special collection service pacific sigdev conference march

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TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL Special Collection Service Pacific SIGDEV Conference March 2011 The Overall Classification of this Briefing: TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 Dated: 20070108 Declassify On: 20360301

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TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Special Collection Service

Pacific SIGDEV Conference March 2011

The Overall Classification of this Briefing:

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 Dated: 20070108

Declassify On: 20360301

Spedai Collection Service SCS Organization

Special Collection Service (F6)

Chief of Staff

TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Special Collection Service Strategic Partnerships

SIGINT Enabling HUMINT

HUMINT Enabling SIGINT

DEA DIA

NRO SSO

FBI State

Secret Service

Law Enforcement

Homeland Security

Tailored Access

COVCOM

Military

CLANSIG Second Party

TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Spécial Collection Service SCS Modernization

èchnology p | a t f Q r m f Q r

Transformational Activitiès" >llèction/Procèssing Systèms

Facilitiès IT Infrastructurè Communications & f ^ a r d Nètworks \ T a r g è t s

Tools

People and Business Practices Accèss to Data

-Dissémination Mèthods Rèquirèmènts Procèss Projéct Portfolio Mgmt

Rotation Policy DNI Training

TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Overview Special Collection Service

• Unified IT Core and Virtualization • Cloud Computing • Global Situational Awareness • Beyond Traditional Accesses • Coherent Digital Access • Empowering Automation • The SCS Cyber Advantage

TOP SECRET II CO MI NT II RELTO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Unified IT Core

IT Services, IT Infrastructure • Capability Improvements:

- Modern IT services and infrastructure to support a net-centric operational model and enhance maintenance and security

• Capability Change: - Rapid response SIGINT presence - Next generation virtual infrastructure - Diversified WAN topology, enhanced LAN - Enhanced interoperable desktop - Improved email service - Workforce mobility - Robust collaboration environment - Site destruct enabler

TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Spécial Collection Servie EINSTEIN/CASTANET

TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Special Collection Service

TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

INTERQUAKE

• Terrestrial Environmental Knowledge Base -Available to all NSAanalysts and partners

• PANOPLY populates IQ with Emitter information and reports including: - Signal Externals - Radio and Payload information - LACs and Cell ID's - Protocol Stacks

TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

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TOP SECRET II CO MI NT II RELTO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Special Collection Service

TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

CES/SSC/AAD VPN "Surge"

• Main Goal: - To evaluate SCS VPN access and analysis to determine better methods

of identifying and exploiting networks of interest. • Two Focuses:

- What can we do with VPN data that is already ingested into the system? • Find better methods of reporting VPN stats and exploitation

determinations from CES back to SSC and site. - Are there methods to better identify and survey VPN's to provide CES

the data they need? • Can we leverage MIRROR, DARKQUEST, PANOPLY survey

information to quickly identify and report the presence of VPN's in surveyed signals?

• Can we use BIRDWATCHER or other means to automatically resurvey for key exchanges and obtain paired collect?

TOP SECRET II CO MI NT II RELTO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

• s

Spécial Collection Service The SCS Cyber Advantage SIGINT prowess provides cyber advantage Unified operations provides holistic approach The right intelligence delivered to the right customer

Broad Spectrum of Capability

Integrated Mission

Geographic Advantage

Signal Access

Analysis ^ Q. O *

Dissemination^ o

& • f

Home field advantage in adversary's space Where our customers want us and our adversaries do not Capitalizing on the "element of surprise"

Signal access for collection, exfil,and infil Microwave, WiFi, WiMAX, GSM, CDMA, Satellite, etc.

Living in the environment Insights on infrastructure and configurations Discoveryof targets, signatures, and behavior

Tailored intelligence products Diverse products driven by national objectives and local needs through formal reporting, target packages, analytic insights, situational awareness, threat warning

Unique platform for conducting and enabling IC operations Fully leveraging 30-years of experience within the NSA and CIA enterprises and using existing authorities

TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

SCS Opportunities Special Collection Service