sociological theory and strategic management

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Sociological Theory and Strategic Management

Institutional Theory, Organizational Ecology & Networks

Oleksiy Osiyevskyy,

PhD Student,

Haskayne School of Business,

University of Calgary

Jan/31/2011

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Part I. Institutional Theory

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“Institutional theory attends to the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure.

It considers the processes by which structures, including schemas, rules, norms, and routines, become established as authoritative guidelines for social behavior. It inquires into how these elements are created, diffused, adopted, and adapted over space and time; and how they fall into decline and disuse.”

Richard Scott (2004a)

Not to confuse with institutional economics!

Institutional Theory: Definition

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The first ideas forming contemporary institutional theory can be traced back to Karl Marx (conflict perspective) and Max Weber (order perspective)

Institutional Theory: Roots and Scope

In 20th century the institutional theory was adopted by multiple social sciences, particularly economics (in neoclassical theory), political sciences (in behavoiralism), sociology (positivism)

In management research the institutional theory is most widely applied in OT

Pictures source: Wikipedia

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First widely-known insights emerged in 1970-1980th, in two distinct places:

Institutional Theory and Management Science

Place Stanford University Yale University

Key Thinkers John Meyer, Brian Rowan, Richard Scott

Paul DiMaggio, Walter Powell

Preceding theories that led to research in institutional theory

Contingency theory Network theory

Initial Question Which institutional forces shape organizational systems?

Which factors make organizations more similar to each other?

Source: adapted from Scott (2004b)

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“Institutionalised organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony” American Journal of Sociology, 83: 340-63.

Key questions: ◦ how are the formal organizational structures formed?◦ what is the role of formal structure in an organization?

Stress on false assumptions of preceding prevailing theories of formal structure: ◦ (a) the formal organizational structure actually governs the activities

◦ (b) “the coordination and control of activity are the critical dimensions on which formal organizations have succeeded in the modern world” (p.342)

◦ (a)+(b) -> formal structures are constructed using rational considerations of actual “demands of their work activities” (p. 341) – (e.g., perspectives of Fayol, Weber, Chandler, etc.)

Institutional Theory: Meyer and Rowan, 1977

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Authors’ view: There is a difference between formal and informal

organizations (p.343):◦ structural elements are only loosely linked to each other and to activities◦ rules are often violated◦ decisions are often unimplemented or implemented with uncertain

consequences◦ technologies are of problematic efficiency◦ evaluation and inspection systems are subverted or rendered so vague

as to provide little coordination Then, why do the formal structures exist? What governs their development?


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Authors’ view: Alternative Weberian source of formal structure: the

institutional legitimacy of rationalized formal structures◦ notions of structure are embedded in the values of society and reflect the

widespread understanding of social reality◦ many positions, programs, policies, procedures are enforced by public

opinion, views of important constituents, knowledge "legitimated through educational system", social prestige, laws, definitions of negligence and prudence, etc.

Such elements of formal structure are manifestation of powerful institutional rules which function as highly rationalized myths.◦ “Such institutions are myths which make formal organizations both easier to

create and more necessary” (p.345)◦ “organizations structurally reflect socially constructed reality” (p.346)


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Authors’ view: Proposition 1: "As rationalized institutional rules arise in

given domains of work activity, formal organizations form and expand by incorporating these rules as structural elements“ (p.345)

Proposition 2: "The more modernized the society, the more extended the rationlized instituional structure in given domains and the greater the number of domains containing rationlized institutions“ (p.345)


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“Institutionalised organisations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony” American Journal of Sociology, 83: 340-63.

Proposition 3: "Organizations that incorporate societally legitimated rationalized elements in their formal structures maximize their legitimacy and increase their resources and survival capabilities“ (p. 352)◦ Confidence and stability is achieved by isomorphism with institutional rules◦ However, sometimes institutional rules conflict with effectiveness or

efficiency; the organizations resolve these conflicts by “decoupling”

Proposition 4: "Because attempts to control and coordinate activities in institutionalized organizations lead to conflicts and loss of legitimacy, elements of structure are decoupled from actitivities and from each other" (p.357)◦ “Integration is avoided, program implementation is neglected, and

inspection and evaluation are ceremonialized” (p.357)


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“Institutionalised organisations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony” American Journal of Sociology, 83: 340-63.

Propostion 5: “The more an organization's structure is derived from institutionalized myths, the more it maintains elaborate displays of confidence, satisfaction, and good faith, internally and externally” (p.358)

Proposition 6: “Institutionalized organizations seek to minimize inspection and evaluation by both internal managers and external constituents” (p.359)


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Conclusion“Organizational structures are created and made more

elaborate with the rise of institutionalized myths, and, in highly institutionalized contexts, organizational action must support these myths. But an organization must also attend to practical activity. The two requirements are at odds. A stable solution is to maintain the organization in a loosely coupled state” (p.359-360)


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“The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields” American Sociological Review, 48: 147-160.

Key questiono what makes organizations so similar with time (“without necessary

making them more efficient”, p.147)?

Key theoretical propositionso rational bureaucracy remains the dominant organization form of

companies

o however, “structural change in organizations seems less and less driven by competition or by the need for efficiency” (p.147)

Institutional Theory: DiMaggio and Powell, 1983

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Key theoretical propositionso Bureaucratization and other forms homogeization are

driven by structuration of organizational fields

o Structuration, in turn, is driven primarily by the state and professions (that became “great rationalizers”)

o “Highly structured organizational fields provide a context in which individual efforts to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint often leads, in the aggregate, to homogeneity in structure, culture and output” (p.147).


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Network approach: organizational fieldso similarity (instead of variability) of organizations increases as they

change grouping together into “organizational fields” (organizations that “in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life” (p. 148)).

o these fields share key suppliers, resource and product consumers, and organizations that produce similar products or services.

o once in a field:o organizations begin to become increasingly similar in form and processes

which impacts their ability to change in the futureo accept that the adoption of innovation may only provide legitimacy instead

of performance improvement


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Yale vs. Standford modelso “Whereas the Stanford models privileged widely shared

symbolic models, DiMaggio and Powell stressed the importance of palpable network connections that transmitted coercive or normative pressures from institutional agents, such as the state and professional bodies, or mimetic influences stemming from similar or related organizations”

Scott (2004b), pp.6-7


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Three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change:o Coercive Isomorphism – occurring as a result of formal and informal

pressures exerted upon organizations by other organizations, cultural expectations, government mandates, legal requirements, societal pressures

o Mimetic Isomorphism – occurring in face of uncertainties, when organizations tend to choose to model themselves on other organizations, attempting to imitate their success and methods for dealing with market uncertainties and ambiguity

o Normative Isomorphism – professionalism causes isomorphic change as a result of the development of a common cognitive base by universities and the growth of professional networks that diffuse new models quickly across organizations. Particular mechanisms include: o personnel filtering due to educational background and affiliationso socialization processes within organizations o influence of central organizations


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“Each of the institutional isomorphic process can be expected to proceed in the absence of evidence that they increase internal organizational efficiency” (p.153)


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Way to Generalize: Tree Pillars of Institutionalization

Institutional Theory: Scott, 1995

Source: Loveridge (2003)

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“Institutional theory and institutional change: Introduction to the special research forum.” The Academy of Management Journal, 45 (1): 43-56.

Vibrant theory widely used in management research for explaining of both individual and organizational action

So far, key emphasis was on institutional construction and convergent change process

However, equally important but less explored is the mechanism of “deinstitutionalization”

Need to consider organizational members as active carriers of institutions (agency perspective)

Institutional Theory: Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002

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“Institutional theory and institutional change: Introduction to the special research forum.” The Academy of Management Journal, 45 (1): 43-56.

Oliver (1992) identified tree major sources of pressures on institutionalized norms and practices (deinstitutionalization):o Functional – caused by perceived problems in performance

level or utility of institutionalized practices

o Political – driven by shifts in the interests and power distribution that supported the existing institutional context

o Social – caused by differentiation of groups (e.g., diversity) or emergence of divergent practices and beliefs (e.g., caused by mergers or becoming global).

Institutional Theory: Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002

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“Follow the leader: Mimetic isomorphism and entry into new markets.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 38: 593-627.

