Some Recent Analyses of the Concept of majāz in Islamic JurisprudenceAuthor(s): Hossein ModarressiReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 106, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1986), pp. 787-791Published by: American Oriental SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/603537 .Accessed: 16/11/2011 02:40

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Some Recent Analyses of the Concept of majaz in Islamic Jurisprudence*

Arab rhetoricians paid special attention to the topic of metaphorical use of words, and it has, therefore, always been a major topic in their work. Under the influence of the philosophical approach which found its way into Arabic rhetoric in the 12th century, the scholars of this discipline tried to find rational interpretations and a philosophical taxonomy for the various modes of metaphorical use. Efforts were made to classify the varieties of relations between the original and metaphorical implications of words which would make it possible for a word to be used in a sense other than the sense for which it was originally made.

Similar discussions have always existed in Islamic jurisprudence which also paid close attention to rhetorical topics and devoted a full chapter to those questions. Recent ShlCT scholars, in particular, discussed these topics with much rigor, wrote numerous monographs and produced many new arguments. This brief study tries to present two examples of their interpretations on the question of metaphorical use of words.

The subject of majdz, (loosely, metaphor) is common to several branches of Islamic scholarship, viz., rhetoric, theology, logic and jurisprudence. It was originally a topic of rhetoric, but it has also been discussed in logic as well as in usWl al-fiqh where words are examined in order to determine their function in reasoning. In theology, majaz was employed in order to solve problems where Divine texts seemed to assign to God requirements of corporeality or recognized him as the source of the misguidedness of people.

The discipline of usal al-fiqh had close ties with rhetoric from the very beginning. Since the Qur'an and hadTth were regarded as major examples of eloquent prose in Arabic and as the first Arabic rhetorical discussions arose around the verses of the Qur'an,' the proper understanding of the Qur'anic verses and hadTth depended on rhetorical prin- ciples; and, subsequently, rhetorical principles were held to have a principal role in legal reasoning. Thus, in the chapters of usWl al-fiqh which explained the rules for reasoning used when dealing with the Qur'an and hadTth, rhetorical con- siderations constituted the major part of the discussion.

R2 Rhetoricians such as al-Sakkaki and Baha' al-Din al-SubkT3

have alluded to this fact. Eventually the concern of usuirls,

theologians, and philosophers with rhetoric, and their careful examination of its various topics, created a new school in this discipline4 which regarded rhetoric as a branch of logic and held that its main purpose was to help with philo- sophical disputation.5 This school tried to establish rhetoric on rational and analytical bases, and thus contributed im- mensely to the development and precision of rhetoric. Usulls,

theologians, and philosophers introduced many new con- cepts: for example, the terms haqrqa (original meaning) and majdz (metaporical meaning), which in their present sense were most likely invented by the Mu'tazilis.6

The topic of majaz has always been a major point of dis- cussion in Arabic rhetoric, and is also carefully discussed in Islamic, and more specifically in recent ShITC, jurisprudence.

* A summary of a paper presented at the Columbia University Seminar on Arabic Studies, on April 23, 1983.

See al-KhatTb al-BaghdddT, Ta'rTkh Baghdad (Cairo, 1931), XIII, p. 254; Ibn al-AnbarT, Nuzhat al-alibbj', ed. I. Al-Samarra'T (Baghdad, 1959), p. 70; YaqUt, Irshad al-arTb (Cairo, 1938), XIX, pp. 158-59; Ibn Khallikan, Wafaydt al- a cyn (Bfilaq, 1275 q), II, p. 155.

2 Al-Sakkaki, Miftah al-'ulim (Cairo, 1937), p. 199. He benefitted from the usalTs' careful nuances in their treatment

of rhetorical topics. In one case of his above-named work (p. 103), this point is clearly demonstrated as he quoted and preferred the approach of "jurisprudents" who held that the definite article indicates that the concept defined has previously existed in the mind or the prior mention of the speaker.

Al-Subkl, 'ArCis al-afrdh (Cairo, 1937), I, p. 53. 4 See al-SuyudtT, Husn al-Muhddara (Cairo, 1299 q), I, p. 190.

Al-SakkakT, pp. 78, 239. 6 Ibn Taymiyya, Kitdb al-Imdn (Cairo, 1325 q), p. 35. The

term maj]z is used in early sources like Abu 'Ubayda's Maj]z al-Qur'dn in the sense of exegetic meaning of the word, i.e., the ideas which are not explicitly explained.

