spatial reasoning in tenejapan mayans...spatial reasoning in tenejapan mayans peggy li* linda...

Spatial Reasoning in Tenejapan Mayans

Peggy Li* Linda Abarbanell Harvard University

Anna Papafragou

University of Delaware

Lila Gleitman University of Pennsylvania

* Correspondence can be sent to P. Li ([email protected]) or L. Abarbanell ([email protected]), Laboratory for Developmental Studies, Harvard University, 25 Francis Ave, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.

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Acknowledgments We wish to thank Randy Gallistel, Susan Carey, and Anna Shusterman for their input. Special thanks go to the community of Tenejapa, Chiapas, especially Alfonso Lopez Santiz and family, CELALI and the Casa de Cultura, Tenejapa, Chiapas. This research was supported by the MBB Faculty Initiative Fellowship and a FLAS Fellowship sponsored by the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard to Linda Abarbanell, and NRSA Postdoctoral Fellowships from NIH to Peggy Li (#F32HD043532) and Anna Papafragou (#F32MH06020).

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ABSTRACT Language communities differ in their stock of reference frames (coordinate systems to

reference locations and directions). English typically uses egocentrically‐defined axes

(“left‐right”). Other languages like Tseltal Mayan lack such a system but use

geocentrically‐defined axes (ʺnorth‐southʺ). It has recently been argued that the

availability of frames of reference in language determines the availability or salience of

the corresponding spatial concepts. In a series of experiments, we explored this

hypothesis by asking whether the absence of an egocentric frame of reference in Tseltal

affects Tseltal speakers’ ability to reason in terms of left and right. In tasks comparing

Tseltal speakers’ ability to solve spatial problems requiring an egocentric frame of

reference to ones requiring a geocentric frame of reference, we found that Tseltal

speakers could easily solve the egocentric problems, and that performance on these

tasks was generally more robust than performance on geocentric tasks. These results

offer evidence against current versions of linguistic relativity.

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Do speakers of different languages come to perceive and conceptualize the world

differently? For the last half of the past century, the linguistic relativity hypothesis was

viewed as untenable by many (e.g., Heider & Oliver, 1972; Pinker, 1994). More recently,

the hypothesis has returned to the forefront of debates in cognitive science and many

commentators now endorse stronger or weaker versions of it (see the essays in

Gumperz & Levinson, 1996; Bowerman & Levinson, 2001; Gentner & Goldin‐Meadow,

2005; cf. also Whorf, 1956 for the original formulation of the hypothesis, and Gleitman &

Papafragou, 2005 for a critical review).

Perhaps the best‐known candidate for linguistic relativity is the domain of spatial

relations, which has been the focus of extensive and influential experimental

investigations (Brown & Levinson, 1992, 1993a, b; Levinson, 1996, 2003; Levinson, Kita,

Haun & Rasch, 2002; Majid, Bowerman, Kita, Haun, & Levinson, 2004; Pederson,

Danziger, Wilkins, Levinson, Kita, & Senft, 1998). These studies start with the

observation that there is considerable cross‐linguistic variation in linguistic

communities’ choices of spatial frames of reference. For example, English typically

makes use of an egocentric, body‐defined coordinate system to reference locations of

objects (“The cup is to the left of the bowl”) or to give directions (“Turn right”).

However, many languages make little or no use of such a spatial frame of reference.

One such language is Tseltal, an indigenous Mayan language spoken in the community

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of Tenejapa and other parts of the Highland region of Chiapas, Mexico. Although

Tseltal has words for ‘left’ (xin) and ‘right’ (wa’el), they are extremely infrequent in

speech. Because of their infrequent use, not every adult Tseltal speaker knows these

two terms. Moreover, the words are restricted in use: they define body parts. Brown

and Levinson (2001) reported that most informants use xin and wa’el exclusively in

nominal compounds with arm and leg terms, and not for any other body parts. These

body part words also do not extend to regions outside the body. Corroborating Brown

and Levinson (2001), Abarbanell (Jan., 2007) tested Tseltal speakers’ comprehension of

xin and wa’el. About 69% of the speakers she sampled correctly identified the xin and

wa’el sides of their body at above chance criterion when given body part commands

