soul as structure in plato’s phaedo

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Douglas J. Young Soul as Structure in Platos Phaedo Abstract: In Platos Phaedo, the soul is mereologically simple; in the Republic, it is tripartite. The arguments in the Phaedo against the harmonia theory of the soul seem to undercut the psychology of the Republic. Commentators have long been puzzled by this apparent inconsistency. I argue that conceiving of a har- monia as a structure dispels persisting confusions about the theory and why Plato rejects it. Keywords: Plato, soul, structure, harmonia, Phaedo Dr. Douglas Young: Lycoming College Department of Philosophy, Williamsport, Pennsylvania, United States; E-mail: [email protected] In Platos Phaedo, the soul is mereologically simple; in the Republic, the embo- died soul is composed of (at least) three parts. 1 Platos apparent inconsistency on this point has been well noted by his commentators, both ancient 2 and mod- ern 3 . The criticisms have sometimes been emphatic. In one noteworthy instance, C. C. W. Taylor insists that if the arguments of the Phaedo against the complex- ity of the soul are conclusive, then it is necessary to attribute extraordinary obtuseness to Plato. 4 The worry is that if Plato successfully refutes the harmo- nia theory in the Phaedo, he apparently undercuts his view in Republic 4 that the soul is composed of three parts. Many and varied solutions to this apparent inconsistency have been offered, though none consider Platos thoughts about 1 There is indication Plato allows for parts other than the rational, spirited and appetitive parts. Individual justice, he claims, arises when the three parts of the soul and any others there may be in betweenare fitted together properly (Republic 4.443d7). 2 Olympiodorus Scholia in Platonis Phædonem §175 suggests similar difficulties arising even for Speusippus and Xenocrates; Alcinous Didaskalikos §§ 2425; Plotinus Ennead IV.7.12; Porphyry On the Faculties of the Soul via Stobaeus, Eclogae Physicae I, 52; Galen De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis IX.9.1-46 and Quod animi mores III.36.12 ff.; Iamblichus via Stobaeus I, 368, 23-369,4. 3 Grote 1875, 159161; Archer-Hind 1882, 123, 130; Archer-Hind 1883, 27; Zeller 1883, 133; Bluck 1955, 2829; Hackforth 1955, 1112; Gallop 1975, 161; Taylor 1983 [1970], 230; Dorter 1982, 106110, 190191; Bostock 1986, 132; Shields 2001, 139 and passim; Lorenz 2006, 37. 4 Taylor 1983 [1970], 230. DOI 10.1515/apeiron-2012-0018 apeiron 2013; 46(4): 469 498 Brought to you by | University of Oklahoma Libraries Authenticated Download Date | 10/25/14 10:47 PM

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Page 1: Soul as Structure in Plato’s Phaedo

Douglas J. Young

Soul as Structure in Plato’s Phaedo

Abstract: In Plato’s Phaedo, the soul is mereologically simple; in the Republic,it is tripartite. The arguments in the Phaedo against the harmonia theory of thesoul seem to undercut the psychology of the Republic. Commentators have longbeen puzzled by this apparent inconsistency. I argue that conceiving of a har-monia as a structure dispels persisting confusions about the theory and whyPlato rejects it.

Keywords: Plato, soul, structure, harmonia, Phaedo

Dr. Douglas Young: Lycoming College – Department of Philosophy, Williamsport,Pennsylvania, United States; E-mail: [email protected]

In Plato’s Phaedo, the soul is mereologically simple; in the Republic, the embo-died soul is composed of (at least) three parts.1 Plato’s apparent inconsistencyon this point has been well noted by his commentators, both ancient2 and mod-ern3. The criticisms have sometimes been emphatic. In one noteworthy instance,C. C. W. Taylor insists that if the arguments of the Phaedo against the complex-ity of the soul are conclusive, then “it is necessary to attribute extraordinaryobtuseness to Plato”.4 The worry is that if Plato successfully refutes the harmo-nia theory in the Phaedo, he apparently undercuts his view in Republic 4 thatthe soul is composed of three parts. Many and varied solutions to this apparentinconsistency have been offered, though none consider Plato’s thoughts about

1 There is indication Plato allows for parts other than the rational, spirited and appetitive parts.Individual justice, he claims, arises when the three parts of the soul “and any others there maybe in between” are fitted together properly (Republic 4.443d7).2 Olympiodorus Scholia in Platonis Phædonem §175 suggests similar difficulties arising even forSpeusippus and Xenocrates; Alcinous Didaskalikos §§ 24–25; Plotinus Ennead IV.7.12; PorphyryOn the Faculties of the Soul via Stobaeus, Eclogae Physicae I, 52; Galen De placitis Hippocratis etPlatonis IX.9.1-46 and Quod animi mores III.36.12 ff.; Iamblichus via Stobaeus I, 368, 23-369,4.3 Grote 1875, 159–161; Archer-Hind 1882, 123, 130; Archer-Hind 1883, 27; Zeller 1883, 133; Bluck1955, 28–29; Hackforth 1955, 11–12; Gallop 1975, 161; Taylor 1983 [1970], 230; Dorter 1982, 106–110, 190–191; Bostock 1986, 132; Shields 2001, 139 and passim; Lorenz 2006, 37.4 Taylor 1983 [1970], 230.

DOI 10.1515/apeiron-2012-0018 apeiron 2013; 46(4): 469–498

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structure.5 Once we see that Plato’s target in the Phaedo is the view that soul isa structure, that worry dissolves.

To make the case, I first outline the distinction between structure as an ob-ject and structure as a property. A structure, I claim, is either a composite ofparts the arrangement of which is essential to its existence or it is the relationalproperty instantiated by the parts of such a composite. Second, using this dis-tinction I clarify, in some detail, the three arguments in the Phaedo whichjointly defeat the harmonia view of the soul: the Priority Argument (91e2–92e3),the Argument from Degrees (93b1–94b3), and the Opposition Argument (92e4–93a9; 94b3–95a2).

Finally, I show how the success of these arguments needn’t undermine theview of the soul on offer in the Republic. Although the embodied soul is a com-posite of reason, spirit and appetite, it is not a structure – it neither is nor de-pends on something which has parts such that their arrangement is essential toits existence.

1 Structure

What do words like ‘structure’, ‘arrangement’, ‘configuration’ or ‘organization’pick out? Consider the following. You enter a flower shop to choose a center-piece for the table. There are several examples in the cooler to pick from. Someare arranged in aesthetically pleasing ways, but contain flowers you don’t like.You could ask the florist to take the flowers from one arrangement and config-ure them in the way you find pleasing. You might even specify the configura-tion you have in mind without mentioning the flowers at all. You could ask thatthe arrangement have three vertical elements of different heights. You couldsketch the arrangement on paper or even replicate it using pencils in a coffeemug. Once you’ve specified which flowers you want and how you’d like them tobe configured, you then select that arrangement. But before placing your order,you decide to get exactly similar arrangements for the dining room, living roomand coffee table.

5 Solutions generally fall into one of the following categories: (1) Plato is inconsistent; eitherbecause his view matured in the Republic or because the Phaedo and Republic contradict oneanother; (2) Plato is talking about the soul in an embodied state in Republic 4, the true natureof the soul is simple; (3) Plato doesn’t literally mean the soul has parts in Republic 4. He iseither being metaphorical or he believes that reason, spirit, and appetite are modes or powersof a simple soul.

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‘Structure’ works similarly. At the playground, there are two elaborateclimbing structures. One is composed of wood and metal. It has steps, slidesand swings assembled so as to resemble a castle. The other also has steps,slides and swings, but is composed primarily of plastic arranged to look like agrain silo. It is possible to accurately describe how the parts of each are config-ured without mentioning the particular material parts out of which they arecomposed. The same structure could also be sketched on paper or made out ofwooden blocks.

The examples above indicate that ‘arrangement’ and ‘structure’ are closelyconnected terms that are used in similar ways. And more to the point, theseexamples indicate that they are used to pick out two very different sorts ofthings. On the one hand, we use ‘structure’ to pick out a certain sort of object. Itis something that might be climbed on or toppled over by the cat. On the otherhand, we use ‘structure’ to pick out a property something (or some things) canhave. It is something that can be specified independently of any particular com-ponent parts. Wood, metal, plastic, blocks or lines on paper might all have thesame structure. A structure might either be something a whole of parts is orsomething a whole of parts has.6 Understood as a property, a structure is therelation between the constituent parts of the whole. Understood as an object, astructure is the whole whose constituent parts are so related.

