SOVIET UNION: Special Studies,

1982-1985

Supplement

UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA

SOVIET UNION Special Studies,

1982-1985

Supplement

Edited by Michael Davis

Guide Compiled by Mike Acquaviva

A microfilm project of UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA, INC.

44 North Market Street • Frederick, MD 21701

Library of Congress Catalogmg-in-Publication Data

The Soviet Union [microform].

(The Special studies series) Accompanied by a printed reel guide, compiled by

Mike Acquavivä: ••'• . 1. Soviet Union-Collected works. I. Davis,

Michael C, 1953- . II. Acquaviva, Mike. III. University Publications of America, Inc. [DK4] 947.085 87-8169 ISBN 0-89093-645-5 (microfilm)

Copyright © 1986 by University Publications of America, Inc. All rights reserved.

ISBN 0-89093-645-5.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Editorial Note v

Acronyms v¡¡

Reel Index

Reell 1980 ! 1981 " 1 1982 2

Reel 2 1982 cont 6

Reel3 1983 1-1

Reel 4 1983 cont. (see 1983 Addendum) ;. 15

ReelS 1984 21

Reels 6-8 1984 cont 26

Reel 9 1984 cont 36 1985 38 1983 Addendum 42

Subject Index 43

EDITORIAL NOTE The executive branch of the United States government requires a

massive amount of information to make policy decisions. The many depart- ments, agencies, and commissions of the government devote much of their energies to gathering and analyzing information. However, even the re- sources of the United States government are not adequate to gather all the information that is needed; therefore the government contracts univer- sities, colleges, corporations, think tanks, and individuals to provide data and analyses. The studies that result from this effort are rarely available to the public. Although the government does publish annual reports and a number of subject-specific studies through the Government Printing Office, a great majority are difficult to find and obtain. University Publications of America (UPA) is now making available some of the most important of these reports in The Special Studies Series.

ACRONYMS ASW Antisubmarine Warfare CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union GDR German Democratic Republic KVS Communist of the Armed Forces KZ Red Star NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization PRO People's Republic of China RFE Radio Free Europe RL Radio Liberty SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile SLOC Sea Lines of Communication SOPMS Soviet Officer Personnel Management System SSBN Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks VV Military Herald

VII

REEL INDEX ReeM

0001

1980

Interacting Evolution of Soviet and American Military Doctrines. Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. J.M. McConnell. September 1980. 121pp.

"The fundamental question of the modern era, Moscow never tires of telling us, is the problem of war and peace. Fortunately peace has prevailed between the great powers... "

1981

0122 Soviet Surrogates in the Middle East.

Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas R.C. Utley. April22, 1981. 18pp.

As increasing importance and attention is placed on the Middle East by virtually every nation in the world, it has become essential to under- stand the goals and aspirations of the key players involved in the struggle for influence. As one of the major competitors, the Soviet Union has recently increased its activity in the region. The Soviet Union's effort to challenge Western influence (specifically the United States) within the Middle East has been traditionally limited to two distinct areas. The first is the massive build-up of its global military capacity and the other is the widespread use of subversion to weaken or overthrow unfriendly governments. It is the second area, which in- volves the use of surrogate countries and organizations to achieve the Soviet goals, which has provided the Soviet Union with the relatively cheap successes and that should be of the greatest concern to Western analysts.

1982

0140 Nuclear Power in the Soviet Bloc. Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico. W.G. Davey. March 1982. 58pp. The growth of Soviet Bloc nuclear power generation to the end of the century is evaluated on the basis of policy statements of objectives, past and current nuclear power plant construction, and trends in the potential for future construction. Central to this study is a detailed ex- amination of individual reactor construction and site development that provides specific performance data not given elsewhere. A major com- mitment to nuclear power is abundantly clear and an expansion of ten times in nuclear electric generation is estimated between 1980 and 2000. This rate of growth is likely to have significant impact upon the total energy economy of the Soviet Bloc including lessening demands for use of coal, oil, and gas for electricity generation.

0198 The Soviet Economy in the 1980s. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Thane Gustafson. April 1982. 35pp. The Soviet economy faces in this decade the most fundamental peacetime problems it has known since the beginnings of the command system in the 1920s. What are the possible implications for Soviet military spending,and foreign policy? Will economic constraints oblige the Soviet leadership to reduce its spending on the military sector, or at any rate to moderate the growth rate of arms spending? Will the Soviet leaders feel able to sustain the increasing costs of their foreign poli- cies, especially in Eastern Europe? Will they face such difficulty that they will resort to draconian measures at home and adventure abroad as a means of maintaining the rule? Western analysts are virtually unanimous on the Soviets' economic difficulties but disagree among themselves about the implications. In this paper the reader will find some essential background information on the issues involved.

0233 Soviet Foreign Policy towards Greece and Turkey: Contrast within Coherence. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Albert Clinton Myers. June 1982. 126pp. This thesis analyzes the evolution of post-1945 Soviet foreign policy towards Greece and Turkey. The Soviet Union has sought to impair and eliminate Greek and Turkish security ties to NATO and to the U.S. Key political, diplomatic, economic, and propagandistic events in Soviet-

Greek and Soviet-Turkish relations suggest patterns of Soviet objec- tives and successes in each country. The Soviet Union has pursued unobtrusive approaches towards Greece, while making more concerted efforts through diplomatic, economic, and perhaps clandestine means, to increase Soviet influence in Turkey. In 1978 and 1979, Turkey's foreign policy seemed to be moderately influenced by Soviet preferences, while a new situation has existed since 1980. The anti- American orientation of Andreas Papandreou's government may offer unprecedented opportunities to Soviet diplomacy in Greece. U.S. blunders made on an ad hoc short-term basis, with respect to the national sensitivities of both countries, have facilitated the successes of Soviet foreign policy. The Greek and Turkish cases suggest that the Soviets have profited from U.S. errors in their implementation of a long-term and consistent policy to reduce U.S. influence in Western Europe.

0359 An Estimate of Some Strengths and Weaknesses of the Soviet Naval Officer That Could Affect His Performance in Future Combat Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Robert William Maggi. June 1982. 121pp.

The purpose of this thesis is to provide information that will assist in estimating the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet naval officer in future combat. This will be accomplished by: examining the obser- vations of senior German military officers, who fought the Soviets in World War II, on the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet's fighting qualities during that conflict; and examining the qualities that are considered by the Soviet Navy today as being necessary for victory in future combat. The results of these two examinations will be compared so as to provide some insight into the fighting qualities that could be expected from the Soviet naval officer in combat. This information when used in conjunction with intelligence data will assist in estimating the strengths and weaknesses of Soviet naval officers in future combat.

0480 The Northern Territories: Case Study In Japanese-Soviet Relations. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Michael A. Thompson. June 1982. 184pp. Japanese-Soviet relations have historically been, as they are today, characterized by distrust and dislike for each other. One of the mani- festations of this antagonistic relationship is the Northern Territories problem, the conflicting claims of Japan and the Soviet Union to a group of four islands in the southern Kuriles. By presenting a case

study of the Northern Territories dispute, this thesis will attempt to illuminate some of the salient differences in the national patterns of Japan and the Soviet Union. It is the hypothesis of this thesis that the Northern Territories problem exists because Japan and the Soviet Union subsist and function in radically different paradigms-disparities in their historical, economic, political, geostrategic, and philosophical existence.

0664 Managing the Ethnic Factor in the Russian and Soviet Armed Forces: A Historical Overview. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. S.L Curran and D. Ponomareff. July 1982. 49pp. This report examines the history of Russian (pre-Soviet) and Soviet attempts to empty and manage national minorities in military es- tablishments and campaigns. The analysis concentrates on policies and practices adopted to involve minority manpower in the military while maintaining Slavic dominance of and control over the armed forces of the state. In particular, the study traces how the number of ethnic groups drawn into the military has consistently expanded throughout the centuries, identifies the types of units and operational roles to which minorities have been assigned, and discusses the difficulties encountered by virtue of language differences and the potential unreliability and disloyalty of non-Russian soldiers. This study should be of special interest to military analysts and intelligence consumers generally who are concerned with future Soviet military capabilities and behavior, as well as to those who analyze Soviet military manpower issues in the light of current demographic shifts in the USSR.

0713 The Soviet Far East Build-up and Soviet Risk-Taking against China. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Harry Gelman. August 1982. 167pp. This report examines factors that have influenced the evolution of the Soviet force build-up in Siberia, Central Asia, and the Soviet Far East under the Brezhnev regime. The report also tracks the changing Soviet view of the risks involved in the use of force against the People's Republic of China during the build-up, the development of Chinese mili- tary programs, the changing Chinese political scene, and China's evolving relationship with the U.S. To this end, the study examines Soviet behavior and probable calculations in the three short Asian military crises of the Brezhnev era in which the security interests of the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union most sharply interacted: the 1969 Sino-Soviet Border Crisis, the 1971 India-Pakistan War, and the 1979

Sino-Vietnamese hostilities. Probable assumptions the Soviets hold regarding their present and future force structure in the Far East are outlined. The report concludes by weighing the security implications of three broad alternatives for Sino-U.S. relations over the next decade: the relations remain unchanged, sharply decline, or significantly improve.

0880 Monitoring of Technology Transfer to the USSR. McLean, Virginia. Victor Basiuk. August 1982. 22pp. Report to the Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.

0902 Reorganizing U.S. Defense Planning to Deal with New Contingencies: U.S.-Sovlet Conflict in the Third World. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Califomia. K.N. Lewis. August 1982 73pp.

This paper discusses how U.S. defense planning might be reorganized to contend with direct Soviet military intervention in regions that have fallen outside the scope of our major defense commitments in the past. To limit the analysis, this paper will address only those situations in which U.S. and Soviet forces are or may become involved in an armed confrontation. For the purposes here, the Third World excludes areas covered by existing U.S. defense arrangements (i.e., all of NATO and Northeast Asia), and the People's Republic of China. Finally, this discussion will be restricted to broad points and will not review im- portant but more technical debates now percolating in public and official defense forums. The aim of this paper is to describe overall classes of threats and options to identify conceptual, unifying themes that can guide defense planning for a range of Third World contin- gencies. This paper will ask, in other words, what the overarching de- terminants of a U.S. policy for countering Soviet aggression in the Third World should be, and, given competing defense requirements, how we should decide which threats are the most important ones to hedge against.

Reel 2 1982cont.

0001 Soviet Nationalities in German Wartime Strategy, 1941-1945. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Alexander R. Alexiev. August 1982. 45pp. This study addresses the policies of Nazi Germany toward the Soviet nationalities during World War II and examines the effect and im- plications of the nationality issue in the armed conflict between the two countries. Before the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the attitudes of the top Nazi leaders toward the Soviet nationalities were characterized by a mixture of ignorance and contempt conditioned by Nazi racial dogmas. Such attitudes were reflected in Nazi war ob- jectives that aimed at the subjugation and economic exploitation of the Soviet peoples and precluded any attempt to harness to the German cause strong anti-Soviet and nationalist sentiments in the Soviet borderlands. Particularly oppressive were German occupation policies in the Ukraine and the Baltic States. The exception to German occupa- tion conduct was the enlightened policy pursued by the Germans in the Caucasus. In view of the oppressive treatment of the Soviet national- ities, except in the Caucasus, it is surprising to find that the Germans were able to secure the military collaboration of huge numbers of Soviet non-Russians. This leads us to conclude that the anti-Sovietism of many non-Russians was of such intensity as to overcome growing mis- givings about and dislike for the Germans. Two basic forms of military collaboration were observed throughout the war. The first involved the direct incorporation of former Soviet citizens in the Wehrmacht (Ger- man armed forces) as auxiliaries. The second consisted of units earmarked by the Germans for internal security and antipartisan functions.

