sotomayor 2003 uruguay peace soldiers from praetorianism to unchecked peacekeeping

8/10/2019 Sotomayor 2003 Uruguay Peace Soldiers From Praetorianism to Unchecked Peacekeeping

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THEPEACE SOLDIER FROM THE SOUTH: FROM PRAETORIANISM TO PEACEKEEPING?

CHAPTER III

Uruguays Peace Soldiers: From Praetorianism to Unchecked Peacekeeping

Arturo C. Sotomayor VelzquezDepartment of Political Science

Columbia UniversityPh.D. candidate

[email protected]

(Draft)

Please do not cite without permission. Comments welcome.

November, 2003.

This paper was supported by two generous travel grants from the Institute of Latin AmericanStudies (ILAS) and the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.


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In 1992 Uruguay sent its first peacekeeping battalion to Asia as part of the United

Nations Transition Authority to Cambodia (UNTAC). In total, 1,330 men from the Navy and the

Army (about 5.5% of the countrys total armed forces) were deployed in four military companies

across Cambodias provinces. Uruguays contribution to peacekeeping (PK) missions was not

new, since several officers participated as military observers in peace operations in places as far

as the Middle East and South Asia. (Ejrcito de la Repblica Oriental del Uruguay 1999, 20-38).

However, the 1992 decision to participate in UNTAC was significant for two main reasons. First,

because by sending its first military, large-scale, and unified contingent abroad, the country

reflected a new approach towards United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKO) that

prioritized the deployment of military units rather than just observers. Second, this event

symbolized Uruguays redirection of the armed forces as well as a radical departure from the

militarys traditional focus. The deployment took place only 6 years after the return to

democracy, when the military finally went back to the barracks following 13 years of

bureaucratic -authoritarian rule. The military dictatorship that ruled Uruguay from 1973 to 1985

was not as brutal as Pinochets regime or the Argentine military junta, but guerrilla and labor

repression and the percentage of people detained for questioning by the military was higher than

in any other country of the Southern Cone. (Stepan 1985, 325; Gillespie 1991, 50-76; Perelli

1990, 39-54; Barahona de Brito 1997, 38-66). Hence, it was somehow paradoxical that thousands

of Uruguayan military officers, who were once responsible for state repression, were now being

sent abroad to protect human rights in countries facing civil wars.

Within a decade of the 1992 deployment, Uruguay became the worlds largest per capita

contributor to UN PKO, with a consistent participation of 1,000 troops per year. Uruguay is

officially one of the top five UN troop contributors, surpassed only by countries such as India,

Pakistan, Bangladesh and Ghana. To date, more than 50% of the Army officers and 34% of all

non-commissioned officers have some kind of peacekeeping experience. Similarly, more than


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10% of Uruguays total armed forces are positioned somewhere in the world in an established UN

PK mission. 1 Uruguayan peace soldiers can be located in places far away from Montevideo,

ranging from Kashmir in Asia to Congo in Africa and Georgia en Central Europe.

Uruguay then provides a critical case to test hypotheses about the effects of PK

participation. This is so because, as argued in the introduction of this study, the potential effects

of participation in peace missions should be evident among democratizing states that have

traditionally contributed troops to the UN. Uruguay is a case that has substantial PK exposure,

experienced a dictatorial regime and went through a transition to democracy in less than two

decades. Has PK participation affected the armed forces? Have radical changes in civil-military

relations occurred as a result of Uruguays participation in UN peace missions? Has PK training

and exposure made military officers less likely to violate basic democratic norms at home?

The chapter assesses the implications of UN involvement for civil-military relations in

Uruguay. As will be discussed, the orientation, training and doctrine of the Uruguayan armed

forces have been radically changed as a result of a decade of PK participation. Nevertheless, such

international engagement has not allowed civilian intervention in doctrinal and defense matters.

PK policies have failed to expand civilian defense communities, while there are no clear signs of

increased civilian defense expertise. Military and civilian authorities tend to approach PK

participation from very different perspectives, assessing them from somewhat distinct agendas.

Civilians in general and political authorities in particular have little interest in UN affairs or in

developing mechanisms to monitor PK participation. By contrast, the military views peace

missions as yet another military mission rather than a multidimensional operation with civilian

components. Civilian and military preferences have not fully converged, while military views

about PK dominate the process of decision-making. Therefore, this case raises questions about

the beneficial effects of PK on civil-military relations.

1Personal interview with General Hctor R. Islas, Director General of the School of the Arms and Servicesand Lt. Colonel Pablo Pintos, Director of the School of Peacekeeping Operations at the School of the Armsand Services, Uruguayan Army, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 8, 2003.


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This chapter will be divided in three sections. The first section will provide a brief

description of Uruguays transition to democracy and how this event motivated an increased

interest in United Nations involvement. The second part of this chapter analyzes the countrys

engagement in PKO by focusing on the largest deployments. Finally, the third section analyses

the effects of PK participation on Uruguays civil-military relations.

I. The Uruguayan Re-democratization Process: Legacies and their Effects

On March 1, 1985, Julio Maria Sanguinetti was sworn as the democratically elected

president of Uruguay. Fifteen years after the establishment of an authoritarian-bureaucratic

regime and after five years of intensive negotiations with the military collegiate, the inhabitants

of the north-east side of the River Plate renewed contact with liberal democracy and the rule of

law. Unlike Argentinas transition to democracy, which took place as a result of the militarys

collapse in the 1982 Falklands-Malvinas war; the re-democratization of Uruguay was caused by

domestic and international pressures that forced the military government to withdraw from direct

rule and hold extrication elections. (Linz and Stepan 1996, 59) Similar to the Chilean case (to be

analyzed in chapter 5), the military tried to impose conditions for their exit from politics by

imposing reserve domains and tutelary powers; however, the strength of democratic forces

(unified political parties and increased pressures from civil society) greatly eroded the bargaining

leverage of the collegial military dictatorship. Pacts and agreements were indeed negotiated

between democratic and military elites; but unlike the pacted transitions to democracy in Brazil

and Chile, the Uruguayan transition was mostly led by civilians who intensely pressured a deeply

divided and unorganized military institution. This enabled the newly elected civilian

government to implement changes in Uruguayan civil-military relations by reforming norms,

rules and organic laws that regulated interactions between the armed forces and society. This

section focuses on the re-democratization of Uruguay and how that political process influenced


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the armed forces mission and role ; which in turn has had consequences on the countrys PK

policies.

A. The extrication of the military and the re-democratization of Uruguay

In 1977, at the peak of the dictatorial regime, the military announced that they would call

for a plebiscite for a new constitution. The announcement was made after the regime faced

increased criticism from President Jimmy Carters administration regarding human rights

violations. As part of Washingtons human rights policy, the US government suspended all

military aid to Uruguay in 1976, a move that irritated military leaders and forced them to justify

their domestic policies. (Caetano and Rilla 1987, 65-75) The military thereupon announced a

timetable to have the Council of the Nation (a non-elected body) write a new constitution to be

submitted to a plebiscite in 1980. The newly drafted constitution handwritten by the military

offered a grim array of restrictions on democratic rights and freedoms. Such restrictions

involved, among other things, the exclusion of Socialist and Communist parties from elections;

the nomination of a single presidential candidate among political parties authorized by the

military; limited political rights for labor unions; the establishment of a permanent National

Security Council, staffed by members of the armed forces; and the legalization of the national

security doctrine embedded in the establishment of the Political Control Commission, which

would have had the authority to dismiss any civilian official, including the president. (Caetano

and Rilla 1987; Gillespe 1991, 70; Nahum 1995, 332-335)

The Uruguayan democratic transition began when, to the surprise of the military, the

opposition won the 1980 plebiscite to reform the national constitution. The armed forces attempt

to portray the vote for the new constitution as a vote for democracy utterly failed. According to

Luis E. Gonzlez, the No campaign won with 57.2% of all votes, while the Yes got 42.8%,

on a turnout of 85.2%. (Gonzlez 1984) The regime sought to restore limited elections because it

perceived it would easily win the referendum, due to the level of political control that the military