1.1 Structure as a Property

If we take a structure to be a property, then the following would count as exam-ples: ‘resembling a grain silo’, ‘resembling a castle’, ‘spiraling out from the cen-ter’, or ‘from oldest to newest’. Here we can consider these properties indepen-dently of the particular components so arranged. Though not every sort of partwill be able to realize every sort of structure, it is clear that these properties are

6 Harte 2002, notes this distinction (159–167) and she makes a compelling case that Plato wasaware of it, citing substantial evidence from the Sophist, Philebus and Timaeus (see especiallySophist 26d1–26e1, Philebus 16c5 ff., 23c4ff. and 64d9–e3; Timaeus 31b6–32c4, 47c7–d7 and53b7–c1). These dialogues are generally agreed to postdate both the Phaedo and Republic how-ever. One might wonder, therefore, whether Plato was consciously appealing to the notion ofstructure in the two earlier dialogues. I can remain agnostic about this issue. The argument ofthis paper is that appealing to structure both clarifies the Phaedo’s arguments against the har-monia view of the soul and answers the interpretative challenge that these arguments undercutthe tripartite soul of the Republic.

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variably realizable.7 So long as the parts meet certain criteria of size, rigidityand strength a wide variety of different parts – sticks, bricks, even marshmal-lows – could be structured like a grain silo. So in one way a structure can beunderstood as a property type. For the sake of convenience, let us regard a vari-ably realizable property type as a universal.8

Although a structure can be understood as a universal, not all universalsare going to count as structures. ‘Weighing 32,000 pounds’ is a variably realiz-able property type that might be realized by single, unified object – an emptytractor-trailer, for example. But it might also be realized collectively by 32,000one pound bars of chocolate sitting in the grocery stores downtown.9 Havingthis sort of property supposes no particular relationship between the object orobjects weighing 32,000 pounds.10

When the relations between the parts make a difference to whether an ob-ject or some objects have that property, you’ve got a structure.11 Take the prop-erty ‘resembling a grain silo’. In order to instantiate this property, the objectmust have as its parts a cylindrical part and a hemispherical part. But in orderfor there to be an object which resembles a grain silo, the hemispherical partmust be sitting atop the cylindrical part. In order to have an object which is likea grain silo, the property must include the relations among its parts. Not anyold relation between the two parts will result in the object instantiating thatproperty.

Finally, we can distinguish between the structural property as a universaland particular instances of that property. Lots of things might have parts thatare arranged such that they are like a grain silo. But it is sometimes importantto talk about the particular structure that some parts collectively instantiate. Forexample, we can attend to the differences between the structure of the parts ofa block model and the structure of the parts of the original even if both are

7 I’ll assume it’s not a requirement that these properties are variably realized. That is, I’llspeak of the property ‘spiraling out from the center’ whether there happen to be any thingsarranged such that they instantiate this property.8 Recognizing that predicates, classes, kinds, etc. might properly count as types but not neces-sarily as universals.9 Here I wish to remain neutral with respect to whether there exists a scattered object whichhas the 32,000 bars of chocolate as its proper parts, though Plato does not seem to acceptunrestricted composition.10 Armstrong 1978, 70 calls these sorts of properties “non-relationally structural”. Of suchproperties he claims that “no particular relations between these parts seem involved in theobject having this property.”11 Armstrong 1978, 70 calls these sorts of properties “relationally structural” and Harte 2002,161 calls them simply “structural properties”.

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instances of the same universal. One important difference between a structurethat is a particular property instance and a structure that is a universal is thatthe former, but not necessarily the latter, is subject to destruction.12 A cat, forexample, could destroy the particular structure that the blocks had once instan-tiated by scattering them across the floor. The parts no longer bear the rightrelations to one another which would collectively make those parts structuredlike a grain silo.

1.2 Structure as an Object

Understood as an object, a structure is a whole whose parts collectively instanti-ate a structural property. A structure of this sort is an organized whole of parts.In other words, it’s an object for which the arrangement of its parts is essentialfor its existence. It’s something that, if composed of the right sorts of parts, onecould climb on, move around or which could come apart at the seams.

Importantly, a structure of this sort is also subject to destruction, but in amanner different than that suffered by a particular instance of a structural prop-erty. A whole of parts is something “subject to destruction through the dissolu-tion of its parts”.13 Since the relations between the parts of an object make adifference to whether it is a grain silo or simply a cylinder and a hemisphere,changes in those relations could result in the destruction of that object.14 Whatmatters is that a structure of this sort can be destroyed by changing the locationor orientation of its parts.

While the most obvious instances of structures qua objects are composed ofmaterial parts, they needn’t necessarily be so composed. We can’t rule out apriori the possibility that there could be structures composed of non-materialparts as well (if in fact it makes sense to speak of such parts).15 And if there

12 Here again, I will assume that universal properties can exist uninstantiated. But even if theydo not, there will be a difference between the way a universal and a particular come to bedestroyed. To destroy a universal, one would have to destroy every last thing which instan-tiated that property. To destroy something that instantiates that universal will involve rearran-ging the parts of an object such that they no longer bear the right relations to one another.13 Shoemaker 2003 [1977], 150.14 That’s not to say that rearranging the parts is the only way a structure might be destroyed.Annihilation might get rid of a structure without necessarily having rearranged any of its parts.15 Shoemaker 2003 [1977], 149–150 offers this as a possibility. He writes: “[I]f there can beimmaterial substances at all … there seems to be no reason why there should not be immaterialentities that have parts … a system of immaterial things which are so related as to constitute acausal unit, rather than an ‘atomic’ immaterial substance.”

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could be such structures, then there seems to be no reason why these non-mate-rial structures shouldn’t also be subject to destruction through dissolution.16

Once the relationship between the parts is destroyed, so too is the structurewhich those parts once composed.

The point here is that a structure qua object is subject to destructionthrough the dissolution of its parts, whether those parts are material or non-material. Consequently Plato’s arguments against the harmonia theory will beequally damaging to both specifications of the object view.

2 The Harmonia Theory Introduced

The harmonia theory makes its first documented appearance in Plato’s Phaedo.17

Socrates is about to be executed. His friends have gathered in his cell and theconversation naturally turns to matters of life and death. Death is not somethingto be feared, he argues, because what we call death is simply the separation ofthe soul from the body (64c4–8). Philosophers should welcome this separation.It is only when separated from the body that the soul is able to apprehend theForms. This cognitive contact is the foundation of knowledge. The body is astumbling block in our pursuit of this knowledge; it fills us with desires, fearsand illusions which distract and confound this effort. Philosophers, who afterall seek wisdom, should separate themselves from the body to the extent thatthey are able. For this reason Socrates says that the one aim of the embodiedphilosopher is to “practice for dying and death” (64a4–5).

His two Pythagorean companions are not convinced. Simmias and Cebespresent an alternative conception of the soul which agrees with Socrates’ viewin one respect – death is the separation of the soul from the body – but dis-agrees in another – this separation is not to be welcomed. Cebes trots out a

16 See Kim 2001 on the necessity for positing spatial or quasi-spatial properties of a non-mate-rial soul in order to “pair” non-material causes with material effects.17 The precise origin of the harmonia theory is a matter of some speculation. Sedley 1995 offersgood reasons to think that the view originated in Pythagorean circles and even some evidenceto trace it back to Philolaus himself. For an excellent discussion of the pre-Platonic origins ofthe theory as well as its fate after Aristotle see Gottschalk 1971. Evidence that the view can betraced to Philolaus can be found in Sedley 1995. By the time Plato wrote the Phaedo, the har-monia theory was acknowledged to have Pythagorean origins. Socrates recognizes two of themain adherents of the view in that dialogue, Simmias and Cebes, as people “who keep com-pany with Philolaus” (Phaedo 61d6–7). In part because Simmias and Cebes “at least mixed inPythagorean circles” the harmonia theory is thought to have Pythagorean roots. See alsoGottschalk 1971.

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popular view: once the soul is separated from the body, it is immediately de-stroyed. He indicates most people actually believe that:

After the soul has left the body it no longer exists anywhere but is destroyed and dies(διφθείρηταί τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται) on the day the person dies, just as it is becoming sepa-rated from the body; and that as it emerges it flies off in different directions (οἴχηται),dispersed like breath or smoke (ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα), and is no long-er anything anywhere. (70a1–6)

This materialist18 view about the soul is given twice more, first by Simmias.After concluding the Cyclical and Recollection Arguments (70c4–72e2; 72e3–77a5), Socrates thinks he has addressed Cebes’ doubts that the soul doesn’t con-tinue to exist after it has been separated from the body. Cebes is not persuadedby these arguments and Simmias picks up the dialectic. “The fear of the major-ity which Cebes mentioned still stands,” he insists, “that at the same time asthe person is dying his soul is scattered and that this is its end” (77b2–5).

