some aspects of perception in old nyāya

PRADYOT KUMAR MONDAL

SOME ASPECTS OF PERCEPTION IN OLD NYAYA

Gautama in the Aphorism 1 .I .4 of Nyriya-Dar&a defmes perception as follows: Perception is that kind of cognition which arises from the contact of a sense-organ with an object, is not impregnated by words, and is unerring and well-ascertained.’ The Sanskrit term ‘pr~ty~kp’ may mean either perceptual cognition (valid or invalid) or the object of perceptual cognition or the instrument of perceptual cognition. But according to the standard interpretation of the stitr~, ‘pratyuk~’ here stands for valid perceptual cognition. Vacaspati MiSra, Jayanta Bhatta and others, accepting this interpretation, suggest that the titra is to be understood by adding to it the term ‘JJQ~Q~ (from which)’ because it is evident from the preceding szifra that Gautama clearly designs the present szitr~ to define the instrument of valid perceptual cognition.*

In the course of time the Naiyayikas have suggested rival interpretations regarding the implication and application of the terms ‘t~~yapadeSya’ (not- impregnated by words) and ‘vyuv~tiy&m&~’ (well-ascertained) occurring in this definition of perception. Some Naiyayikas think that the main purport of the inclusion of these two terms in the definition is to indicate two different types of perceptual cognition. As Vacaspati MiSta holds, the intention of Gautama behind the insertion of these two terms in the definition is to classify rather than to define perceptual cognition.3 Again, some authors, taking these two terms as defining marks of perceptual cognition, are of the opinion that all cases of perceptual cognition seem to be determinate: The purpose of the present discussion is to examine the above claims and to justify the implication of these two terms in accordance with the bh&ya of Vatsyayana.

For the sake of convenience it is better to interpret the bhtisya on the

stitra in question part by part. As regards the term ‘avyapadedya’, Vatsyiiyma

says: All the objects that are have their ‘naming-words’ (n&ruzdheyu&zbd~~). By these (naming-words) objects are as properly known (sanzpr~tygu) as

Journaloflndian Philosophy 10 (1982) 351-316. 0022-1791/82/0104-0357 $02.00. Copyright 0 1982 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.&4.

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to make usage (vyavahhz) possible. In this context one thing, however, is clear, viz., that knowledge of objects resulting from mere sense-object contact is of the form: “This colour” (nipamiti) or “This taste” (rasa-itz]. In plain language, such knowledge just refers to a colour, a taste etc. The words ‘colour’ (tipa) and ‘taste’ (rasa) are only names of the objects of such knowledge. When the knowledge is accompanied by these words, it is explicity of the form ‘knowledge of a colour, of a taste etc.“. Lest knowledge of such forms is misunderstood as knowledge derived from words @ibdaj&ina), the stitrakara has used the term ‘avyapadeiya’ as a precaution.’

The next part of the bh@ya in question presents the matter more clearly. VLtsyayana says: when the relation between the word and the corresponding object is not realised, the knowledge of the object is not caused by the use of “the naming-words”. Even if in the case of perception the relation between the word and the corresponding object is known, there is of course the knowledge that this word is the name of this object. But even then this (so-called) verbal knowledge of the (definite particular) object is not different from the sensuous direct knowledge of it that we already have. [we, in other words, know that the word in question is the name of the object which stands already perceived.] Over and above this ‘knowledge’ of the object there is no word to name (to identify) this knowledge for any use (say, for communication). [Knowledge can be identified only by naming its objects.] Thus, by adding the word ‘it? to the ‘naming-word’ of the object (the definite particular) already known, the knowledge is referred to as ‘the knowledge that it is colour’ or ‘the knowledge that it is taste’. Thus, the ‘naming-word’ has no efficacy at the time of knowing a definite particular, but it has efficacy only when we want to identify it. Therefore, the knowledge of the object resulting from sense-object-contact is not caused by words.6

As regards the term ‘vyavas@&maka’, Witsyayana says: “Having seen with the eyes an object at a distance a person can not decide whether it is smoke or dust. Lest such indecisive cognition resulting from sense-object contact pass as perceptual, perceptual knowledge (proper) is said to be definite or decisive (i.e., of a definite object).” ’ Vatsyayana refutes the view that doubt is exclusively internal to the mind. Doubt may also be external (i.e., simultaneously with, and in the context of, sense-object contact). Such doubt must be excluded from the domain of perceptual knowledge. This is why the term ‘vyavas~ytitmaka’ has been used in the definition.

PERCEPTION IN OLD NYAYA 359

II

Literally, the term ‘vyupadesjra’ means ‘associated with words’. The term ‘avyapadeiya’ is used to point out that perceptual knowledge is not so. By the term ~vpmsdydrmku’ it is meant that perceptual knowledge is of a definite particular. By the use of these two terms the Bhasyakara Vatsyayana and the Varttikakara Uddyotakara reject, on the one hand, the Sabdika view and, on the other, any form of suCz&zya being covered by the term ‘perception’. According to Bhartrhari, the exponent of the Sabdika view, there is no such consciousness in this universe as is not associated with some words.8 He holds that all our awamesses are necessarily constituted by words and also apprehended through them. This in effect means that the objects of consciousness and their names are as close to one another as to verge on identity.’ The objects and their names being thus nearly identical, there can be no consciousness (of objects) without language. In modem terminology, all consciousness involves thought in some form or other (thought being essentially linguistic). Even the dumb and the infant perceive objects along with their names known in their previous births.”