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had achieved. At the time, there were few social movements, no authorized labor unions, little

church activity, and restricted political participation. Therefore, the 1980 victory of the No

campaign had a shocking effect on the military. (Achard 1992, 14-24) As Linz and Stepan

argue, elections refute or reinforce legitimacy claims of power contestants. For some prominent

military officers, the results of the plebiscite weakened their belief in the right to rule. (Linz and

Stepan 1996, 152)

A power struggle between the junta took place after the referendum, leading to the

inauguration of General Gregorio Alvrez as the new president of the country in 1981. General

Alvrez announced that traditional parties would be allowed to choose new leaders by means of

primaries in 1982 and these representatives would in turn negotiate with the armed forces the

design of a new constitution. However, the primaries further eroded the legitimacy of the

military, since voters elected left-wing politicians who had opposing views and demanded the

immediate withdrawal of the military from politics. Parties, particularly in the left, were

unwilling to accept the negotiating conditions of the military, because they feared accusations of

sellout in future elections. So instead of bargaining with the armed forces, they denounced the

restricted conditions imposed by the exiting regime. The civilian opposition from the left and the

right organized and forged alliances that led to massive street demonstrations against the

dictatorial regime. One of such demonstrations took place on the last Sunday of November of

1983, when approximately half a million people (almost 17% of Uruguays total population)

manifested themselves in Montevideos Obelisk, demanding once again that the military returned

to the barracks. This historical event further eroded the legitimacy of the dictatorship and

diminished the militarys chances of achieving a transition by transaction (or pacted transition), of

the kind we witnessed in Brazil and Chile . (Gillespie 1992, 186)

After the massive demonstrations of 1983, the armed forces reconsidered their conditions

and engaged in negotiations once again with the civilian opposition. The military was willing to

allow the celebration of democratic elections in 1984. A verbal commitment was made to release


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some political prisoners from the left, while some Socialist parties were allowed to participate in

presidential elections. Yet, the military insisted on certain political guarantees for their

extrication from politics and so they demanded the exclusion of the Blanco party (a historically

dominant political institution in Uruguay) and the elimination of trials for human rights

violations. (Gillespie 1986, 181-192; Lpez Chirico 2000, 185-190) The negotiations were

known as the Naval Club Accord, but as Gillespie and Gonzlez explain, the transition was not

really a pact but a partial settlement for free elections that was not likely to last long. (Gillespie

1991, 128-238; Gonzlez 1993, 88-128)

Indeed, after the 1984 election of Sanguinetti, the new democratic Parliament legalized

all parties (including the Blanco party) and abolished all institutional acts that imposed

restrictions on democracy. Soon after, the National Security Council was eliminated, military

judges were no longer incorporated into the judiciary, policies regarding military promotions

were reviewed and put under the presidents control, and military budgets began to decrease.

While the first Minister of Defense appointed by Sanguinetti was a member of the armed forces

(General Medina), the policy of appointing civilians as heads of the defense cabinet was re-

instituted after the second presidential election, in 1989. (Lpez Chirico 1999, 285)

The only component of the pact that was left untouched was the issue of human rights

and trials against the military. Civil society organizations and human rights lobbyists voiced

concerns about the quality of democracy in the absence of military trials; while the military

defended itself arguing that an amnesty had been negotiated with the opposition and thus the

Naval Club Accord had to be respected. As a direct result of these tensions in civil-military

relations, the Uruguayan government called for yet another referendum in 1989 on the decision

by the Congress to not prosecute the military for violations of human rights. The result of such

plebiscite was that a narrow majority of Uruguayans (55.4%) voted in favor of the law that

granted the armed forces immunity from prosecution for past violations. A similar law was

granted to the Tupamarus, an urban guerrilla movement that fought against the military in the


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1970s. (Barahona de Brito 1997, 125-151) Uruguay remains as the only case in the Southern

Cone where citizens have been asked to state an opinion on trials against the military.

Consequently, the military attempted to impose prerogatives and reserve domains, but

aborted such strategy in the presence of increased pressures from democratic forces from civil

society and political parties. The transition ultimately remained in the hands of civilians, which

in turn imposed the pace and the conditions of Uruguays democratization process. Due in part to

the strength of political parties and the relative weakness of the military, Juan Linz and Alfred

Stepan classified Uruguay as the only consolidated democracy in the Southern Cone of Latin

America. In their view, Uruguay returned to thestatus quo anteof civil-military relations, by

which they meant that the country went back to the 1967 constitutionalrule. As Linz and Stepan

argue:

In 1990, they (Uruguayan military) had fewer prerogatives than themilitary had in Chile, Argentina, or Brazil. One of the reasons that themilitary was not very powerful in Uruguayan politics after free electionswas that they had virtually no allies. In poll after poll, business elites,

politicians, and mass publics alike rejected military involvement inpolitics In no country in our thirteen-country sample, with the possible

exception of Greece, did democracy start with such a complete rejectionof the political role of the military. (Linz and Stepan 1996, 158-59)

Indeed, in 1995, the consulting firm Latinobarmetro, a group that measures public opinion in

Latin America, conducted a cross-regional poll and asked citizens their opinions about

democracy. In the survey, Uruguay ranked the highest for levels of trust in the democratic

system. According to the poll, 80% of all Uruguayans thought that democracy was preferable to

any other sort of government, while 8% thought authoritarianism was better than democracy, 6%

perceived there was no difference, and 6% expressed no opinion. (Latinobarmetro 1995)


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Nevertheless, Linz and Stepan were cautious in their analysis and asserted that the

Uruguayan democracy had a risk-prone configuration. 2 In their view, the new civilian

government had merely excluded the military from politics without providing it with a role

compatible with an emerging democracy. Civilians failed to re-structure military organizations

and reincorporate the armed forces socially and politically into the democratic system. According

to the authors, there were still civil-military problems, since there was no serious analysis by the

president, Parliament, or the minister of defense as to what type of armed forces Uruguay really

wants. (Linz and Stepan 1996, 160) This created resentment among soldiers and made the

democratic system risky because if a political crisis arose, the armed forces could easily find

allies among disloyal political actors. These allies, in turn, could provide the sources of future

political mobilization for the military; thus generating risk for democratic stability. (Linz and

Stepan 1996, 164) Indeed, students of Uruguayan politics believe that a mix of disloyal political

behavior among politicians with a politically unsatisfied military led to the 1973 coup dtat.

(Lpez Chirico 1985, Rial 1986, Lessa 2003, Lessa 2003b) Consequently, while democracy had

returned to Uruguay by 1990, the sources of military insurgence had not been fully eliminated,

but merely mitigated by the democratization process.

B. The legacies of the democratization process: crisis of identity and tense civil-military relations

In terms of civil-military relations, the extrication of the military from Uruguayan politics

had important consequences on the armed forces missions and military budgets. The restoration

of the democraticstatus quoprompted an unprecedented debate over the question of the

militarys purpose in a democratizing environment. The armed forces faced an identity crisis thataffected their morale and salaries, as budgets and political support plunged.

2A similar analysis is made by Claudio Fuentes. See Claudio Fuentes 1997.


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In the lines above, I argued that the military lacked the latitude and prerogatives to design

policies and assign missions independently from the purview of elected officials. The

democratization process did not grant effective autonomy to the armed forces nor did it provide

extra-military areas within state apparatus. Uruguayan police forces were demilitarized and the

internal security focus that once prevailed among the armed forces eroded as the military returned

to the barracks. Likewise, the military was unable to allocate constitutional responsibilities for

maintaining law and order, as they had originally envisioned in their 1980 constitutional proposal.

The National Security Council had disappeared and so did the Commission for Political Affairs,

which was in charge of intelligence and under military command. (Stepan 1988, 93-127)

In terms of military services, the Air Force and the Navy were far more successful in

maintaining certain internal activities or roles. For instance, the Air Force was given control over

the nationalair space, while the Navy was in charge of safeguarding Uruguays waters; entailing

mostly the patrolling of rivers (such as the River Plate), lakes and the sea. (Lpez Chirico 1999,

273.) But the Army had been deprived from any internal mission and this raise questions related

to the purpose and role of the military.

