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Soviet higher education policyduring world war IIWilliam Moskoff aa Lake Forest CollegePublished online: 06 Nov 2007.

To cite this article: William Moskoff (1986) Soviet higher education policy during world war II,Soviet Studies, 38:3, 406-415, DOI: 10.1080/09668138608411649

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SOVIET STUDIES, vol. XXXVIII, no. 3, July 1986, 406-415

SOVIET HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY DURING WORLD WAR II

by WILLIAM MOSKOFF*

IT is frequently said that World War II demonstrated the resilience of Sovietinstitutions, particularly those associated with central economic planning. Whilea body of literature is beginning to develop in the West about the impact of thewar on Soviet economic, political, and social institutions, no study has yetexamined the effect the war had on Soviet higher education.1 The issue isimportant because higher educational institutions (vuzy) were first of all themajor institutional vehicle for training specialists such as engineers, teachers anddoctors who were absolutely crucial for successful implementation of theindustrialization drive begun in the late 1920s. Second, the vuzy were a majorinstitutional force in diminishing the differences between social classes. Thereare three fundamental questions: What impact did the war have on the highereducation system? What was done to ensure the survival of the vuzy system?What were the consequences of policies carried out during the war?

What will be shown is that there are really several stages into which we candivide the war in order to understand what happened to higher education. Thesestages very closely mirrored the general course of the military side of the war:first there was the shocking crisis of the invasion, then the process of coping in1942, up to the victory at Stalingrad, and then the final stage of victoriousmovement westward, highlighted by the battle of Kursk in July 1943, theliberation of Kiev and Leningrad and the movement into eastern Europe in1944.2 The first stage involved meeting the immediate crisis by evacuating vuzyto the east: in those early months when the economy was shattered byoccupation, when Kiev fell, Leningrad came under siege and Moscow wasthreatened, not only industrial enterprises but the most critical elements of thehigher educational infrastructure were moved. The second part of this stage wasalso the time when the question of where to find the personnel to wage war hadto be tackled. In this period policies were implemented to close the gap betweenmanpower needs and available supplies. The second stage emerged as aconsequence of the first; policies now had to be introduced to begin dealing witha higher education system that had been drained by early exigencies. It is herethat we begin to see permanent changes in the face of higher education. Theparty became much stronger and the class composition of the student bodychanged. The final stage was that of rebuilding higher education in the liberatedareas.

In order to appreciate the degree to which the war 'disrupted' the Soviethigher education agenda, it is also helpful to see where the vuzy system stood onthe eve of the war. Beginning with the first five-year plan, there had been an

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407

extraordinary increase in both the number of vuzy and the number of students.At the start of the academic year 1927/28 there were 148 vuzy in which 168,500students were enrolled. Thirteen years later in 1940/41, the last prewar academicyear, there were 817 vuzy with 811,700 students, representing an almostfive-fold increase in higher education enrolments.3 The fundamental reason forthis increase was the drive to create a technical elite that would help to put thenation on the path to rapid industrialization.4 Thus, throughout the 1930s, asexpansion in the economy took place, there was an almost insatiable demand forspecialists.

Stage I—Invasion, Evacuation and Manpower Shortages

Soon after the Germans invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, betweenJuly and November, 1,523 industrial enterprises were evacuated to the Volgaregion, the Urals, Western and Eastern Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia.By the middle of 1942, about 80% of the enterprises were once againfunctioning.5 The decision was also made to evacuate as much of highereducation as possible, particularly in those educational areas deemed to be ofdirect importance to the war effort. The pressures placed on the rail system wereenormous as trains moved west carrying men to fight the war and east carryingmostly war-related industrial enterprises and equipment. The combination ofscarce rail facilities and the disorganization of the time meant that theevacuation of vuzy had to wait a few months. In all, 147 vuzy that were locatedeither in occupied areas or in areas close to the front were evacuated.6

There is some circumstantial evidence that although there were evacuationplans, these had to be abandoned in view of the near collapse of Soviet militaryresistance in the first months of the war and replaced by hastily improvisedplans. The main thing to be seen in the summer and autumn of 1941 is ahand-to-mouth confusion and a disorderly effort in the midst of the reigningcrisis.