787

788 Journal of the American Oriental Society 106.4 (1986)

"Any word which is used, because of some relationship, in a sense other than the original lexicographic one, is majdz." This is the definition of the term majdz given by 'Abd al- Qahir al-JurjanT, the renowned rhetorician.7 Al-JurjanT refers, obviously, to literal majdz, the standard example for which is the use of the word "lion" (asad) in the sentence "I saw a lion shooting an arrow" (ra'aytu asadan yarmT) in the sense of a brave man. Al-Jurjani pointed, for the first time in Arabic rhetoric,8 to another kind of majdz which he called

maj]z hukmT.9 In this category, the word is not used in a sense other than its original one but the function which is attributed to it refers, in reality, to a different subject, such as the attribution of the construction of the town to the emir in the sentence "the emir built the town" (bana 'l-amTr al- madTna). Obviously, the emir only gave the order for the construction of the town and did not take part in the action of construction. Earlier rhetoricians had considered such expressions to be, in fact, exaggerations'( or that a word was omitted in the sentence' (as in the case of majdz al-hadhf, such as in the phrase "ask the town" in the Qur'an, XII:82 where the subject of the request is, naturally, the people, thus the complete form is "ask the people of the town.") Accord- ing to this latter understanding, the word "town" is not used metaphorically in the sense of its people; rather, the word "people" has been omitted. In later rhetorical discussions, the first category of majdz is called majdzfi '7-kalima (literal majdz) and the second one majdz fi I-isndd (majdz in attribution). Al-Sakkaki'2 held that in this latter form, the word "emir," for instance, as in bana 'l-amTr al-madTna, replaces that of the actual builders and refers to them rather than to its original sense; thus he called such expressions isti'dra bi 'I-kindya. 13

The relationship which metaphorically joins two concepts to each other has been divided into various categories-up to twenty-five. The most important is the relation of similar- ity which exists in examples such as the use of the word lion

in the sense of brave man. The metaphorical use of a word because of this similarity is, more specifically, called isti'cra. Other examples are technically called majaz mursal (loosely, synecdoche), a clear instance of which is the use of a word, which originally denotes a part of a collectivity, in the sense of the whole, as in the case of the use of the word raqaba (literally neck) to mean a slave. The rhetoricians maintained that such usage is correct provided that the part concerned is so essential that with its absence the whole cannot remain. 4

Following the above classification, the rhetoricians held that in the case of isti'cra, too, the word is employed in a sense other than the original. But Al-Jurjani15 and al- Sakkaki16 noted that in the case of isti'cra, the word is used, in fact, in its original meaning and the speaker tended to recognize the brave man as an instance of the concept of "lion." Thus, the real difference between isti'dra and the original use is that in the latter case the subject is an instance of the relevant concept in the outside world, but in the case of isti'cra it is so in the mind of the speaker. The isti'cra is not, thus, an example of the literal majdz;17 rather, as some later scholars have expressed, it is the use of a word in a pretended instance (lard iddi'c'T). Al-SakkdkT explained that the mental action used in isticdra is based on the supposition that there are two categories of the "lion." One is the usual kind which has a high degree of bravery together with the given appearance; the other kind has the same degree of bravery without that specific appearance."8

7 Al-JurjdnT, Asrdr al-baldgha, ed. H. Ritter (Istanbul, 1954), p. 325.

8 Yahya b. Hamza al-'AlawT, al-.Traz (Cairo, 1914), III, p. 257. 9 Al-Jurjani, Dalh'il al-ijdz, ed. M. Rashid Rida (Cairo,

1372 q), pp. 227, 231. 10 Al-Mubarrad, al-Kdmil, ed. Z. Mubarak (Cairo, 1936),

I, pp. 118, 188; III, p. 117. Sibawayh, al-Kitzb (Cairo, 1316 q), I, p. 169.

12 See his Miftih al-'uluim, p. 189. '3 This concept refers to the cases where (to use the termi-

nology of I. A. Richards) the "tenor" (mushabbah) is mentioned but the "vehicle" (mushabbah bih) is implied (al- Sakkaki, p. 179); the reverse of the situation existed in the case of isti'dra where the "vehicle" is used and the "tenor" is meant.