(e.g., “Raise your left arm.”). Furthermore, of those who were above chance, only 64%

understood unconventional, but grammatical commands extending the terms beyond

the scope of body (e.g., “Point to the left box”).1

In place of egocentric coordinates, Tenejapans utilize a system of terms (alan and

ajk’ol) based on the overall inclination of the terrain (“downhill” and “uphill”) they

inhabit. For instance, rather than saying “Pass me the cup to the left”, Tenejapans would

request the cup “to the uphill”. These geocentrically‐defined terms are used even when

1 Note that the failure to interpret the unconventional commands despite knowing xin and wa’el as body terms does not necessarily show that left‐right concepts are difficult to grasp, and that such relationship did not occur to the listeners. Alternatively, since there were no established conventions in the language, the listeners might not know who’s left or right (e.g., the experimenter’s or the listeners) was meant despite the fact that one box sat to the right and one to the left of the listener. Further studies, such as the present ones, are necessary to establish whether such concepts are indeed difficult for Tseltal speakers.

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one is on flat terrain to reference general directions which roughly correspond to the

north‐south axis. Moreover, they are used in descriptions of small‐scale arrays such as

the arrangement of items on tabletops for which English speakers prefer left and right.

Directions on the horizontal, orthogonal to the uphill‐downhill axis, are referred to

equally as ta jejch (‘crosshill’). 2

These striking cross‐linguistic differences in spatial encoding have been associated

with corresponding differences in spatial concepts in speakers of different languages.

For instance, Tseltal‐speaking Tenejapans have been credited with the ability to

accurately track geographical locations and directions regardless of egocentric

displacement (what is known as “dead reckoning” in other species). Levinson et al.

(2002) cite the case of a woman who was taken to an unfamiliar town and, in a strange

house at night, asked her husband whether the hot water tap was the uphill (southern)

or the downhill (northern) one on the sink. According to another report, a Tenejapan was

blindfolded, spun around over 20 times in a darkened house and, “still blindfolded and

dizzy”, pointed in the correct direction of batz’il alan, or “true downhill” (Brown &

Levinson, 1993b). Conversely, left/right asymmetries are claimed to be “systematically

downgraded” in Tenejapan cognition (Levinson, 2003).

2 A terminological note: reference frames in the world’s languages have often been described in the literature in terms of a tripartite distinction between relative, intrinsic, and absolute (Levinson, 1996). This set of terminology is highly controversial (Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 2000; Watson, Pickering, & Branigan, 2006). For present purposes, we adopt the terms “egocentric” vs. “geocentric”. For further discussion of these various terminologies, see Gallistel (1999), Gleitman, Li, Abarbanell, Gallistel, and Papafragou (in prep), and Shusterman & Li (under review).

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More pertinently for present purposes, Tseltal‐speaking Tenejapans were compared

to speakers of Dutch (a language with left/right terms like English) on a series of

nonlinguistic spatial tasks. The tasks made use of the properties of different coordinate

systems which dissociate under rotation. For example, participants were first shown a

spatial array on a table (e.g., a card with a red dot to the left/north of a blue dot). They

then turned 180° to face a second table where they were asked to identify the “same”

array from a range of alternatives. Crucially, after turning, there are two equally correct

solutions, depending on one’s reference frame. One can either mentally rotate the array

along with one’s body, preserving its left‐right (egocentric) orientation, or translate the

array with respect to the environment, maintaining its north‐south (geocentric)

orientation. In such tasks, Dutch speakers overwhelmingly prefer egocentric responses,

while Tseltal speakers primarily produce geocentric responses. Similar preferences

surface in tasks that ask participants to recreate the motion path of an agent moving

along a maze after having themselves rotated 180°. This fairly strong correlation

between spatial language and spatial reasoning has led Levinson and colleagues to the

conclusion that language shapes one’s underlying preferences for representing spatial

relations.

These results have raised considerable discussion and their interpretation has been

greatly debated (see Li & Gleitman, 2002; Levinson et al., 2002). One issue left open by

this previous set of experiments concerns the scope and actual limitations of Tseltal

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speakers’ spatial reasoning skills. Notice that the experimental evidence for this

population’s reasoning style is mostly based on their preference for geocentric solutions

to ambiguous rotation tasks where participants were asked to reproduce the “same”

spatial array or path. These tasks have at least two correct solutions (one geocentric, the

other egocentric), so participants need to guess the experimenter’s intent as to what

counts as the “same” in order to solve the task. It is possible that, in interpreting the

open‐ended experimental instructions, participants consult the way their language

community customarily speaks about or responds to inquiries about locations and

directions (see Li & Gleitman, 2002). In Tseltal, where geocentric vocabulary is used

even for small‐scale (e.g., tabletop) arrays, spatial identity is taken to preserve

geocentric coordinates. Similarly, in Dutch or English, where left and right are typically

used for tabletop space, the “same” is taken to preserve this egocentric alignment.

This raises the question of what would happen if the spatial task is no longer open‐

ended and there is a correct solution. Would Tseltal speakers still be influenced by the

way their language community customarily speaks in solving such a task? If language

restructures nonlinguistic cognition in the manner suggested by Levinson (2003) and

colleagues, the effect of language will remain even when task directions are clear:

Tseltal speakers should find it easier to solve tasks requiring a geocentric versus an

egocentric response. In addition, Tseltal speakers should face difficulties if forced to

solve spatial tasks requiring the use of left‐right coordinates. But if Tenejapans are able

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to switch easily and flexibly to an egocentric perspective when task demands are

unambiguous and favor egocentric solutions, the claim that spatial reasoning is driven

by the linguistic encoding of space becomes less plausible.

To test these predictions, we conducted a series of three experiments which tested

Tseltal speakers’ spatial reasoning skills. Our experiments were unambiguous versions

of the classic rotation experiments reported above (i.e., they had correct solutions). In

each experiment there were two matched conditions that varied in whether the

geocentric or the egocentric frame of reference was required to correctly solve the task.

The egocentric condition alone informs us of Tenejapans’ ability to reason about left and

right. A comparison of the two conditions allows us to assess Tenejapans’ relative

difficulty in reasoning egocentrically vs. geocentrically.

Experiment 1

Participants

Twenty‐six Tseltal‐speaking adults (mean age = 35, SD = 16.31) were recruited

through Casa de Cultura in Tenejapa.3 The participants were tested individually in a

quiet and furnished room that had a large window with a view to the outside. Each

3 Our previous research (Gleitman, Li, Abarbanell, Gallistell, & Papafragou, in prep.; Abarbanell, Jan., 2007) verified that this population used predominantly geocentric linguistic frames of reference. Using the director-matcher task described in Pederson et al. (1998), 8 pairs of directors and matchers never used any “left” or “right” type terms in discussing spatial arrangements. We also elicited linguistic descriptions from the current twenty-six participants after their participation in both Experiments 1 and 2. Specifically, the experimenter used a ball to traverse a path through a maze and then asked the participant to describe the path. The paths were the same ones that the participants saw and recreated during the test trials of Experiment 2. None of the participants, including those in the egocentric condition, used the left-right terms to describe the paths. As expected, they predominantly made use of landmarks and geocentric terms in describing the paths.

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participant was paid 50 pesos for his/her time. Our subjects were mostly unschooled

and illiterate and knew little or no Spanish.

Stimuli

Two sets of twelve identical (6 in. x 6 in.) cards, each with two same‐design dots on

it (see Figure 1a), were constructed. For one set, the two dots varied in size. For the

other set, the two dots varied in color.

Procedure

This task was adapted from Brown and Levinson’s (1993a) “chips tasks”. The basic

paradigm involved memorizing the orientation of two dots on a card (e.g., the green dot

is left/south of the yellow dot) and then selecting the “same” card from four identical

cards rotated at 0°, 90°, 180°, and 270° (see Figure 1b).

(a) (b)

Figure 1. Stimuli set used in Exp. 1.

(a) (b)

Figure 1. Stimuli set used in Exp. 1.

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Similar to the original Brown and Levinson’s chips task, a familiarization phase

preceded test trials. The experimenter first displayed four identical but distinctly

oriented cards in a row. The participant was then asked to make another row with four

more identical cards beneath the first row so that the new cards matched in orientation

to the first row. The experimenter demonstrated once with the new cards and then

asked the participants to do the same. Correction, although rarely necessary, was

provided for the mis‐oriented cards. Next, the participant was introduced to the task

with two practice trials: given a stimulus card, the participant had to find the “same”

card among four identical but differently oriented cards. As practice, the participant

made the selection with the stimulus card in full view. The familiarization then

continued with 4 memory trials for which the participants memorized the dot

orientations. The stimulus card was placed inside a 6”x6” square box and presented to

the participant. Once the participant memorized the orientation of the card, the

experimenter then closed the box and laid out the other four identical cards in their

distinct orientations for the participant to select the “same” card. After selection, the

box was opened to provide feedback. The practice and memory trials involved only

one table, with the participants always facing in a single direction.

