south korea’s shift in defense posture and its effect on northeast asian security balance

7/30/2019 South Koreas Shift in Defense Posture and Its Effect on Northeast Asian Security Balance

1/28

Kim, Soo Min

1

South Koreas Shift in Defense Posture and Its Effect on Northeast Asian Security

Balance

GOVT 451-01: Conflict in Asia

11.20.2012

Kim, Soo Min

Source: Caters News Agency, Row after row of F-16 Fighting Falcons fills the airstrip in a

show of force at Kunsan Air Base, South Korea.


2/28

Kim, Soo Min

2

On March 26, 2010 around 21:20 local time1, South Korean government was

in a state of unexpected emergency. It was reported that the ROK Navy ship Cheonan

experienced an explosion and was rapidly sinking with military. Security-weary Seoul

was then once again faced with the first artillery strike on Southern soil since the

Korean War on November 10th when North Korean forces decided to shell

Yeonpyeong Island, which is about 7 miles within the DPRK mainland2 (see Figure

1), in response to the ROKs regular military drills nearby. These two pivotal events

that left a reminding mark on the Korean peninsulas state of security have

consequently caused South Korea to take a number of sharp turns in terms of its

defense posture.

Figure 1: Area map of NLL, Yeonpyeong Island, and Cheonan sinking

Source: BBC News Asia-Pacific, North Korean Artillery hits North Korean Island, November 23,

2010

Although South Koreas Lee administration ordered an immediate response in

regards to the attack by firing back 80 rounds with K9 self-propelled howitzers3, with

each shell having a relatively superior killing range of 50 square meters 4, the

retaliation was not without restraint and hardly full-scale. UN Secretary-General Ban

1Certo, Peter, Greg Chaffin, and Hye-Eun Kim. "The Cheonan Incident: Skepticism Abounds." Foreign

Policy in Focus, 15 2011. Web. Web. 16 Nov. 2012.

.2

"Tensions high as North, South Korea trade shelling."Associated Press 24 11 2010, n. pag. Web. 16

Nov. 2012. .3

Kim, Hyung-jin, and Kwang-tae Kim. "Korea Attack: Yeonpyeong Island Shelled by North Korea."AP/

The Huffington Post[Incheon] 23 11 2010, n. pag. Web. 14 Nov. 2012.4

"K9 155mm self-propelled howitzer." Globalsecurity.org. N.p.. Web. 16 Nov 2012.

.


3/28

Kim, Soo Min

3

Ki-moon has called North Koreas artillery attack as one of the gravest incidents

since the end of the Korean War, and that any differences should be resolved by

peaceful means and dialogue. 5 Though immense retaliation by the Lee

administration was withheld, the two incidents served as a great breach of South

Korean security and conveyed a sense of threat that could easily escalate into a war.

Following these incidents in 2010, the ROK has taken multiple steps to strength its

security measures, especially in terms of defense and readiness against possible North

Korean provocations in the future. South Korea has reached a mutual agreement with

its long-time ally, the United States, which decided to fully transfer wartime

operational control (OPCON/ Strategic Alliance 2015) to Seoul in December 2015 6.

The ROK also disclosed its new missile guidelines under which it will extend

the range of ballistic missiles to 800 km with 500 kg payload, and the payload of

unmanned aerial vehicles from 500 kg to 2,500 kg7. The ROK Defense Ministry also

announced 73 short-, mid-, and long-term military reform goals of the new DR 307

plan to be carried out during 2011 to 20308. All of such changes and transformations

point in one directionSouth Korea is tangibly and symbolically obtaining a more

independent grasp of its military forces and capacity, in addition to security measures.

Because South Korea is moving in a direction in which it now has more independent

means and options with which it can proceed with decreased involvement of the U.S.

intermediary to deter the DPRK in its provocations, the ROKs more self-sufficient

defense posture will not only enable fast-paced response to lower-level aggressive

actions by North Korea but also incentivize other Northeast Asian states to strive to

prevent further escalation of tensions.

How South and North Korea Came to be

The security of South Korea had never been an autonomous matter since the

5"As it happened: Korean artillery clash." BBC News n.d., BBC News Asia-Pacific n. pag. Web. 16 Nov.

2012.


4/28

Kim, Soo Min

4

end of World War II. The United States and the Soviet Union each sought trusteeship

in the Korean Peninsula following the Japanese signal for surrender in 1945, and the

two major powers rather hastily proposed a North-South division of Korea along the

38th parallel of latitude, thus the United States taking control in the South and the

USSR of the North9. The joint occupation, in hindsight, served to be the initial phase

of division between South and North Korea, as the Korean War from 1950 to 1953,

after a series tug and pull between two forces that were each supported by the U.S.

against the USSR and China, ultimately resulted in final separation along the 38 th

parallel.

Source: The Christian Science Monitor, North Korean soldiers look at the southern side

as South Korean soldiers stand guard at the Panmunjom (DMZ) that separates the two Koreas.

In 1953 the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed between then and now

communist-occupied North Korea and U.S.-backed South Korea, both states agreeing

to a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a

final peace settlement is achieved.10 The 1953 agreement, in addition to creating the

Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)11, a 2.5 mile-wide high-security buffer zone

between their borders, also resulted in six decades of separation and hostilities until

9Robinson, Michael E. Korea's Twentieth-Century Odyssey:A Short History. Honolulu: University of

Hawai'i Press, 2007. Print. 10710

United States. National Archives. Document for July 27th: Armistice Agreement for the Restoration

of the South Korean State. Washington, DC: , 1953. Web. .11

Havenly, Joe. "Korea's DMZ: 'Scariest place on Earth'."CNN World27 Aug 2003, n. pag. Web. 16 Nov.

2012. .


5/28

Kim, Soo Min

5

today. In 1953, the U.S.-R.O.K. Mutual Defense Treaty was signed, under which the

United States agreed to help South Korea defend itself against external aggression; to

help maintain this security assurance, the U.S. has placed its military personnel and

troops in the South, establishing a Combined Forces Command (CFC) in 1978 to

coordinate efforts with over 680,000 men South Korean armed forces.12

In 1979, South Korea and the U.S. reached an agreement that limited the

ROKs missile capabilities to 180 km (112 mile) range, later revised in 2001 to 300

km, and 500 kg payload13. In 2001, South Korea also joined the Missile Technology

Control Regime (MTCR), voluntarily binding itself to control the export of ballistic

missiles and its components capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction

(WMD). As the MTCR allows cooperation among member countries in terms of

missile transfers which is done as they assume responsibility for taking all steps

necessary to ensure that the item is put only to its stated end-use,14 the U.S. in

October 2012 has decided to permit South Korea in more than doubling the range of

its ballistic missiles, from 300 km to 800 km, to counter increasing security threats

from North Korea. Furthermore, the modified agreement increases the payload the

ballistic missiles can carry to 500 kg and that of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or

drones, to 2,500 kg from the previous 500 kg.15

Since the division between North and South Korea in 1953, security matters

have always been a thin ice to walk on. Aggressive North under a totalitarian dynastic

dictatorship of the Kim family has been maintained since 1953, at first with the

assistance of China and the USSR, but by the end of the Cold War, China remaining

its only ally in Northeast Asia. In contrast to South Korea, which at first suffered

under economic stagnation and political struggles, North Korea enjoyed relative

12"Background Note: South Korea." Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. U.S. Department of

State, 12 2012. Web. 16 Nov 2012. .13

Klingner, Bruce. "U.S. Should Allow South Korea to Extend Its Missile Range."Asia and the Pacific.

The Heritage Foundation, 23 2012. Web. 16 Nov 2012.

.14

"Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers."Missile Technology Control Regime. N.p.. Web.

16 Nov 2012. .15

Snyder, Scott. "South Koreas New Missile Guidelines and North Koreas Response." Asia Unbound.

Council on Foreign Relations, 9 2012. Web. Web. 16 Nov. 2012.

.


6/28

Kim, Soo Min

6

prosperity even until the 1970sm when it began to feel the social and economic

limitations of Stalinist communist doctrine. Always having been a highly militarized

state, reflecting the remnants of the Korean War, North Korea has implemented a

strategy called songun, which means military-first. Undersongun doctrine, North

Koreans are expected to trust that the military is equipped with the resources,

knowledge, and skills necessary to solve such problems encountered in peoples daily

lives.16 Thus the principle enforces the idea that without the military, people cannot

sustain their existence, because it is integral for their fundamental survival.

With such serious degree of economic decline, the utmost national priority for

North Korea has become its regime survival17, and with its counterpart South Korea

becoming one of the most economically successful states with its remarkable size, the

DPRK had resorted to various means of hostile military actions to threaten the ROK

and make demands; taking an absolute anti-American stance, North Korea has made

harsh condemnations of the South for its alliance, which it saw as shameful, with the

United States. Thus, whereas the ROK has received considerable US support in many

aspects but especially security since the Korean War armistice was signed, North

Korea has been left as rather helpless, aside from Chinas seemingly occasional verbal

defense, leading the Kim regime to decide that strengthening of its armed forces is the

most effective means for its regime survival.

Future Plans for South Korean Defense Posture

Two North Korean attacks in March and November of 2010 may appear as

rather puzzling, for its intentions can only be assumed, but they were certainly

aggravating enough that Seoul took an increasingly defensive posture and that when

the civilian-inhabited island, Yeonpyeong, was shelled, Seoul placed its military on its

highest non-wartime alert, returning fire and sending off F-16 fighters18

in response.

Although South Korea considered military actions against the North to be its last

16Park, Han S. "Korea Economic Institute." Korea Economic Institute. 2.7 (2007): n. page. Web. 16 Nov.

2012. .17

Hodge, Homer T. "US Army War College Quarterly." US Army War College Quarterly. 23.1 (2003):

68-81. Web. 16 Nov. 2012.

.18

Snyder, Scott. "North Korea's Escalating Aggression."Asia Unbound. Council on Foreign Relations,

Nov 23 2010. Web. 16 Nov. 2012. .


7/28

Kim, Soo Min

7

option, considering the high probability of small skirmishes rapidly escalating in

tension, it has been growing more alert in regards to its security and preparation for

potential attacks by the DPRK. In 2005, South Korea launched Defense Reform Plan

2020 (DRP 2020), a comprehensive reform strategy that called for transformation of

its military into a smaller but more capable force by reducing its overall manpower by

25% from 681,000 to 500,000 while compensating for the decrease in number of

troops by acquiring advanced fighter and surveillance aircraft, naval reforms, and

ground combat vehicles.19 Such drastic reduction in the ROK armed forces accurately

reflected the pre-2010 South Korean view of the security condition in the Korean

Peninsula; President Roh in 2005 urged for less militarized society, reducing both the

conscript period from 26 months to 18 months and the size of South Korea armed

forces, all of which stemmed from his rather generous evaluation of substantial

security threats posed by North Korea. Moreover, Roh had expected Pyongyang to

relax its military forces and measures in exchange for his obvious effort to improve

inter-Korean relations, but North Korea did not reciprocate his gestures and instead

chose to maintain its conventional military forces while expanding its asymmetric

force capabilities.

Unfortunately, the DRP 2020 had to be revised in 2009 due to budget

shortfalls and realistic concerns about whether the reduced manpower would be

sufficient for South Koreas defense in preparation for the transfer of OPCON from

the U.S. in 2015, postponing the endpoint of the reform plan to 2025. According to

the Korean National Statistical Office, 20-year-old men from 1977 to 2003 numbered

more than 400,000, which was adequate to maintain active-duty military population,

yet starting in 2008, the number of 20-year-old men is predicted to decline, as low as

308,00020

in 2020. (See Figure 221

) In addition, the DRP 2020 required a 15-year

budget of approximately $505 billion on the premise that the annual military budget

would increase from 2006 to 2010 by 9.9%. Yet by 2009, the reform plan was already

suffering from about $34 billion shortfall and the South Korean Ministry of Defense

19 Klinger, South Korea Taking the Right Steps Toward Defense Reform. 2

20Bennett, Bruce W. "A Brief Analysis of the Republic of Korea's Defense Reform Plan." Occasional

Paper Series. RAND Corporation, 2006. Web. 17 Nov. 2012..21 Bennett, 3


8/28

Kim, Soo Min

8

had to scramble to find ways to savage at least some parts of this faltering plan.

