special issue || change, flexibility, spontaneity, and self-determination in leisure

Change, Flexibility, Spontaneity, and Self-Determination in LeisureAuthor(s): Stanley ParkerSource: Social Forces, Vol. 60, No. 2, Special Issue (Dec., 1981), pp. 323-331Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2578437 .

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Change, Flexibility, Spontaneity, and Self-Deternination in Leisure

STANLEY PARKER, Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, London

ABSTRACT The concepts of choice, flexibility, spontaneity, and self-determination

are important in understanding forms of leisure institutions and behavior. Choice is never completely free, and numerous options do not necessarily mean qualitatively different choices. Flexibility is concerned with the timing of selected courses of action. For the individual, spontaneity is the opposite of routine and pre-planning. Self-determination describes how far the individual is free to decide the quality and conditions of his leisure behavior. Dichotomized values at the societal level of rigidlflexible institutions and at the individual level of spontaneous/programmed behavior yield four types of leisure-like manifestations: stereotyped nonwork activities, free time, recreation, and "true" leisure.

Among the many definitions of leisure a good number embody the concept of choice. To take a few examples, leisure is time to be used according to our own judgment or choice (Brightbill), it is the whole of nonwork where individuals are free to choose (Roberts), or it is simply freely chosen activity (Godbey, b). Furthermore, the importance of choice in the definition of leisure is confirmed by sample surveys in which people are asked to say what they think leisure means. In one inquiry only about a quarter of persons interviewed opted for residual definitions such as all time not actually at work or doing essential things like eating and sleeping: for three- quarters leisure was "only the time you feel free to do whatever you like" (Parker).

A second theme in understanding the meaning of leisure is flexibility. Although the concept of flexibility does not often figure explicitly in definitions of leisure, it is implicit in popular notions of what leisure is all about: doing things when you choose, not having to watch the clock, being able to respond at short notice to a sociable invitation. Flexibility as applied to people is mainly a matter of being willing to change in some way or adapt to the wishes of others; it can, however, apply to institutions which facili- ID 1981 The University of North Carolina Press. 0037-7732/81/020323-31$00.90

323



324 1 Social Forces Volume 60:2, December 1981

tate flexibility in the individual-hence, for example, systems of flexitime in employing organizations.

A third theme is spontaneity, which is the ability to do things of one's own accord on the spur of the moment and without advance preparation- an ingredient of many of the arguably more satisfying leisure opportunities which life offers. Spontaneity is a characteristic of individuals or of their actions, but again it has its societal counterparts, such as leisure service delivery systems which can cope with last-minute or casual as well as pre- planned patronage.

Fourth, there is the importance of the individual being able to de- termine not only the timing and content of his leisure but also the cir- cumstances and conditions under which it is enjoyed-in a word, self- determination. Living, as we do, in societies which play a big part in shaping our knowledge, awareness, values, tastes, habits, and so on, we are never completely self-determined in our leisure behavior. But we can discern differences between societies and between individuals in the degree to which and the ways in which leisure behavior is relatively self-determined. Because leisure is essentially expressive (end) rather than instrumental (means) activity, it may reasonably be argued that, to the extent that self- determination is minimized by society through control or prohibition, leisure in any meaningful sense is made difficult if not impossible to achieve.

Having outlined four themes in the meaning and experience of leisure, I now propose to discuss these in more detail, bearing in mind that, although each concept is perhaps more easily thought of in connection with differences between individuals, there are also variations between societies which help to account for differences between individuals and for what is defined as "normal" behavior on the one hand or "deviant" on the other.

Today people in the democracies of the West live in societies which pay considerable lip service to the ideal of free choice. Positively, the vir- tues of freedom are extolled; negatively, the evils of totalitarianism are denounced. Competitiveness and a market-based economy ensure that a wide choice of goods and services is offered to the consumer who has the means to buy them. Theoretically (though increasingly less often in prac- tice) there is a choice of employment for those who need to earn a living. There is a choice of television programs to watch, a choice of vacation destinations and packages-and even a choice of religions to adhere to.