14 It must be noted that although a concept like "man" involves many parts in its existence in the outside world, nevertheless only some, like head, neck and heart are essential parts, for the concept can exist without some other parts. It must also be noted that the meaning of the word "concept" here is the perception which one has in one's mind derived from realities in the outside world, and is not equivalent to mdhiyya in Islamic philosophical terminology. The criticism of some usiilT scholars of the condition of the essentialness of the part, in which they say that a combination will spon- taneously disappear with the absence of any part of it, and that there is no difference between an essential part or others, is, therefore, irrelevant.

15 See his Dald'il al-i'jaz, pp. 333ff.; compare with p. 232 and various points of his Asrdr al-baldgha where he considered isti'dra as a literal majdz.

16 See his Miftdh, p. 174. It must be noted that he still holds isti'jra to be an instance of literal majdz since it is still used in a sense different from that for which the word was originally established.

" See al-Taftazani, al-Mukhtasar, ed. CA M. al-Sa'TdT (Cairo, n.d.) II, pp. 70, 105.

18 Al-Sakkaki, p. 174. See also al-Taftazani, I, pp. 59-61, II, p. 73.

MODARRESSI: Some Recent Analyses 789

A problem in the topic of majaz is the relation between majdz and isti'cra on the one hand, and tashbTh (simile) and kindya (allusion) on the other. Philosopher-rhetoricians properly separated these concepts from each other. In fact, in cases of tashbTh, such as in the example "Zaydun ka '7-asad" (Zayd is like a lion) and kindya such as "Zaydun kathTr al-rimdd" (Zayd has a great deal of ash); all parts of such sentences are used exactly in their original senses, except that in the case of kindya the situation of having a great deal of ash connoted one's generosity (a generous host has ashes from cooking for his guests). What is meant by the speaker is actually the same connotation (in rhetorical ter- minology: daldla 'aqliyya) not the denotation (technically: daldla wad'iyya).'9

Other rhetoricians faced problems in the cases of both tashbTh and kindya. Some regarded tashbTh to be a kind of

majaz20 although it can in no way be covered by the technical definition of majdz, which is the use of a word in a meaning other than the original one. Diya' al-DTn Ibn al-Ath-r divided majaz into two categories: tashbTh and expansion (tawassu') in expression. Then he further classified tashbTh into the complete form (tashbTh tamm), in which the particle of comparison is mentioned, and the omitted form (tashbTh mahdhaf), in which the particle is deleted. He maintained that the second is the case of isti'dra.2l QAdT al-JurjanT22 held a similar approach in the case of phrases such as "Zaydun asadun" (Zayd is a lion). He maintained that such examples were not cases of isti'dra, which depended on forming an image. Rather, these were simple tashbThs in which the conjunctions were deleted. The full statement was in fact "Zaydun ka 'I-asad." 'Abd al-Qahir al-Jurjani23 and other rhetoricians accepted this analysis in examples such as the above. In the case of kinaya, al-Zamakhshari defined it as "to explain the meaning with a word other than what is originally used to imply it,"24 and so he probably wants to put it in the category of majdz. Some others stipulated that kindya is a case of majz,25 while a third group held that it is an intermediate stage between haqrqa and the majaz.26

A similar discussion arose about the manner of use of metaphorical sentences. In phrases such as "he puts one foot forward and the other back" (yuqaddimu rijian wa yu 'akhkhiru ukhra) which is normally used to describe uncertainty, all words are used exactly in their original senses, but the adaptation of the phrase as a whole to a hesitating person is based on comparing the person's mental status to putting one foot forward and the other back; otherwise, the statement is not literally true as the hesitating person does not put one foot forward and the other back in reality. The use of the phrase as a whole in this sense is, therefore, a majdzT use. Regarding this point, the rhetoricians divided majaz into two groups, majaz mufrad (single majdz) and majaz murakkab (composite maj]z) or majdz fi 'l-tatbrq (majdz in application); and they considered examples such as the sentence above to be in the second category.27 Al- TaftazanT justified this classification by saying that just as individual words are established for their given meanings, combinations of words had also categorical designations (wad' naw C) for their specific implications. This means that the combination of verb and subject, for instance, is estab- lished to imply that the relevant action is done by the subject in the outside world. Consequently, if a combination is used in a sense other than its original given sense, just as in the case above where the action of putting one foot forward and the other back does not take place by the subject in the outside world, the use is, inevitably, a maj]zT one.28

* * *

In recent Shi'i jurisprudence, two more approaches have been suggested for the use of a word in its majdzT sense. Both were originally inspired by 'Abd al-Qahir al-JurjanT and al- Sakkaki's analysis of isti'dra. They are as follows:

