in the forra of hexagonal graphs, divided into

three sections representing the alternative positions on

each value orientation. The graphs were used to plot

frequency distributions in order to analyze within-culture

regularities, plot group coraposite averages, and auialyze

between group differences.

Prior to the administration of the questionnaire,

Kluckholn made informal predictions as to the pattern of

value orientation profiles for four of the five cultural

groups surveyed. These predictions were based on a study

of ethnographic data previously collected from the four

groups. The statistical analyses laurgely confirraed Kluck-

holn's theory; the data also revealed within-culture vari-

ations which were not fully auialyzed in the study.

The saune year that Kluckholn and Strodtbeck's

Variations in Value Orientations (1961) was published,

another study of value orientations was published, written

by three social psychologists, O. J. Harvey, David E. Hunt

and Harold M. Schroder, Their study was also airaed at estab-

lishing a range of vauriability of value orientations but

their approach focuses upon individual rather than cultural

71

value systems^

Harvey, Hunt and Schroder (1961) forraulate a theory

concerned with explaining the developraent auid functioning

of what they caú.1 "conceptual systeras^" The basic assuraption

underlying their forraulation is "that an individuaú. interacts

with his environraent by breaking it down and orgauiizing it

into raeauiingful patterns congruent with his own needs auid

psychological makeup" (Harvey, Hunt and Schroder, 1961:1)•

They view the result of this interaction as being the de-

velopment of standard patterns of perception and behavior

which are based upon the individual's evaluational orien-

tations and which they call "concepts^" These concepts

function to define the positive or negative quality of ob-

jects, events, ideas or other stimuli, auid therefore deter-

mine the type of "affective arousal" that is generated in

an individual by a particular stimuli^ The structure of

a concept is viewed as being determined by the degree to

which the concept is concrete or abstract, with greater

degrees of abstractness giving the individual more control

over his response, or less "stimulus bound^" The structures

and functions of concepts are considered as being interde-

pendent•

Concepts develop, in this theory, by the psycho-

social process of differentiation and integration, that is,

by breaking down the environraent into units which are raean-

ingful on the basis of previously acquired, simpler concepts,

72

and organizing these meaningful units so that they are inte-

grated into the existing conceptual system^ This, according

to these authors, is the leaurning process, and they empha-

size that "what is leaurned" are concepts, or modes of re-

lating to the environment^ They also urge that these modes

of relating to the environment are more important than the

content of what is learned.

Conceptual systems aure groups of interrelated con-

cepts with the saune basic structure or organization and

function as single concepts^ The totality of an individuals

concepts makes up his "self." Conceptual systeras develop

through stages or levels of conceptual coraplexity, progres-

sing to greater degrees of "aú^stractness." These theorists

conceive of levels of coraplexity as related to alternatives,

since the raore concepts one has the raore choice, or control

he has over his environraent^

Four stages of developraent are postulated with

"transitional" periods between each stage. In order of

their coraplexity the stages are: Stage I - Unilateral

Dependence; Stage II - Negative Dependence; Stage III -

Conditional Dependence and Mutuality; and, Stage IV -

Interdependence. Arrestation raay occur in either a given

stage or in a period of transition. Personality organi-

zation is conceptualized as "eraerging from the interactive

affects of the training conditions and stages of develop-

ment" (Haurvey, Hunt and Schroder, 1961:158).

73

The "dimensions" of personality organization pos-

tulated by these theorists, involve the degree of an indi-

vidual's abstractness, openess to progression and direction

of behavioral expression at any of the various stages of

development. Patterns of conceptual organization or types

of conceptual systero functioning are derived froro anadysis

of the stages of development and dimensions of personality

organization. These are denoted as systems I, II, III and

IV. An individual raay function at raore than one systera

level and individuals vary as to their consistency in the

levels of total conceptual systera developraent. And, while

both the stages of conceptual developraent and diraensions

of personality orgauiization aure postulated as universals,

the training systeras are seen as vauriable and the authors

point out: "To the extent that a particular culture does

not utilize certain training conditions, it would not be

expected to produce certain patterns of conceptual structure"

(Harvey, Hunt and Schroder, 1961:158)•

Since these theorists point out that their con-

ceptual systeras construction is based on genotypic, or

structural, rather thaui phenotypic, or content, consider-

ations, actual behavior can only be considered as an in-

dicator of systera level functioning. Therefore raultiple

measures aure viewed as necessary for inferring the con-

ceptual structure underlying any response. The basic

method they call for and give working examples of involves

74

vfhat they call "systero specific situational induction"

or using definite types of "pressures" in order to induce

system specific functioning^

This method requires several phases of investi-

gation and anaúLysis, using a vauriety of techniques^

Exaroples of studies carried out by two of the authors, and

other studies eroploying siroilar roethods of investigation

were cited as evidence to support the viewpoints the authors

present^

This theory suggests that while there can be a good

deal of vauriation within the rauige postulated, basic "raodes

of relating to the world" raay not be as vauriable as the

perspectives of sociological relativisra iraply« In terms of

conforming to the socio-cultural environment, the authors

point to systera I as "tradition-oriented" or responsive to

ethnocentric influence, systera III as "other-directed" or

responsive to norraative influence, and systera IV not gen-

erally conformist, but responsive to "informational" in-

fluence from a wide range of sources^ Systera II is seen

as resisting influence or as basically non-conforraing^

In his "Basic Huraan Needs, Alienation and Authen-

ticity" (1968) Araitai Etizioni seeks to develop a frarae-

work for comparative analysis based on the concept of

"basic human needs^" Etzioni points out that while "raost

sociologists consider the concept of basic huraan needs as

unproductive" (Etzioni, 1968:870) anthropologists and

75

psychoanalysts "rely heavily" on the concept^ (In fact,

Herskovits (1963) points to the unity of human "needs,"