The Army was simply incapable of politically constructing a mission of its own. One of

the factors that contributed to the crisis of identity was the absence of leftist guerrilla movements,

which rendered obsolete the Communist threat that the military had devoted years to combating

and defeating. Indeed, in the early 1960s, the emergence of the Tupamaru movement, an urban,

Communist guerrilla, prompted the intervention of the armed forces in internal security missions,

which ultimately led to the implementation of the national security doctrine in 1973. (Rial 1986,Rilla and Caetano 1987, Lpez Chirico 1985) But by the time the re-democratization of Uruguay

took place, the guerrillas had been defeated, so the military had no explicit domestic threats to

fight, combat and justify its existence. The Armys internal crisis was intensified with the Soviet

Unions collapse and the fall of the Berlin Wall. As Carina Perelli argues, the events in Eastern


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Europe and the end of the Cold War profoundly shocked the armed forces in Latin America, since

the internationalCommunist enemy vanished while the countries democratized. (Perelli 1993)

A second factor that worsened the crisis was the resolution of regional rivalries in the

Southern Cone that eroded the militarys main external mission; namely, the defense of the nation

in case of an external invasion. In particular, Brazil and Argentina reached a nuclear agreement

in the early 1990s and engaged in a project of economic integration, known as MERCOSUR.

Threat environments between Argentine and Brazilian security communities were reassessed,

cooperative attitudes became dominant, and military institutions were reformed. These events

questioned the identity of the Uruguayan armed forces, since the raison dtreof the military was

to protect the country (a buffer state) in case of an armed dispute between neighboring Argentina

and Brazil. Uruguay did not only join MERCOSUR, but its capital, Montevideo, became the

headquarters of the organization, symbolizing a new era of regional integration. In the wake of

these developments, civilians in Uruguay began to seriously question the need for armed forces.

A third dynamic that contributed to the crisis was the militarys public reputation and

national prestige. While an amnesty for human rights violations was granted and trials were

halted, civil society in general continued to view the armed forces as a praetorian institution. In

polls conducted by Latinobarmetro in 1995, Uruguayans perceived the armed forces as an

eroding institution. To the question posed by Latinobarmetro who do you think has more

power in the country, Uruguayans answered that the government (45%) and business

corporations (36%) were more influential than the armed forces (22%). (Latinobarmetro 1995)

So, analogous to neighboring Argentina (studied in chapter 1), the Uruguayan military lackedpublic recognition and was in a desperate search for a mission to assure its institutional survival.

Unlike Brazil and Chile (to be analyzed in chapters 4 and 5), the Uruguayan military found itself

in a defensive position, where it had to continuously justify its existence to citizens that were

traditionally critical of its role.


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The crisis eventually affected the financial resources of the armed forces. Politicians and

soldiers clashed over the size of military budget shares in Uruguays new democracy. Defense

spending proved to be a very low priority for most politicians. Uruguay was widely known and

acknowledged for its strong welfare system during its pre-authoritarian era. So in convergence

with Wendy Hunters electoral dynamic, when the country returned to democracy, legislators had

very strong incentives to use federal funds for socioeconomic programs that ultimately re-

established the welfare system. (Hunter 1997, 5-25) Year after year, politicians diverted funds

from the military to other categories that were highly valued by their constituents. However, as it

will be analyzed in the forthcoming chapters, this dynamic does not apply to Brazil and Chile,

where prerogatives and reserve domains enabled the military to maintain high or constant

expenditure levels with relative political autonomy.

Uruguays military expenditures measured in terms of percentage of the gross national

product (ME/GNP %) decreased between 1985 and 1999, with the exception of 1994, when an

overvaluation of the peso led to general increases in public expenditures. Since Uruguay returned

to democracy in 1985, defense expenditures have decreased from 2.7% to 1.3% of the gross

national product (GNP). According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency records,

the militarys share of the central governments expenditure (CGE) has undergone a steady

contraction. For instance, in 1981, at the peak of the dictatorial regime, the central government

was spending 15.4% of its budget in the military, representing 4.0% of the GNP. By 1989, at the

end of the first democratic administration, military expenditures were reduced to 8.7% of the total

governments expenditures, corresponding to 2.3% of the GNP. To date, the government spends

less than 4.1% of its national expenditures on the military, representing only 1.3% of the GNP.

Similar statistics are reported by theMilitary Balance, published by the Institute of International

Strategic Studies in England. (See tables 1 and 2 below)


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These budgetary shifts affected procurement and military equipment. A country report

by Janes Military stated that the Uruguayan armed forces are all, to varying degrees, equipped

with elderly and in extreme cases inappropriate equipment. (Janes Military Review 2003)

Projects for modernization of the Army were continuously halted; the Navy was using ageing

frigates to accomplish its tasks, while the Air Force did not even have flying conditions in 1991

(with a fleet of only 11 aircrafts).

Because the military had no political supporters, it was unable to build alliances among

legislators across the political spectrum to lobby in favor of increased military budgets. Not even

the most conservative politicians within the rightist Colorado party supported military

expenditures after the democratization. Therefore, the militarys power began to erode even more

as politicians cut military budgets and reduced the resources available to the armed forces.

Table 1: Military expenditures in US constant dollars

316

420

326

482

296282 279

272

200

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

US Dollars

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2002

Year

Military expenditures in US constant dollars

Series1

Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1988-2001(OxfordUniversity Press.)


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Table 2: Military expenditures

Military expenditures as % of Gross National Product (GNP) and Central Government

Expenditure (CGE)

Year Military

expenditures

(in millionsof dollars)

Military

expenditure/GNP

%

Military

expenditure/CGE

%

Total

armed

forces (inthousands)

1974 2.9 11.8 25

1975 2.8 11.6 25

1976 2.3 8.9 28

1977 2.5 9.7 28

1978 2.4 9.7 28

1979 2.4 11.2 28

1980 3 13.1 28

1981 4.0 15.4 28

1982 4.1 13.2 29

1983 3.6 12.4 30

Militarydictatorship

1984 232 2.9 10.9 30

1985 230 2.7 10.6 30

1986 245 2.0 10.1 30

1987 202 2.2 7.7 2

1988 236 2.3 8.1 29

Firstdemocraticgovernment(President

Julio MaraSanguinetti)

1989 268 2.3 8.7 27

1990 277 2.2 9.1 25Seconddemocratic

1991 268 2.0 7.8 25


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1992 322 2.1 8.0 25

1993 277 1.7 5.6 25

government(PresidentJos AlbertoLacalle)

1994 416 2.4 7.3 25

1995 304 1.7 5.9 25

1996 262 1.4 4.6 25

1997 263 1.3 4.2 25

1998 267 1.3 4.0 25

Thirddemocraticgovernment

(PresidentJulio MaraSanguinetti)

1999 275 1.3 4.1 25

Source:U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms

Transfers, issues of 1996 and 1999-2000, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureauof Verification and Compliance 1997, 2000).

Paradoxically, the total number of armed forces did not substantially change since the

election of the first democratic government in 1985. In 2002, Uruguay had 23,900 armed forces,

only 7,000 less than in 1981, when the military was still in power. In 1995, due to a general

increase in the nations budget, the number of soldiers slightly increased from 24,700 to 25, 600.

(See table 2 above and 3 below) Unlike Brazil and Chile, Uruguay has professional military

forces and does not rely on a system of conscription to recruit new soldiers. Nevertheless, the

country has one of the highest ratios of armed forces per citizen in the Southern Cone. According

to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, there are 7.3 soldiers for every 1,000 people;

this is 6 times higher than in Argentina (2.0) and Brazil (1.8), although similar to Chile (7.3).

(See table 4 below)

In interviews conducted by the author, legislative members of the Committee of National

Defense acknowledged that the ratio was high, but substantial reductions had not been introduced

because the armed forces continue to provide public jobs that are needed, especially when the


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country is facing a profound economic crisis, with shortage of employment. 3 Hence, decreasing

the number of soldiers would translate into higher unemployment rates, which can affect the

politicians image. This again confirms Wendy Hunters electoral dynamic hypothesis that

politicians will cut back provisions that threaten their own political agenda. (Hunter 1997, 3, 95-

115) However, the consequence (perhaps unintended) of such policy is that while the military

provides opportunities for public employment, they do so at the expense of their salaries, since

they need to run the institution with decreasing budgets and resources. Ultimately, falling salaries

contributed to the general perception that the military faced an institutional crisis, while it also

affected its ability to lure young men and women into the armed forces.

