some presuppositions

Some Presuppositions

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TheEvidentialForceofReligiousExperienceCarolineFranksDavis

Printpublicationdate:1999PrintISBN-13:9780198250012PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:October2011DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250012.001.0001

SomePresuppositions

CarolineFranksDavis

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250012.003.0002

AbstractandKeywords

Manyphilosophersandtheologianswhoarethemselvesreligiousseereligiousexperiencesascompletelynon-cognitiveandhenceuselessasevidenceforanythingbeyondthesubject'sownpsychologicalstates.Thisviewisusuallyboundupwitharadicallydemythologisedornon-realistpictureofreligiouslanguage.Inordertoinvestigatereligiousexperienceasevidenceforsomethingbeyondpurelyautobiographicalclaims,itisimportanttodefendthepresuppositionthatreligiousexperiencesandreligiousutterancescanandoughttobetreatedascapableofhavingcognitivecontent.Thischapterexaminestheviewsofthosewhoaresympathetictoreligionandwhoyetmaintainthatreligiousutterancesarenotintendedtobefactualassertions.Theroleofmodelsandmetaphorsindescribingreligiousexperienceisalsodiscussed.

Keywords:religiousexperiences,criticalrealism,evidence,religiousutterances,cognitiveaspects,religiouslanguage,models,metaphors


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1.Non-cognitiveViewsofReligiousExperienceManyphilosophersandtheologianswhoarethemselvesreligiousseereligiousexperiencesascompletelynon-cognitiveandhenceuselessasevidenceforanythingbeyondthesubject'sownpsychologicalstates.Thisviewisusuallyboundupwitharadicallydemythologizedornon-realistpictureofreligiouslanguage.Inorderforaninvestigationofreligiousexperienceasevidenceforsomethingbeyondpurelyautobiographicalclaimstogetofftheground,wemustdefendthepresuppositionthatreligiousexperiencesandreligiousutterancescanandoughttobetreatedascapableofhavingcognitivecontent.

Iwillnotdealherewiththeaccountwhichlogicalpositivistshostiletoreligionhavegivenofreligiousutterances,accordingtowhichtheyaremeaninglessoratleastnotfactualassertions.Thevariousformsoftheverificationistprinciplehavebeenarguedagainstsoeffectivelybysomanyphilosophersthatyetanotherrefutationwouldbesuperfluous.Ofinterestherearetheviewsofthosewhoaresympathetictoreligionandwhoyetmaintainthatreligiousutterancesarenotintendedtobefactualassertions.Theseviewsmaytakethreeforms.(i)Religiousexperiencesoccurwithintheframeworkofanautonomouslanguage-game.(ii)Religiousutteranceshaveanemotiveorconativefunction,butnotacognitivefunction.Experienceswhicharedescribedasdirectperceptionsofsome‘supernatural’stateofaffairsshouldbegivendemythologizeddescriptions.(iii)Religiousexperiences,particularlyofthenuminousandmysticalvarieties,areradicallyineffable,andsotherearenoverballyexpressibleclaimsforwhichtheycouldbeevidence.

(i)Thelanguage-gameviewofreligiousutterances(whichincludereportsofreligiousexperiences)originatedwithWittgenstein,andisnowheldbysuchphilosophersasD.Z.Phillips.Onthisview,religiousexperiencescouldbeusedas‘evidence’for(p.6)doctrineswithinonelanguage-gameiftheyconformedtotherulesofthegame,buttheycouldnotbeconsideredveridicalorevenbeassessedatallfromtheviewpointofanotherlanguage-gamesuchasscience,orhumanism.Thisviewoflanguagedoescontainsomeimportantinsights:asweshallseelater,someaspectsofreligiousexperiencescanonlybeappreciatedifoneunderstandssomethingofthespecifictraditionsoutofwhichtheyemerged,justasonecanonlyunderstandwhatcountsasa‘goal’insoccerifoneunderstandstherulesofthegame;andthespecificcriteriabywhichoneassessesexperiencesofordinarysenseperceptionarcnotallapplicabletoreligiousexperience(seeChapterIII.3).Butathoroughgoinglanguage-gameinterpretationofreligiousutterancesdoesnotdojusticetothefacts.Thereisnotspaceheretoargueagainstsuchaninterpretation—thathasbeendoneelsewhere1—butthesefewremarksshouldshowwhyIdonotconsideritthebestapproachtoreligiousexperience,(a)Onthelanguage-gameview,thereoughttobenotjustonelanguage-gamecalled‘religion’,butoneforeachdifferentreligioustradition.Theradicalculturalrelativismthusenvisagedoughttoprecludeanydialoguebetweenthetraditions.Suchdialoguehas,however,provedpossible,(b)Certainreligiousinsightsareconsideredsuperiortoothersonthebasisofcriteriawhichweapplytonon-religiousinsightsaswell(e.g.coherence).(c)Thelanguage-gameviewisultimatelyprescriptiveratherthandescriptive.Subjectsofreligiousexperiencesusuallyconsiderthemtobetrulyreality-depictingandtheirreligiousclaims


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tobevaliduniversally,notvalidjustfortheplayersofonelanguage-game.

(ii)Itwasverycommoninthewakeofthelogicalpositivistattackonreligiouslanguageforphilosopherssympathetictoreligiontopointoutthatmeaningisnotdeterminedbyverifyingobservationsorproceduresalone,butalsobytheusetowhichlanguageisput.2Religiouslanguagemayhaveanemotivefunctionwhichgivesitsutterancesmeaning;likelaughterorasong,itcanexpressandelicitfeelings.Anapparentlyassertivestatementsuchas“theuniverseisthehandiworkofGod”canarouseinthehearera(p.7) senseofwonderattheworldandafeelingfortheintrinsicworthofall‘creation’.Religiouslanguagemayalsohaveaconativefunction;likeapromise,itcanexpressacommitmenttoacertaincourseofaction.Astatementapparentlyentailingtheexistenceofatranscendentbeing,suchas“IloveGod”,mightexpresstheintentiontofollowareligiouswayoflifeinvolvingloveofone'sneighbourandsoon.

Theseareimportantnon-cognitivefunctionsofreligiouslanguage,butsomephilosophersofreligionconsiderthemtheonlyfunctionsofreligiouslanguage.Theythusdenythetwostatementsaboveanyfactualsignificance.R.B.Braithwaitewrites,forinstance,inawell-knownlecture,that

areligiousbeliefisanintentiontobehaveinacertainway(moralbelief)togetherwiththeentertainmentofcertainstoriesassociatedwiththeintentioninthemindofthebeliever.3

The‘stories’or‘parables’neednotbebelievedtobeeffective;novelsmaybejustaseffectiveasbiographiesatinspiringgoodbehaviour.Ostensiblyfactualassertionssuchas“Jesusrosefromthedead”,itisclaimed,donotimpartinformation;theyonlyencouragemorality.BelievingthatsomethingisthewillofGod,forinstance,maymakeitmucheasierforapersontodoit.

Themostexplicitapplicationofsuchnon-cognitiveviewsofreligiouslanguagetoreligiousexperienceisthatfoundinT.R.Mliles'sbook,ReligiousExperience.4ForMiles,religionis“silencequalifiedbyparables”,andreligiousexperiencesarethoseexperienceswhichoccurwhenthesubject‘triestocometotermswithcosmicissues’.Theymaybedescribedusingthevividandcompellingimageryofreligiousmyths,buttobeseenintheirtruelightthedescriptionsshouldberadicallydemythologized,leavingoutreferenceevento“God”.Theydonothingsoabsurdasto‘putpeopleintouchwithanon-materialworld’.Rather,theirrealvalueliesinthewaytheyilluminateone'sunderstandingofoneself,one'srelationtoothers,andone'splaceintheworld.An“experienceofGod”meansanexperienceofloveorasenseof‘holiness’intheworld,expressibleintermsoftheworldandhumanbeings;an“experienceoftheVirginMary”shouldbeunderstoodasaparable(p.8) ratherthanasavisionofapersonwhowasalivemanycenturiesago;andan“experienceoftherisenChrist”shouldbeseenasthesubject's‘recognitionofthecompellingnatureofthedemandtocarryJesusinhisheart’ratherthanasanythingtodowitha‘spiritualbody’ofChrist.Toaskwhetherareligiousexperiencewasveridicalwould,onMiles'sview,showasmuchinsensitivitytothetruenatureofsuchexperiencesasaskingwhethersomepoeticutterancewasliterallytrue


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wouldshowtothenatureandfunctionofpoetry.

Again,thereismuchthatisusefulinthese‘non-cognitive’accounts,particularlyintheircondemnationofacruderealism.Butasgeneralaccountsofreligiouslanguageandexperience,theyareunsatisfactory,forthefollowingreasons.

(a)Theemotiveandconativeimportofareligiousutteranceareoftenparasiticuponitsdescriptivecontent.Religiousutterancesarenotallstringsofnonsensesyllableslike“Wow!';itisthedescriptivecontentwhichelicitstheresponse.Wearemovedtorecognizetheintrinsicworthofallthingsby“theuniverseisthehandiworkofGod”becauseofwhatittellsusabouttheworldandGod'srelationshiptoit;Isaiah'sterribleimageryleadstoreformbecauseitistakentobethedescriptionofanangryGod;theassertion,“Godsolovedtheworld,thathegavehisonly-begottenSon…”inspiresasenseofsecuritybecauseofthebeliefthattherereallyisadivinepowerofinfinitelovesomehowatworkintheworld,inourlives.Themeaningofsuchreligiousutterancescannotconsistentirelyintheirconativeoremotivefunction.(b)Itfollowsfromthepreviouspointthatapersonwhoholdsthatreligiousutterancesandexperiencesarenon-cognitivemustalsoclaim,firstly,thattheutterancesoftenarenotmerelyexclamationsordeclarationsofintentbut‘usefulfictions’whichonlyguideusbecauseweactasiftheyweretrueinsomeway,and,secondly,thatreligiousexperiencesarewidelymisinterpretedbytheirsubjectsasifthoseusefulfictionsweretrue.Butwhyshouldweusesuchontologicallyandspirituallymisleading‘parables’todescribeourmoralconvictionsandour‘comingtotermswithcosmicissues’?Whythinkintermsofreligionscategoriesatall?AsIanBarboursays,“Itwouldbeunreasonabletoadoptorrecommendawayoflifeunlessonebelievesthattheuniverseisofsuchacharacterthatthiswayoflifeisappropriate.”5Amature(p.9) personoughttofindotheraidstohisorhermoralbehaviourthan‘parables’whichgiveunacceptablereasonsforthatbehaviourandwhichevenenjoinbehaviour(suchasworship)whichwouldbepointlessunlessthe‘parable’werereality-depictingtosomeextent.Bythesametoken,thegood‘fruits’ofreligiousexperience,suchaspeaceandrenewedhope,maybeoutweighedbythedisadvantagesofthefalsebeliefswhichsuchexperiencestendtoinduceintheirsubjects.Religiousexperiencesandbeliefsmayevenbedangerous,instillinginthesubjectafalsesenseofsecurity.Thereseemstobelittlereasonforproponentsofthisaccountofreligiouslanguageandexperiencetoremain‘religious’.(c)AnysurveyofreligiousexperienceswillshowthatanaccountsuchasMiles'sisprescriptiveratherthandescriptive;peopledotaketheirexperiencestogivethemaccesstosomethingbeyondthematerialworld.Reportsofexperiencescanusuallybe‘demythologized’tosomeextent,butoftena‘senseofpresence’remainswhichMileswouldnotbeabletogetridofwithoutclassifyingtheexperienceasillusoryinsomefundamentalway.Weareattemptingtoevaluatepeople'sreligiousexperiencesasevidencefortheirreligiousclaimswithasfewcontroversialpresuppositionsaspossible;religiousexperiencesmustthusbe


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takeninthefirstinstancejust‘astheyappearedtothesubject’.ToimposewhatNinianSmartcallsa‘hetero-interpretation’6onthemfromtheoutsetwouldbetobiastheinquiryandbegmanyquestions.Itistruethatsubjectsofreligiousexperienceoftenclaimthatthe‘fruits’ofanexperience,suchasthenewabilityitgivesthemtocopewithlife,arefarmoreimportantthananycognitivecontent.Theymayfeelthatthecognitivecontentisinsignificantbecauseitistakenforgranted,ortheymayfeelthattoconcentrateonitinan‘academicexercise’doesnotdojusticetothepracticalimportanceoftheexperiencesintheirlives.However,aslongasthereissomeallegedcontent,suchexperiencesarevaliddataforthisstudy—andthe‘fruits’willnotbeignored(seeespeciallyChapterIX).(d)Miles'sviewimpliesthatthereligiouspersonmustchoosebetweenradicaldemythologizationandarathercrudebeliefinasupernaturalbeingwhoperformsmiraclesandmakeshiswillknowninvisionsandvoices.Thisistoostrongadichotomy;therearemanyshadesofreligiousunderstandingbetweenthenon-cognitiveandthenaïvelyliteral.Thenextsectionexpoundsa(p.10)‘criticalrealist’viewofreligiouslanguagewhichdoesawaywiththatcrudedichotomyandprovidesamoresensitiveunderstandingofreligiouslanguageandexperience.

2.CriticalRealismItiswidelyacceptedthatreligiouslanguageshouldnotbeunderstoodatanaïvelyliterallevel,andmuchhasbeenwrittenontherolewhichmodels,metaphors,myths,andothernon-literalelementsplayinreligiousthought.Whatisnotsowidelyacceptedisthepossibilitythatirreduciblymetaphoricalutterancescanthemselvesstatetruthsabouttheworld.IfonecanneverspeakofGodinliteralterms,itisargued,thentheword“God”doesnotreallyrefer,andallegedstatementsaboutGodmustmerelyhavenon-cognitivefunctions.Againstthis,the“criticalrealist”accountmaintainsthatmodelsandmetaphorscanhaveimportantcognitivefunctions,andthatitisnotnecessaryto“breakoutofthecircleofmetaphor”ifone'sstatements(religiousorotherwise)aretobereality-depicting.Apersonmaythusfinditimpossibletodescribeareligiousexperiencewithoutrecoursetoreligiousmodelsandmetaphors,andyetbedescribingaveridicalperceptualexperience.

Icandonomoreherethangiveaverybriefsketchof“criticalrealism”.Foramoredetailedexposition,thereadershouldturntosuchworksasIanBarbour'sMyths,ModelsandParadigmsandJanetMartinSoskice'sMetaphorandReligiousLanguage.7Thelatterisanespeciallygoodaccount,andIwillfollowitcloselyhere.