0046 East-West Economic Relations and the Soviet Union's Defense Posture: Report of a RAND Conference, March 20,1982. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Charles Wolf, Jr., Abraham S. Becker, et al. September 1982. 83pp. This workshop conference had two principal purposes: to consider and discuss practicable ideas for restricting West-to-East resource flows, while limiting undesirable side effects on the Western Alliance, the international financial system, the peoples of Eastern Europe, and the Third World; and to identify issues in this broad area that may warrant further study and analysis. Section One of this note distills from the

oral discussion its principal implications with respect to policy and re- search, such as reducing access by Eastern economies to foreign credits, collective action by Western Europe, Japan, and the U.S., and looking at several issues relating to the gas pipeline that may warrant further research. Section Two contains a digest of the meeting based mainly on rapporteur notes of the oral discussion.

0129 Increasing Capabilities of the Soviet Navy. Operational Research and Analysis Establishment. Ottawa (Ontario). G.R. Lindsey. September 1982. 31pp. It is possible to explain the building programs of the Soviet Navy between 1938 and 1975 in terms of the threats perceived by them in distinct periods. A plan to possess a large ocean-going fleet was frustrated by World War II, resurrected when victory was in sight, and abandoned in the late-1940s for a force designed against amphibious assault on the Soviet coast. This threat was supplanted by nuclear strike by Western carrier-borne aircraft, and subsequently by sub- marine-launched ballistic missiles. The Soviet forces emphasized antiship cruise missiles, and then antisubmarine warfare, in both cases at increasing ranges from the home ports of the USSR. Finally, pre- servation of an assured Soviet nuclear capability to threaten Western population and cities assumed high priority, able to be kept intact during the process of a conventional or even a limited nuclear war. This required the building of large Soviet ships, aircraft, and submarines able to defend the Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) in protected bastions adjacent to USSR. This last requirement may provide adequate explanation for the Kiev class VTOL carriers and the Backfire bomber. But the latest cruiser (the nuclear powered Kirov), destroyers (Udaloy and Sovremenny), SSBN (Typhoon), and SSGN (Oscar) are so much larger than any of their predecessors as to suggest a sharp discontinuity in purpose.

0160 Soviet Strategy and the Objectives of Their Naval Presence in the Mediterranean. Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia. Naval Planning and Management Division. R.G. Weinland. September 1982. 46pp. The discussion begins with a brief attempt to locate naval strategy in the Soviet scheme of things. Next, it addresses the evolving expecta- tions of future war and prescriptions for its conduct that have struc- tured Soviet military thinking over the last two decades, and conse- quently seem likely to be reflected in the Mediterranean Squadron's war plans. These expectations and prescriptions also shape the peacetime

operations of the Squadron, the conceptual background of which is then discussed in some detail. The discussion proceeds from postu- lations about Soviet strategy to observations about Soviet actions. And it is those observations and what they suggest about the strategies postulated that form the attempt at the end to outline future Soviet policy and practice.

0206 Soviet and Chinese Strategic Perceptions in Peacetime and Wartime. Rosenbaum (Harold) Associates, Inc., Burlington, Massachusetts. B.N. Garrett and B.S. Glaser. October31, 1982. 183pp. This report on Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the strategic en- vironment examines Soviet perceptions of the threat posed by China on Sino-American security ties; Chinese perceptions of the Soviet threat and the role of the strategic cooperation with the U.S. and Chinese strategy; and Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the character of war, including protracted nuclear war and postwar recovery. The study also develops peacetime/wartime framework for evaluating perceptions of the balance of power.

0389 Trends in Soviet Military Policy. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Benjamin S. Lambeth. October 1982. 34pp. The essay reviews the major doctrinal inputs into Soviet military policy, indicates important distinctions between Soviet and American ap- proaches where appropriate, and surveys the changing nature of Soviet military capabilities so as to underscore their growing con- gruence with long-standing Soviet strategy.

0423 Moscow Campaigns against War Propaganda. Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State), Washington, D.C. Assessments and Research. D. Hertzberg. November 1, 1982. 25pp. On September 23, 1982, the USSR Supreme Soviet suddenly ratified the September 23, 1936, League of Nations International Convention concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace. The con- vention essentially prohibits the transmission of war propaganda or any other information prejudicial to good international understanding. The unexpected Soviet move, coming in the midst of a peace campaign against alleged U.S. Cold War policies, may .presage a new Soviet diplomatic offensive against Western radio broadcasting to the USSR and Eastern Europe. Their goal would be to target Western radio stations, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in particular, as well as other subversive Western information media as violating the convention's

basic principles. Soviet claims that ratification was timely seem con- sistent with Moscow's recent propaganda attacks on RFE/RL's alleged role in the Polish crisis and bitter denunciations of an alleged U.S. ideological offensive against the USSR. Such claims implicitly provide the USSR with justification for the continued jamming of Western broad- casts. Moscow presumably calculates that because of the con- vention's moral and symbolic significance, Soviet exploitation of the war propaganda theme will find receptivity among developing nations, which share the USSR's contention that the international flow of information is Western dominated and should be regulated to protect national sovereignty. Having become a full party to the agreement, the Soviets nevertheless could find themselves vulnerable to chargés of violating certain of the convention's articles, specifically those calling for the verification and correction of incorrect or inaccurate broad- casts.

0448 The Tradeoff between Consumption and Military Expenditures for the Soviet Union during the 1980s. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Mark M. Hopkins et al. November 1982. 124pp.

This study develops a relatively new approach to the modeling of the Soviet economy that uses optimal control theory. The resulting Hop- kins-Kennedy optimal control model is used to address the primary research question of the study: what will be the tradeoff between Soviet consumption and defense spending during the 1980s? Section Two is devoted to the model, its strength is indicated by a number of historical scenarios in Section Three in which the model makes pre- dictions that can be checked against what actually occurred. Section Four examines the implications of an alternative view of Soviet eco- nomic history, put forth by Rosefielde and Lee. Section Five examines demographic change in terms of both growth of the labor force and its ethnic composition. The impact of differing rates of productivity growth and a scenario in which poor weather continues into the next decade are studied in Section Six. Section Seven describes the impact of the increasing cost of energy. Foreign trade, which is likely to play a cen- tral role in the Soviet economy in the next decade, is examined in detail in Section Eight. Section Nine compares a best case and a worse case scenario.

0572 Potential Threats to U.S.-Sovlet Deterrence: The Political Dimension. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. John Van Oudenaren. November 1982. 37pp.

A revised version of a paper presented at the conference on the future role of force in international relations, Bellagio, Italy, July 5-8, 1982, sponsored by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Arms Control Association, and the Rockefeller Foundation. This paper ana- lyzes the stability of U.S.-Soviet deterrence against the background of a changing global environment. It argues that a potential cause of in- stability is the clash between U.S. and Soviet views on the role of the unrealized military potential (in the form of economic power) outside the hands of the two superpowers. Soviet interests are served by the de- velopment of a special relationship with the U.S. in which the latter in effect polices its alliés to prevent them from challenging Soviet equality. From the American perspective however, it grows increasingly difficult to both defend its areas against the Soviet Union while at the same time policing these areas on behalf of the Soviet Union. Hence this is the American disillusionment with détente. The paper then sug- gests three possible ways in which the international order might develop so that the conflicting views of the U.S. and the USSR on the meaning of equality do not threaten deterrence.

0609 The Evolution of Soviet Requirements for Naval Forces-Solving the Problems of the Early 1960s. Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Naval Studies Group. Robert G. Weinland. December 1982. 42pp. Soviet intentions with regard to the objectives, conditions, and manner of use of their naval forces have undergone a number of significant changes over the last 20 years. So have those forces themselves. These changes are obviously related; but the character of that relation- ship is not as well understood as it should be, or might be. Clarifying the linkages between Soviet intentions and the capabilities they acquire to implement them is thus one of the two objectives of this discussion. Its second, and in some respects more important, objective is the identification of the role U.S. actions appear to have played in the evolution of Soviet intentions and capabilities during this period. Here not only the relationship, but the question of its very existence (which has been challenged widely in the academic community) must be addressed.

0651 Energy Resources of East Asian Siberia: Japan and the USSR at the Crossroads. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Wilbur Grant Wright. December 1982. 203pp. East Asian Siberia is a storehouse of various resources, particularly

10

those required for energy production. This vast area that captivates the imagination when Siberia is mentioned is almost exclusively un- known to the outside world. This thesis presents the physical reality of this harsh yet rich land and examines the governmental processes and moods inside Japan and the USSR as well as their joint interaction for development and benefit of this area. The hypothesis developed is that the energy resources of East Asian Siberia are available for exploi- tation if Japan and the USSR work closely to develop them. Their forced cooperation puts them at the crossroads; the routes they take will determine future relations and resource availability for both countries.

0854 Ballistic Missile Submarines of the United States and the Soviet Union: A Comparison of Systems and Doctrine. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Thorn W. Ford. December 1982. 122pp. This thesis compares the development of fleet ballistic missile systems in the U.S. and the Soviet Union and their contribution to the achieve- ment of national security objectives of each nation. To this end, sub- marine and missile technologies, elements of operational practices and support, and general strategic doctrine are traced. A comparative as- sessment of weapon system effectiveness and potential in achieving stated objectives is derived from capabilities, peacetime employment, and wartime plans as stated in open doctrinal documents.

Reels 1983

0001 Appearances of Soviet Leaders, January-December 1982. Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. March 1983. 215pp. The report is an alphabetical and chronological record of the appearances of selected Soviet officials during 1982.

0216 Implications of Technology Transfers for the USSR. Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California. Strategic Studies Center. Donald W. Green and Herbert S. Levine. January 1977. 68pp. Within the past hundred years of Russian history there have been two major periods of concentrated effort to acquire advanced foreign tech- nology. The first of these was connected with the industrialization spurt in the 1890s. As a result of this foreign investment, not only was the

11

capital stock of Russia greatly expanded, but also foreign technology was brought into Russia, both in the form of advanced capital equip- ment itself and in the form of human capital. Foreign technologists, experienced businessmen, managers, and engineers came to Russia as foreign companies were set up within Russia. Direct foreign invest- ment was thus responsible for the implantation of advanced techniques in several key industries. Moreover, the foreign firms competed with Russian firms inside Russia and forced the latter to be more efficient if they were to survive.

0284 Evaluation of the Soviet Tenth Five-Year Plan Using the SRI-WEFA Econometric Model of the Soviet Union. Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California. Strategic Studies Center. Donald W. Green, Gene D. Guill, et al. January 1977. 64pp. This assessment of the feasibility of the Soviet Tenth Five-Year Plan was the result of analysis employing the SRI-WEFA econometric model of the Soviet Union. The current version of the model, SOVMODII, has been developed during the course of the past two years through the combined efforts of economists from Stanford Research Institute's Strategic Studies Center and Wharton Econometric Forecasting Asso- ciates. This asessment, based on the Basic Guidelines for the Soviet economy for 1976-1980, which was published in the Soviet Press following its approval at the 25th Communist Party Congress, repre- sents one of the several issues areas chosen for application of the SRI-WEFA model, both because of its importance to U.S. policy plan- ners, and its usefulness in illustrating the model's capabilities.

0348 Soviet Program for Peace and the West European Peace Movements. Foersvarets Forskningsanstalt, Stockholm (Sweden) M. Skak. c. 1983. 76pp. Lately the questions of peace have come to play an important role in the security policy debate. This study deals with the Soviet peace campaign as well as the West European peace movements' ambitions and relations to Moscow. An analysis of alternative European develop- ments is also included.

0424 Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Implications for Europe and American Foreign Policy Options. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Robert Nelson Boudreau. March 1983. 119pp. This thesis concludes that Soviet expenditures in Indochina, par- ticularly Vietnam, have significantly reduced assets and options

12

available to the USSR in Europe. Economic, military, and political ex- penditures are assessed. Tradeoffs between the Soviet Union's Indo- china resource commitments and European limitations are established. Based on these tradeoffs three policy options for the U.S. in Southeast Asia are formulated--"hard-line," "low-key," and minimal involvement. A "low-key" option, with emphasis on diplomatic and economic instru- ments, is recommended as preferable to military means.