Table 3: Total armed forces

1988 1990 1993 1995 1998 2002

Total 24,400 24,400 24,700 25,600 25,600 23,900Army 17,200 17,200 17,200 17,600 17,600 15,200Navy 4,200 500 4,500 5,000 5,000 5,700

Air Force 400 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000

Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1988-2001(OxfordUniversity Press, several issues from 1988-2001).

Table 4: Armed forces per citizen

Armed forces Population Population/Armed

forces

Armed forces

per 1000people

Uruguay 23,900 3,163,763 132 7.3

Argentina 69,000 36,260,130 525 2.0Brazil 305,000 169,799,170 557 1.8Chile 83,000 15,116,435 182 7.3Sources: Janes Information Group,Janes Military Review2003; and U.S. Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1999-2000 , (Washington, D.C.: U.S.Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance 2000).

3Personal interview with Senator Eleutario Fernndez Huidobro, national senator and member of theLegislative National Commission for Defense, Frente Amplio, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 18, 2003.


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It is safe to assert that the Uruguayan military was caught in a severe crisis of identity.

The absence of purpose, low salaries and decreasing budgetary allocations led to a downward

spiral of morale within the armed forces. While democratic rule had been reestablished, a crisis

in civil-military relations was rapidly emerging in Uruguay. In particular, the armed forces crisis

was aggravated by military officers perception that civilians were very little aware of the

importance of the armed forces. Civilian governments overwhelmed their military rivals with a

set of prolonged and punitive measures. These actions eroded the militarys influence, but they

also left the armed forces in a professionally moribund state, causing resentment. For politicians,

economic constraints would themselves compel the military to implement reforms. Analogous to

Argentina, civilian leaders reasoned that faced with scarcity, the armed forces would react

rationally by cutting endeavors that would make the need for reorganization and restructuring.

(Pion-Berlin 1991, 555) As Dr. Mariano Brito Checchi, former Minister of Defense between

1990-1993, stated: there was a degree of inconformity among some retired military officers

regarding economic compensation and retirement pensions. But we had to rationalize our budget

and we reduced expenditures within the rule of law, with norms, and compensations.4

For military officers, however, the economic constraints translated into operational and

professional decay. In their view, civilians were not following a rational policy sequence, since

reorganization could not come prior to the development of a military mission and doctrine. As a

senior military officer argued, it was difficult for us to commit to changes, since we did not

understand what longer purpose we were supposed to fulfill.5 Fortunately, the crisis did not

translate into insubordination, like in Argentina; but it did greatly affect civil-military relations in

the sense that there was a huge perception gap between Uruguayan society and its armed forces.

4Personal interview with Dr. Mariano Brito Checchi, Rector of the Universidad de Montevideo and formerMinister of Defense between 1990-1993, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 27, 2003.5Personal interview with a senior military officer who requested anonymity, Montevideo, Uruguay, August21, 2003.


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II. The Expansion of Peacekeeping Participation: From Cambodia to Africa

The years between 1985 and 1991 were defined by a crisis that damaged the militarys

morale and eroded civil-military relations in Uruguay. The salary crisis, the lack of modern

equipment, and the absence of proposals for reorienting functions of the armed forces caused

uncertainty and concern in the military services. In this context, PK became a means to respond

to demands for reorganization and a window of opportunities to cope with the challenges posed

by increasing budget cuts.

Uruguay had previous PK experiences in the 50s and 80s, when military observers were

sent to participate in peace missions in Kashmir and Sinai. Yet, the scale of PK participation was

small compared to what would come in the early nineties. In 1991, Venezuela accepted an

invitation by the United Nations to participate in Cambodia by sending ships and a contingent

consisting of more than 1,000 peacekeepers. The following year, a failed military coup organized

by Hugo Chvez impeded Venezuela from deploying its troops to UNCTAC. This provided

Uruguay with an opportunity to occupy the vacant position and assume Venezuelas international

commitment. In 1992 Uruguay deployedBatalln Uruguay I, an infantry battalion of 850 Amy

officers, including 88 military observers, and 480 Navy officers, totaling 1,330 men. Within the

battalion, there were four companies deployed in four Cambodian provinces, each occupying six

border-patrol positions. (Ejrcito de la Repblica de Uruguay 1994; Comando General del

Ejrcito 2003, 68) This represented one the nations largest PK contributions in Uruguays

history, both for the number of officers deployed as well as for the logistics required for the

mission. The operation entailed transporting armed forces, vehicles, ships, hospitals, and aircraft


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sorties from Montevideo, via Bangkok, to Boung Long, in the providence of Ratanakiri, in the

northeast side of Cambodia.6

The decision to allow the armed forces to participate within UNTAC was taken by

President Jos Alberto Lacalle in consultation with the Ministry of Defense. The government

was prompted by economic and political considerations. In the presence of vocal military

resentment due to budget cuts, decision-makers in Uruguay reasoned that UN PKO was a

relatively inexpensive mission that could also divert the attention of the military from domestic

politics towards external roles. The expectation was that the UN would pay the salaries of all

participating officers plus the depreciation of equipment. Indeed, the UN pays troop contributors

a monthly stipend of $1,000 per officer and it also reimburses countries for the expenditures

incurred during the deployment. Hence, the government assumed benefits by providing

additional funding to an unsatisfied military at the expense of the UN.

The military motivations for participation in PK were similar from those of the

government, but they were also triggered by professional and political interests. With decreasing

budgets and an intensified identity crisis, institutional survival appeared as the primary

motivation for increased participation. PK provided an ongoing role that was more likely to be

funded by some sort of international assistance. UN peace missions promised an alternative

mission to face the identity crisis and guaranteed resources for salaries and for future defense

procurement. Similarly, PK provided a field exercise and a professional experience, in which

young officers could be trained on military tactics, logistics, and other functions performed while

in a mission abroad. Finally, this large deployment offered the Army and the Navy theopportunity to improve their domestic and international images. The expectation was that

6Personal interview with Ambassador Pablo Sader, General Director for Political Affairs and formerDeputy Ambassador to the United Nations in 1991-93, Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Montevideo, Uruguay, August 18, 2003.


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domestic criticisms regarding their past mistakes would cease once the armed forces engaged in

missions involving the protection of citizens in other countries.

UNTAC proved to be a very educational experience for both the government and the

military. The expectations about the automatic economic benefits of PK participation were

unrealistic. The government did not realize that UN payments were slow and could take up to

two years for full reimbursement. As Dr. Brito, the former Minister of Defense, revealed in an

interview, we prepared the material, including vehicles, and we even painted the equipment; but

the UN paid with some delay.7 Furthermore, since this was the first contribution that involved

the deployment of military units, the Ministry of Defense lacked expertise on UN reimbursement

policies. The UN outlines minimum requirements from contributing states in what is known as

the Memorandum of Understanding. The memorandum specifies what the world organization

expects from contributor countries, including the number of operational vehicles, man/hours for

observation duties, and quality of the equipment being deployed. The Uruguayan Ministry of

Defense made the decision to send outdated and aged equipment that was practically unusable for

the conditions in UNTAC, but with the expectation that the UN would pay regardless of the state

of the gear. The UN, however, bases its reimbursement policy on the quality of the equipment

and the level of deterioration incurred during the mission. The UN assessment determined that

the Uruguayan equipment was depreciated and was not used sufficiently in the mission; hence, it

did not cover the actual costs of deployment, but offer partial reimbursement.8

Uruguayans learned their lesson and became far more rational in future deployments.

After the 1992 participation in Cambodia, peace soldiers were deployed to Mozambique andAngola. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) was Uruguays first major

7Personal interview with Dr. Mariano Brito Checchi, Rector of the Universidad de Montevideo and formerMinister of Defense between 1990-1993, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 27, 2003.8Interview with an Uruguayan military officer who requested anonymity, Genera l Staff Office of theUruguayan Army, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 5, 2003.


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deployment in Africa. In February of 1993, one year after the Cambodian deployment, Uruguay

sent an infantry battalion consisting of 800 officers to the southern region of Mozambique. The

most modern equipment available, including a logistics section of the Army, tanks, vehicles and

planes, accompanied Uruguayan soldiers. In total, 2,518 Uruguayan peace officers were

deployed in four different rotations. By January of 1995, when UNOMOZ accomplished its

mandate and the mission was finally dismantled, 10% of all the armed forces had been exposed to

the UN mission in Mozambique, making this operation Uruguays largest PK contribution in

history. Unlike Cambodia, the equipment was in better conditions and the UN reimbursed all

costs, including materials, such as gasoline and other resources used during the operation. 9

While the forces in Mozambique undoubtedly composed Uruguays largest contingent

abroad, President Julio Mara Sanguinetti (now in his second term as president) followed his

predecessor's policy line and signaled the governments receptivity to other United Nations

requests for troops. In January of 1996, one year after UNOMOZ, Uruguay sent another infantry

battalion to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II and III (UNAVEM II and III). In

total, 96 military observers and 2,389 officers and non-commissioned officers from the Army

were sent to Angola to help verify a cease-fire agreement and an electoral process. However, the

peace process in Angola failed and by February of 1999 the peacekeepers began to withdraw.

(Ejrcito de la Repblica de Uruguay 1999, 52-55)

Uruguay had not fully recovered from UNAVEM III, when in February of 2000 the UN

Security Council expanded the mandate and objective of the United Nations Mission in the

Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). Given Uruguays previous PK experience, KofiAnnan, the UN Secretary General, requested Uruguayan peace soldiers to form part of a mission

consisting originally of 5,537 military personnel. After domestic deliberations, Jorge Battle, the

9Personal Interview with retired Lt. Col. Denis P. Lacassy, former peacekeeper in Mozambique,Montevideo, Uruguay, August 21, 2003.


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newly elected president of Uruguay, accepted the invitation and the country prepared itself to

deploy its fourth major PKO. As of today, Uruguay has deployed 1,733 commissioned and non-

commissioned officers from the three military services. The South American country is the

leading troop contributor in Congo, providing 21.32% of all peace soldiers. (United Nations

Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2003) Uruguay maintains three battalions in Africa, all

of which are currently responsible for three sectors in the country, including airports and river

transportation. In total, 11% of the Army is currently deployed in Congo.10

Table 5:

Participation in peacekeeping operations by service and by mission, as of May of 2003

PKO Army Navy Air

Force

Total

Guatemala (MINUGUA) 4 obs. 4Honduras-Nicaragua 3 obs. 3Mozambique (ONUMOZ) 215obs.,

23032518

Rwanda (UNAMIR) 46obs. 46Liberia (UNOMIL) 44obs. 44Angola (UNAVEM III) 96obs., 2389 2485Tajikistan (UNMOT) 37 obs. 37Iran-Iraq (UNIIMOG) 37obs. 37Cambodia (UNTAC) 88obs.

742500 1330

Missionsaccomplished

Cyprus (UNFYCYP) 18obs. 18

West Sahara (MINURSO) 91obs. 91Congo (MONUC) 1454 250 29 1733Sierra Leone(UNAMSIL)

11obs. 11

Cote dIvoire(MINUCI)

2 obs. 2

Ethiopa-Eritrea (UNMEE) 41obs. 41India-Pakistan(UNMOGIP) 76obs. 76Timor (UNMISET) 25 obs. 25

Afghanistan (UNAMA) 1obs. 1Georgia (UNOMIG) 19 obs. 19

Missions inprogress

Sinai (MFO) 1853 obs. 1853Total 2,703 obs.

6,888750 29

10,370

10Personal interview with Col. Ral Gloodtdofsky, Military Attach at the Permanent Mission of Uruguayto the United Nations, New York, July 3, 2003. Personal interview with Col. Picabea, General StaffsOffice, Uruguayan Army, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 5, 2003.


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(9,591 total)Obs.= military observerSources: Ejrcito de la Repblica Oriental del Uruguay,El Ejrcito uruguayo en misiones de paz,Montevideo, Uruguay: Imprenta Militar 1999; Comando General del Ejrcito, Ejrcito Nacional:

Desde 1811 al Servicio de la Patria, Desde 1935 al Servicio de la Paz, Montevideo, Uruguay,Ejrcito, 2003; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), MonthlySummary of Contributors, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/home.shtml.

In 1982, when the dictatorship was still in power, Uruguay had participated in 2 PKO,

including India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP) and the Multinational Force Operation in Sinai (MFO).

From 1985 to 2003 the country expanded its participation from 2 to 18 PKO. The number of

Uruguayans deployed with the UN increased from roughly a 100 officers in 1982 to 1,802 in

2003, an increase of over 1000%. While the missions in Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola and

Congo constitute Uruguays largest PK deployments, the country has participated in 16 other UN

PKO, including the MFO in Sinai (not under the UN umbrella). The armed forces have now the

capacity to deploy officers in multiple missions around the world. For instance, the Army is

currently serving in 9 PKO, in addition to MONUC in Africa. To date, about 11,000

commissioned and non-commissioned officers have participated in peace missions, making of

Uruguay the worlds largest per capita contributor to UN PKO, with a consistent participation of

1,000 troops per year. The country is officially one of the top five UN troop contributors,

surpassed only by three South Asian countries (Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh) and one African

state (Ghana).

III. Peacekeeping and its effects

In one decade, from 1992 to 2003, there was a massive expansion of Uruguays PK

contributions. Has the increasing involvement in international missions provided the military

with a more appropriate role within democracy? Did PK participation affect civilian politicians?

Is there more serious analysis by the president, Parliament, and other political institutions as to

what type of armed forces Uruguay has? Have individual officers and soldiers who have been

exposed to PK missions changed their views and become more civilianized? This section will


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analyze how engagement in UN peace missions affected military institutions, civilians, and

individual officers.

A. Peacekeeping and the armed forces: From identity crisis to peacekeeping as a modus

vivendi

In the early 1990s, PK became the primary activity for the Uruguayan armed forces. To

what extent did the expansion of UN involvement change the military? This section addresses

this question by analyzing how PK changed (or did not change) the mission, purpose and focus

the armed forces. Missions are the raison dtreof military institutions and in order for them to

be credible, they must be founded on functions for which the military is uniquely organized,

equipped, and trained, and from which they can develop esprit de corpsand high morale.

(Marcella 1994, 4) PK has been, traditionally, a secondary or tertiary mission for most Latin

American militaries and its effects are assumed to be small. However, the expansive deployment

of soldiers for peace operations in the nineties calls for reevaluating the ways in which external

roles, such as PKO, affect military institutions.

In the theoretical framework of this study (in chapter 1), it was argued that the effects of

PK participation are linked to the democratization process. In particular, the less bargaining

power retained by the military at the time of the transition, the more likely that PK participation

will influence the armed forces. Indeed, the first section of this chapter described how the

military emerged from the democratization process weakened and challenged by the lack of

purpose and mission. Consequently, PK was embraced for institutional self-preservation and for

the protection of special privileges, such as size and budget. But engagement in PKO does not

resuscitate institutions automatically, since adopting new missions also entails adjusting new

functions and standards. In order for the military to keep up with the challenges posed by

democratization, military institutions developed new organizational procedures and changed


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standards as they adopted PKO. Specifically, the expansion of UN missions changed the military

institution in three dimensions; namely missions, organization and resources.

First, involvement in several international peace operations changed the orientation of the

armed forces from domestic politics to external roles. The military transited from inward-

oriented missions (mostly anti-guerrilla tactics) in the seventies, to a crisis of identity in the mid-

eighties and early nineties, to PK in the mid-nineties. In other words, PK provided the mission

that the military so desperately needed at the end of the democratic transition. In interviews

conducted in 2003, several Uruguayan military officers rejected the idea that PK had become

their main mission. As Colonel Roberto Urrutice explains, we continue to value our traditional

mission, entailing the defense of sovereignty, as described by the Constitution.11

Certainly, if

the attention is focused exclusively on formal institutions and written documents, there seems to

be very little evidence that PK has become so important. In Uruguay, there is no white book on

national defense, there are no PK manuals published nor is there an official PK doctrine stipulated

within the national defense policy. For instance, the official website of the Army specifies that its

mission is to guarantee, in all circumstances and against all forms of aggression, the security and

integrity of the nation, its institutions and its inhabitants. The website does have a link for PKO,

but it appears as part of what the Army calls solidarity missions, involving assistance for local

communities and for international peace missions. (Uruguayan Army 2003,

http://www.ejercito.mil.uy/conozca.htm)

However, with more than 11% of the Army currently deployed in Congo, 2,000

officers presently training for Congos third rotation, and with more than 5,000 soldiers (25% of

all armed forces) who have sign up their names as volunteers for future deployments, it is

difficult to dispute the claim that PK has become a significant mission for the armed forces and

the raison dtreof the Army. A substantial number of officers from the three services has been

11Personal interview with Col. Roberto Urrutice, Sub-Director of the School of Peacekeeping Operations atthe School of the Arms and Services, Uruguayan Army, Montevideo, August, 8, 2003.