The range of choice, however, is never unlimited. It is determined historically, temporally, environmentally, situationally, and socially (An- derson). A city worker cannot choose to spend a summer evening fishing in a mountain stream, nor can a tribesman choose to attend a baseball game. Also, an important distinction has to be made between quantitative choice and qualitative choice. A large number of choices which consist of



Change & Choice in Leisure / 325

offerings differing only marginally from each other may in fact result in less of a real choice than if only two radically different options were offered. To be offered 40 flavors of ice cream is fine only if you like ice cream. To be offered a choice of a dozen TV channels all showing the same type of stereotyped program constitutes no qualitative choice. To have the opportunity of voting for several different candidates at an election means little qualitative choice if all of them stand for basically the same electoral program.

The cost of choice has also to be taken into account. Those who maintain that we have (or are at least in process of developing) a society of leisure claim that individuals are increasingly able to make choices about where to live according to criteria of their leisure interests (Dumazedier). But those who rely on work for their income will rarely find that choice of location according to leisure interests is without its costs in terms of employment opportunities narrowed, commuting distances increased, and so on. Additionally, the cost of work decisions-often forced choices-on nonwork life should not be overlooked: to move town in order to find a job or a better job may be at the expense of losing touch with old friends and of being removed from favorite leisure locations.

The second theme of flexibility is also one which our society tends to regard as a desirable general principle in individual behavior and social relationships. It is closely related to the principle of choice, but whereas choice involves the selection of one course of action from two or more, flexibility is more concerned with the timing of the selected course of action. Flexitime has now been adopted widely in public and private employing organizations but it deals only with when the work is to be per- formed, not with what kind of work or work conditions. The limited impli- cation of flexitime for leisure is that choice of working hours or days can be made with the timing of nonwork interests in mind.

Another and more important aspect of flexibility is the attitude of mind with which the individual approaches leisure. This has been the subject of substantive research in relation to the questionable "leisure" of retirement. For many people the set of habits which constitutes a role is changed only with difficulty. To change roles easily-as, for example, from work to leisure-requires a personal quality which Havighurst calls "role flexibility." People who are unable to substitute leisure roles for the lost work role often find retirement a traumatic experience.

Spontaneity as a characteristic of behavior is often valued more highly than its opposite of being routinized or pre-planned. Perhaps it is the very scarcity of truly spontaneous episodes of behavior in industrial society that makes us cherish them when they do occur. For some individuals, deep involvement in activities which require great expenditure of time, effort, and the use of skill (whether this be "work" or "leisure") partakes of the nature of spontaneity-in Csikszentmihalyi's terms, they



326 / Social Forces Volume 60:2, December 1981

enter a state of "flow": they concentrate their attention on a limited stimu- lus field, forget personal problems, lose their sense of time and of themselves, feel competent and in control.

By contrast, lack of human spontaneity is exemplified by an "industrial" approach to both work and leisure activities. Instead of producing a piece of work or rendering a service, one is employed for a certain period of time. Instead of playing a tennis match, one has the use of a tennis court for a prearranged period. In modem industrial society punctuality is a virtue: you turn up at your host's home at an agreed time, or you risk upsetting the plans for the meal. In some less industrialized but more leisurely societies you may arrive for a visit at any time and the meal comes along later-thus you avoid the impression that you have come just for the meal.

Although an important meaning of leisure is that it is relatively self- determined behavior, freedom to choose how to behave is never absolute in any society. However, Clawson is guilty of cultural relativism in assert- ing that "Individual leisure is highly ordered by a society as a whole. This is true as to the amount of leisure, its timing, and the activities in it." Societies vary in the degree to which they allow self-determination, and individuals vary in the degree to which they conform to the prevailing norms or deviate from them. The growth of leisure means that the social system tolerates more "play" or "looseness" and more cultural diversity than in previous eras. When we speak of an individual being able to choose to spend his leisure time as he wishes, we are referring to a range of socially structured options, one of which is to be left alone to "do his own thing."

