soviet air confrontations with pakistan air force during soviet afghan war

8/10/2019 Soviet Air Confrontations With Pakistan Air Force During Soviet Afghan War.

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1 Soviet Air confrontations with Pakistan Air Force during Soviet-

Afghan War.

In late December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. In the context of the ColdWar, this move initially caused a considerable surprise and excitement in the West, as it

was seen as an indirect threat for the situation in the Persian Gulf, especially after the US

lost their most important ally in the area, the Shah of Iran, which was overthrown in

February of the same year. Immediately afterward, however, except for diplomatic

protests, no direct actions were undertaken by Western powers against the Soviet Union,

and it was on the Afghan people to organize a resistance against the aggressor. Initially,

Pakistani military was very concerned about the Soviet move, but subsequent analysis ofthe deployments of the Soviet forces showed, that there was no imminent threat to

Pakistan. Instead, for the first years of the war in Afghanistan, Soviets were

predominantly engaged in establishing bases and keeping urban areas under control.


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Afghan War.

A total of four units of the V-VS (Voenoe Vazdushny Sily - Air Force), one each equipped

with MiG-21s and Mi-24s, as well as two with Mi-8s, were put under direct command of

the 40th Soviet Army (HQ at Termez, in Turkmenistan Soviet Republic). Their pilots

havent got a permission even to close less than 15 km to the Pakistani border. Instead,

Soviets in Afghanistan were initially concerned by a possible Iranian intervention and

this was also a reason for them deploying strong air defence units in the area. However,

after establishing their positions, they placed their forces in defensive and offered the

rebels lots of time and a brilliant chance to start a serious insurgency.

Very soon, it became clear to Pakistan, that there was no conventional military threat for

them from the USSR and that they could organize support for Mujaheddin without any

fear of serious repercussions. Dozens of DRAAF and Soviet An-24s, An-26s, and An-32s

flew every day over the dangerous skies of Afghanistan. Their supply-flights were

instrumental for the survival of several government garrisons around the country. From

late 1986 they started to suffer heavily from the FIM-92A Stingers delivered to the

Mujaheddin from the USA via Pakistan. From early 1981 onward, however, the number of

flying units detached to the 40th Soviet Army was increased, and their aircraft and

helicopters started patrolling along - or even behind - Pakistani borders.

Initially, reconnaissance operations were flown, but very soon first attacks against camps

for Afghani refugees on Pakistani soil were undertaken, as these were places where

Mujaheddin used to pull back for rest and training, and where Pakistani military services

recruited fighters for the war in Afghanistan. Immediately, Pakistan turned to the USA

with a request for better equipment, including new aircraft (foremost A-7 Corsair), SAMs,

radars, as well as items for ECM and ELINT. Pentagon responded by an offer for F-5E Tiger

II and A-10A Thunderbolt II, but this was turned down, as the Pakistanis felt, that suchlow technology was not enough for them to counter the threat. At the time, namely, the

PAF was equipped foremost with Chinese and French types, such like the simple F-6

interceptors and Mirage III/5s, and neither the F-5E nor A-10A could offer any significant

increase in its capabilities.


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Afghan War.

By late 1981, the situation changed in so far, that the Pakistani military services were

directly involved in organizing, supporting and managing the Afghan Mujaheddin, and

subsequently the USA decided to join this effort more intensively as well. Initially, the US

offered support in arms and supplies for Mujaheddin, but very fast, but, after aircraft of

the V-VS started to operate over the Pakistani border more aggressively, a decision has

been brought, to re-supply the PAF with F-16s.

In December 1981, a letter of agreement between Pakistan and the USA was signed,

preparing the way for the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) purchasing 40 F-16 Fighting Falcon

fighters. The USA offered 32 F-16As and eight F-16Bs, but the Pakistanis then changed

the order to 28 F-16As and 12 F-16Bs (all to Block 15 standard), as the PAF was concerned

about the possible needs to conduct all of its training for the type at home in the future.

By October 1982, first two F-16As and four F-16Bs were ready for delivery to their new

owners, while the first group of Pakistani pilots was finishing its training with the 421st

TFS, at Hill AFB, in Utah. The jets were flown to MacDill AFB, Florida and then over

Atlantic, via Azores to Dhahran, in Saudi Arabia. There, American pilots were replaced by

Pakistani, which delivered them to Pakistan.

First Careful Engagements

While the acquisition of new aircraft was underway, the PAF and the Pakistani Army

were already engaged organizing their positions along the Afghani border, which was a

particularly problematic task, considering the rugged terrain and problematic

movements of units and supplies.

It took some time until proper sites were selected and a satisfactory net of radar

stations as well as detection and observation posts, needed for gaining a better controlof the airspace, was established. Finally, two early warning radar stations, #4084 and

#4102, were posted at Landikotal and Aravali, additional, belonging to the 483

Squadron, were deployed in the area between Swat and Miranshah, together with

several mobile low-level radars and units of mobile observers.


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Afghan War.

These stations, together with two radars, positioned near Machlak and Khojal, were not

only to monitor movements of Soviet and Afghani aircraft, but also to guide PAF

interceptors, forward deployed at Peshawar and Samungli air bases. The Peshawar AB

initially housed F-6s of the 15th Squadron, which were deployed there already in late

1979. During the following years, both units flew numerous - but not very intensive -

CAPs. However, as at the time the PAF still have had problems with detecting and

following Soviet and Afghani aircraft (but also because most incursions into the Pakistani

airspace went deeper than two or three kilometers, while the Pakistani high command

was very careful not to provoke Soviets).

They operated under very stringent rules of engagement. According to Pakistani reports

between 1981 and 1986 PAF pilots never got a permission to engage or fire at intruders,

but only to escort them out of the Pakistani airspace. Actually, in most cases, PAF F-6s

hardly even came close to their opponents: namely, although having a fair thrust to

weight ratio and being more maneuverable, F-6s were slower than most of the types

they encountered. Nonetheless, on 1 March 1980, two F-6s intercepted a Russian Il-76

and escorted it back into Afghani airspace. The 15th Squadron was soon followed by the

23rd Sqn, which was initially based at Samungli. In May 1983, the 23rd Sqn was replaced

by 17th Sqn, and in October 1984 the 26th Squadron arrived, also equipped with F-6s. By

that time, the PAF control of the airspace was much better, but the Soviets and Afghanis

were also much more aggressive, and numerous confrontations - albeit without any

firings - followed.

All these units simultaneously provided also detachments to Minhas/Kamra AB, but the

situation still remained so, that the PAF higher command was reluctant to permit its

units to engage either Soviet or Afghani aircraft. Due to the problems with detection andearly warning over such rugged terrain as along the border with Afghanistan, at the

time, the PAF was not able even to timely intercept DRAAF aircraft, flown to Pakistan by

defecting Afghani pilots.


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Afghan War.

In such cases, like on 20 November 1983, when a DRAAF Su-22 crash-landed at Dal

Bandin AB, or on 25 March 1984, when one MiG-17 crash-landed at Mushcab AB, or on 16

July 1984, when an Afghani crew landed their Mi-25 behind the Pakistani border, near

Miranshah, PAF interceptors were nowhere nearby. A PAF F-16A 84711 during a break

between two sorties: this highly agile fighter proved superior to anything the V-VS and

the DRAAF flew at the time. The aggressive PAF pilots, however, sometimes went too far,

and in one of their interceptions of Soviet MiG-23s ended with an errant Sidewinder fired

by the Pakistani flight-leader ended up the tail-pipe of his wingman.

The Arrival of Mirages and F-16s

The situation changed during November 1985 considerably, as - meanwhile - the war in

Afghanistan reached its peak with several Soviet offensives, in which Soviet and Afghan

units tried to destroy rebels in the Paktia province. These operations were heavily

supported by tactical aircraft, and Mujaheddin came under severe pressure, losing one

position and base after the other. Even an intervention of the Pakistani Army, which

deployed a small unit armed with Blowpipe MANPADs couldnt help the situation, as

Blowpipes showed very problematic to operate under given circumstances. During only

one engagement, at least a dozen of them were fired without a single hit, and several

Pakistani officers were injured in the Soviet counterattack. The V-VS and the DRAAF also

suffered considerable losses, as no less but 15 aircraft and helicopters were claimed shot

down by Mujaheddin in two days of fighting in early November, and four helicopters on

13 November. Even such experienced fliers, like Col. Leonid Fursin, Commander of the

190. IAP (equipped with MiG-21s) was shot down during this period. Nonetheless, after

destroying the system of rebel bases along the Pakistani border, Soviets started a series

of attacks in the area adjacent to Miranshah, Parachinar and Peshawar, and increasedthe number of attacks against camps inside Pakistan. Until that time, the PAF actually

operated according to peacetime air identification/engagement procedures, its aircraft

always remaining within the Pakistani airspace, and having an order to first identify any

foreign aircraft inside the Pakistani airspace, and then ask for permission to engage.


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Afghan War.

Such requests would then go up the chain of command, over the Sector Commander, the

Northern Air Command PAF, to the Deputy Chief of Air Staff. Of course, due to this

procedure, lots of precious time was lost, and no successful engagements of Soviet or

Afghani aircraft were possible. Operating under such conditions was both frustrating and

problematic for Pakistani pilots and officers, especially as the number of Soviet and

Afghani incursions into the Pakistani airspace increased, while there was a considerable

public pressure to do something against this. Finally, the situation deteriorated to the

point, where the PAF was compelled to deploy Mirages to Kamra, and F-16s to Samungli

and Peshawar, in February 1986, and to adapt its RoEs in so far, that they now permitted

more freedom of operation for both the tactical operators at local GCI-stations, as well as

for pilots. Soon, numerous serious incidents were to follow.

Before either Mirages or F-16s could arrive, however, the F-6s continued to carry the

brunt of CAPs, and on 11 February 1986, they had their first serious engagement. Two F-

6s, flown by Flt.Lt. Anwar Hussain and Flg.Off. Amjad Bashir were on a CAP, when the GCI

advised them of two contacts NE of Parachinar. Hussain and Bashir were vectored in the

area, and they soon detected four MiG-23s. Closing at a speed of Mach 1, two F-6s were

swiftly positioned right behind Soviet aircraft which turned around and re-entered the

Afghani airspace. The GCI advised Hussain and Bashir to turn around as well, but the

leader of the formation ignored the order to continue the pursuit until a moment when

four additional MiG-23s appeared. Both F-6s immediately turned around, and returned to

their base at high speed and low level.

This short engagement certainly hasnt had any effects on the Soviets, then on 19 March

1986, several waves of Afghan Su-22s, escorted by MiG-23MLDs of the 120. IAP bombedPakistani border posts. These attacks were a prelude for the next offensive of Soviet and

troops of the Afghan Army, initiated on 2 April, the target of which were rebel supply

bases around Tani and Zhawar. By the 10 April 1986, Soviets and Afghanis reached Tani,

and subsequently Su-24s and Su-25s flew a series of strikes using laser-guided bombs.


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Afghan War.

Mujaheddin were forced to organize a frontal defence and fight under circumstances for

which they lacked the training and firepower. Regardless of these developments, the PAF

was still held back, and the next serious engagement followed only on 12 April 1986,

when three F-6s, flown by Gr.Capt. Shahid Kamal, Sqn.Ldr. Rahat Mujeeb and Sqn.Ldr.

Khalid Chaudry were vectored to intercept two contacts in the Parachinar area.

Gr.Capt. Kamal successfully closed into the range of his AIM-9P missiles and fired one

Sidewinder, but no hit was observed. Meanwhile, both the targets and the whole

Pakistani formation turned around towards west, and the GCI advised the pilots, that the

enemy still hasnt noticed them. Thus, Kamal closed again and fired another Sidewinder,

which missed again. The lead handed over to Sqn.Ldr. Chaudry, which identified the

targets as two Su-25s and fired one AIM-9P. The missile initially guided perfectly, but

then turned into the sun and missed. Subsequent reconstruction of the engagement

showed, that Grp.Cpt. Kamal fired, Both of his missiles outside the envelope for targets

which were flying away from him.

Air Battles with Bounded Hands

By early 1986 the engagements between Pakistani, Soviet and Afghani aircraft clearly

showed, that the F-6s of the PAF were outclassed by most modern Soviet types.

Consequently, during the spring 1986, Mirages of the 5th and the 18th Squadrons,

stationed at Kamra, took over. Not much about operations undertaken by these units is

known, but, according to press reports from that time, they scored their first kill - one

MiG-21 of the DRAAF - on 16 April 1986, followed by another MiG-21 on 10 May. The PAF

never confirmed any of these claims. Considering the circumstances at the time, it is

possible that these engagements have happened, but, that - due to RoEs, influenced by

the politics - the PAF was not ready to confirm kills of aircraft whose wreckage fell insideAfghanistan. The - probably - third engagement of Pakistani Mirages happened on 14

May 1986, around 11:00AM, when At 11:00AM of 14 May 1986, Sqn.Ldr. Rao Qamar

Suleman and Flt.Lt. Nawaz of the 18th Sqn were on a CAP SE of Parachinar, when the GCI

vectored them towards several slow flying targets closing at the border.


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Afghan War.

Closing at high speed, both Mirage pilots experienced a dilemma of many fast-jet fliers

when confronting heavily armed but slow attack helicopters. Turning several times

around their targets, Suleman finally acquired a lock on and attacked from a distance of

1.4 kilometers, pressing the trigger at a distance of 900 meters. Th e guns didnt fire, and

Suleman made place for this wingman. Nawaz also tried to open fire from a distance of

800 to 900 meters, but his guns wouldnt fire either, thus, both Mirages returned straight

to their base. Subsequent inspection showed that the gun circuit breaker of Suleman s

aircraft popped out because of short-cut in the gun pack, while his wingman forgot to

remove the gun trigger latch before firing. Technical problems and inexperience of

Pakistani pilots thus deprived them of scoring two kills. By that time, after intensive

training and preparations, two units of the PAF became operational with the F-16s.

The elite 9th Squadron, lead by Wg.Cdr. Abdul Razzak, had 16 pilots and was to take a

burden of operations, flying over 2.200 sorties during the following four years. From

time to time, also the PAF F-16 OCU, the 11th Squadron, was to deploy to the area and

start combat air patrols if needed. The reports about engagements undertaken by this

unit are different, however: some say, that the unit had several engagements, but none

of these were successful, because of the lack of proficiency with the newly acquired AIM-

9L all-aspect Sidewinders. There are other reports, however, indicating that the pilots of

the 11th Sqn also scored at least one kill. The third unit, the 14 Squadron, lead by

Wg.Cdr. Amjad Javed, was to deploy to Kamra in September 1986, and fly over 1.800

sorties by 1989. Under conditions of such intensive operations like in early 1986, and

because of laxed RoEs, it took not long until the F-16s scored their first kill. In early May

1986, the aircraft of the V-VS and the DRAAF flew a series of strikes against the

Mujaheddin bases in the Panjshir Valley, and on the early morning of 17 May also camps

inside Pakistan were bombed. Shortly after the first strike, however, two F-16As, flownby Sqn.Ldr. Hameed Qadri and Sqn.Ldr. Mohammed Yousaf, reached their CAP-station

over Parachinar, when the GCI advised them of two aircraft nearing that area at over 500

knots and already almost ten kilometers inside the Pakistani airspace.


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Afghan War.

While closing to engage, Pakistani pilots made several radar sweeps in order to assure,

that no other Soviet or Afghani aircraft were nearby, then prepared their missiles and

attacked. Closing to a distance of six miles, Qadri achieved a lock-on on one of the

opponents, and immediately got a signal, that the missile tracked. Shortly afterwards, he

fired one Sidewinder, which missed. Passing by the enemies, both F-16s initiated a hard

180 turn and engaged again: I watched my No. 2 cross to my right side and called a

visual as well as tally. I called 'engaged' and quickly locked on one of the Sukhois. I got

all parameters right on one of them, uncaged the missile seeker head and fired my

second AIM-9L missile.

With the plume of fire and smoke, the missile from my right rail raced in a wide

semicircle to the right. Taking tremendous lead, it soon reversed towards the target in a

series of corrections and exploded on impact with the turning Su- 22. Qadri then looked

back to clear his tail, while continuing to keep the second aircraft in his sight and asking

his wingman to keep h is tail clear: I fumbled with my switchology while attempting to

select AIM-9L on Stores Management System and HOTAS.

The silhouette of the first aircraft was visible. The other aircraft was in a left turn. His

radius of turn and my energy state gave me enough confidence that I could easily

achieve kill parameters both with missile and guns. During the turn, I found myself

hitting the fringes of AIM-9P missile. I pulled a high yo-yo as I was in a totally offensive

position. My target was now in a nose-down and heading towards Afghan territory.

After apexing, I quickly rolled back and fired a three-second burst on the exiting Su-22. I

stopped firing when a trail of smoke and flash from his aircraft confirmed a lethal kill.

Through a split 'S', I headed east of Parachinar. For his successful engagement and

achievement Qadri was subsequently awarded the Sitara-i-Basalat. The Sovietssubsequently confirmed the loss of one of DRAAF Su-22M-3Ks, but their reaction was

swift, foremost because of concerns, that PAF F-16s could try to intercept some of Tu-16

bombers, which now regularly operated over NE Afghanistan and relatively close to

Pakistan.