The test trials involved two identically oriented tables at two ends of the room. The

participants stood between the two tables, close to and facing the first table. The tables

were oriented such that the participant’s left‐right was aligned with the uphill‐downhill

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(north‐south) axis, just as in Brown and Levinson (1993a)’s studies. Before the test trials,

participants were given 2 rotation training trials to practice turning and learn how to

hold the box: Participants memorized the two dots on a card placed inside the square

box while facing the first table. The box with the card inside was carried by the

participant to the second table; there the box was closed and participants had to identify

the “same” card from four distinctly oriented identical cards. Participants were

*Note: For rotation training trials, the box is kept open until Table 2. For test trials (as depicted here), the box is closed at Table 1.

Egocentric condition:Participant picks up box and rotates 180°. As a result, the box is rotated 180° and translated to Table 2.

Geocentric condition:Participant rotates 180° and then picks up box. As a result, the box is not rotated and is only translated to Table 2.

Table 1 Table 2

Table 1 Table 2

Figure 2. Egocentric and Geocentric conditions of the chips recognition task (Exp. 1). The top and bottom panels depict how the box is carried by the participant from Table 1 to Table 2.

*Note: For rotation training trials, the box is kept open until Table 2. For test trials (as depicted here), the box is closed at Table 1.



Table 1 Table 2

Table 1 Table 2*Note: For rotation training trials, the box is kept open until Table 2. For test trials (as depicted here), the box is closed at Table 1.



Table 1 Table 2

Table 1 Table 2



Table 1 Table 2

Table 1 Table 2

Figure 2. Egocentric and Geocentric conditions of the chips recognition task (Exp. 1). The top and bottom panels depict how the box is carried by the participant from Table 1 to Table 2.

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randomly assigned to either an Egocentric or a Geocentric condition. In the Egocentric

condition, they held the box containing the card as they rotated so that the card also

rotated 180o. In the Geocentric condition, the box with the card was carried by the

participant such that it did not rotate, even though the participant turned around to

walk to the second table (Figure 2). This manipulation was expected to encourage

Egocentric vs. Geocentric solutions to the task. Participants were then given 8 test trials,

where the same rotation procedure was followed but the box containing the card was

closed before rotation. After selecting the “same” card at Table 2, the box was opened to

provide feedback. In test trials, the orientation of the dots (left‐right/north‐south or up‐

down/east‐west) was fully counterbalanced, as was the choice of card set used

(variation in size/color of the dots).

Results and Discussion

Figure 3 plots the results for the familiarization and test phases. The Geocentric and

Egocentric groups were comparable on the familiarization trials. For the two practice

trials, the two groups did not differ in correctly identifying the “same” card among four

as the stimulus card (73% correct for the Geocentric group vs. 77% correct for the

Egocentric group, t(24) = .27, p = .79). The two groups were comparable on the four

memory trials (88% correct for Geocentric group vs. 83% correct for the Egocentric

group, t(24)=.62, p = .55). The memory trials served not only as familiarization, but also

as a check to see if the participants in the Geocentric and Egocentric conditions had

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comparable memory capacity. Finally, the two groups also did not differ for the

rotation training trials (62% correct for Geocentric vs. 77% for Egocentric group,

t(24)=1.24, p = .22).

The percent correct for the test trials was submitted to a 2 (Condition: Egocentric,

Geocentric) x 2 (Orientation: Left‐right/north‐south, Up‐down/east‐west) x 2 (Card Set:

Size, Color) ANOVA, with Condition as a between‐subject factor. The results yielded

no main effects or interactions (p > .15). Most importantly, the non‐significant effect of

Condition (F(1, 24)=1.38, p = .25) indicated that the Geocentric group (74% correct)

performed no better than the Egocentric group (85% correct). Both groups were well

above chance.4

4 We also included 4 “leave card” trials at the end of each session where participants did not carry the card to the second table. These trials also yielded no significant main effects or interactions: success rate in the Geocentric condition (77%) was no different from the Egocentric condition (75%).