The evacuation of part of Leningrad University began on 19 July, less than amonth after the German invasion, and the first train carrying staff andequipment was supposed to go to Kazan.7 However, it went much further, toElabuga in the Tatar ASSR. The evacuation was highly selective. Thedepartments that went to Elabuga were those which were intended to conductmilitary and industrial research, such as the physics and the mathematicalmechanics departments. The other departments remained in Leningrad andstarted the academic year as usual on 1 September. The institution carried onduring the siege that dominated the city's life during the winter of 1941-42. Butby the beginning of 1942 that part of the university which had remained inLeningrad itself was down to 707 students, or about one-third of the 2,027 whohad started the academic year. In February Leningrad University was evacuatedto Saratov in the Volga region and teaching started on 1 April with a studentbody of 361 and 189 staff. The university did not return to Leningrad until thesecond semester of the 1943/44 year, immediately after the siege ended.8

With respect to the other Leningrad vuzy, it appears that while evacuation

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408 HIGHER ED UCA TION

plans were made immediately after the 1941/42 winter semester had ended, itwas not until the spring that they could be put into operation.9 Between 20March and 15 April 1942 30 Leningrad vuzy were moved eastward.10 BothLeningrad University and the other vuzy were evacuated over the so-called'road of life' provided by the frozen surface of Lake Ladoga.11 Indeed, duringthe period from November 1941 to mid-April 1942 about 554,000 people usedthe ice road as their escape route.12

In contrast to Leningrad, the main evacuation from Moscow took placebetween October and December 1941. A total of 62 Moscow vuzy weremoved—either completely or partially—to 35 different cities; sixteen went to theVolga region, thirteen to Siberia, twelve to Kazakhstan, nine to Tadzhikistan,six to Uzbekistan, four to the Urals and two to Turkmenia. These institutionsbegan to operate during November and December under radically alteredconditions.13 The government was obviously unable to move all of the Moscowvuzy. In the spring and summer of 1942, after the worst of the early offensivehad been repulsed and the German armies driven back, 31 Moscow vuzy wereallowed to resume functioning in Moscow itself.14

A closer look at the experience of Moscow and Leningrad universitieshighlights two problems that accompanied the evacuation process. One was theconfusion that reigned in planning the evacuation and the other was the absenceof the resources necessary to enable the institutions to resume their teaching andresearch activities promptly in their new homes. The initial destination ofMoscow University was Ashkhabad, a remote, medium-size city on the Iranianborder in Turkmenia. The first stage of the evacuation took place over four daysin mid-October.15 About 220 members of the university's staff, which probablyrepresented no more than 15-20% of the total, went with the first two trains toAshkhabad. About 1,000 students literally marched for two months toAshkhabad, about 1,800 miles from Moscow. The disruption of rail facilities isdemonstrated by the fact that even students who left in November by train tookalmost two months to reach their destination. Ultimately about 90% of the staffand students who were not enlisted in the armed forces were supposed to beevacuated, but Moscow University began its academic year in December as askeleton institution. It was not really until March 1942, when 1,320 studentswere enrolled, that the institution had a substantial presence. Even this numberwas far below the 9,000 students (including 5,000 day students) who had beenenrolled at the university just before the war.

Ashkhabad was only the first stop for Moscow University. In the summer of1942 it was re-evacuated to Sverdlovsk, almost 1,400 miles to the north, androughly 750 miles due east of Moscow. This placed it much nearer to the newindustrial base of the country as industries were evacuated to the east to escapeGerman occupation. These industries needed to draw on the university'sresearch. During the war the east became the centre of military industrialproduction. For example, in the already industrialized Urals, military output in1942 was five times what it was in 1940; in the Volga region and in WesternSiberia the increases were 9-fold and 27-fold respectively.16 Moscow Universitystayed in Sverdlovsk for the entire academic year and then in May and June of

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DURING WORLD WAR II 409

1943, as Soviet troops moved westward after the battle of Stalingrad, theinstitution returned to Moscow following an absence of nearly two years.

The experience of Moscow and Leningrad universities is also illustrative of themassive decline in higher education enrolments which took place throughout thecountry. While the enlistment of males of student age was obviously necessary,the reduction in the number of students had several unintended negativeconsequences which soon had to be tackled.

As Table 1 shows, enrolments fell precipitously during the first two academicyears of the war. Vuzy enrolments in 1941/42 were only 39% of the previous yearand in 1942/43 the number of students was 28% of the prewar level. Everybranch of the higher education system was affected, but enrolments held up bestin those areas connected with the war. In 1942/43 enrolments in industry andconstruction vuzy and transport and communications vuzy were at about 40% oftheir pre-war level. The institutions which trained doctors, nurses and othermedical personnel were at 52% of the pre-war figure.17 This suggests realselectivity on the part of the authorities in calling up students for militaryservice. Some students entered the army and navy as volunteers, and otherswere called up. Since all those over the age of 17 were eligible, all vuzy studentswere liable and those who did not volunteer were called up through the regularchannels of the voenkomaty or military registration and enlistment offices.18

Overall, the Soviet higher education student body had contracted by nearly75% in two years. Within these broad statistics, one can get occasional insightsinto human nature. For instance, on 5 May 1942 a plan was adopted for the1942/43 academic year for the number of applications to the vuzy of variousindustries. Naturally, highest priority was given to vuzy belonging to suchindustries as munitions and aviation. But there was one unexpected result: theindustry which met its quota for applications to the greatest extent was meat andmilk industry which fulfilled its plan by 255%.19 One suspects that peoplewanted to be in the vuzy of this industry because they believed it would helpthem to get food during the war.

TABLE 1

NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN VUZY, 1940/41-1945/46 (IN 000S)

1940/41 — 811-7 1943/44 — 325-71941/42 — 312-9 1944/45 — 442-61942/43 — 227-4 1945/46 — 730-2

Source: M. R. Kruglyansky, Vysshaya shkola SSSR v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny, Moscow,1970, pp. 136-7.

Another measure of the disruption of higher education is the extent to whichvuzy had to be shut down, particularly during the early years of the war. Therewere 817 vuzy in 1940/41, 503 in 1941/42, 460 in 1942/43, 522 in 1943/44 and only717 in 1944/45. This includes 60 new vuzy that were established during the war.20

There were five reasons why the number of vuzy declined. The first was thefrequent merging of vuzy with other institutions when they were evacuated toother parts of the country. In 1941 alone 110 vuzy were temporarily merged with

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410 HIGHER EDUCATION

other institutions, mostly institutions of the same type.21 For example, theBelorussian Agricultural Institute was merged with the Voronezh AgriculturalInstitute and the Kharkov Veterinary Institute merged with the KirghizVeterinary Institute.22 A second reason for shutting down vuzy was inadequateenrolments. In 1941 and 1942, 365,000 students left the vuzy, overwhelmingly toserve the military effort in one way or another.23 In 1941 alone 55 vuzy wereclosed because of the enrolment problem. The third reason was the severe dropin the number of teaching staff. At the start of the 1942/43 academic year thenumber of professors and teachers (prepodavateli) had fallen by more than half.On 1 October 1940 there were 50,015 permanent academic staff; exactly twoyears later there were only 24,704. The number of professors fell by 18-2%, thenumber of lectures by 40-1% and the number of teachers by 60-5%.24 Thefourth major reason was the destruction wrought by the Germans. They eitherpartially or completely destroyed 334 vuzy in which 233,000 students had beenenrolled.25 Agricultural institutes lost 33% of their educational space and 34%of their housing.26 In Kiev the university library of 1-3 million books wasdestroyed, as was 90% of the 600,000 volume library of the Donetsk IndustrialInstitute.27 Finally, the Soviet authorities themselves converted more than 800buildings belonging to vuzy and tekhnikumy to military uses, for example, asindustrial enterprises or hospitals.28 As a result of the drop in the number ofvuzy, even given the decline in enrolments, it was common for vuzy to be socrowded that they had to operate two or three shifts a day.29

The second aspect of this first stage involved coping with the enormouspressures on manpower in certain specific areas of expertise. The exigencies ofthe war created a dilemma for Soviet planners. On the one hand, because of thewar they had an immediate need for skilled, technically trained people such asengineers and doctors. On the other hand, there was already a serious shortageof such personnel before the war and the economy was absorbing such people asfast as they could be trained by the vuzy. Understandably, the Soviet authoritieschose a set of policies which maximized the number of skilled people available inthe short run, even if they were inadequately trained or were admitted to vuzywithout meeting normal admission standards. From the regime's point of viewduring the early days of the war the future was now, even if there was somedeterioration in the quality of education.

The first major step was the graduation of students before the scheduled date.At the start of the war 104,700 final year students were pronounced engineers,agronomists, doctors, teachers, etc., and were thereby permitted to miss the lastpart of their education.30 In Leningrad, for example, of the 725 students whowere supposed to have done a fifth year as part of their normal curriculum, 389,or somewhat more than half, were graduated ahead of schedule, takingexaminations in August and September 1941.31 At the major medical school inLeningrad, 1,041 senior level students joined the armed services in September.32

A second and related policy was the brief effort at creating a curriculum withan abbreviated term of study, introduced in 1941. Those vuzy which had a fiveyear degree programme had it shortened to three and a half years and those witha four year programme were reduced to three years. In principle, the total

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number of hours for this curriculum remained the same, but in practice it didnot. The reduction of the term of study was to be accomplished in four ways: (1)by reducing the summer vacation from two months to one and the wintervacation from two weeks to one week; (2) by reducing the amount of timestudents spent in on-the-job training from 22-24 weeks to 9-10 weeks, with acorresponding increase in the amount of time spent in the classroom; (3) bydecreasing the amount of time spent on the senior diploma project from 21weeks to 13-18 weeks; (4) by increasing the number of hours spent per week inlectures from 36 to 42.33

It did not take long for the Soviet authorities to discover that while acceleratedgraduation and its allied policy of a shortened curriculum had been efficacious inthe short run, there were some glaring weaknesses in this approach. Thearguments in favour of accelerated graduation had been twofold. First and mostobviously, the chronic shortages of specialists alone justified the action. Thesecond part of the argument was that the quality of education was unaffectedbecause these students had already had the basic science and engineeringcourses and the time in advanced courses was only being reduced by onesemester in most cases. Perhaps little was actually lost during that first year. Butafter this initial period it was found that students in the first two years at the vuzydid not have the same comprehension of theoretical material as theirpredecessors. In addition, 80% of all students worked. Since they were workinga 4-6 hour day, they found it extremely difficult to combine this with 42 hours aweek in classes.34

Furthermore, the demands of agriculture eroded the planned shortenedsummer vacation for students. Before the war students had been going to thecountryside to do harvesting during their two-month summer vacation. Theformal reduction of their summer break to one month was not compatible withthe demands of agriculture, where there was a desperate need for labour.During the first year of the war, the number of able-bodied men on collectivefarms fell by three million.35 Thus it is not surprising that in a majority of ruralareas students stayed for two months, defeating part of the purpose of the newcurriculum.36 The pressures on student time were further aggravated at thebeginning of 1942 when all students in the non-agricultural vuzy were obliged tostudy general field agriculture and to learn a specialty such as driving a tractor oroperating a combine. Students spent a total of 60-70 hours on agriculturaltraining in the classroom plus ten days of practical training every year.37 Sovietexpectations that students could accomplish all these non-academic tasks andstill complete their education in a shortened period of time were highlyunrealistic.