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Afghan War.

All operations behind the Pakistani border were cancelled, while the 120. IAP, equipped

with 29 MiG-23MLDs (armed with R-24R as well as R-60M AAMs) and five MiG-23UBs was

deployed to Bagram AB, north of Kabul. While Soviet pilots were not permitted to engage

in any kind of air combats, except in self defence, the first encounter followed very soon.

On 19 June 1986, the 9th Squadron PAF was tasked to establish a CAP to NW of Zirat, in

the Quetta area and monitor enemy activity, but not to approach the border any closer

than approximately 50 kilometers. Two F-16As, flown by Sqn.Ldr. Hameed Qadri and

Sqn.Ldr. Yousaf, were on station for almost 40 minutes, when the GCI vectored them to

intercept two contacts inside the Pakistani airspace. The targets turned back, however,

and Qadri abandoned the attack, only to subsequently be vectored towards new

contacts. This time, the engagement was fast: Qadri successfully intercepted and entered

the envelope behind two Soviet MiG-23MLs. However, while closing, he was not able to

jettison his left drop tank due to a technical malfunction, which also prevented him to

fire any of his AAMs. Consequently, Qadri ordered Yousaf to engage and attack, but, as he

was outside the envelope, and both MiG-23s were now flying back into the Afghani

airspace, the attack was abandoned and both F-16s turned back to their base.

Lots of Claims no Explanations

For the rest of 1986, no additional air-to-air engagements were reported. Considering

the fact, that there was not much activity on the ground, as well as that the Mujaheddin

were now supplied with FIM-92A Stinger MANPADs, the V-FA and the DRAAF were at the

time rather engaged with the fighting inside Afghanistan. In October and November

1986, no less but 200 FIM-92A Stingers were deployed with Mujaheddin inside

Afghanistan, and the losses of the Soviet and Afghani air forces became almost

catastrophic. The 200. SchAE, equipped with Su-25s, for example, lost two pilots and fouraircraft within two days in the Khost area, a MiG-23MLD and an An-12B were shot down

on 19 November, and one of last remaining airworthy Il-28s of the DRAAF was also

downed on 29 November over Bagram.


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Afghan War.

Effectively, I had no more than a 1.5 second firing window available. Everything worked

as advertised and with a press of the button, the missile was on its way. As I was

breaking off, I saw the missile impact the target. My wingman also released another

missile, which also impacted the target. The enemy aircraft crashed on snow-clad

mountains below. According to Russian sources, all 39 people aboard the An -26 were

killed. Hardly two weeks later, after several engagements without any fighting, the next

short air battle followed. On early morning of 16 April 1987, two F-16As of the 14th

Squadron, flown by Sqn.Ldr. Badar-us-Islam and Sqn.Ldr. Khalid Pervaiz Marwat were on

a CAP near Thal. Several minutes after they reached the station, the GCI reported enemy

aircraft inside the Pakistani airspace, and pilots were vectored to intercept. Coming out

of the sun and at a high speed, Badar acquired the opponents - several Su-22s of the

DRAAF -visually from a distance of seven miles and attacked: Although faster, we were

also climbing and had to chase the targets for a little while before they came into missile

range. During the chase, I asked my wingman to keep an eye on the other two aircraft

we had previously seen.

The moment I got the missile reticle, I fired my first AIM-9L missile. It was a unique

experience. I had never fired a missile before. As the missile left the rail, it caused a slight

yaw. I kept looking at the missile in some awe, but then lost it and started to look

towards the target. In a couple of seconds, there was a big red flash around the aircraft

that I was targeting. It started to spiral towards the ground in a left-hand turn. I locked

on to the next aircraft and fired a second missile. The controller informed us that we

were getting close to the border and that we should break off and head back. As soon as

my second missile left the rail, I broke left and asked my wingman to do the same.

During the process I looked over the canopy railing and saw another big flash in the area

where my second target was. I dived down and headed towards Bannu and started tolook for my wingman and returned to base. In his post -mission report, Sqn.Ldr. Badar-

us-Islam claimed to have shot down two aircraft.


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Afghan War.

However, after examining all the evidence the PAF awarded him only one, possibly

because the second Sukhoi crashed behind the Pakistani border: the Afghanis later

confirmed, that their Lt.Col. Abdul Jameel successfully ejected and landed safely inside

Afghanistan, but said nothing about any other plane being lost on that day.

The Loss of a PAF F-16A

By that time, first small groups of Mujaheddin - organized by Pakistani military - were

operational inside the Soviet Union! Soviets clandestinely warned the Pakistani

government, not to go too far, and such operations were discontinued. The situation in

the air over the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, however, remained very

tense, especially as Pakistani pilots became bold and flew apparently deep inside

Afghanistan.

In April 1987, the Commander of the DRAAF, Lt.Gen. Abdul Kadir reported, that in the

same year, Pakistani fighters crossed no less but 30 times into Afghani airspace. Pakistan

denied these claims, but many reports confirmed them, especially the next engagement,

which happened on 29 April 1987. On that morning, four MiG-23MLDs of the 120. IAP,

lead by Lt.Col. Pochitalkin, were on a mission of mining pads used by Mujaheddin for

transporting supplies from Pakistan in the Djaware area, when two F-16As from the 9th

Sqn PAF intercepted them. The MiGs flew particularly high and fast and dropped their

CBUs from a shallow dive. According to Pakistani sources, while MiG-23s were dropping

their bombs the F-16s came closer and fired one Sidewinder. However, the whole MiG-23

formation subsequently did a post-strike turn and started to climb, and - according to

Pakistani sources - following this turn the #2 of the Pakistani formation, Flt.Lt. Shahid

Sikander, flew in front of his leader and directly in front of the AIM-9L which re-lockedand scored a direct hit. According to Russians, while turning his formation, Lt.Col.

Pochitalkin took a look around and saw an airplane in flames, falling towards the earth.

He called his comrades and all responded to be still underway and well.


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Afghan War.

Meanwhile, Flt.Lt. Shahid Sikander ejected relatively deep over Afghanistan, but landed

safely in the area controlled by Mujaheddin and was subsequently returned to Pakistan,

together with a wing of his F-16 and one Sidewinder, still attached to its rail. A pair of

PAF F-16As during the training flight (note blue-pained AIM-9L-training rounds). The

pride of the Pakistani Air Force, the F-16s proved invaluable during the operations over

the Afghani border: they were the only factor that prevented the Soviets and the

Afghanis from flying even more attacks against the targets inside Pakistan. According to

Russians, it is very likely that one of their pilots downed the F-16A in some sort of air

combat but never claimed it as such because combats with Pakistani aircraft were

prohibited.

The problem with this version is, that the MiG-23MLDs were not equipped with any air-

to-air missiles when flying such missions, and that in no Soviet, Russian, or Ukrainian

account of this battle is there any indication of the MiG-23-pilots having any clue - such

like RWR-indications - about the F-16s before they saw one of the PAF fighters going

down in flames. Other sources indicate, that the F- 16 flew into the cloud of cluster

bomb units dropped by MiGs, and hit some of the mines/bomblets dropped by MiG-23s.

The problem with this version would be, that CBUs are not deploying at the height at

which the F-16s operated at that moment, but only when coming much closer to the

ground. The fact remains, that this episode is definitely a pretty murky one: even

according to laxed PAF RoEs for that period of time, F-16s have not had anything to do

inside the Afghani airspace. Indeed, subsequently such flights were not permitted again.

But, the two F-16s were obviously there, and thus - despite several very authoritative

Pakistani sources claiming something else - the whole story indicates, that PAF

interceptors operated frequently and aggressively inside the Afghani airspace. Onequestion remains open: what should the #2 of the Pakistani formation do in front of his

leader (even if this happened during some maneuvering) which is "pad-locked" (i.e.

engaging enemy aircraft)? The PAF F-16s operated in "loose duce", so one had nothing to

search in front of the other.


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Afghan War.

It might have happened that the leader of the F-16-pair had some problems with his

equipment, thus he left his #2 go for an attack in front of him, then solved his problems,

locked on the wrong target and fired. Theoretically, this "version" might be confirmed by

press reports from that time, in which Pakistanis first denied any F-16 losses, but claimed

one kill against a MiG-23; then confirmed a loss, confirmed one kill and confirmed one

fratricide; while the final version is one fratricide, no MiG-23s shot down.

Although, according to unconfirmed reports, PAF F-16s have also shot down two

additional An-26s and four Mi-8 helicopters in the Khost area during the same month,

and their operations so far were very successful, subsequently, the Pakistani higher

command prohibited any further incursions into the Afghani airspace. Consequently,

after this loss, RoEs for engagements of Afghani and Soviet aircraft were again limited to

interceptions of only those aircraft, which operated deeper inside the Pakistani airspace.