85%77%

83% 77%74%62%73%

88%

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%

Practice Memory RotationTraining

Test

Familiarization Phase Test Phase

% Correct

Egocentric (n=13)

Geocentric (n=13)

Chance

Figure 3. Results for the chips recognition task (Exp. 1).

85%77%

83% 77%74%62%73%

88%

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%


Test


% Correct

Egocentric (n=13)

Geocentric (n=13)

Chance

85%77%

83% 77%74%62%73%

88%

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%


Test


% Correct

Egocentric (n=13)

Geocentric (n=13)

Chance

Figure 3. Results for the chips recognition task (Exp. 1).

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One might argue that Tenejapans in the Egocentric condition could have succeeded

in the task by initially adopting their preferred geocentric encoding (i.e, “The green dot

is south of the yellow dot”) and then “flipping” their responses (“Now the green dot is

north of the yellow dot”). But if this two‐step process had occurred, it would have had a

cost: Tenejapans could be making more errors in the Egocentric than the Geocentric

condition as a result of the extra “flipping” step. However, we find no evidence for such

difficulty in the pattern of results.

Tseltal speakers’ success on both conditions demonstrates that they can keep track of

and memorize the relationship between the card dots not only with respect to the

environment, but with respect to themselves. This finding offers evidence against the

possibility that the lexico‐semantic gap in encoding left‐right relations in Tseltal creates

a conceptual gap in Tseltal speakers’ spatial reasoning. We went on to test Tseltal

speakers’ spatial reasoning in a more complex task (Experiment 2), since task

complexity has been claimed to increase reliance on culturally/linguistically dominant

frames of reference (see Levinson et al, 2002).

Experiment 2

Participants

The same 26 Tseltal speakers from Experiment 1 participated in this task.

Participants were assigned to the same condition as in Experiment 1. For example, the

Egocentric condition participants in Experiment 1 were again assigned to the Egocentric

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condition in Experiment 2.5

Stimuli

For the test phase, a 10 in. x 10 in. evenly‐gridded square maze (Figure 4a) was

constructed and laminated. A small ball was used during the experiment to

demonstrate a path movement starting from the center of the maze. Test paths consisted

of 1, 2 or 3 legs (Figure 4b). We also constructed a simpler 7 in. x 7 in. square maze for

the familiarization phase, which was used to demonstrate only 1‐leg paths (Figure 4c).

Each maze had a cardboard maze cover.

Procedure

This task is adapted from Brown and Levinson (1993a)’s maze task. For each trial,

participants memorized a path traversed by a ball held by the experimenter and then 5 We replicated our first two experiments in a more rural community (El Retiro) located more than three hours walking distance from the municipal center in an area not easily accessibly by road. There were no significant differences in performance across the two groups.

Figure 4.Mazes used in the maze task (Exp. 2). Panel (a) depicts the 10”x10” complex maze used in test trials. Panel (b) shows sample test paths. Panel (c) depicts the 7”x7” simple maze used in training trials.

1‐Leg

2‐Legs

3‐Legs

(a) (b) (c)

Figure 4.Mazes used in the maze task (Exp. 2). Panel (a) depicts the 10”x10” complex maze used in test trials. Panel (b) shows sample test paths. Panel (c) depicts the 7”x7” simple maze used in training trials.

1‐Leg

2‐Legs

3‐Legs

1‐Leg

2‐Legs

3‐Legs

1‐Leg

2‐Legs

3‐Legs

(a) (b) (c)

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recreated the path. A 6‐trial familiarization phase using the simple maze preceded the

test trials. At the first table, the experimenter demonstrated a straight‐path originating

from the maze center. Participants were then instructed to hold the maze according to

condition (Egocentric or Geocentric) and walk to the second table to recreate the path

on the maze. In the Egocentric condition, the maze was held by the participants as they

rotated so that it also rotated 180° and carried over to the second table. In the Geocentric

condition, the covered maze was carried to the second table but not rotated itself, even

though participants rotated. After 4 such familiarization trials, a maze cover was

introduced. The maze cover was decorated with a complex pattern of lines to block

visual imagery or visual tracing of the path on the maze while the maze was being

carried. Two more familiarization trials with the participant carrying the covered maze

to the second table ensued. The familiarization included at least one path in each of the

four directions (up/east, down/west, left/north, right/south). The experimenter

demonstrated the correct path in case of errors.