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Military innovation began in 1995 when, after Uruguays participation in the UN mission

in Cambodia, a PK training center was established within the School of Arms and Services.

Commanders at the school envisioned an ad hoctraining center that would function temporarily,

while soldiers and officers were being prepared for the missions in Mozambique and Angola. In

1998, the center became the Uruguayan Peacekeeping Operations School and was then given an

expansive mandate that included qualifying officers, troops and personnel from military and

police services for the execution of peace missions abroad. The school now provides training and

courses for military observers, junior officers, contingents, military police forces and

commanding officers. Depending on the military rank, all Army personnel drafted for

participation in PKO spends from 3 to 6 weeks in the school, attending seminars and courses on

several issues. The training is organized via modules, consisting mostly of PK doctrine, as stated

in UN documents, operative techniques, history of the mission and the country where deployment

is being targeted, specific training skills (such as demining), and security measures.13

The School was not only established to justify the Armys new mission, but to help the

military institution to change and adjust to demands posed by the UN. In compliance with UN

regulations, peacekeepers from Uruguay are voluntarily recruited within the three military

branches. However, unlike countries such as Canada, France or Great Britain, Uruguay does not

have a specialized PK unit or a single pre-existing battalion that it can deploy regularly

throughout the world. Instead, an Uruguayan PK infantry unit can be comprised with officers and

soldiers from each of the four national military divisions within the country. So peace soldiers

can come from different services and different national divisions, a challenge for military

13Personal visit to Major Juan Sosa Machado Peacekeeping Operations School in the Armys School ofArms and Services, Camino Maldonado, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 8, 2003. I am grateful to thedirecting staff for providing me access to the School of Arms and Services. In particular, I thank GeneralHctor R. Islas, director of the School of Arms and Services, Col. Pablo Pintos, Director of thePeacekeeping Operations School, Col. Roberto Urrutice, Under-director of the Peacekeeping OperationsSchool, Lt. Col. Tullio Felici, Instructor, and Maj. Ronal Garca, assistant and instructor, for the time thespent with me during my visit.


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cohesiveness. The training center allows enlisted volunteers to know each other and to acquire

new skills, while they develop esprit de corps for the mission.

Compared to Argentinas Center for Peacekeeping Operations (CAECOPAZ), the

Uruguayan school is still underdeveloped. The curriculum is not stated in manuals, there is no

debriefing, and there are virtually no civilian components. The school directors have been

hesitant in generating a national PK doctrine. As Col. Pablo Pintos, the director of the school,

explains, structured knowledge is not very useful at tactical and field levels. There are useful at

a theoretical level, but useless at a tactical level. Training is better if it relies on real field

experience.14 Training in the school takes place at a very inter-personal level, where the

instructor gives information to beginners by sharing his/her personal experiences in previous

PKO. Although many of these benefits appear primarily personal, the military institution

realizes some gains. The expectation is that professional learning from PKO will occur from the

individual to the institution by means of sharing personal anecdotes. Officers can then bring their

newly acquired knowledge and experiences back to their home unit, allowing others to be

exposed to peace missions. Despite the lack of formality and institutionalization, the school

reveals that there is some degree of change and adjustment. Changes in military education did

not take place before expansive PK participation, so a certain degree of internal transformation

within the armed forces can be attributed to the increasing involvement in UN missions.

Another organizationalchange that has occurred as a result of PK participation is intra-

service cooperation. Uruguay, like many other developing countries, faced problems regarding

lack of integration between military services, which often translated into rivalry among Army and

Navy officers. Even during the dictatorial regime, services struggled with each other for

resources and autonomy. After the transition to democracy, the Navy and the Air Force jealously

guarded its centers and resources, while preventing attempts to merge or reassign assets with the

14Personal interview with Col. Pablo Pintos, Director of the Peacekeeping Operations School, CaminoMaldonado, Uruguay, August 8, 2003.


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Army, which was suffering the most from atrophy. Demands for expansive PK participation

changed the willingness of the three forces to adopt new patterns of interaction. As General

Hebert J. Figoli argues, PK helps our three forces to operate jointly.15

Cambodia, in particular, forced the Army and the Navy to work together in ways that

they had not done before. In UNTAC, Navy officers, frigates, and a hospital assisted 1,000 Army

peacekeepers in transporting equipment and patrolling rivers. In fact, Uruguayans marines

interviewed for this study claim that Cambodias Navy actually emulates Uruguays Armada,

since marines were primarily in charge of reconstituting and training a new Navy for the Asian

country.16 In total, about 1,500 Navy officers have participated in peace missions, while 10% of

all current active officers have had some kind of PK experience. The Navy has not participated

as massively in PKO as the Army, but each deployment has increased the linkages between the

two services. As Captain Ricardo J. Shunk explains, there is a natural rivalry between services.

We rarely work together on a regular basis, so it is difficult to operate jointly . PK is one of the

few instances where we have to cooperate. In fact, we now depend on the Army for the success

of the mission in Congo.17 In MONUC the three services are working together for the first time,

as the Air Force is currently responsible for Congos airports, while river transportation is being

provided by almost 250 Navy officers.

An enduring rivalry prevails regarding the School of Peacekeeping Operations, since the

training facility is still in the hands of the Army. An integrated school has been suggested,

following the Argentine example of CAECOPAZ, but internal disputes have complicated the

quest for unification. Training center assets are still jealously guarded by the Army.

Nevertheless, while full reorganization has not been speedy, PK has forced the military to

15Personal interview with General Hebert F. Figoli, General Director of the Center of High NationalStudies (Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales), CALEN, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 11, 2003.16Personal interview with Cap. Fernando Franzini, Director of Public Relations, Uruguays Navy,Montevideo, August 20, 2003.17Personal interview with Cap. Ricardo J. Schunk, Director of Peacekeeping Operations, Uruguays Navy,Montevideo, August 20, 2003.


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rationalize certain military functions and to embrace different patterns of interaction. Army

commanders are now more likely to delegate river, maritime, and air patrolling duties to the other

services; thus showing willingness to share not only responsibilities, but benefits derived from

international participation in peace missions. PK has also offered an opportunity to adjust

officers to new and cooperative inter-service patterns of behavior.

New SOPs have been introduced as a direct consequence of inter-service collaboration

with the United Nations. The Uruguayan infantry battalion for Cambodia was deployed at a fast

pace, within 10 days, thanks to the assistance of private transportation companies from Canada

and Russia hired by the UN. But the contingent was supposed to be ready for the mission within

less than a week, revealing the need for better planning and coordination. (Ejrcito de la

Repblica Oriental delUruguay 1994) Demands to ensure rapid deployment were also increased

when Uruguay committed itself to the United Nations Rapid Deployment Stand-by System

(UNSAS), which attempts to pledge state members to send forces and resources within the agreed

response times for UN PKO. Consequently, in order to reduce deployment time considerably the

presidency of Uruguay decreed the creation of the National System for Support of Peacekeeping

Operations (SINOMAPA in Spanish), in 1994. SINOMAPA resides within the Ministry of

Defense, coordinating PK policies among military organizations and government agencies.

SINOMAPAs goals are to ensure that the units are prepared to start the mission, to make sure

that deployment is as rapid as is possible, and to guarantee economic, political and technical

support for the success of the mission, once participation has been decided by the President and

the Ministry of Defense.18

Criticism has been voiced regarding the system, per se, since there is very little civilian

control or intervention in this body. The SINOMAPA is chaired by the President, but its regular

18Personal interview with Col. Ral Gloodtdofsky , Military Attach at the Permanent Mission of Uruguayto the United Nations, New York, July 3, 2003; and personal interview with Ambassador Pablo Sader,General Director for Political Affairs and former Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations in 1991-93,Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 18, 2003.