Itisimportanttorecognizethattheproblemofirreduciblemodelsandmetaphorsisnotuniquetoreligion.BothSoskiceandBarbourshow,forinstance,thatmodelsareasindispensabletoscienceastheyaretoreligion;eveninscience,theyaremuchmorethanusefulfictionsorheuristicdeviceswhichcanbediscardedonceatheoryhasbeenformalized.Scientificmodelssuchasthe‘billiardball’modelofgasmoleculesaidtheinterpretationofdata,suggestavenuesforfurtherresearch,andareviewedby


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scientistsas(inadequateandsymbolic)representationsofanaspectofreality.8(p.11)Moreover,bothscienceandreligionrelyonamultiplicityofmodelsintension;individualmodelsarerarely“descriptivelyprivileged”.9Modelsinteract,supplementing,complementing,andlimitingeachother,generatingfruitfulquestionsforresearchandpreventingthedevelopmentofinappropriateanalogies(inreligion,forinstance,themodelofGodas‘spirit’showsthatthephysicalaspectsofthe‘fatherhood’modelareinapplicable).BarbourevensuggeststhatthemodelsofGodasimmanentandpersonalontheonehandandtranscendentandimpersonalontheother(traitstypicallyrevealedbynuminousandmysticalexperiencesrespectively;seeChapterVII)mayhavethesamesortofcomplementaryrelationasthewaveandparticlemodelsoflighthaveinphysics.10

Irreduciblymetaphoricalstatementsarenotuniquetoreligion,either.11Itshouldbepointedoutfirstofallthatsuchstatementsneednotresistallattemptsatclarification.Onemaynotbeabletopointtotheintendedreferentortoparaphrasetheminliterallanguage(whichusestermsintheirstandard,familiarsenses),butitisusuallypossibletorephraseorexplainthemintermsofother,lessobscuremetaphors.Thedistinctionbetween‘literallanguage’and‘metaphor’isinanycasesomewhatvague:somemetaphorshavebecomesofamiliarthattheyarenowregardedasliteralterms(e.g.the‘stem’ofaglass)andhavelostmostoftheiroriginalassociations(suchtermsare‘deadmetaphors’—itselfagoodmetaphor!).Even‘reducible’metaphors(e.g.‘shipofthedesert’)cannotnormallybetranslatedintoliterallanguagewithoutsomelossofcontent,sinceoneisstrippingoffasubtleandpotentiallyvastnetworkofassociations.Butoftenwecannotputourapprehensionsoftheworld(betheysecularorreligious)intolanguageatallwithoutusingmetaphors,employingexistinglinguistictermsinanewcontext.AsSoskicepointsout,itisamistaketoviewmetaphorsasnothingmorethancolourfuloremotivelinguisticornaments,ortoseemetaphoricalsentencesasutteranceswhichcannot“really”betrueuntiltheyareexpressedinliteralterms.Metaphorsoftenfunctionasvehiclesofcognitiveinformationwhichcannotbeconveyedinanyotherway.Theymay,forinstance,fillthelexicalgapwhensomethingisinventedor(p.12)discovered(‘whitenoise’),suggestanewwayoflookingatthings(‘rosy-fingereddawn’),guideinvestigationintothenatureofsomething(the‘flow’ofelectricity),describe‘private’experiences(a‘sharp’pain),ordescribeexperienceswhichfewhavehadandforwhichthereforefewstandardtermsareavailable(aseeingpersoninablindcommunitytryingtodescribecolour).Thoughthetermsareusedinnon-standardways,theyareunderstoodasmetaphorswithinthecontextofthespeaker'sintentions,theparticularsituation,andthesharedsetofassociationswhichbothspeakerandhearerbringtothediscourse;12theyrequireallparticipantsto“gobeyondthewordsgiven”.(Wewillseeinalaterchapterhowallperceptioninvolves‘goingbeyondtheinformationgiven’;itishardlysurprisingthatunderstandingspeechinvolvesthistoo.)

Itisoftenmaintainedthatsuccessfulreferencetoanobjectrequiresliteralandaccuratedescriptionsofthatobject,andthatthisisimpossibleinthecaseof‘God’.Ithasbeenshown,however,thatdescriptionsdonotneedtobeliteral,exhaustive,orunrevisablcbeforeaspeakercanusethemtorefer.Events,experiences,andotherphenomenamaybe‘dubbed’beforetheirnatureisproperlyunderstood,butthetermusedcontinuesto


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referasthetheoriesaboutitarechangedandcorrected13(unlessitmustbecompletelyabandoned,as“phlogiston”was).Donnellan'sexample,inwhichonesuccessfullyreferstoacertainmanby“themandrinkingamartini”despitethefactthatheisactuallydrinkingwater,14andKripke's‘Columbus’examplebothshowthatinanappropriatecontext,incorrectdescriptionscanrefer:

inKripke'sexample,aspeakerwhoknowsofColumbusonlythathewasthemanwhodiscoveredthattheworldwasroundorthathediscoveredAmericareallyreferswhenhementionsColumbus,eventhoughColumbusdidneitherofthesethings.Thereasonthespeakerrefershere,eventhoughallhisparticularbeliefsaboutColumbusareincorrect,isbecausetherelevantlinguisticcompetencedoesnotinvolveanunequivocalknowledge,butratherdependsonthefactthatthespeakerisamemberofalinguisticcommunitywhichhaspassedthenamefromlinktolink.15

(p.13) Linguisticcontinuity,sharedassociations,andcausallinkswithexperiencesandeventscanallenablethegroundingofareference.MetaphoricalandinadequatereferencestoGodcanthusbeconsideredtobereality-depictingiftheyaregroundedincommunityhistoryandexperiences.

Modelsandmetaphorsareoftenverycloselyrelated.Somemetaphorssuggestexplanatorymodels(e.g.the‘flow’ofelectricity,mentionedabove);othersaregeneratedbymodels(themodelofthebrainasacomputerhasspawnedmanysuchmetaphors).Manymetaphoricaldescriptionsofreligiousexperiencescanbeunderstoodintermsofmodels,andmanygroundbreakingreligiousinsightshaveconsistedinthesuggestionofanewmodelofdivinity,whichthengeneratesnewmetaphors.

Overtime,inbothreligiousandsecularspheres,anetworkofinterlockingmodelsandmetaphors,richinassociations,becomesembeddedincommunitytradition.Thesemodelshavebeenselectedbythecommunityasparticularlyappropriatetotheirexperience;theyarecontinuallyrevisedandembellished,oftenacquiringnewandilluminatingassociations.16Theymayalsobecompletelyoverthrown,iftheycometobeseenasirrelevantorincorrect.Modelsandmetaphorsconsideredappropriatebyonegenerationmayberejectedbythenext;thoseappropriatewithinoneculturalcommunitymayberejectedbyanother;newexperiences,newknowledge,changingsocialconditions,andtheideasofinfluentialindividualsmayleadtorevisions.Amodeloriginallygroundedinexperiencemaybecomesoembeddedinacommunityandsoreworkedthatmostpeoplehavenoknowledgeofitssources;inbothreligionandscience,“werelyonauthoritativemembersofourcommunitytogroundreferringexpressions”.17

Religiousdescriptionsareusuallyrecognizedasbeing‘inadequate’aswellasirreduciblymetaphorical—forhowcouldourlimitedlanguageadequatelydescribe‘ultimatereality’?Noonemodelormetaphorcapturesallitsaspects.Yet,asthissectionhaspointedout(andSoskicehasshown),singlemodelsarerarelydescriptivelyprivileged;metaphorical,inadequate,andeveninaccuratedescriptionsmaysuccessfullyrefer;andwherereferenceis(p.14) groundedinexperience,linguisticcontinuity,andshared


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associations,religiousmetaphorscanbeunderstoodas‘reality-depicting’.‘Criticalrealism’thusavoidsboththenaїverealist'sunsupportableclaimsabouttheprimacyandincorrigibilityofaparticularmodelofGod(togetherwithpossibledangersofanthropomorphism)andthenon-cognitivist'sradicalprogrammeofdemythologization,whichreducesreportsofreligiousexperiencestopoeticallyembellishedstatementsaboutthehumancondition.

Thisisnottosaythatallreligiouslanguageismetaphorical,northatalldescriptionsofreligiousexperiencesare.Termsareoftenusedinverystraightforwardways—e.g.“Ihadavisionofacross”,“Ifeltacomfortingpresence”.Norisittosaythatwhenmetaphorsareused,theyarealwaysoftheirreduciblekind—“Myheartburnedwithlove”and“I…havemy‘spiritual’batteriesrecharged”,18forexample,usereduciblemetaphors.Anditcertainlydoesnotimplythatquasi-physicalvisionsareonlynaïverealists'misinterpretationsofexperiences.Forinstance,apersonmayhaveavisionofGodasamightyking,use‘mightyking’non-metaphoricallyinthedescriptionofhisexperience,andyetrealizethathisvisiononlytookthatformbecausehiscommunityuses‘kingship’asonemodelforGod.