To Bhartrhari the object in thought is nothing but the meaning of a name that shapes the thought (bfZuddh&rrhQSya em vcfcyatvati). An object belongs to thought by virtue of being named. Thus thought proper begins with the stage of perception. Perception involves an element of interpretation through classification. Such classification presupposes class-concept to which the objective factor belongs. So the structure of knowledge is nothing but the naming pattern of its percept. The percept as an object of knowledge is at the same time the meaning of an expression. The unity of thought and percept is identical with the unity of meaning and expression. Seeing an unknown quadruped in a zoological garden a child asks, “What is it?” His parents reply, “It is an elephant”. The name ‘elephant’ here satisfies the query and the child is confident that he has now known the thing. So in a piece of knowledge the name of the object has as great a role as of the object

itself. It is inconceivable that somebody knows an animal such as elephant but does not know that it is called ‘elephant’. NageSa Bhatta, going a step further, disregards even the role of the objective factor in knowledge and has made a pointed reference to the fact of knowing a thing by knowing its name alone.”

The ‘name’ in Sabdika philosophy is not a physical reality consisting of

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a succession of sound-waves. The ‘name’ here is only the image of a word or a sentence.r2 Bhartrhari recognizes the reality of letter-essence, (IUP-sphofa), wordessence (pada-sphota) and sentenceessence (vriccya-sphqta). A unitary letter-essence is manifested by the many parts of the corresponding letter- sound, a unitary word-essence by the many letters that compose the word-sound, and a unitary sentence-essence by the many words that compose the sentence-sound. Each and every such letteressence, wordessence and sentenceessence is unitary, i.e., numerically one, indivisible and partless. They are not just wholes made of parts.13 A wordessence which is manifested by the successively uttered letters produces the knowledge of the object in so far as it is denoted by the word. If the oneness of a word can be said to be due to the oneness of the object denoted, it is equally the case here that even that oneness of the object denoted is due to the oneness of the word. A wordessence is an eternal non-temporal entity, anticipating a priori some object, but until and unless it has been made into a conventional designation, it cannot produce knowledge of the object.

VBtsyayana rejects the Sabdika thesis outright. According to him, the perception of an object in no way requires the knowledge of the relation between the object and its name. The dumb and the infant, who are innocent of words and their relation to objects, perceive those objects without having the knowledge of that relation. Again, those who are conversant with words, the objects that are meant and their mutual relations do not, as a matter of fact, apprehend them as identical with one another. They apprehend the words as the names of the objects. The knowledge of the relation between the objects and their names comes after the knowledge derived through bare sense-object contact. First, the sense-organ comes in contact with the object and there arises a perceptual awareness. This awareness then helps recollect the appropriate word (if we have any knowledge of the word at all). Proper perceptual knowledge, which is thus antecedent to word- involving experience can in no way own its existence to such words.

The term ‘vyavas~ycitmaku’ is meant to exclude so-called ‘perceptions in the form of doubt’ (anavadh&a~jfi&na). On perceiving the common characteristics of different objects in the object presented to sense, doubt arises in the mind about the definite nature of the object. Perception in the form of such a doubt, having fallen short of definite knowledge, must be excluded from the field of perceptual cognition proper. The inclusion of the term ‘vyavasCyrihnaka’ serves this purpose.


III

The Tatparyatikaikara Vacaspati MiSra is of the opinion that by the two terms avyapadeiya and uyavasciycitmaka the SMrakara rejects the Sibdika view and the Buddhist view respectively and intends to divide perceptual knowledge into two kinds, viz., ‘nirvikalpaka’ and ‘savikalpaka’. Sabdika philosophy denies the possibility of nirvikalpaka-pratyaksa altogether, whereas the Buddhists accept nirvikapakzz-pratyaksa alone as valid. The Naiyayikas accept the validity of both the nirvikalapka and the savikalpaka types of pratyaksa. According to the Sabdika view, there cannot be any such knowledge as ‘nirvikalpaka’. Vacaspati Mis’ra criticises this Sabdika view as follows:

First, word is alleged to be identical with the object it stands for. But what is meant by ‘word’ here? Does it mean the particular sound heard or does it mean a word-form (padasphota)? Neither of these alternatives are tenable. Nobody ever real&s any identity of the object with the eternal sphofa. So ‘word’ cannot mean ‘sphofa’. The fact, on the other hand, that the infant and the dumb can have knowledge refutes the other alternative. On the part of the infant and the dumb, knowledge is in no way due to words. It is only the objects and not the words that appear in their perception.

Secondly, it can not be said that the deaf and the dumb and the infant perceive objects with the memory-impressions of their names known in their previous births. Objects revealed in their perception are clear and distinct (vi&da), but the memory-impressions of previous births are at best vague and unclear (avis’ada). How can a vague and unclear thing be identified with a clear and distinct thing ? l4 Moreover, if the memory-impression of previous births be identified with the object, why does not the child use word when he perceives the object for the first time?

Thirdly, although words generally refer to their objects, they do not do it necessarily. Words, when accompanied by quotation marks (‘iti’ in Sanskrit), do not refer to objects but to words themselves. Moreover, if the word and its denotation were identical, the blind man would have grasped the object colour as he grasps the word “colour” and the deaf would have grasped the word “colour” when he sees object colour.r5 Thus, according to Vacaspati MiSra, by the term ‘avyapadeiya’ Gautama refutes the Sabdika view and includes nirvikalpaka-pratyakg.

- - The word vyavasayatmaka, according to Vacaspati MiSra, is used to signfiy

judgemental perception (savikalpaka-pratyaksa). Buddhist logicians like

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Diiinaga, Dharmakirti and others do not recognise the validity of judgemental perception. Diiimiga understands by ‘perception’ the knowledge in which there is no reference to any mental-construction.16 Only non-judgemental perception (nirvikarpaka-pratyaky) is free from any such mental construction. So only such perception is valid. According to Vacaspati the word ‘vyavas&y&maka’ in the sz.itra refutes such Buddhist-contention and proves that Gautama recognises constructive perception as valid. Let us consider the Buddhist thesis in some detail.