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attendees are the chief commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The statutory director of

this body is the Chief of Staff of the Army, who reports directly to the Armys Commander in

Chief. The heads of other executive departments and agencies (such as the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and the Ministry of Economics), as well as other senior officials, are invited to attend

meetings of the SINOMAPA when appropriate. (Comando General del Ejrcito 2003, 153-154)

The subsequent section will address the issue of lack of civilian control and how it poses

challenges for the system. However, the existence of SINOMAPA illustrates how the armed

forces have been adopting new procedures to coordinate their action and adjust their behavior to

UN demands.

Third, involvement in UN peace missions has changed the material incentives for

recruiting soldiers and officers and the rules for purchasing new equipment. In 1991 the armed

forces were facing a serious challenge regarding low salaries and poor gear. While PK

participation has not increased military budgets (quite the opposite, see table 1 and 2), the

stipends derived from UN contributions have afforded an alternative source of income to improve

salaries and buy material. The expectation of the Uruguayan government was that the UN would

pay for all incurred costs, including transportation, equipment and salaries. The assumption

turned out to be unrealistic, because as UNTAC proved, the UN partially paid the costs of the

mission. But, PK did provide the armed forces with a valuable justification to impede larger cuts

and even obtain some extra treats.

The UN pays contributor states a monthly stipend of $1,000 for each member of a unit

deployed within a contingent. This payment is given directly to the government, which in turn

distributes it among its armed forces. Conversely, officers assigned on UN observer mission

(without a contingent) receive a direct per-diem rate from the UN that varies from $85 (US) to

$120(US) , depending on the country and the mission. In other words, the government does not

profit from military observers, since payment does not goes through any governmental

bureaucracy.


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Interestingly enough, the hard cash that comes from the UN has often been used by the

armed forces to obtain governmentaleconomic supplements. The claim often made by the

military is that participation in PK provides resources that bring prosperity and wealth to

Uruguay. For instance, in July of 2003, Dr. Yamand Fau, the Minister of Defense, declared that

the deployment of 1,807 peacekeepers in 2002 had generated wealth for the country in the

amount of approximately $20 million dollars, just for UN viaticum. (Instituto de Ciencia

Poltica de la Universidad de la Repblica 2003) This is a significant amount considering that

Uruguays major export product is beef and sales overseas for this item represented $16 million

dollars in 2002. In fact, PK has made military labor services Uruguays most important export

product.

However, while a certain degree of prosperity has been created as a direct consequence of

internationalism, the government has also incurred in major expenditures. In addition to the

payment provided by the UN, peacekeepers from Uruguay receive an additional 50% pay hike

from the government, increasing individual salaries substantially. The argument is that peace

missions are risky and separate officers from their families for a 6-month period. So, the state

provides extra sources to compensate for the alleged costs. This means that a significant amount

of the national defense budget goes into paying salaries, rather than supplying or moderniz ing the

armed forces. For instance, in 2002, the budget for the Ministry of Defense was of $200 (US)

million, of which $140 million (US), more than 70%, covered expenditures for salaries. (see table

6 and 7) The outcome is that the average salary for an active officer that is deployed in a PK

mission has more than tripled vis--vis regular military wages. For example, a lieutenant colonel

is paid roughly $700 (US) a month. While on a UN mission, the same lieutenant colonel can

make up to $6,000 (US) a month; this is more than quadruple his/her normal salary because of all

the extra incentives the state provides. Likewise, a Navy non-commissioned officer makes $100

(US) a month, while on a UN mission, the same soldier can make up to $1,000 (US) a month.

(see table 8) Consequently, PK has alleviated the ailments caused by defense cuts and low


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salaries by providing additional payment. This has been done at the expense of the UN and the

national budget.

Table 6: Distribution ofmilitary budget in 2002

Military budget 2002

70%

13%

8%

9%

salaries

maintenance

supplies

procurement

Source: Instituto de Ciencia Poltica de la Universidad de la Repblica, Informe SemanalUruguay No. 98. Observatorio Cono Sur de Defensa y Fuerzas, August, 2-8, 2003; Congreso

Nacional de la Repblica de Uruguay. Comisin de Presupuestos, Integrada con la de Hacienda.Montevideo, Uruguay, July 30, 2003.Table 7:Representative figures for individual salaries

Army

Normal salaryusd/month

Salary aspeacekeeperwithincontingentusd/month

Salary asmilitary observer(Mozambique)

Salary ascommander of aPKO

Lt. Col. $700usd./month $3,000usd./month $4,000usd/month $6,000usd/month

Navy

Normal Salaryusd/month

Governmentalsupplement

UN stipendusd/month

Total salaryUsd/month


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(50% increase ofthe salary)

Non-commissionedofficer

$100 usd ($300U pesos)

$50 $850 $1,000

Marine officer Normal salary 50% $1000-1,400 $2,200Commander Normal salary 50% $1000-1,400 $3,000

UN reimbursements for operational costs incurred in the missions have also enabled the

armed forces to purchase some equipment. The data available on reimbursements is not fully

accessible or public , but recent declarations by the Minister of Defense reveal that Uruguay

received approximately $129 (US) million dollars in the past 11 years for its contribution in UN

PKO. (Instituto de Ciencia Poltica de la Universidad de la Repblica, Informe no. 96 2003) The

money that has returned to the country has enabled the military to acquire military equipment

from Eastern Europe. A recent report by Janes Military revealed that: Following Uruguays

rejection of US military aid during the Carter administration, the country turned elsewhere,

notably to Belgium and Spain, for its requirements. Argentina also provided some second-hand

material. Recent acquisitions of Eastern European equipment may indicate a new trend in

acquisition policies. (Janes Military, 2003)

Indeed, using the justification that new material was required to fulfill PK duties, the

Army and the Navy have been shopping for battle tanks, vessels, minesweepers and frigates from

NATO excess stocks and from former Warsaw Pact countries. Eastern Europe has been a natural

supplier for Uruguay, since prices are low and the equipment can be delivered from Germany or

Poland directly to the missions in Africa. The Navy has also expressed interest in procuring

second-hand frigates from the United Kingdom to replace its old craft. The choice is the result

of an interest in deploying helicopters at sea. This is not possible with the Commandant Riviere

Class frigates, which lack both flight deck and hangar. (Janes Military, 2003) As Captain

Ricardo J. Schunk explains, We need operative equipment in Congo; otherwise the UN will not

reimburse us. I cannot send aged equipment because my personnel needs good resources and


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they cannot be put under risk for being poorly equipped. Yes, PK requires initial investment so

that the gear can last for at least 2 years. The most up-to-date equipment was purchased for and

while in the mission.19

To some analysts, the idea of purchasing equipment for PK missions is troubling because

the most modern Uruguayan gear is now overseas. As Professor Julian Gonzlez argues, we

have sent our best helicopters abroad, when some of this equipment could be used at home. What

will happen if there is a national security crisis and our best gear is miles away?20 Similarly,

critics of this policy, like Juan Rial, argue that most recent acquisitions have been bought with

international loans and debt, with the expectation that the UN will reimburse the operational costs

of Congo in the future.21

However, payment is slow and most of the time the UN does not

reimburse the full amount.

In any case, PK has served as an escape valve to deal with the financial crisis that

affected the armed forces at the end of the democratic transition. PK has not only provided a

survival mission, but a modus vivendi, in which higher salaries and military acquisitions are

justified in terms of peace contributions. The armed forces have changed their suppliers, adjusted

their budgets, created new SOPs, founded institutions, and introduced new training programs

based on UN needs and demands. To a certain extent, PK participation has appeased the armed

forces, since they can no longer blame the government for maintaining an ill-equipped and

underpaid military. The state of the military has slightly improved, especially compared to 1991,

when it was facing simultaneous financial and identity crises. However, the question is whether

these transformations have strengthened civilian control and increased civilian expertise on

defense matters. This is the main issue to be discussed in the following section.