0543 Thresholds In Soviet Military Thought RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. B.S. Lambeth. March 1983. 15pp.

Since the early 1960s, American strategic theory has dwelled heavily on the question of conflict thresholds and their significance in deter- mining the advisability of various U.S. options in crises. This approach has been part of a broader American tendency to regard military power as a bargaining tool for selectively influencing adversary behavior in circumstances where the destructiveness of nuclear weaponry has ruled out more undisciplined modes of force employment. Its object has been to identify distinct levels in the scope and intensity of violence whose manipulation might influence an adversary's crisis decision making and thus capitalize on his reluctance to assume escalatory risks. The quintessential example of this fixation was Herman Kahn's classic escalation ladder, which depicted 44 discrete rungs of inter- state violence ranging from prewar crisis maneuvering to full-blown, insensate nuclear war. Although largely untested in practice, the in- tellectual premises that inspired this and similar notions have exerted a major influence on U.S. strategic concepts, not only for European and other regional contingencies but also for direct conflict with the Soviet Union. This paper reflects on how the Soviets have come to think about thresholds in their own strategic planning.

0558 Search of the Russian Scientific Literature for the Descriptions of the Medical Consequences of the Kyshtym Accident. Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee. Department of Environ- mental and Water Resources Engineering. F.L Parker. March 1983. 141pp.

This report describes a study concerning the nuclear waste accident at Kyshtym in the Soviet Urals in 1958. Soviet medical literature, inter- views with potentially knowledgeable people, and samizdat (under- ground documents smuggled to the West and/or surreptitiously cir- culated in the Soviet Union), were studied to attempt to determine what injuries or deaths, if any, occurred as a result of the event. All of the

13

cases of radiation exposure discussed in the various literature search- ed seemed to be typical occupational or therapy overdoses. No allusion to the massive numbers reportedly irradiated in the accident appears in the literature searched. Evidently, these data are classified and not discussed in the open literature. This study also resulted in a modification of our understanding of the accident's cause; i.e., per- haps there was no single cause. At present, the best supposition is that there were many releases of wastes to the river system over time, plus an explosion in the fuel reprocessing plant, and that would help to explain the widespread distribution of nuclides. The lack of short-half- lived nuclides relative to long-lived ones can also be explained by the release over an extended period and the time between the accident and the beginning of the studies.

0699 Soviet Threat to Europe: Prospects for the 1980s. Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Otto P. Channey, Jr. May 20, 1983. 44pp. This memorandum examines current Warsaw Pact capabilities in Central Europe, with particular emphasis on force modernization and improvements, doctrine and tactics, and attack scenarios. Pact prob- lems are discussed, including topography, logistics, reliabillity of allies, and language difficulties. Finally, the author discusses Soviet con- cerns for the remainder of the decade, concluding that the Soviets will not be able to launch a blitzkrieg against Western Europe that would lead to a quick and decisive victory.

0743 Soviet Crisis Relocation Program. Science Applications, Inc., McLean, Virginia. Center for Soviet Studies. Final Report, May 1, 1982-June 1, 1983. Leon Goure. May 1983. 261pp. This report describes and analyzes, on the basis of open Soviet source materials, Soviet civil defense concepts, plans, organization, priori- ties, training programs, and capabilities pertaining to crisis relocation of residents of high-risk urban areas and workers of significant eco- nomic installations. Soviet sources indicate not only that crisis relo- cation continues to be an important element of the Soviet civil de- fense program, but also that there is a requirement for the relocation of leadership elements, essential workers, and urban civil defense forces regardless of the availability of shelters in the cities. Soviet civil de- fense has well-developed, comprehensive plans for implementing a rapid relocation of the urban population to exurban areas in a highly organized and strictly controlled manner. While small-scale evacuation

14

exercises are conducted throughout the USSR, it is uncertain how well Soviet plans, organization, and procedures will perform in an actual large-scale relocation.

Reel 4 1983 cont.

0001 Soviet Diplomatic Relations and Representation. Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State), Washington, D.C. Current Analyses. D. Hertzberg. June 6, 1983. 20pp. This paper, intended as an informal research aid, lists those countries with which the USSR has diplomatic, consular, and/or commercial relations and includes the name, date of accreditation, and CPSU Central Committee membership (where applicable) of each Soviet ambassador. Also listed are countries with which the USSR has not exchanged diplomatic representation but which it has recognized, either unilaterally or reciprocally. Unilateral Soviet recognition, indi- cated in the Notes column, is recognition generally extended to a new nation by an official statement without reciprocation from the recog- nized party. This is a relatively informal diplomatic category that does not necessarily signify a Soviet intention to establish formal diplomatic relations. Ambassadors accredited to another country, with which the USSR has diplomatic relations but where no diplomatic mission exists per se, are so indicated. Foreign countries that host a Soviet embassy, but which do not have diplomatic representation in the USSR, are so indicated. Because an embassy generally includes a consular section, only consulates separate from the embassy are specifically listed.

0021 Soviet Shift in Emphasis from Nuclear to Conventional, Volume I: The Long-Term Perspective. Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Naval Studies Group. James M. McConnell. June 1983. 37pp. These two volumes detail the shift over time in the Soviet selection of military options. Volume I deals with changes in their long-term per- spective on military development. Having achieved a nuclear counter to the U.S. strategy of massive retaliation in the early 1960s, Moscow at first favored a long-term conventional emphasis as a follow-on, but abandoned this in 1965 in favor of nuclear options. However, in 1976- 1977, the Kremlin returned to a primary conventional orientation, rounded out recently with a declared policy of no first use of nuclear

15

weapons. All these shifts seem to have been reflected in changes in Soviet deterrence criteria and, considering their character and timing, may perhaps be best explained as symmetrical reaction to concurrent U.S. plans.

0058 Soviet Shift In Emphasis from Nuclear to Conventional, Volume II: The Mid-Term Perspective. Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Naval Studies Group. James M. McConnell. June 1983. 64pp. These two volumes detail the shift over time in the Soviet selection of military options. Volume II deals with the implementation of the long-term perspective in midterm doctrinal increments that coincide with the five-year plans. In each of the doctrinal periods since 1960, the Soviets have managed to introduce a new independent option: all-out nuclear war (1960-1965), a conventional local war in the Third World (1966-1970); limited intercontinental nuclear warfare (1971- .1975), theater nuclear war (1976-1980), and protracted conventional war between the two coalitions (1981-1985).

0122 New Soviet Strategy in the Third World. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Alexander R. Alexiev. June 1983. 49pp. This study sets forth in broad outline several major changes ob- servable in recent Soviet strategy for penetration in the Third World, details the specific instrumentalities of the Soviet guest for leverage, and addresses some of the Soviet Union's strengths and weaknesses. Section Two traces the origins and evolution of Soviet Third World policies up to the early 1970s and examines the causal factors and circumstances leading to a reassessment of Soviet policies and the formulation of a new strategy. Section Three highlights the international circumstances and Soviet military-political realities providing incen- tives for the new approach and analyzes its doctrinal-ideological frame- work. The specific methods and instrumentalities-military, political, and economic--of Soviet penetration of the Third World under the new strategy are addressed in Section Four. The main conclusions are presented in Section Five.

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0171 Modeling the Soviet Economy for Recovery after a Nuclear Attack: An Examination of Capital Accumulation, Labor Force Skill Levels, and Interactions with Agricultural Output Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. School of Engineering. S.S. Sato and D.C. Spraggins. June 1983. 140pp.

Research is conducted on the various types of post-attack recovery models available in the unclassified literature. Problems of economic substitution and the Soviet disaster recovery experience are examin- ed. Identification of the critical factors affecting post-disaster eco- nomic recovery is attempted. A four-sector input/output-based eco- nomic growth model is linked to a three-level education and personnel allocation system that includes age-specific death rates and labor force decrements due to training system development and military service. A ceiling is placed on annual percent increase in capital stock, and labor force deaths due to starvation are coupled to agricultural out- put. Results indicate possible masking of capital stock ceiling effects by the size of the starvation dieoff effects.

0311 Soviet Theater Nuclear Capabilities: The European Nuclear Balance in Transition.

Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. R. Kennedy. August 31, 1983. 39pp. This memorandum examines the changing strategic and theater nu- clear environment; Soviet theater nuclear force improvements and doctrine; the implications of Soviet theater nuclear build-up for deter- rence and the defense of Europe; and NATO's response. The author concludes that the changing balance of theater capabilities has re- sulted in a devaluation of deterrence, a decline in Western self-con- fidence, and an increase in NATO's vulnerabilities. The author also contends that if the Soviet Union is unwilling to negotiate a significant reduction of intermediate-range nuclear forces that now pose a serious threat to the West, the NATO deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles will not only help to restore balance to the NATO/Warsaw Pact nuclear equation, but also will enhance deterrence, reduce NATO's vulnerabilities, and thus, will contribute to crisis stability in Europe.

0350 Soviet Naval Indian Ocean Squadron. Raison d'Etre:. Action or Reaction?

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. A.M. Stout. September 1983. 128pp.

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The Soviet Naval Indian Ocean Squadron began its active deployments to the Indian Ocean in 1968. This led to a wide-ranging debate as to its purpose, which could be active or reactive in nature. To deal properly with the Squadron, it is important for the planner to understand the difference between the two. This thesis examines the broad range of theorized missions for the Squadron. These Western theories are com- pared to determine the relative merits of each. A very select number of Soviet writers' works are examined for any correlation with the Western theories. This is set against the background of a historical survey of U.S. and Soviet naval relations in the region. The results of these comparisons lead to the conclusion that the Squadron's mission is both active and reactive, and that most of the theories have some merit.

0478 Costs of the Soviet Empire. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. C. Wolf, Jr., K.C. Yeh, et al. September 1983. 78pp. This study develops and applies a comprehensive framework for es- timating all of the economic costs incurred by the Soviet Union in ac- quiring, maintaining, and expanding its empire. We define the "empire" to include the geographically contiguous countries of Eastern Europe and Afghanistan, and the parts of the empire that lie "abroad." The included countries cover a wide range of types and degrees of Soviet influence and control-a characteristic that is not unique to the current Soviet empire. We define the costs of empire to include costs incurred by the Soviet Union to maintain or increase control in countries under Soviet domination, to acquire influence in countries that are candidates for future Soviet control, and to thwart or subvert countries opposed to it. Previous studies of the costs of the Soviet empire have been con- cerned with selected parts of the total costs, for example, emphasizing costs associated with particular countries or groups of countries such as those in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), or with such specific cost categories as Soviet economic and military aid. Our study draws on this prior work, combining and supplementing it in various ways. Substantial gaps and inadequacies remain in the avail- able data. One of our aims is to highlight the most important gaps and thereby provide a basis for further data collection and analysis.

0556 Dissent and Nationalism in the Soviet Baltic. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Alexander R. Alexiev. September 1983. 54pp. This paper examines the evolution of Baltic dissent and nationalism in the 1970s and early 1980s, focusing on their determinants, signifi-

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canee, and potential for generating political instability in this important region of the Soviet Union. This is the region most directly affected by developments in Eastern Europe, and in turn it is the one most likely to affect Soviet policies in the area. The report focuses on Soviet policies and practices that are perceived as generating dissent and nationalist unrest in the Balkan republics and analyzes the scope and nature of, and constraints on, political and religious dissent there. Research for this study has included an extensive review of Western and Soviet literature and in-depth interviews with a number of recent émigrés from the Balkans.