According to the Buddhists, objects of savikalpaka-pratyak!a are constructions (kalpand). Such construction is known as ‘vikaZpa’.l’ In judgemental perception we relate some unreal properties or characterizers to the exclusive particular (svaZ&qa). It happens when we impose identity where there is actually difference and when we impose difference where there is actually identity.18 According to the Buddhists such constructions may be of five types (paticavidhd kalpand). These are j&i-kalpanci, gu@-kalpand, ktiy&kalpaiU, n&wkalpami and dravya-kalpand. In cases of j&i-kalpami, guy-kalpand and kriy&kalpantf, we impose difference, whereas j&i, guy and knjui are nothing apart from the thing (i.e., the particular). There is no distinction between j&i and &itim& (that which possesses theititi), guy and gzqzavdn (that which possesses the guna), and kriyti and ktiybin (that which possesses the kriyd). But we wrongly differentiate the one from the other. In cases of dravya-kalpand and n&a-kalpand we ignore the distinction between two different dravyas (bhinna-dravyadvayo~) and between a name and the thing which is named (mima-nrimino~). Two things (dravyas) that we locate in the same locus (s&m%idhikara~yena) are in fact quite different from one another. In a judgemental knowledge like “this is a pot”, we identify “pot” with “this” but the “pot” is quite different from the “this”.

It seems that the Buddhist concept of kaZpunti has a deeper significance. It is the role of tim&kaZpati in cognition that has moved the Buddhist thinkers to a great extent. According to the Buddhist logicians, Dharmakirti and Difinaga, objects of judgemental perception are spontaneous constructions of our mind. It seems that these constructions are essentially linguistic. Our mind constructs the percepts in the capacity of thought and thought acts according to the exigencies of words. So it is the tima-kalpami that forms the basis of the other types of kalpand. The Names are divided into class-names, substantives, adjectives and verbs I9 @ti, dravya, guw, and kriyi). Such names are not contained in the objects as such (svalakgu-s).

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They are neither apprehended with them, nor inherent in them nor produced by them. The name of the object can not be found in external world like the sval&a~-s. The cognizing individual apprehends only the svalakggs and then arbitrarily applies to it (niyojatif) some kalpati-s or vikalpa-s (some features) and wrongly thinks that the vikalpa-s are really there in the objects. The cognizing individual possesses, indeed, a faculty of sense-perception (darha-vijfhina) and a faculty of imagination (vikalpa-vij&Cza). According to the Buddhists, the faculty of imagination of the individual is due to an aruidi-vikalpa-v&and, a spontaneous activity of the mind, a ‘biotic force’ (in the coinage of Stcherbatsky) responsible for the logico-grammatical structure of the empirical world. But, strangely enough, after imposing the vikalpa-s onto the svalakgna-s the individual overlooks his imaginative faculty and wrongly thinks that he really perceives the constructed whole. The individual, in fact, can perceive only the svalakqza and his perception can never transcend the nirvikalpaka level.

Uddyotakara, Vacaspati MiSra, Jayanta Bhatta and the Mimtisakas have elaborately examined and criticised the Buddhist view. They all agree in this that judgemental perception cannot be considered as invalid simply because it is judgemental. For them, judgemental perception is as passive as non- judgemental perception. According to the Naiyayikas, there are real relational wholes, i.e., the objects with all their features, in the world. They hold that there are really stable and durable objects and we directly perceive them without any kind of manipulation. In judgemental perception we perceive them related with all their properties without the aid of our imaginative faculty. The object of judgemental perception stands already synthesised in nature and do not require any sort of synthesization or supplementation. At the first moment of sense-object contact we apprehend (i) the object as it is or (ii) the features as they are or (iii) the object as it is and the features as they are without relating the one with the other (satisarg&htia). Although the objects apprehended are always endowed with features like j&i, gqa, kriyd, etc., it is only in savikalpakapratyakm that we perceive the unity, i.e., the object as qualified by their different features. When this entity is apprehended, its name with which a relation has been previously established is brought to memory. The object being designated by its name becomes the subject of communication. The different features of the object are objectively determined and force themselves on our minds. Even the remembered elements, according to the Naiyayikas, may sometimes be

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perceived with the object in an extra-ordinary manner @f&a-IakgwpratyakFa), but never in an ordinary perception.

Kumarila Bhatta also favours a similar view. In his ,!?Zokavzirttika he says that what is perceived at the fnst moment is the ‘pure object’ (sirddham vastu) shorn of all its identities and differences (anuvrttivydvrtti-rahitam), but it nevertheless contains them .*O At the next moment of savikalpaka- pratyaksa the thing appears to us as conjoined with qualities and universals.

Thus the Nyaya concept of ‘vikalpa’ is quite different from that of the Buddhists. For the Buddhists, this term is more or less synonomous with terms like ‘kalpanzi’, ‘pmtikalpa’, ‘pmpa&a’, etc. The functions like ‘imposing’, ‘constructing’, ‘manipulating’, ‘judging’, ‘synthesising’, ‘supplementing’ are so many names of the one and the same mental operation known as ‘vikaZpa’.*z The Buddhists hold that this mental operation is essentially linguistic.2* But, for the Naiyayikas, ‘vikalpa’ is in no way a mental creation. Among the five types of vikalpa-s recognised by the Buddhists, viz., nzima, j&i, guw, kriyzi and dmvya, the Naiytiyikas, barring ‘Mna’, regard all these vikalpas as ‘categories of realities’, i.e., objective realities.23 The ‘n&za-vikalpa’ is not, however, objectively real. 24 It has only conventional importance. But, even then, it is not always an imaginative construction.25 Once we accept a particular convention, a name attains some definite meaning subject to certain rules and techniques regulating that convention.

