south central railway bi-monthly headquarters...

South Central Railway Headquarters Safety Organisation

DETAILS OF UNUSUALS AND ACCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE DURING JULY & AUGUST 2014

BI-MONTHLY SAFETY BULLETIN

July & August 2014

1. Brief of the accident:



On 21st July 2014, at 08.07 hours, when Train No. 12650 NZM – YPR Karnataka Sampark Kranthi Express was on run between KCG – FM stations of HYB Division, train parted in two portions between S-8 and S-7 (5th from TE) at KM 12/10.

The headstock of the Coach No. SWR WGSCN 95244 – PEV end worked out due to lack of fusion and lack of penetration in the weld of centre plate to inner headstock. During the headstock replacement in POH in 2008 at MYS Workshop in SW Railway, repairs were not carried out as per welding practice which resulted in welding joint strength reduced and failure has taken place in service which resulted in train parting.

NIL

CWM/MYS Workshop staff of SW Railway.

a. RDSO needs to specify the guidelines and procedure for inspection of welding joint for headstock apart from corrosion repairs during IOH and POH schedules in the Shops.

b. After carrying out the corrosion repairs to underframe headstock during POH, guidelines from RDSO is needed for conducting load test in Workshop.

SNF Station - On 10th August 2014, at 13.00 hours, 10 BOBYNL + 1 BV rolled back from sorting line No.2 to Steel Siding – 1 and hit the dead end and infringed the SNF – MLY bye-pass line and resulted into derailment of BV + 2 wagons. The wagons escaped from the stabled location and travelled for about 1 KM before derailing at the dead end. On the previous day, i.e., on 9th August, 24+1 BOBYNL (loaded with ballast) was received on GL-2 of SNF station and the train was further backed into sorting line No. 2. Out of 24 wagons, 14 loaded wagons were despatched to HYB at 02.00 hours of 10.8.2014 leaving the 10+1 wagons in stabled condition.

Due to improper stabling and securing precautions.

a. Sri. G. Tirupalli Das, Dy.SS / SNFb. Sri. B. Chandrasekhar, Pointsman / SNFc. Sri. R. Ajay Kumar, Pointsman / SNFd. Sri. T. Hanumanth, Assistant Pointsman / SNF

On 20th August 2014, at 03.55 hours, KPCC Goods was despatched into RTPS Siding from Yadlapur station of GTL Division by taking ‘off’ Shunt Signal. After the clearance of the train beyond the Shunt Signal, the Dy.SS normalised the trap point, i.e., kept in ‘open’ position. LP of the train experienced inability to haul the load into the siding and hence, decided to back the train to pick up momentum. But, the train crew failed to ensure that the trap point is ‘closed’ before backing the train and as a result of that BV + 2 wagons derailed.

Crew of the train backed the train without obtaining the prior permission of Dy.SS / YDLP and without ensuring the trap Point is closed.

LP, SM/RTPS & Guard of the train are held responsible.

Cause:

Matters brought to light:

Staff held responsible:

Suggestions and recommendations:

Cause:


Cause:


5.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Electrical Department:a. On 22nd August 2014, it was noticed at Komarapudi (KMLP) station of

BZA Division that VCD for locos i.e. 23844+23362/WAG 5A/BSL shed was tested and found that VCD lamp was glowing and buzzer sound also came, but B.P. pressure was not discharged . Checked and found that I.P. valve C.O.C. was in ‘closed’ condition. After opening the I.P. valve C.O.C, activated VCD, B.P. pressure was discharged. Similar situation was found in Train No. BOXN with locos 27329+28013/WAG-7/KZJ which was regulated on DN loop line. This is very serious.

b. On 5th August 2014, it was noticed at HYB station of SC Division that majority of pit lighting and catwalk lighting is not functioning making it more unsafe for night primary maintenance of rakes for long distance express trains such as A.P. Express. 69 lights out of 143 on Pitline No.10, 8 out of 64 in Pitline No. 8 were not glowing. Cat-walk lighting between line no. 7-8 (91lights out of 96), between line No. 8-9 (65 lights out of 96) and between line No. 9-10 (51lights out of 75) are not glowing.

c. Pit line no.2 of NED station – inadequate drainage. Cat walk lights In pit line No-1, out of 104 lights, 28 lights not glowing. In pit line No-2, out of 146 lights, 30 lights not glowing.

6.0 Other General Irregularities noticed:

a. Efficacy of detonators was tested by keeping 5 detonators at KMLP station on 22nd August 2014 under the wheels of wagons and found that only one exploded. It was also noticed that the detonators given as personal equipment to train crew and station were having irregularities in the form of expired detonators, label of the tin display one date of manufacture and inside the tin the detonators are of different year.




On 22nd August 2014, Train No. 17405 (ADB – TPTY) Krishna Express arrived at MUE station at 00.25 hours. Loco reversal is essential to work the train towards SC direction. Accordingly, the Guard applied handbrake in the Guard Compartment of the incoming rear SLR and got down to get into the SLR at the other end of the formation (will now become working SLR). The Pointsman applied handbrake in the incoming front SLR before detaching the loco for reversal. Guard of the train changed his SLR and released the handbrake in the now working SLR (earlier front SLR) but failed to release the handbrake of rear SLR which he worked the train from ADB to MUE. Crew started the train after a detention of 40 minutes for loco reversal at MUE. SM/SVN which is immediately next to MUE noticed sparks emanating from the front SLR when the train was running through the station and alerted the crew on walkie-talkie who have stopped the train between SVN – UMRI and released the brake blocks and continued their journey. The loco crew also claimed that they have checked the next to engine SLR at DAB and found no unusual. When the train was received at NZB station, the Mechanical Staff who were on rolling ‘in’/ ‘out’ duties noticed heavy sound in the vehicle and examined the coach at station which had developed flatness of 65mm and 3mm depth on the wheel of the front SLR. The coach was detached at NZB.

Non-ensuring of releasing of hand brakes before leaving MUE by the Guard of the train.

Guard of the train Sri. Taher Hussain, PAU of NED Division who worked the train right from ADB to NZB for failing to ensure personally whether the handbrake of both SLRs are released when the train stopped at MUE for 40 minutes.

On 10th August 2014, DN 12797 Venkatadri Express (KCG – CTO) was received on non-platform line at Rajampet station of GTL Division. The train was having schedule stop at Rajampet. SM/Hastavaram taken line clear for Venkatadri Express from SM/RJP and accordingly the train entry was made in the TSR, but SM/RJP mistook it as Goods train and hence made arrangement to receive it on Mainline which is non-platform line and given through signals after consulting SCOR. LP of Venkatadri Express stopped the train on through signals and enquired SM/RJP who replied that he thought that it is Goods. After the departure of the train, SM/RJP gave arrival & departure timings to SCOR but did not bother to inform the ‘all-concerned’ whereas the Guard of the train gave ‘all-concerned’ message.

Miscommunication between two SMs and SCOR.

Sri. T. Balachandrudu, SM/HAQ and Sri. C. Subramani, Dy.CHC/GTL are held responsible.

(SPAD) On 22nd August 2014, Train No. 12850 Down SC – SHM Express was signalled for reception onto DN Mainline at Kovvur station by the Station Master at 14.01 hours by taking ‘off’ DN Home Signal to ‘caution’ aspect since the block section ahead is still occupied by Simhadri Express. LP of the train is supposed to come and stop near the DN Mainline Starter Signal But the LP of the train passed Starter Signal at ‘on’ and stopped after passing a length of engine + 4 coaches.

Cause:


Cause:


Man of the month Awardees (March / April / May 2014)

Sri. Emanual, Dy.SS/MQR

Sri. A. K. Haldar, Dy.SS

Sri. M. Kumaraswamy, Guard/KZJ

Sri. M. Kumaraswamy, Dy.SS

Sri. Subhod Yadav, Dy.SS

Sri. N. Rama Rao, LP/SC

Sri. S. Ravikanth, LP/SC

Sri. Y. N. K. Rao, LP/SC

Sri. R. K. Viswakarma, ALP

Sri. Atul Bhattacharya, LP/SC

Sri. Shamshad Alam, ALP/SC

Sri. R. L. M. Raju, LP/SC

Sri. S. K. Yadav, ALP/SC

Sri. T. Venu Kumar, Dy.SS

Sri. Kamal Saheb, Trackman

Sri. M.Krishtaiah, Keyman

Sri. D. Venkatakrishna, LP/Goods/RU

Sri. Pappanna, Keyman

Sri. Prakash Thoman, Gateman

Sri. M. Sudhakar, LP/Goods/RU

Sri. D. Rambabu, SM/SF

Sri. Mantu Kumar, Pointsman

Sri. K. Viswanath, DY.SS/MMPL

Sri. P. Rama Sekhar, Dy.SS/VNM

Sri. C. Hanumanthu, Keyman

Sri. Rambhupal Naidu, Guard

Sri. Suresh Harijan, Keyman

Sri. Chiranjeevaiah, SMR/MYL

Sri. Xavier Prasad, SMR/GY

Sri. V. Laxman Rao, LP

Sri. K. Venkateswara Rao, Dy.SS/KQA

Sri. R. Adinarayana, LP

Sri. Anjaneyulu, Keyman

Sri. B. M. Basha, LP/NRE

Sri. P. Nagaraju, Pointsman/KPU

Sri. M. Dhanashekar, LP/BTTR

Sri. K. Umaruddin, Guard/NRE

Sri. Santosh kumar, Dy.SS/VP

Sri. P. H. Trivikraman, SM/ASP

Sri. S. K. Mishra, Dy.SS/HDD

Sri. ARL Reddy, LP/Goods/DMM

Sri. K. Sudhan Raju, LRASM/RJP

Sri. A. Kiran Kumar, Pointsman

Sri. G. Damodaram, LP/Goods/RU

Sri. R. K. Prajapathi, ALP/RU

Sri. S. Prakash, LP/Mail/SBC

Sri. Prasad, Gateman

Prakash Singh, Goods LP/AWB

Sri. V. Srinivasu, LP/Goods/PAU

Sri. Bajrang, Trolleyman

Sri. Chandu Kondiba, Trolleyman

Sri. B. Srinivasa Rao, Pointsman

Sri. P. S. V. Ramudu, Sr.PWS/BTTR

Sri. A. Antony, YPA/BTTR

Sri. D. Mohana Rao, SS/BVRM

Sri. Ram Khiladi Meena, Tech.I/BZA

Sri. D. Nigam Babu, Tech. III/BZA

Sri. K. Srinivasa Rao, LP/Goods/BZA

Sri. A. Bal Krishna, ALP/BZA

Sri. M. Murli, Gateman/DWP

Sri. Manasa Ranjan, ESM/NDD

Kumari P. Priyadarshini, APM/MAG

Sri. S. Ramanjaneyulu, YPC

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CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER, HEADQUARTERS

SAFETY ORGANISATION

OPER

ATING

STAFF – D

o observe for any unusual in the run through train

while exchanging ‘all-right’ signals

Cause:

Other matters brought to light:


Cause:

Other matters brought to light:


Cause:


Late reaction and late application of brakes.

Home Signal was passed at 14.06 hours at a speed of 83 KMPH and DN Mainline Starter Signal at 14.07 hours at a speed of 54 KMPH as per the analysis made from the datalogger report.

Sri, S. K. Osman, LP /BZA & Sri. K. V. Narayana, ALP / BZA.

(SPAD) On 25th August 2014, SM/SKP issued PLCT + T. 369 (3b) to pass DN LSS and DN IB Signals (between SKP-NPL) at ‘on’ position due to failure After obtaining the documents, the LP started his train at 10.38 hours and passed the DN LSS + DN IBS at ‘on’ but, the LP also ignored the Gate Stop Signal of LC Gate No.22/E at ‘on’ and passed the LC Gate in ‘open’ condition. Gateman of LC Gate No.22/E complained about this to SM/NPL who in turn intimated SM/LPI to stop the train and enquire. The train was stopped at LPI and fresh crew has relieved them to work the train to SC.

Failure of LP to obey the ‘stop’ aspect of LC Gate Signal and ignoring the presence of LC Gate. He mistook that the given documents permit him to pass all signals between SKP-NPL at ‘on’.

Block instrument replacement work is programmed and permitted by SCOR because of which PLCT was issued. SM/SKP obtained line clear at 10.20 hours for this train and informed Gateman of LC Gate No. 22 at 10.25 hours much ahead of the arrival of train (train arrived at 10.37 and left at 10.38). Gateman closed the gate and took ‘off’ Gate Stop Signal for 17319. Gateman took oral permission from SM for a nature call and after returning, he came to know that the train has not yet passed and hence, asked permission of SM to put back the Gate Signal and ‘open’ the gate for clearing the road traffic. But, the Gateman after clearing the road traffic failed to close the gate and take ‘off’ Gate Signal again for the train.

Sri. Xavier Cruze, LP/SC, Sri. Sanjay Kumar, ALP/SC and Sri. V. Ramesh, Gateman of LC Gate No. 22/E.

On 29th August 2014, at 11.30 hours, a dead loco No. 11449 which was on Road No.4 of TPTY station of GTL Division was asked to be cranked and then bring the empty rake of 17430 Rayalaseema rake from pitline towards RU end onto platform. Accordingly, the LP/Shunter took charge of the dead loco and cranked the loco which started rolling passed Starter Signal No.44 at ‘on’ and derailed in the Trap Point No. 118.

The dead loco when stabled, the truck isolation cut out cock was in ‘closed’ position as such the pressure in the gauge was ‘zero’ which was not noticed by the Shunter after cranking the dead loco. He also took the notch without ensuring the brake power of the loco leading to derailment.

Shunter/TPTY.



FLASH NEWS LETTER NO.4

IRREGULARITIES NOTICED

1. Train crew, i.e., LP, ALP & Guard of the train shall never back the train unless permission of SM in rear is obtained as per GR & SR 4.12.

2. Attention ….. station Operating Staff and Loco Running Staff “Stabling precautions are essential to be complied with as per SR 5.23 not only on running lines but also on stabling / siding lines except that red ink entry, placing of tail lamp/tailboard on LV of either side”,

3. All CCCs, SMRs, TIs, SSE/P.Way should test the efficacy of detonators (under their jurisdiction) once in 12 months as per SR 3.64.5.1

1.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of staff of Operating Department:

a. As per Para 2.6, LC Gate No. 44 at KM 36/8-9 towards MTM Port end was shown as Traffic Gate and its normal position as ‘open to road traffic’ with telephone connectivity, but this LC Gate is not manned, instead the Pointsman will go and close the gate for the shunt movements. Even there is no gate telephone. Suitable amendment to Para 2.6 and Appendix ‘A’ of MTM/SWR needs to be given.

b. At MTM station of BZA Division few interlocking arrangements need to be studied and redone in the interest of safety and speeding up the movements during failures, viz; when Home Signal fails, Calling-on Signal below Home Signal No. 28 and First Routing Home Signal No. 30 – both are not responding since the interlocking arrangement is that once Home Signal No. 28 fails, Home Signal No.30 also fails. Similarly, once the Calling-on Signal below Home Signal No. 28 fails, the Calling-on Signal below Home Signal No.30 also fails? It is not proper to link the two Calling-on Signals., instead it would be proper to delink them and enable the SMs to use the Calling –on Signal provided below Home Signal No. 30 and draw the train upto second Routing Home Signal No.28 during signal failure.

Another interlocking feature that needs to be studied is to delink both the Home Signals and make them independent working, i.e., it should be possible to take ‘off’ the FSS (Signal No.30) keeping the second Routing Home Signal No. 28 at ‘on’. Present interlocking arrangement is not permitting this movement. The mandatory adequate distance of 180m (Block Overlap) do exist between the two Home Signals.

c. On 5th August 2014, it was noticed at HYB station of SC Division that Stabled Load Register was kept in Crew Lobby for enabling the crew of the train to write the details in the register after stabling while signing ‘off’. This is improper; the register should be kept and maintained by the SM and not by Crew Lobby. Since the register is kept in Crew Lobby, the PNs were not exchanged by SM with SCOR at 23.05 hours though MMTS rake (No. 40147) was stabled on PF – 5 from 22.45 hours. It is necessary for the station staff to understand the importance of updating the record, especially when the formation / vehicle are stabled on running lines. One live diesel loco (No. WDG3A 14657/MLY) along with one dead loco (No. WDG-4 12258/GY) was found at the dead end of PF – 2 was kept on PF from 21.30 hours, stabling entry was not made, Loco in energized and unmanned.

d. On 12th August 2014, during bi-monthly safety audit of NED station of NED Division, it was noticed from the Stabled Load Register that though loco of SBC – NED Link Express is stabled, the LP of the train is not signing in the stabled load register. He is also not using the safety equipment such as skids to secure the loco which is in violation of SR 5.23.3 and 5.23.4.1 & 5.23.4.2. Guard of the train is applying the handbrake of only rear SLR. He is supposed to ensure that both SLRs (front and rear) handbrakes are applied as per SR 5.23.

e. It was also noticed at NED station during the safety audit inspection of the station on 12th August 2014 that station staff were performing shunting in the face of an approaching train which is in violation of Para 8.4.1 of SWR / NED, violation of GR 8.10 and Para 7 of Appendix XII of G&SR. Rake of Sachkhand Express was pulled from Pitline and backed via mainline on to PF-1 after granting line clear and departure of Devagiri Express from Limbagaon station.

f. It was noticed on 6th August 2014 at MRGA station of GNT Division that loading activity was taking place which is very close to PF-3 and in the process the road lorries are infringing the normal train movements. It is not proper for the Division to permit train movements on PF-3 when loading activity is in progress. Similar arrangement already exist at Chityal station.