0610 START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks): Problems and Prospects. Amy War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. R. Kennedy. November 1, 1983. 42pp. This memorandum examines origins of SALT and the complexities of the strategic arms control process. It focuses on such problems as those that arise from dissimilar perceptions of threat, differing force structures, growing vulnerabilities, rapid technological change, and the imperatives of verification. The author concludes that many of the same factors that gave impetus to strategic arms control efforts in the late 1960s and early 1970s remain. Thus, despite the chilling of re- lations between Washington and Moscow as a result of such events as those in Afghanistan, Poland, and Grenada, the Soviet attack on Korean Air Lines 007, and missile deployments in Europe, there is rea- son for guarded optimism concerning the possibility of another super- power strategic arms control agreement. The Strategic Issues Research Memoranda Program of the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, provides a means for timely dissemination of' ana- lytical papers that are not necessarily constrained by format or con- formity with institutional policy. These memoranda are prepared on sub- jects of current importance in areas related to the author's professional work or interests. This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study.

0652 The Economist's Perception of the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Balance • An Update for 1970-1981. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. J. Goldhamer. November 1983. 133pp.

This study compares the image of the U.S.-Soviet projected by The Economist (London) during 1979-1981, and characteristics of their reporting on the strategic balance, with the findings of an earlier study covering the years 1948-1973. In contrast to the earlier period during

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which the U.S. was generally regarded as enjoying overall superiority, The Economist m 1979-1981 perceives the balances as tilting in favor of the Soviet Union. Shifts are noted in the aspects of the strategic balance that The Economist considers critical in evaluating the bal- ance, with the conventional forces moving from the background to the forefront of attention and defensive capabilities receding. While most characteristics of The Economist's reporting on the strategic balance identified in the earlier study still prevail, a significant change is found in its treatment of new weapon developments. These are no longer perceived as creating an immediate shift in the strategic balance, even before they become operational.

0785 Le Monde's Perception of the U.S.-Sovlet Strategic Balance: An Update for 1979-1981. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. J. Goldhamer. December 1983. 65pp. This study compares the image of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance held by selecting Le Monde reporters, and specific characteristics of their reporting on the strategic balance, with the findings of a study covering the years 1948-1973. Le Monde's image of parity in the U.S. and Soviet strategic forces and a forecast of temporary vulnerability of U.S. land-based missiles in the 1980s are in marked contrast to the prevailing image of 1948-1973. Shifts are noted in aspects of the strategic balance that Le Monde considers critical in evaluating the balance, with the proportion that land-based missiles represents in the arsenals of the two sides and the balance in conventional forces and euro missiles taking on importance, and defensive capabilities less important. In 1981, there is a striking instance of a tendency, noted for the 1948-1973 period, to perceive an immediate shift in the strategic balance when a new weapon appears, well before it becomes operational.

0850 Security Assistance Rationales: The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. R.V. Kikla. De- cember 1983. 123pp. This thesis analyzes Soviet arms transfer policies within the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) relative to three perspectives: political and diplomatic, strategic and military, and economic. The political and diplomatic perspective emphasizes political control and maximization of Soviet influence as a primary rationale for Soviet arms transfers. The strategic and military perspective emphasizes military power and the maximization of the WTO's military potential as an alliance. The eco-

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nomic perspective focuses on the Soviet military-industrial complex and internal decision making as a factor in arms transfers. The inter- relationship of these three perspectives defines the objectives and limitations of Soviet arms transfers within the WTO. The thesis con- cludes that the quality of Soviet arms transferred to the WTO will always be at least a generation behind those equipping Soviet forces and that East European license production will only be of equipment that is relatively obsolete by Soviet standards.

0973 Salyut: Soviet Steps toward Permanent Human Presence in Space. Office of Technology Assessment, Washington, D.C. December 1983 87pp.

The study examines the range of capabilities that the Soviets have achieved in using men and women aboard the Salyut stations and the directions their program may take. It includes the results of a workshop held in December 1982 that marked the first time a large group of experts gathered for an extended, public, unclassified discussion of Soviet space activities. The Office of Technology Assessment found that the U.S. is ahead of the USSR in most areas of space science and application. The Soviets are more knowledgeable in space biology and medicine. The USSR's venture into space differs in two major respects: expanding human habitation beyond Earth is a fundamental goal; and in the modification and adaptation of technology it has already proven successful.

Reels 1984

0001 Aircraft Carriers In Soviet Naval Theory from 1960 to the Falklands War. Center for Naval Analyses. Alexandria, Virginia. Naval Studies Group. C.C. Peterson. January 1984. 21pp. The 23-year record of Soviet thinking about sea-based air power sug- gests that the Soviets decided to invest in CTOL aircraft carriers because they were unable to find ways in which the generation of V/STOL carriers they had designed in response to requirements of the 1960s could by themselves satisfy the radically redefined naval war- fare imperatives of the 1970s. This remains true in the early 1980s, even though the Falklands crisis has persuaded the Soviets that V/STOLs can have a role, a limited one, in the battle for air superiority over the ocean. The requirement for a CTOL carrier stemmed directly

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from a change in Soviet views on command of the sea, command of the air, and fleet air defense; and indirectly from a perception that the war at sea, contrary to earlier expectations, would be protracted and close- ly contested.

0022 "Stalbo Debates:" Their Point of Departure. Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Naval Studies Group. C.C. Petersen. January 1984. 16pp. "Stalbo Debates" are a series of articles published over the last two years in the principal Soviet theoretical journal, Morskoy Sbornik. Topics include: general part of the theory, theory of the naval art, theory of building the navy, theory of the navy's rear support, theory of the navy's command and control, theory of operational, tactical, and other types of training, and naval science. For all the contention reflected in the "Stalbo Debates," then, the participants all agree on a number of key points. This consensus is very likely a product of de- cisions made in the last half of the 1970s to reshape the Soviet armed forces organizationally and theoretically for the sake of better inte- grating their combined efforts in wartime. One result of this reorgan- ization has been the establishment of a High Command in the Far Eastern TVD.

0038 Changing Strategic Balance and U.S. Defense Planning. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. R. Kennedy. February 1, 1984. 37pp. This memorandum evaluates the nature of and objectives behind the unrelenting build-up of Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The author con- cludes that while the Soviet Union may be seeking some "margin of superiority," deterrence of nuclear war remains a pre-eminent Soviet objective. The author further concludes that while U.S. strategic retal- iatory forces have become more vulnerable to a Soviet pre-emptive attack, the Soviet Union does not yet have the capacity to execute a disarming "first-strike." Nevertheless, the U.S. must modernize its strategic forces and engage the Soviet Union in arms control efforts if future strategic instabilities are to be avoided.

0075 Military Dimension of Soviet Policy in the Third World. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. F. Fukuyama. February 1984. 32pp. Over much of the postwar period, the Third World has constituted the chief area of the East-West competition, and promises to remain so for

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the foreseeable future. The extraordinary burst of Soviet activism be- ginning with the October 1973 Middle East war and culminating in the invasion of Afghanistan was responsible, more than any other factor, for American disillusionment with détente and the subsequent broad decline in U.S.-Soviet relations. There is, however, considerable dis- agreement over the significance of the Soviet behavior and the extent to which it affects American security. The argument has been made, particularly in Europe, that the Soviet threat from and to the Third World has been vastly overblown because of the ephemeral nature of Soviet influence and the West's marginal stake in most countries there. Now that we are in the midst of a prolonged succession process during which Third World policy will almost certainly be re-evaluated in Moscow, it would be useful to stand back and assess the military dimension of postwar Soviet policy in the Third World and its con- temporary implications. Specifically, this article will attempt to answer two related questions: first, to what degree have military consid- erations been a driving force behind Soviet gains there to date; and second, to what extent have the Soviets been pursuing a systematic strategy, particularly in the past decade?

0107 Soviet Civil Defense Medical Preparedness Program. Science Applications, Inc., McLean, Virginia. Center for Soviet Studies. L Goure. March 1984. 128pp. This report describes and analyzes, on the basis of Soviet open source materials, the mission, organization, plans, training, operations, capa- bilities, and shortcomings of the Soviet Civil Defense Medical Service and its readiness to deal with mass casualties in the event of a nuclear war. The Civil Defense Medical Service incorporates the entire Soviet medical and public health system and all of its personnel and is rein- forced by a large number of Volunteer First Aid Squads recruited from the working population and students, elements of the armed forces' medical service, and the compulsory instruction of the entire pop- ulation in first aid. Civil defense instruction is compulsory for all medical students as well as for physicians and middle-level medical personnel. Soviet plans call for the pre-attack relocation of all medical and public health institutions and their personnel from high-risk urban areas to rural areas and the rapid expansion of medical facilities in small towns and rural areas. Some plans call for a two-stage medical evacuation system. The first stage will include first aid to casualties by First Aid Squads and the evacuation of the injured to Mobile First Medical Assistance Detachments that will operate in the areas of destruction and provide triage and emergency medical treatment.

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0235 Influence of Soviet and American Political Culture on Negotiating Positions: The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Case. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. W.R. Blackburn. March 1984. 129pp. This thesis explores the influences of the underlying political culture of the Soviet Union and the U.S. on the positions of those governments at the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations. It defines the term political culture as the conceptual framework within which politics operates. The thesis then discusses the historical evolution and pri- mary characteristics of the elite political cultures of both nations. In the process of this, a cultural model or stereotype of the political elite of each nation is postulated. This model is then utilized to evaluate the negotiating positions of each country from a cultural standpoint. Finally, the thesis concludes that political culture probably does in- fluence the positions of governments and may be a useful method of evaluating those positions and predicting future actions. In addition, the thesis sees a possibility of utilizing political culture as one method of determining the importance of those positions to the governments involved.

0364 Russian Culture and Soviet Science. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. B.C. Galvin. March 1984. 152pp. This thesis analyzes the effect of Russian culture and Soviet ideology on Soviet science. Russian culture is shown to inhibit the ability of Soviet scientists to achieve major breakthroughs or develop radically new theories. Culture does, however, enhance the Soviet ability to thoroughly exploit and innovatively apply proven scientific theories and technologies. The Soviet inability to achieve breakthroughs compels their reliance on Western technology. Their proficiency in exploiting proven technologies enables the Soviets to compete effectively with Western military systems. Thomas Kuhn's description of the scientific process is utilized as a framework in this analysis.

0516 Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Options for the 1980s and Beyond. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. J. Van Oudenaren. March 1984. 103pp. This report examines the importance of Eastern Europe to the USSR, the Soviet approach toward the region in the past, and possible future short-term and longer-term Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe. It examines dilemmas facing the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the Soviet "preferred vision" for a European order that would overcome

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these dilemmas. It assesses the collapse of the Brezhnev policy to- ward Eastern Europe, Soviet assessments of its causes, and likely responses.

0619 Impact of Soviet Ethnicity and Demographic Changes on Soviet Foreign Policy. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. P. W. Wyatt. March 1984. 76pp. This thesis examines Soviet ethnic and national problems resulting from the gradual demographic shifts presently underway. It considers the impact of the shift from a Russian majority in a Russian-dominated society, to the Russians becoming only one large minority group among many. The tensions that will increasingly strain the Soviet system as a result of the demographic changes and the complex problems with which the new Kremlin leadership must deal are discussed in relation to Soviet foreign policy. A major problem of the coming decades will be how the leadership attempts to resolve these changes. The nationality problems of the Soviet Union may not intrinsically be momentous, but are crucial for their potentially exacerbating effects on Soviet foreign policy.

0695 Limits of Intervention: Soviet Naval Power Projection Capabilities and the Decision to Intervene. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. G.D. Holliday. March 1984. 130pp. This thesis considers the factors that influence a Soviet decision to use naval power for intervention in Third World countries beyond their borders. A qualitative cost-benefit analysis is described for general application and several case studies are developed using decision points that follow from the analysis. Operational definitions of the phys- ical assets available for use in an overseas power projection are then offered and compared against the requirements for levels of escalation suggested by decision points that can be reasonably projected to occur.

