special collection service pacific sigdev conference march
TRANSCRIPT
TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
Special Collection Service
Pacific SIGDEV Conference March 2011
The Overall Classification of this Briefing:
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20360301
Spedai Collection Service SCS Organization
Special Collection Service (F6)
Chief of Staff
TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
Special Collection Service Strategic Partnerships
SIGINT Enabling HUMINT
HUMINT Enabling SIGINT
DEA DIA
NRO SSO
FBI State
Secret Service
Law Enforcement
Homeland Security
Tailored Access
COVCOM
Military
CLANSIG Second Party
TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
Spécial Collection Service SCS Modernization
èchnology p | a t f Q r m f Q r
Transformational Activitiès" >llèction/Procèssing Systèms
Facilitiès IT Infrastructurè Communications & f ^ a r d Nètworks \ T a r g è t s
Tools
People and Business Practices Accèss to Data
-Dissémination Mèthods Rèquirèmènts Procèss Projéct Portfolio Mgmt
Rotation Policy DNI Training
TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
Overview Special Collection Service
• Unified IT Core and Virtualization • Cloud Computing • Global Situational Awareness • Beyond Traditional Accesses • Coherent Digital Access • Empowering Automation • The SCS Cyber Advantage
TOP SECRET II CO MI NT II RELTO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
Unified IT Core
IT Services, IT Infrastructure • Capability Improvements:
- Modern IT services and infrastructure to support a net-centric operational model and enhance maintenance and security
• Capability Change: - Rapid response SIGINT presence - Next generation virtual infrastructure - Diversified WAN topology, enhanced LAN - Enhanced interoperable desktop - Improved email service - Workforce mobility - Robust collaboration environment - Site destruct enabler
TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
Spécial Collection Servie EINSTEIN/CASTANET
TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
Special Collection Service
TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
INTERQUAKE
• Terrestrial Environmental Knowledge Base -Available to all NSAanalysts and partners
• PANOPLY populates IQ with Emitter information and reports including: - Signal Externals - Radio and Payload information - LACs and Cell ID's - Protocol Stacks
TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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TOP SECRET II CO MI NT II RELTO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
Special Collection Service
TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
CES/SSC/AAD VPN "Surge"
• Main Goal: - To evaluate SCS VPN access and analysis to determine better methods
of identifying and exploiting networks of interest. • Two Focuses:
- What can we do with VPN data that is already ingested into the system? • Find better methods of reporting VPN stats and exploitation
determinations from CES back to SSC and site. - Are there methods to better identify and survey VPN's to provide CES
the data they need? • Can we leverage MIRROR, DARKQUEST, PANOPLY survey
information to quickly identify and report the presence of VPN's in surveyed signals?
• Can we use BIRDWATCHER or other means to automatically resurvey for key exchanges and obtain paired collect?
TOP SECRET II CO MI NT II RELTO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
• s
Spécial Collection Service The SCS Cyber Advantage SIGINT prowess provides cyber advantage Unified operations provides holistic approach The right intelligence delivered to the right customer
Broad Spectrum of Capability
Integrated Mission
Geographic Advantage
Signal Access
Analysis ^ Q. O *
Dissemination^ o
& • f
Home field advantage in adversary's space Where our customers want us and our adversaries do not Capitalizing on the "element of surprise"
Signal access for collection, exfil,and infil Microwave, WiFi, WiMAX, GSM, CDMA, Satellite, etc.
Living in the environment Insights on infrastructure and configurations Discoveryof targets, signatures, and behavior
Tailored intelligence products Diverse products driven by national objectives and local needs through formal reporting, target packages, analytic insights, situational awareness, threat warning
Unique platform for conducting and enabling IC operations Fully leveraging 30-years of experience within the NSA and CIA enterprises and using existing authorities
TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL