Spousal homicide in Russia: Gender inequality in a multifactor model Violence against Women; Thousand Oaks; Oct 1997; Edward W Gondolf; Dmitri Shestakov; Volume:  3Issue:  5Start Page:  533-546ISSN:  10778012Subject Terms:  Social research

Murders & murder attemptsMarriageDomestic violenceSexes

Geographic Names:  RussiaAbstract:Information from secondary sources, interviews with officials and international conferences are used to describe the role of social disorganization, normative violence and gender inequality in the high rate of spousal homicide and disproportionate female murders in Russia.Full Text:Copyright Sage Publications, Inc. Oct 1997[Headnote]Recent sociological research on spousal violence implies a multifactor model of social variables to explain rates and sex ratios of spousal homicide across societies. Information from secondary sources, interviews with officials, and international conferences are used to describe the role of social disorganization, normative violence, and gender inequality in the high rate of spousal homicide and disproportionate female murders in Russia. The Russian situation illustrates the prominent role of social disorganization in the level of spousal homicide. However, the contradictory status of women in Russia appears to contribute to the high ratio of female murders in that country. In sum, gender inequality surfaces as a paradoxical but essential factor in explaining spousal homicides. Russia has recently been besieged by dramatic economic and political change. Headlines have noted drastic increases in violent crime and organized crime. There has been little attention, however, to the nature and level of spousal violence behind these headlines. For years, the ideal Soviet man and woman dominated the state's portrayal of family life and limited discussion of family problems. Since Perestroika, attention to family problems has increased, and with this increased attention has come an awareness of violence in the home-and particularly the high level of spousal homicide.' Improved East-West relations have opened the doors to social science exchanges and new information on Russia. With these developments come the opportunity to explore spousal violence in that country: What accounts for the high levels of violence in Russia as opposed to the United States? Russia offers a useful contrast to the West for the study of social problems, such as spousal violence. Although it shares many social and organizational aspects with modernized industrial countries of the West, its Soviet legacy and recent political changes provide a convenient test for Western social theories. Spousal violence research in the West implies a multifactor model with a complexity of influences and a variety of intervention points (Carlson, 1984; Dutton, 1985; Edleson & Tolman, 1992; Kurz, 1989; Straus, 1983). The model suggests that spousal violence is related to a framework of social disorganization, normative violence, and gender inequality. Spousal violence, for instance, may be related to the breakdown of society in general, another aspect of the so-called culture of violence (i.e., normative violence), or a manifestation of the subjugation of women (i.e., gender inequality)-or some combination of these. Additionally, community factors, represented by indicators for spousal violence legislation and services, appear to mediate the influence of other societal factors (Browne & Williams, 1989; Counts, Brown, & Campbell, 1992; Stout, 1989; Yllo & Straus, 1990). The social factors, furthermore, may reinforce and contribute to one another. For instance, normative violence may serve to disrupt and threaten social institutions in a way that contributes to social disorganization. Gender inequality may allow for the male power struggles and conflicts that contribute to social disorganization and normative violence. Cross-national comparisons have been used to further define and elaborate the model, contrasting spousal homicide rates, spousal homicide sex ratios, and the circumstances of spousal homicide (Browne & Williams,1989; Counts et al.,1992; Wilson & Daly, 1993). Spousal homicide has been used as an indicator of spousal violence because it offers a concrete and documented form of spousal violence and is obviously the violence of greatest concern to the individual and society. The role of gender inequality in this macromodel building is a fundamental and complex one. Women's taking nontraditional roles appears to decrease women's risk for homicide in developed countries, but if they achieve higher economic status, their risk may increase (Gartner, Baker, & Pampel, 1990; Levinson, 1989). We attempt here to apply the emerging multifactor model to spousal homicide in Russia. The model serves as a framework to help organize information on secondary sources, interviews, and collaborative surveys on Russian families. Whereas such a review admittedly lacks a systematic scientific assessment, it provides a descriptive summary of the factors and related issues that might be tested in future research. The descriptive information suggests that social factors different from those that explain spousal homicide in the United States predominate in explaining spousal homicide in Russia. Gender inequality, in particular, appears to play a central but complex role in accounting for the high likelihood that women will become homicide victims in Russia. ASSESSING SOCIAL FACTORS IN RUSSIA Indicators for the four primary social factors of the multifactor model are used to focus and organize our consideration of spousal homicide in Russia: social disorganization, normative violence, gender inequality, and community resources. Social disorganization refers to the Durkheimian notions of normlessness and anomie when conventional social controls, roles, and expectations are suspended, contradicted, or ambiguous. One of the primary indicators for social disorganization is political instability in terms of abrupt or frequent changes in government, political leaders, and social policy (e.g., Parker & Toth, 1990; Smith & Brewer, 1992).