The test phase involved the same rotation procedure but with the more complex

maze (Figure 3) and a maze cover. Each participant was given 10 test trials (2 1‐leg

paths, 4 2‐leg paths, and 4 3‐leg paths).6

6 We also administered 10 “leave maze” trials at the end of this study for which participants were told to continue doing the same thing but leave the maze at Table 1 and recreate the path on an identical maze at Table 2. Performance was degraded in these trials (percentage correct were respectively 76%, 79%, 60% for the 1‐, 2‐, and ‐3 Legs of the Egocentric condition; 76%, 60%, and 31% for the Geocentric condition), but the same pattern of main effects and interaction held.

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The familiarization trials reconfirmed the comparability of the Geocentric group and

Egocentric group in memory capacity and understanding of the task for simple straight‐

paths on the simple maze (92% correct for Geocentric group vs. 97% correct for the

Egocentric group, t(24)=1.5, p = .16).

Turning to test trials (Figure 5), we present the results in terms of path complexity

(number of legs). A trial was counted as correct if the participant retraced the entire

path correctly. As the Figure indicates, Tseltal speakers’ performance on the Egocentric

condition clearly surpassed the Geocentric condition as the number of legs in the test

paths increased. A 3 (Leg Number: 1, 2, 3) x 2 (Condition: Geocentric, Egocentric)

ANOVA using percent correct as the dependent measure revealed a main effect of

Condition (F(1, 24)=24.7, p < .001), reaffirming that the Egocentric condition was easier

Figure 5. Results of the test trials of the maze task (Exp. 2).

Egocentric (n=13)

Geocentric (n=13)

0102030405060708090100

1‐Leg 2‐Legs 3‐Legs

% Trials Correct

100%92%

96%60%

80%35%

Figure 5. Results of the test trials of the maze task (Exp. 2).

Egocentric (n=13)

Geocentric (n=13)

0102030405060708090100


% Trials Correct

100%92%

96%60%

80%35%

Egocentric (n=13)

Geocentric (n=13)

Egocentric (n=13)

Geocentric (n=13)

0102030405060708090100


% Trials Correct

100%92%

96%60%

80%35%

0102030405060708090100


% Trials Correct

100%92%

96%60%

80%35%

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than the Geocentric condition. There was an effect of Leg Number (F(1, 24)=64.7, p <

.001), with 1‐leg being easier than 2‐legs (p < .001) and 2‐legs being easier than 3‐legs (p

< .001). Lastly, the Leg Number x Condition interaction was also significant (F(1,

24)=14.7, p < .001), suggesting that, as the number of legs increased, so did the difference

between Geocentric and Egocentric conditions.

Once again these results demonstrate that Tseltal speakers are capable of reasoning

egocentrically, ruling out strong versions of linguistic relativity. Even more stunningly,

they show that geocentric reasoning can be harder than egocentric reasoning for a

group of speakers whose language predominantly encodes directions and location with

geocentric terms: this outcome is inconsistent with weaker versions of linguistic

relativity which claim that linguistic encoding preferences make certain spatial

reasoning patterns more accessible or salient than others.

Experiment 3

In this experiment, we compared egocentric with geocentric reasoning in Tseltal

speakers in a task that required the use of spatial frames in retrieving hidden objects.

The task was designed such that left‐right encoding could be used to successfully locate

the hidden object in the Egocentric condition. Similarly, only geocentric encoding could

successfully retrieve the hidden object in the Geocentric condition.

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Participants

Twenty‐four Tseltal‐speaking adults (mean age = 45.6; SD=20) who had not

participated in the previous experiments were recruited from the same Tenejapa

population. They were tested individually in the same room as previous experiments.

Stimuli

In the Egocentric condition, we used a swivel chair with spokes to the left and right

on which two identical boxes were attached. In the Geocentric condition, the same chair

was used but the spokes and boxes were removed and the boxes were placed on the

floor to the left and right of the chair (see Figure 6).

Procedure

Each participant was tested on both the Egocentric and Geocentric condition, with 8

trials per condition. Order for the two conditions was blocked and counterbalanced. For

the task, participants sat on a swivel chair with two boxes, one to each (left/right) side of

Figure 6. Swivel chair set‐up (Exp. 3).

Egocentric Geocentric

Figure 6. Swivel chair set‐up (Exp. 3).