1. One opinion suggests that the real basis for metaphorical use is the expansion (tawassu') which the mind introduces to the concept for which the word is originally established, so that it comes to cover new instances. For example, the mind expands the concept of "lion" to include all brave beings. Such an expansion naturally depends on the strength of the relationship between two concepts in the mind. The correct- ness of metaphorical use follows, in its turn, this mental expansion. If the expansion is general, that is to say one concept is to embody the other in all cases, the use of the word established for the first concept in the sense of the second one is maj]zfi 'T-kalima or literal metaphorical use. But if there is no such general mental expansion and one concept can mentally replace the other only in certain cases, that is to say there exists no substantial relationship between the two concepts but only a provisional relationship with regard to a

19 Al-Qazw~ni, al-Idah, ed. M. M. 'Abd al-Ham-d (Cairo, n.d.), p. 318.

20 Ibn Rashlq, al-' Umda, ed. M. M. 'Abd al-Hamld (Beirut, 1972), I, p. 268; al-Subki, 'Aras al-Afrah, III, p. 290; Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Fawa'id (Cairo, 1327 q), p. 54; al-SuyUtT, al- Itqan (Cairo, 1368 q) II, p. 41.

21 Ibn al-Athir, al-Mathal al-sa'ir, ed. M. M. 'Abd al- Hamld (Cairo, 1939), I, p. 356.

22 See his al- Wisata bayn al-MutanabbT wa khusamih, ed. A. 'A. al-Zayn (Sidon, 1331 q), p. 40.

23 See his Asrar al-balagha, p. 298. 24 Al-ZamakhsharT, al-Kashshaf (Cairo, 1953), I. p. 215. 25 Ibn Rash-q, I. p. 268; al-SuyUt-, II, p. 41. 26 Ibn al-Athir, II, p. 210; al-QazwTnT, pp. 318-19.

27 Al-Qazwrinl, pp. 268, 304. 28 Al-TaftizanT, II, p. 96.

790 Journal of the American Oriental Society 106.4 (1986)

third concept so that this latter can be attributed in the mind

to either of the two former ones, the use of the word established for the first concept in the sense of the second one is restricted to the case where that third concept is to be attributed to a subject, and such a use is majdzfi 'l-isnad.

The supporters of this analysis maintained that the general mental expansion is limited to the cases where the instance of the first concept in the outside world has the highest degree of a qualification and specification so that the imaging of that concept involves the imaging of that qualification and specifi- cation in its highest degree; as is the case with the concept of "lion" which in its existence in the outside world is thought to be an animal with complete bravery and its imaging therefore is combined with that qualification. In such cases, the mind can establish the relevant concept as a mirror for that specific qualification and forget the other qualifications which the concept accompanies in its real existence, none of which is, however, so important or so clear as the one above, that is, bravery. Thus, any other concept with the same qualification will be inevitably joined in the mind to the former concept, and this mental connection will make it possible to apply the word established for the first concept to the instances of the second one. Consequently, the literal metaphorical use of one word in the sense of another will be restricted to the cases where the relationship is based on the similarity between two concepts, i.e., the cases which are termed isti'dra in rhetoric. All other cases are instances of majdzfi 'l-isnad for which no regulation can be set as it follows the specifications of each given case.29

None of the regulations suggested in the rhetorical sources to regulate the forms of relationship between two concepts is correct. The use of the word raqaba (neck) in the sense of a slave, for instance, is justified by saying that a whole can be expressed by the mention of an essential part. If this is true, the use of the words "heart" or "head" in the above case must be accepted, too, as they are at least as essential as the neck. Moreover, even the use of the word raqaba in the sense of "slave" is permissible only in specific cases, namely where the ownership or manumission of a slave is concerned,30 i.e., in the two combinations of milk al-raqaba and 'itq al-raqaba. The reason behind such a usage is to separate the nature of ownership of a slave from the ownership of an object, since the ownership of an object comprehends all of its existence, but the ownership of a slave involves just the control over him which is similar to the control that the ruler has over subjects or which the jailer has over prisoners. The mental presupposi- tion of this usage is that one can imagine a string that con- nects the slave to his owner, one end of which is in the hand of

the owner and the other on the neck of the slave; and this tie is fixed where ownership is expressed and is cut where manu- mission is stated.3'

Such mental presuppositions can be discovered in all cases32 where a relationship between two concepts has been claimed, a fact which includes all of the relevant instances in the category of comparative maj]z. Examples such as "ask the town" which are held to be instances of majaz al-hadhf are all misunderstood, since the word "town," for instance, does not imply merely the houses, buildings, streets, etc.; rather, it refers to a social unit, i.e., establishment and people. An area without population is not normally regarded as a "town" unless its situation when it was populated is envisaged. To "ask a town," therefore, implies directly to ask the people of a community.33 Thus, the prevailing view among rhetoricians which holds that the word "people" is deleted here in order to make the statement shorter34 is not correct.