0825 Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the Third World. Kent State University, Ohio. Lyman L Lemnitzer Center for NATO Studies. R.W. Clawson. March 31, 1984. 12pp. This paper discusses implications for NATO of the relationship between the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the Third World, specifically including: NATO nations' reactions to Soviet political involvements in former colonial areas; NATO nations' comparative assessments of

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economic and strategic threats or problems arising from Soviet Third World activity; assessment of Soviet intentions; and policy.

0837 Soviet Naval Mission Assignments, Part 1 : Soviet SSBN Roles in Strategic Strike. Ketron, Inc., Arlington, Virginia. Final Report, January 1977-April 1979. R.W. Herrick. April 1979. 209pp. This is the first document in a series of seven examining the Soviet open literature and public media on the subject of strategic strike from the start of the nuclear missile era after Stalin's death in 1953. Soviet naval writings and top military and political leaders' media appearances were researched. The evidence concerning the central issue of whether or not the navy's SSBNs were given a share with the strategic missiles forces in the initial deep strike mission against the continental U.S. proved adequate to permit drawing reasonably firm conclusions. This study uses a five-year period between the successive Soviet Party Congresses for the reason that Soviet reviews of strategy, doc- trine, and weapons procurement policy are all integrated with the five- year plans for overall production. Revised mission assignments for the five Soviet military services are more often than not completed in the months just before a Party Congress and approved by the Congress along with the new five-year plan.

Reel 6 1984 cont.

0001 Soviet Naval Mission Assignments, Part 2: Pro-SSBN Mission: The SSBN-Protection Mission. Ketron, Inc., Arlington, Virginia. Final Report, January 1977-June 1979. R.W. Herrick. July 13, 1979. 68pp. This study is the second in a series of seven to present the evidence available from Soviet naval and military writings of the existence in the Soviet naval mission structures of a second new nuclear era mission along with strategy strike by SSBNs: that of protection of these SSBNs while out of port. Importance is attributed to this mission by Soviet military and naval writers as well as the implications for the relative priority accorded to SSBN-protection with respect to other significant Soviet naval missions. The initial look at each of the missions taken in preparation for this project suggests that the SSBN-protection mission would be either number one in importance or among the top three. Once

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all ofthe remaining studies of the ten possible Soviet naval missions for a general nuclear war are completed, it should prove possible to list the SSBN-protection mission with some confidence in priority order with regard to the other nine missions.

0069 Soviet Officer Personnel Management System. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. M.L Wood. April 6, 1984. 33pp.

What are the major components of the Soviet Officer Personnel Man- agement System (SOPMS)? Are the prescribed procedures and the actual working procedures mutually supportive? Information analyzed was gathered from current Soviet public media documents, defectors, Soviet emigrants and contemporary unclassified publications. The Soviet military educational sub-system from preliminary training courses through their senior service college is reviewed as are the sub- systems of promotions, distributions/assignments, and separations. SOPMS and its sub-systems look good on paper, but the increasing Soviet media exposure of officer corruption and examples of poorer leadership depict major weaknesses/failures in the system. The triple chain of command supervisory system (Army, KGB, Communist Party) stifles initiative and often works in divergent directions. Loyalty to one's supervisor takes priority over loyalty to the army. Taking care of oneself comes before taking care of one's troops. Soviet officials are aware of the gulf between prescribed and actual practices and have in- stituted programs to close the gap and improve the officer corps, e.g., better schools, better training. Afghanistan is being used as a training ground to encourage more initiative in leadership exercises on the part of officers. SOPMS has improved in the last decade and the Soviet officer probably is better than his World War II counterpart. The final verdict on whether SOPMS is successful or not will have to be decided at a much later date or on a future battlefield.

0102 Soviet Naval Mission Assignments, Part 3: Appendices A-J. A Protracted Withholding Role for Soviet SSBNs. Ketron, Inc., Arlington, Virginia. Final Report, January 1977-January 1980. R.W. Herrick. 322pp. This study is the third in a series of seven addressing the question of whether or not the USSR presently has a strategy of withholding a significant part of the SSBN force to influence the course and outcome of any general nuclear war that continues beyond the initial nuclear ex- change. A preliminary review of the potentially relevant statements of naval, military, and political leaders over the 25-year period from

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January 1955 to January 1980 covered in this study made it apparent that if the evidence to answer the question regarding protracted SSBN withholding was contained at all in the outpouring of the Soviet media, it was well buried and would require research and analysis. Accordingly, a three-part analysis was designed: 1) all of the most promising state- ments of potential relevance would be extracted, categorized by sub- ject matter, and provided in appendices; 2) the data were based on a combination of the Soviet Communist Party's Congresses, which occur at five-year intervals and are the occasion for promulgating the new five-year economic plans; and 3) a final summary would examine each of the data sets across the entire quarter of a century to guard against the possibility that the methodology employed of examining the data in three separate chronological chunks had not introduced any significant errors or obscured any important relationships between like data in different services.

0424 Managing the Strategic Triangle: Summary of a Workshop Discussion. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. N.D. Levin and J.D. Pollack. April 1984. 88pp. In May 1983, The RAND Corporation convened a two-day workshop to explore a broad range of conceptual and practical issues associated with U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and the interactions of these policies within the U.S.-USSR-PRC strategic triangle. This note summarizes the main issues discussed at the workshop. It reveals not only considerable differences of views about the value of the strategic triangle concept to U.S. policy plan- ners, but also great uncertainty about whether and how to relate America's China policy to U.S. dealings with the Soviet Union. There was general agreement that U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and China must each be cast in basically bilateral terms and that an exces- sively manipulative approach to managing great-power relations can easily backfire; but at the same time it was recognized that U.S. policies toward each nation influence in some measure the actions of the other, whether intended or not. The discussion demonstrates that there is still no clear consensus on how to conduct interactive relations with the Soviet Union and the PRC.

0512 A Look at Meat and Poultry Production in the Soviet Union. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. R.A. Thompson. May 29, 1984.34pp. The Food Program announced by the Communist Party Central Com- mittee in May 1982 is a major effort to increase per capita consumption

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of quality food, especially the supply of meat and poultry products. The U.S. currently supplies about one-third of Soviet grain imports and there is good potential for this share to increase further, if the U.S. can regain credibility as a reliable grain supplier. A convincing argument can be made that distinct political advantage accrues to that country that has abundant agricultural commodities and through long-term trade relationships elicits from the other a degree of dependence for their food imports. The vagaries imposed on the Soviet agricultural sector by weather, centralized management, farm-worker productivity, and ruble constraints probably means that the USSR will be a major im- porter of agricultural commodities for the foreseeable future. The planned per capita consumption of meat and poultry by 1990 will still fall 18 pounds short of Soviet nutritional norms and will be about 66 pounds short of current annual U.S. consumption. In a country where military priorities have been allowed to dominate domestic policies to the point where canning of food is limited by the shortage of steel to make cans, there will certainly be much study in the Kremlin over "guns-or-butter" issues in the years ahead.

0546 Understanding Soviet Objectives and Behavior. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. R.A. Life. May 17 1984. 36pp.

The motivation for Soviet behavior in domestic issues and foreign policy is not well understood in the free world. Because the USSR is a superpower most people who have never visited the country tend to mirror-image the Soviet standard of living, way of life, and the basis for national decision making as nearly identical to that in the U.S. and other modern industrial nations. They are absolutely wrong. Soviet leaders respect three factors: raw military power, resolve on the part of national leaders to use that power, and a strong, visible economy. The Soviet people, and especially their leaders, suffer from an inferiority complex. The primary objective of Soviet leaders is to ensure the sur- vival of the Motherland and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and its leadership.

0582 Soviet Economic Stringencies: External Reactions and Reper- cussions. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. C. Wolf, Jr. May 1984 15pp. Soviet economic stringencies, unless they are appreciably relieved by Western credits, are likely to induce the Soviet leadership to be more parsimonious in its willingness to accept these burdens in the future.

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On the other hand, the expansion of Soviet international influence and power ranks sufficiently high among the objectives of the leadership that strong efforts will be made to meet the requisite costs of the em- pire, even in the face of economic stringencies at home.

0597 Sea Is Red: The Slno-Sovlet Rivalry and Its Naval Dimension. Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Naval Planning and Management. K.G. Weiss. May 1984. 51pp. Despite recent efforts to improve relations, Moscow and Beijing's competition in Asia has continued with little let-up since their proxy war in Indochina (1978-1979). As a result, China continues to look to the U.S. for support against the Soviet Union. This stability in U.S., Chinese, and Soviet relations can be explained, in part, by looking at the maritime element of the strategic equation in Far East. How do we account for the relative lack of change in relations among the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union-despite significant leadership changes in all three countries since 1979? The reason is simple: strategic realities, as the Chinese like to put it, make a dramatic transformation in the triangular equation difficult, if not necessarily inconceivable. And as in the past, recent Sino-Soviet negotiations have been accompanied by a competition for political and military advantage in Asia. This rivalry has spread to the seas bordering China. It is from the maritime perspective that this paper will view current dynamics in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

0648 End of the Brezhnev Era: Stasis and Succession. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. C.J. Duch. June 1984. 96pp. In the absence of constitutional guidelines for political succession in the USSR, the Brezhnev succession proceeded on an ad hoc basis. The election of Yuri Andropov as General Secretary in November 1982 followed an intense period of political coalition building, which ensued upon the death of Party Secretary Mikhail Suslov in January 1982 and Brezhnev's serious illness in March of the same year. Andropov's victory over his chief rival, Party Secretary Konstantin Chernenko, in- dicated that a coalition with foreign policy interests was able to control the succession and defeat a coalition of economic managers. The equipoise in the Politburo after Andropov's election indicates that key domestic and foreign policy issues were not completely resolved with Andropov's election and that future changes in the leadership may indicate a corresponding policy evolution.

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0744 Soviet R&D Statistics, 1970-1983. Indiana University at Bloomington. R.W. Campbell. June 1984. 67pp. The report updates several earlier reports under the same general title, revising and filling in some earlier data and extending all series to 1983 where possible. It continues the methodology for adjusting Soviet scientific manpower data to the National Science Foundation concept of scientists and engineers employed in research and development used in earlier reports, and adds to the explanation of the rationale for that methodology.

0811 Economic Leverage on the Soviet Union in the 1980s. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. AS. Becker. July 1984. 89pp.

This report presents a re-evaluation of the use of leverage on Soviet behavior by means of the instruments of East-West economic re- lations. A conceptual framework is presented in Sections Two and Three, centering on the ideas of leverage and denial as policy tools and on the opportunities and constraints offered by Soviet economic dependence and vulnerabilities. Sections Four through Five analyze the actual use of the major export instruments, grain, credit, and gas pipeline technology, during the early 1980s. Section Seven takes up the issue of consensus in the Western Alliance as a condition of successful East-West trade policy. The author concludes that the only possibility for effective denial over the long term is to aim at selective impedance of the Soviet military effort.

0900 Exploiting "Fault Lines" In the Soviet Empire: An Overview. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. J. Van Oudenaren. August 1984. 22pp.

The failure of the NATO alliance to keep pace with the growth of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military power has prompted discussion in the West of alternative approaches to security in Europe. A small but influential group of American specialists argues that NATO could strengthen its position relative to the Pact by exploiting the vulnerability of the Soviet "empire" to fragmentation along national, ethnic, or other lines. In peacetime, the U.S. and Western Europe could further their security interests by challenging the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe and seek- ing to split the USSR from its allies. In wartime, NATO could pursue a counteroffensive strategy aimed at terminating the war on the Soviet- Polish and Soviet-Czechoslovak borders. By announcing a counter- offensive strategy and acquiring the capability to implement it, these experts argue, NATO would improve its deterrent against conventional

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or nuclear war in Europe. These strategies for political offensives and military counteroffensives are based on the premise that the fault lines or cleavages within the Soviet empire can be identified and exploited. This paper examines this premise and its implications. It looks at the various intra-empire cleavages and analyzes their suitability for use in NATO political and military strategy.