Empirical study of the process “of organizational change through entry into new markets” (p.593) using density-dependence model of competition and legitimation

Key premiseso Density-dependence model (from organizational ecology theory):

rate of organizational founding has an inverted U-shape relationship with density:o proportional to the degree to which the organization form is legitimateo inversely proportional to the level of competitionTheory elaboration: the author applies density-dependence model to

diversification into the new marketo Mimetic Isomorphism: when faced with uncertainty, organizations

tend to imitate others, by this means “substituting institutional rules for technical rules” (p.595)

Institutional Theory: Haveman, 1993

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Key premiseso Organizations imitate organizations within the populationo Population = industry (p.596) / maybe better choice would be to

use strategic groups?o “Interactions between organizations tend to be localized along a

size gradient” (p.597)

Empirical evidenceo Savings and loan industry in Californiao Deregulation of industry allows organizations to diversify


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Key results (p.622):o “in general, thrifts do not imitate the behavior of their size

peers”

o “the number of successful organizations incumbent in a market would influence rates of market entry”

o “large organizations serve as especially strong role models for other large organizations but that highly profitable organizations serve as role models for all organizations, not just other profitable organizations”


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Conclusions from results (p.622):o “organizations attend to the actions of successful organizations

and will imitate their behavior”

o “the presence of successful incumbents in a new market will legitimate that market, making it more attractive to potential entrants”

o “as the number of successful incumbents in a new market grows, a competitive effect will swamp the legitimation effect, making entry less attractive to other organizations”


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Results from the theoretical perspective:o Support the mimetic isomorphism hypothesis (institutional theory)

o Verification of the density-dependence model (organizational ecology theory), applying it to the new context: diversification into the new market

Possible concerns:o Testing of theory on only one industry (possible idiosyncratic

features)o Contradiction to two prior studies that failed to find mimetic

isomorphismo Using only secondary financial data


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Emphasis on environmental influence on strategy (both developed and implemented)

More positive theoretical perspective

Different understanding of rationality◦ effectiveness and efficiency (e.g., profit) in structuralist perspective◦ “socially constructed” rationality (e.g., gaining legitimacy and survival) in institutional theory

Lots of practical insights, e.g. (some of them):◦ Clayton Cristensen’s “Innovators’ Dilemma” showing the necessity to break up with the

institutional rules (context) to launch disruptive innovations

◦ Strong emphasis on real effectiveness and efficiency in market economy should(???) lead to shift from “institutionalized” rationality to “real” rationality – functional pressure for deinstitutionalization

◦ Celebrated “Industry best practices” can in fact be highly rationalized institutional myths (in the form of conventional wisdom, regulatory requirements, business process models in IS, etc.)

Institutional Theory: Strategic Management Perspective

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Limitations of institutional theory applied in strategic management field:◦ Lack of normative (prescriptive) ideas◦ The obvious necessity to conduct qualitative research (inside

companies); the generally available secondary (financial and statistical) data is ususally not enough

◦ Not enough emphasis on the firm, strong bias towards environment analysis (addressed by neoinstitutional theory)

Institutional Theory: Strategic Management Perspective

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Part II. Organizational Ecology

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“Organizational ecology (also organizational demography and the population ecology of organizations) is a theoretical and empirical approach in the social sciences that is especially used in organizational studies.

Organizational ecology utilizes insights from biology, economics, and sociology, and employs statistical analysis to try and understand the conditions under which organizations emerge, grow, and die.”

Source: Wikipedia

Some authors (e.g., Barron (2003)) consider organizational ecology to be a part of more general theory, the evolutionary theory, that tries to understand “dynamic processes such as emergence of new organizations and new forms of organization, changes in organizations, and the life cycles of industries” (p.74).

Seminal paper that started the discussion in organizational ecology - Hannan, M. T. and Freeman, J. H. 1977. The population ecology of organizations. American Journal of Sociology, 82: 929-964.

Organizational Ecology: Roots and Scope

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“The population ecology of organizations.” American Journal of Sociology, 82: 929-964.

Key questions: ◦ Effects of environment on organizational structure◦ Why are there so many kinds of organizations?