Attempting to assuage Simmias and Cebes of their fears Socrates also says:

You seem afraid, like children, that the wind would literally blow apart the soul andscatter it (διαφυσᾷ καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν) as it leaves the body, especially if one happensto die in a high wind and not in calm weather. (77d7–e2)

They agree that Socrates has accurately portrayed their view and sheepishly askhim to show where they’ve gone wrong. If it turns out that the soul is scattered“like breath or smoke”, they would have good reason to fear the death theirfriend will face that evening.

What underlies their fear, however, is a mereological worry. If the soul iscomposed of parts, it seems reasonable to believe that it won’t survive separa-tion from the body. There is a lot of evidence that over time, composite materialobjects tend to dissolve into their constituent parts. Simmias and Cebes areafraid that the soul might be subject to destruction through dissolution.

Socrates first attempts to dispel this worry by arguing that the soul is indes-tructible and immortal by embracing a version of dualism19 in his Affinity Argu-ment (78b4–84b4). He argues that like the Forms, the soul is simple, incorpor-eal, invisible and divine and consequently not subject to destruction throughthe dissolution of its parts. Simmias and Cebes needn’t worry that Socrates’ soulwill be blown apart like breath or smoke.

18 Unless specified otherwise, I’ll use ‘materialism’ and its cognates to refer to any view ac-cording to which the soul and body are wholly and only material.19 I’ll use ‘dualism’ to refer to any account according to which the soul is wholly and onlyimmaterial and the body is wholly and only material.

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Simmias is not convinced. He presents the harmonia of a musical instru-ment as a counterexample to the Affinity Argument and then offers his ownview that the soul is a harmonia of the parts of the body. Understanding a har-monia to be a structure – either as a property instance or an object – clarifieshis position.

2.1 Harmonia as a Property Instance

Destruction through dissolution is not the only way something could meet itsend. Even if the soul isn’t composed of parts, its existence might depend onsomething that is so composed. Simmias claims Socrates’ Affinity Argument isinadequate in just this respect.

One might make the same argument about a harmonia, lyre and strings, that the tuning –something invisible, incorporeal, beautiful and divine – is in the tuned lyre, while thelyre itself and its strings are bodies, corporeal, composite, earthly and akin to what ismortal. (85e5–86a3)

Like the soul, the harmonia or tuning of a musical instrument also has affinitieswith the Forms. If Socrates’ Affinity Argument were sound, then it casts its nettoo wide: all sorts of things would be immortal, not just souls. Mocking thisabsurd result, Simmias jokes that Socrates “would say that the tuning itselfmust exist and that the wood and strings must rot before the tuning can suffer”(86b2–3). But we don’t need anything as severe as the destruction of the materi-al parts of the lyre to destroy its tuning – a humid day would suffice. Althoughthe tuning of the lyre might be invisible, incorporeal, beautiful and divine, itfails to outlast the lyre’s material parts. The harmonia here is ontologically de-pendent on the lyre and its strings, though it is not composed of those parts.Incorporeality is not enough to secure immortality.20 The harmonia theory,therefore, is a successful counterexample to the Affinity Argument.

But the theory is not just introduced as a counterexample; Simmias takesthe soul to be a harmonia.21 He claims that the soul is a tempering or tuning ofthe parts out of which the body is composed. He puts it this way:

20 Cf. Scaltsas 1990, 110–115.21 Simmias does say that it is what we take the soul to be. There has been quite a bit of spec-ulation about who is to be included here. Some have suggested it’s just Simmias and Cebes,others that he means other Pythagoreans like him. I’ll not take a stand on this issue. For argu-ments in favor of the Pythagorean interpretation see Rowe 1993, 204–204. For an argumentagainst that interpretation see Gottschalk 1971, 191–192.

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When the body is stretched and held together by the hot and the cold, the dry and the wet,and things of that sort, our soul is the tempering (κρᾶσιν) and harmonia of these thingswhenever they’ve been tempered rightly with each other and in measure. (86b8–86c2)

So what does it mean to say the soul is a tempering or harmonia? The four ele-ments – earth, air, fire and water – were thought to have natural tendencies inopposite directions.22 These elemental forces form pairs of contraries: the hotwith the cold, the wet with the dry. Each member of the pair tends to opposethe work of the other. When these elemental forces are put in the proper bal-ance with one another, they combine to form a dynamic whole.23 That balanceis a harmonia. When those forces get out of balance, the harmonia is destroyed.So just as the lyre has strings pulling against the wooden frame and a frameopposing that tension, so the soul is the harmonia of opposed forces. Under-stood in this way, it is clear that the soul lasts only as long as the elementswhich compose the body are pulling against each other with the proper tension.Simmias concludes:

If the soul is a kind of harmonia, clearly, when our body is relaxed or stretched out with-out due measure by diseases and other evils, the soul must immediately be destroyed,even if it is most divine. (86c3–6)

The harmonia theory of the soul presented here steers a middle course betweenthe materialist view first proposed by Simmias and Cebes and the dualism withwhich Socrates responds. According to this compromise position, the soul is astate or property of the body that depends on the elements which compose thebody being in the right balance. In order for the parts of the body to be in sucha balance, it is clear why they must be fitted together rightly and in due propor-tion. If the wooden frame of a lyre weren’t pulling against the strings with ade-quate tension, the instrument would be out of tune. If the frame were pullingagainst the strings with too much force, the strings might break. The same goesfor the hot, cold, wet and dry – the parts which jointly compose the body. If thehot is not adequately opposed by the cold, the parts will not have the properbalance. When these parts are out of balance, Simmias suggests the result willeither be sickness or death.24

22 For a Platonic account of natural tendencies of the hot, cold, wet and dry see Timaeus61d5–62b6. For an excellent account of the literal and metaphorical understanding of theseelemental forces in Greek philosophy see Lloyd 1964.23 See also Caston 1997, 322.24 In Philebus 64d9–e3 Plato also explains that measure and proportionality are essential forsomething to be compound (κρᾶσις):“Any combination (σύγκρασις) which does not have measure (μέτφον) or the nature of propor-tion (συμμέτρου φύσεως) in any way whatsoever necessarily destroys both its ingredients and,

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Though the soul itself is not subject to destruction through the dissolutionof its parts, its existence depends on structure of the parts of the body which isso subject. So whatever affinity the soul bears to the Forms, it isn’t enough tosecure its continued existence once separated from the body.

As I’ve claimed above, there are two ways to understand the view that aharmonia is a property. On the one hand, it can be understood as a universal25

– the soul just is the property according to which the parts of any human bodyare combined. On the other hand, it can be understood as a particular – thesoul is the property according to which the parts of an individual body are com-bined.

There is good reason for thinking that the harmonia theory of the soul Sim-mias presents doesn’t take the soul to be a universal. Suppose the proportion ofthe elements in the body is 7 parts earth to 2 parts air to 1 part fire to 3 partswater (7:2:1:3). This ratio, the mathematical entity, is not something ontologi-cally dependent on any particular material thing. Moreover, the same propor-tion can be exemplified by anything having units so related to one another. Thelengths of sides in a quadrilateral or the numbers of cards in each suit in a handof bridge might be related according to the same ratio. So if the soul is a harmo-nia and we regard a harmonia as a universal, then we are forced to an absurdresult: a human being, a plane figure and a hand of cards could have the samesoul.26 But Simmias and Cebes are concerned about the fate of Socrates’ soul,not the fate of a universal.

Taking the soul to be a harmonia understood as a particular property, theconcern about its destruction is relevant. Suppose the soul is taken to be a stateor condition of the elements of a certain body – the structure that the parts ofthe body have. This sort of structure would be subject to destruction and soSimmias and Cebes would be rightly concerned if the soul were a particularproperty. When the parts of the body revert to their natural places, the particu-lar structure of that body is destroyed.

primarily, itself. A thing of this sort is truly no compound (οὐδὲ γὰρ κρᾶσις), but a kind ofunblended disaster (ἄκρατος συμπεφορημένη) …”Without the right proportion of elements, no composition results. Combinations, it seems here,are not the sorts of things that can admit of degrees. Something is either a compound of ele-ments which have been combined with measure and proportionality or fails to be a compoundat all, and is instead an “unblended disaster”.25 This view is considered and rejected by Wagner 2001, 73–4; Bostock 1986, 122; and Taylor1983 [1970], 222–223.26 Understanding the claim more narrowly as a ratio of the four elements doesn’t help. Again,Simmias and Cebes are concerned about Socrates’ particular soul.

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2.2 Harmonia as an Object

But that’s not the end of the story. Although when we hear the word ‘tuning’ wetend to think of something musical, the word ‘harmonia’ has applications be-yond that. In fact, the use of ‘harmonia’ in musical contexts wasn’t even theprimary meaning of the term in antiquity.27 The verbal cognate ‘harmozein’usually means ‘to fit together’, ‘to fasten’, or ‘to join’. It is thus a term more athome among stonemasons and shipwrights than among philosophers or musi-cians.28

Simmias also broadens his use of the term beyond musical contexts. Heclaims that his counterexample could have been framed in terms of the harmo-niai in any of the other crafts. According to the argument he imagines, the soulwould be destroyed “even if it were most divine, like the other tunings too, boththe ones in music and in all the other products of craftsmen” (86c6–8). Withthis, Simmias means to show that his argument could be generalized to the har-moniai resulting from any of the skilled crafts. Now the products of the crafts-men are things like paintings, embroidery, textiles, buildings or furniture – ma-terial objects whose parts have been fitted together for a particular purpose.29

Simmias might just be widening the initial scope of the theory. Like theinvisible, immaterial and divine harmonia of a lyre, there are invisible, immater-ial and divine harmoniai in paintings, textiles, buildings and furniture. Whatmight the “tuning” of a chair be? Presumably it’s the principle of organizationthe material parts of the chair have. The arrangement or organization makessome bits of wood a whole chair (and not a table, say). In other words, it’s aproperty collectively instantiated by the component parts in virtue of which theyconstitute a whole.

However, this is not how Socrates understands it. Socrates identifies theharmoniai with the composite material objects themselves, not with the princi-ples according to which their parts have been fitted together. Let me explain.

Twice Simmias indicates that his view about the soul could just as well becalled a compositional theory of the soul. First, at 86b9–10 Simmias offers theharmonia theory of the soul as his own positive conception of how the soul and

27 Illevski 1993, 24.28 See Illevski 1993, 24. Homer describes how Odysseus built the raft he used to sail fromCalypso’s island this way: “He bored through all [the timbers] and fitted them together (ἥρμοσ-σεν) with treenails and then with cords fastened (ἁρμόζειν) his raft together” (Odyssey 5.274–248). Also, in masonry work, the mason is said to fit the stones together (ἁρμόζειν) to make awall.29 This list of crafts comes from Republic 3.400d11–401a8. Plato writes that grace, harmony,rhythm and simplicity can be found in the soul as well as in the products of the craftspeople.

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the material elements are related. The soul, he claims, is a compound andharmonia of the elements which compose the body, i.e., the hot, cold, wet, dry,and things of that sort. Later on in his presentation of his view, Simmias asksSocrates to reply to those who, like himself, take the soul to be “a compound(κρᾶσιν) of material elements” and the first thing to be destroyed at death(86d2–3). So Simmias takes ‘compound’ and ‘harmonia’ to be equivalent.

But what does ‘krasis’ mean in this circumstance? According to the stan-dard definition a krasis is a blending of things which form a compound.30 It isneutral, however, about the sort of elements out of which one might form acompound. Water and wine or the vowels of two consecutive syllables areequally good candidates. Importantly however, the krasis and the elements outof which it is composed are of the same type. A krasis of vowel sounds is itself avowel sound, for example. Here, a krasis is not a property or state of those ele-ments. Rather it is a whole or composite of the same type as its parts.

Something similar is going on in the case of the soul. If the soul, as Sim-mias suggests, is a krasis of material elements and a krasis is a whole or compo-site of the same type as its parts, then the soul would be a material composite.This connection is made explicitly in the passages where Socrates identifies har-monia with synthesis.

Much like ‘synthesis’ in English, ‘synthesis’ in Greek has a broad range ofapplications. The term typically picks out composite entities that have been puttogether to form a whole. In poetry, a synthesis is a composite of syllables orwords; in mathematics it is a sum; in logic it is the union between two terms ina proposition. A synthesis is, in a word, a composite.

Socrates twice identifies harmonia with synthesis. Socrates’ first argumentagainst the harmonia theory begins with a question: “Does it seem natural for aharmonia or any other composite (τινὶ συνθέσει) to be in a different state from theelements of which it is composed? (συγκέηται)” (92e5–93a9). Just because a har-monia is a synthesis needn’t imply that it’s a synthesis of material parts, however.

Socrates clarifies the issue when he identifies harmonia and synthesis a sec-ond time. Socrates rehearses Simmias’ position, asking if he still believes that:

A harmonia is a composite entity (σύνθετον πρᾶγμα) and that the soul is a harmoniacomposed (συγκεῖσθαι) out of the things held in tension in the body, for surely you willnot allow yourself to maintain that a composite harmonia (ἁρμονία συγκειμένη) existedbefore that from which it had to be composed (συντεθῆναι). (92a7–92b3)

From this passage we learn three things. First, we learn that Socrates believesthat a harmonia is a composite object. Second, we learn that the soul, under-

30 See LSJ ‘κρᾶσις’ (1).

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stood as a harmonia, is a composite object. And third, we learn that the soul,understood as a harmonia, is composed out of the things held in tension in thebody. In his initial presentation of the theory, Simmias claimed that the thingsheld in tension in the body are “the hot and the cold, the dry and the wet, andthings of that sort” (86b8–86c2). So it is the material elements which are theconstituent parts of the soul, understood as a harmonia. This would make thesoul a composite, material object. Simmias does not protest. Despite initiallypresenting a harmonia as something “invisible, incorporeal, beautiful and di-vine” the theory also allows for a materialist specification.

Commentators have resisted reading the passage this way.31 Some havegone so far as to say the the harmonia theory essentially involves a contrastbetween an incorporeal harmonia and a corporeal entity upon which it de-pends.32 The proponents of this view point to the passage where Simmiasframes his counterexample to the Affinity Argument (85e3–86b5). In that pas-sage, however, Simmias never offers a harmonia theory of the soul. He simplyoffers the harmonia of a lyre as something “invisible, incorporeal, beautiful anddivine” (85e5–86a1). This particular harmonia is dependent on the lyre andstrings which Plato describes as “corporeal, composite, earthly and akin to whatis mortal” (86a1–3). While I agree that a harmonia can be something immaterial,it needn’t necessarily be. Socrates’ arguments against the harmonia theory bearthis out below.

Even if Socrates has misunderstood Simmias’ original position, it is clearenough that Socrates takes the harmonia theory of the soul to admit of a materi-alist specification. A harmonia can be a composite of the parts out of which thebody is composed. In other words, a harmonia can be a structure understood asa material object.33

31 See, for example, Wagner 2001, 76; Rowe 1993, 218; Taylor 1983 [1970], 219 and Hackforth1972, 113. Hackforth, for example, noted that expressions like ‘composite thing’ (σύνθετονπρᾶγμα) and descriptions of the soul as something ‘composed’ (συγκεῖσθαι in 92a9 or συν-τεθῆναι in 92b2) “are all likely to suggest something concrete and material.” Despite this like-lihood, he resists the possibility that Simmias regarded harmoniai in this way – resting his caseprimarily on Simmias’ initial presentation.32 Taylor 1983 [1970], 219 claims that Simmias’ harmonia theory essentially involves a contrastbetween an incorporeal harmonia and a corporeal entity upon which it depends. LikewiseWagner 2001, 73–76 argues that the harmonia theory of the soul is “necessarily dualist”. Shesuggests that Simmias’ harmonia theory means to establish a parallel between one materialentity and one “nonmaterial, causally dependent correlate”.33 My view is not uncontroversial. There is a wide range of interpretations of the harmoniaview. For example: Wagner 2001, 73; Langton 2000, 13; Rowe 1993, 205; Scaltsas 1990, 109–114; Bostock 1986, 122; Taylor 1983 [1970], 217–8; Gallop 1975, 148; Hackforth 1972, 97–8 n. 1;and Gottschalk 1971, 181–3, 194–5.

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3 Plato’s Refutations

Now let us turn to Plato’s three refutations of the harmonia theory of the soul.Plato offers three arguments against the theory: (1) the Priority Argument (91e2–92e3); (2) the Argument from Degrees (sometimes called ‘Argument B,’ 93b1–94b3); and (3) the Opposition Argument (sometimes called ‘Argument A,’ 92e4–93a9; 94b3–95a2).

In this section I investigate these arguments with the goal of answering thefollowing questions:

(1) Against which specification of the harmonia theory is the argument directed?(2) How does the argument work?(3) Is the argument successful against that specification?

I show that the Priority Argument successfully refutes the specification of thetheory according to which a harmonia is a structure composed of parts. TheArgument from Degrees undermines both this and the specification which takesa harmonia to be a particular property. The Opposition Argument is also direc-ted against the object view, but misses its intended target. This doesn’t diminishits overall importance however. It turns out that this argument anticipates (withsome important differences) the argument for the tripartition of the soul in Re-public 4.

Rather than undermining the theory of the tripartite soul upon which thepolitical and psychological theories of the Republic are based, the arguments ofthe Phaedo merely restrict it. Two of the arguments against the harmonia theoryare conclusive against the specification according to which the soul is a harmo-nia of material parts – a structure qua object.

3.1 The Priority Argument (91e2–92e3)

Plato’s first argument against the harmonia theory is his most straightforward.However, it demands that one accept some of Plato’s more controversial views:that learning is recollection, that the Forms exist, that we have prenatal knowl-edge of them, and that we can realize sensible particulars to be inferior in-stances of those Forms. If one is able to swallow all of this, the Priority Argu-ment is clear: the doctrine of recollection implies that the soul exists beforebirth and so before the parts of the body exist. According to the harmonia theoryof the soul in question here, the soul is a composite of the material parts of thebody. But since no composite could exist prior to the parts from which it iscomposed, no harmonia could exist prior to the parts of the body.

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The Priority Argument begins with a back-reference in which Cebes “re-calls” the view that “for us learning is nothing other than recollection” (72e5–6).34 The theory of recollection is accepted by all the interlocutors. It seems tobe given in order for Simmias to “experience that which we are discussing,namely recollection” (73b7). Instead of providing a detailed recapitulation ofthe proof for the theory of recollection, Simmias is presented with a brief sketchand presumably recalls the argument in full. Once this object lesson in recollec-tion is complete, all the parties to the discussion take the view as secure.

The Recollection Argument (72e3–78b3) has received sustained and detailedstudy,35 so let what follows suffice as a sketch of its main line. Plato’s goal is toshow that the soul must have existed before its embodiment.36 Although theprecise details of the argument are disputed, the main thread is simple enough.Socrates claims that we37 have some knowledge – i.e., knowledge of the equalitself – which we arrive at indirectly by means of the senses. When we do, werecognize that sensible equal things “strive” or “desire” or “wish” to be like theequal itself, but fail to do so perfectly. This recognition that the sensible equalthings fall short of the equal itself couldn’t occur unless we had prior knowl-edge of the equal itself.38 But since we began perceiving at birth, we must haveacquired our knowledge of the equal itself sometime before we were born. Sincewe must have acquired this knowledge before we were born, we must have ex-isted at that time. Although we seemingly forget this knowledge when we areborn, we can later recollect it.

34 See also Meno 81e ff.35 For some notable and influential studies about the Recollection Argument in the Phaedosee Gerson 2003, 65–79; Gerson 1999; Scott 1999, esp. 102–118; Osborne 1995; Bedu-Addu 1991;Bostock 1986, 60–115; Ketchum 1979; Gallop 1975, 113–137; Nehemas 1975; Ackrill 1973; Dorter1972; Gosling 1965 and Hackforth 1955, 65–77.36 Though the argument doesn’t establish immortality Plato indicates that the RecollectionArgument is one half of an argument for the immortality of the soul. At 77c1–d5 Socrates claimsthe Recollection and Cyclical Arguments jointly prove the immortality of the soul.37 What group he actually has in mind is unclear. It seems that we have three possibilities: (1)the ‘we’ picks out those who are immediately present and the primary interlocutors of the dia-logue – Socrates, Simmias and Cebes and the others in the cell; (2) the ‘we’ picks out anyPlatonist; and (3) the ‘we’ picks out people in general. For the various possibilities see Bedu-Addu 1991, 39 and 39 n. 16; Bostock 1986, 66–69; Gallop 1975, 120–121; Ackrill 1973, 191–192.38 There are two streams of interpretation. Some read this argument as suggesting that therecollection of the Forms doesn’t just account for our ability to compare Forms with sensibleparticulars but also the very formation of the concept of equality. Two important defenders ofthis line are Bostock 1986, 66ff. and Ackrill 1973, 177–195. Two opponents of this line are Scott1999; Fine 1993, 137–138; and Fine 2003 [1987], 62–63 n. 41.

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Having made the connection between the doctrine of recollection and theprenatal existence of the soul, the argument centers on the claim that “a harmo-nia is a composite thing” (σύνθετον πρᾶγμα, 92a7–8). Since this claim is at theheart of the Priority Argument, it is worth having another look at the passage inwhich it appears:

But you must change your mind my Theban friend, said Socrates, if you still believe thata harmonia is a composite thing (σύνθετον πρᾶγμα), and that the soul is composed (συγ-κεῖσθαι) out of the things held in tension in the body, for surely you will not allow your-self to maintain that a composite harmonia (ἁρμονία συγκειμένη) existed before that fromwhich it had to be composed (συντεθῆναι). (92a6–b2)

The view being presented here is one according to which the soul is a compositematerial thing whose parts are the elements – in other words, a material struc-ture.

The rest of the Priority Argument falls out from the two premises now estab-lished: (1) the soul exists prior to the body; and (2) a harmonia is a composite ofmaterial parts. Tracing the consequences of the second premise, Plato claimsthat a composite harmonia cannot exist prior to the parts from which it is com-posed. This addition seems like it’s on relatively sure footing. Just as a brickbuilding cannot exist before the bricks which compose it, a composite harmoniacannot exist before the material parts which compose it. This premise pits theharmonia theory of the soul squarely against the implications of the doctrine ofrecollection. If we accept the Recollection Argument, the soul exists before theparts of the body. No material composite, however, could exist prior to the partsout of which it is composed.

Simmias is then faced with a choice. He must either reject the doctrine ofrecollection and its implication that the soul preexists the body or reject thematerialist interpretation of the harmonia theory. He opts for the latter on thegrounds that he accepted the harmonia theory “without proof, because of a cer-tain likelihood and plausibility” (92c11–d2).39 The argument about recollectionand learning, however, was derived from “a hypothesis worthy of acceptance”(92d6–7).40

39 Against these sorts of arguments, Simmias warns: “I know that arguments based on like-lihood are impostors, and if one doesn’t guard against them they will completely deceive”(92d2–5). There is a bit of irony here, for Simmias is also indicting Socrates’ Affinity Argumentas well. Parts of that argument explicitly trade on likelihoods (81c8–82b8) as is well noted byRowe 1993, 219.40 Neither Simmias nor Socrates explicitly say what makes the doctrine of recollection worthyof acceptance. We must presume, given Simmias’ indictment of arguments based on likelihood,its status as a hypothesis must put it on firmer footing.

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With this, Simmias is brought around to Socrates’ point of view and con-cludes “that I cannot allow myself nor anyone else to say that the soul is aharmonia” (92e2–4). The soul has a property – being able to exist prior to theparts of the body – which no harmonia of parts could have. Thus the harmoniatheory is to be rejected.

It can now be seen that the Priority Argument explicitly deals with the spe-cification of the theory which takes a harmonia to be structure as an object; acomposite of the parts of the body. The argument would also work if we regarda harmonia as a particular property or an structure composed of non-materialparts.41 However, the textual evidence suggests that the argument is explicitlydirected against the view of a harmonia as a material structure.

3.2 The Argument from Degrees (93b1–94b3)

The Argument from Degrees has received the most critical attention because it’sthe most obscure. According to standard readings, the argument contains eithera fallacious inference or a contradiction. A careful look, however, reveals theargument to be a valid reductio ad absurdum of the view that the soul is a har-monia. Using the distinction between structure as property and structure as ob-ject brings the argument into focus and avoids the problems ordinarily attribu-ted to it.

Most attention has addressed one question: Can harmoniai admit of de-grees? It may seem obvious that they do. One lyre can be more or less in tunethan another. But what is troubling is that Plato says things in the course of thisargument which suggest both a positive and negative answer. Fortunately, de-termining which Plato actually believes turns out not to matter when one readsthe Argument from Degrees as structured around a central dilemma: either har-moniai admit of degrees or they don’t. If they do admit of degrees, the soul can’tbe one since souls don’t admit of degrees. If harmoniai don’t admit of degrees,the moral differences between souls couldn’t be accounted for. So on eitherhorn, it turns out that the soul cannot be a harmonia. Let us now turn to thedetails of this difficult argument.