Figure 2: The Number of 20-Year-Old ROK Men

It is difficult to assume the degree seriousness underlying realistic

implementation of the original DRP 2020, but the plan certainly contained a number

of flawed presumptions that failed to take into account the decline in manpower

resulting in insufficient number of men that can be called for active-duty and severe

budget deficit onset as early as 2009. The DRP 2020 may have appeared to be an

innovative plan created accordingly with the less alarmed South Korean Ministry of

National Defense (MND), but an objective and professional evaluation is not

completely favorable of the MNDs planning: It clearly reflects very deep thinking

about how to improve ROK military capabilities [But] quite a number of risks to

the DRP could cause it to fail and perhaps jeopardize ROK security.22

After two provocations by North Korea, however, in March 2011, South

Korean Defense Ministry announced a list of 73 military reform objectives of the new

DR 307 plan to be executed from 2011 to 2030. Although DR 307 can be perceived as

an updated replacement for DRP 2020, it can also be recognized as a statement in

response to North Koreas unprovoked attacks, as it accurately reflected the South

Korean public opinion at the time. People were no longer sympathetic to North Korea

and viewed their unwarranted attacks as immediate potential for another civil war:

DPRK hostilities in 2010 have also pushed ROK leaders to amend their reform plans

to pursue a more aggressive strategy to guard against future DPRK hostilities.23

22Bennett, 40

23 Cordesman, Anthony H., Andrew Gagel, Varun Vira, Alex Wilner, and Robert Hammond. The Korean


9/28

Kim, Soo Min

9

In the process of shifts and changes, complete enforcement of DR 307 would

bring about comprehensive reformations within South Korean military command, unit,

troop, and force structures. The MND hopes to create an efficient military command

system to take the initiative in war planning, prepare for theater operations after

wartime OPCON transition, and construct a new combined defense system for U.S.-

ROK combined operations24. Under DR 307, the MND plans to reduce the number of

units but advance combat capabilities of combat troops organizations, and reform

troop structure by shifting the military command toward a technology-intensive

format supported by officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) to compensate

for the lack of skilled soldiers. Perhaps the most notable anticipated change to be

facilitated by DR 307 is the improved military service jointnessin terms of

interoperability and combat effectiveness of South Korean armed forces, to be done

by reorganizing the top military command structure and more thoroughly

incorporating different service branches. Thus the reform plan, undeniably driven by

North Korean provocations in 2010, considers enhanced collaboration among ROK

military branches to be one of utmost priorities, as President Lee Myung Bak and the

ROK military have been scrutinized and condemned for what the public in the

aftermath of North Korean attacks saw as faulty military preparation and delayed

counterattack25 stemming from fragmented communication and lack of readiness in

terms of coordination.

Such attempts to improve jointness among military branches can also be

recognized as an increased focus on successfully facilitating OPCON in 2015, when

the Combined Forces Command (CFC) will cease to exist. Because the OPCON

transition was mapped out with South Korea taking the lead in defense against North

Korea and other operations, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) will take charge in

war fighting, and the U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM)26 will serve as supporting

Military Balance: Comparative Korean Forces and the Forces of Key Neighboring States. Washington,

DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2011. Print.24

Klingner, Bruce. "South Korea: Taking the Right Steps Toward Defense Reform. 5-625

Manyin, Mark E., Emma Chanlett-Avery, and Mary Bet Nikitin. United States. Congressional

Research Service. U.S.-South Korea Relations. Washington, DC: , 2011. Web.

.26

O, Tara. "Center for U.S.-Korea Policy: A Project of the Asia Foundation." Center for U.S.-Korea Policy:

AProject of the Asia Foundation. 2.9 (2010): Print.


10/28

Kim, Soo Min

10

command while the current U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) terminates.

OPCON, which is a legacy of American involvement in South Korean affairs since

the 1950-1953 Korean War, enforced that South Korean soldiers serve under the

command of U.S. forces should a war break out in the peninsula. As DRP 2020 was

modified to satisfy a more realistic and functional reform measures, the OPCON

transition must also be appropriately implemented, offering sustained degree of unity

of command that U.S.-ROK CFC has provided. Though it may appear as if the U.S. is

surrendering its active involvement in South Korea, a Military Cooperation Center

will be launched to plan military operations, joint military exercises, logistics support

and intelligence exchanges, and assist in the operation of the communication,

command, control, and computer systems.27 The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan

(OPCON), if carried out properly and efficiently carried out, should be able to reach

its objectives of upgrading South Korean defense capabilities, improving USFK,

enhancing South Korean command and control systems, and better preparing military

exercises to counter North Koreas new asymmetrical challenges with unprecedented

degree of independence from the United States.

Source: Council of Foreign RelationsAsia Unbound

, Obama in SeoulAnother milestone agreement recently reached is the U.S. agreement to new

missile guidelines for South Korea. South and North Koreas capitals, Seoul and

Pyongyang, respectively, suffer from the tyranny of proximity,28 which is that

27Manyin, Mark E., Emma Chanlett-Avery, and Mary Bet Nikitin. 21

28Loeb, Vernon, and Peter Slevin. "Overcoming North Korea's 'Tyranny of Proximit'y: Military Planners

Say a U.S. Victory Would Come at Great Human Cost, Especially to South Korea." Washington Post20

Jan 2003, A16. Web. 17 Nov. 2012. .


11/28

Kim, Soo Min

11

North Korean artillery systems and rocket launchers capable of wreaking havoc on the

South Korean capital is less than 40 miles away. The Korean Peninsula itself is of

limited distance, in width and length, and its division in half has resulted in proximity

that has left the North and South too close for comfort. South Koreas extension of its

missile range always being a precarious matter to discuss, the United States had

sought to primarily limit the range to 300km; while Seoul had served as Washingtons

pivotal linchpin in Northeast Asia, the U.S. also did not wish to wield its power so as

to disturb major regional powers, such as Japan but especially China. Prior to South

Koreas new missile guidelines (NMG), it has been, an open secret that the U.S. had

been reluctantout of concern for a negative effect on its nonproliferation

campaign.29 Yet under the newly reached guidelines, South Koreas ballistic missiles

are now able to cover not only all of the North Korean regions but as far as Beijing

and parts of Japan. (SeeFigure 330)

Figure 3: South Koreas new missile range with the revised missile pact of 2012

The primary reason for which the missile pact was revised in accordance to

South Koreas demand was to deter armed provocations from North Korea; South

29Lee, Chi-dong. "White House says S. Korea's improved missile capability to target only N.

Korea." Yonhap News Agency[Washington, DC] 08 Oct 2012, n. pag. Web. 17 Nov. 2012.

.30

Song, Sang-ho. "U.S. agrees to extend Seouls ballistic missile range: reports." Korea Herald23 Sept

2012, n. pag. Web. 17 Nov. 2012.

.


12/28

Kim, Soo Min

12

Korean national security adviser Chun Yung-Woo had explained, If North Korea is to

attack or provoke, we are able to incapacitate its nuclear and missile (capabilities) in

the early stage. 31 Such U.S. decision to accommodate to Seouls demand is rather

surprising as it can be negatively perceived as dangerous by many; though the

Chinese government withheld from making any public statements in regard to the new

pact, Chinas state news agency, Xinhua, carried an article saying the Seoul-

Washington move runs counter to a global arms control agreement known as the

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 32 Critics of the new guidelines

express concerns that the agreement will undermine the credibility of the MTCR and

the DPRK may exploit this event to justify its further provocations, potentially

leading to long-range ballistic missile tests or a third nuclear weapon test later on. But

after the Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong Island shelling incidents took place within

the same year with only a few months in between, the NMG is being widely

welcomed by South Koreans. Kim Tae-woo, a top security and defense expert in

South Korea, who also heads the Korea Institute for National Unification, indicated

that the gap in asymmetrical warfare capabilities between the North and South has

dangerously widened as the Kim regime has relentlessly sought to expand its nuclear

and missile programs33, thus Seoul can finally use the NMG to leverage its intention

to strike back North Korea in reaction to any future provocations. The DPRK, as

anticipated, reacted with a rather repetitive reminder that it has missiles that can reach

the United States, the strike zone including not only the bases of the puppet forces

and the U.S. imperialist aggression forces bases in the inviolable land of Korea, but

also Japan, Guam and the U.S. mainland.34 (SeeFigure 435)

31 Yan, Holly. "North Korea says it has missiles that can reach the United States." CNN 09 Oct 2012, U.S.

n. pag. Web. 17 Nov. 2012. .32

Lee, Chi-dong. "White House says S. Korea's improved missile capability to target only N.

Korea." Yonhap News Agency[Washington, DC] 08 Oct 2012, n. pag. Web. 17 Nov. 2012.33

"S.Korea's New missile guideline big step forward in deterring NK: analysts." Yonhap News

Agency[Seoul] 07 Oct 2012, n. pag. Web. 17 Nov. 2012.

.34

Yan, Holly. "North Korea says it has missiles that can reach the United States." CNN 09 Oct 2012, U.S.

n. pag. Web. 17 Nov. 2012. .35

"North Korea warns US on missiles after South deal." BBC News 09 Oct 2012, Asia n. pag. Web. 17

Nov. 2012. .


13/28

Kim, Soo Min

13

Figure 4: North Korean missile rangesmaximum estimated/ calculated

The ROK and U.S. have become accustomed to North Koreas such rhetoric,

after multiple times at which the DPRK threatened to turn Souths presidential office

or Seoul into a sea of fire.36 And in fact, North Korean regime is deploying the

same old tactics of verbal intimidation and threats when, the matter of fact is that its

missiles have been capable of reaching Hawaii and Alaska for quite some time.37

The DPRKs Kim regime had undermined its credibility of nuclear development when

it launched a satellite, undoubtedly a disguise for a long-range ballistic missile38 in

April of 2012. Assessing North Koreas harsh condemnation of the NMG and

disapproval of Seoul-Washington alliance, one could easily predict another

provocation in the near future, but also a hint of North Koreas anxiety: In sum, the

550 km and 1,000 kg numbers will be heard loud and clear in Pyongyang. 39

36CNN Wire Staff, . "North Korea threatens 'a sea of fire' upon South Korea." CNN 24 Nov 2011, U.S. n.

pag. Web. 17 Nov. 2012. .37

Bendikova, Michaela. "South Korea Missile Range Extension: A Good Step Toward Security." The

Foundry. The Heritage Foundation, 11 2012. Web. Web. 18 Nov. 2012.

.38

Grant, Stan. "North Korea prepares controversial rocket launch." CNN [Tongchang-ri, North Korea]

09 April 2012, U.S. n. pag. Web. 18 Nov. 2012. .39

Pinkston, Daniel. "The New South Korean Missile Guidelines and Future Prospects for Regional

Stability." Strong & Prosperous. International Crisis Group, 25 2012. Web. Web. 18 Nov. 2012.

.


14/28

Kim, Soo Min

14

Although some South Koreans still remain discontented with the NMG,

claiming that U.S. imposing of missile restraint is a violation of their national

sovereignty, the ROK government and military officials are satisfied with what they

are viewing as a major breakthrough in terms of gaining more self-sufficient means to

defend itself. Daniel Pinkston, a North East Asia Program deputy project director at

the International Crisis Group states:

Ballistic missiles are attractive to ROK defense planners because it is

virtually impossible for the DPRK to intercept them. Geography has

determined that once launched from ROK territory, they would strike targets

in the DPRK within 3-5 minutes. Some strategists believe this capability

gives Seoul the option of making limited precision strikes in remote rear areas

of the DPRK before Pyongyang could react, which is probably truesome

analysts argue that the window of opportunity for DPRK preemption would

not exist with a ballistic missile option.40

North Korea also possesses 700 Scud short-range tactical ballistic missiles that can hit

South Korea; the Scud missile, in addition to having conventional explosive warhead,

also could carry chemical or biological warfare agents. A possible scenario offered by

Bruce Klingner of the Heritage Foundation is as follows: Pyongyang could utilize

Scud missiles to fire non-persistent chemicals at frontline units and persistent

chemical agents against rear logistical and resupply targets, such as Busan Harbor.41

Having already committed two uncalled-for acts of war against South Korea in 2010,

no one can say with certainty that such a scenario is only hypothetical and may not

happen at the most unexpected time and occasion. After all, North Korea has a better

record on implementation of threats than negotiated commitments42, though it too

frequently resorts to bluffing tactics and flamboyantly critical rhetoric to escalate the

tensions and verbally demonstrate its unswerving intention to use all means for

40 Pinkston, Daniel. The New South Korean Missile Guidelines and Future Prospects for Regional

Stability.41

Klingner, Bruce. "U.S. Should Allow South Korea to Extend Its Missile Range." Asia and the Pacific.

The Heritage Foundation, 23 2012. Web. 16 Nov 2012.

.42

Snyder, Scott A. "Precarious Balancing Act on the Korean Peninsula."Asia Unbound. Council on

Foreign Relations, 20 2010. Web. 18 Nov. 2012. .


15/28

Kim, Soo Min

15

protection.

But the NMG may only be one of numerous transformations contributing to

South Koreas more self-sufficient defense posture to be further established. The U.S.

transfer of operational control (OPCON) of the ROK military scheduled to finalize in

2015 is one of the reasons for which the Obama administration had decided to allow

missile range extension, despite some openly recognizing it as a violation of the

MTCR and others seeing it as potentially threatening regional stability. In addition to

South Koreas shift towards taking a more self-sufficient defense posture and

obtaining appropriate means for independent deterrence through execution of DR 307,

DRP 2020 (postponed to 2025), and OPCON transfer, the NMG is significant in that it

may possibly, though conjectured with limited faith, convey a more convincing

message to the DPRK to return to arms control negotiation process. Signifying U.S.

public endorsement in allowing of South Korea to take independent actions to a

certain degree with measures such as the extended missile range pact, not only North

Korea but also China will certainly feel uncomfortable, to say the least, especially

because parts of its territory such as Beijing can be reached within 800 km. In fact,

South Koreas enhanced ballistic missile capabilities can be recognized as an intended

warning to North Korea and also U.S. attempt to check China s regional power and

occasional abuse of its rising regional hegemon status in supporting North Korea

during times of heightened hostilities.

Although with the modified NMG and extended missile range, the probability

of miscalculation of the other sides expected reaction and thus performing not the

most rational response still exists, the knowledge of South Koreas possession and

deployment of 800 km range ballistic missiles, to be ready in 2017, can act as the

deterrent factor in inter-Korean relationship. The extended missile range can be

recognized as a destabilization factor in that in reaction to South Koreas new missile

guidelines being announced, North Korea will be tempted to express its discontent by

executing another nuclear test or demonstrating missile capabilities43, a potential

scenario that could unfold with rapidity and lead to an arms race, especially as South

Korea have obtained independent means for taking a self-sufficient defense posture.

43Pinkston, Daniel. "The New South Korean Missile Guidelines and Future Prospects for Regional

Stability."


16/28

Kim, Soo Min

16

North Korea is rather notorious for its spontaneous test launching of ballistic missiles

and other weaponry but having failed four satellite launches already, with the most

recent acknowledgement of a letdown and consequent humiliation in April 2012 (See

Figure 544) that was undoubtedly followed by immense financial cost, not to mention

the loss of face on the international stage, even a state known for great dedication to

missile development will not want to initiate or get involved in an arms raceand

neither will any other state in Northeast Asia. Such assumption may lead to a positive

scenario in which China feels pressured enough to restrain North Koreas spontaneous

and unprovoked actions in the future for the sake of regional stability, thus South

Koreas acquiring of extended missile range itself exerting influence as a deterrent

factor.

Figure 5: Process of North Koreas April 2012 Failed Satellite Launch

It is a well-proven fact learned from trial and error that North Korea and its

aggression will not be thwarted simply by diplomatic efforts; South Korea should

abandon its spineless attitude in terms of their security system that is more focused on

44Moon, Gwang-lip. "North fires rocket but it explodes right after lift-off." Korea Joongang Daily14

April 2012, n. pag. Web. 19 Nov. 2012.

.


17/28

Kim, Soo Min

17

defending itself when encountered with threats, and take a stronger stance and the

initiative in pursuing offensive-intensive posture, as it did by extending its ballistic

missile range. As the ROK shifts toward more self-sufficient defense posture, South

Korean leaders should also not be fearful that deploying a missile defense system or

even criticizing North Korea over its military provocationswould anger Pyongyang,

lead to a collapse of the inter-Korean engagement policy.45 After all, Seouls

voluntary self-restriction certainly did not prevent North Korea from developing

missiles that can cover all of South Korea46 and neither would Pyongyang have not

exploited the fact that with the ballistic missile range of 300 km, prior to the modified

guidelines, the only way for South Korean forces to reach North Korean targets in the

rear areas would have been to play them along the DMZ, well within range of North

Koreas artillery.

Current Northeast Asian Balance

Although it is difficult to make precisely accurate evaluation of any aspects

pertaining to North Korean defense budget due to the DPRKs extreme reluctance to

reveal any information, and when it does, the data may have been tampered with,

Janes has made an insightful analysis on the DPRK military expenditure, drawn from

ROK sources; Korea Institute of Defense Analyses (KIDA) has stated that the

DPRKs defense budget reached nearly USD 9 billion in 2009, 15 times more than the

official amount declared by Pyongyang, which had announced a USD 570 million

defense budget, but when calculated on an exchange rate based on Purchasing Power

Parity (PPP) terms, the accurate estimate is around USD 8.77 billionan increase in

defense budget in contrast to seriously deteriorating North Korean economy47. The

U.S. Department of State also confirmed that North Koreas defense spending

exceeded 22% based on its estimate that the DPRKs GDP in 2009 was 40 billion

determined by PPP. In contrast, the ROKs military spending was US $27.1 billion,

45Klingner, Bruce. "The Case for Comprehensive Missile Defense in Asi." Backgrounder. The Heritage

Foundation, 07 2011. Web. 19 Nov. 2012. .46

Klingner, Brce. "Dont Skimp on South Korean Missile Range." The Foundry. The Heritage

Foundation, 05 2012. Web. 19 Nov. 2012. .47

Cordesman, Anthony H., Andrew Gagel, Varun Vira, Alex Wilner, and Robert Hammond. The Korean

Military Balance: Comparative Korean Forces and the Forces of Key Neighboring States . Washington,

DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2011. Print. 1


18/28

Kim, Soo Min

18

2.8 % of its GDP; despite the sheer economic strength discrepancies between two

states, it is worth noting that North Korea devotes a prominent amount of its GDP for

military efforts in terms of percentageembodying the ideals ofsongun. The CIA

estimates that the population of DPRK amounts to 22.7 million while the ROKs

population is 48.6 million thus more than 2.1 times that of North Korea; the DPRK

has 6.1 million males eligible for military service and 885,000 young men entering

military age per year while the ROK has 13.3 million eligible males and 371,000

entering military age.48 In comparing South and North Korean circumstances, it is

numerically and statistically shown that the ROK exceeds DPRK in every aspect of

resources to use in supporting its national security structure, and the overall trends are

likely to remain to favorable for South Korea.49

Source: San Francisco Gate, ROK Special Army soldiers demonstrate their martial arts skills

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies The Military

Balance 2011, in terms of Northeast Asian military manpower50, China holds the

greatest number in all three categories: air force, navy, and army. North Korea takes

the second place in the size of air force and army, and the only branch in which South

Korea exceeds the DPRK is the air force. Both states in the Korean Peninsula have

greater men power in three branches than Japan. The DPRK clearly devotes a

disproportionate amount of its GDP to military expenditures, but given the economic

48Cordesman, Anthony H., Andrew Gagel, Varun Vira, Alex Wilner, and Robert Hammond. The Korean

Military Balance: Comparative Korean Forces and the Forces of Key Neighboring States . 449

Ibid.,450

Cordesman, Anthony H., and Robert Hammond. The Military Balance in Asia: 1990-2011.

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2011. Web.

. 41


19/28

Kim, Soo Min

19

crisis that has plagued North Korea for such a protracted period of time, it cannot help

but fall behind other Northeast Asian states in not only conventional forces but also in

modernization.

In fact, one of growing concerns is that North Korea has relentlessly sought

an asymmetric strategy to enhance its long-range strike capability against civilian

and military targets to compensate for declining conventional capabilities.51 An

increasing propensity to obtain self-propelled artillery, multiple rocket launchers,

ballistic missiles in addition to the intensive attention being given to the DPRK

Special Forces that is in charge of infiltrating the ROK rear, are all part of the DPRKs

attempt to make up for the retrogression in modernization. It can be noted from

Figure 652 that from 2000 to 2011, the air force division implemented a drastic

increase in SAMs (Surface-to-Air Missiles). South Korea, on the other hand, directed

more attention towards taking over areas previously monitored by US forces, such as

surveillance, reconnaissance, and early warning: In 2005 the ROK Ministry of

Defense released The Defense Reform 2020 Initiative, which outlined ROK

strategy to create a slimmer and more self-reliant military focused on technological

improvements.53 As can be noted from Figure 754, to achieve the goal to become a

blue-water navy by 2020, the ROK Navy has increasingly deployed indigenous

destroyers, the total number increasing from 6 to 10; a decrease in total naval aviation

was compensated by doubling the ASW (anti-submarine warfare) with expected

gradual increase.

51Ibid., 11

52Cordesman, Anthony H., Andrew Gagel, Varun Vira, Alex Wilner, and Robert Hammond. The Korean

Military Balance: Comparative Korean Forces and the Forces of Key Neighboring States. 1153

Ibid., 1254 Ibid., 12-13


20/28

Kim, Soo Min

20

Source: The Christian Science Monitor, The South Korean navy destroyer Chungmugong

Yisunshin

With rising degree of threat and provocations from the North, South Korean

leaders, especially after the sinking ofCheonan, decided to increase militarization in

the Yellow Sea and ASW helicopters. The ROK army decided to reduce the

magnitude of the proposed troop cut to maintain army man power at 517,000 instead

of 500,000. In the wake of November 2010 Yeonpyeong artillery attack, South Korea

expedited parts of its modernization plan by proceeding with the purchase of fifth

generation stealth fighters to be completed by 2015.

Figure 6: Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea Military Modernization Trend, 2000-2011

Figure 7: Republic of Korea Military Modernization Trend, 2000-2011


21/28

Kim, Soo Min

21

The idea of evaluating the conventional balance between two Koreas is

difficult in that multiple factors such as asymmetric, nuclear forces, and the possible

involvement of the U.S. and Japanese forces in support of South Korea and Chinas

defense of its buffer state North Korea would all have to be taken into consideration

for an accurate judgment of how a conflict might unfold. Yet, it is worth noting that


22/28

Kim, Soo Min

22

while the DPRK exceeds the ROK often in quantities and size of its conventional

forces, North Korea may face serious limits on conventional capabilities and qualities

of its largely outdated equipments. With some speculations from experts and reports

that the DPRKs level of economic crisis is far more severe than assumed that it even

lacks the national fuel stocks to carry out a major conventional offensive in 2011 55,

North Koreas superiority in total active and reserve manpower is no longer an

appropriate measure for its force strength. In fact, South Korea has superior air-craft

capability, naval surface vessel fleet strength and capability, smaller holdings of

SAMs but more modern and capable systems, although simultaneously it should not

be neglected either that the DPRK has a major lead in amphibious vessels, potential

mine layers, smaller surface vessels useful in asymmetric warfare, conventional

submarines, and perhaps most importantly, the will power to take advantage of any

means available against the Souththus all the more important are elements such as

U.S., Japan, and China involvement, and asymmetric warfare capabilities.

Having weathered through both ups and downs over 60 years, the U.S. has

had legal obligation to Seoul under UN Security Council Resolutions passed in 1950

and considers South Korea to be one of its closest allies in Northeast Asia. The U.S.

national military strategy for 2011 states: We expect to maintain a strong military

presence in Northeast Asia for decades. The Republic of Korea has proven a steadfast

ally supporting US security efforts around the world; our commitment to the Republic

of Korea is unwavering as North Korea remains a provocative threat to regional

stability.56 In fact, U.S. assistance and show of support were immediate after the

sinking of the Cheonan on March 2010 and artillery shelling of Yeonyeong on the

following November. Because Japan has been drifting away in terms of its alliance

with the U.S. because of internal domestic struggles and upheavals, South Korea in

the past few years have reinforced its role as the strongest ally in Northeast Asia for

Washington; with South Korea becoming one of the fastest growing and economically

advanced states in the global community today, it can be assumed with high certainty

that should a conflict break out between the DPRK and ROK, the United States would

use all means necessary to aid South Korea not only to preserve peace in the

55Ibid., 19

56 Ibid., 67


23/28

Kim, Soo Min

23

Peninsula but also to restore stability within Northeast Asia.

Asias security structure is growing complex with formal and informal

multilateral relationships and ties that in a hypothetical conflict in the Korean

Peninsula, Japan and China would inevitably have to take a stance in the scenario,

although outside powers would initially work to deter both states from an entering

into a phase of escalated conventional conflict. If such efforts fail, China would most

likely support the DPRK, a state that has functioned as its buffer state since the end of

the Korean War and was once perceived as its satellite state while Japan would have

to decide whether to support U.S. basing and staging into Korea, also considered

likely though the degree of involvement uncertain. North Korea poses security threats

to Japan as well, that as early as 1998, the North unsuccessfully launched a rocket

called the Taepodongthat flew over Japan then fell into the Pacific57.

If the level of conventional conflict heightens and there is to be any major

DPRK success on the groundwould almost certainly lead the U.S. to escalate its

forces and to expand its range of targets in the DPRKSimilarly, any ROK success

that threatened the existence of the DPRKwould confront China with the risk of

losing a key buffer statethus choose to intervene to ensure that ROK and US forces

did not occupy part of the DPRK.58

Northeast Asian Economic Interdependence and the Significance of

South Koreas Self-Reliant Defense Posture

Apart from the current intricate web of alliances and tension in Northeast

Asian region, objective comparison and data analysis indicate that the ROK is far

more advantageous in terms of armed capabilities. But the involvement of China and

often frustrating protection it offers to North Korea, and also moments in which it

remains silent to any provocations by the DPRK to the South, are major impediments

in sending and enforcing a stronger warning to Pyongyang. Even though the ROK has

a population more than 2.1 times that of the DPRK and an economy nearly 37 times

that of the North, South Koreans can never quite forget about perpetual North Korea

57Choe, Sang-Hun. "North Korea Says Its Missiles Can Reach U.S. Mainland." New York Times [Seoul]

09 Oct 2012, n. pag. Web. 20 Nov. 2012. .58

Cordesman, Anthony H., Andrew Gagel, Varun Vira, Alex Wilner, and Robert Hammond. The Korean

Military Balance: Comparative Korean Forces and the Forces of Key Neighboring States . 21


24/28

Kim, Soo Min

24

threats embedded in their lives; both the torpedo attack on the Cheonan that led to 46

lost lives and artillery shelling on a civilian-inhabited island of Yeonyeong that

resulted in 4 deaths including those of civilians, after all, was seen as stemming out of

nowhere in such an unforeseen manner. But with all discrepancies in ideologies aside,

the United States and South Korea are one of its best exports trading partners, the U.S.

at 17.1% and South Korea at 4.4%59 of its share; although it is an extreme case, if

Seoul-Washington were to enforce economic sanctions against Beijing in urging

China to undermine its support for Pyongyang, Chinese economy would have to

endure a significant blow. In fact, in addition to military capabilities, it is the

economic interdependence that often functions as the most efficient diplomatic tool;

and China being North Koreas principal trading partner and source of financial aid,

Pyongyang cannot afford to ever lose China as an ally. If the initial phase in which

major Northeast Asian states and the United States cannot reach an agreement to

reduce the tension and hostilities continue to escalate, internal instability within North

Korea could offset a massive influx of refugees and defectors into China through its

northeastern border, a scenario that China had always been concerned about. Thus

escalation and irresolvable degree of tension is the least favorable and desired that is

to be avoided in all cases.

A commonly held belief among Koreans is that the North and South, though

it may take many more decades, are two states of one nation and will eventually be

unified. Yet North Koreas anachronistic regime is disproportionately based on its

military capabilities, even which is tenuously supported by largely outdated

conventional weapons and massive manpower that relies on asymmetric warfare and

most importantly, weapons of mass destruction. Two provocations in 2010 initiated by

North Korea, the sinking of the ROK navy ship Cheonan and artillery shelling of a

civilian-inhabited island Yeonpyeong in the Yellow Sea, had functioned as a catalyst

in shifting South Koreas defense posture to a considerable degree. Some efforts by

South Korean leaders were made prior to the 2010 incidents, calling for a more self-

reliant defense posture to maintain readiness in countering North Korea s spontaneous

unprovoked hostilities but the process was accelerated with extensive momentum

59 The CIA World Factbook. Washington D.C.: The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2012. Web.

.


