staff ride handbook for the battle of chickamauga 18-20 september 1863

7/27/2019 Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Chickamauga 18-20 September 1863

1/185

o c amauga,18-20 September 186

Dr. WiEliam Glenn RobertsonLieutenant Colonel Edward P. ShanahanLieutenant Colonel John I. BoxbergerMajor George E. Knapp

Combat Studies instituteU.S. Army Cammand and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-69001992


2/185

Library of Congress CataIoging-in-PublicaStaff ride handbook for the BattIe ofC%ickamauga, M-21863 I by WilIiam Glenn Robertson . [et al. I .p. cm.Includes bibliographical references (p. 1.1. Chiekamauga (Ga. ), Battleof, 1863. 2. CNational Militry Park (Ga. and Ten&-Guidebooks.

William Glenn, 1944- . II. U.S. Army CommandColIege. Combat Studies Institute.1475.81 .S73 1992973.7356~20


3/185


4/185

l-19 September 1863 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3. Reorganization of the Army of Tennessee,19--2OSeptember1863 ..~...............,..~..,.....4. Regimental line of battle from march column . . . .5. Maneuvering brigades at Chickamauga,20September1863 . . . . ..~............~...........U...6. Thegrandcolumn . . . , . . . . . . ~. . . . . . . *. . . . . . . .

Maps1. Sites of maps 2 through 5 in relation ta the Chickaand Chattanooga National Military Park for day2. Day 1, stands 1 through 16 ..............................3. Dayl,standsl?through20 .............................4. Day 1, stands 21 through 25 .............................5. Day l,stands26thraughZS .............................6. Sites of maps 7 through 10 in relation to the Chickaand Chattanooga National Military Park for day7. Day 2, stands 1 through 15 ..............................8. Day2,stands 16 through22 .............................9. Day2,stands23through28 .............................

10. DayZ,stands29through39 .............................

V


5/185

. Chickamauga . . ..I.....I.............~........I.....~5. Variety of weapons in WiIders brigade,30September1863 . . . . ..l.............................6. Sample of Federal logistical data . 1 e . . . . . . . .7. Casualties of the battle s . . . . v , . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vii


6/185


7/185

ra ne wor a perm s access o a s gn canThus, the park is an excellent physical laboratoconflict at the tactical and human level. Finaproximity. to the city of Chattanooga, Tennesseeasily supportable logistically for Staff Ride groupthis campaign offers a great opportunity for studofficer, as generations of American soldiers haveThe StaffRide Randbook for the Bat&z ofSeptember 1863, provides a systematic approach tgreat Civil War battle. Part I describes the organiand Confederate Armies, detailing their welogistical, engineer, communications, and medicalIn part II, the Chickamauga campaign is dibattIe in historical perspective and illustrating hthe overall context of the Chickamauga campaign.Part III furnishes a suggested route to follfirsthand, concrete view of how the battle developroute, various phases of the battle can be discupoints made concerning the evolving battIe. Also ivignettes by participants in the battle that descriinsights into the emotional disposition of the comPart IV furnishes current information on thsources of assistance, and logistical data for cond

addition, appendixes give order of battle inforarmies, meteorological data, and a list of Medal othe battle. A bibliography is also provided,


8/185

79 different posts. At the start of the war, 183 of theseeither on frontier duty or in transit, while the remaicoastal artillery batteries, guarded the Canadian borcoast or 1 of the 23 arsenals. In 1861, this Armycommand of Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, the 75the Mexican-American War. His position as genertraditional, not statutory, because secretaries of wardesignated a general to be in charge of the field forcecongressional approval The field forces themselvesthrough a series of geographic departments, whoreported directly to the general in chief. This depafrequently modified, would be used by both sides throWar for administering regions under Army control.

Army administration was handled by a system osenior officers were, by 1860, in the twilight of longtechnical fields. Six of the ten bureau chiefs were ovold. These bureaus, modeled after the British sydirectly to the War Department and were not subjectthe general in chief. Predecessors of many of todaysand combat service support branches, the following bestablished by 1881:

Quartermaster MedicalOrdnance Adjutant GeneSubsistence PaymasterEngineer Inspector GeneTopographic Engineer* Judge Advocat

During the war, Congress elevated the Office of theand the Signal Corps to bureau status and created aNote that no operational planning or intelligenceAmerican commanders before the Civil War had neverstructure.This system provided suitable civilian control ansupport to the small field army prior to 1861. Ultimat

*Merged with the Engineer Bureau in 1863.

1


9/185

With the outbreak of war in April 186monumental task of organizing and equipexceeded the prewar structure in size and cmaintained control of the Regular Army,initially created a regular force, mostly on papthe North lost many of its officers to the Sexceptional quality. Qf 1,108 Regular officers1861,270 ultimately resigned to join the Sout15,135 enlisted men, however, Ieft the ranks.

The Federal government had two basicRegular Army. It could be divided into traininfor newly formed volunteer regiments or be reta reliable nucleus for the Federal Army in coScott envisioned a relatively small force totherefore insisted that the Regulars fight aRegular units fought well at the First Battlebattles, Scotts decision ultimately limited theon the war. Battle losses and disease sooRegulars, and officials could never recruit sthe face of stiff competition from the statvolunteer regiments. By November 1864, mbeen so depleted that, they were withdrawn frowar, therefore, was fought primarily with volthe vast majority of wham had no previouexperience.

Neither side had diEeuIty in recruitingrequired to fill the expanding ranks. InAbraham Lincoln called for 75,000 men from3-month period, This figure probably represguess as to how many troops would be needquickly. Almost 92,000 men responded, as torganized, but untrained, militia companieBull Run in July 1861, these ill-trained andgenerally fought much better than they wer


10/185

As the war continued and casualty lists grevolunteering faded, and both sides ultimately resortedto help El1 the ranks. The Confederates enacted the filaw in American history in April 1862, followedgovernments own law in March 1863. Throughoexperiments in American conscription, both sides aprograms in less than a fair and efficient way. Cotended to exempt wealthier citizens, and initially, drsubstitutes or pay commutation fees. As a resulcapability, and morale of the average conscript was pomen, particularly in the South, enlisted to avoid thconsidered a conscript. Still, conscription or the threatultimately helped provide a sufficient quantity of ssides.

Conscription was never a popular program, anparticular, tried several approaches to limitrequirements. These efforts included offering lucratifees paid to induce volunteers to fill required quotas.Federals offered a series of reenlistment bonuses, ithirty-day furloughs, and the opportunity for veteramaintain their colors and be designated as %eterinfantry regiments. The Federals also created an Invrenamed the Veteran Reserve Corps) of men unfit forwho performed essential rear-area duties, The Unioalmost 179,000 blacks, mostly in federally organiregiments By February 1864, blacks were being coNorth as well. In the South, recruiting or conscriptinpolitically sensitive that it was not attempted until Malate to influence the war.

Whatever the faults of the manpower mobilizatimpressive achievement, particularly as a first efforVarious enlistment figures exist, but the best estiapproximately 2 million men enlisted in the Feder1861-65.0f that number, 1 million were under armswar. Because the Confederates records are inco


11/185

reflecting the common roots for both armies.war with a Regular Army organized into amusket-equipped structure. Each of the 10 pcvnsist.ed of ten 87-man companies withstrength of 878, At the beginning of the war,Regular infantry regiments with a norganizational structure. The new regimentwith a maximum authorized strength ofbattalion, with eight loo-man companies, wthe prewar regiment. Essentially an effvrt tothe new structure was unfamiliar to most leaa variant of the vld structure for newly fvrThe Federal War Department establishedregimental organization with a strength that1,046 (varying in authorized strength by upThe Confederate Congress fixed its la-comp1,045 men. Combat strength in battle, holower because of casualties, sickness, leavesstraggling.

The battery remained the basic artilleryand larger formal groupings of artillery emthe eastern theater. Four understrength Regthe U.S. Army at the start of the war, and oadded in 1861, for a total of sixty batteribatteries were volunteer organizations. Aconsisted of 6 guns and had an authorized strbattery of six X&pounder Napoleons couldorganized as horse or flying artillery, caindividual mounts, and more horses than mebat,tery. Their Confederate counterparts, plaand available manpower, usuaIly operatedoften with guns of mixed types and caliberseldom reached their initially authorizedsoldiers.


12/185

to describe their units throughout the war. The Federalcompanies or troops into squadrons, with four tocomprising a regiment. Confederate cavalry units, orprewar model, authorized ten 76man companies per rvolunteer cavalry units on both sides also formed into sbattalions. Later in the war, both sides began to mergregiments and brigades into division and corps organizatFor both sides, the unit structure above regimensimilar to todays structure, with a brigade controllingregiments and a division controlling two or more bribrigades generally contained regiments from more twhile Confederate brigades often had several regimentsstate. In the Confederate Army, a brigadier gencommanded a brigade, and a major general commandedFederal Army, with no rank higher than major gene

often had colonels commanding brigades and brigacommanding divisions.The large numbers of organizations formed, as share a reflection of the politics of the time. The War Depaconsidered making recruitment a Federal responsibiproposal seemed to be an unnecessary expense forinitially envisioned. Therefore, the responsibility

remained with the states, and on both sides, stcontinually encouraged local constituents to formregiments. This practice served to strengthen supportand national politicians and provided an opportunityhigh rank for ambitious men. Although such local recregiments with strong bonds among the men, it alsothe ranks of existing regiments with new replacemenprogressed, the Confederates attempted to funnel repunits from their same state or region, but the Federalcreate new regiments. Existing Federal regiments dethome to recruit replacements, but these effortssuccessfully compete for men joining new local regimeformed regiments thus had no seasoned veterans to trai


13/185

Infantry 19 regular regiments2,125 volunteer regiment8

60 volunteer battalions351 separate companies

Artillery 5 regular regiments61 volunteer regiments17 volunteer battalions408 separate batteries

Cavalry 6 regular regiments266 volunteer regiments

45 battaliona78 separate companies

The LeadersBecause the organization, equipment, taConfederate and Federal Armies were similunits in battle often depended on the qualityindividual leaders. General officers were appocentral governments. At the start of the war,all, of the more senior officers had West Pointexperience. In 1861, Lincoln appointed 126 g82 were, or had been, professional officers. Jeighty-nine, of which forty-four had receiveThe remainder were political appointees, buFederaI and seven Confederate generalsexperience.