Key Ideas: ◦ The dominating approach to the analysis of organization-environment

hinders the further field’s development by failing to bring ecological models to handle the questions that are “preeminently ecological”

◦ Ecological models focus on selection, while researchers in management theory so far emphasize primarily adaptation perspective

Organizational Ecology: Hannan and Freeman, 1977

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Problem of adaptation perspective: “Clearly, leaders of organizations do formulate strategies and

organizations do adapt to environmental contingencies. As a result at least some of the relationship between structure and environment must reflect adaptive behavior or learning. But there is no reason to presume that the great structural variability among organizations reflects only or even primarily adaptation.” (p.930)

Structural inertia limits the ability of organizations to adapt, and it is the main factor governing the choice between adaptation and selection models

The stronger the environmental pressure and structural inertia, “the more likely that the logic of environmental selection is appropriate” (p.931).


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Internal factors causing structural inertia:

Sunk costs

Constraints on the information received by decision makers

Internal political constraints

Historical constraints (necessity to alter the normative agreements) / close link with institutional theory


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External pressures causing structural inertia:

Legal and fiscal barriers to entry and exit from markets

External constraints on information (particularly in turbulent situations, when it is most essential)

Legitimacy constraints / close link with institutional theory

Collective rationality problem


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Unit of analysis – population of organizations

“a population of organizations consists of all the organizations within a particular boundary that have a common form” (p.936)

“an organizational form is a blueprint for organizational action, for transforming inputs into outputs” (p.935)


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Adaption as a feature of an organization in evolutionary process

The capacity to adapt is itself subject to evolution

“organizations develop the capacity to adapt at the cost of lowered performance levels in stable environments. Whether or not such adaptable organizational forms will survive (i.e., resist selection) depends on the nature of the environment and the competitive situation” (p.937)


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Two sources of isomorphism (p.939):

“nonoptimal forms are selected out of a community of organizations” - selection pressure

“organizational decision makers learn optimal responses and adjust organizational behavior accordingly” – adaptation.

Important note: different explanation of mechanisms of isomorphism comparing to institutional theory (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).


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Ecological model of competition (p.941):

X1 – population sizek1 – the capacity of the environment to support X1

r1 – natural rate of population growth

Important note: this the first version of density-dependence model


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Niche theory: “social organizations in equilibrium will exhibit structural features

that are specialized to salient features of the resource environment” (p.946) – because of isomorphism mechanisms

When the environment is not stable, the relative fitness of a company is determined by its specialism/generalism:


High Variability

Low Variability

Coarse grain Generalist Specialist

Fine grain Specialist Specialist

Source: Barron (2003), adapted from Hannan and Freeman (1989)

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“Localized competition and organizational failure in the Manhattan hotel industry, 1898-1990”

Empirical study of effect of localized competition on rates of failure in the Manhattan hotel industry

Key theoretical framework – density-dependence model (organizational ecology), adjusted:◦ The competition in the model must be localized, i.e., include only part of

the whole population, since “the potential intensity of competition between organizations is proportional to the overlap or intersection of their resource requirements” (p.581)

◦ Competition is localized on three dimensions: size, geographic location, and price

◦ Failure rate as the primary focus of analysis

Organizational Ecology: Baum and Mezias, 1992

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“Localized competition and organizational failure in the Manhattan hotel industry, 1898-1990”

Empirical evidence◦ Data on Manhattan hotels industry◦ 100-years time span◦ 593 hotels in sample

Key results◦ Intensity of competition depends on similarity in terms of size,

geographic location, and price◦ Competitors are localized within particular segments of the distribution

variation

Organizational Ecology: Baum and Mezias, 1992

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Emphasis on environmental influence on strategy

Primarily positive theoretical perspective

Complementary to IO “worldview”

Population of organizations = strategic groups ???

Multiple links with institutional theory, e.g.:◦ Institutionalization as pressure for structural inertia◦ Legitimacy

Organizational Ecology: Strategic Management Perspective

IO Organizational Ecology

Unit of analysis Firm and industry Firm and population

Focus Growth and performance Founding and failure

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Different understanding of rationality◦ effectiveness and efficiency (e.g., profit) in structuralist perspective◦ “rationality of natural selection” in organizational ecology perspective

Limitations of organizational ecology theory applied in strategic management field:◦ Lack of normative (prescriptive) ideas◦ ??? (what else?)

Organizational Ecology: Strategic Management Perspective

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Part III. Networks

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“Economic action and social structure: The problem ofembeddedness.” American Journal of Sociology, 91: 481-

510.Key questions:

◦ How behavior and institutions are affected by social relations?◦ To which extent the economic action is embedded in structures of

social relations

Key Ideas: ◦ Today there are two basic perspectives on the question of how

social relations influence economic activity: “undersocialized” – neoclassical economic view, extremely

autonomous (atomized) rational behavior in pursuit of self-interest “oversocialized” – sociological view, “the behavior and institutions to

be analyzed are so constrained by ongoing social relations that to construe them as independent is a grievous misunderstanding” (p.482)

Networks: Granovetter, 1985

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“Economic action and social structure: The problem ofembeddedness.” American Journal of Sociology, 91: 481-

510. Author’s view – both conceptions are not accurate:

◦ “A fruitful analysis of human action requires us to avoid the atomization implicit in the theoretical extremes of under- and oversocialized conceptions. Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy. Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations.” (p.487)


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“Economic action and social structure: The problem ofembeddedness.” American Journal of Sociology, 91: 481-510. Mechanisms of handling of malfeasance in economy:


“Undersocialized” perspective Efficient markets; infrequent inefficiencies are handled by “clever institutional arrangements” (p.489)

“Oversocialized” perspective Trust in society, “generalized morality”

Social network perspective Trust within networks of social relations

“The embeddedness approach to the problem of trust and order in economic life, then, threads its way between the oversocialized approach of generalized morality and the undersocialized one of impersonal, institutional arrangements by following and analyzing concrete patterns of social relations. “ (p.493)

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“Economic action and social structure: The problem ofembeddedness.” American Journal of Sociology, 91: 481-510. Discussion of markets and hierarchies research program

(Oliver Williamson’s ideas):◦ Williamson’s question: “under what circumstances economic

functions are performed within the boundaries of hierarchical firms rather than by market processes that cross these boundaries” (p.493)

◦ Williamson’s answer: “the organizational form observed in any situation is that which deals most efficiently with the cost of economic transactions” (p.493).

◦ In particular, internal hierarchy is preferred over market transactions because of market failures: “Bounded rationality” problem “Opportunism” problem


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“Economic action and social structure: The problem ofembeddedness.” American Journal of Sociology, 91: 481-510. Discussion of markets and hierarchies research program

(Oliver Williamson’s ideas):


Source: Williamson (1986), p.117

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“Economic action and social structure: The problem ofembeddedness.” American Journal of Sociology, 91: 481-510. Critique of markets and hierarchies research program:

◦ “The efficacy of hierarchical power within the firm is overplayed” (p.494)

◦ It is an “undersocialized conception that neglects the role of social relations among individuals in different firms in bringing order to economic life” (p.495)

◦ “A wedge is opened here for analysis of social structural influences on market behavior. But Williamson treats these examples as exceptions and also fails to appreciate the extent to which the dyadic relations he describes are themselves embedded in broader systems of social relations” (p.495)


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“Economic action and social structure: The problem ofembeddedness.” American Journal of Sociology, 91: 481-510.

The author's alternative to markets and hierarchies research program:◦ “I argue that the anonymous market of neoclassical models is virtually

nonexistent in economic life and that transactions of all kinds are rife with the social connections described.” (p.495)

◦ “the network of social relations within the firm might be more dense and long-lasting on the average than that existing between” (p.495)

◦ “there is evidence all around us of the extent to which business relations are mixed up with social ones” (p.495)

◦ “It is not only at top levels that firms are connected by networks of personal relations, but at all levels where transactions must take place”


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“Economic action and social structure: The problem ofembeddedness.” American Journal of Sociology, 91: 481-510.

The author's alternative to markets and hierarchies research program:◦ “the long-term relations of contractors and subcontractors, as well as the

embeddedness of those relations in a community of construction personnel, generate standards of expected behavior that not only obviate the need for but are superior to pure authority relations in discouraging malfeasance..” (p.498)

Key implication of embeddedness view for markets and hierarchies question:o “we should expect pressures toward vertical integration in a market where

transacting firms lack a network of personal relations that connects them or where such a network eventuates in conflict, disorder, opportunism, or malfeasance. On the other hand, where a stable network of relations mediates complex transactions and generates standards of behavior between firms, such pressures should be absent.” (p.503)


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“Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances.” Academy of Management Journal, 38

Key question:o What factors explain the choice of governance structures in

interfirm alliances?

Preceding theoretical view on the question

o TCE (transaction cost ecomonomics), inherited from prior vertical integration (“make-or-buy”) studies

o Problem: ignorance of trust building between the partners (e.g., in case of repeated alliances)

Networks: Gulati, 1995

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Two types of alliances:o Equity-based (hirerarchical). Key problem – costly.o Nonequity-based (market exchanges). Key problem – possible

opportunistic behavior of partners

R&D alliances are considered exceptionally risky (thus, must tend to be equity-based, according to TCE view)

Key theoretical proposition: previous experience of alliances builds trust between partners, resulting in less frequent usage of equity-based ventures in future


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Data:o 2,400 alliances in the U.S., Japan, and Europeo 1970-1989 time spano Unit of analysis – individual joint venture announced

Statistical technique:o “Logit” regression


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Results (p.105):o (1) that R&D-based alliances are more likely to be equity based than non-

R&D alliances – TCE approach prediction supported

o (2) that the larger the number of prior alliances between two firms, the less likely are their subsequent alliances to be equity based – trust approach prediction supported

o (3) that the larger the number of prior equity alliances across two firms, the less likely their subsequent alliances are to be equity based – trust approach prediction supported

o (4) that international alliances are more likely to be equity based than domestic alliances – trust approach prediction supported


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Emphasis on environmental (social networks) influence on strategy (both developed and implemented)

Positive theoretical perspective, but easy to derive practical implications

Links with organizational ecology (pressures from the network of connections), and institutional theory (networks as the source of pressure for isomorphism)

Alternative perspective on industry economics, not based on neoclassical model of rational atomic actors

Practical implications, e.g.:◦ Stakeholder management (in terms of building trust)◦ Global business

Lamitations:◦ Hard to research◦ ??? other ???

Networks: Strategic Management Perspective

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Barron, D. 2003. “Evolutionary theory” pp.74-97, in The Oxford Handbook of Strategy, v.1, Faulkner, D.O. and Campbell, A., eds, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baum, J. A. C. and Mezias, S. J. 1992. “Localized competition and organizational failure in the Manhattan hotel industry, 1898-1990”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 37: 580-84.

Dacin, MT., Goodstein, J. & W.R. Scott. 2002. “Institutional theory and institutional change: Introduction to the special research forum.” The Academy of Management Journal, 45(1): 43-56.

DiMaggio, P.J. & Powell, W.W. 1983. “The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organisational fields.” American Sociological Review, 48, 147-160.

Granovetter, M. 1985. “Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness.” American Journal of Sociology, 91: 481-510.

Gulati, R. 1995. “Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances.” Academy of Management Journal, 38: 85-112.

Haveman, H. A. 1993. “Follow the leader: Mimetic isomorphism and entry into new markets.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 38: 593-627.

Hannan, M. T. and Freeman, J. H. 1977. “The population ecology of organizations.” American Journal of Sociology, 82: 929-964.

Loveridge, R. 2003. “Institutional approaches to strategy” pp.98-131, in The Oxford Handbook of Strategy, v.1, Faulkner, D.O. and Campbell, A., eds, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Meyer, J. W. and Rowan, B. 1977. “Institutionalised organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony.” American Journal of Sociology, 83: 340-63.

Scott, W. Richard 1995. Institutions and Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Scott, W. Richard 2004a. “Institutional theory.” pp. 408-14, in Encyclopedia of Social Theory, George Ritzer, ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Scott, W. Richard 2004b. “Institutional Theory: Contributing to a Theoretical Research Program”, in Great Minds in Management: The Process of Theory Development, Ken G. Smith and Michael A. Hitt, eds. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from http://icos.groups.si.umich.edu/Institutional%20Theory%20Oxford04.pdf

Williamson, O. 1986. “Economic organization. Firms, markets, and policy control” . NY: New York University Press.

References

http://icos.groups.si.umich.edu/Institutional%20Theory%20Oxford04.pdf

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