Reel 7 1984 cont.

0001 Directory of Soviet Officials: Science and Education. Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. August 1984. 386pp. This directory identifies individuals who hold positions in or are mem- bers of selected scientific and educational organizations.

0387 Chronology of Soviet Dissidence: January 1970 through December 1982. Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State), Washington, D.C. Assessments and Research. I. Belousovitch and T. Davis. May 17, 1983. 77pp. This chronology was compiled from various annual, monthly, and weekly chronologies produced by the Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. As such, the chronology is intended as a research aid'and guide: it high- lights activities of the human rights dissidents, emphasizes the years 1977-1982, and does not cover in-depth all aspects of dissent in the USSR, such as nationalist and religious opposition.

0464 Directory of Soviet Officials: National Organizations. Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. November 1984. 364pp. This directory identifies individuals who hold positions in or are mem- bers of national-level Soviet organizations.

0828 Industrial Development of Siberia and the Soviet Far East RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. D.E. Pinsky. September 1984. 87pp. During the 1980s the Soviet leadership will be forced to cope with a growing energy shortage in the western industrialized core of the USSR by accelerating the extraction of fuel and raw materials east of the Urals. The major issue of Soviet policy is and has been the debate over

32

the appropriate nature and pace of economic development for the eastern regions, whether to maintain concentration on the fuel energy complex or to attempt balanced development across industries and between eastern and western regions. Although official declaratory policy continues to call for balanced comprehensive development, the energy-fuel focus has, if anything, increased. Given the general in- vestment constraint the Soviet leadership is now facing, combined with the Soviet leadership's resistance to reform and change, it is unlikely that there will take place the major shift and restructuring of investment for regions east of the Urals that a balanced economic development would require.

0915 What Soviet Commanders Fear from Their Own Forces. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. N. Leites. May 1978. 99pp.

Reactions are portrayed from the three principal publications in which they would be displayed: the Soviet armed forces' daily Red Star(KZ), the ground forces' monthly, Military Herald (VV), and the armed forces' political monthly, Communist of the Armed Forces (KVS). The study concerns the decade from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. Many of the statements quoted are attributed to junior officers. But they appear in publications that express in every detail the preoccupations of the High Command. Weaknesses presented are aimlessness, mindlessness, in- decision, carelessness, wasting time, scattering resources, lawless- ness, complacency, pretense, warring by oneself, bad moods, indiffer- ence, sluggishness, failure to carry through, intermittence, ups and downs, to and fro, falling from excellent, and giving up.

1014 "Rlmland" of Northeast Asia: A Study of Soviet Power Projection. Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. CD. Hilebrand. March 1984. 59pp. This report presents an outline and discussion of the geopolitical con- cept developed by N.J. Spykman as it relates to Soviet militarism. It emphasizes the importance to world stability of the "rimlands" of Eu- rope, the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and the Far East. For the pur- pose of this paper, the "rimland" of Northeast Asia is specifically examined and serves as a model of the entire geopolitical concept. The purpose of the study is to determine whether or not Soviet power pro- jection in Northeast Asia conforms to Spykman's theory of geopolitics.

33

Reel8 1984 cont.

0001 Future of Soviet-North Korean Relations. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. H. Gelman and N.D. Levin. October 1984. 62pp. This report examines factors that have influenced the Soviet rela- tionship with North Korea to the present time, and evaluates the prospects for this relationship over the next decade. It attempts, in particular, to isolate and weigh those factors that could make for significant change, particularly those that could contribute to greater instability on the Korean peninsula. From the perspectives of both the Soviet Union and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea the bilateral relationship has for many years been difficult and cool. There is reason to believe that we are entering a rather fluid and dynamic period that might present Moscow and Pyongyang with both new dan- gers and new opportunities. From the North Korea perspective, the most volatile factor concerns perpetuation of the ruling regime. On the Soviet side, there are two factors that could impel the Soviet leadership to consider important changes in policy. One would be the possibility of obtaining concrete security benefits. The other factor would be a decision by the U.S. to use South Korea as a platform for long-range theater nuclear weapons directed at the Soviet Union.

0063 State of Western Research on Soviet Military Strategy and Policy. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Benjamin S. Lambeth. October 1984. 73pp. This note reviews Western research on Soviet military thought, with special emphasis on Soviet doctrine and its impact on Soviet force planning and behavior. It traces the evolution of the field since the 1950s; examines the ongoing debate over major issues regarding the Soviet military challenge; discusses problems of evidence and inter- pretation as they apply to Soviet military research; and suggests new directions for the field. It is the overall character of the Soviet threat, not Soviet doctrine in isolation, that inspires the most heated con- tention in the current national security debate. Although some of this contention revolves about legitimate differences over the meaning of ambiguous data, it stems for the most part from a prior conflicting as- sumption about the Soviet Union.

34

0136 U.S. Economic Leverage and the Soviet Union. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. J.C. Fernandez. October 1984. 36pp.

This paper presents a disaggregate model of the workings of economic leverage. The model identifies factors that influence the probability of success in any attempt to use leverage, and those that affect the costs of making such an attempt. The model is used to identify areas of agreement and of controversy in the debate over the efficacy of lever- age, and reveals more agreement than might be apparent from the acrimonious literature on the subject. Analysis using the model sug- gests that the quality of the debate-and the likelihood of achieving some consensus-might improve if participants were to eschew their previous reliance on anecdotes and historical examples and concen- trate instead on gathering systematic information on specific factors that influence leverage outcome.

0172 War In Afghanistan: Soviet Strategy and the State of the Resistance. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Alexander R. Alexiev. November 1984. 9pp. This report contains a brief statement made to a Senate hearing held near the fifth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Topics include: the military, economic, and political dimensions; the state of resistance-weapons and supplies, and political and economic prob- lems; and resistance effectiveness and the question of aid.

0181 Strategic Employment of the Soviet Navy in a Nuclear War. University of Southern California, Los Angeles. J.J. Tritten. December 1984.571pp.

This study is primarily concerned with what appears to be the primary role of the Soviet Navy: preparation for fighting of a nuclear war in- volving the USSR and the U.S. in which the homeland of each of these nations is threatened with or subjected to destruction by long-range strategic nuclear systems (as strategic is generally used in the West). This research is concerned with two major issues. The first is to con- sider the strategic employment of the Soviet fleet in nuclear war and deterrence involving the Soviet and American homelands. Second, an important by-product is the creation of a better methodology for analyzing the Soviet Navy. The new methodology will be tested by con- sideration of these deterrence and war roles.

35

0752 Directory of Soviet Officials: Republic Organizations. Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. February 1985. 356pp. This directory is a listing of prominent personalities in the fifteen republics of the Soviet Union, their positions, when they were appoint- ed, and their dates of birth.

Reel 9 1984 cont.

0001 Challenges to Soviet Control in Eastern Europe. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. J.F. Brown and A.R. Johnson. December 1984. 44pp. This report summarizes and develops the findings of a project that ex- amined the security issues posed for the U.S. by the likely evolution of the Soviet Bloc during the 1980s and beyond. Primary emphasis was placed on the political, economic, and social challenges to Soviet interests in Eastern Europe, as the framework for appraising the extent to which East European military forces can augment Soviet military capabilities in the late 1980s and the degree to which the Soviet army can operate in Eastern Europe unconstrained by local developments. Among the authors' conclusions are the following: Poland has been pacified but not "normalized"; latent and active opposition continues; the process of pacification has made the army the real focus of power; and Poland and Rumania are in economic crisis, and economic prob- lems are severe throughout the region. Nevertheless, the East Euro- pean economies have developed to the point where they have no choice of improved performance if they are cut off from the inter- national economy. The decline of consumerism will contribute to social ferment and working-class frustration. The USSR and local leaderships in Eastern Europe will attempt to muddle through by pursuing con- servative and repressive, rather than adaptive status quo policies in the face of greater social ferment.

0045 Analysis of Soviet Military Manpower. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. C. Gurdeniz. De- cember 1984. 148pp. The effectiveness of any military force can be determined by the ca- pabilities and reliability of its individual members. This has always been the primary concern for military strategists and decision makers. Pre- diction of human performance is still a problem for the administrative

36

science area as well as military manpower area. Having such a big armed force, the Soviet Union confronts manpower problems that can affect overall military effectiveness. This thesis investigates the quali- tative and quantitative problems of Soviet military manpower. It looks at Soviet demography, manpower availability, ethnic issues, training, and education. It also attempts to appraise the performance of the Soviet soldier.

0193 Implications of the Soviet Military Presence In Southeast Asia. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. K.D. Viner. De- cember 1984. 112pp. This thesis considers the implications of the Soviet military presence in Southeast Asia. It shows the inadequacy of Soviet attempts to build in- fluence in the region through use of nonmilitary means and subsequent Soviet reliance on military assistance programs and military deploy- ments to gain influence. The reaction by regional nations and the U.S. to the military presence is described. Conclusions are reached con- cerning the threat posed by the Soviet military presence to both regional states and the U.S. The likelihood of a long-term Soviet military presence in Indochina is explored in relation to U.S. and regional security. The current U.S. response to the threat is detailed and the future course of action is suggested.

0305 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Trends and Precedent in Soviet Foreign Policy. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. J.P. Wilkins. De- cember 1984. 195pp. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been explained routinely in terms of Soviet vital security interests inherent in that region's geo- political setting. It nevertheless can be interpreted as the culmination of a trend in Soviet Third World policy toward the use of direct, un- mitigated force in pursuit of national interests. This thesis examines the significance of Moscow's decision to intervene in Afghanistan, in the context of overall Soviet policymaking. Additionally, the impact of recent reverses experienced by the Soviet Afghanistan policy on future Soviet decision making is essayed.

37

1985

0500 Possible Change in Soviet Views on the Prospects for Anti-Submarine Warfare. Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Naval Planning and Management Division. J.M. McConnell. January 1985. 18pp. In the summer of 1982 there was an apparent shift in Soviet views on the future potential for combating submarines. The following points trace the perceived evolution of this shift. From the early 1970s, Soviet emphasis had been on the submarine's great capacity for concealment and the decreasing cost effectiveness of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) as a "law-governed" trend extending into the foreseeable future. The first sign of a new perspective came in 1970-1980; here, the Soviets implied that no significant breakthrough in ASW was expected during the next five-year plan (1981-1985), but they did not rule out an effective innovation after that. In 1982, however, the Soviets appar- ently saw an operational capability arising ahead of this schedule. Using alleged U.S. views as an almost certain surrogate for their own, they indicated that a "technological breakthrough" in ASW (possibly nonacoustic and space-based) was imminent, perhaps (this is the best interpretation) before the end of the current planning period in 1985. A new "law-governed" trend in naval affairs was set out: the growing sus- ceptibility of submarines to detection and the increasing cost effective- ness of ASW. If Moscow is on the verge of a long-range detection ca- pability, then one might want to speculate on the means they would develop for submarine kill. It is conceivable that they might revive the concept, abandoned in the 1970s, of using a submarine-launched bal- listic missile (SLBM) system for hitting mobile targets at sea.

0518 Directory of USSR Foreign Trade Organizations and Officials. Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. January 15, 1985. 116pp. This publication is a reference guide to leading officials of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and other organizations engaged in foreign trade activities. It may be used to find the incumbents of given positions within an organization or the positions of given individuals. It also serves as a guide to the internal structure of some organizations.

0634 ClausewKz and the Soviets. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. W.F. Karbowsky. March 29, 1985. 19pp.