As Roberts points out, many of the options that the growth of leisure creates are open to groups rather than to solitary persons. It is not so much the case that an individual determines for himself, in a kind of inner- directed (to use Riesman's term) way, how he will behave in his free time. It is much more likely that an individual will either "follow the crowd" in an other-directed way or fall in with a much smaller crowd of like-minded individuals in group activity of one kind or another.

So far I have discussed the roles of four concepts in the meaning and understanding of leisure: choice, flexibility, spontaneity, and self- determination. I want now to consider the possibility that what various combinations of these concepts produce, in different individuals and in different types of society, are what may be called leisure-like manifestations, or various degrees of approximation to an ideal state of leisure. In order to do this, I shall find it desirable to make a major simplifying assumption: that choice and flexibility are variables which relate primarily to societies, and that spontaneity and self-determination are variables which relate primarily to individuals. I have argued above that all four concepts are appli-



Change & Choice in Leisure / 327

cable both to societies and to individuals, but nevertheless some degree of primacy of relevance will help simplify the analysis I shall try to make.

In summary form, then, the possibilities are:

* society offers a narrow choice of activities/experiences * or a wide choice of activities/experiences * society has rigid institutions * or flexible institutions * the individual is programmed in his behavior * or spontaneous in his behavior * the individual is other-determined * or self-determined

Theoretically this offers 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 or 16 different possible combinations of social structure and individual behavior. But I believe that it is possible to demonstrate empirically that most of these combinations are unlikely to occur. For example, it is probable that a society with rigid institutions will offer its members a narrow rather than a wide choice of activities or experiences, and it is more likely that an individual who is spontaneous in his behavior will be self-determined rather than other-determined. The unlikely combinations may still occur, and are worthy of sociological investi- gation elsewhere, but they should not deter us from attempting to distin- guish here the relatively dominant trends and frequent associations.

In Figure 1 four types of leisure-like manifestations are summarized which broadly represent a movement, in both social structural and individual behavioral terms, from less leisure to more leisure. This amounts to the presentation of four "ideal types" and the positing of certain directions of change which correspond to the development of society from pre- industrial through industrial to post-industrial forms.

In traditional, simpler, primitive, or pre-industrial societies there is generally no leisure in the modern sense of time set aside for the purpose and activities which are experienced more or less consciously as leisure. Certain activities, such as festivals, hunting, and market-going, may have leisure-like qualities, but the separation of life experiences and social institutions into those of work and leisure-one important characteristic of industrial society-has yet to take place. Such societies have rigid social institutions which offer the individual relatively little choice of activities. This type of society, however, tends to breed individuals who do not expect or seek choice-they are "programmed" to conform to tradition, and so the leisure-like manifestation appropriate to this type of society may be described as stereotyped nonwork activities.

There are two possible main directions of movement away from this type of society. One occurs when the society becomes less rigid and develops more flexible institutions, and the other direction is the encouragement




of individual or personal development toward a greater degree of self- determination. There is no logical reason why these two types of development should not occur together, but it is my contention that modern industrial societies tend to differ in the major leisure paths which they have so far taken away from stereotyped nonwork activities.

Some contemporary societies have managed to become more flexible in their institutional arrangements while remaining populated with individuals who mostly continue to show relatively little self-determination in their behavior. Other societies seem to have remained essentially traditional while tolerating and even encouraging more idiosyncratic behavior. The guiding leisure-like principles of these two types of society are respec- tively recreation and free time. I should perhaps add that, despite the labels in Figure 1, countries and continents as culturally diverse as America and Europe do not lend themselves to being categorized so simply as I have done. In such cases we may have to look at the subcultural level to get a more accurate picture of whether recreation or free time dominates.