In view of the above discussion, Vacaspati concludes that the terms ‘avyapadedya’ and ‘vyavas&y&naka’ indicate two different forms of perceptual cognition (nirvikulpaka and savikalpaka respectively) and are not to be regarded as defming-marks of such cognition. The term %yavasziyzitn&ca need not be used to exclude the so-called ‘perception in the form of doubt’. Doubtful perception, being invalid, is already excluded by the term ‘avyabhic&zV. The author of the Nyayasutra-v@ti, Visanatha, also agrees to such an interpretation.26

IV

Wicaspati MiSra has explained the bh@ya in question in this line. Such an interpretation is no doubt novel. But it certainly does not agree with the interpretations given by Vatsyayana and Uddyotakara. He, however, confessed that he interpreted the szitra according to the suggestion of his teacher Trilocana.*’ Avyapadeiyata and vyavasziyzitmakutti, as these are


- - understood in the Ttitparyatlka seem to be complementary to each other. A piece of knowledge which is avyapades’ya cannot be said at the same time

- - to be vyavasayatmka. That is why, according to Vacaspati Misra, those two terms cannot at one and the same time be the defining-marks of perceptual knowledge. Such an implication is quite foreign, however, to Vatsyayana and Uddyotakara as we consider their texts.

But the question is: - Is there any inconsistency in the bhtisya for which these terms could not be treated as defining-marks of perceptual knowledge? If nothing inconsistent is found in the bh&rya, what is the use of an alternative explanation, excluding those terms from the proper definition? On the other hand, had the inclusion of those terms in the definition intended to establish any thesis that was contrary to the Nyaya system of thought, they could not but be excluded from the proper definition.

In the ordinary sense of the word ‘vyapadeiya’, it means ‘what finds expression in words’. Thus the awareness which arises from the sense-object contact and is named after its object has to be called vyapadeiye. And if the term ‘avyapudefya’ contained in the siitra is taken to deny the perceptual character of such awareness then this term should in all propriety be excluded from the definition. That perception, even as perception, can well be, and often is, named after its object (vyupadeSya), is one of the central doctrines of Nyaya epistemology. Again, that the knowledge ‘This is a pot’, arising from sense-object contact and at the same time expressible in words, is perceptual is a common Nyaya doctrine. The point is that a form of verdical awareness generated by sense-object contact can not be excluded from the field of perceptual cognition simply because it is expressible in language. On the contrary, if expressible awareness alone is unconditionally taken to be perceptual awareness then non-constructive perception would be at stake. The Tatparyatika avoids such an awkward position and protects the two different forms of perceptual knowledge - non-judgemental (nirvikalpaka) and judgemental (sauikalpaka) by the two different terms. In spite, however, of this defence of Vzlcaspati, we cannot accept his interpretation for the following reasons:

(i) He has taken the word ‘vyapadesjta’ to mean a substantive that is qualified by an attribute (vis’e.+qza-vi@ta-vife?ya 28) and, correspondingly, the term ‘avyapadesjra’ to mean what is without a substantive-attribute relation. But, clearly, this is not the literal meaning of the term, whether it is ‘uyapadefya’ or ‘avyapadesjla’.

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(ii) Such an interpretation is not in agreement with the interpretations we have in the bh&ya and the vtirttika. Uddyotakara clearly states that all the five terms contained in the definition of perceptual cognition should be regarded as its defining marks. The term indriy~rthasannikarSotpanna, e.g., rejects the perceptual character of inference, the term jiicina that of pleasure, pain etc., the term avyapadesjra, of Gbda, the term avyabhiciri of erroneous perception and the term vyavatiy&maka of doubtful perception.2g The omission of any of these terms would make the definition too wide.

(iii) Vacaspati claims that his account represents the real intention of the Bhasyakara and the Vlrttikakara. But then the question is: were it so, why did they not interpret the stitra in that way in a straightforward manner? Geniuses like the Bhasyakaira or the Varttikakara should not be pinned down to an interpretation that credits them with an intention which could not be principally theirs.

(iv) We should take note of the fact that in N.S. 1.1.4 Gautama intends to define perceptual cognition (or the means of perceptual cognition). The scope of classification could come only after a definition was fully stated. The szitra as such contains the term ‘avyabhic&i’ in between the terms ‘avyapadeiya’ and ‘vyavastiy&n&z’. This clearly indicates that the Sutrakara intended no division before the definition was to be completely stated, for had division been intended, why were not the intended two sub-classes stated consecutively without being mediated by what Vacaspati MiSra takes to be a defining mark? So we can not take it for granted that those two terms have been included in the szitra for the purpose of classification.