19Personal interview with Captain Ricardo J. Schunk, Director of Peacekeeping Operations, Navy,Montevideo, Uruguay, August 20, 2003.20Personal interview with Professor Juilian Gonzlez, Coordinator of the Southern Cone Observatory ofDefense Policies and Armed Forces, Universidad de la Repblica, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 11, 2003.21Personal interview with Juan Rial, Uruguayan expert and consultant to the United Nations DevelopmentProgram, New York, November 5, 2003.


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B. Soldiers and. Politicians: Enduring Gaps in Civil-Military Relations

Participation in peace operations changed the general orientation and focus of the armed

forces from domestic to external missions. However, these changes can reflect mere adjustments

without entailing real transformations in civil-military relations. To argue that PK exercises

profound effects on civil-military relations implies that civilians preferences and interests are

also being shaped and changed by the countrys engagement in peace operations. Has the

adoption of new international missions transformed interactions between civilians and soldiers?

Is there firm civilian control over the military as a result of Uruguays increasing participation in

PKO? Has the expansion of UN involvement increased civilian expertise on defense and security

policies?

Despite the large number of troops participating in PKO, relations between civilians and

the military remained without change throughout the nineties. In 1996, Linz and Stepan

concluded that the quality of Uruguayan civil-military relations was not high since there was no

serious analysis by political institutions as to what type of armed forces the country required.

(Linz and Stepan 1996, 160) Seven years have passed since the publication ofProblems of

Democratic Transition and Consolidation; yet, the quality of Uruguayan civil-military relations

has not experienced a radical transformation, even if PK contributions have increased. Two set of

problems are present in todays Uruguay. First, civilians have continued to delegate authority to

military organizations, without actively involving diplomatic agencies and other political

institutions. Second, the absence of diplomatic intervention has halted a larger national debate

about the countrys PK policies, so defense communities have not expanded beyond the military

domain.

PK participation has not followed political imperatives. There has not been an explicit

attempt to incorporate the armed forces into foreign policy objectives. In fact, unlike India,

Canada, Sweden, Argentina or Brazil, countries that actively participate in UN negotiations,


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Uruguay has never been part of the UN Security Council and there are no plans to join the body

as a non-permanent member. As Ambassador Pablo Sader explains, we are a small country that

does not have strategic interests abroad. Being in the Security Council exposes state -members to

enormous international pressures.22 The consequence of this policy is that the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs does not participate in the formulation of Security Council resolutions that

eventually determine the mandates of PKO. Since there is no active diplomatic or political

engagement, Uruguay does not have diplomats and civilian functionaries supporting the United

Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). Appointments at the UNDPKO

are politically determined according to national quotas that are often negotiated in the Security

Council. The Council and the UNDPKO are the most important bureaucracies within the UN

system, since authorization, mandate, logistics, command, budget and political affairs are

managed by these two bodies. Together they generate information and delegate authority that can

then be used by national organizations to influence the decision-making at home. Since the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs is absent from both, the UNDPKO and the Council, Uruguay relies

on third parties to gather information about PK missions.

Uruguays diplomatic delegation at the UN headquarters in New York does have a

military attach within its bureaucracy. Following the new SOPs established by the

SINOMAPA, a colonel from the Army has been appointed by the president to help coordinate PK

policies in New York. The attach, however, does not report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

but to the Ministry of Defense. It is the attach who he gets to travel around the world obtaining

information about the mission from the field. His function also includes establishing contacts

with the UNDPKO and working as an informal liaon officer, developing links between the UN

command and the armed forces. The problem is that this system has actually encouraged

information asymmetries. The Ministry of Defense has informational advantages about PK

22Personal interview with Ambassador Pablo Sader, General Director for Political Affairs and formerDeputy Ambassador to the United Nations in 1991-93, Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Montevideo, Uruguay, August 18, 2003.


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issues and the data collected by the attachs office is rarely shared, debriefed or diffused. The

attach has devoted more time to developing his contacts and expertise on PK matters than any

other diplomatic member within the Uruguayan embassy; thus increasing the influence of the

Ministry of Defense.

Similarly, the criterion to determine troop contributions is unrelated to the countrys

diplomacy. Uruguay has sent peacekeepers to more than 20 countries, but in only 6 of these

missions there has been a diplomatic representation. In Cambodia, a plenipotentiary ambassador

was appointed after the deployment of troops. Africa is by far the most preferred area for

deployment (8 out of 20 missions); yet, there are few embassies in the region, Congo and South

Africa being the exceptions. (See table 7) Trade interests or economic policies have not inspired

the countrys active involvement in peace missions in Africa. As Ambassador Felipe Paolillo,

Uruguayan Permanent Ambassador to the UN, explains There are countries who see Africa as an

important international market, we believe the continent has an economic potential, but that is not

our immediate goal. We are there for international solidarity and we are a neutral party.23 The

indirect consequence of this policy is that, yet again, the Foreign Ministry does not rely on its

network of diplomatic offices to obtain field information about the missions where soldiers are

being sent. The information is generated by military envoys who visit the countries and assess

the conditions for deployment without political input. Only the Ministry of Defense knows what

judgment was used to determine the various risks and political viability of PKO.

Table 8: Diplomatic missions where peacekeepers have been deployed.

Peacekeeping missions Diplomaticrepresentation1. Guatemala (MINUGUA) Yes2. Honduras-Nicaragua Yes3.Mozambique (ONUMOZ) No4. Rwanda (UNAMIR) No

23Personal interview with Ambassador Felipe Paolillo, Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the UnitedNations, New York, June 1 7, 2003.


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5. Liberia (UNOMIL) No6. Angola (UNAVEM III) No7. Tajikistan (UNMOT) No8. Iran-Iraq (UNIIMOG) No9. Cambodia (UNTAC) Yes10.West Sahara (MINURSO) No11. Congo (MONUC) Yes12. Sierra Leona (UNAMSIL) No13. Iraq-Kuwait (UNIKOM) No14. Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE) No15.India-Pakistan(UNMOGIP) Yes16. Timor (UNMISET) No17. UNFYCYP (Cyprus) Yes18. Georgia (UNOMIG) No19. Cte dIvoire (MINUCI) No20. Afghanistan (UNAMA) No

Source: Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Part of the problem has to do with the fact that the presidency, where the key decisions

are made, has delegated authority to the Ministry of Defense, instead of empowering the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs. It is in this area where differences between Argentina and Uruguay are the

most evident. In the former case, diplomatic bureaucracies were used to shift decision-making

processes from the militarys exclusive domain and toward diplomacy, where PK policies became

subject to international scrutiny and thus the responsibility of ambassadors rather than soldiers.

As established in the theoretical framework of this study (chapter 1), it is under these conditions

that PK is more likely to have an effect on civil-military relations. In the Argentine context, the

delegation of authority to the Foreign Ministry provided additional mechanisms for civilian

control, since military and diplomatic bureaucracies checked and controlled each other as they

coordinated common policies. Likewise, a minimum degree of civilian intervention occurred

when PK policies were delegated to diplomats, who in turn were more likely to think in political

terms and less influenced by military organizational biases. Such context provided fertile ground

for the expansion of defense communities and critical thinking from non-military organizations.

Conversely, in Uruguay, there has not been an attempt to policy handle; that is, to move

some decision-making about troop contribution out of the Ministry of Defense and towards the


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Foreign Ministry. Each major troop deployment did not progressively transfer power from one

bureaucracy into another. The presidency did not invite members of the diplomatic corps to play

a key role in assisting, designing, and implementing decisions made by the executive branch.

Each decision made about peace contributions did not trigger a thorough discussion or debate

about the consequences it would trigger for the countrys foreign policy. These decisions

generated a principal-agent problem, in which the control of the military bureaucracy has caused

greater challenges. As resources and engagement increased, so did the authority and autonomy of

the Ministry of Defense. This agency led by a civilian-appointed official, is mostly staffed by

retired and active service commanders.

Since there are no other political institutions monitoring or controlling PK policies, aside

from the presidency itself , supervision depends on the legislative branch. Unfortunately,

Congress plays a minor role in the PK decision-making process. Senat

sotomayor 2003 uruguay peace soldiers from praetorianism to unchecked peacekeeping

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