41 Above, I’ve given arguments for rejecting the interpretation of the harmonia theory accord-ing to which the soul is a structure understood as a universal (p. 10). The Priority Argumentgives us one further reason to reject it. If we regard a harmonia as a universal property, theargument wouldn’t work. Such a structure, say the ratio 7:2:1:3, is capable of existing prior toany material parts being arranged according to it.

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The argument begins with an obscure question. Socrates asks: “Isn’t it nat-ural for each harmonia to be a harmonia in whatever way it has been harmo-nized?” (93a11–12). He attempts to clarify as follows:

Isn’t it the case that if it’s been harmonized more and to a greater extent (μᾶλλον … καὶ ἐπὶπλέον), if indeed it’s possible to allow this (εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι), it will bemore and to a greater extent a harmonia and if <harmonized> less and to a lesser extent(ἑττον τε καὶ ἐπ᾿ ἔλλατον), it will be less and to a lesser extent <a harmonia>? (93a14–b3)

Despite Simmias’ positive reply, this revised question is far from clear.42

There is, however, a perfectly reasonable sense in which a harmonia can besaid to be harmonized. Consider the distinction made above between a structurequa property and a structure qua object. It is clear that we can sensibly talkabout the structure of a structure – a property which the object has. Take, forexample, the ratio 2:1 and a particular molecule of water. The molecule itself(the object) is organized according to the ratio (the property). The same can besaid of a harmonia. We can speak of the harmonia (the property) which a har-monia (the object) has. A lyre both is and has a harmonia. It is a harmonia inso-far as it is an organized whole of parts; it has a harmonia insofar as those partshave been fitted together according to a certain principle of organization.

Next it’s necessary to determine what might be intended by the phrase “ifindeed it’s possible to allow this.” Despite claims to the contrary,43 it seemsclear that Socrates is entertaining the thought that harmoniai might admit ofdegrees (even if just for the sake of argument). Though, the issue of whetherharmoniai do in fact admit of degrees isn’t consequential for the argument.

Socrates then connects his views about harmoniai with those about thesoul. He is open to the possibility that harmoniai admit of degrees. He is not,however, open to that possibility with regards to the soul. Drawing on the possi-bility that harmoniai admit of degrees he asks:

And so is this the case in relation to the soul, such that one soul is to a greater extent andmore <a soul> than another, or to a lesser extent and less itself, <namely> a soul? (93b5–7)

Simmias replies with an unconditional “in no way whatsoever” (93b8). Here So-crates is clearly suggesting that no souls – at least in so far as they are souls –will admit of degrees. That is, one soul cannot be more or less a soul than anyother.

42 For example Gallop 1975, 160 writes that “it is not easy to attach sense to an attunement’sbeing tuned in different degrees, or even at all.”43 Burnet 1911, 95 argues that this proviso is “a plain indication that it is not possible” for aharmonia to admit of degrees, citing evidence from Republic 349e10–13 where a tuning isthought to be a kind of limit (πέρας). See also Rowe 1993, 221.

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Does this give Socrates enough to conclude that the soul cannot be a har-monia understood as an object? Some of Plato’s earliest commentators haveread this passage as offering a self-contained argument against the harmoniatheory of the soul. Themistius, for example, offers this tidy reconstruction “[Pla-to argued] … that a harmonia admits of more and less (μᾶλλον καὶ ἑττον),whereas the soul does not.”44 Philoponus suggests that the argument to thispoint is fallacious.45

I agree neither with Themistius that Plato has established a self-containedargument against the harmonia theory, nor with Philoponus that the inferencehe suggests is invalid. The overall structure of the argument is a reductio adabsurdum of the claim that the soul is a harmonia.46 The view is reduced toabsurdity by means of a dilemma. On the first horn, Socrates assumes that har-moniai admit of degrees; on the second, he assumes they don’t.

What we have in the passage under scrutiny is the first horn of this dilem-ma. If this is right, the argument to this point will look like this: Assume thatharmoniai admit of degrees. Souls, insofar as they are souls, do not differ indegree. Therefore the soul cannot be a harmonia. This reading does justice toThemistius’ insight that Plato is presenting a complete argument here. Althoughit does result in the conclusion that the soul is not a harmonia, it is only half ofthe story.

The second horn of the dilemma begins with Socrates’ interjection: “Comeon, by Zeus! One soul is said to have intelligence, excellence and goodnesswhile another is said to have ignorance, depravity and evil…” (93b9–c1). Hispoint is that there is a perfectly reasonable sense in which souls do admit ofdegrees. Some are more intelligent than others, some are morally better thanothers. They don’t differ in the degree to which they are souls, but it seems theycan differ in the degree to which they are, say, virtuous. Socrates continues topress this point, challenging the friend of the harmonia theory to explain howhe would account for the moral differences between souls:

And so among those who have posited that the soul is a harmonia, what will anyone saythese things in the soul are, [e.g.] excellence and evil? Are they some other harmonia ordisharmony? And is it harmonized, i.e., the good soul, and does it have in itself, being aharmonia, another harmonia, while the other <bad soul> is itself unharmonized anddoesn’t have another harmonia? (93c3–8)

44 Themistius, In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis 24.25–26. He takes this to be one offive arguments Plato uses to combat the harmonia theory.45 Philoponus, In Aristotelis De Anima Libros Commentaria 142.22–26.46 I agree, therefore, in this much at least with Wagner 2001, 79; Gallop 1975, 161; Taylor 1983[1970], 230–231. Their reconstruction of the rest of the argument is, however, quite different.

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Simmias, now in the role of reluctant standard bearer for the view, agrees thatthe harmonia theorist must say something like this. The main point of Socrates’suggestion is clear. If good and bad souls are equally souls, they must be differ-ent with respect to their excellence and evil. These moral characteristics are alsoassumed to be harmoniai. So the good soul is a harmonia and contains a furtherharmonia, namely excellence.47

According to the standard reading, the next step in the argument contains afallacy. Socrates establishes an apparently fallacious equivalence between har-moniai and souls. Here’s what he says:

But it was previously agreed, he said, that one soul is neither more nor less a soul thananother, and this is the agreement, one harmonia is neither more and to a greater extentnor less and to a lesser extent a harmonia than another. (93d1–4)

It is quite clear that claims about the soul are meant to be parallel to claimsabout harmoniai. But the claim that souls don’t admit of degrees is not, withoutfurther assumptions, equivalent to the claim that harmoniai don’t admit of de-grees.

The most logical choice for filling in that gap seems to be the assumptionfor the reductio that the soul is a harmonia.48 On this strategy, Socrates wouldbe establishing the equivalence by simple substitution. If the soul is identical toa harmonia, that would seemingly allow one to substitute ‘harmonia’ for allinstances of ‘soul’ in the argument. This strategy will work, however, only if

47 Two things to note about this suggestion. First, this account of the virtuous soul seems toanticipate that presented in the Republic. There Plato will define virtues like justice (430e3–4)and moderation (431e7–8) as kinds of harmoniai comprised of the three parts of the soul – therational (439d), the non-rational or appetitive (439d), and the spirited (439e). He characterizesjustice in terms of a right relationship between those parts.– Second, his account of the vicious soul is problematic. As the passage at 93b5–7 indicates,Socrates and Simmias agree that one soul is not more and to a greater extent a soul than anyother. The excellent and evil soul shouldn’t differ in the degree to which they are souls, butthey should differ inasmuch as the former has a second harmonia among its parts while thelatter lacks that harmonia. But that’s not the account we get. Socrates does claim that the evilsoul lacks this second harmonia, but he also appears to claim that the evil soul is itself dishar-monious (93c3–8). Read in this way, the passage under consideration would yield the followingtwo premises in the Argument from Degrees: (1) the excellent soul is a harmonia and has withinit an additional harmonia; and (2) the evil soul is not a harmonia and lacks any additionalharmonia. Socrates seems to have set the harmonia theorist up as a straw-man. Simmiasshouldn’t have agreed that the evil soul is itself a disharmony. And indeed, in the very nextline of the argument they reiterate their agreement that souls don’t differ in the degree to whichthey are souls.48 Taylor 1983 [1970], 225.

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everything true of the soul is true of a harmonia and vice versa. Here’s why. Thepremises – (1) the soul is a harmonia and (2) no soul admits of degrees – don’timply that no harmoniai admit of degrees. There might be some harmoniai thatare more and to a greater extent harmoniai than others, even though the soul isa harmonia that doesn’t admit of degrees. Thus the two claims ‘souls don’tadmit of degrees’ and ‘harmoniai don’t admit of degrees’ are not equivalent.

But Taylor offers a quick fix – introduce the claim that harmoniai don’t ad-mit of degrees as a new premise in the argument.49 Taken this way, the argu-ment wouldn’t depend on a fallacious equivalence. Despite the helpful sugges-tion, he doesn’t trace its implications.

Above I suggested the possibility that the Argument from Degrees might beorganized around a central dilemma – either harmoniai admit of degrees or theydon’t.50 Now we have good reason to take this view seriously. If Socratesdoesn’t introduce the claim that harmoniai don’t admit of degrees as a new as-sumption, the argument will depend on a fallacious equivalence. But if thatclaim is so introduced, we need to explain why he appears to open the argu-ment by assuming just the opposite. If the argument is structured around a di-lemma, this is easy to do.

Whether or not harmoniai admit of degrees, the argument is structured insuch a way that the need for an answer is neutralized. If it turns out that harmo-niai admit of degrees, Socrates can show that the soul is not a harmonia. But ifit turns out that they don’t admit of degrees, the next stage in the argument willalso show that the soul is not a harmonia.

Operating under the assumption that harmoniai don’t admit of degrees, So-crates goes on to show why the soul couldn’t be a harmonia understood as aproperty. The moral differences that exist between souls – some being more ex-cellent or more evil – cannot be accounted for if harmoniai don’t admit of de-grees.51 In order to account for the moral differences between souls, the friendof the harmonia theory establishes a corollary view: the good soul is a harmoniaand has a second harmonia, excellence, which the bad soul lacks. Souls clearlyhave greater and lesser degrees of excellence. So as a result of this addendumto the theory, it should turn out that souls do have greater and lesser degrees ofharmonia. But this view turns out to be at odds with the assumption governingthis horn of the dilemma – harmoniai don’t admit of degrees.

49 Taylor 1983 [1970], 227.50 p. 17.51 Socrates and Simmias run through a series of connections from 93d6–94b3 which wind upat this conclusion.

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One consequence of this assumption is that each harmonia will “have ashare in” or “participate in” (μετέχειν; 93d10, e5, 94a2, a4) harmonia equally.Since no soul is more of a soul than any other, no soul can have more a shareof harmonia than any other. If that’s right, it will turn out that all souls will beequally good (or bad), since no soul can have more a share in excellence (orevil). But according to the moral corollary, good souls will have more of a sharein harmonia than bad souls. The argument is brought to a contradiction and sothe soul cannot be a harmonia.

The only difficulty in understanding the argument against the second hornof the dilemma is that Plato now speaks of one harmonia “having a share in” or“participating in” another harmonia. Standard accounts won’t do.52 But by tak-ing into account the two ways to understand what it means to be a harmonia,the passage becomes straightforward.

A harmonia can be a property – the principle of organization a whole ofparts has; or a harmonia can be an object – the organized whole of parts. Thisseems to be what is at issue here when Plato speaks of a harmonia “participat-ing in” or “having a share in” harmonia. The soul is a structure, an organizedwhole of parts which instantiates a property, the principle according to whichits parts are structured. Since no soul is more or less a soul than any other(93d12–93e2), no soul is more or less an object than another. But if that is right,then the parts of each will have been “harmonized” or structured according tothe same principle of organization. The moral differences between souls, how-ever, are determined by the different ways the parts of the soul are organized. Ifthe parts of every soul have the same principle of organization, then every soulwill have the same moral characteristics. Since this is absurd, the soul cannotbe a harmonia whether it’s a particular property or an object.

52 Gallop 1975, 163–164 and Hackforth 1955, 119. On Hackforth’s account, souls won’t differ inthe degree to which their parts have been harmonized. Rather the good soul will be a harmoniaand have another, the bad soul will be a harmonia and simply fail to have a second. This mighthelp explain the difference between a morally excellent person and someone who is morallydepraved, but it won’t help explain how there could be a range of moral conditions betweenthose two extremes.– Gallop’s suggestion seems to allow for a range of moral conditions – souls can more or lessapproximate some standard. This means that all souls which have met some minimal standardof organization are equally souls, but some are more correctly organized than others. But whatmakes something a soul on the harmonia theory? The correct arrangement of the material partsof the body – the hot, cold, wet and dry. In order for one soul to be morally better, thosematerial parts would have to be more correctly arranged. It seems reasonable that the better orworse arrangement of the parts of the body could account for why one person is healthier thananother, but it is not clear how it could make one soul more excellent.

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3.3 The Opposition Argument (92e4–93a9; 94b3–95a2)

The Opposition Argument is discontinuous. Plato first outlines a series of meta-physical principles about the relation between a harmonia and the parts out ofwhich it is composed (92e5–93a10). Then resuming argument (94b4–95a3) afteran interruption, he argues that the soul has a power that a harmonia lacks,namely the ability to oppose the parts out of which it is composed. The soul canoppose the desire of the body for drink, but no harmonia is capable of opposingits parts. The soul, he concludes, cannot be a harmonia.

At 92e5–93a10 Socrates and Simmias outline four metaphysical principlesconcerning the causal powers of harmoniai and the parts of which they’re com-posed. These principles represent Plato’s most abstract reflections in the Phaedoabout the nature of the relationship between composite objects and their parts.It is worth having them in front of us:

(P1) Does it seem to you that a harmonia or any other composite (ἤ ἄλλῃτινὶ συνθέσει) can be in any other state than that which the things fromwhich it is composed are in? – Not at all.

(P2) Nor, I presume, to act or be acted on in some way other than the waythey act or are acted on. – He assented.

(P3) Therefore (ἄρα) a harmonia doesn’t lead those things from which it iscomposed, but follows them. – He agreed.

(P4) Therefore (ἄρα) it is quite impossible for a harmonia to move in theopposite direction, make a sound or to otherwise be opposed to itsparts. – Quite so.

Again we see that Plato takes a harmonia to be a structure qua object. Here theposition is put quite generally: harmoniai can’t act contrary to their parts, what-ever those parts might be.

These metaphysical principles point to an important admission about howPlato understands the causal powers of composite objects. The relation betweena harmonia and its parts is best characterized as one of mereological superveni-ence: a whole mereologically supervenes on its parts just in case the propertiesof the whole are determined or fixed by the properties of and relations betweenits parts.53 The principles above capture that view. The intrinsic properties of awhole will covary with the properties of its parts. There can be no changes inthe whole without corresponding changes in the parts.

53 See Kim 2000, 15–19; Kim 1984, 154; Kim 1978, 155–156. See also van Inwagen 1987, 27. Thisview comes to the fore here in the Opposition Argument because it is here that Plato specifi-cally articulates how the causal powers of harmoniai are related to the material parts of whichthey are composed.

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One important result of this is that a whole will have no causal powerswhich have not been determined by the causal powers of its parts. If a wholehad a causal power not determined by those of the parts, then the whole couldact without a corresponding change in the parts. This situation isn’t possible fora harmonia. A harmonia can’t be “in any other state than that which the thingsfrom which it is composed are in” (92e4–93a2). In other words, a harmonia mer-eologically supervenes on its parts. If a harmonia has any causal powers, it hasthem in virtue of the causal powers of its parts. For this reason a harmoniacouldn’t act differently than, let alone oppose, its parts.54

The Opposition Argument proper (94b4–95a3) spells out the implicationsfor the soul given Plato’s general metaphysical principles about harmoniai andtheir parts. The argument begins with the claim that the soul, especially if it is awise (φρόνιμον) soul, rules (ἄρχειν) the body (94b4–5). Plato immediately ex-plains what this means: the wise soul doesn’t follow the affections of the body(τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν), but rather opposes those affections (94b7–8).55

Plato cites evidence familiar to anyone who knows the Republic. There areoccasions when the body is hot and thirsty and the soul draws the person torefrain from drinking or occasions when the body is hungry and the soul drawsthe person to refrain from eating (94b7–c1). Plato also cites a passage from theOdyssey when, in attempting to overcome his anger and fear Odysseus “struckhis breast and rebuked his heart saying, ‘Endure, my heart, you have enduredworse than this.’”56

54 There’s an obvious counterexample, however. The harmonia of a lyre is destroyed long be-fore its wood, pegs and strings. This seems to be a case where the harmonia is affected differ-ently than its parts. This objection is first articulated by Gallop 1975, 167.– This objection misses the asymmetry of the dependence relation, however. A harmonia andits causal powers fundamentally depend on the parts out of which it is composed. Those parts,however, don’t depend on the harmonia. Earth, air, fire and water can exist whether or not anyharmoniai exist, but no material harmonia can exist without earth, air, fire and water. A harmo-nia is in the state it’s in and has the powers it has because the parts out of which it is com-posed are in the state they’re in and have the powers they have.55 Presumably the wise soul doesn’t oppose all the affections of the body, just those affectionswhich run contrary to reason. Also, the soul doesn’t always rule and lead the body. There aretimes when bodily desires can adversely influence the soul. The desire for wealth can some-times make us too busy to practice philosophy (66c8–d3). The soul doesn’t always succeed inruling the body, but the argument only needs the weaker claim that the soul is able to rule thebody. The contrast is with a harmonia which cannot oppose the parts from which it is com-posed. Cf. Bostock 1986, 131–134.56 Phaedo 94d5–e1 where Plato cites Odyssey 20.17–18.

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In the Republic, this evidence is used to show that these opposed desiresmust have originated in different parts of the soul.57 In the Phaedo, however,desires for food or drink or emotions like anger and fear are taken to be bodilyaffections. The conflict between the desire to drink and the refusal to drink isthus taken to be a conflict between the body and the soul. Since the soul is ableto oppose the bodily desire for drink et al., the soul can be said to rule the body.

Plato next invokes the conclusion from the metaphysical principles estab-lished earlier. If the soul were a harmonia, “it wouldn’t make a sound opposedto the tensions, slackenings, pluckings, or any other affections of its compo-nents, but would follow and never lead” (94c3–7). This gives him what he needsto finish off the harmonia theory. The soul has a property – the ability to opposethe affections of the body – which a harmonia couldn’t have. Rather than op-posing their own empirical evidence or the divine poet Homer, Socrates andSimmias conclude “in no way is the view that the soul is a harmonia well held”(94e8–95a1).

The argument misses its intended target however. The soul is not said tooppose the bodily elements but the affections of the body. These are affectionslike hunger and thirst, fear and anger; not elements like the hot, cold, wet anddry. So Plato is warranted only in concluding that the soul is not a harmonia ofbodily affections.58 The argument appears to be unsuccessful against the theoryfirst presented by Simmias which held that the soul is a harmonia of bodily ele-ments.

Suffice it to say, however, that although the Opposition Argument seems tomiss its intended target, it paves the way for one of the most important argu-ments in Plato’s middle period – the tripartition of the soul.

4 Implications for Rejecting the Harmonia Theory

Above I noted that Plato has been charged with being “extraordinarily obtuse”if the arguments of the Phaedo conclusively overturn the harmonia theory. Thecharge is so biting because if Plato successfully defeats the harmonia theory, itappears he will have undercut the tripartite soul upon which the political andpsychological theories of the Republic are based. However if Plato’s argumentsdon’t successfully defeat the harmonia theory, then roughly a third of the Phae-do will be of no purpose. Neither alternative is ideal.

57 Republic 4.441b6ff.58 This objection is suggested by Bostock 1986, 132 and Gallop 1975, 167.

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Two solutions present themselves. First we might make the case that, de-spite appearances, the view of the soul in the Republic is not one according towhich it has three parts but rather that the soul has only one part – a mereolo-gical simple. There is little doubt that Plato argues for the tripartition of the soulin Republic 4. But Republic 10 seems to present a different picture. There Platois open to the possibility that the disembodied soul is simple. He distinguishesthe way the soul is manifest “in its truest nature” or “as it is in truth” from theway it appears “when it is immersed in human life” that is, when it is embodied(Republic 10.611b1, 611b10, 612a5). He makes it clear that while it is embodied,the soul appears to be “composed from many parts” and “not most finely fittedtogether” (611b5–7). But like the sea god Glaucus whose true nature is obscuredby shells, seaweed and stones, the true nature of the soul might be obscured bycorporeal accretions (611c7–d8). Proper philosophical training is meant to helpone to get rid of the corporeal accretions and would allow us to see what thetrue nature of the soul is and we’d “be able to determine whether it has manyparts or just one” (612a3–4). This is certainly not definitive evidence that thetrue nature of the soul consists of only one part, but Plato does consider this agenuine possibility.

But even if there were an airtight argument in Republic 10 proving the dis-embodied soul to be simple, the soul as it is presented in the Phaedo and in thefirst nine books of the Republic is the soul as it appears to us – embodied. Theview of the embodied soul in the Phaedo is clearly different than the view of theembodied soul in the Republic. The embodied soul in the Republic has (at least)three parts. Since the embodied soul is presented as having three parts in theRepublic, our first strategy for dealing with the dilemma won’t work.

There is a second, and more effective, strategy. The view on offer in Repub-lic 4 seems to be that the embodied soul has parts – reason, spirit and appetite.Now if we are to accept the conclusions of the Phaedo and the tripartition of theembodied soul in Republic 4, then it must be the case that the tripartite souldoesn’t constitute a harmonia. In other words, it is not a structure of three partswhich is subject to destruction through dissolution. This leaves open the possi-bility that the parts of the tripartite soul could come apart, without that result-ing in the soul’s destruction. The parts of the soul are not related in such a waythat they constitute a structure.

In Republic 4 justice is described as a property collectively instantiated bythe three parts of the soul. Justice is a property one has just in case reason,spirit and appetite are functioning correctly and none is attempting to do thework appropriate to another part. Justice is a harmonia understood as a struc-tural property of the three parts of the soul. So justice, not the soul, is beingtaken to be a structure qua property.

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Nor does he regard the soul as a structure qua object. The tripartite soul ofRepublic 4 doesn’t meet the conditions necessary for it to count as a structurequa object. First, the arrangement of the parts of the soul isn’t essential to itsexistence. The parts of the just soul might be arranged such that each part iscarrying out its own work and not “meddling” in the affairs of the others. Butthe unjust soul needn’t have its parts so arranged. Even a soul which is ruledby appetite and not by reason is still, nevertheless, a soul.

Second, it is a feature of a structure qua object that it is subject to dissolu-tion through the dissolution of its parts. The destructibility of the soul isn’t ex-plicitly addressed in Republic 4, but it is in book 10. There Plato outlines theSpecial Vice argument.59 He suggests that there is destructive force that is nat-ural for each sort of thing. Sickness for the body, blight for grain, rot for woodand rust for iron. The destructive force Plato claims to be natural to the soul isnot the dissolution of its parts – as one would expect if the soul were beingthought of as a structure composed of parts. Instead he claims that vices – in-justice, licentiousness, cowardice and ignorance – are destructive forces naturalto the soul. But these aren’t able to disintegrate or destroy the soul (609b–610e). So the soul isn’t subject to destruction through the dissolution of itsparts. Nor is it dependent on something which is so subject.60 For these reasons,it’s clear that the soul in the Republic is not a structure.

Plato is therefore neither inconsistent nor obtuse for rejecting the harmoniatheory in the Phaedo. The arguments of the Phaedo overturn the claim the soulis a structure, not the claim that it may be tripartite.

5 Conclusion

Plato presents three arguments against the harmonia theory – the Priority Argu-ment, the Argument from Degrees and the Opposition Argument. The first suc-cessfully refutes the specification which takes a harmonia to be a structure qua

59 608dff. I don’t claim that the argument is sound. My point is that Plato doesn’t indicatethat the soul is subject to destruction through dissolution, which would be natural to think ifhe conceived of the soul as harmonia.60 Republic 10.610b1–5: “let’s never say that the soul is destroyed...even if the whole bodywere cut up into the tiniest pieces.”* I would like to extend a special thank Gail Fine for her very helpful comments on earlierversions of this paper. I am also grateful to Charles Brittain, Victor Caston, Terence Irwin, Mat-thew Stuart, John Whelan, and the anonymous readers for Apeiron for their helpful comments,criticisms, and suggestions.

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object. The second refutes this specification and that according to which a har-monia is understood as a particular structural property. The third argument isaimed at the object view, but fails to refute it. Despite the overall success ofthese arguments in refuting the harmonia theory, Plato needn’t be thought of as“extraordinarily obtuse” for so doing.

The concerns which underlie the harmonia theory and Plato’s argumentsagainst it are essentially mereological. If the soul is a structure understood tobe an object composed of parts, then Socrates’ interlocutors are rightly con-cerned about how long it could last. The soul, he argues, is not a structurewhich is subject to destruction through the dissolution of its parts nor is it aproperty dependent on something so subject. By considering and ultimately re-jecting the view that the soul is a structure, the Phaedo reveals some of Plato’simportant metaphysical commitments about the relationship between parts andwholes.

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