a. At KMLP station of BZA Division, Point No.17A was checked and found that Gauge at crossing ahead of 1m from crossing nose is +11mm, GR pads under crossing, GFN liners at crossing portion are missing, S&T bond wires are connected to CMS crossing by Exo-thermic weld which is not permitted.

b. Major Girder Bridge No.282 (17 x 12.19M) at KM 141/22- 142/2 between GDR-MBL stations on UP & DN lines was checked on 22nd August 2014 and found that at GDR end approach fish plate joints are not squared, 3m staggered for both LH & RH side, Gauge varies from N to -10mm on the bridge proper on DN line, Rail fixing bolts/nuts are loose, Sleeper numbers are not marked, Bridge approach on UP line (BZA end) needs immediate attention i.e., packing required, On UP line, Gauge varies from +2mm to + 10mm and N to -10mm on the bridge proper. At maximum locations gauge gauge variation of -5 to -10mm is noticed. Rail fixing bolts are loose. Electromeric pads between channel sleepers bottom and girder top are completely perished. On UP line, Guard rail is higher than running rail on span no.16, 15 & 14 against not less than 25mm. Girder top flange – deep corrosion pits are seen. Fish plate joints gaps are uneven.

c. During the safety audit inspection of NED station on 12th August 2014, it was noticed that Point No.33A (trap), closure pieces need to be removed on both sides, At KM 348/9-8 bent fish plate joint is provided to defective weld with two far end bolts are not removed & not inspected, Point No.31B - all the chair plates are corroded, Point No.28B (1 in 8 ½)- ERC greasing not done, Point No.26B- CMS crossing sleeper spacings to be attended, Platform No.1, 2 & 3 - inadequate drainage.

a.On 22nd August 2014, it was noticed at Komarapudi station of BZA Division that on no. of occasions the S-1 (Home Signal) route is not clearing after the

arrival of full length trains. All together 42 times since January 2014. SMs failed to record them as failures in the Signal Failure Register which is in violation of COM/O/SC letter No T.411/P/1/Vol. VIII dated 01.5.2014.

2.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Engineering Department:

3.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of S&T Department:

b. It was also noticed at KMLP station on 22nd August 2014 from the Relay Room Key Register that It was written in the register that on 26th February 2014, at 14.50 hours, the BPAC between KMLP – VRJN stations was made through (i.e., by-passed) as per the instructions of JE/Signals/GDR.Disconnection Notice (T.351) was not given. Disconnecting or by-passing the BPAC is in violation of Railway Board letter No. 2009/Safety (Signals)/26/2 dated 29.4.2010 which stipulate that ‘instances have come to the notice that where the BPACs cannot be reset, the BPACs are by-passed from the block instruments to eliminate train passing on PLCT which is a dangerous trend and needs to be curbed to ensure safety’.

c. Also noticed at this station that during the month of May 2014, the BPAC between KMLP-VKT stations was reset for 21 times, SMs/KMLP failed to enter this failure in the S&T Failure Register which is in violation of COM/SC letter No. T.411/P/1/Vol. VIII dated 01.5.2014

d. On 6th August 2014, during inspection of RC station of GTL Division, it was noticed that EOLB provision for Traffic LC Gate No. 218 was commissioned from 5th May 2014. Subsequent to the commissioning, number of failures were recorded and the remarks passed by S&T Officials was “due to public forcibly trying to lift the lifting barrier, the signals are flying back”. Division shall plan for an alternate arrangement to ensure that the signals are not flowing back, especially on the face of an approaching train which is unsafe. Interesting fact is that this LC Gate is closed permanently for road traffic and barricading was done in view of RUB work with effect from 1st August 2014. But SM/RC was advised to intimate particulars of trains with the Gateman and one Gateman in shifts is also posted to work at this LC Gate. Closure of LC Gate is also proved in taking ‘off’ signals.

e. During the safety audit inspection of NED station on 12th August 2014, it was noticed that Point No.23 connecting Road No.1 to Goods Siding was disconnected from 27.7.2012 and further not connected / no work is in progress / no fresh proposals. Division to check and rectify.

f. Also noticed that cable meggering of NED station was done on 30-01-2013 and is overdue from January 2014.

g. On 15th July 2014, it was noticed at Pingli station of NED Division that the BPACs between PIZ – PBN and PIZ – MQL stations were disconnected with effect from 26.1.2014 and 01.02.2014 respectively which is in violation of Railway Board guidelines.

a. On 6th August 2014, it was noticed at RC station of GTL Division that Daily testing of BA equipment not done from 31.7.14 to 5.8.14.

b. During the safety audit inspection of NED station on 12th August 2014, it was noticed that 8 Shunters are shuttling from PAU to work at NED. Their headquarters can be shifted from PAU to NED.

c. Lie-over loco (Golden Hour Concept) is not kept on ARMV/PAU as notice on the day of safety audit inspection on 12th August 2014. Last mock drill was conducted on 22.07.2014 and the timings recorded in the Log book of MRV reveal that time of order – 05:10 A.M. Departure from station- 0 6 : 1 0 A . M (turn out time – 60 minutes against stipulated time of 20 minutes).

d. RB Failures:

4.0Irregularities noticed in the working of Mechanical Department:

As many as 46 cases of RB failures (BZA-19, SC-16, GTL-7, NED-2 & HYB-2) were noticed by field staff when trains were passing through stations and during rolling ‘in’/’out’ examination time from 1st April 2014 to 31st August 2014 which is a cause of concern.

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SOUTH CENTRAL RAILWAY

HEADQUARTERS SAFETY ORGANISATION

BI-MONTHLY SAFETY BULLETIN –July & August 2014

DETAILS OF UNUSUALS AND ACCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE

DURING JULY & AUGUST 2014

1. Brief of the accident: On 21st July 2014, at 08.07 hours, when Train No. 12650 NZM – YPR

Karnataka Sampark Kranthi Express was on run between KCG – FM stations of HYB

Division, train parted in two portions between S-8 and S-7 (5th

from TE) at KM 12/10.