Egocentric GeocentricEgocentric GeocentricGeocentric

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a chair. In the Egocentric condition, the boxes rotated with the chair and participant. In

the Geocentric condition, the boxes remained stationary (on the floor) while the subject

was rotated. On each trial, the experimenter indicated in which box she was going to

hide the coin. The initial position of the chair faced east for each trial so that the

left/right sides corresponded to north/south. Then the participant was blindfolded and

spun slowly 360° plus an additional 90°, 180°, 270°, or 360°. The blindfold was

subsequently removed and the participant was asked to point to the coin’s location on a

single try. The final positioning of the chair was randomized with two trials per

position for each condition.


The percentage correct (i.e., retrieval of the coin on the first try) for the Egocentric

Condition (92.3%) was surprisingly higher than the Geocentric Condition (80.0%; paired

t(23)=2.82,p=.01). Since this was a within‐subjects design, this result shows that the same

person typically found the Egocentric condition easier than the Geocentric condition. 7

There was no a priori reason to expect poorer performance on the Geocentric condition

relative to the Egocentric condition. Tenejapans could have easily encoded the correct

box in the Geocentric condition (“The one to the south/The one next to the table”) and

as a result performed correctly. In fact, given the anecdote from Brown and Levinson

7 We replicated the effect with another group of Tenejapans (n=24, Ego: 94.4% vs. Geo: 76.2%) in which we provided increased incentive to respond correctly on both types of trials by letting them exchange the coins retrieved on the first try for actual currency.

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(1993b, p. 52) in which a Tenejapan spun around 20 times was able to point in the

agreed direction while still dizzy and blindfolded, we expected at‐ceiling performance

from our non‐blindfolded, non‐dizzy participants. Nonetheless, our finding supports

the conclusion from Experiment 2: egocentric reasoning seems to be easier than

geocentric reasoning regardless of the language one speaks.

General Discussion

Previous cross‐linguistic studies on speakers’ spatial reasoning skills (e.g., Pederson

et al., 1998; Majid et al., 2002) have raised considerable discussion and their

interpretation has been greatly debated (see Li & Gleitman, 2002; Levinson et al., 2002).

An issue, left open by these previous studies for which the current studies began to

address, pertains to the scope and actual limitations of Tseltal speakers’ spatial

reasoning skills. Our studies show that Tseltal speakers are capable of reasoning in

terms of left/right concepts despite the lack of corresponding words for spatial

coordinate systems in their language. This conclusion goes against strong versions of

linguistic relativity, according to which lexical gaps may plausibly lead to conceptual

gaps (cf. Dehaene, Izard, Pica & Spelke, 2006 for a related demonstration of geometric

reasoning in populations without geometric vocabulary). Perhaps more surprisingly,

our results also show that the dominance of geocentric terms in the Tseltal linguistic

spatial system does not create an advantage for geocentric over egocentric spatial

reasoning: depending on task demands, Tseltal speakers can flexibly switch between

23

the two systems. Furthermore, they are often better able to reason egocentrically than

geocentrically, especially when confronted with more complex reasoning tasks (see also

Niraula, Mishra, & Dasen, 2004). This speaks against certain weaker relativistic views,

according to which linguistic preferences for encoding spatial relations make certain

spatial systems more salient or accessible than others (Levinson, 2003; Majid et al., 2004;

Pederson et al., 1998).

These findings are even more striking given that our methods made only minimal

and subtle changes to the battery of rotation tasks which have been used by previous

researchers to support linguistic relativity. There is no evidence that our tasks trained or

taught participants to behave in a way that they were unaccustomed to. Our practice

sets where the logic of the task was demonstrated were quite short: moreover, during

these practice trials, participants quickly caught on to the task demands and provided

appropriate responses.

In sum, even though unexpected on previous theoretical and empirical relativistic

claims in the literature, the conclusion that Tenejapan Mayans are flexible in their

spatial reasoning is not so surprising. After all, multiple frames of reference are

necessary to represent where things are in everyday life, and several creatures from

birds to the lowly bee have been know to make use of these different spatial systems

(Gallistel, 2002a, b). These observations, together with the experimental results reported

above, can best be explained by assuming that the linguistic encoding of spatial frames

24

of reference underrepresents people’s ability to think about where objects are located or

how they move in space.

25

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