Other indicators are economic recession and increased class differences. Indicators for the social pathology associated with social disorganization are drug and alcohol abuse and suicide. Normative violence refers to tolerance for interpersonal assaults in what has been referred to as a culture of violence (Ember & Ember, 1993; Straus, 1983). Some of the primary indicators for normative violence are pervasive military presence and expenditure, high rates of violent crime, widespread broadcast of violent action films and television shows, and the popularity of combative sports, such as football and boxing. Gender inequality refers to disparities in social, political, and economic status of women versus men (e.g., Gartner et al., 1990; Levinson, 1989; Yllo & Straus, 1990). Common indicators have been lack of legal support for women's rights and well-being; underrepresentation of women in political and governmental positions; lower levels of employment, occupational status, and income levels for women; and less household mobility in terms of few child care options, restrictive divorce laws, and traditional gender roles for women. Finally, community resources refers to the availability of "sanctions and sanctuaries" at the local level (Counts et al., 1992). These resources are generally in the form of social services and shelters for victims of spousal violence, and police action and criminal penalties for perpetrators (e.g., Browne & Williams, 1989; Counts et al., 1992). Our information on these social factors is drawn primarily from the literature reviews of survey research on Russian families (Maddock, Hogan, Antonov, & Matskovsky, 1994) and interviews with Russian officials on spousal violence and homicide.2 Descriptive material and data on social disorganization, general violence, and crime are drawn from a conference of U.S. and Russian researchers, practitioners, and policy makers titled International Perspectives on Crime, Justice, and Public Order, held in St. Petersburg, Russia, in June 1992. Economic, social, and crime statistics were corroborated with data from the Russian embassy in the United States (Kuznestsov, 1994). Our assessment of spousal homicide is based on 1991 official homicide statistics adjusted for considerations derived from case review studies (for elaboration, see Gondolf & Shestakov, in press). The information examining contributing social factors is admittedly tentative and problematic. A Russian-U.S comparison is made particularly difficult because of the limited social science research in Russia prior to Perestroika, the rapid social and political changes that accompanied Perestroika, and the lack of resources for systematic data collection. Additionally, national descriptive statistics are confounded by an ethnic and cultural diversity that far surpasses that of the United States. SOCIAL FACTORS SPOUSAL HOMICIDE As reported elsewhere, the spousal homicide rate in Russia appears to be substantially higher than in the United States (Gondolf & Shestakov, in press). There may be as many as 1.7 times more spousal homicides in Russia than in the United States. Most striking is that the ratio of female victims in Russia far surpasses that of the United States and Europe. The likelihood of murder of a woman as opposed to a man by an intimate partner is nearly 3 times greater in Russia than in the United States (1:6 vs. 1:2.3). These findings indicate that Russian women are 2.5 times as likely to be murdered by their spouses or lovers than their American counterparts. (This likelihood is based on the spousal homicide rate adjusted for sex ratio.) Importantly, women in the United States are twice as likely as women in comparable Westernized countries to be victims of spousal homicide (Wilson & Daly, 1992), making Russian women the most vulnerable in industrialized countries. How do we explain the level and nature of spousal homicide in Russia? SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION Spousal homicide in Russia must, of course, be considered in a broad social context that includes a society in the midst of dramatic change and upheaval. Dramatic political, economic, and social changes may promote social anomie, individual stressors, and general despair that contribute to violence in general (Beliaev, 1992; Gilinsky, 1993). Most prominent of these changes is the revolutionary political transformation accelerated in the past 3 years by privatization of government-owned businesses (Kuznetsov, 1994). Politically, the government has moved from the liberalization of government policies under Perestroika to the breakup of the Soviet Union and the disbanding of the Communist party. A new constitution has been formulated, but two coup attempts and contentious factionalism have slowed its implementation. Russia has fallen into an economic depression similar to the 1930s depression in the United States. Unemployment has soared from nearly zero to over 20%, if the "hidden" unemployment of factory layoffs and cutbacks is included. Inflation has reached 100% the past 3 years, wiping out individual savings and wealth (Kuznetsov,1994). The government has issued vouchers to private citizens to claim ownership of previously government-owned industries. However, abuse and misunderstanding of the voucher system have brought a wave of confusion and uncertainty. Overall, a sense of betrayal, distrust, and humiliation has beset much of the population, according to journalistic accounts and our personal observations (Fedarko, 1994). The black market and the Russian Mafia are increasingly controlling sectors of the economy, and emerging entrepreneurs are creating a nouveau riche class (an estimated 300,000 in Moscow) that simultaneously draws scorn and envy from the struggling mass of Russians, whose average income is U.S. $100 per month (Babkov, 1992; Kuznetsov, 1994). The elderly, in particular, are suffering under inflation that depletes their savings and from the reduction of government supports; they increasingly contribute to the estimated 40,000 homeless in Moscow alone. Even while economic hardships intensify, many Russians boast to journalists and researchers that they will endure (Fedarko, 1994; Kuznetsov, 1994). Russian character has endured the hardships of modern history that range from 20 million dead in the Great War (World War II), to the repression of a totalitarian regime, to dissolution of its superpower status. Russia continues to have the highest rate of alcoholism in the industrialized world, despite Gorbachev's launching under Perestroika of a publicity campaign against excessive drinking (Gilinsky, 1992). Drug use is said to be on the rise among successful entrepreneurs and is being promoted by black market profiteers. A great deal of confusion surrounds private values, which in the past were reinforced by state ideology. Even though Russians exhibit a new enthusiasm for religion and the reopening of churches, they also tolerate open prostitution in international hotels and thefts from companies and the black market, as the coauthors and journalists have directly observed (Fedarko, 1994; Rope, 1994). In sum, the social disorganization from the dramatic political and economic changes in Russia has brought disillusionment and anomie that appear to be reflected in the social pathology of alcohol abuse, crime, and homicide in general. Viewed in this light, the high rate of spousal homicide may be an extension of general social disorganization.