Cause: The headstock of the Coach No. SWR WGSCN 95244 – PEV end worked out due to lack

of fusion and lack of penetration in the weld of centre plate to inner headstock. During the

headstock replacement in POH in 2008 at MYS Workshop in SW Railway, repairs were not

carried out as per welding practice which resulted in welding joint strength reduced and failure

has taken place in service which resulted in train parting.

Matters brought to light: NIL

Staff held responsible: CWM/MYS Workshop staff of SW Railway.

Suggestions and recommendations:

a. RDSO needs to specify the guidelines and procedure for inspection of welding joint for

headstock apart from corrosion repairs during IOH and POH schedules in the Shops.

b. After carrying out the corrosion repairs to underframe headstock during POH, guidelines from

RDSO is needed for conducting load test in Workshop.

2. Brief of the accident: SNF Station - On 10th August 2014, at 13.00 hours, 10 BOBYNL + 1 BV

rolled back from sorting line No.2 to Steel Siding – 1 and hit the dead end and infringed the SNF

– MLY bye-pass line and resulted into derailment of BV + 2 wagons. The wagons escaped from

the stabled location and travelled for about 1 KM before derailing at the dead end. On the

previous day, i.e., on 9th August, 24+1 BOBYNL (loaded with ballast) was received on GL-2 of

SNF station and the train was further backed into sorting line No. 2. Out of 24 wagons, 14 loaded

wagons were despatched to HYB at 02.00 hours of 10.8.2014 leaving the 10+1 wagons in stabled

condition.

Cause: Due to improper stabling and securing precautions.


a. Sri. G. Tirupalli Das, Dy.SS / SNF

b. Sri. B. Chandrasekhar, Pointsman / SNF

c. Sri. R. Ajay Kumar, Pointsman / SNF

d. Sri. T. Hanumanth, Assistant Pointsman / SNF

3. Brief of the accident: On 20th August 2014, at 03.55 hours, KPCC Goods was despatched into

RTPS Siding from Yadlapur station of GTL Division by taking ‘off’ Shunt Signal. After the

clearance of the train beyond the Shunt Signal, the Dy.SS normalised the trap point, i.e., kept in

‘open’ position. LP of the train experienced inability to haul the load into the siding and hence,

decided to back the train to pick up momentum. But, the train crew failed to ensure that the trap

point is ‘closed’ before backing the train and as a result of that BV + 2 wagons derailed.

Cause: Crew of the train backed the train without obtaining the prior permission of Dy.SS /

YDLP and without ensuring the trap Point is closed.

Staff held responsible: LP, ALP & Guard of the train are held responsible.

4. Brief of the accident: On 22nd

August 2014, Train No. 17405 (ADB – TPTY) Krishna Express

arrived at MUE station at 00.25 hours. Loco reversal is essential to work the train towards SC

direction. Accordingly, the Guard applied handbrake in the Guard Compartment of the incoming

rear SLR and got down to get into the SLR at the other end of the formation (will now become

working SLR). The Pointsman applied handbrake in the incoming front SLR before detaching

the loco for reversal. Guard of the train changed his SLR and released the handbrake in the now

working SLR (earlier front SLR) but failed to release the handbrake of rear SLR which he

worked the train from ADB to MUE. Crew started the train after a detention of 40 minutes for

loco reversal at MUE. SM/SVN which is immediately next to MUE noticed sparks emanating

from the front SLR when the train was running through the station and alerted the crew on

walkie-talkie who have stopped the train between SVN – UMRI and released the brake blocks

and continued their journey. The loco crew also claimed that they have checked the next to

engine SLR at DAB and found no unusual. When the train was received at NZB station, the

Mechanical Staff who were on rolling ‘in’/ ‘out’ duties noticed heavy sound in the vehicle and

examined the coach at station which had developed flatness of 65mm and 3mm depth on the

wheel of the front SLR. The coach was detached at NZB.

Cause: Non-ensuring of releasing of hand brakes before leaving MUE by the Guard of the train.

Staff held responsible: Guard of the train Sri. Taher Hussain, PAU of NED Division who

worked the train right from ADB to NZB for failing to ensure personally whether the handbrake

of both SLRs are released when the train stopped at MUE for 40 minutes.

5. Brief of the accident: On 10th August 2014, DN 12797 Venkatadri Express (KCG – CTO) was

received on non-platform line at Rajampet station of GTL Division. The train was having

schedule stop at Rajampet. SM/Hastavaram taken line clear for Venkatadri Express from

SM/RJP and accordingly the train entry was made in the TSR, but SM/RJP mistook it as Goods

train and hence made arrangement to receive it on Mainline which is non-platform line and

given through signals after consulting SCOR. LP of Venkatadri Express stopped the train on

through signals and enquired SM/RJP who replied that he thought that it is Goods. After the

departure of the train, SM/RJP gave arrival & departure timings to SCOR but did not bother to

inform the ‘all-concerned’ whereas the Guard of the train gave ‘all-concerned’ message.

Cause: Miscommunication between two SMs and SCOR.

Staff held responsible: Sri. T. Balachandrudu, SM/HAQ and Sri. C. Subramani, Dy.CHC/GTL

are held responsible.

6. Brief of the accident: (SPAD) On 22nd

August 2014, Train No. 12850 Down SC – SHM

Express was signalled for reception onto DN Mainline at Kovvur station by the Station Master at

14.01 hours by taking ‘off’ DN Home Signal to ‘caution’ aspect since the block section ahead is

still occupied by Simhadri Express. LP of the train is supposed to come and stop near the DN

Mainline Starter Signal for clearance of Simhadri Express. But the LP of the train passed

Starter Signal at ‘on’ and stopped after passing a length of engine + 4 coaches. Cause: Late reaction and late application of brakes.

Other matters brought to light: Home Signal was passed at 14.06 hours at a speed of 83

KMPH and DN Mainline Starter Signal at 14.07 hours at a speed of 54 KMPH as per the analysis

made from the datalogger report.