(v) As Govardhan P. Bhatt , in his Epistemology of the Bhaf[a School of Ptirva-Mirruinisti points out, if the s&m is interpreted as much as a definition of perception as also stating the kinds of perceptual cognition, it would be self-contradictory. The term ‘vyavas&y&maka’ means what is definite. Now if the term ‘vyavasaydtmaka’ stands for judgemental perception it would imply that non-judgemental, perception is indefinite. That, however, would mean, in turn, that it can not be regarded as knowledge, for indefinite cognition like doubt etc., is always rejected as apram& or wrong cognition in Nyaya system. Therefore, the whole titra should be understood as the definition of perception. 3o *

(vi) Moreover, Hemachandra in his Pram&a mim&hs@ tells us in so many words that Trilocana and Vacaspati MiSra have evolved a novel interpretation of the s&a, disregarding all earlier commentators3r Phambhusana Tarkavagisa,


in his second edition of Nytiya-Datiana, has remarked that such an interpretation (viz. that of Vacaspati MiSra) can not be accepted, because it is in agreement neither with the interpretation offered by the BhQyakara nor with the one by the Vlirttikak5ra.32

V

Under the circumstances it is clear that we have to fmd out some other interpretation, alternative to that of Vacaspati. The controversy regarding the exact significance of Gautama’s use of the term ‘avyapadeiya’ has been elaborately dealt with in Jayanta Bhatta’s Nyriyamfijari. His review of the various interpretations of the word ultimately leaves the responsibility for accepting any one of the views to the learned readers themselves.33 One of the views he has enumerated is that the term is used to reject the perceptuality of that knowledge which is due to both sense-object contact and word or instruction of some experienced person. According to this view, knowledge due simultaneously to senseobject contact and the utterance of word is not perceptual but derived truly from certain words used. When a person perceives an object, i.e., a jack-fruit, but does not know its name then, although he perceives the object as character&d by some of its properties, he does not perceive it as a jack-fiuit. Only, eventually, if he hears from somebody that it is called a ‘jack-fruit’ then and then only does he perceive it as a jack-fruit. In spite of the fact that such a piece of knowledge is in some respect derived from sense-object contact, it is not perceptual but derived truly from the word used. The reasons for this are as follows:

(i) In such a piece of knowledge instruction of somebody enters as the integral factor. In such cases if somebody asks the subject how he has come to know that it is a jack-fruit, the latter will spontuneously reply that he has been instructed that way by Mr. X, never that he has perceived the object as such and such.

(ii) Gautama’s definition of verbal knowledge is wide enough to allow some role of sensory elements in the body of that knowledge, but his definition of perception cautiously excludes the role of any element of Gibdajiirina from it.

(iii) Thirdly, although the apprehension of the fruit is of sensory origin yet it could not be said to be solely sensous because without the instructions

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throwing light on its name the present apprehension, i.e., apprehension of the jack-fruit as a jack-fruit would not have arisen.

The interpretation presented by Jayanta Bhatta which has been sought to be substantiated by the arguments stated above does not, however, stand the test of adequate examination. The knowledge of the definite thing called jack-fruit, when properly examined, reveals that it is perceptual rather than verbal. First, the character of an object is not always such as common people do believe it to be and formulate. For example, common people may say that a certain small reservoir of water is reserved for the use of Nandin, though, as a matter of fact, it is used by all sages.

Secondly, verbal knowledge proper, derived from CiptopadeSa, is not the same thing as what has been made to pass above under that name, viz., the knowledge of a perceived thing as a jack-fruit. In the case of knowledge of perceived thing as a jack-fruit, the ipse dixit of the person concerned only expresses the name of that object presented to the sense. It does not say anything about the object itself or about its differentia. Even in case it does that, the perception as a stronger pram&u than the ipse dixit will not permit any scope for that ipse dixit, because both refer to one and the same object at the same time.”

Thirdly, this knowledge of the object (called jack-fruit) takes place only as there is sense-object contact and does not take place when there is no such contact, whereas the ipse dixit in question has no such invariable relation with that knowledge.

Fourthly, even the common man to whom the opponent, in his account, has referred to will never call this sensory knowledge indirect as every sZb&jMna is. In the absence of the statement stating the name of the object we may not have the knowledge of the naming word. But can there be any doubt that we have the knowledge of the object presented to our sense? The knowledge of the object presented to our senses is solely due to the sense-object contact. The knowledge of the naming word only identities such knowledge and makes it communicable. Hence such a piece of knowledge should be regarded as perceptual and not verbal.

Vacaspati denies the name ‘verbal’ of any knowledge seeming to be derived simultaneously from sense-object contact and words, According to him, there are, as a matter of fact, two cognitions foisted upon one another. As we know an object (a viie?ya or a viSe.wga or their sahqg-a) through our sense-organ, this piece of knowledge is to be regarded as perceptual;


but as we use the word, say, ‘a.jack-fruit’, we only want to know the object meant by that word (nicyMz~), and, as such, this piece of knowledge should be regarded as verbal. So there can be no verbal knowledge as the joint- product of both senseobject contact and word (ubhayaja#Cr~). A piece of knowledge resulting from both senseobject contact and word-instruction may be analysed into two elements: (a) a presentative element and (b) a verbal element. The presentative element is the revelation of the object (a definite particular). The verbal element is no revelation of the object, it only denotes it. Hence in the capacity of a mere word or a name it is not at all a piece of knowledge of some definite particular.

VI

It is evident from the above discussion that there was a great deal of controversy among the traditional (prticiga) Nyaya thinkers themselves regarding the implication of the term ‘avyapadeSya’. The fact is that mere association of the naming word neither debars an apprehension of a definite particular from being perceptual nor makes it necessarily verbal.

One thing is clear from the extract of the bhasya, viz., that the term ‘uvyupadeiya’ should be regarded as the defining mark of perceptual awareness (vide notes 5 and 6). Not only non-judgemental (nirvikulpakrz) but also judgemental (savikalpuku) perception has been defined by this term in the bh&ya. The plain reading of the bh@ya reveals the fact that the word ‘uvyapadesjtu’ is synonomous with the word ‘hibda’35 and is mainly intended to save constructive perception from being merged in verbal cognition. There is apparent similarity between the verbal statement like ‘this is a cow’ and the statement conveying perceptual cognition like ‘this is a cow’. As statements both refer to the same fact, which might lead one wrongly to treat the statement conveying perceptual cognition as verbal cognition. This possibility is removed by the insertion of the term ‘avyupudesjla’. Where the verbal statement ‘this is a cow’ produces a piece of knowledge it is subject to the recollection of the meaning of a set of words ascertained by hkti and laksa@, Without the knowledge of the meaning of a set of words (with which the knower is familiar) no verbal knowledge is possible. But although the statement conveying perceptual cognition requires the knowledge of the meaning of words, perceptual cognition as such is in no way dependent on the knowledge of words. Perceptual knowledge is not word-associated at the time of its

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origin. Resulting first from the sense-object contact, judgemental perception takes the help of words (.vubdu) for identification, because there is no other possible means of identification besides words. Words only express what has been already cognised and contribute nothing to the cognition as such. A piece of knowledge due to sense-object contact thus may or may not be expressible in words. Even when it is so expressible its actual expression depends on the knowledge of the meaning of words and the ability to use them. Words have nothing to do with the origination of such apprehension, viz., perceptual cognition. So the word ‘avyupde@’ in the sense of utibdu denies the causal role of words in perceptual awareness. In other words, judgemental perception is not the same as perceptual judgement. Judgemental perception, even as perception, may be expressed in language but a perceptual judgement is always a judgement expressed in language. When an expressed judgement is understood from the point of view of a hearer it becomes a separate source of knowledge, viz., ipse dixit, in Indian philosophy. Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya in his “An Idea of Comparative Indian philosophy” has expressed a similar view. He writes: “Thought as judgement, according to Nyaya, is either the perception of a passive unity of different data (in suvikalpa-prufyukgz) in substantive-adjective relation, with the possible role of language involved (ubhihpyu) or, going beyond perception, conscious management of data through actual use of language. Indian philosophers generally understand the second phenomenon from the point of view of a hearer, not from that of the speaker.“36 Professor Gopinath Bhattacharyya also in his comments on Tarku-Sutigruhu Dipikci makes a distinction between judgemental perceptual cognition and perceptual judgement. He writes: “If by the term Ljudgement] we are to understand any cognition which has in its cognitum a differentiation between a determinans (vifeqzu) and a determinandum (vis’e?yu), then of course ‘savikalpuku’ perception is to be taken as an instance of ‘judgement’. If, however, we are to understand by ‘judgement’ a cognition which must exhibit an articulation of the cognitum as ‘subject-predicate’, then it is difficult to give a categorical answer. It will alI depend on, whether ‘subject-predicate’ (udde@u-vidheyu) is equivalent to determinandum-determinans (viiegxz-viiegzyz) or not. If it is, then ‘suvikulpuku’ is a perceptual judgement , if it is not, then ‘suvikulpuhz’ is a perception but not perceptual judgement.“37

Let us consider in this connection a case we have already discussed, viz., the knowledge of a thing as a jack-fruit, where the name ‘jack-fruit’ is learnt,

PERCEPTION IN OLD NY.iYA 371

simultaneously with our sense contact with the thing, from somebody’s instruction. In spite of this association with a word, Jayanta Bhatta has no objection against calling it perception in the sense of avyapadeiya, because, according to him, that ‘instruction by somebody’ is only an accessory to the sense-organ operating in that perception. But is not this identification of ‘the thing as a jack-fruit’ ahibda for this reason?

Our reply is ‘No’. We argue that the role of instruction here, whether simultaneous with perception or only remembered, is only extrinsic, having nothing to do with the origination of that perceptual knowledge. It is necessary only for (linguistically) identifying the object of perception which, as an object of perception, is already a definite object even before it is so linguistically identified. That perceptual knowledge of the definite object is certainly a&ibda, but not so the extrinsic linguistic identification of it as a ‘jack-fruit’. So the insertion of the term ‘avyapadesjra’ in the definition of valid perceptual cognition as such is quite justified and necessary in the sense of ‘aGbda’.

It follows from the above discussion that the earlier Naiyayikas admit neither the instrumentality (karagtva) nor the causality (kti~~+~a) of words or names in perceptual cognition. Instrumentality being a special kind of causality, the denial of causality logically implies the denial of instrumentality, but not vice versa. There is not much difference of opinion about the fact that the recollection of the names or words has no instrumentality in producing perceptual cognition of a definite object. But it seems that the Bhasyakara and other older Naiyayikas do not admit even any kind of causality of the names or words in perceiving a thing.% The reasons are mainly two: Firstly, the name or word has neither anvaya (agreement in presence) nor uyatireka (agreement in absence) relation with the perceptual cognition proper. 39 Secondly, while a cause has to be an invariable antecedent (niyataptiruavytti), th e name of an object is not one such in the case of perception of an object.

According to the Sabdikas a name is identical with the object it refers to. So, to be associated with an object is to be associated with its name. On the other hand, according to the Buddhists, the name being a ‘vikalpa’, nirvikalpaka-pratyakg is not associated with names or words, but savikalpaka-pratyaks is surely due to some association with names or words. The Naiyayikas hold that neither nirvikalpuka-pratyaks nor sauikalpaka- pratyaksa as such is due to any association with names or words. So the insertion of the term ‘avyapadeiya’ in the definition of valid perceptual

372 PRADYOT MONDAL

cognition as such, not only rejects the &ibdika view but also the Buddhist view of perception.

VII

Thus, all sorts of judgemental perception (savikalpaka-prat) are avyapadeiya, and so is non-judgemental perception (nirvikalpaka-pratyaky). The difference between them (according to Jayanta Bhatta it is the only difference) is that while the former is expressible in language the latter is not ~0.~’ The non- judgemental perceptual cognition is inexpressible not because the knower lacks the knowledge of words or the ability to use words but because the object of such cognition is beyond the reach of words. That is why even an expert orator can not express such cognition. Expressible perceptual cognition again may be either actually expressed or it may be expressible but is not actually expressed due to lack of knowledge of words or inability to express. Persons who have knowledge of words and ability to use language may well express the judgemental perceptual cognition that they have. Persons devoid of such knowledge and ability (i.e., those who are deaf and dumb) may have judgemental perceptual cognition but they can not express them.41 In both the cases, however, judgemental perceptual cognition logically presupposes some sort of non-judgemental perception.