38

The basic question is whether the study of Clausewitz would be valuable from the point of view of understanding the Soviets. Data were gathered by examining the heritage of Lenin and specifically his study of Clausewitz. The evaluation was made of Soviet military science. For Lenin, Clausewitzian thought provided a theoretical framework for legit- imizing the Marx-Engels ideology. Succeeding generations of Soviets were attracted to Clausewitz because of his understanding of war. Clausewitzian theories have become so mingled with Russian military science that the latter cannot be understood without the former. Should the American military officer study Clausewitz? Certainly, if he or she has a desire to know the enemy.

0653 Future Directions for Analysis of the Soviet Economy. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. C. Wolf. December 1984. 10pp.

The political and social characteristics of the Soviet system ought to be the starting point for considering the future directions of modeling and analysis of the Soviet economy, because these characteristics have a pervasive and neglected effect on the relationships between the Soviet economy and the Soviet military and security objectives broadly construed. In turn, these relationships suggest an agenda for future research.

0663 Soviet Anti-SLOC Debate In Open Literature. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. D.M. Whetstine. March 1985. 109pp. This thesis examines and analyzes the Soviet anti-SLOC (sea lines of communication) debate as it appears in open literature from the pub- lication of Gorshkov's Sea Power of the State in late-1975 through the conclusion of the "Theory of the Navy" debate in mid-1983. The thesis, with note taken of the Russian/Soviet cultural background, focuses on both Soviet historical assessments of the significance of anti-SLOC operations during World War II, "The Great Patriotic War," and of anti- SLOC operations considered as a. modern problem of naval strategy and naval art. The anti-SLOC debate, in both its historical and modern context, reflected the priorities of Soviet military doctrine of the time and the planning uncertainties associated with transitional periods. The "Theory of the Navy" debate addressed, and may have resolved, criti- cal issues of the unity of naval doctrine with Soviet military doctrine that were first raised in the anti-SLOC debate.

39

0772 Concept of Discipline in the Soviet Armed Forces: A Paradox for the New Soviet Man. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. R.N. Smith. March 1985. 52pp. This thesis is an examination of discipline in the Soviet armed forces. A review of the historical development of the concept of discipline re- veals an interesting paradox. Throughout Russian and Soviet history there is a consistent pattern to rely on physical punishment to impose discipline that continues to the present day. This is in contrast to regulations and reforms seemingly designed to limit the use of physical punishments for disciplinary purposes. The reliance on punishment is in further contrast to the successful methods employed by Alexander Suvorov to impose discipline. The examination of discipline in the Soviet armed forces also reveals a second paradox. This paradox arises due to the Soviet Marxist-Leninist insistence for quantification to provide scientific solutions, while discipline is recognized as an un- quantifiable morale factor of war. An examination of current disciplinary problems in the Soviet armed forces highlights this point.

0824 Reliability of the Warsaw Treaty Organization: Can the Soviet Union Depend on Its Northern Tier Allies? Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. K.A. Prichard. March 1985. 147pp. This thesis examines the reliability of Czechoslovakia, East Germany (GDR), and Poland (the Northern Tier Eastern bloc states) as Soviet allies in case of a war with NATO. The success of Soviet efforts to bind the political, military, and economic systems of these states into a ho- mogeneous whole under Moscow's control is evaluated. In spite of a good deal of interdependence among the East Bloc countries, hostility towards the Russians and between the various ethnic groups makes control difficult and reliability questionable in a conflict with the West. East Germany is the most reliable of the three and is not likely to shift its position in the near future in spite of differences of opinion on how to deal with East German-West German relations. Czechoslovakia is out- wardly reliable, but only because the people see no chance of breaking the Soviets' grip. Poland is now, and will be for the foreseeable future, an unreliable ally, but one whose geographical position is so vital to the Soviet Union that the Russians will expend whatever resources nec- essary to keep it under control.

40

0972 USAWC (United States Army War College) Military Studies Program: Conversations with a Soviet Officer-Towards a More Balanced View of History.

Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. B.P. Mullady. April 15, 1985. 36pp. While assigned to the U.S. Military Liaison Mission in Potsdam, East Germany, the author had several conversations with Soviet officers concerning the Second World War. Building on this experience, the Soviet version of the war is presented using a variety of Soviet sources and emphasizing differences with the Western version. The author then discusses the problem with both versions and concludes that the truth is somewhere between the two accounts. The most serious problem is that our de-emphasis of the Great Patriotic War has allowed U.S. Army officers to overlook the major campaigns and main course of the war as well as fail to study the tactics, strategy, and doctrine of our most pow- erful potential enemy today. Military officers need to know this war far better than they do.

1008 C2 Soviet Style-Control and Control. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. D.C. Stutz. May 21, 1985. 25pp.

The relationship between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the government of the country, and its military is one which is not under- stood, nor appreciated, by a large segment of the American people. Although the constitution of the USSR guarantees many individual rights and privileges and a representative type government there are many qualifiers that must be viewed in depth. It is the Communist Party that maintains control over all aspects of the government, and the citizenry, through its control over the nomination of approved can- didates. When the Bolsheviks came to power, they readily gained control of the military and used it as their control mechanism. To further enhance their control over the country, the KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs were formed to watch over the armed forces and the population. The Party maintains its control with an organization struc- ture that parallels that of the government and ensures that Party elites, at each level of government and Party, are dual hatted with positions in each. Thus it is the Party that in effect controls everything the repre- sentative government does. Control of the armed forces is maintained in the same manner. Party organizations exist at each level of com- mand throughout the armed forces to direct their training and readiness.

41

1983 Addendum

1033 Soviet Military Doctrine: An Overview. Department of the Air Force, Washington, D.C. K.M. Currie. May 2, 1983. 32pp. This assessment, one of a series produced by the Directorate of Estimate's Strategic Studies Division, provides a general overview of Soviet military doctrine. It examines how Soviet doctrine is formulated, how it is structured, and what it tells us about the Soviet perceptions of a future war. What emerges from the discussion is the clearly offen- sively oriented war-fighting, war-winning nature of Soviet military doc- trine and Soviet views of war and deterrence that differ fundamentally from our own. This assessment has avoided the pitfalls inherent in many Western studies that mirror-image Soviet military doctrine with that of the U.S. It is published at the unclassified level to ensure the widest possible dissemination and discussion of the issues it raises. This publication should serve as a stimulus to further understanding and examination of the Soviet military threat.

1065 USSR-Japan Energy Cooperation in Siberia: Implications for U.S.-Japan Relations. Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. O.K. Chapman. March 1983. 14pp. This paper examines how a seemingly straightforward bilateral Japan- ese energy cooperation project can become a contentious problem when multilateral foreign policy issues come to the fore. The focus is on how joint Soviet-Japanese oil and gas exploration in Eastern Siberia became a source of bitter U.S.-Japanese disagreement when Presi- dent Reagan sought to impose trade and technology sanctions against the Soviet Union to block or delay the completion of the Siberian gas pipeline deal with Europe. This is only one of several examples of how sudden changes in U.S. foreign policy have served to dampen Tokyo's enthusiasm for close energy cooperation with Washington. Prospects for future Japan-U.S. energy cooperation will be better understood by examining them within a broader economic foreign policy context.

42

SUBJECT INDEX The following index is a guide to the major subjects of this collection. The first

Arabic number refers to the reel, and the Arabic number after the colon refers to the frame number at which a particular subject begins. Hence 3: 0934 directs the researcher to the subject that begins at Frame 0934 of Reel 3. By referring to the Reel Index that constitutes the initial section of this guide, the researcher can find the main entry for this subject.

Afghanistan foreign policy 9:0305 military policy 5:0075 Soviet empire 4:0478 strategy 8:0172

Agriculture commodities 6:0512 output--post-nuclear attack

recovery 4:0171 Aircraft carriers

naval theory 5:0001 see also Navy

Andropov, Yuri election of 6:0648

Anti-SLOC (sea lines of communication) debate

literature 9:0663 Antisubmarine warfare (ASW)

9:0500 Armed forces (Soviet)

commanders 7:0915 discipline 9:0772 ethnic factor 1:0664 medical service 5:0107 see also Navy

Arms control SALTtreaty4:0610 strategic balance 5:0038

Balkan dissent and nationalism 4:0556

Ballistic missile submarines U.S. 2:0854 USSR 2:0129,0854

Baltic region dissent and nationalism 4:0556

Brezhnev, Leonid Eastern Europe 5:0516 era 6:0648 Far East 1:0713

Capital accumulation post-nuclear attack recovery

4:0171 Central Asia

1:0713 Chernenko, Konstantin

6:0648 China, People's Republic of (PRC)

risk-taking 1:0713 rivalry 6:0597 security-U.S. 2:0206 strategic perceptions 2:0206

43

strategic triangle 6:0424,0597 U.S.-Soviet conflict 1:0902

Civil defense crisis relocation 3:0743 medical preparedness program

5:0107 Clausewitz, Karl von

9:0634 Cold War

U.S. policies 2:0423 Command system

1:0198; 7:0915; 9:1008 Communist of the Armed Forces (KVS)

Soviet commanders 7:0915 Communist Party Congress, 25th

3:0284 Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)

Central Committee 4:0001 control"C2 9:1008 Food Program 6:0512 leadership 6:0546

Consumerism 9:0001

Control C2 9:1008

Conventional weapons 4: 0021, 0058

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)

4:0478 Crisis relocation program

3:0743 C2

9:1008 Culture

. 5:0364 Czechoslovakia

reliability of 9:0824 Decision making

Afghanistan 9:0305 military 9:0045

Defense planning U.S. 1:0902

Defense posture 2:0046

Defense spending 2:0448

Demographic changes 5:0619

Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering

1:0880 Detente

U.S.-Soviet 2:0572 Deterrence

military development 4:0021,0058 navy-strategic employment 8:0181 U.S.-Soviet 2:0572

Diplomatic relations representation 4: 0001 Soviet-Greek 1:0233 Soviet-Turkish 1:0233

Directories 7:0001,0464:8:0752

Discipline armed forces 9:0772

Dissidence chronology 7:0387

East Asian Siberia energy resources 2:0651

Eastern Europe control 9:0001 East-West economic relations

2:0046 security assistance 4:0850 Soviet Union-foreign policy 5:0516

East Germany see German Democratic Republic

East-West economic relations 2:0046; 6:0811

Econometric model SRI-WEFA 3:0284

Economic costs empire 4:0478

Economic power 2:0572

Economic relations East-West 2:0046; 6: 0811

44

Economist strategic balance 4:0652

Economy five-year plan 3:0284 future 9:0653 general 1:0198 leverage 6:0811 optimal control theory 2:0448 post-nuclear attack recovery

4:0171 stringencies 6:0582 U.S.-leverage8:0136

Education officials 7:0001

Energy industrial development-shortages

7:0828 nuclear power 1:0140 resources-East Asian Siberia

2:0651 Soviet-Japanese cooperation-

Siberia 9:1065 U.S.-Japanese cooperation 9:1065

Ethnic factor armed forces 1:0664 foreign policy 5:0619

Europe foreign policy 3:0424 nuclear balance 4:0311 security-Soviet empire 6:0900 threat 3:0699

Falklands War naval theory 5:0001

Far East build-up 1:0713 industrial development 7:0828 Sino-Soviet rivalry-naval dimension

6:0597 Fault lines

Soviet empire 6:0900 "First-strike"

strategic balance 5:0038 Five-year plan

antisubmarine warfare 9:0500 general 3:0284

Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN)

2:0129; 5:0837; 6:0001,0102 Food Program

USSR-meat and poultry production 6:0512

Foreign investments 3:0216

Foreign relations Afghanistan 9:0305 costs 1:0198 Eastern Europe 5:0516 ethnicity 5:0619 Greece and Turkey 1:0233 Indochina 3:0424 military dimension 5:0075 Third World 9:0305 trends 9:0305