3.TheIneffabilityofReligiousExperiencesWemustnowdealwithclaim(iii),theclaimthatreligiousexperiences,particularlythenuminousandmysticalonesusuallyappealedtomostinargumentsfromreligiousexperience,aresoradicallyineffablethatnocognitiveclaimscanbebasedonthem.Thenon-cognitiveviewsofreligiouslanguagejustexaminedimplyboththatreligiousexperiencesarenotsuitableasjustificationforreligiousbeliefsandthatreligiousbeliefsdonotrequirejustification;thisviewmerelyimpliestheformer.Butarereligiousexperiencesactuallyradicallyineffable?InthissectionIwilllookatthereasonswhyexperiencesmayhaveseemedso,withparticularregardtomysticalexperiences.Theinvestigationwillleadtotheconclusionthat,thoughmysticalexperiencesareoftenclaimedtobeineffable,theyaregenerallynotineffableintheradicalsensewhichwouldpreventthemfrombeingcognitiveexperiences.

(p.15) WilliamJamesgoessofarastocallineffability“thehandiestofthemarksbywhichIclassifyastateofmindasmystical”,19andTennysoncertainlyechoesacommoncomplaintwhenhewrites:“Iamashamedofmyfeebledescription.HaveInotsaidthestateisutterlybeyondwords?”20Yetvividanddetaileddescriptionsofmysticalexperiencesabound,descriptionswhichincludecognitiveclaimsandwhicharesufficientlypreciseforotherstobeabletorecognizethattheyhavehad‘thesamesortofexperience’Whythendomysticssooftenclaimineffability?

(a)Poetichyperbole:inmanycases,expressionssuchas“unspeakablebliss”and“theexperienceisbeyondthepowerofmerewordstodescribe”shouldbetreatedinthesamewayas“unbearablepain”whichisneverthelessborneand“impossiblefeats”whichareneverthelessperformed;theexaggerationconveystheintensityorimmensityofsomefeaturefarbetterthanaliteraldescriptioncouldonitsown.Theclaimthatamysticalexperienceisineffableemphasizesthefactthatitwastremendouslysignificant,involvedoverwhelmingemotions—


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difficultenoughtoarticulatenormally—andwashighlyunusual.Forinstance,theadditionof“Thedescriptionisquiteinadequate”tooneofHardy'scorrespondents'reportsthat“themainsensationwasofbeingloved,afloodofsweetnessofgreatstrength,withoutanyelementofsentimentalityoranythingbutitself,”21alertsustothefactthattheactuallyveryusefuldescriptionistobetakenseriously,andnotjustasacolourfuldescriptionofanordinaryexperienceof‘beingloved’.(b)Asecondpossiblesourceof‘ineffability’isthefactthat,tosomeextent,emotionsandsensationsmustbeexperiencedtobeunderstood;averbaldescriptioncannotconveytheexperienceadequatelytoonewhohasnothadit.ThePersianmystical-Ghazaliexpressesthisviewwhenhewrites,…[I]progressed,asfarasispossiblebystudyandoralinstruction,intheknowledgeofmysticism.Itbecamecleartome,however,thatwhatismostdistinctiveofmysticismissomethingwhichcannotbeapprehendedbystudy,butonlybyimmediateexperience,byecstasyandbyamoralchange.Whatadifferencethereisbetweenknowingthedefinitionofhealthandsatiety…andbeinghealthyandsatisfied!Whatadifferencebetweenbeingacquaintedwiththedefinitionofdrunkenness…andbeingdrunk!(p.16) …Whatremainedformewasnottobeattainedbyoralinstructionandstudybutonlybyimmediateexperienceandbywalkinginthemysticway.22

Thistypeofineffabilityisnotpeculiartomysticism,norisitusuallyradical,asmetaphorsandanalogiescanoftenbeusedtogivethehearersomesenseofwhattheexperienceislike.Experiencessuchasbeinginlove,reachingsafety,‘goingwildwithjoy’,floatingonwaterwithone'seyesclosed,and‘losingoneself’insomeintenselyabsorbingactivity,arecloseenoughtocertainmysticalstatesthat,withsuitablecare,amysticcanenablesensitivereadersbothtounderstandwhatheorshewentthroughtosomedegreeandtorecognizetheirownexperienceasbeingofthesamekind,shouldthereaderseverbefortunateenoughtohavesuchanexperience.Eveniftheyareparticularlygiftedatexpressingthemselves,themystics'abilitytomakethemselvesunderstoodwillbegreatlyenhancediftheybelongtoacommunitywitharichvarietyofstandardmetaphorsemployedbypreviousmystics,inthesamewaythatweareoftenhelpedtoarticulatesuchcommonhumanexperiencesaspain,joy,andlovebymeansofacommonmetaphoricalvocabulary.(c)Sometimesmysticalrevelationsaresofundamentalandall-encompassingthatsubjectsareunabletoarticulatethem,thoughtheyareleftwithanimpressionofhaving“understoodeverything”:“Sothatiswhatitisallabout!”23StTeresaofAvilaexplainsthispredicamentwithareal-lifeanalogy:shewastakenintoaroomwithamagnificentdisplayofobjetsd'art,“setoutinsuchawaythatyoucanseealmostallofthemasyouenter”.“AlthoughIwasthereforsometime,”shewrites,“therewassomuchtobeseenthatIcouldnotrememberitall,sothatIcouldnomorerecallwhatwasinthoseroomsthanifIhadneverseenthem,norcouldIsaywhatthethingsweremadeof;Icanonlyrememberhavingseenthem


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asawhole.”24Perhapsifsubjectswereabletodescribemysticalexperienceswhiletheywereoccurring,theywouldbeabletomakemoreexplicitknowledgeclaims,insteadofmerelyretainingthefrustratingbutexhilaratingimpressionofhavingunderstoodthesecretoftheuniverse.(p.17) Experienceswhichareineffableinthiswayareoflittleuseasevidenceforclaimsabouttheexternalworld—exceptfortheclaimthatpeoplesometimeshavesuchexperiences.However,wemustrememberthatsomepeoplearemoregiftedthanothersatarticulatingtheirthoughts,moreadeptatanalysingexperiencesand‘intuitions’.Agreatmanymysticsareabletoputtheirallegedrevelationintowords,albeitusuallyonlypartiallyandinadequately.Some,suchasR.M.Bucke(quotedinChapterII.4,below),giveaveritableencyclopaediaofinsightsattained,rangingfrometernallifetoloveasthefundamentalguidingprincipleoftheuniverse—despitesayingthatitwas“anintellectualilluminationimpossibletodescribe”!25(d)Thereisaview,championedbyWilliamStaceinparticular,thatmysticalexperiencesaredescribedasineffablebecausetheyareinherentlyparadoxical.26Themysticseemstoexperiencethedissolutionofthesubject-objectdistinction,seeGodasbothpersonalandimpersonal,andsoon—apparentcontradictions.[Themystic]isembarrassedbecauseheis,likeotherpeople,alogicallymindedmaninhisnonmysticalmoments…WhenhereturnsfromtheworldoftheOne,hewishestocommunicateinwordstoothermenwhatheremembersofhisexperience.Thewordscomefromhismouth,butheisastonishedandperplexedtofindhimselftalkingincontradictions.Heexplainsthistohimselfbysupposingthatthereissomethingwrongwiththelanguage.Hesaysthathisexperienceisineffable.27

Staceisprobablyrightthatthisisonereasonwhyexperienceswhichcanactuallybeaccuratelydescribedareallegedtobeineffable.Weneednotgoasfarashedoes,however,insayingthattheparadoxicalityofmysticalexperiencesissuchthattheyreallydocontravenethelawsoflogic.Mysticsmay‘findthemselves’sayingthattheexperiencewas“bothaandnot-a”,butsubsequentreflectionontheexperienceusuallyleadsthemtointerpretthatphenomenoninacoherentway.AsChapterVIIwillshow,thereisarichtraditionwithintheworldreligionsofanalysisoftheapparentlycontradictoryaspectsofthedivine,andenoughplausiblesolutionshavebeenproposedforusnottofeeltrappedbyapparentself-contradictions.Paradoxesdonothavetoleadtoa(p.18) senseofunfathomable,non-logicalmysteryinreligionanymorethantheydointhesciences;inbothrealmstheyhaveencouragedreflection,questioning,andthedevelopmentofconceptstomakesenseofpuzzlingexperiences.(e)Proponentsoftheviewthatmysticalexperiencesareradicallyineffableoftendrawheavilyupontextsfromapophaticorvianegativamystics.Thereareplentyofsuggestivepassagestochoosefrom.Dionysiusthepseudo-AreopagitewritesthattheDivineisnotsoul,ormind…Itisnotimmovablenorinmotion,oratrest…norisItGodheadorgoodness…nordoesItbelongtothecategoryofnon-


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existenceortothatofexistence…norcananyaffirmationornegationapplytoIt…28

AndGregoryofNyssasaysthatThetruevisionandthetrueknowledgeofwhatweseekconsistspreciselyinnotseeing,inanawarenessthatourgoaltranscendsallknowledgeandiseverywherecutofffromusbythedarknessofincomprehensibility.29

ThewriteroftheBookofTaoconcurs:“TheTaothatcanbeexpressedisnottheeternalTao;”for“howcan[words]representtheall-embracing,trueTaoandthenamelessname?”30Everygreatreligioustraditionwouldbeabletosupplyexamples.

Howeverradicallyapophaticthesemysticalutterancesseem,though,theymustberejectedasindicationsthatmysticalexperiencesaresoradicallyineffablethattheyarenon-cognitive.Atrulyradicallyineffableexperiencecouldnotberepresentedinthememorybeyondbeing‘relived’,andcouldnotbeexpressedatallinwords.Evenmetaphorswouldbeuseless;onlysilencewouldbeappropriate—andindeed,therearemysticswhohavefeltpushedtothisextreme.Butitisdifficulttoseehow,ifnodescriptionispossible,subjectscouldevenconfidentlydescribetheirexperiencesas‘mystical’.Andanobjectthatwastrulyradicallyineffablewouldbebeyondhumanexperience.Stacewrites:

Absoluteineffability…wouldmeanthatthesomethingcalledineffablewouldbeoutsideourconsciousnessaltogetherinthesenseinwhichGodis(p.19)presumablyoutsidetheconsciousnessofadog.ItmayplausiblybesupposedthatGodisabsolutelyunknowabletoadog.Adogcouldnotthink“Godisunknowabletome.”OnlyabeingconsciousofGod,oratleastconsciousofsomemeaningwhichheattributestotheword“God,”couldsay“Godisunknowabletome.”31

Thisdoesnotmeanthatapophaticmysticshavebeendeludingthemselves.Acloserlookattheirwritingsrevealsthattheirnegativelanguageoftenconcealsa‘positive’purpose(seeChapterVII)andthattheydousepositiveimageryaswell.Negativelanguageemphasizesthefactthatnodescriptionscanpossiblybeadequatetotheinfinite,holygroundofallexistence,andthatwecanneverknowGod‘asheisinhimself’:hecannotbe“gottenandholden”bytheunderstanding.Butwemustrememberherethe‘criticalrealist’discussionofreligiousmodelsandmetaphors(section2,above).Thedivinemaybefargreaterthananythingthehumanconstitutioncandirectlyexperienceorthehumanmindfullyencompass,butwecanspeakofit.

Inhisearlyworkonlogicalpositivism,A.J.Ayermadethisstarkpronouncement:“Ifamysticadmitsthattheobjectofhisvisionissomethingwhichcannotbedescribed,thenhemustalsoadmitthatheisboundtotalknonsensewhenhedescribesit.”32Wehaveshownabovethat“cannotbedescribed”shouldnormallynotbetakeninsuchastrictsense.Themystic'sdescriptionsmaynotbeadequate;theymaybeinextricablyboundupwithmodelsandmetaphors,andthedivinemayremainultimatelybeyondthegraspofhumanconcepts,butthatdoesnotmeanthattheofteneloquentattemptsofthemysticto


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communicatehis‘vision’arenotintendedtogiveussomeindicationofanultimaterealitybeyondhisownpersonallife.

4.SomeRemarksabout‘Experience’An‘experience’,forthepurposesofthisstudy,isaroughlydatablementaleventwhichisundergonebyasubjectandofwhichthesubjectistosomeextentaware.

(i)Bythequalification“roughlydatable”Iexcludethesensesof‘experience’inexpressionssuchas“theaccumulatedexperienceofa(p.20) lifetime”and—thebaneofjob-hunters—“experiencerequired”.Sinceacontinuousorlifelong“awarenessofthedivinepresence”isnormallymanifestedinnumerousepisodicexperiences,thisrestrictionshouldnotblindustoanyimportantaspectsofreligiousexperience.Thisshouldnotbetakentoimplythatexperiencescanoccurinisolationorthattheyare“episodic”inthesenseofhavingsharplydefinedboundaries.(Nordoesitimply,whenwegettothespecificallyreligiousexperiences,thatIwillbedealingonlywiththemoreextraordinaryorintenseexperiences.)AsChapterVIwillshow,experiencesdonottakeplaceinavacuum,butarealwaystheproductofinteractionwithotherexperiences,beliefs,theenvironment,andthesubject's‘set’.33(ii)Experiencesareundergone.Thisdoesnotmeantheyareinvoluntary;Icancausemyselftohaveanexperienceofpainbystickingmyhandintothefire.Italsodoesnotmeanthatthesubjectofanexperienceissimplyapassiverecipientorrecorder,for,asweshallseeinChapterVI,agreatdealofunconsciousinterpretationmustbeperformedinperceiving.Itdoes,however,excludementalactivitiesdirectedbyoneself,suchasthinking,calculating,anddaydreaming.Whilereachingtheconclusionofanargumentmaybeconsideredan‘experience’onsomeaccounts,Idonotwishtodosohere.Thus,asudden‘flashofinsight’onlookingintoaglorioussunsetthat“abenevolentpowercreatedallthis”wouldbeareligiousexperience,butthearrivalatthatsameconclusionafterachainofreasoningwouldnot.Thoughtswhichareverysudden,unexpected,oroverwhelmingmayseemtothesubjecttobe‘given’orplacedinthemindbysomeexternalpowerratherthantobeproducedunderhisorherownpowerordirection;theyarethus‘experiences’onthisaccount,andmanyofthemcomeintothecategoryofreligious‘revelatory’experiencesdiscussedbelow.(iii)Subjectsmustbeawareofexperiencestosomeextent.Thisispartofwhatitistobeamentalevent.Eventswhichareundergonebytotallyoblivioussubjectsdonotconstituteexperiences(e.g.(p.21) surgerywhilethesubjectisundergeneralanaesthetic);neitherdoeventsofwhichthesubjectsareawareonlyinthesenseofknowingthattheeventsarehappeningtothem(e.g.beingattractedtotheearthbytheforceofgravity,and,formanybelievers,beingcontinuallysustainedbyGod.)Subjectsneednotbeawareatthetimeoftheexperiencethattheyarehavinganexperienceofacertainsort,thoughtheymaycharacterizeitasanexperienceofthatsortwhentheyrememberit(e.g.thememoryofanevent