Finally, the departure from the vuzy of the accelerated graduates of 1941 ledto a shortfall the year after. This is one of the principal reasons why the 34,500vuzy graduates in 1942 equalled only 20% of the 171,000 that had beendemanded by the economic planners.38 All of this led to a decision on 18 June1942, after less than a year under the new scheme, to change the academic yearback to its normal prewar schedule and to return to the prewar curriculum aswell.39

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412 HIGHER ED UCA TION

Stage II—Coping With Low Enrolments

The second stage in the evolution of Soviet higher education policy during thewar involved dealing with the low enrolments caused primarily by enlistmentand secondarily by the accelerated graduation of senior level students. As thedata above showed, in a mere two years enrolments fell to one-third of theprewar level. The most notable problem was the existence of too few studentswho could become tomorrow's technical intelligentsia. The decision to removefinal-year students from their institutions at the start of the war had a perverseeffect on the distribution of the student body. In 1941/42, of the 227,400students, 107,000 or almost half were first-year students. In contrast there wereonly 43,000 second-year students, 27,000 third and fourth-year students, and23,000 fifth-year students.40

A number of policies were introduced in order to bolster sagging enrolments,several of which also had the effect of implicitly emphasizing social class as afactor in higher education.41 First, in 1942/43, the entrance examinationrequirement was dropped for all students who graduated from a secondaryschool in 1940 and 1941 with grades of 'excellent' and 'good'.42 If there were stillvacancies after all these students had been admitted, students who graduated in1941/42 with lower grades were also exempted. This order remained in effect in1943 as well. It was not until 11 March 1944 that the exemption from entrancerequirements was abolished. Second, on 15 September 1943 a system of stipendsfor all students who were in the 'excellent' and 'good' categories was established.Since children whose parents were members of the intelligentsia were morelikely to have higher grades than the children of parents of working-class orpeasant origin, they were more likely to be the beneficiaries of both of these newpolicies. But the most dramatic policy move was the exemption from enlistmentin 1943 and 1944 of students in the country's 87 largest vuzy. Since these weregenerally located in the largest urban areas, the rest of the war was to be foughtby an army whose composition would be more peasant in origin than before.

The combined effects of not enlisting students and increasing stipendssubstantially reduced the proportion that dropped out of higher education. In1942/43 29-3% of students left for one reason or another; in 1943/44 this figurefell to 19-9% and in 1944/45 to 17%.43

A second phenomenon of this period was the significant strengthening of theparty's role in the life of the vuzy. At the beginning of the war the number ofpeople involved in the vuzy party organizations fell dramatically, simply byvirtue of the large number of students who went to the front. Gradually,however, these organs began to grow in size, but now they were under closertutelage on the part of the party and underwent greater bureaucratization. Thereis ample evidence of the party's new vitality. First, a great deal of attention waspaid to making sure that party members headed the komsomol and trade unionorganizations in the vuzy. Second, during the war faculty party organizationsand party groups which had not existed before the war were created. Third, theparty created trade union and komsomol organizations in many vuzy which hadno party presence before the war. This was true, for example, of fourteen

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DURING WORLD WAR II 413

Moscow vuzy. Finally, allegedly in response to the dual phenomena of thegrowing size of the party organs and their increased involvement, two newsecretarial posts were created, although in Moscow the holders only seemed tobe involved in the party organizations of the largest vuzy.44 These new posts inthe bureaucracy assured party control in the most important vuzy of the country.

Stage III—The Road to Recovery

The final stage in Soviet wartime policy coincided with the process ofreturning higher education to a position more nearly resembling the prewarsituation. This could only take place after the course of the war had changed infavour of the Soviet Union. During 1943 and 1944 146 vuzy were returned to theoriginal locations. In addition the physical reconstruction of more than 170 vuzywas also undertaken during the 1943-44 period.45 The reduced pressure oninternal resources also permitted an increase in expenditures from the centralbudget. Enrolment figures also began to climb in 1943 and in 1945/46, the firstyear after the war, they reached 90% of the 1940/41 figure. In 1942 the statebudget expended 821-3 million rubles on the vuzy, less than one-third of the1940 budget of 2,686 million rubles. In 1943, however, the budget rose to 1,123-1million rubles and in 1944 it climbed to a wartime high of 1,980-4 million rubles.It was not until the 1945 budget of 2,856 million rubles that the prewar level wasexceeded.46

There are no precise figures on the number of students who died in the war,separate from the general figures on war deaths, which are themselves so muchin dispute. On the basis of census age distribution figures, however, we cansurmise that the war took a heavy toll on students. The two main census groupsinvolved would be males aged 15-19 and 20-24. In 1939 there were 16-09 millionmales in these two age groups. 20 years later when these two groups should havebeen 35-39 and 40-44 years old, there were only 8-52 million (53%) who hadsurvived to the 1959 census. Unfortunately, the 1979 census has not beenpublished in sufficient detail to provide age distribution figures. But it willsuffice for our purposes to recognize that at the time of the 1970 census, 16-89million, or 92-3% of the males who were 15-24 in 1959 were still alive.47

Conclusion

The war was a calamitous experience for Soviet society in many ways, but itsinstitutions demonstrated a remarkable resilience. Evacuation was not only ameans of survival for a large part of the industrial base, but also for a major partof the higher education system. Had the Soviet authorities not acted to move somany of their institutions eastward, they would very probably have had a muchmore difficult task after the war to re-establish the normal functioning of asystem of higher education. Given the importance of the vuzy role in preparingthe technical intelligentsia, one may speculate that Soviet postwar economicgrowth would not have been as robust as it was. While mistakes were made intrying to cope with the wartime demand for such groups as doctors and

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414 HIGHER EDUCATION

engineers, some of them were a logical consequence of the crisis and in thesecases should be seen as unavoidable. On the other hand, it was self-delusion thatqualified specialists could be trained while at the same time doing voluntarydefence work and harvesting crops with no loss either to themselves or society.Notwithstanding these follies, it is a measure of the Soviet success in holding thehigher educational infrastructure together that enrolments could be increased sosignificantly within a year after the war and went on to rise from 730,200 in1945/46 to 1,247,400 in 1950/51, an increase of half a million students in fiveyears. The survival of the vuzy system during the war and its significant postwargrowth both reflect the high priority given to higher education.

Lake Forest College

*I would like to thank T. An thony Jones , an anonymous referee and most especially Carol Gaylefor their many helpful comments .

1 See for example the collection of articles in Susan J . Linz, The Impact of World War II on theSoviet Union, Rowman and Allenheld, 1985.

2 T h e following books in English provide an excellent description of the military and economichistory of the war: Alec Nove , An Economic History of the USSR, (London , 1969), Harr isonSalisbury, The 900 Days, (New York , 1969) and Alexander Wer th , Russia at War, 1941-1942, (NewYork , 1964). A standard source in Russian is the six vo lume, Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi VoinySovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 gg. (Moscow, 1960-65).

3 E . A . Belyaev and V. G. Dubinkin , 'Rost chislennosti nauchnykh kadrov v soyuznykhrespubl ikakh (1917-1970 gg . ) ' , Istoriya SSSR, 1972 N o . 5, p p . 109-124.

4 Fo r a comprehensive t rea tment of the subject see, Kendall E . Bailes, Technology and SocietyUnder Lenin and Stalin, (Princeton University Press , 1978).

5 Sanford R. L ieberman, 'The Evacuat ion of Industry in the Soviet Union During World War I I ,Soviet Studies, X X X V , No . 1, (January 1983) pp . 90 -91 .

6 M. R. Kruglyansky, Vysshaya shkola SSSR v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny, (Moscow,1970), p . 80.