Foreign trade general 2:0448 organizations-directory 9:0518

Gas pipeline 2:0046

Geopolitics 7:1014

German Democratic Republic (GDR) reliability of 9:0824

German wartime strategy, 1941-1945 nationalities 2:0001

Global military capacity 1:0122

Great Patriotic War anti-SLOC debate 9:0663 history 9:0972

Greece foreign policy 1:0233

Indian Ocean deployment 4:0350

Indian Ocean Squadron navy 4:0350

India-Pakistan War (1971) 1:0713

Indochina foreign policy 3:0424 military presence 9:0193

45

Industrial development 7:0828

Industrialization Siberia and Far East 7:0828 technology transfer 3:0216

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force negotiations 5:0235

International financial system 2:0046

Japan economic relations 2:0046 energy cooperation-U.S. 9:1065 energy cooperation-USSR: Siberia

9:1065 energy resources 2:0651 ; 9:1065 relations-Northern Territories

1:0480 Kahn, Herman

escalation ladder 3:0543 KGB

C29:1008 general 6:0069

Korea, Democratic People's Republic of see North Korea

Kuriles 1:0480

Kyshtym accident nuclear waste 3:0558

Labor force skill levels-post-nuclear attack

recovery 4:0171 League of Nations International Convention

2:0423 Literature

scientific 3:0558 Meat and poultry production

Food Program 6:0512 Medical preparedness program

civil defense 5:0107 Mediterranean

naval presence 2:0160

Middle East Soviet surrogates 1: 0122 war 5:0075

Militarism 7:1014

Military behavior 1:0664,0713; 6:0546 build-up-Far East 1: 0713 capabilities 1:0664; 9:0045 commanders 7:0915 development 4:0021,0058 discipline 9:0772 doctrine 9:1033 economy 9:0653 ethnic factor 1:0664 intervention 1:0902 manpower 9:0045 medical service 5:0107 options 4:0021 policy 2:0389 publications 7:0915 science 9:0634 Slavic dominance 1:0664 Southeast Asia 9:0193 spending 1:0198; 2:0448 Third World 5:0075 thought 3:0543 Western research 8:0063 Western system 5:0364 see also Armed forces (Soviet);

Navy; Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO)

Military expenditures Indochina 3:0424; 9:0193

Military Herald (VV) Soviet commanders 7:0915

Ministry of Foreign Trade 9:0518

Minorities military 1:0664

Mobile First Medical Assistance Detachments

5:0107 Models

economic 2:0448; 3:0284

46

Monde, Le strategic balance 4:0785

Moscow propaganda 2:0423

Nationalism dissent-Baltic 4:0556

Nationalities German wartime strategy 2:0001

National Science Foundation 6:0744

National security-U.S. 4:0610; 5:0075; 8:0063; 9:0001

Naval theory 5:0001 ; 9:0663

Navy aircraft carriers 5:0001 anti-SLOC debate 9:0663 antisubmarine warfare 9:0500 capabilities 2:0129 Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine

(SSBN) mission 6:0001,0102 Indian Ocean Squadron 4:0350 Mediterranean 2:0160 mission assignments 6:0102 nuclear war 8:0181 officers 1:0359 power 5:0695 rear support 5:0022 requirements 2:0609 Sino-Soviet rivalry 6:0597 "Stalbo Debates" 5:0022 strategic employment 8:0181 strategic strike 5:0837 strategy-debates 9:0663 strategy-Mediterranean 2:0160 submarines 2:0129,0854; 5:0837;

6:0001,0102;9:0500 Nazi Germany

nationalities 2:0001 Negotiations

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force case 5:0235

"New Soviet Man" 9:0772

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Northern Tier allies 9:0824 nuclear balance 4:0311 relationship 5:0825 Soviet empire 6:0900 Soviet foreign policy 1:0233

Northeast Asia "rimland"7:1014

Northern Territories 1:0480

Northern Tier allies dependency 9:0824

North Korea relations 8:0001

Nuclear attack economic recovery 4:0171

Nuclear forces intermediate-range 4:0311 ; 5:0235

Nuclear power 1:0140

Nuclear war navy 8:0181

Nuclear waste Kyshtym accident 3:0558

Nuclear weapons 4:0021,0058

Optimal control theory economy 2:0448

Peace program 3:0348

Personnel Management System officers 6:0069

Poland control 9:0001 reliability of 9:0824

Polish crisis-propaganda 2:0423

Politburo 6:0648

Political culture 5:0235

Politics culture 5:0235 U.S.-Soviet deterrence 2:0572

47

Poultry production Food Program 6:0512

Propaganda war 2:0423

Publications military 7:0915

Radio Free Europe (RFE) propaganda 2:0423

Radio Liberty (RL) propaganda 2:0423

Raw materials Urals 7:0828

Red Star {KZ) Soviet commanders 7:0915

Republic organizations officials 8:0752

Research and development (R & D) statistics 6:0744

Resistance Afghanistan 8:0172

"Rimland" Northeast Asia-Soviet power

7:1014 Risk-taking

China 1:0713 Rumania

control 9:0001 Russians

culture and Soviet science 5:0364 pre-Soviet 1:0664 scientific literature 3:0558

Salyut Program space 4:0973

Samizdat Kyshtym accident 3:0558

Science culture 5:0364 literature 3:0558 officials 7:0001

Sea lines of communication (SLOC) 9:0663

Security national U.S. 4:0610; 5:0075;

8:0063; 9:0001 rationales 4:0850

Security assistance Eastern Europe 4:0850

Siberia energy resources 2:0651 industrial development 7:0828 Japan-energy cooperation 9:1065

Sino-American security 2:0206

Sino-Soviet Border Crisis (1969) 1:0713

Sino-Sovlet rivalry naval dimension 6:0597

Sino-Vietnamese hostilities 1:0713

Slavic dominance military 1:0664

Southeast Asia military presence 9:0193

Soviet Civil Defense Medical Service 5:0107

Soviet commanders fears of 7:0915

Soviet economic stringencies 6:0582

Soviet empire costs 4:0478 fault lines 6:0900

Soviet intervention naval power 5:0695 see also Afghanistan

Soviet military doctrine overview 9:1033

Soviet-North Korean relations 8:0001

Soviet Officer Personnel Management System

6:0069 Soviet officers

conversation 9:0972 Personnel Management System

6:0069 strengths and weaknesses 1:0359 see also Armed forces (Soviet);

Military; Navy

48

Soviet officials foreign trade organizations 9:0518 national organizattons 7:0464 republic organizations 8:0752 science and education 7:0001

Soviet Party Congress 5:0837

Soviet science Russian culture 5:0364

Soviet Union Afghanistan 8:0172; 9:0305 anti-SLOC debate 9:0663 antisubmarine warfare 9:0500 armed forces 1:0664 ballistic missiles 2:0854 Baltic region 4:0556 C2 9:1008 China, People's Republic of (PRC)

2:0206; 6:0597 Clausewitz, Karl von 9:0634 crisis relocation 3:0743 defense posture 2:0046 diplomatic relations 4:0001 dissidence 7:0387 Eastern Europe 5:0516; 9:0001 economic leverage 6:0811 ; 8:0136 economy 1:0198; 9:0653 • empire 4:0478; 6:0900 energy resources 2:0651 European threat 3:0699 Far East 1:0713 five-year plan 3:0284 Food Program 6:0512 foreign policy 5:0619 foreign trade 9:0518 industrial development 7:0828 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force

Negotiations 5:0235 Japan-energy cooperation: Siberia

9:1065 leaders-appearances 3:0001 meat and poultry 6:0512 military 1:0001 ; 2:0389,0448;

3:0543; 9:0045,1033 nationalities 2:0001

naval officers 1:0359 naval theory 5:0001 navy 2:0129,0160; 5:0695 Northern Territories 1:0480 Northern Tier allies 9:0824 North Korea 8:0001 nuclear power 1:0140; 4:0311 objectives and behavior 6:0546 officials 7:0001,0464; 8:0752 Party Congress 5:0837 power projection 7:1014 program for peace 3:0348 Salyut Program 4:0973 security assistance 4:0850 strategic triangle 6:0424 surrogates 1:0122 technology transfer 1:0880;

3:0216 Third World 4:0122; 5:0825 U.S.-strategic balance 4:0652,

0785 Vietnam 3:0424

Space travel Salyut Program 4:0973

SRI-WEFA Econometric Model 3:0284

SSBN (Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine)

missions 5:0837; 6:0001, 0102 "Stalbo Debates"

5:0022 Stanford Research Institute

3:0284 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT)

origin 4:0610 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

problems and prospects 4:0610 Strategic missile forces

5:0837 Strategic nuclear forces

5:0038 Strategic planning

U.S. 3:0543

49

Strategic triangle managing 6:0424 Sino-Soviet rivalry-naval

dimension 6:0597 submarine-launched ballistic missile

(SLBM)9:0500 Strategy

military 2:0389 naval 2:0160 Soviet empire 6:0900 Third World 4:0122 U.S. 4:0021 Western research 8:0063

Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)

9:0500 Submarines

2:0129, 0854; 5:0837; 6:0001, 0102;9:0500

see also Navy Subversion

Middle East 1:0122 Surrogates

Middle East 1:0122 Suslov, Mikhail

party secretary 6:0648 Suvorov, Alexander

discipline 9:0772 Technology

Western 5:0364 Technology transfer

1:0880; 3:0216 Theater nuclear forces

USSR 4:0311 Third World

East-West economic relations 2:0046

foreign policy 9:0305 foreign policy-military dimension

5:0075 general 5:0825 nuclear or conventional war 4:0058 strategy 4:0122 U.S.-Soviet conflict 1:0902

Trade foreign 2:0448; 6:0811 ; 9:0518

Turkey foreign policy 1:0233

25th Communist Party Congress five-year plan 3:0284

Ukraine occupation 2:0001

United States Army War College (USAWC)

Soviet officers 9:0972 Urals

raw materials 7:0828 U.S.

ballistic missiles 2:0854 defense planning 1:0902 economic leverage 8:0136 economic relations 2:0046 foreign policy 3:0424 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force

Negotiations 5:0235 military 1:0001 Soviet conflict 1:0902 strategic balance 4:0652,0785;

5:0038 strategic theory 3:0543 strategic triangle 6:0424, 0597 see also Strategic Arms Reduction

Talks (START) U.S. defense planning

Soviet conflict 1:0902 strategic balance 5:0038

U.S.-Japan relations USSR-energy cooperation 9:1065

U.S.-Soviet conflict defense planning 1:0902

U.S.-Soviet strategic balance The Economist 4:0652 Le Monde 4:0785

Vietnam 3:0424

War Afghanistan 8:0172; 9:0305 nuclear 8:0181

50

War propaganda 2:0423

Warsaw Pact see Warsaw Treaty Organization

Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) capabilities 3:0699; 9:0001 general 5:0825 Northern Tier allies 9:0824 nuclear balance 4:0311 reliability 9:0824 security assistance 4:0850 Soviet empire 6:0900

Wehrmacht (German armed forces) citizens 2:0001

Western Alliance East-West economic relations

2:0046 Western research

military strategy and policy 8:0063 West European peace movements

3:0348 Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates

3:0284 World War II

1:0359; 2:0001 ; 9:0972

51

THE SPECIAL STUDIES SERIES

Africa, 1962-1985

Asia, 1980-1985 China, 1970-1980

Europe and NATO, 1970-1985

Immigration, 1969-1985

International Trade, 1971-1985

Japan, Korea, and the Security of Asia, 1970-1980

Latin America, 1962-1985 The Middle East, 1970-1985

Multinational Corporations, OPEC, Cartels, Foreign Investments, and Technology Transfer, 1971-1985

Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, and the Threat of Thermonuclear War, 1969-1984

The Soviet Union, 1970-1985

Terrorism, 1975-1985

Vietnam and Southeast Asia, 1960-1980

UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA