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Volume 6, Issue 10

Soft Power and Bargaining Leverage on the KoreanPeninsula

Benedict Edward DeDominicis

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES http://www.SocialSciences-Journal.com First published in 2012 in Champaign, Illinois, USA by Common Ground Publishing LLC www.CommonGroundPublishing.com ISSN: 1833-1882 © 2012 (individual papers), the author(s) © 2012 (selection and editorial matter) Common Ground All rights reserved. Apart from fair dealing for the purposes of study, research, criticism or review as permitted under the applicable copyright legislation, no part of this work may be reproduced by any process without written permission from the publisher. For permissions and other inquiries, please contact <cg-support@commongroundpublishing.com>. THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES is peer-reviewed, supported by rigorous processes of criterion-referenced article ranking and qualitative commentary, ensuring that only intellectual work of the greatest substance and highest significance is published. Typeset in Common Ground Markup Language using CGPublisher multichannel typesetting system http://www.commongroundpublishing.com/software/

Soft Power and Bargaining Leverage on the KoreanPeninsulaBenedict Edward DeDominicis, The Catholic University of Korea, SouthKorea

Abstract: The Republic of Korea (ROK) has a significant overall diplomatic bargaining leverage ad-vantage in relation to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in shaping internationalbehavior to support or acquiesce to the ROK assuming sole representational legitimacy for thebroader Korean nation. Aside from the ROK’s direct diplomatic bargaining leverage advantages towardsthe DPRK, the ROK’s indirect leverage over the DPRK is enhanced through the ROK’s power leveragein its international diplomatic interaction with the United States and the rest of the internationalcommunity. Perceived influence capability over third countries is only one bargaining lever for com-prehending DPRK-ROK interaction, but the source of the ROK’s ability to influence these thirdcountries is significantly “soft-power” based. Soft power’s role may be understood in terms of publicopinion, legitimacy and nationalism in affecting relevant public opinion constituencies both withinthe Koreas and within these third countries. South Korea’s development has made it a national growthmodel for the rest of the post Cold War world. Its international political influence and national eco-nomic prosperity derives partly from the Cold War political bifurcation of the Korean nation, whichmade the South Korean ROK state comparatively open to external cultural, economic and politicalinfluences. North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons is comprehendible as representing acompensatory bargaining leverage response.

Keywords: Soft Power, Hard Power, Smart Power, North Korea, DPRK, South Korea, ROK, UnitedStates, Nationalism, Legitimacy, Public Opinion, Bargaining, Leverage, Diplomacy, InternationalRelations, Cold War, Hegemony, Christian, China, Russia, Neoliberal Institutional

Introduction

ACCORDING TO NYE (e.g. 2007), ‘soft’ power in the form of legitimacy cangreatly reduce the resource and operational costs of international intervention inregional disputes, civil wars, and failed states. If possible, ‘attracting’ an authorit-arian regime to democratize is more effective as part of a conflict resolution formula

than intervening militarily to coerce a state to become democratic. Due to increasing globalawareness of economic and political interdependency, soft power’s role will continue togrow relative to hard power in the era of globalization and the information revolution. Inter-national politics has increasingly become a contest of competitive demonstration of politicalcapacity as perceived by elites and publics relative to military capabilities. As more peopleincreasingly have access to information technology, the ability to share information and toshape the political opinion of targeted publics by appearing legitimate and credible becomesa continuously increasing source of attraction and power. As information about apparent

The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social SciencesVolume 6, Issue 10, 2012, http://www.SocialSciences-Journal.com, ISSN 1833-1882© Common Ground, Benedict Edward DeDominicis, All Rights Reserved, Permissions:cg-support@commongroundpublishing.com

national development successes are shared, common outlooks and approaches are promoted.1

Creating political contextual conditions so as to appear to be on the right side of nationalcollective development aspirations consequently improves the ability of the US to deal withworld security challenges.Inclusion of legitimacy and public opinion as components of ‘soft power’ diplomatic

bargaining leverage in dyadic interaction requires a theoretical framework for conceptualizingnationalism. Soft power is slower and more cumbersome to manipulate than hard powersince acquisition of soft power through legitimacy is more dependent upon the responsesand actions of other political actors, including individual-level (e.g. perceptions among thecitizenry), state-level (e.g. group constituency interests) and international-level variables(e.g. approval by other state governments and international organizations). As the failure ofUS intervention in Southeast Asia illustrated, effective political strategic planning in use offorce and other forms of hard power also requires a policy relevant understanding of thedynamic behavioral parameters of public opinion, legitimacy and nationalism within thetarget national community as well as in the community of the initiating government.2

ROK vs. DPRK Competitive International Diplomacy: ‘Hard’ and ‘Soft’Power as Bargaining LeverageCottam andGallucci (1978) provide a comprehensive framework checklist for disaggregatingand analyzing bargaining leverage in dyadic interaction (illustrated below).3

1 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “The Place of Soft Power in State-Based Conflict Management,” Leashing the Dogs of War.eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Hall, (Washington: United States of Institute of Peace,2007), 394–96.2 Demetri Sevastopulo, “Gates wants action on ‘today’s wars’,” Financial Times (5 December 2008), reportsthat the G.W. Bush Administration’s Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, would continue in this role into the newObama Administration, advocating for the promotion of US ‘soft power’ including through the subordination of“kinetic” operations to achieving the ‘good governance’ objectives necessary to undermine what he sees as thesources of discontent that support terrorist activity.3 Cottam, Richard and Gerard Gallucci, The Rehabilitation of Power in International Relations: A Working Paper,(Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1978), 9.

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Table 1: A List of Diplomatic Bargaining Levers that is All-inclusive

Bargaining Base“Active” levers:“Passive” (tacit bargaining) levers1. Perceived ability to give or withhold aid.1. Perceived public attitudes2. Perceived ability to influence the actions ofa third country.

2. Perceived possible great powerinvolvement.

3. Perceived ability to use force.3. Awareness of interdependence.4. Perceived trade opportunities.4. Perceived long term power alterations.5. Perceived ability to deal with domesticpolitical dissatisfaction.

5. Perceived economic/and/or politicalstability.

6. Perceived transnational appeal of ideology.6. Perceived irrationality of leaders.7. Perceived willingness to alter relationshiptype.

7. Perceived adverse effect on friendship.

8. Perceived likelihood of accidental war.*Cottam and Gallucci, 48–49.

Passive and active levers roughly correspond with each other. Passive levers are strongdiplomatic instruments, but their magnitude changes relatively slowly and they may beconsidered constants in this diplomatic case analysis. Active levers are variable, e.g. offermore or less economic aid. The disaggregation of diplomatic leverage into forms of activeand passive levers provides a framework for clarifying the interactive nature and role of‘soft’ as well as ‘hard’ power in international diplomatic bargaining. The application of ‘soft’power crosses active and passive leverage categories. The ‘power of attraction’ workswithin a diplomatic context of pan-Korean nationalist public opinion sentiments as well asinternational appeal as a national development model. This power of attraction is most ap-propriately understood through analysis of its application concomitantly with other sourcesof diplomatic bargaining leverage. They include the traditional ‘hard power’ leverage ofthreat and use of deadly force as well as direct economic aid incentives. The leverages arenot all equally salient in any given diplomatic negotiation. Application of particular leveragein diplomatic bargaining may impact on the salience and intensity of political context trendsthat determine the relative effectiveness of other levers, e.g. a military air strike may generatea nationalist attitudinal backlash strengthening the domestic political stability of the targetregime for a time.

Passive Levers1) Perceived public attitudes: i.e. relative intensity, salience, and orientation of pan-Koreannationalist attitudes in each target polity to which diplomatic bargainers appeal to attemptto generate public opinion pressure to sway the other. Interestingly, indications are that thestrength of pan-Korean attitudes is such that resentment towards the US exists particularlyamong younger generations who do not remember the war and deprivation of the 1950s.They manifested themselves in the form of significant doubts that North Korea was respons-

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ible for the March 2010 sinking of the ROK’s Cheonan warship, to the exasperation of theSouth Korean government.4 At least until North Korean shelling of the ROK’s Yeonpyeongisland in November 2010, public opinion surveys in the ROK showed a persistent suspicionthat the ROKmilitary or the USmilitary was responsible for the sinking among a significantsegment of the ROK public.5 As any visitor to ROK can see, the influence of Americaneconomic, political and cultural models is notable. The US-South Korea case illustrates someconsequences of US polity influence in laying the long-term foundations for mutual softpower influence relationships. The bases of American-Korean perceived shared public atti-tudinal-cultural ties that facilitate Seoul’s perceived influence capabilities towards the US(active lever #2 below) include relative success in proselytizing American protestant Chris-tianity in Korea beginning in the late nineteenth century.6 About two-thirds of Korea’sChristians lived in what became the DPRK andmany fled to the South in the ensuing turmoilof the partition.7 An explosive growth occurred in self-professed Protestant (‘Christian’ inKorean parlance) believers beginning in the 1960s concomitantly with South Korea’s rapideconomic development.8 The various Protestant sects today constitute around 20% of theSouth Korean population and another 11% self-identifies as Roman Catholic. The successof the appeal of Korea to segments of the US public is evident in the most recent reports ofChristian activists, Korean and US, openly infiltrating into the DPRK, with the aim of dis-rupting the brutally abusive human rights performance of the regime.9

North Korean public attitudes are challenging to discern due to the totalitarian, closedcontrol system. However, a wealthy Korean-American Presbyterian missionary played theleading role in establishing the first new private university in Pyongyang.10 The Presbyterian‘Somang’ and ‘Sarang’ ‘mega-churches’ in Seoul have played important roles in helping tofund and support this initiative.11 Themother of DPRK ‘founder’ Kim Il-sung was a Presby-terian deacon and a government-sanctioned church in Pyongyang is named in her honor.12

This diplomatic negotiation context is also one in which people network effectively to achieveimpressive objectives as in the example of the Somang (‘Hope’) and Sarang (‘Love’) churches.In this informal form of “Track II” diplomacy, ‘amateurs’ may also play a role in shapingthe diplomatic bargaining context.13

4 Christian Oliver, “S Korea reshuffle keeps hard line on North,” Financial Times, (8 August 2010).5 “Threats from N. Korea Reveal Generation Gap in S.Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, (9 June 2010). This report notes onepoll that indicates 20% of the South Korean public did not believe that North Korea sank the Cheonan.6 Dae Young Ryu, “The Origin and Characteristics of Evangelical Protestantism in Korea at the Turn of theTwentieth Century,” Church History, 77/2 (June 2008).7 Jane Lampman, “How Korea embraced Christianity,” The Christian Science Monitor (7 March 2007).8 Gil-Soo Han, Joy J. Han and Andrew Eungi Kim, “‘Serving Two Masters’: Protestant Churches in Korea andMoney,” International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, 9/4, (November 2009), 333–34. ‘WhiteAnglo-Saxon Protestant’ (WASP) missionaries from the US arrived in late 19th century to bring what the SouthKoreans today call “Christianity,” while Roman Catholicism initially arrived by way of Korean converts fromBeijing in the late 18th century establishing the presence of “Catholics” in Korea.9 Beaumont, Peter, “US human rights activist crosses Chinese border into North Korea: Missionary calls for KimJong-il to free political prisoners and give up power,” The Observer, (27 December 2009).10 Mark McDonald, “An Unlikely Pairing Bears Fruit in North Korea,” New York Times, (25 October 2010).11 Interviews with Somang Church parishoners in 2011. As is widely known in Korea, President Lee Myungbak is a member and supporter of Somang Church, and church services regularly conclude with a prayer forPresident Lee Myung-bak (this writer’s direct observation).12 “Windows on Asia: North Korea-Religion,” Asian Studies Center, Michigan State University,http://asia.isp.msu.edu/wbwoa/east_asia/north_korea/religion.htm.13 Diana Chigas, “Capacities and Limits of NGOs as Conflict Managers,” Leashing the Dogs of War, eds.

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2) Perceived possible great power involvement: DPRK efforts to engage China are com-prehendible as efforts to boost its leverage in negotiations with the ROK and its allies. Duringthe ColdWar the intensity of the Soviet-US conflict motivated their competition for influencein local conflicts elsewhere. A prospective US-China conflict would likely generate similardynamics. National security actors in Washington would derivatively perceive South Koreaas more important as a regional instrument for responding to the perceived challenge fromChina. Greater US interest in local allies to counter Chinese influence would consequentlyincrease the diplomatic bargaining leverage of South Korea towards the US. South Korea’simportance for the pursuit of US regional policy aims would increase as US regional com-petition with China intensifies. Similarly, the DPRK’s dependency relationship with thePRC would also manifest increasing DPRK bargaining leverage towards Beijing insofar asBeijing would increasingly see the DPRK as necessary for counteracting US influence inEast Asia. Concomitantly, the DPRK political vulnerability due to regime instability con-sequently would increase DPRK diplomatic bargaining leverage towards Beijing. Thisleveragemay be used to obtain material resources and diplomatic support in order to maintainthe political stability that is also in Beijing’s interest.14

3) Awareness of interdependence: Seoul has a great advantage in this lever in relation tothe DPRK, which relies upon international economic subsidies in various forms, includingfrom Seoul as well as fromBeijing.15 These subsidies may be necessary for the DPRK regimeto maintain itself. DPRK behavior may be understood as an attempt to compensate in nego-tiations through increasing the salience of the danger of accidental war with a nuclear-armedDPRK (discussed below) that also impacts the international business environment in Seoul.China surpassed the US as the ROK’s largest overall trading partner in 2004.16 This source

of leverage favors Washington and Beijing rather than Seoul. Seoul hopes that the mutualimportance of China-South Korean trade ties provides a powerful incentive to encourageChina at least to restrain North Korea’s bellicose behavior towards the South.17

4) Perceived long term power alterations: #2 above highlighted the bargaining leverageof the ROK and DPRK towards their respective Great Power patrons as partly dependenton the intensity of Great Power conflict. The increasing relative economic andmilitary powercapabilities of China itself is a trend interacting with the potential for intensifying politicalconflict between the US and China to increase Seoul and Pyongyang’s bargaining leveragetowards their respective Great Power patrons. Seoul’s diplomatic objectives include encour-agingWashington to continue to support a close alliance with Seoul to address the challengefrom Pyongyang while being careful not to alienate a rising Beijing. The political significanceof the recently adopted Free Trade Agreement between the US and the ROK is apparent

Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Hall, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace), 554.14 Jayshree Bajoria, “Backgrounder: The China-North Korea Relationship,”Council on Foreign Relations (7 October2010), http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097.15 Mark E. Manyin, “South Korea-U.S. Economic Relations: Cooperation, Friction, and Prospects for a FreeTrade Agreement (FTA),” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, (16 September 2005), 10.16 Manyin, 2, 9.17 Congressional Research Service, “China’s Foreign Policy and “Soft Power” in South America, Asia andAfrica,” Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, April 2008, p. 56,http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html.

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from a bargaining leverage perspective.18 In this assessment, it is comprehendible as a tac-tical move to fortify the ROK’s diplomatic bargaining leverage towards the US and a risingChina while working to promote continuing economic cooperation between China and theUS with South Korea as a regional economic nexus between the two. As noted above, theDPRK’s ability to rely on this lever in diplomatic bargaining is also significantly dependenton the state of relations between Washington and Beijing. The DPRK, consequently, has aninterest in promoting a perception of threat fromWashington among Beijing policy-makingcircles, although its capacity to do so is limited. Recent North Korean actions have led theUS navy to engage in show-of-force exercises in the Yellow Sea jointly with South Korea.19

AnAmerican naval presence in the Yellow Sea has generated varying degrees of consternationin Beijing.20Beijing’s response to the November 2010 US-ROK joint exercises in the YellowSea immediately following the DPRK’s Yeonpyeong island bombardment, however, wascomparatively restrained.21

5) Perceived economic/and/or political stability: This lever refers specifically to the legit-imacy of the regime, rather than the political stability of a particular elite ruling faction. Ageneral indicator of the degree of legitimacy is the extent and effectiveness of the role ofcoercion in the domestic political regime of the authorities in the initiating and target states.The ROK as a developed democracy has an advantage over the DPRK in this regard; theROK regime authorities successfully exploit liberal political and economic policy modelsand remain in power. On the other hand, and perhaps counter-intuitively, the DPRK’s com-parative lack of development success and consequent potential instability can be a sourceof diplomatic bargaining leverage towards the PRC, if not to the ROK, to obtain materialresources and diplomatic support. Again, the intensity of conflict between Beijing andWashington will indirectly help determine how much leverage Pyongyang may have overits own ‘superpower’ patron. Media reports regularly note intensified repression by Chineseauthorities in response to calls for a ‘jasmine revolution’ following the “Arab Spring.”22

This behavior strongly implies that the authorities in China may view the prospect of thecollapse of the DPRK regime as another source of political instability to be avoided. Politicalchange may be inevitable in the DPRK, but the Kim ruling group may use this leverage toshape this change to serve its own perceived interests.6) Perceived irrationality of leaders: evidently used intensively by the North Korean lead-

ership towards all the other parties in the Six Party talks (North and South Korea, Japan,US, Russia, PRC), in conjunction with threat of accidental war involving weapons of massdestruction. The regime authorities demonstrated their tolerance of the deaths of many hun-dreds of thousands of North Korean citizens from starvation in the 1990s rather than riskthe loss of the regime through reform. Global awareness of their collective choice arguablyreinforces this lever.

18 “South Korea says US FTA to draw China, Japan investment,” channelnewsasia.com, (22 February 2012). ROKPresident Lee Myung-bak emphasized that the ROK-US FTA would attract additional Chinese (and Japanese) in-vestment into the ROK as an access point into the US export market.19 Joseph Cotterill, “US sends aircraft carrier to Korea stand-off,” Financial Times, (24 November 2010).20 Kathrin Hille, “China and US stage Yellow Sea war games,” Financial Times, (3 September 2010).21 Christian Oliver and Geoff Dyer, “South Korean defence minister resigns,” Financial Times, (26 November2010).22 Simon Rabinovitch, “Beijing critic missing as Ai goes free,” Financial Times (23 June 2011).

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7) Perceived likelihood of accidental war: DPRK nuclear weapons possession boosts thesignificance and magnitude of this lever towards the ROK and all interlocutors but especiallytowards the US, concomitantly with “perceived irrationality of leaders.” Analysts note thatthis leverage has been successful in acquiring economic subsidies for the DPRK from theinternational community.23

8) Perceived adverse effect on friendship: refers to personal relations among foreign policydecision makers as a factor shaping negotiations. High-profile visits by former US Presidentsand others have at times contributed to significant policy outcomes.24 Determining whetheror not a significant degree of personal rapport had developed between individual personalitiesinteracting with Kim Jong-il is of course difficult. Determining whether or not the desire topreserve this rapport between him and other particular personalities had been a significantfactor in North Korean policy decisions is even more so. Aside from the personal preferencesof Kim Jong-il or his son, their decisional latitude within the North Korean political systemto act on them to change radically the DPRK’s nuclear policy was probably insignificant.25

Active Levers1) Perceived ability to give or withhold aid: clearly a major source of ROK leverage towardsthe DPRK, South Korea is also developing its reputation further through becoming an inter-national aid donor.26 South Korea’s development success allowing it to become an interna-tional aid donor also increases its soft power bargaining leverage as discussed below under“perceived transnational appeal of ideology.”2) Perceived ability to influence the actions of a third country: South Korea’s globally

perceived close relationship with the US increases its bargaining leverage towards otheractors including the DPRK. Again, the nature of the relationship between Beijing andWashington will impact on the strength of this lever for use by the DPRK and the ROK intheir negotiations with each other. To the extent the PRC is perceived in Pyongyang ascommitted to the Six Party format for negotiations over the DPRK’s nuclear program, thebargaining leverage of Washington, Seoul and Tokyo towards the DPRK is increased. Thislever also serves as a grouping into which to place the respective soft and hard power capab-ilities of the DPRK and ROK for influencing other countries in analyzing the DPRK-ROKdyadic diplomatic bargaining interaction per se. The ROK’s “soft” power “transnationalappeal of ideology” leverage towards the US includes American nationalist ideological self-identification with South Korea as a critical, costly, but successful early battle in Asia in the

23 See, for example, Andrei Lankov, “OPINION ASIA: You Can’t Teach a New Kim Old Tricks: In an unusuallywitless move, Pyongyang’s missile launch shoots down its own strategy to get food aid,” Wall Street Journal, (21March 2012). Lankov also emphasizes the critical importance of Korean nationalism in explaining the politicalbehavior of both North and South Korea, “Opinion: post-unification nationalism,” Korea Times (22 April 2012).24 Robert J. Art and Patrick N. Cronin claim that Jimmy Carter’s intervention in 1994 may well have avoided war,“Coercive Diplomacy,” Leashing the Dogs of War, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Hall,(Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 307.25 Ken E. Gause, “North Korean Civil-Military Trends: Military-First Politics to a Point,” September 2006, 6,http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/.26 Christian Oliver, “S Korea wants to be the perfect host – but success is out of its hands,” Financial Times (10November 2010).

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long Cold War containment conflict in which the US ultimately prevailed in 1991.27 TheDPRK similarly appeals to People’s Republic of China leadership ideological sensibilitiesin reiterating the great sacrifices the PRC made in the Korean War, including the loss ofMao Tse-Tung’s eldest son, Mao Anying, along with more than 183,000 other Chinese sol-diers.28 Nationalism as a value is not an ideology per se but it can associate with ideologyto intensify commitments to policy objectives, motivated by intense communal self-identi-fication with a national in-group.29 Korean “soft power” arguably includes US nationalistideological sympathy for the ROK andChinese sympathy (albeit problematic) for theDPRK.30

As noted under passive lever #1, “perceived public attitudes,” the bases of American-Koreanperceived shared cultural ties that facilitate Seoul’s perceived “soft power” influence capab-ilities towards the US also include relative success in proselytizing American protestantChristianity beginning in the late nineteenth century to the present.31

The election of Ban Ki-moon as UN Secretary General may be seen as one of theachievements of overall ROK bargaining leverage in international relations. The ROK is aclose US ally yet an ROK candidate was acceptable to the other permanent members of theUN Security Council. North Korea carried out a nuclear weapons test explosion in the midstof the final stages of the 2006 UN decision-making process that selected Ban Ki-moon asthe eighth secretary general of the United Nations.32

3) Perceived ability to use force: the DPRK leadership evidently perceived it as a relativestrength during the late 1960s and early 70s’ that subsequently deteriorated.33 The surprisesinking of the Cheonan demonstrated that it had not deteriorated as much as observers mayhave assumed.34 On the one hand, failed missile tests may undermine perceptions of DPRKmilitary technology and capabilities.35 On the other hand, the surprising speed of NorthKorea’s development of uranium enrichment capabilities which it showcased to the interna-tional media in November 2010 also strengthens this lever.36

4) Perceived trade opportunities: a significant lever for South Korea in negotiations withall countries. As noted (above) to counter ROK potential trade pressure vulnerabilities tothe DPRK’s PRC ally, the ROK-US Free Trade Agreement is comprehendible as a counter-

27 Paul D. Wolfowitz attempted to appeal to American international self-identity in advocating the maintenance ofa US military presence in Iraq: “In Korea, a model for Iraq,” New York Times (30 August 2010), providing politicalevidence of the salience of Korea in this regard.28 Aaron Back, “Remembrance as Reminder? Mao’s Son in N. Korea,”Wall Street Journal: China (26 November2010). This North Korean 60th anniversary commemoration ceremony occurred just days after the North Koreanshelling of Yeonpyeong island.29 Martha L. and Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism and Politics: the Political Behavior of Nation States ,(Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2001), 4–16.30 Benjamin Kang Lim, “China, between a rocket and a hard place on North Korea,” Reuters (10 April 2012).31 Dae Young Ryu, “The Origin and Characteristics of Evangelical Protestantism in Korea at the Turn of theTwentieth Century,” Church History, 77/2 (June 2008).32 Warre Hoge and Choe Sang-Hun, “Security Council Approves South Korean as U.N. Chief,” New York Times,(10 October 2006).33 e.g. Mitchell Lerner, “The USS Pueblo Incident,” (13 November 2002), http://web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wed_archives02fall/lerner.htm; Erik Slavin, “Tragic 1976 ax murders at Korean DMZ recalled,” Stars and Stripes (16August 2008); “DMZ-DPRK Tunnels,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/kpa-tunnels.htm. Thisperiod corresponded with the US de-escalation and end of military operations in Southeast Asia.34 “North’s New Midget Subs are Torpedo Equipped,” Korea Joongang Daily, (7 December 2010).35 “Obama: North Korea not ‘real good at’ rocket launches; failed launch still a ‘deep concern’,”Washington Post(14 April 2012).36 Daniel Dombey, “N Korea Reveals New Uranium Facility,” Financial Times (21 November 2010).

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move to raise the ROK’s value to rising China in the ROK’s current status as a partner ofthe US. The FTA arguably makes the ROK an even more important access point into theUS market for Chinese firms investing in and partnering with ROK firms.5) Perceived ability to deal with domestic political dissatisfaction: This lever refers to the

typically more specific and immediate diplomatic political context issue of the stability ofa particular government or ruling elite faction rather than to the basic issue of the legitimacyand stability of the regime (passive levers #1 and #5 above). In the DPRK case, however,the two may be so closely related that they are essentially the same: the rule of the Kimdynasty may be synonymous with the survival of the regime and the existence of the DPRKitself. North Korea’s totalitarian control system had given its authorities an advantage relativeto the ROK during the height of the Cold War. Its ability to control information access bythe population has significantly decreased.37 The disintegration and collapse of the ColdWar along with the supremacy of liberal economic globalization has contributed to the in-creasing domestic public discontent towards Kim Jong-il following the 2002 economic re-forms adopted in the DPRK.38 The strength of the DPRK control apparatus in the form ofthe state coercive apparatus would affect the strength of this lever in diplomatic negotiations,and indeed the South Korean “balloon” propaganda offensive has targeted the North Koreanmilitary.39 ROK President Lee Myung-bak had earlier suspended the ROK “sunshine dip-lomacy” approach to the DPRK of his predecessor, which had emphasized increasing eco-nomic interaction and aid to the DPRK to encourage compliancewith international communitydemands regarding the DPRK’s nuclear program.40 The increasing belligerency of the DPRKauthorities towards the ROK is arguably comprehendible according to this framework as anattempt to weaken the domestic political authority of ROK President Lee Myung-bak andhis ruling “New Frontier” party. If so, then the generally unexpected maintenance of rulingparty majority control in the 12 April 2012 ROKNational Assembly parliamentary electionswas therefore an apparent DPRK failure.41

6) Perceived transnational appeal of ideology: The post Cold War appeal of the SouthKorean national development model is a source of soft power leverage in the post Cold Warera of globalization and global capitalism in Asia and on the Korean Peninsula.42 In ROK-DPRK diplomatic bargaining, attempts to boost this lever occur when the diplomatic inter-locutors with the DPRK actively attempt to inform the North Korean public of the compar-

37 Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, “Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in NorthKorea,” International Security, 35/1, (Summer 2010) 55.38 Jiyoung Song, “The Right to Survival in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” European Journal of EastAsian Studies, 9/1 (2001) esp. 104–5.39 Mark McDonald, “N. Korea Threatens South on Balloon Propaganda,” New York Times (27 February 2011),these leaflets are most likely to be encountered by the million North Korea soldiers stationed along thedemilitarized zone (DMZ). Other forms of “psychological warfare” include South Korea’s placement ofilluminated large steel Christmas trees along the DMZ; see, for example: Matthew Cortina, “Christmas Trees Re-moved From North Korean Border as Christian Goodwill Gesture,” Christian Post, (26 December 2011), notingthat the trees were switched off a few days later as a “good will gesture” to North Korea following the death ofKim Jong-Il on 19 December 2011 while the North Korean authorities had earlier threatened “unexpected con-sequences” for the lit display.40 Donald Kirk, “As North Korea plans missile launch, South Korea’s conservatives edge out liberals,” ChristianScience Monitor (12 April 2012).41 “Unexpected Election Win for South Korea’s Ruling Party,” Deutsche Welle (12 April 2012)42 Dr. Stephen Noerper, Speaker and Moderator and Senior Vice President, The Korea Society, “Korea as a Devel-opment Model,” Transcript of Executive Breakfast, 1 December 2010.

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ative political and economic deprivation of the DPRK, especially (but not only) in relationto the ROK.43 Indirectly, it would affect ROK-DPRK interaction to the extent that the DPRKleadership perceives it as appealing internationally to influence the actions of third countries(active lever #2 above).7) Perceived willingness to alter relationship type: The relevance of this lever to intra-

Korean relations is indirect insofar that each side uses it as a lever with their respective patron:the DPRK towards China (perhaps negligible but a DPRK switch to alliance with Russia isarguably conceivable) and the ROK towards the US.44 South Korea’s political dependenceupon the US may make this option appear weak. The intensity of this lever for use by lesserpowers will co-vary with the intensity of Great Power conflict and political competition.Conceivably, the possibility of a PRC attempt to appeal to pan-Korean nationalist attitudesin the form of a promise of support for Korean reunification in return for the ROK leavingthe US alliance system is a factor that the US government has to consider in formulating itsdemands towards the South Korean government as the South Korean economy becomes in-creasingly dependent on China. The intensity of national communal motivations, whilesubdued and not so salient during periods of perceived stability, may suddenly resurge duringtimes of rapid political change/crises, as illustrated in the case of German reunification. Oncethe “unthinkable” became quite plausible in 1989 due to changes in the USSR, Germanyquickly reunified, at high economic cost to West Germans, despite trends in public opinionpolls over the previous decades indicating that West Germans, and particularly young WestGermans, had as a whole lost interest in reunification.45 The intensity of pan-Korean politicalunification sentiments among SouthKoreans in terms of their collective behavioral willingnessto accept the burden of a massive transfer of wealth to integrate the north are a topic ofspeculation in the international media.46

ConclusionAs the analytical summary above highlights, active and passive levers are products of theinteractive development of both North and South Korea with the international political systemsince national partition in 1945. In accordance with neoliberal institutionalist analysis in in-ternational relations theory, American hegemony largely creates the international politicalenvironment enabling South Korean hard and soft power capabilities.47

In diplomatic bargaining, various levers operate simultaneously and affect, negativelyand positively, each other’s effectiveness: a ‘leverage system.’48 The aim here has been tobegin to conceptualize the general concept of soft power as bargaining leverage in interna-

43 See, for example, Mark McDonald, “N. Korea Threatens South on Balloon Propaganda,” New York Times (27February 2011), in which the South Korean authorities included information about the Arab uprisings in millionsof leaflets sent by the South Korean military in February 2011.44Henry Meyer, “North Korean Leader Kim Backs Natural-Gas Pipeline, Russia Says,” Bloomberg Businessweek,(3 February 2012). Of course, if actually built, then such a pipeline would affect other DPRK bargaining leveragetowards the ROK and the rest of the world also.45 Martha L. and Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism and Politics, 128.46 See, for example, David Pilling, “The fantastical dream of a united Korea,” Financial Times (6 May 2010).47 See, for example, Arthur A. Stein, “Neoliberal Institutionalism,” The Oxford Handbook of InternationalRelations, eds. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 210–11,sec. “Coercive Cooperation: The Power of Clubs and First Movers.”48 Cottam and Gallucci, The Rehabilitation of Power, 48–49.

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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES

tional diplomacy in a comparative setting with other sources of bargaining leverage. ‘Smartpower’ as a current concept in international relations discourse is successful internationaldiplomacy that coordinates bargaining leverage application effectively with predictableconsequences and more effective planning over the short, medium and long term.49 Gener-ating predictable consequences that lowers the danger of loss of control over the politicaldynamics of a crisis is a more challenging task without a clearer understanding of the polit-ical context. This context includes unsatisfied pan-Korean nationalist public attitudes as wellas American and Chinese security and economic vested interests and communal and ideolo-gical attachments.50

About the AuthorProf. Benedict Edward DeDominicisBenDeDominicis currently lives in Seoul, South Korea. He earned his PhD in political sciencefrom the University of Pittsburgh and his BA from Ohio State University. He completed asemester of study in Moscow. Dr. DeDominicis taught at the new, USAID-funded AmericanUniversity in Bulgaria for 15 years before taking a position at the Catholic University ofKorea. His Walden University specialization includes public policy and human resourcemanagement. His research interests include Bulgaria and Southeastern Europe, Newly Inde-pendent States and Greater Middle East, American foreign policy, and the United Nations,European integration, and Korean and Northeast Asian international relations.

49 Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall, “Leashing the Dogs of War,” Leashing the Dogsof War. eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Hall, (Washington: United States of Institute ofPeace, 2007), 13. Smart power “involves the strategic use of diplomacy, persuasion, capacity building, and theprojection of power and influence in ways that are cost-effective and have political and social legitimacy.”50 Martha L. and Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism and Politics, esp. 131–33, 241–45.

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BENEDICT EDWARD DEDOMINICIS

Editor Bill Cope, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA

Editorial Advisory Board Patrick Baert, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK Norma Burgess, Syracuse University, Syracuse, USA Bill Cope, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA Peter Harvey, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia Vangelis Intzidis, University of the Aegean, Rhodes, Greece Paul James, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia Mary Kalantzis, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA Gerassimos Kouzelis, University of Athens, Athens, Greece Massimo Leone, University of Turin, Turin, Italy Alexandros-Andreas Kyrtsis, University of Athens, Athens, Greece José Luis Ortega Martín, Universidad de Granada, Granada, Spain Bertha Ochieng, University of Bradford, Bradford, UK Francisco Fernandez Palomares, Universidad de Granada, Granada, Spain Miguel A. Pereyra, Universidad de Granada, Granada, Spain Constantine D. Skordoulis, University of Athens, Athens, Greece Chad Turnbull, ESADE Business School, Barcelona, Spain Chryssi Vitsilakis-Soroniatis, University of the Aegean, Rhodes, Greece

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