A society which develops more flexible institutions tends to reflect the conviction of its influential members that government and/or business has (a) a legitimate right to concern itself with leisure provision, and (b) an obligation to provide its citizens with the widest possible choice of leisure opportunities (we need not go into the motives of social control and finan- cial advantage which underlie these convictions). But in pursuing these

SPONTANEOUS, FREE TIME "TRUE" LEISURE SELF-

DETERMINED European Leisure Society > Society

Traditional American Society Society

o PROGRAMMED, z TRADITION STEREOTYPED, - OR OTHER- NONWORK

DIRECTED ACTIVITIES RECREATION

RIGID INSTITUTIONS, FLEXIBLE INSTITUTIONS, LIMITED <-------------------------------- WIDE

CHOICE OF ACTIVITIES CHOICE OF ACTIVITIES S O C I A L S T R U C T U R E

Figure 1. LEISURE-LIKE MANIFESTATIONS



Change & Choice in Leisure I 329

twin aims society does not necessarily make any substantial change in the degree of self-determination exhibited by its citizens.

As compared with the members of pre-industrial societies, most Americans are relatively free of the confining ties of tradition-instead they are often, in Riesman's terminology, other-directed, eager to be as others wish them to be, to think and behave as others wish them to think and behave. The recreation movement is a practical expression of this social philosophy: some people are trained to become "recreation profes- sionals," there are recognized places to go to recreate, special clothes in which to recreate, special delivery systems-including those for special populations-which are aimed to facilitate the enjoyment of the experience. All these manifestations are often graced by the term "leisure," but if the individual remains essentially other-determined and programmed rather than self-determined and spontaneous then it is questionable whether what we have is true leisure. We have instead the situation aptly described by Brehaut: "the influence of industrialization has spread itself to leisure to such an extent that leisure is no longer free time but unfree time." The concept of anti-leisure is also relevant here (Godbey, a): this refers to activity which is undertaken compulsively, as a means to an end, from a perception of necessity, with a high degree of externally imposed con- straint, with considerable anxiety, with a high degree of time consciousness and a minimum of personal autonomy. In short, activity having the label of leisure while being quite remote from its essence.

This brings me to another direction in which it has been possible to move away from traditional stereotyped nonwork activities. While some societies have remained essentially traditional in institutional structure and customary behavior, they have nevertheless allowed and sometimes en- couraged their citizens to have more freedom of expression. Amounts of time free from work have grown, but instead of rushing to fill such time for the masses with the paraphernalia of recreation, governments and other potential corporate providers have generally interfered little in what people do in their nonwork time. Free time activities are in some sense more "liberal" than are stereotyped nonwork activities, but they are often still accompanied by structural rigidities. This type of leisure-like manifestation is more typical of Europe than of America, although admittedly that is a sweeping generalization.

Finally we come to the tantalizing prospect of "true" leisure. To the extent that my model represents-however crudely-a temporal movement in world society toward an ideal state of leisure, then we can use it to estimate the progress being made in this direction. I agree with the spirit of what de Grazia writes about the difference between leisure and free time:

Leisure and free time live in two different worlds. We have got in the habit of thinking them the same. Anybody can have free time. Free time is a realizable aim




of democracy. Leisure is not fully realizable, and hence an ideal not alone an idea. Free time refers to a special way of calculating a special kind of time. Leisure refers to a state of being, a condition of man....

However, I also believe that, as compared with a starting point of stereotyped nonwork activities, free time is on the road to leisure and is, indeed, one of its essential ingredients. Without release from burdensome labor or employment, without some degree of growth in the self-determination of the individual in how his nonwork time is to be spent, leisure is impossible.