25/28

Kim, Soo Min

25

after the attacks. Although postponed by a few years, the United States had decided to

close down the CFC (Combined Forces Command) that had been in existence since

the end of the Korean War and transfer wartime operational control (OPCON)

completely to South Korea by 2015; this agreement certainly does not signify an end

or a decline of the U.S.-ROK alliance but rather its growth and fortification. In 2011,

the South Korean Ministry of National Defense had also announced a list of short,

mid, and long term military reform objectives to be met by 2025, in reaction to the

ROKs waning tolerance with North Koreas unjustifiable attacks, marking the

beginning of a renewed self-sufficient defense posture and also its willingness to take

offensive actions. Most notable shift was the Seoul-Washington agreement to extend

South Koreas ballistic missile range to 800 km, more than twice its previous range of

300 km, and increases the payload the ballistic missiles can carry to 500 kg and that

of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones, to 2,500 kg from the previous 500 kg.

All of these changes in a comprehensive sense indicate a change in security climate of

the Korean Peninsula, especially as South Korea is pursuing more independent means

to prepare to counter future North Korean provocations. An observation of military

expenditures, economic strength, military equipment modernization, conventional

military balance, and the potential involvement of other influential states such as

Japan and China in inter-Korean issues demonstrate that South Koreas increasingly

self-sufficient defense posture and appropriate means to maintain such attitude in

addition to its augmented scope of security decision making against North Korea, and

the complex web of economic interdependence and sheer potential of a conflict within

the Peninsula sprawling into a larger scale warfare, it is likely that Northeast Asian

states will work to avoid rapid escalation of tensions in the initial phase of hostilities,

thus contributing to preserve regional balance of security.


26/28

Kim, Soo Min

26

Source bibliography

"As it happened: Korean artillery clash."BBC News n.d., BBC News Asia-Pacific Web. 16 Nov.2012.


27/28

Kim, Soo Min

27

Klingner, Brce. "Dont Skimp on South Korean Missile Range." The Foundry. The HeritageFoundation, 05 2012. Web. 19 Nov. 2012. .

Klingner, Bruce. "South Korea: Taking the Right Steps Toward Defense Reform. Backgrounder

Published by The Heritage Foundation. 2618 (2011): Print..

Klingner, Bruce. "The Case for Comprehensive Missile Defense in Asia."Backgrounder. The HeritageFoundation, 07 2011. Web. 19 Nov. 2012. .

Klingner, Bruce. "U.S. Should Allow South Korea to Extend Its Missile Range." Asia and the Pacific.The Heritage Foundation, 23 2012. Web. 16 Nov 2012..

K9 155mm self-propelled howitzer." Globalsecurity.org. Web. 16 Nov 2012..

Lee, Chi-dong. "White House says S. Korea's improved missile capability to target only N.Korea." Yonhap News Agency [Washington, DC] 08 Oct 2012, n. pag. Web. 17 Nov. 2012..

Loeb, Vernon, and Peter Slevin. "Overcoming North Korea's 'Tyranny of Proximit'y: Military PlannersSay a U.S. Victory Would Come at Great Human Cost, Especially to South Korea." Washington Post20Jan 2003, A16. Web. 17 Nov. 2012. .

Manyin, Mark E., Emma Chanlett-Avery, and Mary Bet Nikitin. United States. Congressional ResearchService. U.S.-South Korea Relations. Washington, DC: , 2011. Web..

Moon, Gwang-lip. "North fires rocket but it explodes right after lift-off." Korea Joongang Daily 14April 2012, Web. 19 Nov. 2012.."North Korea warns US on missiles after South deal."BBC News 09 Oct 2012, Asia n. pag. Web. 17

Nov. 2012. .

O, Tara. "Center for U.S.-Korea Policy: A Project of the Asia Foundation." Center for U.S.-KoreaPolicy: A Project of the Asia Foundation. 2.9 (2010): Print.

Park, Han S. "Korea Economic Institute." Korea Economic Institute. 2.7 (2007): n. page. Web. 16 Nov.2012. .

Pinkston, Daniel. "The New South Korean Missile Guidelines and Future Prospects for RegionalStability." Strong & Prosperous. International Crisis Group, 25 2012. Web. 14 Nov. 2012..

Robinson, Michael E.Korea's Twentieth-Century Odyssey:A Short History. Honolulu: University ofHawai'i Press, 2007. Print. 107
http://koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2951443&cloc=joongangdaily|home|tophttp://koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2951443&cloc=joongangdaily|home|tophttp://koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2951443&cloc=joongangdaily|home|tophttp://koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2951443&cloc=joongangdaily|home|tophttp://koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2951443&cloc=joongangdaily|home|top


28/28

Kim, Soo Min

28

"S.Korea's New missile guideline big step forward in deterring NK: analysts." Yonhap NewsAgency[Seoul] 07 Oct 2012, Web. 17 Nov. 2012..

Snyder, Scott. "North Korea's Escalating Aggression."Asia Unbound. Council on Foreign Relations,Nov 23 2010. Web. 16 Nov. 2012. .

Snyder, Scott. "Precarious Balancing Act on the Korean Peninsula."Asia Unbound. Council on ForeignRelations, 20 2010. Web. 18 Nov. 2012. .

Snyder, Scott. "South Koreas New Missile Guidelines and North Koreas Response." Asia Unbound.Council on Foreign Relations, 9 2012. Web. Web. 16 Nov. 2012..

Song, Sang-ho. "U.S. agrees to extend Seouls ballistic missile range: reports." Korea Herald23 Sept2012, n. pag. Web. 17 Nov. 2012..

"Tensions high as North, South Korea trade shelling."Associated Press 24 11 2010, n. pag. Web. 16Nov. 2012. .

United States. National Archives.Document for July 27th: Armistice Agreement for the Restoration ofthe South Korean State. Washington, DC: , 1953. Web. .

Yan, Holly. "North Korea says it has missiles that can reach the United States." CNN09 Oct 2012, U.S.n. pag. Web. 17 Nov. 2012. .

south korea’s shift in defense posture and its effect on northeast asian security balance

Documents