Nonetheless, in August 1987, the Government of Afghanistan claimed, that Pakistani F-

16s had shot down another An-26s, this time one with civilians aboard, near Khost. Until

today, however, Pakistan never confirmed this claim, and it remains unknown if

anything similar happened. Anyway, much time was to pass until the next engagement

between Soviet or Afghani aircraft and Pakistani interceptors.

The Shadow-Boxing

By late 1987 the situation for Soviets in Afghanistan was detoriating rapidly. A large

number of FIM-92A Stingers available to Mujaheddin made the operations of the Soviet

air power a tricky and risky business, compelling its fliers to remain high, or operate by

night. Without efficient air power, and at the pace they lost aircraft to Stingers, however,

the Soviets could neither effectively control rural areas of Afghanistan, nor assureconstant flow of supplies to several isolated garrisons along the Pakistani border. As if

this was not enough, unrest spread in the DRAAF and a series of defections or direct

attacks against Afghani officials followed. On 3 October 1987, two Afghani crews flew

their Mi-4 helicopters to Pakistan and landed near Chihal.


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Afghan War.

Although both helicopters were returned to Afghanistan, their crews were granted

political asylum. Shortly after, one Su-22s of the DRAAF tried to bomb the Presidential

Palace in Kabul. As the MiG-23MLD interceptors of the 168. IAP, which reinforced the 120.

IAP in August 1987 (bringing the total of MiG-23MLDs stationed inside Afghanistan to 46)

and were also stationed at Bagram AB, were deemed not enough to stop any similar

attacks in the future, the V-VS was forced to deploy the 115th GvIAP, equipped with MiG-

29s, to Termez AB, in the then Soviet Republic of Turkmenistan, the sole task of which

was the air defence of the Afghani capital.

This measure proved effective: several weeks after MiG-29s arrived in the area of

operations, no less but four Su-22s flown by Afghani pilots tried to attack the residency

of the President of Afghanistan, but were intercepted by Soviet MiG-29s and all shot

down within minutes. When in late 1987 Mujaheddin put Khost under a siege, the V-VS

also deployed the 185. BAP, equipped with Tu-22M-3s to Marry-2 AB. Squadron-sized

formations of this regiment flew a series of attacks, dropping up to 200ts of bombs at

once at rebel position, and using even 3.000kg heavy FAB-3000 bombs.

Because the bombers operated continuously very close to the Pakistani border, four Tu-

22PDs of the 341.DBAP, usually based at Ozernoye, were deployed to Mary-2. Tu-22PDs

were equipped with powerful jamming equipment, which proved successful, as no

Pakistani interceptors were either encountered or even registered near the areas where

Tu-22s operated. By the spring of 1988, the situation in Afghanistan remained practically

the same: Khost was still under a siege, but the rebels were not capable of taking it, and

sporadic - but heavy - Soviet air raids continued, until the pull-out of Soviet forces was

initiated. The first garrison to go was that in Barikot, which was - on 23 April 1988 -

evacuated to Jalalabad. The Soviets hoped, that their retreat could be executed in wellorganized and peaceful manner. But, the rebels started a series of fierce attacks against

Jalalabad which only caused even more losses.


17/41


Afghan War.

During May, additional Soviet contingents pulled back from southern and south-western

Afghanistan, but, instead of going straight back home, a good part of them was now

engaged in new fighting in the Jaji area, where a sizable group of Mujaheddin became

active. On 24 June, a group of rebels executed a well organized attack against the Kabul

airfield, destroying eight Su-25s there, and in the following days, Bagram also came

under repeated rocket-fire. The Soviets, however, initiated a massive resupply operation

for the regime in Kabul, and hundreds of tons of weapons, ammunition and other items

were flown to Afghanistan during the following months. Also, from late July 1988, Soviet

aircraft also started a new series of raids against camps inside Pakistan. One of these

missions, however, ended in another catastrophe.

The Broken Wing

On the late afternoon of 4 August 1988, a section of Su-24s was underway to attack an

Afghan refugee camp near Miranshah. Half an hour before sunset however, they were

detected by Pakistani radars, and two F-16As of the 14th Squadron, flown by Sqn.Ldr.

Ather Bokhari (on F-16A 85-725) and Sqn.Ldr. Taufeeq Raja, were scrambled to intercept.

Reaching a position over Hangu the Pakistani pilots were advised that the enemy turned

back towards Afghanistan. Thus, the F-16s slowed down and started what seemed to be

another several-hours-long CAP during the early evening. Sqn.Ldr. Bokhari then

continued the story. I was vectored on a heading of 300 degrees, and the controller

reported the target 30 degree left, 15 NM. I turned left and called contact.

The GCI controller clearly told me to go ahead and shoot the target. I achieved a head-on

IR lock on one aircraft at 7 NM flying high. He started to turn right at 6.5 NM, putting me

on at 3.5 NM. I engaged burners and closed to less than 2.5 NM from the target beforethe desired launch zone (DLZ) started to flash. As all parameters were met, I fired the

missile and saw it go towards the target in the TD box on the HUD. I next saw a ball of

fire in the TD box. I broke left to 120 degrees, descended to 5,000 feet, and dispensed

chaff and flares.


18/41


Afghan War.

On looking back at the 8 o'clock position, I saw flares at about 3-4 NM and mistook them

initially for missiles. It all but stopped my heartbeat but my controller reassured me that

there were no other aircraft in the vicinity. I then took a safe passage home.

A V-VS Su-25 "Grach" seen armed with bombs and unguided rockets while rolling at

Baghram AB. The type proved highly successful during the operations over Afghanistan,

but started suffering losses to Stingers and Pakistani interceptors in the time between

1986 and 1988. Despite many reports on the contrary, no Su-25s were ever delivered to

the Afghani Air Force. (Avijatsija & Vremja)

According to Russian sources, upon being attacked by an F-16s, the leader of the Su-25-

formation, Col. Alexander Rutskoy initiated a hard, 6.5G turn into the threat. Nonetheless,

it seems Rutskoy subsequently lost the sight of the opponent which pulled an even

harder turn behind him in the darkness and was shot down by an AIM-9L. Upon impact

the Su-25 broke in two, and the wreckage was found the following morning, but the

cockpit was empty.

Thus, the Pakistanis organized a search operation, and the next evening Rutskoy was

caught by local people, which handed him over to the authorities. Interestingly, the

Russian pilot subsequently explained, that he was surely hit by a radar-guided missile,

fired from the forward hemisphere, and declined to believe, that Bokhari used only one

AIM-9L, fired from the rear hemisphere. However, it remains unclear why the Soviet

formation continued their attack after being intercepted by F-16s: the target was not

worth the danger they faced, and their RWRs should actually have warned them of the

threat. But, considering the fact, that remaining three members of Rutskoys formation

were far closer to the Afghani border, it seems possible, that the Colonel tried to defendthem by engaging the F-16 and thus buying some precious time. The loss of Rutskoy and

his Su-25s, however, was not the only bad news for Soviets in that month: hardly four

days later, another Afghani pilot defected with his MiG-21 to Parachinar, in Pakistan.


19/41


Afghan War.

Equally, the tactic - or better said, the almost complete lack of any defensive

maneuvering - displayed by Rutskoys formation remains unclear as well, especially in

the light of the next engagement between Soviet and Pakistani aircraft, which followed

hardly one month later.

Shaheens on the Prowl

At 06:06AM of 12 September 1988, two F-16As of the 14th Squadron, flown by Sqn.Ldr.

Khalid Mahmood (on F-16A 85-728) and Sqn.Ldr. Anwar Hussain took off from Kamra AB

in order to set up a CAP over the Nawagai area. Around 06:40AM, they were vectored by

the GCI to intercept two contacts which were closing the Pakistani border at high level in

eastern direction. Both F-16s were soon in proper position, but the contacts then turned

to the north flying parallel to the border. In fact, there were not only two, but a total of

12 MiG-23MLDs of the 120. IAP in the air that morning, eight of which were loaded with

bombs and have got the order to attack certain targets in the Kunar Valley, while four -

split in two pairs (Lt.Col. Sergey Bulin with Maj. N. Golisienko, and Maj. S. Petkov with 1st

Lt. V. Danchenkov) - acted as escorts. Detecting four additional contacts, the GCI swiftly

turned the F-16s towards the new threat, and Sqn.Ldr. Mahmood acquired a total of six

contacts, of which four in the forward formation were trailed by additional two coming

from behind.