Parallel considerations apply to the other route to "true" leisure, via recreation. It can be argued, as McCormack does, that recreation and leisure are opposite principles: "Recreation is a system of social control, and like all systems of social control, it is to some degree manipulative, coercive and indoctrinating. Leisure is not." While not disagreeing fundamentally with that proposition, I would also suggest that the contribution of recreation to the progress toward leisure should be recognized. Recreation, or more precisely the recreation movement, is the institutional component which makes approximation to the state of leisure possible. Without some degree of social organization of nonwork opportunities, without the wide and I would hope qualitative choice of activities available to the individual which that organization exists to provide, leisure is impossible.

Free time falls short of leisure because it is concerned only with the dimension of time and not with the dimension of quality of activity. With free time as a goal, individual attitudes may change in the direction of greater spontaneity and self-determination (giving rise to the collective search for identity and pursuit of cultic activity which Klapp has so acutely observed) while social institutions remain relatively unconcemed with how free time is spent. Recreation falls short of leisure because, although "leisure" institutions are introduced into the social structure, they are de- signed to service the needs of mostly other-determined individuals. The wide range of choice of activities which is such a superficially attractive feature of "recreation" societies masks a deeper failure to comprehend, and therefore to move further toward, the true leisure condition of man.

Radical critiques of the manifestation of leisure in contemporary Western societies point explicitly to its shortcomings in terms of authen- ticity and implicitly to the character of true leisure. Thus Fromm writes of the passive and alienated consumer:

He 'consumes' ball games, moving pictures, newspapers and magazines, books, lectures, national scenery, social gatherings, in the same alienated and abstractified way in which he consumes the commodities he has bought . .. Actually, he is not free to enjoy 'his' leisure; his leisure-time consumption is determined by industry . . . the customer is made to buy fun as he is made to buy dresses and shoes. The value of the fun is determined by its success on the market, not by anything which could be measured in human terms.



Change & Choice in Leisure I 331

To the extent that this is an accurate portrayal-and I grant that the picture may be overdrawn-of contemporary individual behavior and social structure, it poses a challenge to those of us who wish to go beyond both free time and recreation toward a more truly leisured society. Remembering that leisure is an ideal to be pursued rather than a fixed state to be achieved, we may scrutinize proposals for more or "better" leisure to see how far they represent genuine advances in choice, flexibility, spontaneity, and self-determination.

There is a role for the revolutionary social critic who, ideologically at least, stands outside the society and type of behavior he is exposing. There is also a role for the more reformist free-time laymen and recreation profes- sionals who can become more aware of the sweep of leisure history of which they are part.

References

Anderson, N. 1961. Work and Leisure. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Brehaut, J. 1980. "The Industrialization of Leisure." Paper presented to the

Sociological Association of Australia and New Zealand conference. Brightbill, C. K. 1963. The Challenge of Leisure. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. Clawson, M. 1964. "How Much Leisure Now and in the Future?" In J. C. Charles-

worth (ed.), Leisure in America: Blessing or Curse? Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, No.4.

Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1976. "Play and Intrinsic Rewards." Journal of Humanistic Psy- chology 15.

deGrazia, S. 1962. Of Time, Work and Leisure. New York: Twentieth Century Fund. Dumazedier, J. 1967. Toward a Society of Leisure. New York: Collier-Macmillan. Fromm, E. 1955. The Sane Society. New York: Rinehart. Godbey, G. a:1975. "Anti-leisure and Public Recreation Policy." In S. Parker et al.

(eds.), Sport and Leisure in Contemporary Society. London: Leisure Studies Asso- ciation.

. b:1980. "Leisure Education and Public Policy in the 1980s." Unpublished paper.

Havighurst, R. L. 1954. "Flexibility and the Social Roles of the Retired." American Journal of Sociology 59(4).

Klapp, 0. E. 1969. Collective Search for Identity. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. McCormack, T. 1971. "Politics and Leisure." International Journal of Comparative

Sociology 12. Parker, S. 1972. The Future of Work and Leisure. New York: Praeger. Riesman, D. 1953. The Lonely Crowd. New York: Doubleday. Roberts, K. 1978. Contemporary Society and the Growth of Leisure. London: Longman.



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