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witnessedwhileonewashalf-asleep);andtheyneedneverhaveanyknowledgeofthecauseortruenatureoftheirexperience,foranexperiencetohaveoccurred(e.g.whenthesubjectistakeninbyahallucination).(iv)Beingmentalevents,experiencesare‘private’inthesensethatthesubjectsareinabetterpositiontosayhowthingsseemtothemtobe(inChisholm's‘epistemic’senseof‘seem’;seebelow)thananyoneelseis.Othersmustinferwhatthesubjectisexperiencingfromhisbehaviour,verbalreports,andsoon.34Someexperiencesarealso‘private’inthesensethatthesubjectisinabetterpositiontosayhowthingsreallywerethananyoneelse;theseareexperiencesofthesubject'sownsensations,emotions,andstatesofmind,towhichthesubjecthas‘privilegedaccess’.SuchexperiencesIcall‘nonperceptualexperiences’.Inthecaseofperceptualexperiences(Iamusing‘perceptual’herenotasan‘achievement’term,implyingthattheexperiencewasveridical,butrathersimplyasalabelforexperienceswhichareputativeperceptions)thesubjectisnotnecessarilyinthebestpositiontosayhowthingsreallywere,sincetheobjectoftheexperience(theallegedpercept)isanexternalobject,event,orstateofaffairs,beyondthesubject'smentallife(sensations,etc.),andsomethingtowhichotherpeopleshouldbeabletogainjustasdirectaccess.

Notallexternalperceptsare‘public’inthesensethatanyonefulfillingcertainphysicalandconceptualconditionswillhaveanexperienceofitsseemingtothemthattheperceptisthere.IfthereisaGod(andthisgoesforother‘supernatural’beingsaswell),onewouldexpecthimtobeabletochoosetowhomherevealshimself.Thus,althoughmanyreligiousexperiencesareperceptualexperiences,onepersonmayhavesuchanexperiencewhile“hisneighbourequallyattentiveandequallywellequippedwithsenseorgans(p.22) andconcepts”maynot.35InthisstudyIwillbeinterestedprimarilyinperceptualreligiousexperiences,sinceonlytheycanofferdirectevidenceforareligiousrealitybeyondbelievers'ownminds.Nonperceptualreligiousexperienceswillnotbeignored,however,sinceitwillbeseenattheendthateventheyhaveacertainevidentialfunction.

Bothperceptualandnonperceptualexperiencesmayhavesensoryandcognitivecomponents.Myexperienceofanger,forinstance,mayconsistofcertainsensationsplusthebeliefthatIhavejustbeeninsulted,andmyperceptualexperienceofanapplemayinvolvevisual,tactile,andgustatorysensationsplusvariousbeliefsaboutapplesandthebeliefthattherereallyisanapplethere.Somenonperceptualexperienceshavenocognitivecomponent(e.g.asuddentingle),whilesomeperceptualexperienceshavenosensorycomponent,thoughthisismoreunusual.Examplesofthelatterarethephenomenonof‘blind-sight’,wherepeoplewhohavenovisualsensationsfromsomeportionofthevisualfieldcanneverthelesssaywhereobjectsareinthe‘blind’region,36andnonsensoryexperiencesoftheapparentpresenceoractionofadivinebeing.Mostofthecognitiveelementsofbothperceptualandnonperceptualexperiencesaretheresultof‘incorporatedinterpretation’,animportantconceptwhichwillbeintroducedbelowanddiscussedfurtherinChapterVI.


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Becauseofthesenseinwhichallexperiencesareprivate,werelyheavilyonsubjects'owndescriptionsoftheirperceptualexperiences.Thesedescriptionsmaybe—usingSwinburne'sterminology37—‘internal’or‘external’.An‘external’descriptionsuchas“IwasawareofthepresenceofChristnearme,comfortingme,”entailsthattheallegedperceptexistedoroccurredasdescribed;tousethatdescriptionasthebasisofanargumentfromreligiousexperiencewouldbegthequestion.An‘internal’descriptionislessambitious;“IhadanexperienceofitsseemingtomethatChristwasnearme,comfortingme,”doesnotentailanythingaboutanexternalobject,event,orstateofaffairs,butonlyaboutthewaythingsseemedtothesubjecttobe.Bothbelieversandnonbelieverswouldacceptthatthesubjecthadthatexperience,andsowehaveanuncontroversialstarting-pointfromwhichtobuildtheargument.(p.23) Itistruethatpeoplerarelyreporttheirexperiencesin‘internal’terms,butthisisduetowhatGricecalls‘conversationalimplicature’:38inordinaryconversation,itisassumedthataweakerstatementwillnotbeassertedwhereastrongerstatementcouldhavebeen.Incommonusage,forinstance,“Ibelieve”implies“Idoubt;Iamnotsure;Idonotknow”—whereasphilosophersmaintainthatbelievingisanecessaryconditionofknowing!Inthisstudy,theword‘seems’(andsimilartermssuchas‘looks’and‘appears’,allofwhichinnormalconversationwouldimply“butitisn't”or“butitmaynotbe”)willbeusedinChisholm's‘epistemic’sense,39inwhichthesubjectsareinclinedtobelievewhat‘seems’tothemtobeso,andinwhichitsseemingtothesubjectsthatxispresentisanecessaryconditionoftheirperceivingthatxispresent.40(Theinclinationtobelievecanbeoverridden—onemaystronglysuspectoneishallucinating,forinstance—butitmayalsobefollowedwithoutquestion.)Althoughinternaldescriptionswouldbemisleadinginordinaryconversation,then,wewillusethemherewhenappropriate.

Wemustalsodistinguishbetween‘auto-descriptions’,thedescriptionssubjectsthemselveswouldgiveoftheirexperiences(whichwillsometimesbecalled‘experientialreports’),and‘hetero-descriptions’,descriptionsotherswouldgive.ThetermsarebasedonNinianSmart's‘auto-interpretation’and‘hetero-interpretation’,41butsince‘interpretation’canbeusedinsomanywayswhenappliedtoexperience(asweshallsee),Ihavepreferredtomakethisdistinctionintermsofdescriptions.Hetero-descriptionsarerefer-entiallytransparent;thatis,co-referringexpressionsmaybesubstitutedwithoutalteringthetruth-valueofthedescription.Forinstance,ifweknowthatthebirdJonessawwasathrush,thenwecangivethehetero-description,“Jonessawathrush,”eventhoughJonesdidnotknowatthetimethatthebirdhewaslookingatwasathrush.The(external)auto-descriptioninthiscasemightbe,“Isawabird.”Anyalternativeexpressionwhichthesubjectwouldhaverecognizedatthetimeasco-referringcanbesubstitutedinanauto-description,butauto-descriptionsareotherwiseopaque.External(p.24) descriptionsoftheform“Sperceivedthatp”(asopposedto“Sperceivedx”)andallinternaldescriptionsareopaqueandmustbeauto-descriptions.(Anauto-descriptioninthissenseneednotbestatedinthefirstpersonsingular;itmust,however,usewhatwouldbe‘thesubject'sownwords’.)

Thetransparencyofhetero-descriptionsisnotlimitedtoexpressionsreferringtotheallegedpercept;theycanalsodescribetheexperience'struenatureandcauses.Thus


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Jones'sexperienceofitsseemingtohimthatthereisabirdinhisvisualfieldmightbedescribedasthehallucinationofabirdbroughtonbyahighfeverandJones'schildhoodfearofbirds.Hetero-descriptionsofreligiousexperiencesgivenbyscepticsareoftenofthisform.

