staff ride guide battle of antietam

7/30/2019 Staff Ride Guide Battle of Antietam

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Staff Ride Guide

Ted Ballard

Battleof

Antietam


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Staff Ride Guide

Battleof

Antietam

by

Ted Ballard

Center of Military HistoryUnited States Army

Washington, D.C., 2008


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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ballard, Ted.Battle o Antietam / by Ted Ballard.

p. cm. (Sta ride guide)1. Antietam, Battle o, Md., 1862. 2. Antietam National

Battlefeld (Md.)Guidebooks. I. Title. II. Series.E474.65.B325 2006973.7336dc22

2006012153

Cover: Battle o Antietam, Thure de Thulstrup

First Printed 2006CMH Pub 3531


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Foreword

The U.S. Army has long used the sta ride as a tool or pro-essional development, conveying the lessons o the past tocontemporary soldiers. In 1906 Maj. Eben Swit took twelve o-fcer students rom Fort Leavenworths General Service and StaSchool to the Chickamauga battlefeld on the Armys frst o-fcial sta ride. Since that time Army educators have employedthe sta ride to provide Army ofcers with a better understand-

ing o a past military operation, o the vagaries o war, and omilitary planning. It can also serve to enliven a units esprit decorpsa constant objective in peacetime or war.

To support the Armys initiatives, the Center is publish-ing sta ride guides such as this one on the Battle o Antie-tam. This account is drawn principally rom contemporary andater-action reports, as well as rom reminiscences o partici-pants, both ofcers and enlisted men.

The Battle o Antietam provides important lessons in com-mand and control, leadership, and unit training. This small vol-ume should be a welcome training aid or those undertaking anAntietam sta ride and valuable reading or those interested inthe Civil War and in the history o the military art.

Washington, D.C. JOHN S. BROWN15 September 2005 Brigadier General, USA (Ret.)

Chie o Military History


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The AuThor

Ted Ballard was a historian with the U.S. Army Center oMilitary History rom 19802004 and a part o the Centers staride program since 1986.Battle o Antietam joins his other battle-feld guides to Balls Blu and First and Second Bull Run. He wasa contributor to the Centers publication The Story o the Non-commissioned Ofcer Corps; the author oRhineland, a brochurein the Centers series commemorating the ftieth anniversary o

World War II; and a contributor to the U.S. Army Training andDoctrine Command publicationAmerican Military Heritage andto the Virginia Army National Guard publication The TraditionContinues: A History o the Virginia National Guard, 16071985.


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PreFAce

The Battle o Antietam has been called the bloodiest singleday in American History. By the end o the evening, 17 Septem-ber 1862, an estimated 4,000 American soldiers had been killedand over 18,000 wounded in and around the small arming com-munity o Sharpsburg, Maryland. Emory Upton, then a captainwith the Union artillery battery, later wrote, I have heard othe dead lying in heaps, but never saw it till this battle. Whole

ranks ell together. The battle had been a day o conusion,tactical blunders, individual heroics, and the eects o just plainluck. It brought to an end a Conederate campaign to liberatethe border state o Maryland and possibly to take the war intoPennsylvania. A little more than one hundred and orty yearslater, the Antietam battlefeld is one o the best-preserved CivilWar battlefelds in the National Park System.

Antietam is ideal or a sta ride, since a continuing goal othe National Park Service is to maintain the site in the conditionin which it was on the day o the battle. The purpose o any staride is to learn rom the past by analyzing the battle through theeyes o the men who were there, both leaders and rank-and-flesoldiers. Antietam oers many lessons in command and con-trol, communications, intelligence, weapons technology versustactics, and the ever-present conusion, or og o battle. Wehope that these lessons will allow us to gain insights into deci-sion-making and the human condition during combat.

Several persons assisted in the creation o this sta rideguide. At the U.S. Army Center o Military History, KatherineEpstein edited the manuscript, Sherry Dowdy turned sketchmaps into fnished products, and Henrietta Snowden designedthe fnal guide. Thanks also to Paul Chiles, Ted Alexander, KeithSnyder, and Brian Baracz, sta historians at the Antietam Na-tional Battlefeld, who took time out rom their busy schedulesto review the manuscript or historical accuracy.

In the narrative, the names o Conederate personnel and

units appear in italic type, Union personnel and units in regulartype. Any errors that remain in the text are the sole responsibil-ity o the author.

Washington, D.C. TED BALLARD4 May 2006


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conTenTs

PageAntietam: An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Prelude to the Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3The Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Further Readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Chronology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48Order o Battle, 17 September 1862 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77Tactics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79Small Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Artillery Projectiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86Logistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

U.S. Army Bureau System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89Supply Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Selected Biographical Sketches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93Union Ofcers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93Conederate Ofcers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Suggested Stops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Maps

No.1. Invasion o Maryland and Union Response,

313 September 1862 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52. Conederate Movements per Special Orders 191,

1013 September 1862 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103. Battle o South Mountain, 14 September 1862 . . . . . . . 144. Conederate Situation: Aternoon, 15 September 1862 . . . 165. Battlefeld Situation, 15301600, 16 September 1862 . . . . 206. Hookers Attack, 06000630, 17 September 1862 . . . . . . 237. Hoods Attack, 07000730, 17 September 1862 . . . . . . . 278. Sumners Attack, 0900, 17 September 1862 . . . . . . . . . 299. Sedgwicks Retreat, 0930, 17 September 1862 . . . . . . . . 31

10. Frenchs Attack, 09301000, 17 September1862. . . . . . . 3311. Richardsons Attack, 10001030, 17 September 1862 . . . . 35


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Page12. Collapse o Conederate Center, 1300,

17 September 1862 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3713. Burnsides Attack, 10001100, 17 September 1862 . . . . . 39

14. Burnsides Attack: 12001300, 17 September 1862 . . . . . 4115. A. P. Hills Attack, 1530Nightall, 17 September 1862 . . . 43

Tables

No.1. Army o the Potomac, Casualties during the Battle o

Antietam, 17 September 1862 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 752. Army o Northern Virginia, Casualties during the

Maryland Campaign, 1419 September 1862 . . . . . . 763. Typical Civil War Small Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824. Typical Civil War Field Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Illustrations

Previous to Antietam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Burnside Bridge rom the Union Side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Burnside Bridge rom the Conederate Side . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Battle o Antietam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Conederate Dead along Hagerstown Pike . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Conederate Dead at Dunker Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30Sunken Road, Looking Southeast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34Sunken Road, Looking Northeast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34The Charge across the Burnside Bridge, Antietam. . . . . . . . . . 42

George B. McClellan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93Ambrose E. Burnside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94Joseph Hooker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96Edwin V. Sumner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Joseph K. F. Mansfeld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98Robert E. Lee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99James Longstreet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100Thomas J. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

James E. B. Stuart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Illustrations courtesy o the ollowing: 93, National Portrait Gallery, SmithsonianInstitution. All other illustrations rom the Library o Congress.


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AntietAm: An Overview

Prelude to the Battle

The year 1862 began with high hopes in Washington thatthe Conederate capital at Richmond, Virginia, would be cap-tured and the war brought to a successul conclusion. A large,well-equipped orce, the Army o the Potomac, had been orga-

nized and in the spring set out or the Union enclave at FortMonroe, Virginia. Commanded by Maj. Gen. George B. McClel-lan, the Army o the Potomac then marched up the Virginiapeninsula to lay siege to Richmond; other smaller commandsremained in northern Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley tomaintain security or the Federal capital.

However, instead o Union success, the spring and sum-mer saw a string o Conederate victories in Virginia. In Mayand June a small Conederate orce commanded by Maj. Gen.

Thomas J. Stonewall Jackson separately deeated three smallunion commands in the Shenandoah Valley, threatening the se-curity o Washington. To better deend the capital and possiblyassist in the attack on Richmond, President Abraham Lincolnordered that these three commands be consolidated into a orceto be known as the Army o Virginia.

During the early summer, in the Seven Days Battles, theArmy o the Potomac was driven back rom the Conederatecapital by the ConederateArmy o Northern Virginia, command-ed by General Robert E. Lee. The Federal government then de-cided to withdraw the Army o the Potomac and join it withthe Army o Virginia. However, beore both Union commandscould unite, Lees army marched north and in late August de-eated the Army o Virginia at the Battle o Second Bull Run,thirty-ve miles south o the Union capital. As summer came toan end, the Union had not captured Richmond and the Coned-erates appeared poised to capture Washington.

Although the year had seen one Conederate victory ateranother in Virginia, months o campaigning had taken its tollon the Army o Northern Virginia. Lees command had sueredmany casualties who would be dicult to replace. It was alsoshort on rations and supplies, and literally thousands oLeestroops were without sucient clothing, especially shoes. As the

Army o Northern Virginia prepared to embark on another major


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campaign, only its military organization prevented it rom re-sembling a mob o hungry vagabonds.

In the days ater Second Bull Run, the government in Wash-ington prepared or an expected Conederate assault and Lee

pondered his options. Insucient numbers o troops, rations,ammunition, and other supplies prevented him rom either at-tacking or engaging in a siege o the city. Washington was sur-rounded by extensive ortications, bristling with artillery, anddeended by large numbers o troops.

Lee could not aord to remain idle. It would be only a mattero time beore Union orces reorganized and embarked on yetanother advance into Virginia. To draw the Union Army out oits entrenchments around Washington and into the open, Lee

planned to march north o Washington into Maryland. A Con-ederate movement north o the Potomac River would threatenboth Washington and Baltimore and orce the Federal govern-ment to devote large numbers o troops to deend those cities.

In early September Lee wrote to Conederate President Je-erson Davis that theArmy o Northern Virginia was not properlyequipped or such a campaign, especially since thousands oits men were bareoot. Nevertheless,Lee thought that his armywas strong enough to keep the enemy occupied north o the

Potomac until the approach o winter would make an enemyadvance into Virginia dicult, i not impossible.1 Richmondwould be sae, at least until the ollowing spring. On 4 Septem-ber theArmy o Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac River nearLeesburg to the martial strains o Maryland, My Marylandand marched on to Frederick, Maryland.2 (Map1)

Fity-ve-year-old VirginianRobert E. Lee was the son o Rev-olutionary War hero General Henry Light Horse Harry Lee.

Robert E. Lee graduated second in the West Point Class o 1829

and later served in the Mexican War, in which he was slightlywounded. He was superintendent o West Point rom 1852 to1855. In April 1861Lee resigned his commission, hoping to re-main out o the coming confict. However, ater Virginia seced-ed rom the Union in late May,Lee accepted an appointment ascommander o Virginia military orces. Later he served as mili-tary adviser to Jeerson Davis. On 1 June 1862, Davis assigned

1 U.S. War Department, The War o the Rebellion: A Compilation o the OcialRecords o the Union and Conederate Armies, 70 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Gov-ernment Printing Oce, 1887), ser.1, vol. 19 (hereater cited as OR), pt. 1, p.144, and pt. 2, pp. 59091.2 Henry Kyd Douglas,I Rode with Stonewall (Marietta, Ga.: R. Bemis Publish-ing, 1993), p. 620.


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Lee to command the orce deending Richmond, which wouldsoon become known as the Army o Northern Virginia. Duringthe summer he led that army in the successul Battles o theSeven Days and Second Bull Run. Now, in early September,Leeled theArmy o Northern Virginia north to the Potomac and intoMaryland. He entered Maryland not on horseback but in an am-bulance, or almost a week earlier he had allen and broken asmall bone in one hand and strained the other. His hands had

Map 1

JACKSON

LONGSTRE

ET

JACKSO

N

JAC

KSON

JACKSON

McLAW

S

WALKER

D.H.HILL

A R M Y OFNOR T H E R N V IR GIN IA

L E E

SUMNER

FRANKLIN

BURNSIDE

A R M Y OF T H E P OT OM A C

M c C L E L L A N

IXI

IIXII

VIIV(-)

Shenan

doah

Riv

er

Ch

es

apeakeandOhioCanalPotomacRiver

W E S T

V I R G I N I A

V I R G I N I A

M A R Y L A N D

White's Ford

Williamsport

Hagerstown

MartinsburgSharpsburg

Boonsboro

Frederick

Rockville

Harper's Ferry

Leesburg

Manassas Junction

Chantilly

Centreville

Alexandria

Middleburg

WASHINGTON

313 September 1862

INVASION OF MARYLANDAND

UNION RESPONSE

160

Miles


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been placed in splints, with his right arm in a sling. It would beanother week beore he would be able to ride at all, and thenonly with a courier oten leading his horse.3

At the beginning o the Maryland Campaign, the Army o

Northern Virginia was organized into two inantry commands,or wings.4

Forty-one-year-old Maj. Gen. James Longstreet commandedone wing o the army. A native o South Carolina,Longstreethadgraduated rom West Point in 1842. LikeLee, he was wounded inthe Mexican War. At the beginning o the Civil War,Longstreetresigned his U.S. Army commission and accepted a commis-sion as brigadier general in the Conederate Army, command-ing an inantry division. In October o the same year Longstreet

was appointed major general and during the summer o 1862commanded a wing in theArmy o Northern Virginia.Longstreetswing contained the divisions oMaj. Gens. Laayette McLaws and

Richard H. Anderson, as well asBrig. Gens. David R. Jones,John B.Hood, andJohn G. Walker.

Thirty-eight-year-old Virginian Stonewall Jackson command-edLees other wing.Jackson had graduated rom West Point in1846 and resigned his commission almost ten years later to be-come an instructor at the Virginia Military Institute. When the

Civil War broke out, Jackson accepted a colonelcy in the Vir-ginia militia. Shortly thereater, while a brigadier general at theFirst Battle o Bull Run, he earned the sobriquet Stonewall bystanding rm against Union attacks. Jacksons wing includedthe divisions oMaj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill, Maj. Gen. Daniel H.

Hill (Jacksons brother-in-law),Brig Gen. John R. Jones command-ingJacksons division, andBrig. Gen. A. R.Lawton commanding

Ewells Division (the name given to the division previously com-manded byMaj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell). Jackson also spent time

traveling in an ambulance. Shortly ater entering Maryland, hewas injured when his horse reared up and ell on him. Jacksonwas severely bruised and unable to ride or several days.5

In addition to the two inantry wings,Lees army included acavalry division commanded by 29-year-oldMaj. Gen. James E.

B. Stuart, a Virginian and 1854 graduate o West Point. Stuartsdivision also included three batteries o artillery commanded byCapt. John Pelham.

The artillery o theArmy o Northern Virginia at the Battle oAntietam totaled approximately 246 guns, at least 82 o which

3 Ibid., p. 144. See also Robert E. Lee, Recollections and Letters o Robert E. Lee(New York: Garden City Publishing Co., Inc., 1904), pp. 7879.4 These two commands were ocially designated corps on 6 November.5 Douglas,I Rode with Stonewall, p. 620.


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were rifed, organized into batteries o 46 guns each. A battal-ion o several batteries was attached to each division, and ourbattalions o several batteries each were attached to the armysreserve artillery, command by Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton.6The strength o theArmy o Northern Virginia in July was almost50,000 men. However, by the Battle o Antietam in mid-Sep-

tember, combat casualties, sickness, and straggling had reducedthose numbers to roughly 35,000.7

Ater crossing the Potomac, the main portion o the Armyo Northern Virginia reached Frederick by 7 September. The ol-lowing dayLee issued a proclamation to the people o Marylandin which he promised to aid you in throwing o this oreignyoke and to restore sovereignty to the state.8

Meanwhile, the Federal government at Washington was mov-ing to counterLees advance into Maryland. On 5 September theArmy o Virginia was ocially consolidated with the Army o

Previous to Antietam, Alred R. Waud. The drawing shows Conederates

crossing the Potomac, with Union scouts in the oreground.

6OR, pt.1, p. 835.7Walter H. Taylor,Four Years with General Lee (Indianapolis: Indiana Univer-

sity Press, 1996), pp. 61, 73. See also OR, pt. 2, p. 602.8OR, pt. 2, p. 602.


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the Potomac, with the whole to be commanded by 35-year-oldGeneral McClellan. A West Point graduate o 1846 and ormerclassmate oGeneralJacksons, McClellan had resigned his com-mission in 1857. He served or a time with the Illinois Central

Railroad and shortly beore the Civil War was president o theeastern division o the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad. When warbroke out, McClellan oered his services to the military orceso Ohio. In late 1861 he was summoned to Washington by Presi-dent Lincoln, commissioned major general in the Regular Army,and appointed as general in chie o the Army.

Although McClellan was an excellent administrator andenormously popular with the troops, he was at constant oddswith the Lincoln administration over military policy. In March

1862, when McClellan let Washington to accompany the Armyo the Potomac to Fort Monroe, Lincoln relieved him as generalin chie. (He retained command o the Army o the Potomac.)McClellans continued bickering with the administration andthe ailure o his campaign beore Richmond led to calls or hisdismissal. It was, thereore, a surprise to many when Lincoln an-nounced that McClellan would command the reorganized armyduring the Maryland Campaign. Lincoln believed that McClel-lan alone was capable o the complex task o quickly reorga-

nizing and consolidating the two demoralized armies and thenleading them immediately into battle. In addition to many regi-ments and batteries drawn rom the deenses o Washington,the new elements o McClellans army included the North Caro-lina Expeditionary Force o Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnsides IXCorps. Burnsides command had arrived in northern Virginia in

July rom operations along the coast o the Carolinas. In earlySeptember Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Coxs Kanawha Division, whichhad arrived rom western Virginia the previous month, was at-

tached to the IX Corps.When the War Department learned that Lees army had

crossed into Maryland, McClellan was ordered to pursue imme-diately. By 7 September he was leading the Army o the Potomacnorth in search oLee.

Lee, unaware o McClellans pursuit, contemplated his nextmove at Frederick. He planned to shit his army westward acrossSouth Mountain to Hagerstown, Maryland, where he could es-tablish a supply line to Winchester, Virginia, in the ShenandoahValley. And, asLee wroteDavis, Should the results o the expe-dition justiy it, I propose to enter Pennsylvania.9 Aside romdrawing the Union army arther rom its base in Washington,

9 Ibid., p. 592.


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such a move would allow the Conederates to continue gather-ing much-needed supplies.

BlockingLees plan to open a line o communications intothe Shenandoah Valley, however, were two Federal garrisons:

10,000 men at Harpers Ferry and about 2,000 at Martinsburg.Lee had expected both garrisons to fee westward ater the Con-ederates crossed the Potomac, but instead authorities in Wash-ington had ordered the garrisons to remain in place. Theirpresence meant thatLee would have to capture the enemy gar-risons beore continuing his march toward Pennsylvania. In adiscussion withLongstreet,Lee proposed dividing the army intoseveral elements to accomplish the mission. Longstreetadvisedagainst such a move, arguing that the Union army at Wash-

ington, though disorganized and demoralized ater Second BullRun, was still a threat. He said that he knew a number o Unioncommanders who could put it in order and march against us,i they ound us exposed, and make a serious trouble beore thecapture [o Harpers Ferry] could be accomplished. Lee spokeno more o the proposal toLongstreet, who thought the plan amere passing thought.

However, Longstreets assessment was premature. Lee, aterconsultation with Jackson, decided to capture the two garri-

sons.10 On 9 September Lee issued Special Orders 191,11 whichexplained the Harpers Ferry operation in detail, including theroutes o march or the various units involved. (See Map 2.)Jack-son, with the divisions commanded by J. R. Jones, Lawton, andA.

P. Hill, was to recross the Potomac River at Williamsport, Mary-land, and capture the garrison at Martinsburg. Jackson and hiscommand were then to march to Harpers Ferry, approachingthe town rom the west.Longstreets divisions underMcLaws,R.

H. Anderson, and Walkerwould assist Jackson at Harpers Ferry.

McLaws andAnderson were to march directly to Harpers Ferryand occupy the heights north o the Potomac and east o thetown, while Walkerwas to cross the Potomac at Point o Rocksand occupy the heights south o the town. While Stuarts cav-alry screened the armys various movements, the division oD.

H. Hill was to occupy Boonsboro to prevent any Union troopsin Harpers Ferry rom escaping in that direction. Although theorder indicated thatLongstreets command was to halt at Boons-boro,Longstreet, along withLee and the divisions oD. R. JonesandHood, continued on to Hagerstown. The division oD. H.

Hill was to halt at Boonsboro as a rear guard. At the successul

10 James Longstreet,From Manassas to Appomattox (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippin-cott Co., 1896), pp. 20102.11OR, pt. 2, pp. 60304.


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conclusion o the operation,Lees army was to reunite at Hag-erstown; at that time he would determine whether to continueto march north into Pennsylvania. DespiteLongstreets orebod-ings about the operation,Lee was certain that McClellan wouldremain or some time near Washington to complete the Union

LONGSTREET

LEE

JACKSON

JACKSO

N

JACKSON

JACKSON

McL

AWS

WALKER

D.H.HILL

UNION

GARRISON

Ca

t

o

c

t

in

Mo

u

n

t

a

in

Sou

th

Mount

ai

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Anti

etam

Creek

Sh

enandoah

Riv

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Poto

mac

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W E S T V I R G I N I A

V I R G I N I A

M A R Y L A N D

Williamsport

Hagerstown

Martinsburg

Shepherdstown

Sharpsburg

Boonsboro

Middletown Frederick

Harper's Ferry

Leesburg

Point of Rocks

1013 September 1862

CONFEDERATE MOVEMENTS

Per Special Orders 191

120

Miles


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Armys reorganization.Lee also expected the Harpers Ferry op-eration to be completed no later than 13 September.12

The Conederate army departed Frederick on 10 September.Jacksons command marched to Williamsport, where it orded

the Potomac while bands played Carry Me Back to Ole Vir-ginny.13 On 12 September, asJackson approached Martinsburg,the Federal garrison there fed to Harpers Ferry. The ollowingmorningJackson resumed his march; by the evening o 13 Sep-tember, the time by whichLee had hoped the operation wouldbe nished, the commands oJackson, Walker, R. H. Anderson,andMcLaws were surrounding Harpers Ferry.

On 12 September, only two days ater the Conederate armysdeparture rom Frederick, elements o the Army o the Potomac

began entering that city. The ollowing day McClellan himselarrived. The 80,000-man Union army was organized into threewings. Thirty-eight-year-old General Burnside commanded thearmys right wing, consisting o the I Corps, led by Maj. Gen.

Joseph Hooker, and the IX Corps, led by Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno.Sixty-ve-year-old Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner commanded thecenter wing, which included Sumners own II Corps and the XIICorps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks. Because Bankshad been retained in Washington to command the deense o the

capital, the corps was placed under the temporary command oMaj. Gen. Joseph K. F. Manseld. Thirty-nine-year-old Maj. Gen.William B. Franklin commanded McClellans let wing, which in-cluded Franklins own VI Corps and the division o Maj. Gen.Darius Couch. Couchs division had been part o the IV Corps,but that organization had recently been disbanded and Couchsdivision attached to Franklins command. Brig. Gen. Alred Plea-sonton commanded McClellans cavalry division, which con-tained ve brigades o cavalry. McClellans eld artillery consisted

o approximately 300 guns, typically organized into batteries o6 guns, each with several batteries assigned to each division. Al-most 60 percent o McClellans artillery was rifed.

Ater McClellan arrived at Frederick on the morning o 13September, circumstances intervened on his behal. That morn-ing a Union enlisted man camping near town ound several ci-gars around which was wrapped a copy oLees Special Orders191, which had been lost by a Conederate courier.14 By earlyaternoon the document was in McClellans hands.

12 Longstreet,From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 206.13 Douglas,I Rode with Stonewall, p. 623.14 Silas Colgrove, The Finding o Lees Lost Order, inBattles and Leaders othe Civil War, ed. Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel, 4 vols. (New York:The Century Co., 1887) (hereater cited asB&L), 2: 603.


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McClellan now knew oLees plan or the capture o HarpersFerry and o the division o the Conederate army into severalsmaller commands. I McClellan moved quickly, he could crossSouth Mountain, interpose his army between Lees orces, and

deeat them one at a time. McClellan later wrote that he im-mediately gave orders or a rapid and vigorous orward move-ment.15 But the pursuit did not occur that aternoon. Earlier inthe day the IX Corps had been sent to cross Catoctin Mountainand was approaching Middletown. McClellan ordered the IXCorps to continue to Turners and Foxs Gaps on South Moun-tain the ollowing morning. At 1820 McClellan also orderedthe VI Corps to cross Cramptons Gap the ollowing morning.Around midnight a condent McClellan sent a telegram to Pres-

ident Lincoln: I have all the plans o the rebels, and will catchthem in their own trap i my men are equal to the emergency.He added, Will send you trophies.16

McClellans condence about conrontingLees army, how-ever, came to be tempered by his mistaken belie thatLeesarmyoutnumbered him. From a variety o sources, he was gettingestimates o Conederate strength ranging rom 80,000200,000men.17 Moreover, as McClellan telegraphed Washington, Every-thing seems to indicate that they intend to hazard all upon the

issue o the coming battle. They are probably aware that theirorces are numerically superior to ours by at least 25 per cent.18

Observing that a general battle against such odds might, tosay the least, be doubtul, McClellan asked to be reinorced bytroops stationed in deense o Washington. The administrationresponded by sending the V Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen.Fitz John Porter.

On the evening o 13 September Lee received the unwel-come news rom Stuarts cavalry scouts that the Union army

had reached Frederick. Stuartestimated Union strength to be90,000.19 Shortly aterward Lee may have learned rom Stuartthat, according to a local citizen, a copy o Special Orders 191was in McClellans hands.20 With McClellan aware oLeesscattered orces and the Union army approaching the South

15 George B. McClellan,McClellans Own Story(New York: Charles L. Websterand Co., 1887), p. 572.16OR, pt. 2, p. 281.17 Ibid., pp. 233, 248.18 Ibid., p. 254.19 Longstreet,From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 219.20 Joseph L. Harsh, Sounding the Shallows: A Conederate Companion or the

Maryland Campaign o 1862 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2000),pp. 17071.


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Mountain gaps,Lee had to act quickly. He ordered D. H.Hill,supported byHoodandD. R. Jones, to deend Turners and FoxsGaps. Farther south, McLaws was to continue his role in theHarpers Ferry operation but send a part o his orce to deend

Cramptons Gap.On 14 September McClellans right wing, commanded byBurnside and consisting o Hookers I Corps and Renos IXCorps, ought its way to the top o South Mountain. (See Map 3.)By evening the Conederate deenders barely held their groundon the crest. During the ghting Reno was killed, and GeneralCox assumed command o the IX Corps. Six miles to the south,Franklins VI Corps attacked Cramptons Gap. Ater a hard-ought battle with McLaws deenders, Union orces occupied

the gap. It had taken all day, but McClellans army had capturedone mountain gap and would probably orce its way throughthe other two the ollowing morning. McClellan was jubilant.He telegraphed the War Department, It had been a gloriousvictory. When the results o the Battles o South Mountainreached the White House, Lincoln, who only a ew days earlierhad eared a Conederate attack on Washington, telegraphedMcClellan: Your dispatch o to-day received. God bless you andall with you! Destroy the rebel army, i possible.21

Having watched the deense o the northern gaps, late in theeveningLee determined that the troops at hand were insucientto prevent an expected Union attempt to cross the mountain theollowing morning. Consequently, he decided to end the cam-paign in Maryland and withdraw the troops then with him toVirginia by way o a Potomac River ord at Shepherdstown. Butshortly thereater Lee received the news that Union troops hadtaken Cramptons Gap. I the Union troops crossed through thatgap the ollowing morning, they could relieve the Union garrison

at Harpers Ferry. To guard against the potential Union maneuver,Lee decided to halt his retreat near Sharpsburg and threaten anyenemy orce moving againstMcLaws andAndersons rear.

On the morning o 15 SeptemberLee, along withLongstreet,D. R. Jones andD. H. Hills divisions, and a portion oStuartscavalry, reached Sharpsburg on Boonsboro Pike. The town is justeast o Antietam Creek and only about three miles rom the Po-tomac River. A bridge across the river had been destroyed earlierin the war, but the river could be crossed at Botelers Ford, lessthan a mile downstream rom Shepherdstown.

Around noon Lee received news o the surrender o theHarpers Ferry garrison. The surrender was announced to the

21 McClellan, McClellans Own Story, p. 583.


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Map 3

UNIONGARRISON

RE

NO

IX

HOOKER

I

BURNSI D

E

SUMNER I I

PORT

ER

V

MANSFI E

LD

X I I

FRANKLIN

VI

COUCH

IV

(-)

McLAW

S(-

)

W ALKER

JACKSON

McLA

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LON

GSTREET

D.

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HILL

C

at

o

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t

inM

ou

n

t

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in

Sou

th

Mounta

in

Fox's Gap

Turner's Gap

Crampton's Gap

Anti

etam

Cree

k

Potom

acRiver

Che

sapeakeandOhioCana l

W E S T

V I R G I N I A

V I R G I N I A

M A R Y L A N D

Williamsport

Hagerstown

Shepherdstown

Sharpsburg

Keedysville

Boonsboro

Rohrersville

Middletown

Frederick

Harper's Ferry

Point of Rocks

14 September 1862

Note: Roads are approximate.

BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN

120

Miles


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army, which, according toLee, reanimated the courage o thetroops.22 A short time later Stuartarrived to inormLee o thelarge number o Union prisoners captured at Harpers Ferryand the vast amounts o supplies. With thousands o his men

bareoot, Lee quickly responded, General, did they have anyshoes? Pointing to a Conederate unit standing bareoot near-by,Lee told Stuart, These good men need shoes.23

With Harpers Ferry captured and the Conederate victorsnow marching to rejoin the army at Sharpsburg,Lee elected toremain in Maryland a little longer.Lee made a risky decision toremain north o the Potomac River and conront an enemy hebelieved to outnumber his army by two to one. On 15 Septem-berLee had on hand at Sharpsburg only about 25,000 men. The

Conederates at Harpers Ferry might add another 15,000 men,but it would be a day at least beore these troops might rejointhe army at Sharpsburg. AtLees back was the Potomac River. I

Lee was driven back to Botelers Ford by an aggressive enemy,it might mean disaster or the Conederates. Still, Lee was re-luctant to withdraw rom Maryland so soon ater his liberat-ing entry only a week earlier. And even though his commandmight be outnumbered, he had condence that his men couldhold their own against the Army o the Potomac. He decided to

make a stand at Sharpsburg.In 1862 three narrow stone bridges crossed Antietam Creek

in the vicinity o Sharpsburg. A road rom Keedysville onBoonsboro Pike crossed the stream at the northernmost, or up-per, bridge near the mill o Philip Pry. A mile south o the upperbridge, Boonsboro Pike crossed over the middle bridge (nowreplaced by a modern highway bridge). A mile south o Sharps-burg, the lower bridge, now called Burnside Bridge, crossed thestream. Antietam Creek could also be crossed at Prys Mill Ford,

a hal-mile south o the upper bridge; at Snavelys Ford, a milesouth o the lower bridge; and at several other smaller armords.

Leedeployed his small command around Sharpsburg. (See Map 4.)The division oD. R. Jones was placed on high ground east othe town and south o Boonsboro Pike. The small brigade o

Brig. Gen. Robert Toombs was assigned to guard the lower bridge.Farther south, a portion oStuarts cavalry guarded the armysright fank. Northeast o town, D. H. Hills division was placed

22 Cliord Dowdey, ed., The Wartime Papers o Robert E. Lee (Boston: Little,Brown and Co., 1961), p. 318.23 Ezar A. Carman, Unpubl Narrative History o the Battle, copy on le atAntietam National Battleeld, ch. 9, p. 55.


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between the middle bridge and Dunker Church. (Also known asDunkard Church, the small white structure belonged to a paci-st sect known as the Church o the Brethren. Outsiders calledthe congregation Dunkers or Dunkards because o a doctrine

o three total immersions during baptism.)Hoods division wasplaced near Dunker Church. SurroundingHoods command werethree woodlots known as the West, North, and East Woods anda gently rolling armland o cornelds, plowed elds, and pas-tures. On the opposite side o the pike rom the church almosthal a mile arther north was a thirty-acre corneld that wouldgain notoriety in the battle. To guard the armys let fank, an-other portion oStuarts cavalry was placed northwest o DunkerChurch near the bend in the Potomac River.Lee established his

headquarters in a tent on the western edge o town on Boons-boro Pike.McClellans army began crossing the northern gaps o South

Mountain on the morning o 15 September and marched to-ward Sharpsburg. To the south, Franklins VI Corps, ollowed byCouchs division, crossed at Cramptons Gap. Franklins missionhad been to relieve the Harpers Ferry garrison; but some timeater noon the mission changed when, as McClellan later wrote,the total cessation o ring in the direction o Harpers Ferry

indicated but too clearly the shameul and premature surrendero the post.24 McClellan ordered Franklin and Couch to halt atthe western oot o South Mountain and await urther orders.

McClellans army began arriving on the east side o AntietamCreek on the aternoon o 15 September. Although a orce oConederates could be seen halted on the west side o the creek,McClellan believed that the enemy was in ull retreat and wouldcross the Potomac River back into Virginia that night.25 McClel-lan established his headquarters on Boonsboro Pike about a mile

south o Keedysville. While the cavalry halted on the heightseast o the middle bridge, Maj. Gen. Israel B. Richardsons andBrig. Gen. George Sykes divisions took positions opposite thebridge and Hookers I Corps halted east o the upper bridge.Sumner, with Maj. Gen. John Sedgwicks and Brig. Gen. WilliamFrenchs divisions and Manselds XII Corps, halted at Keedys-ville. McClellan later said that he had hoped to make an attackthat aternoon; but ater a rapid examination o the position, Iound it was too late to attack that day.26 Instead, he spent theaternoon waiting or more troops to arrive, assigning positionsor the troops to camp that night, and placing artillery batteries,

24OR, pt. 1, p. 29.25 Carman, Unpubl Narrative History, ch. 13, p. 5.26OR, pt. 1, p. 29.


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including long-range rifed artillery, on the ridge overlooking thecreek. That evening Coxs IX Corps arrived and was placed oppo-site the lower bridge. During the day McClellan had suspendedthe organization o Burnsides right wing and ordered Hooker

to report directly to him rather than to Burnside.27

Burnside wasassigned command o the let wing o the army, which consistedo only the IX Corps.

On the morning o 16 September McClellan, still expectingthe Conederates to be mostly across the river in Virginia, wroteto his wie: Have reached thus ar and have no doubt deliveredPenna and Maryland. All well and in excellent spirits.28 Mc-Clellan also sent a telegram to Washington: This morning aheavy og has thus ar prevented our doing more than to ascer-

tain that some o the enemy are still there. Do not yet know inwhat orce. Will attack as soon as situation o the enemy is de-veloped.29 When the og cleared, McClellan spent most o themorning riding along his line, examining the ground, ndingords, clearing approaches, and hurrying up ammunition andsupply-trains.30 Around noon Maj. Gen. George W. Morells di-vision o the V Corps arrived, accompanied by Porter himsel,and was halted near Keedysville.

While McClellan continued to prepare to attack,Jackson and

the divisions o J. R. Jones and Lawton arrived at Sharpsburg,rejoining Jacksons third division, commanded by D. H.Hill.

Jacksons ourth division, that oA. P. Hill, remained at HarpersFerry to secure captured property and parole the large num-ber o prisoners (about 12,000). Walkers division oLongstreetscommand also arrived rom Harpers Ferry and halted a shortdistance south o the town.

By 1330 McClellan was nally ready to go on the oensive,but he was reluctant to commit a large portion o his army to

a rontal attack. Instead, he ordered Hookers I Corps, stationedby the upper bridge, to cross Antietam Creek and i possible toturnLees let fank. McClellan later started in his report o thebattle:

My plan or the impending engagement was to attack the enemyslet with the corps o Hooker and Manseld, supported by Sumnersand, i necessary, by Franklins; and as matters look avorably there, tomove the corps o Burnside against the enemys extreme right, uponthe ridge running to the south and rear o Sharpsburg, and having

27 Ibid. See also p. 418.28 Stephen W. Sears, ed., The Civil War Papers o George B. McClellan: SelectedCorrespondence, 18601865 (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1989), p. 566.29OR, pp. 30708.30 McClellan,McClellans Own Story, p. 590.


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Map 5

J. R. J O N E S

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JONES

WALKER TO

OMBS

D.H

.H

ILL

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RI C

KETTS

DOUBLEDAY

PL EASONTON

M c C L E L L A N

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etam

Creek

Burnside Bridge

(Lower Bridge)

Snavely's Ford

The North Woods

The Cornfield

The WestWoods

The East Woods

Middle Bridge

HAGERSTOWN

PIKE

SMOK

ETOW

N RO

AD

BOONSBORO

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Porterstown

S H A R P S B U R G

16 September 1862

BATTLEFIELD SITUATION

15301600

16000

Yards


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lower bridge. To meet the northern threat,Lee sentJackson withJ. R. Jonescommand toward Dunker Church to join withHood.Lawton was initially ordered to support Toombs brigade at thelower bridge; but aterLee determined that there was no Unionattempt to cross the lower bridge,Lawton was sent to joinJack-son. Walkers command remained south o Sharpsburg, availableto support Toombs i necessary.

Shortly beore dark Hookers columns, preceded by skirmish-ers rom Meades division, reached the East Woods.Hoods divi-sion opened a lively skirmish with Meades men, but darknessand a drizzling rain ended the conrontation. Hoodthen with-drew to the West Woods, south o Dunker Church. Jackson ex-tracted a promise rom Hoodthat his division would return tothe ront the moment it was called upon.

Leaving Brig. Gen. Truman Seymours brigade o Meadesdivision in the East Woods, the remainder o Hookers corps

moved into bivouac just east o Hagerstown Pike and northo the Joseph Poenberger home. Hooker, still nervous aboutconronting an enemy that he believed to outnumber him, in-ormed McClellan that his attack would begin at dawn. He alsoasked that reinorcements be sent to him beore the attack.

During the night McClellan ordered Franklins VI Corps,still near Cramptons Gap, to join the main army at Sharpsburg.Couchs division was ordered to remain in place. Around mid-night, per McClellans orders, the 7,500-man XII Corps crossedAntietam Creek and by 0200 encamped about two miles northo the East Woods, joining Hookers I Corps.

Facing the threat o an attack the ollowing morning, LeeorderedA. P. Hills division at Harpers Ferry to march or Sharps-burg at rst light.Hill was to leave a small orce behind to com-plete the removal o captured property.

Burnside Bridge, a Conederate View


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The Battle

Shortly beore daylight on 17 September Hookers corps be-gan to stir, initiating heavy ring between the pickets o both

sides. By roughly 0600 the rain had ceased, and the I Corps be-gan its advance south through a low-lying morning mist. (Map6) Hooker stated that this immediate objective was to reachhigh ground almost a mile to the south (site o the present-dayVisitor Center).33 While Doubledays division marched southalong Hagerstown Pike, Ricketts division moved west o Smo-ketown Road. The brigades o Col. Albert L. Magilton and Lt.Col. Robert Anderson o Meades division waited in reserve nearthe North Woods. Seymours brigade, also o Meades division,remained in an advanced position in the southwest corner othe East Woods. In addition to Hookers own artillery placedon high ground near the Joseph Poenberger arm, his advancewas also supported by long-range rifed guns on the heights easto Antietam Creek. These guns enladed Jacksons lines, drop-ping rounds randomly along Hagerstown Pike.

Under heavy re rom Union artillery, Jacksons commandwaited. The division oJ. R. Jones was west o Hagerstown Pike,

about 500 yards north o Dunker Church. Farther west, the bri-gade oBrig. Gen. Jubal A. Early, part oLawtons division, sup-ported Stuarts cavalry. East o the pike, on the southern edge othe Corneld, Lawton extended Jacksons line toward the EastWoods. South o this position, near the home o Samuel Mum-ma, a portion oLawtons command protected Jacksons rightfank.

While Union artillery kept up a steady re into Jacksonsposition, Conederate guns quickly responded. Along Nicode-

mus Hill, ourteen guns oPelhams artillery opened re intoBrig. Gen. John Gibbons brigade o Doubledays division. OneoHoods artillery battalions, commanded by Col. Stephen D.

Lee and directly in the path o the Union advance, red rom aknoll just east o Hagerstown Pike and opposite Dunker Church.As the gunners on both sides kept up a lively re, a civilianspectator noted, The cannonade, reverberating rom cloud tomountain and rom mountain to cloud, became a continuousroar, like the unbroken roll o a thunder-storm.34

Jacksons men did not have long to wait. Doubledays andRicketts divisions soon reached the Miller arm and haltednorth o the Corneld. The corn stood six eet high, but Hooker

33 Ibid., p. 218.34 Charles C. Con, Antietam Scenes, inB&L, p. 682.


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Map 6

L A W TO N ( - )

S T A R KE

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J. R. J ON E S

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OD

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TON(-)

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A RLY

PELH

A

M

J A C K S

ON

M E A D E ( - )

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E(-)

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P S

DU R YE A

HARTSUFF

CHRISTIAN

P AT R

I CK

G IB B

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UB

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The Nor t h Woods

T h e C o r n f i e l d

The Wes t Woods

Th e

Eas t Woods

Nicodemus Hill

HAGERSTOW

NP

IKE

LANDING ROAD

SUNKEN ROA D

SM

OKE

TOWN

ROAD

Jos. Poffenberger

Nicodemus

Mumma

A. Poffenberger

Hauser

Dunker

Church

17 September 1862

HOOKER'S ATTACK

06000630

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deduced rom the bayonets protruding above the corn that theeld contained a large number o Conederate troops. Hookerordered two batteries o artillery orward rom the Joseph Po-enberger arm, and the guns began raking the Corneld withround ater round o canister. Hooker vividly described thescene: In the time I am writing every stalk o corn in the north-ern and greater part o the eld was cut as closely as could havebeen done with a knie, and the slain lay in rows precisely as

they stood in their ranks a ew moments beore. It was never myortune to witness a more bloody, dismal battle-eld.35

Shortly aterward, the inantry advance resumed. As Rick-etts division approached the Corneld, two o his three bri-gades halted when the commander o one was seriously wound-ed and the other lost his nerve. The result was that only one oRicketts brigades entered the Corneld to conrontLawtons di-vision. Ater a short but bitter standup ght, the Union brigadewas driven back with heavy losses. Ricketts remaining two bri-gades, now under new commanders, attacked Lawton; but theassaults were uncoordinated and each in turn was driven romthe Corneld.

35OR, pt. 1, p. 218.

Battle o Antietam, Thure de Thulstrup, Showing the Union Advance on theDunker Church


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While Ricketts brigades ought in the eastern portion o theCorneld, Doubledays division ought in the western portion.An ocer in Doubledays command aterward wrote, Men,I cannot say ell; they were knocked out o the ranks by doz-ens.36 Near Hagerstown Pike, Doubledays men struck the letoLawtons command and drove the Conederates back. A por-tion oJ. R. Jonesdivision then attacked Doubleday, but it was

driven back. Ater losing many casualties, Lawtons commandalso ell back to join D. R. Jones. The bloody Corneld was inUnion hands.

By 0700 over hal oJacksons command had been killed orwounded. J. R. Jones let the eld ater being stunned by the ex-plosion o artillery shell.Brig. Gen. William E. Starke, a brigadecommander in Jones command, was killed, the rst Coneder-ate general to be killed or mortally wounded during the battle.With his line collapsing, Jackson called on Hoods division orassistance.

Hoods men were preparing breakast in the West Woodssouthwest o Dunker Church when they received orders to move

36 Ruus R. Dawes, Service with the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers (Marietta, Ga.: E.R. Alderman and Sons, 1890), p. 90.

Conederate Dead along the West Side o Hagerstown Pike. The Corneld isto the right.


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at once to the ront. The command quickly departed the woodsand headed north with Col. William T. Woords brigade onthe let and Col. Evander M. Laws brigade on the right. (Map 7)Doubledays and Ricketts divisions had resumed their advance

when they were suddenly attacked byHoods men. A Union O-cer remembered, A long and steady gray line, unbroken by theugitives who fy beore us, comes sweeping down through thewoods around the church. They raise the yell and re. It is likea scythe running through our line. Now save, who can. It is arace or lie that each man runs or the corneld.37

The let oHoods division drove into the Corneld, whereanother round o violence exploded. Hoodlater wrote, It washere that I witnessed the most terrible clash o arms, by ar,

that has occurred during the war.38

As his men pressed or-ward,Hoods let fank came under re rom Doubledays troops,who had allen back to the west side o Hagerstown Pike. Bat-tery B, 4th U.S. Artillery, also west o the pike, opened re onthe Conederates. The guns red canister at a range o less thantwenty-ve yards, throwing splintered pieces o ence rails andmen alike into the air. The Conederates who survived the blastbegan shooting down the gunners.

While part oHoods command ought along the pike, the

1st Texas Inantry pushed through the Corneld toward theMiller armhouse, where Magiltons and Andersons brigades oMeades division had arrived earlier. The one-sided conronta-tion resulted in the Texans suering over 80 percent casualtiesand retreating to the Corneld.

Meanwhile, the right oHoods division entered the EastWoods. There, it conronted Manselds newly arrived XIICorps, which McClellan had ordered to support Hooker the daybeore. Manseld, thinking that his command was ring on

Hookers men, rode in ront o his line to halt the ring and wasmortally wounded. Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams, one o Man-selds division commanders, assumed command o the corpsand launched a counterattack into the Corneld. Hoods com-mand was driven back to the West Woods.

While Williams division halted in the Corneld, the otherdivision o the XII Corps, commanded by Brig. Gen. George S.Greene, detached one brigade to support Williams. Greenes tworemaining brigades continued south on Smoketown Road. Colo-nelLees guns quickly withdrew, and Greene halted on a plateaueast o Dunker Church. It was around this time that Hookerreceived a slight wound in the oot and turned over command

37 Ibid.38OR, pt. 1, p. 923.


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Map 7

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T h e

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Nicodemus Hill

HAGERSTOWN

PIK

E

LANDING ROAD

SUNKEN ROA D

SMOKE

TOWN

ROA

D

Jos. Poffenberger

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Nicodemus

17 September 1862

HOOD'S ATTACK

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o the I Corps to Meade. Meade, believing that the XII Corpswas arriving to relieve Hookers corps, began withdrawing the ICorps toward the North Woods.

As the ghting momentarily paused, McClellan ordered

Sumner to send two o his three divisions to support Hooker.Sumner led Sedgwicks and Frenchs divisions across the creekat Prys Mill Ford and headed or the battleeld. Sumners thirddivision, commanded by Richardson, remained east o the creekguarding artillery.

Shortly beore 0900 Sumners two divisions reached theEast Woods. Ater a brie halt, the command resumed its ad-vance, which did not progress in a unied manner. (Map 8) Itsplit rst around Greenes division, which held the open plateau

near Dunker Church, with Sedgwicks three brigades moving toGreenes right into the West Woods and Frenchs three brigadesmoving to Greenes let. Then, within the advance o Sedgwicksdivision on the West Woods, one o Brig. Gen. Willis A. Gor-mans regiments, the 34th New York Inantry, became detachedand ended up near Dunker Church. There, it ound the 125thPennsylvania Inantry, which had become separated rom Wil-liams division and had entered the West Woods some time ear-lier. Thus, Sumners two divisions did not attack together.

Sumner personally led Sedgwicks division to HagerstownPike, where the men climbed post-and-rail ences on either sideo the road and entered the West Woods. Sedgwicks leading bri-gade, commanded by Gorman and minus the stray 34th NewYork Inantry, reached the ar side o the woods and quicklyopened re on the remnants oJacksons command to the west.The other two brigades, commanded by Brig. Gens. Napoleon

J. T. Dana and Oliver O. Howard, lay down in the woods andawaited orders. As Gormans men appeared at the western edge

o the woods, troops rom the commands oLawton and J. R.Jones opened re. Gorman later wrote, Instantly my wholebrigade became hotly engaged, giving and receiving the mostdeadly re it has ever been my lot to witness.39

The Conederates rushed to meet the new Union threat inthe West Woods.Earlys brigade let its position to the west andmoved into the West Woods. Earlier in the morning, Pelhamsartillery had shited south rom Nicodemus Hill to a position onthe heights west o the A. Poenberger arm. Lee sent Walkersdivision rom its reserve position south o Sharpsburg and thedivision oMcLaws newly arrived rom Harpers Ferry. Joiningthese divisions was the brigade oCol. George T. Anderson oD.R. Jones division.

39 Ibid., p. 311.


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Map 8

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These Conederates, almost 8,000 strong, charged into theWest Woods, rst overrunning the isolated 34th New York and125th Pennsylvania Inantries, then striking the let and rear oSedgwicks division. (Map 9) Danas and Howards brigades leaptto their eet and tried to meet the attack, but it was too late. Likedominoes, they began to tumble northward with the Coneder-ates in close pursuit. Gormans brigade was also attacked, but it

had more time to react and turned to meet the threat. Acting asa rear guard, Gormans command withdrew northward, stop-ping now and then to re a volley at its pursuers.

The remnants o Sedgwicks division fed across the Millerarm, where they sought the protection o Hookers I Corps ar-tillery. Williams division in the Corneld and Union artillerystopped the Conederates and drove them back to the WestWoods. Sumners attack into the West Woods had been a disas-ter. In less than thirty minutes, Sedgwick had been woundedand more than 40 percent o his division had been either killedor wounded.

As Sedgwicks division was collapsing, Frenchs 5,700-mandivision, having split to the let o Sedgwicks advance into theWest Woods and cheered on by the martial music o regimentalbands, crossed the Mumma and Roulette arms and advanced


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Map 9

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toward an old arm road, now known as the Sunken Road orBloody Lane. (Map 10)

The Sunken Road joins Hagerstown Pike 500 yards southo Dunker Church, runs east about a thousand yards, and then

turns south to Boonsboro Pike. Waiting in the road were almost2,500 men oD. H. Hills division. The let oHills line con-tained the brigade oBrig. Gen. Robert E. Rodes, which extendedrom near Hagerstown Pike to the lane leading to the WilliamRoulette home. OnRodeslet, connecting with the pike, wereremnants o the brigades oBrig. Gen. Roswell S. Ripley, Col. D. K.

McRae, and Col. A. H. Colquitt, which had ought in the Corn-eld earlier in the morning. OnRodesright, the brigade oBrig.Gen. George B. Anderson continued the line another 200300

yards.Hills headquarters was about 300 yards south o the road,at the home o Henry Piper. As Frenchs division approached,the Conederates strengthened their position by piling up encerails whileHill sent urgent messages toLee or more troops.

When Frenchs men appeared on the high ground above theSunken Road, the Conederates let loose a volley that staggeredand halted the Union line. Both sides then settled down to pour-ing volley ater volley into each others ranks. Many ocers onboth sides soon ound themselves on oot, their horses killed or

wounded. G. B. Anderson received a wound in the oot that wouldlead to his death about one month ater the battle. When a regi-mental commander stepped orward to replaceAnderson, he wasshot and killed. With casualties mounting on both sides, some o

Rodesmen let the road several times and charged Frenchs line;but the uncoordinated attacks were driven back.