The only problem for Pakistanis now was, that the F-16s were still at the level of 3.500

meters, while their targets flew at more than 10.000 meters, and the rear pair of the

targets was flying much faster than the first four aircraft. Indeed, the Soviet GCI detected

Pakistani F-16s, and advised Petkov and Danchenkov to block them, while the rest of the

formation was to turn back towards West. But, the Pakistanis were faster: closing to adistance of 12km, Mahmood achieved a radar lock-on, but his Sidewinders failed to track

the target, as the Soviet pilots engaged their IR counter measures. Mahmood started no

less but three attempts to acquire, but failed to do so and, after closing to a distance of

less than three kilometers, tried for a fourth time.


20/41


Afghan War.

Finally, he was successful, and fired one AIM-9L from a low-to-high/left-to-right

conversion attack and 135 aspect angle. His target was MiG- 23MLD Bort 55, flown by

Capt. Sergey Privalov, which engaged his IRCM. The Sidewinder closed, however, and

exploded over his aircraft, sending dozens of hot splinters into the wings and the

fuselage. The whole Soviet section executed a turn to the West now, with Privalov in tow

and Petkov and Danchenkov joining the formation without - as it seems - trying to

engage F-16s with their R-24s, while Bulin and Golisienko closed from the north and

certainly tried to acquire a lock on.

However, Mahmood was already executing a hard port turn underneath the enemy

formation, rolling out directly behind it and in a perfect attack position behind no less

but six MiG-23MLDs! His radar immediately achieved another lock-on, but Mahmood

rejected the lock and switched over to an auto-lock, which automatically selected his two

AIM-9P missiles, considered better for stern attack. Closing to a distance of three

kilometers, the Pakistani fired another missile at the MiG-23MLD flown by Maj. Petkov,

when the GCI warned him of two Soviet aircraft directly behind. Mahmood broke hard

into the threat, but found nothing there, only to - upon a turn back to the west - realize

that the rest of the Soviet formation was already too far away to be intercepted and

almost over the Afghani border. For two F-16 pilots there remained nothing else but to

return back to their base.

According to Pakistani reports, this warning of two Soviet aircraft behind Mahmood and

Hussain was caused by a radar controller, Sqn.Ldr. Irfan-ul-Haq, misinterpreting a clutter

on his scope. In fact Lt.Col. Sergey Bulin and Maj. N. Golisienko were closing from that

side, however, their Sapheer-23ML radars were not able to pick-up the lower flying F-16s

(probably due to a ground clutter), thus denying them a chance to attack with R-24missiles. Subsequently they turned towards the West and joined the rest of the

formation. P rivalovs MiG -23MLD 55 managed it back to Bagram (albeit it overshoot the

runway and was badly damaged when the nose-leg collapsed), just like Petkov, whose

aircraft was not damaged at all.


21/41


Afghan War.

Nonetheless, after an analyze of the HUD-film and radar bands, the PAF and a team of

American experts claimed, that in all probability, both Sidewinders fired by Mahmood

found their targets. Subsequently, a pretty massive search for the wrecks of both MiGs

was started, supposedly finding one of them on the Pakistani side of the border, and

another inside Afghanistan. Reportedly, the recovery of the wreck that fell inside

Afghanistan was not possible, because it was scattered over a large - and mined - area,

while one missile pylon was recovered from the aircraft that fell inside Pakistan.

Thus, Sqn.Ldr. Khalid Mahmood was credited with two kills (and the pilot claimed he

would have shot down all the six MiG-23s he engaged, if there was no warning based on

falsely interpreted radar picture), while the Russians say they h avent suffered any losses

at all, and, according to their descriptions the whole situation rather looked like a try to

set up a trap for Pakistani fliers, which functioned, but remained empty, because of the

inability to acquire the enemy properly. The height at which the Soviet aircraft operated

certainly indicated that this might have been truth, because operations at such heights

might have lowered the problems with the ground clutter the Sapheer-23ML have had.

Final Engagements

The wish of the Soviets to catch at least one of Pakistani F-16s was perhaps influenced by

several Iraqi claims, that their MiG-23MLs have shot down Iranian Phantoms, Tomcats

and Tigers. The Soviets certainly wanted to show their capabilities and were eager to

engage. A good illustration of this was the case when on 26 September 1988, Maj.

Vladimir Astahov and Capt. Boris Gavrilov intercepted two Iranian AH-1Js some 75

kilometers south-east of Shindand, and shot both down, supposedly using R-24 missiles.

However, this was also to be the last engagement of Soviet interceptors during the War

in Afghanistan. By this time, the Soviets troops were already pulled back from most ofAfghanistan, and the DRAAF was now alone to fight against Mujaheddin, which took one

city after the other. Under such circumstances, the government in Kabul was rather

careful not to provoke the Pakistanis even more.


22/41


Afghan War.

Nonetheless, on 3 November 1988, two F-16s of the 14 Squadron, flown by Sqn.Ldr.

Ehtsham Zakaria and Sqn.Ldr. Khalid Mahmood (on F-16A 85-717), were on a CAP over the

Kohat area, the GCI informed them of six contacts closing towards the border, three of

which subsequently entered the Pakistani airspace, while three - probably escorting MiG-

21s - remained over Afghanistan. Both F-16s were swift to engage, closing upon the

enemy, when their contacts suddenly executed a 180 turn and flew back towards

Afghanistan, apparently after being warned by their GCI. Closing to a range of eleven

kilometers, Zakaria acquired the target visually and recognized it as a Su-22, flying at a

level of almost 6.000 meters. While both F-16s were still in a climb, the Sukhois were

already underway to the west, but then, one of Afghanis turned back into the threat at

the same time when Zakaria experienced some difficulties with his Sidewinders.

The Su-22 corrected his route towards the leading F-16, but Mahmood was quick in

countering this move and firing one AIM-9L from a range of approximately five

kilometers in a head-on-pass. The missile impacted, blowing several pieces off the

Sukhoi, but the aircraft continued to fly. While Zakaria maneuvered for a gun-attack,

Mahmood fired another Sidewinder, this time from a 150 - 160 aspect angle. The second

hit broke the Su-22 in two and the wreck fell some 18 kilometers inside Pakistan. The

pilot. Capt. Abdul Hashim, ejected and was captured by Pakistani Army. DRAAF Su-22M-4K

seen on landing at Baghram AB sometimes in 1986. The Type proved popular with

Afghani pilots because of its good payload and range, and became also the main fighter-

bomber of the DRAAF. Nevertheless, it was not nimble enough for battling the highly

mobile Mujahedding down between the mountain ranges. (Avijatsija & Vremja)

Generally, this was the last serious air-to-air engagement over the border between

Pakistan and Afghanistan, even if several other interceptions were undertaken by

Pakistani interceptors afterwards, and a number of Afghani pilots defected to Pakistan.For example, in the night from 20 to 21 November, Sqn.Ldr. Ather Bokhari supposedly

intercepted one Afghani An-26 near Khost, when the transport suddenly exploded in

mid-air and crashed.


23/41


Afghan War.

On 8 December 1988, a DRAAF pilot defected with his MiG-21MF to Miranshah, in

Pakistan, and on 31 January another An-24 crashed in the Khost area, after being

intercepted by Sqn.Ldr. Khalid Mahmood. At that time, despite at least two additional air

raids undertaken by Soviet Tu-22M-3s, the future of the Afghani government was sealed,

as it basically remained only in control of the area around Kabul. Just like many of

remaining ground units, numerous defections hit the DRAAF afterwards: on 3 July 1989, a

crew of an Mi-24 defected with their helicopter to Pakistan and landed near Kica, three

days later another pilot flew his Su-22M-4K to Peshawar, and on 29 October 1989 a MiG-

21 followed him to the same Pakistani air base. For all purposes, however, the direct

Soviet involvement in the war in Afghanistan ceased by the end of 1989, and

subsequently, this conf lict developed into a pure civil war, with different Afghani

fractions battling each other.

In 1988 as the Soviets were in the middle of their pull-out from Afghanistan the DRAAF

consisted of following units:

- 232. OBVP 20 Mi-4, Mi-6, Mi-8 stationed at Kabul International

- 321. BAP 60 Su-22M-3K, Su-22M-4K, Su-17UM-2K stationed at Baghram AB

- 322. IAP 60 MiG-21MF/bis (four squadrons) stationed at Baghram AB, but with

detachments at Shindand and several other airfields

- 332. OBVP ? Mi-8 helicopters stationed at Jurum

- 355. BAP 30 Il-28 and MiG-17, stationed at Shindand, but with most Il-28s at Kabul andin unrepairable condition: it seems this unit was also equipped with L-39s and acted as

training outfit

- 375. OBVP 25 Mi-24D/Mi-35V and Mi-8/17, with main base at Mazar-e Sharif


24/41


Afghan War.

- 377. OBVP 25 Mi-35V, Mi-8, Mi-17 stationed at Kabul International

- 393. IAP 50 MiG-21MF/bis stationed at Mazar-e Sharif

- 377. OBVP 25 Mi-35V, Mi-8, Mi-17, stationed at Kabul International (and other bases)

- ? TAP with 40 An-2, Il-14, An-26/30/32 transports, stationed mainly at Kabul

International.

After the Soviet pull-out, in 1989, the official Afghan Army retreated into the larger cities,

fortifying them in the process. All the Army was doing for the next several months was to

fire SS-1B Scuds at different concentrations of Mujaheddins (over 1.000 Scuds were fired),

and attacking them with air power. Otherwise, the DRAAF was busy supplying all the cut-

out garrisons. In February 1990, during the fighting in the Abbassak Pass, and in March

1990, during the fighting north of Kabul, the Mujaheddins cut the last land connection

between Kabul and the Soviet Union. By late 1991, the official Afghan Army was actually

non-existing, as the units either disintegrated due to desertions, or the local

commanders disobeyed the orders from Kabul and took over the control. Only most of

the DRAAF as well as the special units and the Inner Ministry troops remained loyal to

Najibullah's regime. Nevertheless, even the DRAAF was not completely loyal: already in

December 1989 two pilots flew their Mi-34Vs to Panjshir Valley, and deserted to Masood.

These two helicopters remained operational for the next ten years. Najibullah was now

negotiating with different political parties and warlords, and an agreement was reached

for the creation of an interim government. However, the Mujaheddin also started to fight

each other, so soon what little was left of any official structures fell apart as well: thiswas the moment when the USA have lost the patience and interest, and have pulled out

as well, stopping any kind of deliveries to the Pakistanis and in turn leaving them

without any help and financial support for the Mujaheddins.


25/41


Afghan War.

In October 1991, some Pakistani-supported Mujaheddin fractions attacked Gardez with

tanks and artillery they received from Saudi Arabia (most of this material was captured

from the Iraqis, in February 1991). During the fighting, however, the rivalry between

different Mujaheddin groups escalated, and the battle ended with them fighting each

other. Under these circumstances, the local landlord, Gen. Rasheed Dostam, established

himself as the man in power: he organized his own militia, which took away the

equipment of two full army divisions and a good part of the DRAAF. Dostam was soon

powerful enough to reach Kabul as well, where he then turned the coat and put himself

on the side of the government.

But, please note: although he operated a militia consisting of former Army troops and

equipped with former Army weaponry, he was not the part of the Army. How many

aircraft and helicopters he controlled in late 1991 is unknown, but it is known that in

December of that year the DRAAF was left only with Su-22M-3Ks and Su-22M-4Ks of the

321. IBAP at Baghram, the 322. IAP with perhaps 65 MiG-21s also at Baghram, the 377.

OBVP at Kabul International, and the 332. OBVP stationed at Jurum. In October 1991, the

USSR planned to deliver 15 Su-24MKs to the DRAAF, but this was cancelled because of the

situation of the service. The 375. OBVP at Mazar-e Sharif was obviously one of the units

which were integrated into Dostam's militia.

By the spring of 1992 Dostam had some 70.000 fighters, as well as some 60 MiG-21s and

Su-22s, 60 helicopters, and 200 T-55 and T-62 tanks under his command. This force was

in a relatively good condition, because it possessed huge stocks of spare parts and

weapons left back by the Soviets. Indeed, in early 1992, Dostam felt powerful enough to

start mixing in the war in Tajikistan: his force helped in the evacuation of many refugees

over Amudarja river into Afghanistan. However, before they were able to fully integratetheir forces, the elements of Massoud's and Hekmatyar's fractions entered Kabul, on 25

April 1992. Better planning and possession of some 50 tanks enabled Masood to capture

all the important installations.


26/41


Afghan War.

The Pakistani-supported Hekmatyar was mad about this fact and started shelling Kabul

with BM-21s and heavy artillery: before the Dostam-controlled parts of the former DRAAF

could react and silence his guns and rocket launchers in a series of effective strikes

(mainly flown by Su-22s), over 40.000 civilians were killed in Kabul. The Dostam's fighter-

bombers then also supported Massoud's troops when these fought to capture the Kabul

International (or Qahra International Airport). Once this was done, on 26 April 1992

Dostam's An-12Bs and An-26s flew most of Massoud's units into the Afghani capital, and

from the following morning Masood and Dostam were controlling Kabul - or what was

left of it - alone, but quasi in the name of all the Mujaheddin, placing Rabbani as the

transitional President of Afghanistan. Dostam's AF was active in the summer of 1992

again, during the fighting against the Hezbi-i-Islami, in the Charasiab area, during which

at least three of Dostam's fighters were shot down by FIM-92A Stingers. The fighting here

stopped only in October when Hekmatyar - newly supplied with ex-Iraqi artillery from

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan - started shelling Kabul again, on 14 October 1992.

Dostam's AF flew strikes against Hekmatyar's artillery positions, but it was once again

too late and not enough: the shelling was so terrible, that most of the city was ruined

and all the foreign diplomats have left. By February 1993, when Masood and Dostam

managed to push Hekmatyar out of the artillery range Kabul was completely

destroyed. Once there was some sort of the peace, Rabbani positioned Dostam as

Defence Minister. But, then they broke, and Masood was placed in Dostams place.

Dostam then turned the sides and joined Hekmatyar: thus in late 1993 the well-known

"Dostam-Golboddin Militia" (DGM) was organized, which meanwhile included more than

70% of the former Afghan Army and DRAAF weaponry. The DGMAF, commanded by Gen.

Barir was mainly stationed at Mazar-e Sharif. Gen. Barir was known to have flown many

combat sorties himself; this was especially the case when the DGM AF started bombingKabul and Baghram in support of a new attack against Massoud's troops.


27/41


Afghan War.

The strike against Baghram largely prevented the operations of the rest of the former

DRAAF, but by early January 1994, the official Afghan AF was operational again, and

when DGMAF MiG-21s appeared over Kabul again, on 12 January, two of them were shot

down in air combats with AAF MiG-21MFs (one DGMAF pilot was captured). On 23 January,

the DGMAF repeated the strike against Baghram, damaging one runway heavily, but this

force was - due to its cooperation with Hekmatyar - in dire straits with its own

personnel, and during this attack, no less but four DGM-pilots deserted, landing their

intact aircraft on the undamaged runway of Baghram. Minutes later, three others landed

at Shindand and also changed the side - so it seems only the strike leader returned back

to Mazar-e Sharif. The DGMAF flew some more combat sorties during 1994, as, after

failing to take Kabul, the DGM turned to conquer other parts of Afghanistan. It is known,

for example, that on 19 March one of its MiG-21s was shot down during the fighting with

Ismail Khan's troops near Balkh, in south-western Afghanistan.

At least a dozen of other DGM aircraft - including MiG-21s, Su-22s, and different

transports - were shot down by the end of the year. By May, however, they had to move

their main base away from Mazar-e Sharif, as the airfield there was captured by

Massoud's troops: afterwards, the DGM AF could only operate from several smaller

airfields - former dispersal sites - in northern Afghanistan, where he was constantly

replenished from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. But, while the Rabbani and Masood were

busy with DGM in the north, another - and completely unknown so far - movement

appeared in the south: the Pakistani-created and Saudi-financed TALIBAN, actually

organized by the ISI after the disappointment with Hekmatyar. The spread of the Taliban

was so well organized, that within few weeks after their appearance in 1994 70% of the

country came under their control, many of "invincible" Mujaheddins were defeated, and

the Rabbani's government remained only in possession of Kabul and the areas further inthe north. In February 1995, the Taliban conquered areas held by Hekmatyar, capturing

more than 200 MBTs, and APCs, as well as few helicopters.


28/41


Afghan War.

The DGM held only slightly longer: by that time, it was in need of new weapons and

spare parts, but these were not forthcoming from the CIS-states without proper

payments any more: at one moment, Dostam was forced to exchange several of his

fighter-bombers for two Uzbeki L-39s, so he could train his pilots properly. During the

flight to Uzbekistan, on 26 January 1995, one of the Su-22s crashed. In February the DGM

lost also a Mi-17, the rotor of which disintegrated in flight. In March 1995, the Taliban

closed upon the Hekmatyar's garrison in Charasiab, which then fled without firing even a

single shot.

As if this would not be enough, Dostam and Hekmatyar then turned again against

Masood and new fighting broke out in the Kabul and Khenj areas, during which the last

air combats of this war happened: on 7 June DGM AF Su-22s bombed Khenj when they

were intercepted by AAF MiG-21s, which shot down one Sukhoi. However, at this stage

also the "Taliban AF" - the later Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Air Force (IEAAF), initially

created and run by the Pakistanis - appeared, and its MiG-21s shot down two of AAF

helicopters over the Samgan Province, on 14 June, when these were transporting

ammunition to Massoud's troops. The next action of the IEAAF was not less spectacular:

on 3 August 1995, its MiG-21s intercepted a Russian Il-76 which was underway with

supplies for Masood, and forced it to land at Khandahar.

The Origins of the IEAAF

Where these MiG-21s came from is unknown: "officially" they were former DRAAF aircraft,

mainly captured at Herat. However, it must be said, that the DRAAF had not so many MiG-

21s stationed in southern Afghanistan, so their actual source is unknown. Certainly, as

religious scholars, the Taliban had no clue about flying MiG-21s - and even less somaintaining such planes - and at the time no former DRAAF-personnel worked with

them, so the actual background of the IEAAF is pretty clear: PAF.


29/41


Afghan War.

During the rest of spring and the whole summer, the AAF and the DGM AF suffered one

loss after the other, as their fighter-bombers were repeatedly shot down by Taliban

MANPADs (mainly FIM-92A Stingers, but also some Pakistani-supplied Anzas). In October,

finally, the Taliban captured Herat, and then approached Kabul. The IEAAF was very active

at this time, but was also suffering considerable losses: on 16 October, for example

Masood fighters downed no less but three MiG-21s and a Mi-8 over Maydan Shah during a

single action, using MANPADs.

On 31 October also two IEAAF MiG-21s were shot down over Khandahar, and one over

Kabul. Finally, on 12 November two IEAAF Mi-8s were shot down near Log: one of them

carried the Mullah Omar, but he survived. By the late 1995, Masood - and also Ismail Khan

- were reinforced by new arms deliveries from Russia and Iran, respectively. Several

Russian and IRIAF Il-76s were registered while landing at Jalalabad and Baghram at the

time. IRIAF transports were in mid-December 1995 seen even directly over Kabul,

escorted by IRIAF F-14A interceptors). Thanks to these reinforcements, Masood managed

to stop the first Taliban attack against Kabul.

On 1 November 1995, the DGMAF tried to destroy the IEAAF on the ground, but the

operation failed completely: one Su-22 was shot down (pilot captured), and the others

aborted the attack after seeing the fierce air defences around the Taliban airfields

(foremost that near Khandahar). By the end of November, Masood has lost most of his

remaining intact MiG-21s and Su-22s, and from that moment on, the IEAAF practically

possessed the air superiority over Afghanistan, and its Su-22s flew a series of strikes

which by the summer of 1996 weakened the Massoud's defences so much, that the

Taliban finally broke into Kabul, and captured not only the city, but also the Baghram AB,

where most of the last remaining - even if mainly inoperational - MiG-21s and Su-22swere captured intact. Masood later admitted that the Taliban came so fast, that his

troops haven't managed to destroy or even sabotage their aircraft. Because of this, again

the question raised, who was leading the "Islamic scholars" in the fighting that they

were so successful against battle-hardened Mujaheddin?


30/41


Afghan War.

In their next operation, undertaken in January 1997, the Taliban attacked the DGM and

destroyed it completely: most of the DGM troops fled into CIS countries in the north.

Afterwards, the situation remained pretty same until late 1999: Masood held some 10%

of Afghanistan, and Rabbani's government was accepted as the official Afghani

government, even if having no power actually. Their only success was the re-capture of

the Baghram AB, in 1998, when Masood used a moment at which the Pakistanis were not

careful: the attack was successful, and again many MiG-21s and Su-22s were captured

intact, even if none of them was ever made flyable again.

The Last Two Years

Due to the lack of coherent command & communications structure, especially regarding

the use of heavier weapons, the Taliban could not go much further than they managed

so far - especially not without more direct help from Pakistan. So, in 1998, Pakistani

Government and Army - obviously growing inpatient by the Taliban inability to deliver

the final defeat of what was now known as the "Northern Coalition" or "United Front"

(unified command of mainly Tajik Afghan forces in north-eastern Afghanistan, under the

command of Masood) - intensified their support for Taliban. This process reached

unprecedented levels by late that year and throughout the 1999 and 2000. At the time,

Pakistani help was "limited" to massive food supplies, fuel, ammunition, and spares

supply. The amounts of these supplied by Pakistan varied through years, but enabled -

for example - the IEAAF to mount up to 30 strike missions daily, or a total of up to 160

sorties per week in late 1998.

The Pakistani help was also influential in creating the IEAAF as an "official" (Taliban) AirForce from what was before a rag-tag group of pilots and aircraft without any organized

support, and enabling this service some particularly intensive transport operations, like

in late 1998, when An-12s and An-26s flew dozens of troop-transport and supply

missions into the north, in support of the offensive in which Taloqan was captured.


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Afghan War.

At the time shortly after its "official" creation, the IEAAF 1998 was a pretty powerful asset

for its circumstances. It had over 30 intact MiG-21s alone. Yet, with the loss of the air

base at Baghram, almost 70% of its assets were lost as well. During the retreat from

Baghram, Taliban disabled or destroyed all aircraft they could not take with them (so

many were inoperational at the time), and that's the reason for plenty of pictures taken

at that airfield during the last two years, showing scores or broken and derelict planes

lying around.

The IEAAF reached the peak of its effectiveness in the year 2000, during the Taliban

offensive against Taloqan, when it flew no less but 160 combat missions within two

weeks. However, for the reasons which will be explained further below, it suffered a loss

of at least eight MiG-21s and Su-22s, all shot down by SA-14 MANPADs. Not a single of the

downed pilots was recovered (although, some ejected safely and were captured), which

caused a significant problem for the IRAAF that became apparent already by the autumn

2000, when the for when the force was hardly active at all due to the lack of pilots and

ammunition (this was one of the factors for the Taliban offensive being stopped in

Badakhshan, in September 2000). Especially the loss of General Allahdad, Commander of

the Mazar-e-Sharif AB and one of IEAAF most distinguished pilots - whose MiG-21 was

shot down on 6 August 2000, by an SA-14 over Taloqan - proved to be a heavy blow for

the IEAAF.

Nevertheless, the military successes of the Pakistani special forces supported by the

IEAAF and the al-Qaida in NW Afghanistan enabled the opening of another supply route -

via Turkmenistan, foremost important for fuel imports. This route remained intact until

the early days of November 2001, despite immense interdiction efforts of the USNfighters since 8 October 2001. Namely, Turkmenistan declared itself "neutral" in the US-

lead Anti-Terror War even after the local government agreed to accept US forces on its

soil. By the early 1999, the Taliban military became completely dependent of the

standing force of the al-Quaida's militant structures, as well as the PA and PAF.


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Afghan War.

Even more so, the financial support from al-Qaida helped the Taliban also attract and

keep foreign volunteers in Afghanistan. To make it clear: right since 1994, when the

Taliban "appeared", the Pakistanis have contributed the greatest proportion of the

Taliban. By 2001, between 5.000 and 7.000 Pakistani volunteers were members of the

Taliban, or, better said, the al-Qaida network in Afghanistan, which at the time was said

to have had between 8.000 and 12.000 combatants inside the country. The situation of

the Pakistanis in Afghanistan was, however, not that simple: their contingent was

divided into three overlapping categories. The hard-core of the majority were young

students from Pakistani madrassahs (religious seminaries) of the Deobandi School

(which produced most Taliban), mobilized and moved into Afghanistan often without

any kind of even rudimentary military training. This force would certainly never be able

to deliver such defeats to Masood, Dostam, and Hekmatyar as it did between 1994 and

1998: indeed, all the Taliban advances in that time caused massive losses to this force, to

such degree, that by 2001 they actually ceased to be of any importance.

Then there was the next "class" of the Pakistanis, foremost those sent to Afghanistan by

different religious organizations, like Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (formerly Haraka-ul-Ansar),

the anti-Shi'ia Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), and the smaller Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.

These were mainly Pakistani militants, to large degree also former members of the

Pakistani military, with good previous training and additional knowledge of ground

operations. The third "class" were PA, ISI, and PAF regulars. At earlier times, 1994

through 1998, these were mainly professional officers: they were tasked with planning

and logistic roles. Some were retired officers, non-commissioned officers, and

technicians of the PA and the PAF: they were mainly tasked to lead the less experienced

troops of the first two "classes". By August and September 2000, however, also the first

regular PA units - initially the special forces - were deployed, and they became influentialin the capture of Taloqan. By the summer of 2001, the PA should have had elements of

three regular commando battalions (the locals called them everything possible: between

"regiment" and "division") operating in Afghanistan - of course under the guise of

"Taliban".


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Afghan War.