NORMATIVE VIOLENCE The high level of spousal homicide may also reflect the level of violence throughout the society in the form of militarism, crime, and combative sports. In the early 1980s, Russia and the Soviet Union had the largest and most extensive military force in the world; 70% of the economy was related to the defense industry (Kuznetsov,1994). Sovietologists often critiqued Soviet militarism as a means of legitimating an autocratic and repressive government. At the same time, the militarism of the former Soviet Union has been rationalized as a largely defensive measure, due to a history of invasions, devastating wars, and vulnerable borders. Nearly every existing family lost at least one relative during World War II, and 50% of Russian young men have served in the modern Soviet military (Boss & Gurko, 1994). This deep-seated militarism, apparently promulgated by the state and embraced by much of the population, has recently met with resistance. The previous decade saw the end of the controversial Afghanistan war, which was openly broadcast on Russian television and which deeply affected the current generation, much as Vietnam did an earlier generation in the United States. Moreover, the militarism has been checked by the breakup of the Soviet Union and the loss of superpower status. Ethnic conflict and political strife within and among the republics have brought a new kind of military tension closer to home (Gilinsky,1993; Kuznetsov, 1994). The army's 1993 attack on the Russian parliament building, for instance, raised the level of fear, anger, and discontent among average citizens and reestablished the role of the military in the new Russia. Russia has experienced dramatic increases in violent crime and civil violence in the past 5 years (Beliaev, 1992; Gilinsky, 1992; Stepashin, 1992). Violent crime, according to state statistics, has more than doubled to a rate of 325 incidents per 100,000 people (Gilinsky, 1993; Stepashin, 1992). The crime rate in urban areas is rapidly approaching that of the United States. These statistics reflect an increase in Mafia-related killings, predatory street violence, and spousal violence, as well as the ethnic conflicts already mentioned (Kostoev, 1992). The collapse of the Soviet Union, furthermore, brought thousands of troops home from the European front. They returned to high unemployment, already crowded housing, and general discontent-all of which contribute to crime (Beliaev, 1992). For years, legal regulation of guns amounted to gun control, so the number of weapons in households was therefore very low. The number of available guns has substantially increased, however, due to two situations: First, many of the returning military men have brought guns back with them from the front; second, ethnic conflicts have increased the underground flow of armaments, making guns more available to the private citizen (Shestakov, 1992). Media violence has been considerably more regulated in Russia than in the United States and has not been a primary issue of debate (Beliaev, 1992). The state-owned-and-managed media have, until Perestroika, offered very few details of political, civil, or spousal violence. Film and televised entertainment have conventionally displayed only mild levels of violence in comparison with entertainment in the United States. Recently, however, satellite television has brought in Western action films, and less restricted news media have graphically portrayed the escalating violence across the country. The extent and level of combative sports, which might reinforce or promote aggression, are minimal in Russia compared with the United States, especially with the demise of state-funded national teams of elite athletes and the disrepair of major sport facilities. In sum, reinforcements for violence are currently more pervasive in the Russian society that was once highly contained by totalitarianism. A tradition of military prowess underlies responses to ethnic strife and economic shifts, and media violence from the West offers reinforcement for the now unbridled tensions and fears. From this perspective, the level of spousal homicide may be an extension of the violence on the streets into the homes. GENDER INEQUALITY The status of women may especially contribute to the sex ratio of spousal homicide; so many more women are being killed by their male partners than the reverse. As mentioned previously, the political and economic status of women, as well as household and relationship status, is associated with the level of spousal violence in a country or culture (e.g., Levinson, 1989; Yllo & Straus, 1990). Reforms under the Russian czars in the mid-1800s and early 1900s initially decreed the specific civil rights of Russian women. Legal equality for Russian women was explicitly reaffirmed in the Soviet constitution of 1918 and championed by Communist ideology (Boss & Gurko, 1994). The image of the hearty Soviet woman is reflected today in monuments and murals in Moscow and other major cities, which replace the billboards of sexy female models common to the West. But the everyday reality for Russian women does not necessarily meet this image, as academic surveys, journalistic reports, and observation confirm (Boss & Gurko, 1994; Rope, 1994; Sloane, 1994). Few women have had positions in diplomatic and international relations or in the upper echelons of the Russian government. Women composed about one third of the Supreme Soviet and 50% of local Soviet government, in part as a result of a de facto quota system of representation (Boss & Gurko, 1994). However, in the more recent 1989 First Congress of People's Deputies, only 15% of the members were women (Zimmerman, Antonov, Johnson, & Borisov, 1994). In 1989, the Committee on the Family, Children, and Women was established to help promote women's participation in politics as well as to attend to other gender and family issues. Until recently, the percentage of women in the Russian workforce was the highest in the industrialized world. Nearly 90% of Soviet women from 25 to 55 years of age worked outside the home, a figure that has fallen to about 75% in the current Russian depression (Boss & Gurko, 1994). Many women simply wanted to return to the home and not have to "work so hard," but low family incomes have made outside employment a necessity. Nearly 40% of scientists and 36% of engineers are women. But the majority of Russian women labor in monotonous factory jobs and receive lower wages than their male counterparts (Zimmerman et al., 1994). As in the United States, employed women still do most of the housework as well. As a result of the extensive casualties in World War II, many households of the previous generation were headed by widowed women, and today's husbands were raised primarily by women. The status of Russian women, therefore, involves a conflict between fulfilling established household roles and at the same time performing in the workplace (Olson & Matskovsky,1994). Women are, furthermore, faced with limited child care, alcoholic family members, weak rape laws, and spousal violence (Sloane, 1994). Ethnic and political struggles have overshadowed women's issues and immobilized a groundswell of women's dissatisfaction. The divorce rate in Russia has been increasing over the past 25 years and has stabilized at about 40%; about 10% of Russian families are single-parent families (Oslon & Matskovsky 1994). However, mobility and independence of divorcees are substantially curtailed by the

tremendous housing shortage that frequently forces even divorced or separated couples to share their small state-owned apartments (Fedarko, 1994; Shestakov, 1992). Russian women, in sum, face increased contradictions as their social and economic status ensured by the state is challenged by loss of jobs, lack of mobility, and entrapped relationships. It is difficult for them to confront or escape abusive relationships aggravated by social and political tensions of the times. COMMUNITY RESOURCES According to research on spousal homicide, community resources devoted to spousal homicide appear to mitigate the influence of social factors and contribute to a lower level of spousal violence and spousal homicide. Such resources are relatively few in Russia, possibly allowing spousal violence to escalate unchecked. There are organizations in the two largest cities offering services for sexually assaulted women, but they are not generally known and do not provide substantial service as yet (Sloane, 1994). Some apartment buildings have rooms reserved for emergencies, but these rooms are not readily available because they may be used for situations other than spousal violence; they are increasingly difficult to maintain amid the pressing housing shortage (Shestakov, 1992). Consequently, women, in particular, have little mobility or opportunity to escape from escalating violence. Psychological treatment for troubled families is increasing, but most of the couples who participate in this treatment are selfreferred (Shestakov, 1992). The state campaign to reduce alcoholism is indirectly related to the reduction of spousal violence because spousal violence is very highly associated with high levels of alcohol abuse in Russia (Gilinsky, 1992). Intervention into spousal violence is left primarily to the police, yet police have no explicit arrest policy or protocol for spousal homicide. In fact, the overtaxed police departments are currently consumed by street and Mafia violence. Although the crime rate has dramatically increased, most urban police departments have faced reductions in staff and equipment because of the state's economic crisis (Stepashin, 1992). CONCLUSION MULTIFACTOR MODEL The high level of male-perpetrated spousal homicide in Russia appears to be associated with high levels of social disorganization and normative violence (especially in terms of continuing militarism and high crime rates). These factors, in turn, appear to be interrelated in some fashion. The normative violence in Russia coincides with the sudden increase in social disorganization, particularly political instability and economic collapse. The relatively high status of women in the economy and politics may be neutralized in part by the social and economic crisis and lack of support services for assaulted women. Russian social commentary suggests that unemployed and politically emasculated men may project their own loss of status and increased frustrations on women, especially if they feel weakened relative to women's secure family and community roles. The Russian situation appears to illustrate the prominent role of social disorganization in the level of male-perpetrated spousal homicide. This is especially the case when there is a lack of mediating intervention in the form of spousal violence services. The role of gender inequality initially appears less clear. Women in Russia by some measures would appear to have the political and economic status that might help to counter the high level of female homicides. Communist rhetoric supporting women in the workplace and the central role of women in the post-World War II home have bolstered women's status in Russia. However, the low level of work and the lack of mobility to move out of an abusive relationship entrap many Russian women. Furthermore, the workload of women and their lack of resources have precluded involvement in social services that might help abate abuse and the prospects of spousal homicide. Whereas the increase in social disorganization in Russia appears to contribute to the very high level of spousal homicide in that country, the contradictory status of women may be the crucial factor in the high ratio of female murders. Russian women have had relatively high social status, but this status has been more to advance the state rather than to protect the individual. The apparent lack of personal rights for women in Russia may account for the lack of spousal violence services and legal actions that might otherwise check the high rate of male-perpetrated homicides. A surge of individual women's rights in Russia may, inversely, serve to offset the consequences of the sudden social disorganization and normative violence, as it appears to have done in the United States. [Footnote]NOTES