Responding to Hills pleas or assistance, Lee sent Maj. Gen.Richard H. Andersons division, which had arrived rom HarpersFerry that morning. Andersons men advanced rapidly through

town and at roughly 1000 joinedHills men in the Sunken Road.(See Map 11.) Shortly aterward, Richardsons division, which Mc-Clellan had ordered to march to the battleeld rom guardingartillery east o the Antietam, arrived on the let o Frenchs com-mand.

Among the rst o Richardsons units to reach the Sunken Roadwas Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Meaghers Irish Brigade, composed oimmigrants recruited in New York City and Massachusetts. Oncoming into close and atal contact with the enemy, accordingto Meagher, the ocers and men o the brigade waved theirswords and hats and gave three hearty cheers or their general,George McClellan, and the Army o the Potomac.40 The Irish-men red several volleys at the Conederates in the Sunken

40OR, p. 294.


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Map 10

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17 September 1862

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Sunken Road, Looking Southeast, toward the Present-Day Stone ObservationTower


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Map 11

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. ANDERSON

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41 James Longstreet, The Invasion o Maryland, inB&L, p. 669.

Road then charged up to the road and continued the ght atclose range. Standing in the open, entire ranks o Meaghersmen were shot down. Meagher, injured when his stricken horseell on him, was carried rom the eld. O the 1,400 men in

Meaghers brigade when it arrived on the eld, almost 1,000 laydead or wounded. The remainder o Richardsons division soonarrived to join the ray.

While Frenchs and Richardsons divisions ought along theSunken Road, Greenes division charged into the West Woods,driving back elements o Walkers division. For roughly twohours Greene held his advanced position; but concerned thathis command might be surrounded in the woods and not re-ceiving requested support, the division ell back to the East

Woods.Upon Greenes retreat, Walkers men quickly reoccupied theWest Woods. Greenes withdrawal also exposed the right fanko Frenchs division, which the 3d Arkansas and 27th North Car-olina Inantries, joined by groups rom the mixed commands tothe let oRodesbrigade, attacked. (Map 12) French halted hisattack on the Sunken Road and quickly aced westward to meetthe threat. His command was soon joined by a portion o Rich-ardsons division. The arrival near the East Woods o Maj. Gen.

William F. Smiths division o the IV Corps caused the Coned-erates to withdraw. A portion o Smiths division pursued theminto the West Woods but was driven back.

Around 1230, suering rom heavy casualties, lack o am-munition, and a misunderstanding o orders, the Conederatesin the Sunken Road began to withdraw toward Sharpsburg. AsRichardsons command crossed the road, now lled with thebodies o its ormer deenders, Richardson was mortally wound-ed by a ragment o shell.

The Conederate retreat rom the Sunken Road uncovered agreat gap in the center oLees line. According toLongstreet, a-ter the loss o the Sunken Road, The Conederate army wouldbe cut in two and probably destroyed, or we were already badlywhipped and were only holding our ground by sheer orce odesperation.41 Very ew Conederates now stood in the way oa Union advance rom the Sunken Road. Seeing two abandonedConederate cannon south o the road,Longstreethad his staman the guns while he led their horses. D. H. Hill grabbed amusket and, with roughly 200 Conederates, led an unsuccess-ul counterattack.


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Map 12

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42OR, p. 377.43 Ibid., p. 279.44 McClellan,McClellans Own Story, p. 603.

With the Conederate center broken, one great Union pushmight have destroyed what was let oLees army. Franklins IVCorps, Porters V Corps, and the armys cavalry division stoodpoised or action. But McClellan made no attempt to capitalize

on the Union success. It would not be prudent to make the at-tack, he said, our position on the right being ... considerablyin advance o what it had been in the morning.42 Instead ocontinuing to advance, McClellan ordered Richards division tohalt and to hold that position against the enemy.43Lees cen-ter was sae.

While the attack against the Sunken Road was in prog-ress, Burnsides IX Corps, commanded by Cox, was attackingToombs command at the lower bridge. (Map 13) Toombs had

only 400 men to hold the bridge, supported by another 100romBrig. Gen. Thomas F. Draytons brigade and a company omen rom Jenkins brigade, commanded by Col. JosephWalker,both oD. R. Jones division. The Union attack began about1000, but the assaults were piecemeal, with only one or tworegiments attacking at a time. The 11th Connecticut Inantryo Col. Edward Harlands brigade o Brig. Gen. Isaac P. Rod-mans division began the assault; but ater suering heavy ca-sualties, including the death o its commander, the regiment

withdrew. While the 11th Connecticut Inantry attack wastaking place, the rest o Rodmans division, along with a bri-gade o the Kanawha Division, searched or a ord south othe bridge. Rodman had been inormed that a ord existed lessthan a mile below the bridge, but he discovered the crossing tobe impracticable, being at the oot o a steep blu rising morethan 160 eet on the side o the creek. Rodmans commandcontinued south and crossed at the waist-deep Snavelys Ford,two-thirds o a mile below the bridge.

Ater the withdrawal o the Connecticut troops, an aide romMcClellan arrived near the bridge to check on the status o theattack. He reported to McClellan that there had been little prog-ress. McClellan ordered Burnside to assault the bridge at onceand carry it at all hazards.44 Around 1100 Burnside ordered the2d Maryland and 6th New Hampshire Inantries o Brig. Gen.Samuel D. Sturgis division to cross the bridge. Toombs deend-ers, however, quickly drove them back.

Around noon McClellans aide once again reported thatBurnsides troops had yet to cross the bridge. McClellan sentthe armys inspector general, Col. Delos B. Sackett, to order


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45OR, p. 138.46 Ibid., p. 981.47 Ibid., p. 1000.

Burnside, at the point o the bayonet i necessary, to capturethe bridge immediately. McClellan instructed Sackett to remainwith Burnside until the attack was successul.

Burnside next ordered the 51st New York and 51st Pennsyl-

vania Inantries, also o Sturgis division, to attempt to cross thebridge. Around 1300 the two regiments, supported by a howitzerpositioned near the bridge abutment, charged across the bridgeand reached the opposite bank. (Map 14) About the same time,Rodmans division made its crossing at Snavelys Ford. Northo the bridge, several companies o the 28th Ohio Inantry othe Kanawha Division waded across the creek to the west bank.With the crossing o Burnsides troops at the bridge and otherUnion troops crossing above and below, Toombs deense ended

and the remnants o his command ell back toward Sharpsburg.It had taken three hours or the IX Corps to secure a cross-ing, and it would be another two hours beore Burnside couldget the entire corps across the creek. McClellan was unhappywith the delay and ordered Burnside to continue his attack.Around 1500 the IX Corps began climbing the slopes towardSharpsburg. As the troops approached the town, a Union signaldetachment east o Antietam Creek signaled to Burnside, Lookout well on your let; the enemy are moving a strong orce in

that direction.45 It is unknown whether Burnside actually sawthe warning message.

The approaching Conederates were elements oA. P. Hillsdivision arriving rom Harpers Ferry.Hill had let the brigade o

Brig. Gen. Edward L. Thomas at Harpers Ferry to continue remov-ing captured supplies, but he himsel headed toward Sharpsburgwith his ve remaining brigades. Around 1430, ater a seven-teen-mile orced march, the head oHills command reachedSharpsburg;Lee quickly ordered it toward Burnsides advancing

columns. (See Map 15.) While the brigades oCol. J. M. Brocken-brough andBrig. Gen. William D. PenderguardedHills right, thebrigades oBrig. Gens. L. OB. Branch, Maxcy Gregg, andJ. J. Ar-chercharged into Burnsides let. The strenuous march had seri-ously depleted their strength, however, and the three attackingConederate brigades numbered ewer than 2,000 men.46 In act,

Archers brigade alone numbered only 350 men.47While Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Willcoxs division, on the right

o Burnsides attack, continued its advance to the outskirts oSharpsburg, the sudden attack on the Union let halted Rod-mans division. A portion o the Kanawha Division was ordered


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Map 14

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up the slope to support Rodman, but the troops had dicul-ty distinguishing riend rom oe in the battle smoke. Troopidentication was made even more dicult because some o

Hills men were wearing portions o Union uniorms capturedat Harpers Ferry. In the conusion the portion o the KanawhaDivision ordered to support Rodman was outfanked by Gregg

and ell back.For the IX Corps eort to climb the hill to Sharpsburg, it

suered 2,000 casualties, including General Rodman, killed ear-ly in the attack. Rodman was the third Union general ocerto be killed or mortally wounded this day. Toward the end othe ghting,Branch was killed, bringing to three the number oConederate general ocers killed or mortally wounded in thebattle.

It was now around 1700 and growing dark. Unsure o thesize o the Conederate orce attacking his let, Burnside orderedthe IX Corps to withdraw to the creek. As the sun set on whatwould become known as the bloodiest single day o the war,the IX Corps established a deensive perimeter near the lowerbridge.Lees exhausted troops on the heights above the bridgewere content to remain in place.

The Charge across the Burnside Bridge, Antietam,


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The ollowing morning, 18 September, the two armies re-mained in position. McClellan wrote, To renew the attackagain on the 18th or deer it, with the chance o the enemysretirement ater a day o suspense, were the questions beore

me.48

McClellan decided to wait and issued orders to renewthe attack on 19 September. Lee, however, was ready to keepup the ght. An additional 5,0006,000 stragglers had caughtup with the army; according to one oLees ocers, the Con-ederate commander hoped to turn McClellans fank near thebend o the Potomac River west o Nicodemus Hill. Due to thelarge amount o Union artillery in the area, the plan was aban-doned.49 Unable to outfank McClellan on the Maryland side othe river,Lee withdrew his army to Virginia during the night o

18 September, hoping to recross the Potomac at Williamsportand attack McClellans rear. The plan, however, was thwarted bythe poor physical condition o his army;Lee decided to remainin Virginia.50

On the morning o 19 September McClellan discovered thatthe Conederates had withdrawn. A eeble Union pursuit result-ed in a sharp ght at Botelers Ford the ollowing day, but Mc-Clellan was content to remain in Maryland and claim victory.

Lees army withdrew into the Shenandoah Valley to continue to

gather supplies.Weeks passed. In early October Lincoln visited the Union

army near Sharpsburg to urge McClellan to cross into Virginiaand give battle. McClellan, however, insisted that he neededmore men and supplies beore beginning another campaign. On6 October Lincoln telegraphed McClellan to cross the Potomacand give battle to the enemy or drive him south.51

On 10 October, while the Army o the Potomac remainedin the Sharpsburg area, 1,800 men o Stuarts cavalry crossed

the Potomac near Williamsport and reentered Maryland on anarmed reconnaissance. The troops rode to Chambersburg, Penn-sylvania, then eastward, gathering intelligence and much-need-ed horses while pursued by McClellans cavalry. Ater circlingaround McClellans encamped army, Stuarts men recrossed thePotomac near Leesburg on 12 October.

McClellan was still at Sharpsburg on 25 October, when hewired to Washington that he remained unable to move becausehis horses were suering rom sore-tongue and atigue. An ex-asperated Lincoln responded: I have just read your dispatch

48 Ibid., p. 32.49 Harsh, Sounding the Shallows, pp. 21415.50OR, pt. 2, p. 626.51 Ibid., p. 72.


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52 Ibid., p. 485.53 Sears,Papers o George B. McClellan, p. 469.54Report on the Conduct o the War, 8 vols. (Wilmington: Broadoot PublishingCo., 1998), 1: 368.55 Douglas Southall Freeman,R. E. Lee: A Biography, 4 vols. (New York: CharlesScribners Sons, 1935), 4: 16869.

about sore-tongued and atigued horses. Will you pardon me orasking what the horses o your army have done since the battleo Antietam that atigues anything?52

The Army o the Potomac nally began to cross the Potomac

River on 26 October but did not complete the crossing or al-most a week. Lincoln nally reached the end o his patience andon 7 November relieved McClellan o command and replacedhim with Ambrose Burnside.

Summary

For the North, the ght along Antietam Creek became knownas the Battle o Antietam. In the South, it became known as theBattle o Sharpsburg. O the nearly 70,000 Federal troops actu-ally engaged in the battle, nearly 13,000 were killed, wounded,or missing; the approximately 35,000 Conederates engaged lostalmost as many.

Writing to his wie, McClellan said, Those in whose judg-ment I rely tell me that I ought the battle splendidly and that iswas a masterpiece o art.53 In truth, however, McClellan misseda series o opportunities. By ailing to commit his orces to battle

on 15 and 16 September, McClellan squandered a chance to ex-ploit his numerical superiority. On 17 September McClellanspiecemeal commitment o only a portion o his command dur-ing the battlein driblets, as General Sumner later describedit54ailed to deliver a knockout blow to destroy the Army oNorthern Virginia. McClellans decision not to renew the battleon 18 September, with the same i not greater opportunity osuccess as the previous day, as well as his ailure to energeticallypursue the Conederate army on 19 September, allowed Lee to

withdraw to the saety o the Virginia shore.Lee, like McClellan, generally believed that the role o an

army commander was to bring his army to the battleeld and al-low his subordinates to handle the tactical details.55 But the des-perate situation on 17 September orcedLee to become activelyinvolved in the battle, despite injuries to both his hands. Hespent most o the day on the heights in the area o the present-day National Cemetery, where he watched the progress o the


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56 Sears,Papers o George B. McClellan, p. 473.

battle and personally dispatched various units to endangeredportions o the eld. He sent the commands oWalker,McLaws,and G. T.Anderson just in time to halt Sedgwicks advance onthe Conederate let fank; rushedR. H. Anderson to supportD.

H. Hills deense o the Conederate center; and, whenA. P. Hillsdivision began arriving at Sharpsburg in the aternoon, hurriedHills command to save the Conederate right fank.

Although the Conederates had been orced out o Mary-land,Lees campaign had been a partial success.Jacksons captureo Harpers Ferry provided the Conederates with a large amounto supplies, including clothing, shoes, thousands o small armsand ammunition, and over seventy pieces o artillery. In addi-tion, another major Federal oensive in Virginia had been de-

layed, albeit only briefy. In mid-December Burnside, now com-manding The Army o the Potomac, attempted to interpose hiscommand between Lee and Richmond. The maneuver culmi-nated in a Union deeat at the Battle o Fredericksburg.

Although Antietam was not the decisive Union victory orwhich Lincoln had hoped, it did give the president an opportu-nity to strike at the Conederacy politically, psychologically, andeconomically. On 22 September Lincoln issued the preliminaryEmancipation Proclamation, declaring that the Federal govern-

ment would ater 1 January 1863 consider slaves in any state inrebellion against the Federal government to be ree. The procla-mation had no immediate eect behind Conederate lines, nordid it ree any slaves in states still in the Union. Nevertheless,Lincolns proclamation would be the Federal governments rstocial step toward the abolition o human slavery.

Shortly ater the battle, McClellan wrote that Conederatedreams o invading Pennsylvania had dissipated orever.56 Dur-ing the coming months, however, Lee would wait or another

opportunity to cross his army north o the Potomac. The sum-mer o 1863 would nd the Army o Northern Virginia and theArmy o the Potomac, the latter commanded by the recentlypromoted Maj. Gen. George Meade, conronting each other atthe small Pennsylvania town o Gettysburg.


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Further reAdings

Bradord, Ned, ed.Battles and Leaders o the Civil War. New York:Grammercy Books, 2001.

Harsh, Joseph L. Conederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and theMaking o Southern Strategy. Kent, Ohio: Kent State UniversityPress, 1998.

. Sounding the Shallows: A Conederate Companion or the

Maryland Campaign o 1862. Kent, Ohio: Kent State Univer-sity Press, 2000.

. Taken at the Flood: Lee and Conederate Strategy in theMaryland Campaign. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press,1999.

Murn, James V. The Gleam o Bayonets: The Battle o Antietamand Robert E. Lees Maryland Campaign, 1862. Baton Rouge:Louisiana State University Press, 2004.

Sears, Stephen W.Landscape Turned Red: The Battle o Antietam.Norwalk, Conn.: Easton Press, 1988.

U.S. War Department. The War o the Rebellion: A Compilationo the Ocial Records o the Union and Conederate Armies, 70vols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Oce, 1893,ser. 1, vol. 19, pts. 1 and 2.


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ChrOnOLOgY

Times are approximate and based on those given in the ater-action reports by unit commanders or in postwar reminiscences.

47 September 1862

TheArmy o Northern Virginia, commanded by General Robert E.

Lee, crosses the Potomac River near Leesburg and marches toFrederick, Maryland.

The Army o the Potomac, commanded by Maj. Gen. George B.McClellan, leaves Washington in pursuit oLee.

9 September

Lee issues Special Orders 191, detailing his plan to capture Uniongarrisons at Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry.

10 September

Lee and Maj. Gen. James Longstreetmarch to Hagerstown. Maj.Gen. D. H. Hills division halts at Boonsboro as rear guard.

Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson marches to capture the Union gar-rison at Martinsburg.

The divisions oMaj. Gens. Laayette McLaws andRichard H. An-derson approach Harpers Ferry rom the east.

Brig. Gen. John G. Walkers division crosses the Potomac Riverinto Virginia and approaches Harpers Ferry rom the south.

12 September

The Army o the Potomac begins arriving at Frederick.

Jackson reaches Martinsburg, but the Union garrison lees toHarpers Ferry.


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13 September

staff ride guide battle of antietam

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