In January 2001 the process of the mobilization of such assets was maximized, with

intensive support from Pakistan now reaching levels through deployment of other

regular PA units. On 10 January 2001, for example, a meeting was held in Akora Khattak,

in Pakistan, between the leaders of Pakistan-based extremist groups, top-ranking

officers of the Pakistani ISI (such as Gen. (Ret.) Hamid Gul, former Chief of the military

intelligence services) and Gen. Aslam Beg of the PA, which advocated maximized military

support of Pakistan to the Taliban/al-Qaida coalition, and defying the UN sanctions

against the Taliban.

Interestingly, the meeting, at which representants of as many as 30 militant and military

groups attended (all protected by hundreds of heavily armed guards of their own), was

held in a broad daylight despite the martial law by the military Government of Pakistan;

obviously, the whole affair was orchestrated by the Pakistani Government. One of the

consequences of this meeting was an intensification of Pakistani support and

deployment of new PA units into the northern Afghanistan. In a sweeping move,

preceding the deadline of the imposition of new UN sanctions against the Taliban and

foreign "volunteers" (actually mercenaries) in Afghanistan, from 12 January onward, a

number of new commando and artillery units of the Pakistani Army, partially manned by

Pakistani volunteers (not regular PA personnel), in total some 1.500 Pakistani nationals,

was deployed in northern Afghanistan in preparation for foreseeable attacks on the

government forces. According to contemporary reports, PA General Qamar-u-Zaman was

assigned as the new officer in charge of military operations in Afghanistan, replacing PA

General of the Army Saeed Zafar, who functioned in the same capacity in Afghanistan

over the past year. Furthermore, additional new commanders arrived, including the PA

General Tariq Bashir, formerly commander of the 9th Division of the PA; Brig. Momin and

Col. Sanaullah from PA's Kohat Division.


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Afghan War.

Col. Hamza of the Pakistan's ISI (military intelligence service); whole "998 Brigade" was

replaced by the 996 Brigade (CO Brig. Amjad of Sayawali; the unit was a part of what was

called "Charat Commando Division" by the Afghanis), and being placed in reserve; the

117 Brigade was replaced by the 994 Brigade (CO Brig. Faizan Khan of Laki Maroot,

Pakistan); and the 625 Artillery Battalion (CO ? Rafique, active PA officer).

In addition, PA Brig. Amjad was assigned the CO of Pakistani forces in the Takhar

Province, where during the summer PA units, and units of Pakistani volunteers were

equipped with additional equipment to establish capability to cross the Kokcha River.

These reinforcements, however, have not managed to build up a strength needed for the

expected "final offensive" against NC/UF forces in NE Pakistan, as during the relatively

mild winter 2000/2001, the MC/UF forces under command of Ahmadshah Masood have

not only managed to stop several fierce attacks by Pakistani/Taliban/al-Qaida forces, but

also to spoil their preparations by engaging Taliban forces on several places, and forcing

the Pakistanis to react, practically placing them at a defensive, instead of enabling them

to act, and start their own offensive.

The fighting was focused on two areas: starting an offensive in the western Afghanistan,

the NC captured several cities and villages in the strategic Yakolan District, in late

December 2000 and early January 2001. On 3rd January, Taliban counterattacked around

Konduz (150km north of Kabul), trying to push NC forces away from the city and cut their

main supply route into Tajikistan. Additional Taliban - actually Pakistani units -

supported by air strikes and artillery - were then rushed from Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif,

towards Bamiyan, at best helping to stabilize the front. It is highly likely, that some of

the Arab "Jihadis" (of which there were between 2.000 and 4.000 with the al-

Qaida/Taliban) - foremost the Egyptians - and some of almost 2.000 Chechens have hadsome sort of experience with the aircraft, and have helped the IEAAF as well.


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Afghan War.

Now, by 2001, the IEAAF had 21 MiG-21s (of which 8 operational and 13 non-operational

and mostly used for spare parts); 17 Su-20/22 airframes (8 operational and 9 non-

operational and mostly used for spare parts, plus one example - the "white 82" -

exhibited at the entrance to Kabul International)); and five L-39 airframes (of which two

intact but not operational and three in derelict condition). The IEAAF possessed also four

Mi-24 or Mi-35 helicopters, and eleven operational Mi-8s (the number of derelict or non-

operational airframes was unknown). A large fleet of military transports was available,

even if these were mainly officially operated by t he Afghan Ariana" Airlines.

All these aircraft were very active throughout the whole year (especially in winter, when

most roads are useless due to snow) and were in reasonably good condition. Here is the

list of transport aircraft at the times available to IEAAF, Ariana, and Tyumenaviatrans.

First column gives the operator of the aircraft, the second is the aircrafts identity

(registration or serial), then the construction number, and the last is the model of the

aircraft.

Owner Registration/Serial c/n Model

Afghan Air Force 229 SFG1008 An-26







Afghan Air Force 236 SFG1015 An-26Afghan Air Force 237 SFG1016 An-26





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Afghan War.










Afghan Air Force 284 AN32021 An-32















Afghan Air Force 387 4342205 An-12

Afghan Air Force 388 AN12238 An-12Afghan Air Force 390 AN12239 An-12

Afghan Air Force T-001 87010105 Il-18

Afghan Air Force T-004 SFG1007 An-26

Afghan Air Force T-005 SFG1006 An-24


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Afghan War.

Remark: some An-12 transports are equipped with Soviet-designed bomb racks that

could carry up to 38 250-kilogram bombs.

Ariana Afghan AL CCCP-87255 Yak-40

Ariana Afghan AL YA-BAG 7306602 An-24

Ariana Afghan AL YA-BAH 17306709 An-24

Ariana Afghan AL YA-BAL 14105 An-26

Ariana Afghan AL YA-BAN 14304 An-26

Ariana Afghan AL YA-BAO 14305 An-26

Unconfirmed CIS YA-DAA AN12353 An-12

Polet Russian AC YA-DAB 5342801 An-12

Ariana Afghan AL YA-DAG 87304504 An-24

Ariana Afghan AL YA-DAM 104-04 An-24

Ariana Afghan AL YA-FAU 20343 Boeing727

Ariana Afghan AL YA-FAW 19619 Boeing727

Ariana Afghan AL YA-GAX 331 DHC6

Ariana Afghan AL EP-CPG 748 Tu-154

Ariana Afghan AL YA-DAF An-24

Ariana Afghan AL YA-DAJ 47309603 An-24

Ariana Afghan AL YA-FAY 22289 Boeing727

Tyumenaviatrans YA-87486 9441438 Yak-40

The cadre of IEAAF pilots at the time to 50% consisted of former DRAAF officers, while the

other 50% were "volunteers" and "instructors" from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt,

some of them highly experienced. In total, however, the CO of the IEAAF, Gen. YousafShah (which earlier served as MiG-21 and Su-22 in the DRAAF, and then the DGM AF,

before defecting to Taliban in 1996; his vice was Gen. Jamil, former An-26-pilot, which

also served in the DRAAF and the DGM AF before defecting to Taliban in 1998) haven't had

more than 700 people working in his service. Main bases of the IEAAF were Kabul,


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Afghan War.

Jalalabad, Shindand, and Khandahar. During 1998 and 1999, the performance of the

IEAAF operations varied considerably, and it is probably this that created the "feeling" on

the side of the UF/NC that the PAF was flying combat operations against them.

Usually, the original IEAAF pilots were heavily dependent on the GCI system - even for the

simplest air-to-ground missions, most of which were flown at levels between 1.000 and

4.000m. Despite severe destruction and losses, the Afghan GCI system remained roughly

intact and was capable of guiding and supporting fast jet fighters in the area of Mazar-e-

Sharif, Taloqan, and Kabul.

Taliban pilots were known to be heavily reliant on the GCI from the monitoring of their

communications, but in 1999 and 2000 this changed: suddenly, the pilots appeared

which need not as much GCI-support. Some of these pilots had very good situational

awareness, and their attacks were exceptionally precise. In some cases it was noticed,

that some targets were hit by such pilots first, followed by the less experienced ones,

which would try to hit the same place, marked by the smoke and dust from the earlier

attacks.

The IRAAF in 2001

The year 2001, the so-called "Taliban Air Force" - actually the air force of the Islamic

Republic of Afghanistan = IRAAF - started with eight operational Su-22s, eight MiG-21s,

two intact and two inoperational L-39s and a total of 11 Mi-8 helicopters. Some reports

said that there are also Mi-17s, but no traces of these could be found. By the time, there

were still around 700 people working in the IRAAF, which operated from airfields at

Kabul (very seldom: the field is foremost used for civilian and transport flights),

Jalalabad, Shindand and Khandahar, although there should also be at least three or fouradditional - lets call them so - "dispersal" sites as well.

8/10/2019 Soviet Air Confrontations With Pakistan Air Force During Sovi

soviet air confrontations with pakistan air force during soviet afghan war

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