Bothautoandhetero-descriptionscanvaryindegreeoframificationandcompleteness.Thelattertermshouldbeclearenough;itisthedifferencebetween,say,theexperientialreports,“Isawadog”and“Isawalargeblackdogwithfloppyears”.Theformertermismoredifficult.(ItisalsoborrowedfromNinianSmart,42thoughIdonotagreewitheverythinghesaysaboutit.)Veryroughly,themorehighlyramifiedadescriptionis,themoreitentailsbeyondwhatwasactuallyobserved.Highlyramifieddescriptionsmayinvolvehighlytheory-ladenterms(e.g.“aglaciatedlandscape”)orveryspecificterms(e.g.“beagle”asopposedto“dog”or“animal”),oremployspecializedknowledge(e.g.“Thisisthepenwhichtheprimeministerusedtosignthetreaty”).A‘maximal’auto-description(myterm)describesthewaythingsseemedtothesubjecttobeatthetime,withwhateverdegreeoframificationthatwas.A‘moderated’auto-descriptionretreatsfromthatdegreeoframificationtostatementswhichcommitthesubjecttolessbeyondwhatwasactuallyobserved(e.g.“alandscapeofsuch-and-suchadescription”),anda‘minimal’auto-descriptionattemptstodescribethesensorycomponentalone.Moderatedandminimalauto-descriptionsoftendonotdojusticetotheexperience,aswhenthewitnessingofagoalisdescribedintermsoftheplayers'movements;andtheycanbedifficulttogive—artistsaretrainedtoseethingsintheminimallyramifiedtermsofshapesandcolours,butmostpeoplewouldbeunabletodescribeinlessramifiedtermstheexperienceswhichmakethemclaim,“Iseethatyouareunhappy”or“Ihearmyhusband'svoiceonthetelephone”.

(p.25) Itisnotalwaysobviouswhatdegreeoframificationisintendedbythespeaker.Forinstance,althoughtheterm‘God’isgenerallyquitehighlyramified,apersonmayuseitwithouthavinganymoreprecisemeaninginmindthan‘anoverwhelmingholypower’,andcertainlynotintendingtoimplythewholecorpusoftraditionalChristianthought.Expressionsmayacquireanetworkofassociationswithinacertaintradition,butevenapersonfromwithinthattraditionmaynotalwaysusetheexpressionwiththoseassociationsinmind.Thisfactwillproveimportantwhenwecometocompareaccountsofexperiencesfromdifferenttraditions.

Theveridicalityofaperceptualexperienceiscloselyboundupwithitsauto-description,amongotherthings.Perceptualexperiencesareveridicaliftheobjectwaspresent,theeventoccurred,orthestateofaffairsobtainedasitseemedtothesubject(asdescribedinhisauto-description)andtherewasan“appropriate”causalrelationbetweentheperceptandthepercipient.Thecausalconditioniscrucial,andwillbeelaboratedbelow.Theotherconditionshowstheimportanceofdescription.Thereisno‘onerightway’todescribeaparticularexperience.Whichfeaturesarerelevantandwhatdegreeoframificationandcompletenessappropriatedependslargelyonthecontextofutterance.InonecontextitmayproveimportanttodescribeanexperienceasanexperienceofitsseemingtomethatJohnwasunhappyorthattherewasananimalontheroad;inanother,


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ImayhavetorememberhowJohnwasdressedorthattheanimalwasafox.Suchexperiencesmightwellbeveridicalunderonedescriptionandunveridicalunderanother;veridicalityisonlyanall-or-nothingaffairifonerestrictsittoexperiencesundertheirmostcompletemaximalauto-description.

Experienceswhichareunveridicalunderacertainauto-descriptionareoftenveridicalunderamoderatedorlesscompleteauto-description.Forinstance,ifIclaimtohaveseenarabbit,andtheperceptturnsouttobearock,theexperiencewasstillveridicalunderthedescription,“Isawasmalldarkobject”.Suchexperiencesare‘misperceptions’.Ifthereisnoauto-descriptionunderwhichaperceptualexperienceisveridical(e.g.ifitisahallucination),thenitisa‘nonperception’(nottobeconfusedwith‘nonperceptualexperiences’).Manyreligiousexperiencesmaybemisperceptions,andstillbeofuseasevidenceforsomelessramifiedreligiousclaims,aslaterchapterswillshow.

Justasitispossibleforexperiencestobeunveridicalunderone(p.26) descriptionandyetbeevidenceforamoderatedexperientialclaim,itispossibleforexperiencestobeveridicalandyethavelittleornoevidentialforce.Itisforthisreasonthatthisworkisanexaminationofthe‘evidentialforce’ofreligiousexperiencesandnotprimarilyoftheir‘veridicality’.ThispointwillbeexplainedfurtherinChapterIV,whereageneralaccountisgivenofthewayperceptualexperiencescanbeusedasevidenceforclaimsabouttheworld.

Thesecond,‘causal’conditionismoredifficulttospellout.Somesortofcausalrelationshipbetweentheperceptandpercipientisnecessary,otherwiseanexperiencesuchasmyhypnoticallyinducedvisionofJoneswhenJoneshappenstobepresentwouldbeaveridicalperception.Thiscausalrelationshipmustalsobean“appropriate”one,sothatcasessuchastheperceptionofahologramofatablearerejectedasperceptionsoftheoriginaltable,thoughtheoriginaltableiscausallyrelatedtothehologram.Becauseofthedifficultyofspecifyingacausalrelationshipwhichbothmaintainsthelogicalpossibilitythattelepathyandclairvoyanceyieldperceptionsandallowsforthecomplexcausalchainsbywhichsuchthingsasmicroscopesmediateperceptions,Iwillcontinuetousethevagueword“appropriate”untilChapterVIII.3,wherethereligiousapplicationofthecausalconditionisdiscussed.

Religiousexperiencesareoftensaidtobe“amatterofinterpretation”.Therearesomanywaysinwhichexperiencescanbesaidtobe‘interpreted’,though,thatthefinaltaskofthissectionmustbetoclarifythedifferentusesoftheterm.

Whenitisclaimedthatreligiousexperiencesareordinaryexperiencesonwhichanunwarrantedreligiousinterpretationhasbeenimposed,thetermisusuallybeingusedinthe‘derogatory’sense:“itismerelyamatterofinterpretation”.Proponentsofsuchaviewoftenclaimthatthoughperceptssuchastablesandchairscanbe‘given’inanexperience,adivinepresencemustbe‘interpreted’.MorewillbesaidonthismisguidedviewofperceptualexperienceinChapterVI.


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Asecond,moreimportantsenseof‘interpretation’isthatof‘retrospectiveinterpretation’,43usedwhenanexperienceisunderstood(p.27) inthelightofsubsequentreflectionornewinformation.Imayhavetheexperienceofitsseemingtomethataduckisquacking,butifIlookoutofthewindowandseeapersonblowingaduck-call,Iwillretrospectivelyinterpretthatexperienceastheexperienceofhearingaduck-callbeingblown.Myinternalauto-descriptionwillremainthesame—Icannotchangethewaythingsseemedtometobeatthetime—butIwouldassertadifferentexternaldescription.Thereisadangerthatsuchretrospectiveinterpretationmaybecomeincorporatedintoourmemoryofourexperiences,whichthenmakestheexperiencesfalselyappeartohavebeengoodevidenceforcertainclaims.Thisdangerisespeciallyapparentwhenwearedealingwithhighlyramifieddescriptionsofreligiousexperiences.

Thisisnottosaythatretrospectiveinterpretationsshouldbeavoidedorthatretrospectivelyinterpretedexperiencesareevidentiallyuseless.Thesecondduck-callexperienceenabledthesubjecttounderstandherfirstexperiencebetter;andthetwoexperiencestogetherwereexcellentevidencefortheclaimthatsheheardaduck-callbeingblownbeforeshelookedoutofthewindow.Religiousexperiencesareoftenretrospectivelyinterpretedinthelightofotherreligiousexperiences,inwhichcasetheexperiencescanworktogetherasevidenceinanargumentfromreligiousexperiencealone.Often,however—likemanyofourexperiences—theirtruesignificanceisonlybroughtoutafterreflectionbasedonothertypesofexperiences,beliefs,andsoon.Manyreligiousexperiencesaremorelikeparticularlyinsightfulorefficaciousmomentswithinacontinuingprocessofpsychological,religious,andcognitivedevelopmentthanlikeone-offvisionsorecstasies,andcontextisveryimportanttotheirevaluation.Wewillsee,infact,thatmosttypesofreligiousexperiencebestsupportreligiousclaimswhentheyaretakeninconjunctionwithothertypesofevidence.Hiddenretrospectiveinterpretationisonlyadangerifonebelievesreligiousexperiencesontheirownoughttobeabletoconfirmhighlyramifiedclaims.

Thereisasenseinwhichallexperiencesare‘mattersofinterpretation’.Thisthird,crucialsense,‘incorporatedinterpretation’,isinterpretationweperformunconsciouslytotransformthestimuliwithwhichweareconstantlybombardedintointelligibleexperiencesofrecognizablepercepts.Itisincorporatedwithoutourawarenessintoanexperienceandisthusinseparablefromit;itis(p.28) whatmakesushavethatexperience,seethingsthatway.Farfrombeing‘mereinterpretation’,itisnecessarytoallperception.Neithertablesnordivinebeingsare‘given’assuchtoapassiverecipient.ThiskindofinterpretationisdescribedmorefullyinChapterVI.

Afourthcategory,‘reflexiveinterpretation’,islikeincorporatedinterpretationinthatitisnotarrivedatbyconsciousinferenceorreflection;however,itisformedimmediatelyaftertheexperience,andnotincorporatedintotheexperienceitself.Oftenthisisbecausetheexperienceisofsuchbriefduration,aswhenonehearsasharpsoundandreflexivelyinterpretsitasagunshot.Thissenseof‘interpretation’willproveimportantinthecaseofmysticalexperiences,wheretheexperiencesthemselvesaresaidtobesooverwhelmingandsoemptyofallthoughtsanddistinctionsthatinterpretationisimpossibleduringthe


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experience,buttheauto-descriptionsgivenonemergingfromtheexperience(e.g.“unionwithGod”)areneverthelessoftenspontaneousratherthantheresultofreflection.

Withsomeofthephilosophicalgroundworkoutoftheway,letusnowturntothe‘data’themselves,thereportsofreligiousexperiences.

Notes:

(1)Seee.g.KaiNielsen,ContemporaryCritiquesofReligion(London:Macmillan,1971),ch.5,whereitisarguedthatthisviewofreligiouslanguageleadsinevitablytoreligiousscepticism.

(2)SeeN.Schedler,“TalkAboutGod-Talk:AHistoricalIntroduction”inN.Schedler(ed.),PhilosophyofReligion(NewYork:Macmillan,1974),pp.221–50;andFrederickFerré,BasicModernPhilosophyofReligion(London:Allen&Unwin,1968),ch.12.

(3)“AnEmpiricist'sViewoftheNatureofReligiousBelief”,inJohnHick(ed.),TheExistenceofGod(NewYork:Macmillan,1964),pp.229–52.

(4)London:Macmillan,1972.

(5)Myths,ModelsandParadigms(London:SCM,1974),p.58.

(6)In“InterpretationandMysticalExperience”,Rel.Stud.,I(1965),75–87.

(7)Oxford:ClarendonPress,1985.Manyofmyexamplesaredrawnfromthisbook.

(8)SeeBarbour,ch.3andSoskice,ch.VI.2;seealsoMaryHesse,RevolutionsandReconstructionsinthePhilosophyofScience(Brighton:HarvesterPress,1980),ch.4.

(9)SeeSoskice,especiallyp.103;andBarbour,chs.5and8.

(10)Barbour,ch.5.3.

(11)SeeSoskice'sdiscussion,ch.v.3.

(12)Thecrucialcontributionofcontexttothemeaningofanydiscourse,metaphoricalorliteral,isstressedincurrentpsycholinguisticstudiessuchasP.N.Johnson-Laird'sMentalModels(Cambridge:CUP,1983),especiallych.15.

(13)Ashappenedwiththeterm“gene”,forinstance;seeSoskice,p.126.

(14)KeithS.Donnellan,“ReferenceandDefiniteDescriptions”,Phil.Rev.,75(1966),281–304.

(15)Soskice,p.127.

(16)IanRamseydescribessuchaprocessinhisModelsforDivineActivity(London:SCMPress,1973).


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(17)Soskice,p.149.

(18)ThelatterisquotedbyAlisterHardyinTheSpiritualNatureofMan,p.116.

(19)TheVarietiesofReligiousExperience,p.367.

(20)QuotedbyJames,p.370n.

(21)InHardy,p.58.

(22)al-Ghazali,DeliverancefromError,inTheFaithandPracticeofal-Ghazālī,tr.W.MontgomeryWatt(London:Allen&Unwin,1953),pp.54–5.

(23)QuotedinHardy,p.I10.

(24)InteriorCastle,tr.,anded.E.AllisonPeers(GardenCity,NY:Doubleday,1961),p.152.

(25)QuotedinJames,p.385.

(26)WilliamStace,MysticismandPhilosophy(London:Macmillan,1960),pp.304–5.

(27)Ibid.p.305.

(28)TheMysticalTheology,ch.V,fromDionysiustheAreopagite:OntheDivineNamesandtheMysticalTheology,tr.,C.E.Rolt(London:SPCK,1920),pp.200–1.

(29)LifeofMoses,ii.162–4,inJ.Daniélou,FromGlorytoGlory,tr.H.Musurillo(London:JohnMurray,1962),p.118.

(30)TaoTêChing,ch.I,lineI,tr.byCh'uTa-Kao(London:UnwinBooks,1970;1stedn.1937);andcommentarybyCh'uTa-Kao,p.II.

(31)Stace,p.291.

(32)Language,TruthandLogic(London:VictorGollancz,1936),p.180.

(33)Itisinterestingtonotethat,justasEnglish-speakingphilosophershavehadtostruggletoclarifythedistinctionbetween‘knowing’afactand‘knowing’apersonwhileotherEuropeanlanguagesprovideseparatewordsforthetwokindsofknowledge(e.g.theGermanwissenandkemien),Ihavehadtomakeadistinctionherebetween‘episodic’and‘accumulated’sensesof‘experience’whichwouldhavebeenobvioustoaGermanspeaker:‘experience’heremeansErlebnisratherthanErfahrung.

(34)Whenwespeakofpeoplehaving‘thesameexperience’,itisthetypetowhichwearereferring,notthetoken.

(35)Swinburne,p.249.


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(36)L.Weiskrantz,“VarietiesofResidualExperience”,QuarterlyJournalofExperimentalPsychology,32(1980),365–86.

(37)pp.244–5.

(38)H.PaulGrice,“LogicandConversation”,inPeterColeandJ.L.Morgan(eds.),SyntaxandSemantics,vol.3(NewYork:AcademicPress,1975),pp.41–58.

(39)R.M.Chisholm,Perceiving(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniv.Press,1957),ch.4.

(40)Aslongasonetakes“perceiving”inthe‘opaque’sense.

(41)In“InterpretationandMysticalExperience”.

(42)In“InterpretationandMysticalExperience”.

(43)Theterms‘retrospective’,‘incorporated’,and‘reflexiveinterpretation’areborrowedfromPeterMoore,“MysticalExperience,MysticalDoctrine,MysticalTechnique”,inStephenKatz(ed.),MysticismandPhilosophicalAnalysis(London:SheldonPress,1978),pp.101–31.IusethemsomewhatdifferentlyfromMoore,sinceheappliesthemonlytoaspectsofmysticalexperience.

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