2. Another opinion tries to exclude the subject of majaz totally from the world of use and to recognize it as a psychological question related to the motive behind the use. According to this opinion, the word is always used in its original sense. Thus, there is no literal majaz in reality, for the word is neither used in a different sense, nor has a new case been claimed to be an instance of that concept, nor has an expansion been made in the concept. Rather in the cases of

majdz the real intention of the speaker is different from what the word means.

Consider this example. A person teases a timid person by calling him a lion. Has the word been used in a sense other than the original? or has the concept expanded? or is the timid person claimed to be an instance of lion? Obviously, the word is used in its original meaning and the speaker wanted to convey the exact concept of lion to the addressee's mind. Otherwise, the reaction which the speaker wanted to get from the addressee would not come into effect. The real difference between such a use and the case of haqTqa is, therefore, in the motive behind the speech, which in our case is teasing rather than narrating a fact. Similarly, in cases where a speaker describes an idea with certain exaggerations in order to strengthen the statement, or to effect the feeling of the addressee and the like, he uses the word in its original sense as a strategem to produce one of those reactions.

In the example of "ask the town," for instance, the purpose is to give the impression that the subject is so clear that even the walls and buildings can give witness. Likewise, where the word "eye" is used in the sense of a guard, the claimed relation

29 Sadiq al-TabrCzi, al-Maqdldt al-Ghariyya (Tabrlz, 1317 q), pp. 201-2.

30 Ibid., p. 183.

' Ibid., p. 186. 32 For details in each specific case, see ibid., e.g., pp. 192-95. " Ibid., p. 197. 34 Ibn Rash1q, I, p. 250.

MODARRESSI: Some Recent Analyses 791

between a whole and a part has no role, rather it tends to draw a mental picture of an ideal guard where a guard is entirely a watching eye and seems to have no other parts. The beauty of all poetic metaphorical uses and exaggerations lies in the fact that the real meaning is envisaged and adapted to the instance in the outside world, exactly as is the case with the use of a word in the original sense. But, in this latter case, the purpose of speech is to report a reality as it is and to transfer the very idea for which the word is originally established to the addressee; while in the former one, majdz, it is not to report a reality but to serve another purpose such as causing a specific reaction. The same applies to maj]z murakkab where the mind compares the status of a hesitating person to someone who puts one foot forward and another back.35

This opinion is based on a general analysis in Islamic jurisprudence of various forms of the implications of a word. According to this analysis, each statement has three kinds of implications which agree with each other in some cases and disagree in some others, namely perceptional implication (mad/al tasawwuri), attestative implication (madlal tasd-qT) and really intended implication (madlalliddr). The first rubric

refers to the original sense of a word; the second refers to the addressee's understanding that the words are used in their original literal sense and therefore implies the possible correct predicates; the third concerns the motive behind a statement and indicates that, unless proven otherwise, the internal desire and the real wish of the speaker do not differ from the perceptional-attestative implications of the statement, and that he wanted to express a real desire or to report a fact.

In Islamic jurisprudence, this latter analysis was originally laid down to protect the validity of a divine law after it was qualified with an exception, in view of the cases in which it was not clear whether they are covered by the exception or not. If one holds that the Legislator, from the beginning, had not used the word in its full meaning, which covers all instances, there is no way to apply the law to uncertain instances as it is not clear whether they were included by the Legislator or not. But if it is said that he used the word in its full and original meaning, although he may later demonstrate his desire otherwise as the nature of legislation normally requires, then we have a valid "attestative" implication and we follow it until we get certainty in a case, through a new statement or some other means, that the real intention of the Legislator does not conform with his "attestative" one.

HOSSEIN MODARRESSI

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

3 Al-Khumayni, TahdhTb al-usl, I (Qum, n.d.), p. 31. See also his Risalafi qdcidat ldarar (edited in a collection of his treatises entitled al-Rasd'il [Qum, 1385 q], I, pp. 5-68), pp. 34-35.