7 T h e discussion of the Leningrad University evacuation is drawn from Istoriya LeningradskogoUniversiteta, (Leningrad, 1969).

8 A low student-staff rat io prevailed at Moscow University as well, probably reflecting the facttha t the staff were too old to be enlisted in the a rmed forces.

9 Kruglyansky, p . 77.10 F . B . Komal , ( ed . ) , Sovetskaya vysshaya shkola v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny,

(Moscow, 1980), p . 55.11 Kruglyansky, p . 89.12 Leon G o u r e , The Siege of Leningrad, New York , 1962, p . 239.13 V . V . Drynochkin , 'Vysshie uchebnye zavedeniya stolitsy v evakuatsi i ' , Istoriya SSSR, 1975

N o . 1, p p . 132-7.14 Kruglyansky, p . 88.15 The discussion of the Moscow University evacuation is drawn from Moskovskii Universitet v

Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine, (Moscow, 1975).16 Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, Moscow: Progress Publishers, (1974), p . 139.17 Kruglyansky, p p . 136-7.18 Komal , p . 35.19 A . I . Lu tchenko , Sozdanie inzhenerno-tekhnicheskikh kadrov v gody postroeniya sotsializma v

SSSR 1926-1958 gg., (Minsk 1973), p . 146.2 0 Kruglyansky, p . 129.2 1 Ibid. p . 130.2 2 Lu tchenko , p . 144.2 3 Komal , p . 6 1 .2 4 Kruglyansky, p . 146.25 Lu tchenko , p . 141.

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DURING WORLD WAR II 415

2 6 M . R . Kruglyansky, 'Vuzy-fronty i tyli: tak gotovilis ' spetsialisty v gody voiny ' , Vestnik vyssheishkoly, 33 n o . 5 , (1975), p . 64.

2 7 Kruglyansky, Vysshaya Shkola, p p . 96, 98 .2 8 Ibid, p . 78 .2 9 See for example Istoriya Leningradskogo Universiteta, p . 361 and Komal , p . 49 .3 0 Kruglyansky, Vysshaya Shkola, p p . 96, 98 .31 Istoriya Leningradskogo Universiteta, p . 362.3 2 M . M . G r i n s h p a n , 'Leningradski i Sani tarno-Gigienicheski i Meditsinskii Insti tut v gody Vel ikoi

Oteches tvenno i Vo iny ' , Sovetskoe Zdravookhranenie, 1972, N o . 2 , p . 5 1 .3 3 Kruglyansky, Vysshaya Shkola, p . 5 1 .3 4 Ibid. p p . 65 , 67.35 Yu. B. Arutyunyan, Sovetskoe krest'yanstvo v Gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny, (Moscow,

1970), p . 66.3 6 Kruglyansky, Vysshaya Shkola, pp . 65, 67.3 7 Kruglyansky, 'Vuzy-fronty' , p . 10.3 8 Kruglyansky, Vysshaya Shkola, p . 145.3 9 Ibid. p . 68.4 0 Ibid. p . 131.4 1 Dur ing the period 1928-31 there was a so-called cultural revolution during which, among o ther

things, people without traditional secondary school credentials were sent to universities. O n thissubject see Sheila Fitzpatrick, 'Cultural Revolution as Class War ' , in Sheila Fitzpatrick, ( e d . ) ,Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931, ( Indiana University Press, 1978); and Fitzpatrick,Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, (Cambridge University Press , 1979).

4 2 Lu tchenko , p . 135.4 3 Kruglyansky, Vysshaya Shkola, pp . 132, 133, 135, 141, 145.44 Komal , pp . 39 -41 .4 5 Lu tchenko , pp . 146-7.4 6 Kruglyansky, Vysshaya Shkola, p . 126.4 7 USSR census data published in Iosif G. Dyadkin , Unnatural Deaths in the USSR, 1928-1954,

(Transaction Books , 1983), p . 54.

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