"aspirations" and "endowments" as fundaraental to the con-

cept of cultural relativisra.) The basic needs Etzioni

postulates, the needs for recognition and affection are

especially conducive to the view of raan as highly respon-

sive to social influence. However, Etzioni's use of this

concept puts basic huraan needs in a soraewhat different

light. Etzioni (1968:870) suggests that the concept serves

"to correct an 'oversocialized' conception of raaui, which

prevails in mainstream sociology." This "oversocialized"

conception is basic to the sociological relativism of

Bolton's (1958) typology.

Etzioni views the prevailing conception in sociol-

ogy of the need for affection and recognition as unproductive

for the following reasons: (1) the great diversity of

social institutions and cultural patterns suggests that

huraaui needs caui be satisfied in a treraendous variety of

ways; (2) whether such needs are universal or not is un-

important because needs are so highly malleable that dif-

ferences in social institutions can be explained in terms

of the functional requirements of the social systera or

historical forces; and, (3) huraan needs cannot be clas-

sified erapirically since they are never found in "pure forra,"

but only in socio-culturally specific forras.

Etzioni (1968:870) holds that "it is fruitful to

76

assume that there is a universal set of basic human needs

which have attributes of their own and are not determined

by the social structure, cultural patterns or socialization

processes." The socio-psychological needs for affection

and recognition are conceived as being part of this "uni-

versal set." They can be operationalized so that empirical

indicators can be used to raeasure the degree to which spe-

cific social roles roeet these needs. Both the costs of

socialization for social roles and of the social control

necessary to keep the roles filled or to keep people adher-

ring to the prescriptions for the roles, Etzioni contends,

will be higher for those roles in which these needs are

not adequately met. He asserts that the direction of the

pressure to change brought about by persons seeking raore

fulfilling roles or by chauiging the role prescriptions for

unsatisfying roles, will be patterned. Furtherraore he

states that, "We expect these relations to hold in whatever

culture, society or sub-unit of these, one chooses to

study" (Etzioni, 1968:874).

Not only does Etzioni suggest that this forraulation

could be useful in correcting the "oversocialized" conception

of raaui, but also in deterraining the extent to which a soci-

ety is effective in meeting the needs of its huraan raerabers.

In other words, as a standard against which "erapirically

valid" judgements could be raade with regard to a culture

or society's "effectiveness" in raeeting human needs.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Relativistic perspectives with regard to human

social behavior, including the conceptions men hold of

"reality," have been fundaraental to sociological endeavor

since the founding of the discipline of sociology. How-

ever, three intellectual strearas have developed during

the present century which have added new diraensions to the

relativisra inherent in sociology and converged to produce

what sociologist Charles D. Bolton (1958) calls "socio-

logical relativisra." These three lines of thought are:

cultural relativisra, which eraphasizes the role of culture

in shaping raen's perceptions and conceptions of the world;

the sociology of knowledge which eraphasizes the socio-

historical position of the thinker in deterraining his

"style of thought," and, syrabolic interactionisra which

offers explanations as to the raechanisras by which individuals

"internalize" the raeanings—cognitive as well as norraative—

of their socio-culturally specific environments. Taken

together these three lines of thought offer a perspective

of "reality" as socio-culturally produced and thus relative

to the spacio-teraporal location of the experiencing indi-

77

78 viduals.

Froro the point of view of sociological relativism,

"human nature" is extremely "plastic" and therefore capable

of taking on an almost infinite variety of socio-cultural

shapes. This viewpoint has had an influence upon social

science research in two ways. First it has reinforced the

phenomenological position that social science must, at

present at least, be limited to idiosyncratic statements

which explain human social behavior in specific situations,

even though universal patterns or "essences" may eventually

be derived from the study of social behavior in specific

situations^ Second, it has encouraged attempts to dis-

cover the limits of variability in both "huraan nature"

and the structure and functioning of culturaú. and/or social

systems through comparative analysis.

The dilemma that sociological relativism presents

to sociology, as well as the other social sciences, is that

if raen "inevitably" view the world in a socio-culturally

conditioned mauiner, then the social scientist's obser-

vations of human social behavior are, like all men's, a

product of a paurticular socio-cultural frame of reference.

And, while the problem of observer-bias has long been

recognized in social science aui increased awareness of this

problera has developed as awareness of the diraensions of the

socio-cultural relativity of men's conceptual frameworks

have grown. Thus, sociological relativisra presents to

79

sociology the same sort of dilerama that Einstein's "great

idea" (Newton, 1958) presents to physics, that is, that

the view the scientist has of reality depends on the

position frora which he does his "viewing^"

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