- - Like ‘avyapadeiya’, the term ‘vyavasayatmaka’ also is to be taken as the defining mark of perceptual cognition. In Nyaya epistemology, although the term ‘pratyaksa’ in general is wide enough to include erroneous and doubtful perception, yet valid perceptual cognition (‘pratyakgz-prami) is clearly distinguished from both erroneous and doubtful perceptions. Again, although both erroneous and doubtful perceptions are known as aprarmi, each of them possesses distinct nature and scope. The term ‘avyabhicrfri’ occurring in the definition of perception, excludes erroneous perception from the purview of valid perceptual cognition. Gautama includes the term ‘vyavauiytitmaka’ in the definition of perception to exclude such dubious perception. So not only savikalpaka-pratyak!a but also nirvikalpaka-pratyak?a is covered by this term, as both the types of perceptual cognition are veridical and definite (not dubious).

The term ‘vyavasayatmaka’, however, is generally taken in the sense of determinate knowledge. In some cases the term ‘determinate’ bears a very much similar sense as ‘definite’. For this reason the Sense of the term


‘indeterminate’ is very often confused with that of the term ‘indefinite’. But the Naiyayikas would never accept ‘savikalpaka-pratyakp and ‘nirvikalpaka- pratyaksa’ as ‘definite’ and ‘indefinite’ respectively. ‘Nirvikalpaka-pratyaksa’ of the Naiyayikas can in no way be said to be indefinite. So it is better not to use the terms ‘determinate’ and ‘indeterminate’ to refer to ‘savikalpaka- pratyakg’ and ‘nirvikalpaka-pratyakg respectively in this sense. The Navya-Nyaya account of perceptual cognition, however, is different. The Navya-Naiyayikas regard ‘nirvikalpaka-pratyaksa’ as neither prati nor apraM. A separate and independent discussion may be undertaken to explain it in detail.

We may close our present discussion with affirming once again that in N.S. 1 .1.4. Gautama had only defined veridical perceptual cognition. The Siitrak%ra and the Bheyakara nowhere clearly classified perceptual cognition into non-judgemental (nirvikalpaka) and judgemental (savikalpaka). However, both types of perceptual cognition can consistently be deduced from the satra. But, for that reason, it need not be held that some part of the szitra is intended to define veridical perceptual cog&ions and some part to classify such cognitions.

Bolpur College, India

NOTE

* This, of course, does not seem to be a very solid point against Vacaspati Miira.

REFERENCES

1. “IndriyHrthasannikarsotpannam jiianam avyapdedyam avybhidri vyavasriyatmakarh pratyaksam”. N.S. 1 .1.4.

2. “Pratyak@numanopama-na&bdah pramanlni”. N.S. 1.1.3. 3. “Tatravikalpikayah padam avyapadeiyam iti savikalpikayasca vyavasayatmakam

iti”. NyayavaWkatPtparyatika (1 .1.4 p. 125). 4. “Gautama’s definition seems to regard all perceptual knowledge as determinate”.

Radhakrishnan, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 58. 5. “Yavadartham vai namadhcytiabd&, tair arthasampratyayah, arthasampratyayac

ca vyavaharah. Tatredam indriyHrthasannikarsadutpannam arthajnanam rupam iti va rasa iti evam va bhavati . . . ata aha avyapadesyam iti”. NyHyabh%sya 1.1.4.

6. “Yad idam anupayuktc s’abdlrthasambandhe ‘rthajiitinam tan na nimadheya~abdcna vyapadiiyatc . tadevam arthajnanakale sa na samakhyaSabdo vyapriyate vyavahtiakale

374 PRADYOT MONDAL

I.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12. 13.

14.

15. 16.

17.

18.

19.