Staff held responsible: Sri, S. K. Osman, LP /BZA & Sri. K. V. Narayana, ALP / BZA.

7. Brief of the accident: (SPAD) On 25th August 2014, SM/SKP issued PLCT + T. 369 (3b) to

pass DN LSS and DN IB Signals (between SKP-NPL) at ‘on’ position due to failure to the LP of

DN 17319 UBL – SC Express. After obtaining the documents, the LP started his train at 10.38

hours and passed the DN LSS + DN IBS at ‘on’ but, the LP also ignored the Gate Stop Signal

of LC Gate No.22/E at ‘on’ and passed the LC Gate in ‘open’ condition. Gateman of LC

Gate No.22/E complained about this to SM/NPL who in turn intimated SM/LPI to stop the train

and enquire. The train was stopped at LPI and fresh crew has relieved them to work the train to

SC.

Cause: Failure of LP to obey the ‘stop’ aspect of LC Gate Signal and ignoring the presence of

LC Gate. He mistook that the given documents permit him to pass all signals between SKP-NPL

at ‘on’.

Other matters brought to light: Block instrument replacement work is programmed and

permitted by SCOR because of which PLCT was issued. SM/SKP obtained line clear at 10.20

hours for this train and informed Gateman of LC Gate No. 22 at 10.25 hours much ahead of the

arrival of train (train arrived at 10.37 and left at 10.38). Gateman closed the gate and took ‘off’

Gate Stop Signal for 17319. Gateman took oral permission from SM for a nature call and after

returning, he came to know that the train has not yet passed and hence, asked permission of SM

to put back the Gate Signal and ‘open’ the gate for clearing the road traffic. But, the Gateman

after clearing the road traffic failed to close the gate and take ‘off’ Gate Signal again for the

train.

Staff held responsible: Sri. Xavier Cruze, LP/SC, Sri. Sanjay Kumar, ALP/SC and Sri. V.

Ramesh, Gateman of LC Gate No. 22/E.

8. Brief of the accident: On 29th August 2014, at 11.30 hours, a dead loco No. 11449 which was on

Road No.4 of TPTY station of GTL Division was asked to be cranked and then bring the empty

rake of 17430 Rayalaseema rake from pitline towards RU end onto platform. Accordingly, the

LP/Shunter took charge of the dead loco and cranked the loco which started rolling passed Starter

Signal No.44 at ‘on’ and derailed in the Trap Point No. 118.

Cause: The dead loco when stabled, the truck isolation cut out cock was in ‘closed’ position as

such the pressure in the gauge was ‘zero’ which was not noticed by the Shunter after cranking the

dead loco. He also took the notch without ensuring the brake power of the loco leading to

derailment.

Staff held responsible: Shunter/TPTY.

****

1.

Flash News Letter No.4 1. Train crew, i.e., LP, ALP & Guard of the train shall never back the train

unless

permission of SM in rear is obtained as per GR & SR 4.12.

2. Attention ….. station Operating Staff and Loco Running Staff “Stabling

precautions are essential to be complied with as per SR 5.23 not only on

running lines but also on stabling / siding lines except that red ink entry,

placing of tail lamp/tailboard on LV of either side”,

3. All CCCs, SMRs, TIs, SSE/P.Way should test the efficacy of detonators

(under their jurisdiction) once in 12 months as per SR 3.64.5.1

Irregularities noticed

1.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of staff of Operating Department:

a. As per Para 2.6, LC Gate No. 44 at KM 36/8-9 towards MTM Port end was shown as Traffic

Gate and its normal position as ‘open to road traffic’ with telephone connectivity, but this

LC Gate is not manned, instead the Pointsman will go and close the gate for the shunt

movements. Even there is no gate telephone. Suitable amendment to Para 2.6 and

Appendix ‘A’ of MTM/SWR needs to be given. b. At MTM station of BZA Division few interlocking arrangements need to be studied and

redone in the interest of safety and speeding up the movements during failures, viz; when

Home Signal fails, Calling-on Signal below Home Signal No. 28 and First Routing Home

Signal No. 30 – both are not responding since the interlocking arrangement is that once

Home Signal No. 28 fails, Home Signal No.30 also fails. Similarly, once the Calling-on

Signal below Home Signal No. 28 fails, the Calling-on Signal below Home Signal No.30

also fails? It is not proper to link the two Calling-on Signals., instead it would be proper to

delink them and enable the SMs to use the Calling –on Signal provided below Home Signal

No. 30 and draw the train upto second Routing Home Signal No.28 during signal failure.

Another interlocking feature that needs to be studied is to delink both the Home Signals and

make them independent working, i.e., it should be possible to take ‘off’ the FSS (Signal

No.30) keeping the second Routing Home Signal No. 28 at ‘on’. Present interlocking

arrangement is not permitting this movement. The mandatory adequate distance of 180m

(Block Overlap) do exist between the two Home Signals.

c. On 5th August 2014, it was noticed at HYB station of SC Division that Stabled Load Register

was kept in Crew Lobby for enabling the crew of the train to write the details in the register

after stabling while signing ‘off’. This is improper; the register should be kept and

maintained by the SM and not by Crew Lobby. Since the register is kept in Crew

Lobby, the PNs were not exchanged by SM with SCOR at 23.05 hours though MMTS

rake (No. 40147) was stabled on PF – 5 from 22.45 hours. It is necessary for the station

staff to understand the importance of updating the record, especially when the

formation / vehicle are stabled on running lines. One live diesel loco (No. WDG3A

14657/MLY) along with one dead loco (No. WDG-4 12258/GY) was found at the dead end of

PF – 2 was kept on PF from 21.30 hours, stabling entry was not made, Loco in energized

and unmanned.

d. On 12th August 2014, during bi-monthly safety audit of NED station of NED Division, it was

noticed from the Stabled Load Register that though loco of SBC – NED Link Express is

stabled, the LP of the train is not signing in the stabled load register. He is also not using

the safety equipment such as skids to secure the loco which is in violation of SR 5.23.3

and 5.23.4.1 & 5.23.4.2. Guard of the train is applying the handbrake of only rear SLR. He is

supposed to ensure that both SLRs (front and rear) handbrakes are applied as per SR

5.23. e. It was also noticed at NED station during the safety audit inspection of the station on 12

th

August 2014 that station staff were performing shunting in the face of an approaching train

which is in violation of Para 8.4.1 of SWR / NED, violation of GR 8.10 and Para 7 of

Appendix XII of G&SR. Rake of Sachkhand Express was pulled from Pitline and backed via

mainline on to PF-1 after granting line clear and departure of Devagiri Express from

Limbagaon station.

f. It was noticed on 6th August 2014 at MRGA station of GNT Division that loading activity

was taking place which is very close to PF-3 and in the process the road lorries are infringing

the normal train movements. It is not proper for the Division to permit train movements on

PF-3 when loading activity is in progress. Similar arrangement already exist at Chityal

station.

2.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Engineering Department:

a. At KMLP station of BZA Division, Point No.17A was checked and found that Gauge at

crossing ahead of 1m from crossing nose is +11mm, GR pads under crossing, GFN liners at

crossing portion are missing, S&T bond wires are connected to CMS crossing by Exo-thermic

weld which is not permitted.

b. Major Girder Bridge No.282 (17 x 12.19M) at KM 141/22- 142/2 between GDR-MBL

stations on UP & DN lines was checked on 22nd

August 2014 and found that at GDR end

approach fish plate joints are not squared, 3m staggered for both LH & RH side, Gauge varies

from N to -10mm on the bridge proper on DN line, Rail fixing bolts/nuts are loose, Sleeper

numbers are not marked, Bridge approach on UP line (BZA end) needs immediate attention

i.e., packing required, On UP line, Gauge varies from +2mm to + 10mm and N to -10mm on

the bridge proper. At maximum locations gauge gauge variation of -5 to -10mm is noticed.

Rail fixing bolts are loose. Electromeric pads between channel sleepers bottom and girder

top are completely perished. On UP line, Guard rail is higher than running rail on span

no.16, 15 & 14 against not less than 25mm. Girder top flange – deep corrosion pits are seen.

Fish plate joints gaps are uneven.

c. During the safety audit inspection of NED station on 12th August 2014, it was noticed that

Point No.33A (trap), closure pieces need to be removed on both sides, At KM 348/9-8 bent

fish plate joint is provided to defective weld with two far end bolts are not removed & not

inspected, Point No.31B - all the chair plates are corroded, Point No.28B (1 in 8 ½)- ERC

greasing not done, Point No.26B- CMS crossing sleeper spacings to be attended, Platform

No.1, 2 & 3 - inadequate drainage.

3.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of S&T Department:

a. On 22nd

August 2014, it was noticed at Komarapudi station of BZA Division that on no. of

occasions the S-1 (Home Signal) route is not clearing after the arrival of full length trains. All

together 42 times since January 2014. SMs failed to record them as failures in the Signal

Failure Register which is in violation of COM/O/SC letter No T.411/P/1/Vol. VIII dated

01.5.2014.

b. It was also noticed at KMLP station on 22nd

August 2014 from the Relay Room Key Register

that It was written in the register that on 26th February 2014, at 14.50 hours, the BPAC between

KMLP – VRJN stations was made through (i.e., by-passed) as per the instructions of

JE/Signals/GDR.Disconnection Notice (T.351) was not given. Disconnecting or by-passing the

BPAC is in violation of Railway Board letter No. 2009/Safety (Signals)/26/2 dated 29.4.2010

which stipulate that ‘instances have come to the notice that where the BPACs cannot be

reset, the BPACs are by-passed from the block instruments to eliminate train passing on

PLCT which is a dangerous trend and needs to be curbed to ensure safety’.

c. Also noticed at this station that during the month of May 2014, the BPAC between KMLP-

VKT stations was reset for 21 times, SMs/KMLP failed to enter this failure in the S&T

Failure Register which is in violation of COM/SC letter No. T.411/P/1/Vol. VIII dated

01.5.2014

d. On 6th August 2014, during inspection of RC station of GTL Division, it was noticed that EOLB

provision for Traffic LC Gate No. 218 was commissioned from 5th

May 2014. Subsequent to

the commissioning, number of failures were recorded and the remarks passed by S&T Officials

was “due to public forcibly trying to lift the lifting barrier, the signals are flying back”.

Division shall plan for an alternate arrangement to ensure that the signals are not flowing back,

especially on the face of an approaching train which is unsafe. Interesting fact is that this LC

Gate is closed permanently for road traffic and barricading was done in view of RUB work

with effect from 1st August 2014. But SM/RC was advised to intimate particulars of trains

with the Gateman and one Gateman in shifts is also posted to work at this LC Gate. Closure

of LC Gate is also proved in taking ‘off’ signals.

e. During the safety audit inspection of NED station on 12th August 2014, it was noticed that Point

No.23 connecting Road No.1 to Goods Siding was disconnected from 27.7.2012 and further

not connected / no work is in progress / no fresh proposals. Division to check and rectify.

f. Also noticed that cable meggering of NED station was done on 30-01-2013 and is overdue from

January 2014.

g. On 15th July 2014, it was noticed at Pingli station of NED Division that the BPACs between PIZ

– PBN and PIZ – MQL stations were disconnected with effect from 26.1.2014 and 01.02.2014

respectively which is in violation of Railway Board guidelines.

4.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Mechanical Department:

a. On 6th August 2014, it was noticed at RC station of GTL Division that Daily testing of BA

equipment not done from 31.7.14 to 5.8.14. b. During the safety audit inspection of NED station on 12

th August 2014, it was noticed that 8

Shunters are shuttling from PAU to work at NED. Their headquarters can be shifted

from PAU to NED. c. Lie-over loco (Golden Hour Concept) is not kept on ARMV/PAU as notice on the day of

safety audit inspection on 12th August 2014. Last mock drill was conducted on 22.07.2014

and the timings recorded in the Log book of MRV reveal that time of order – 05:10 A.M.