[Footnote]1. The term spousal here refers to a more inclusive category of intimate heterosexual partners, including separated and divorced couples, boyfriends and girlfriends in intimate relationships, and cohabiting male-female couples. Spousal violence and spousal homicide have previously been viewed as distinct from other forms of homicide and interpersonal violence in terms of both societal and individual factors (e.g., Parker & Toth, 1990).

[Footnote]2. The coauthors conducted joint informational interviews with the following persons: chief, Murder Investigation Department, Ministry for Internal Affairs; chief, Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences; director, Russia Advanced Training Institute for Criminal Investigators; vice chairman, Council of Science, Office of the Mayor, St. Petersburg; deputy chairwoman, Committee for Social Affairs, Office of the Mayor, St. Petersburg; administrative committee, Office of the Mayor, St. Petersburg; editor, Radio Russia; director, Crisis Network, St. Petersburg; chief, Family Program, St. Petersburg Psychiatric Clinic; chief, St. Petersburg State Penitentiary for Women. The lead author visited Russia for 2 weeks in the summers of 1992 and 1994, and the coauthor visited the United States for additional collaboration in the fall of 1991.

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[Author note]EDWARD W. GONDOLF Indiana University of Pennsyluania DMITRI SHESTAKOV

St. Petersburg State University, Russia

[Author note]AUTHORS' NOTE: The authors wish to thank Sonya Shestakov for her translation and research assistance during their collaboration. The Mid-Atlantic Addiction Training Institute, Indiana University of Pennsylvania; Office of International Services, Indiana University of Pennsylvania; and Department of Law and Criminology, St. Petersburg State University, Russia, offered funding and support for the research.

[Author note]Edward W. Gondolf, Ed.D, M.PH., is associate director of research for the Mid-Atlantic Addiction Training Institute (MAATI) and professor of sociology at Indiana University of Pennsylvania. He is author of several books and articles on domestic violence, including Battered Women as Survivors and Psychiatric Response to Family Violence.

[Author note]Dmitri Shestakov, Ph.D, is a criminology professor at St. Petersburg State University, Russia. He also conducts training for criminal investigators and is author of the text Family Criminology as well as monographs and articles on spousal homicide in Russia.