20. 21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

tu vyapriyate. Tasmldasabdam arthajiianam indriyarthasannikarsotpannam iti”. Ibid., 1.1.4. “Diirlc c%ksusl hyayamartharh pa6yannavadharayati dhuma iti VP renuriti va, tadetadindriy&rtha.sannikarsotpannam anavadharanajfilnarh pratyaksarh prasajyata ityata r?ha ‘vyavaslyatmakam iti”. Ibid., 1.1.4. “Naso’sti pratyayo loke yah sabdanugamad rte /,anuviddham iva jiianam sarvam hbdena gamyate I/“. Vakyapadiya 1st. Kanda, Sloka, 123. The term ‘anuviddha’ is ambiguous, It is generally held that according to the Sabdikas the object and its naming-word are identical. But ‘anuviddha’ does not always mean complete identity. Sometimes it means co-existence and often identity in difference. “ltikartavyata Joke sarva iabda-vyap&ayH,/ yam piirvahitasamskaro balopi pratipadyate” // Vikyapadiya 1 st. Kanda Sloka, 121. “Ataeva caksusa dfsyamanam api ajfiata-bodhakam padartham ‘kim idam iti na janami’ iti vyavaharanti tadupades’eca jiiatam iti vyavaharanti”. Nagesabhatfa, Laghumatijusd p. 353. Hemanta Ganguly, Philosophy of Logical Construction, p. 35. “Pade na varna vidyante varnesvavayava na ca / vakyat padanam atyantam praviveko na kascana /j’ VaiyikarayBhtisaw-Kdrikd, - 68, p. 490. “Yugapad vaiiadyavai6adyarUpaviruddhadharmmayogena bhedaprasangat”. Nydyav&ttikata‘tparyatik& p. 127. “Yadipunaridam SabdHtmakam rtip%di bhavet . . . rupam grhniyat.” Ibid., p. 129. “Tatra pratyaksam kalpanapodhamyaj-jiianam arthe rupadau nama-jatyadi-kalpana- rahitam”. Nytiya-f+aveia (Gaekwad oriental series p. 7). “Vacya-vacakayojanH hi vikalpah” Prarnd~avlirttika-Manoratha Nandi vytti, p. 143. “THS ca kvacid abhede’pi bhedakalpanat kvacic ca bhede’pyabhedakalpanat kalpana ucyante.” Nycyamafijari, p. 123. “Kalpana or conceptualization is, according to Dignaga, cithcr adding a propername, such as “this is Dittha”, or adding a general name, such as “This is a cow”, or adding a quality-name such as “this is white”, or adding a motion-name, such as “this is cooking”, or adding a substance-name, i.e., qualifying it with a substance, as in “this has horns”. B. K. Matilal (Nyiyaeirttikatllrporyatik&) p. 463. ilokavcfrttika, PratyakSasiitra, V, 118. The term ‘vikalpa’ roughly corresponds to William James’s ‘conceiving state of mind’, William James, Psychology (1) p. 461. “Vikalpa-s in Savikalpa-pratyaksa are either thought forms or language forms and neither of them reprcscnts anything that is really thcrc.” - “An idea of comparative Indian philosophy”, Dr. Kalidas Bhatfacharyya, p. 62. All India Oriental Conference, Santiniketan, 1980. “Vikalpa-s are very much vyapara-r for the cognition caused by sense object contact and nothing else. (tasmad indryarthasannikarsalabdhajanmano vikalpa darsanavya- pariinanya iti yuktam utpaiyamah) Nyiyavirttikattitparyatikd, p. 141. “The inclusion of ‘name’ (nama) under ‘vikalpa’ seems to bc unauthorised from the stand point of the Nyaya-School”. Comments on Tarka-Samgraha Dip&& Prof. Gopinath Bhattacharyya, p. 176. “Adding of names etc., is not always imaginative construction, because there is


no incompatibility between a judgement’s being produced by a sensory stimulus and its revealing the connection of its object with names, etc.” B. K. Matilal, summary of Nydyavrfrttikat&paryatik& p. 462.

26. “Tasya vibhggah avyapadeiyam vyavasayatmakam iti nirvikalpakam savikalpakanceti dvividham pratyaksam ityarthah”. NydyasPtra-vctti - N.S. 1.1.4.

27. “Trilocanagurunnitamarganugamanonmukhaih / Yathamanarir yathhastu vyakhyatam idam id$am”//. Nyliyav@rttikatdtparyatlka, p. 133.

28. “Tatkarma vyapadeiyam visesyam iti yabat”. Ibid., p. 125. 29. “Samastam ity %ha yasmadekaso’numana sukhas’abdaviparyayasarhsayajfi%nani

nivartyanta-iti”. NyrSyavrirttika 1.1.4 p. 39. 30. Govardhan P. Bhatt, Epistemology of the Bh@a School of firvamimliritsti p. 154. 31. “Atra ca purvacaryakrtavyakhyabaimukhyena samkhyavadbhis-

trilocanavacaspatipramukhair ayam arthaQ samarthitah . .” Hemachandra, Pram&a-MimdnisZ p. 36.

32. Phanibhusana Tarkavagisa, NyZyadars~na (2nd edition, Pratyaksa sltra). 33. “ltyidryamataniha dariitani yathagamam, yadebhyah satyamabhati

sabhyastadabalambyat~m”. Nyliyamaiijari p. 94. 34. “6 ceyam pramitih pratyaksapari” NyCyabhiFya - 1.1.3. When one and the same

object could be perceived through sense-object contact and known equally through any other pram@a, perception holds the field and does not allow any scope for those other pram&-s. This is the famous Nygya-maxim which has been recognised by other systems also.

35. The term ‘afn‘bda’ here means ‘not caused by words’. But it seems that even any association with names or words of perceptual cognition at the time of its origin has been denied by this term.

36. “An Idea of Comparative Indian Philosophy” - Prof. Kalidas Bhattacharyya (Ah India Oriental Conference, Santiniketan 1980) p. 80 (Note 4).

31. Prof. Gopinath Bhattacharyya - Tarkasatigraha Dipika on Tarkasatigraha with a translation in English and notes (1976) p. 176.

38. B. K. Matilal, summary of Nycfyanirttikat&paryatik& p. 462. 39. According to the Nyaya-epistemology, the name is not a vis’e?qa but an upalak;ap.

The relation holding between the name and the named is neither identity (tidctmya) nor causality (tadutpatti), nor characterisation (viiesana-viiesyabhtiva) but a special relation of referring (Gcya-vccuka-satisarga), arbitrarily established by convention (saniketa).

40. “Tasmid ya eva vastvatma savikalpasya gocarah / sa eva nirvikalpasya iabdollekhavivarjjitah//” Nyayamafrjari, p. 144.

41. “Anyatha balamlkadinam nendriyajah syadvikalpah BabdasmarnabhavHt”. Nyciyavirttikatdtpuryatik6, p. 138.

42. “Tatprams na prama na’pi bhramah syannirvikalpakam”. NyciyasiddhrSntamuktZvali, V. 135, p. 484.

The page-numbers noted above are in accordance with the texts mentioned in bibliography.

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376 PRADYOT MONDAL

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some aspects of perception in old nyāya

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