Departure from station -06:10 A.M (turn out time – 60 minutes against stipulated time of

20 minutes).

d. RB Failures:

5.0 Irregularities noticed in the working of Electrical Department:

a. On 22nd

August 2014, it was noticed at Komarapudi (KMLP) station of BZA Division that

VCD for locos i.e. 23844+23362/WAG 5A/BSL shed was tested and found that VCD lamp

was glowing and buzzer sound also came, but B.P. pressure was not discharged .Checked and

found that I.P. valve C.O.C. was in ‘closed’ condition. After opening the I.P. valve C.O.C,

activated VCD, B.P. pressure was discharged. Similar situation was found in Train No.

BOXN with locos 27329+28013/WAG-7/KZJ which was regulated on DN loop line. This is

very serious.

b. On 5th August 2014, it was noticed at HYB station of SC Division that majority of pit

lighting and catwalk lighting is not functioning making it more unsafe for night primary

maintenance of rakes for long distance express trains such as A.P. Express. 69 lights out of

143 on Pitline No.10, 8 out of 64 in Pitline No. 8 were not glowing.

Cat-walk lighting between line no. 7-8 (91lights out of 96), between line No. 8-9 (65 lights

out of 96) and between line No. 9-10 (51lights out of 75) are not glowing.

c. Pit line no.2 of NED station – inadequate drainage. Cat walk lights In pit line No-1, out of

104 lights, 28 lights not glowing. In pit line No-2, out of 146 lights, 30 lights not glowing.

d. As many as 46 cases of RB failures (BZA-19, SC-16, GTL-7, NED-2 & HYB-2) were

noticed by field staff when trains were passing through stations and during rolling

‘in’/’out’ examination time from 1st April 2014 to 31

st August 2014 which is a cause of

concern.

6.0 Other General Irregularities noticed:

a. Efficacy of detonators was tested by keeping 5 detonators at KMLP station on 22nd

August

2014 under the wheels of wagons and found that only one exploded. It was also noticed that

the detonators given as personal equipment to train crew and station were having irregularities

in the form of expired detonators, label of the tin display one date of manufacture and inside

the tin the detonators are of different year.

****

Man of the month Awardees (March / April / May 2014) Sri. Emanual, Dy.SS/MQR Sri. Mantu Kumar, Pointsman Sri. A. Kiran Kumar, Pointsman

Sri. A. K. Haldar, Dy.SS Sri. K. Viswanath, DY.SS/MMPL Sri. G. Damodaram, LP/Goods/RU

Sri. M. Kumaraswamy, Guard/KZJ Sri. P. Rama Sekhar, Dy.SS/VNM Sri. R. K. Prajapathi, ALP/RU

Sri. M. Kumaraswamy, Dy.SS Sri. C. Hanumanthu, Keyman Sri. S. Prakash, LP/Mail/SBC

Sri. Subhod Yadav, Dy.SS Sri. Rambhupal Naidu, Guard Sri. Prasad, Gateman

Sri. N. Rama Rao, LP/SC Sri. Suresh Harijan, Keyman Prakash Singh, Goods LP/AWB

Sri. S. Ravikanth, LP/SC Sri. Chiranjeevaiah, SMR/MYL Sri. V. Srinivasu, LP/Goods/PAU

Sri. Y. N. K. Rao, LP/SC Sri. Xavier Prasad, SMR/GY Sri. Bajrang, Trolleyman

Sri. R. K. Viswakarma, ALP Sri. V. Laxman Rao, LP Sri. Chandu Kondiba, Trolleyman

Sri. Atul Bhattacharya, LP/SC Sri. K. Venkateswara Rao, Dy.SS/KQA Sri. B. Srinivasa Rao, Pointsman

Sri. Shamshad Alam, ALP/SC Sri. R. Adinarayana, LP Sri. P. S. V. Ramudu,

Sr.PWS/BTTR

Sri. R. L. M. Raju, LP/SC Sri. Anjaneyulu, Keyman Sri. A. Antony, YPA/BTTR

Sri. S. K. Yadav, ALP/SC Sri. B. M. Basha, LP/NRE Sri. D. Mohana Rao, SS/BVRM

Sri. T. Venu Kumar, Dy.SS Sri. P. Nagaraju, Pointsman/KPU Sri. Ram Khiladi Meena,

Tech.I/BZA

Sri. Kamal Saheb, Trackman Sri. M. Dhanashekar, LP/BTTR Sri. D. Nigam Babu, Tech.

III/BZA

Sri. M.Krishtaiah, Keyman Sri. K. Umaruddin, Guard/NRE Sri. K. Srinivasa Rao,

LP/Goods/BZA

Sri. D. Venkatakrishna, LP/Goods/RU Sri. Santosh kumar, Dy.SS/VP Sri. A. Bal Krishna, ALP/BZA

Sri. Pappanna, Keyman Sri. P. H. Trivikraman, SM/ASP Sri. M. Murli, Gateman/DWP

Sri. Prakash Thoman, Gateman Sri. S. K. Mishra, Dy.SS/HDD Sri. Manasa Ranjan, ESM/NDD

Sri. M. Sudhakar, LP/Goods/RU Sri. ARL Reddy, LP/Goods/DMM Kumari P. Priyadarshini,

APM/MAG

Sri. D. Rambabu, SM/SF Sri. K. Sudhan Raju, LRASM/RJP Sri. S. Ramanjaneyulu, YPC

INSPECTING OFFICIALS – Ensure schedule of inspections are

completed.

LP / ALPs – Do observe the permanent and temporary speed

restrictions scrupulously. Guard of trains also to ensure this.

CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER

HEADQUARTERS SAFETY

ORGANISATION

OPERATING STAFF – Do observe for any unusual in the run

through train while exchanging ‘all-right’ signals

LPs & LP/Shunters – After cranking the dead loco, check the

brake power of the loco before taking movement.

south central railway bi-monthly headquarters...

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