Of the volunteer officers who comprised tfor both armies, colonels (regimental comm*Legions were a form of combined arms team, wi\b aThey were awar, legions Pproximately t&e strength of a large regimeost their combined arms orgamzatlon.


14/185

Much has been made of the West Point backgrowho ultimately dominated the senior leadership parmies, but the graduates of military colleges weresuch institutions to command divisions, corps, or arthough many leaders had some combat experience frWar era, very few had experience above the companyin the peacetime years prior to 1861. As a result, tinitially conducted at any level by professional offiterminology. Leaders became more professional thrand at the cost of thousands of lives. General Williawould later note that the war did not enter its prountil 1863.CiviEWarStaffs

In the Civil War, as today, the success oforganizations often depended on the effectiveness of tstaffs. Modern staff procedures have evolved only grincreasing complexity of military operations. This efrom complete in 1861, and throughout the wapersonally handled many vital staff functions, most nand intelligence. The nature of American warfmidnineteenth century had not yet clearly ovcapabilities of single commanders.Civil War staffs were divided into a general stcorps. This terminology, defined by Winfield Scottfrom modern definitions of the terms. Table 2 lispositions at army level, although key functions are rto regimental level. Except for the chief of staff anwho were considered personal staf??and would oftencommander was reassigned, staffs mainly contained r

the various bureaus, with logistical areas being bLater in the war, some truly effective staffs began towas the result of the increased experience of the of


15/185

Assistant inspector generalstaff Carps

EngineerOrdnanceQuartermasterSubsistenceMedicalPaySignalProvost marshalChief of artilIery

George B. McClellan, when he appointed hichief of staff, was the first to officially use this titlesenior commanders had a chief of staff, this posany uniform way and seldom did the man in tcentral coordinating authority of the chief ofheadquarters. This position, along with most othused as an individual commander saw fit, makingsomewhat different under each commander. Thischief of staff was among the most important sduring the Civil War. An equally important weaany formal operations or intelligence staff. Liaialso ill-defined, and various staff officers or solfunction with little formal guidance. Miscommuknowledge offriendly units proved disastrous timThe Armies at Chickamauga

Major General William S. Rosecrans Armywas organized into four infantry corps and a cav1). Eleven infantry divisions would see actioRoseerans effective strength was over 80,000would be available for the battle; most of theseveral additional units were securing tcommunication, which stretched to Nashville. Alt


16/185


17/185

famous fighting McCook family) were Wealthough I&Cook was a young and immatureRosecrans other corps commander, Thomas L.veteran of the Mexican War, was relatively incommand. David S. Stanley, an exceIlent cavalbecame ill in midcampaign and was replaced jbattle by the ineffective Robert B. Mitchell. Adivision commanders would prove inadequate, owas served by a better-than-average set of CivilOn the Confederate side, General BraxtTennessee grew to almost 60,000 men in the tBattle of Chickamauga. (For a comparison of Reffective strengths, see table 3.) Bragg% menthough some regiments had no battle experireinforcements who would arrive by 20 Septcontained eleven infantry divisions, organized i(For the organization of the Army of Tenness1863, and its reorganization on 19-00 Septemand 3.) Braggs senior subordinates were probaFederal counterparts, Unfortunately, many hcommander and tended to question many ofHill, Simon B. Buckner, William H. T. Walker,West Pointers, as was Episcopal Bishop Leonidaday of battle, James Langstreet, a West Poreputation from service under Robert E. Lee inalong with 7,700 men. Joseph Wheeler and Nlatter a particularly gifted soldier) commandecorps. The quality of some of Braggs divisioexceptional: Alexander P. Stewart and Patricamong the best division commanders of the entir

Rosecrans army staff was better orgaAlthough both men tended to handle too manRasecrans log?stical staff was more experienced,of staff, Brigadier General (later President) Jaoperational assi&ant during the battle. Braggs


18/185

4 Sep - 1,100 Engineers on Iines ofcommunication duty 16 Sep + 2,700 McBriS&P - 1,306 Posts (Davis) brigade 18 Ssp +4,000 Laguarding trains 19-20 Sep +3,700 Ke

10 Sep -2,100 Wagners CWood's) Hubrigade garrison inChattanooga19 Sep 62,200 19-20 Sap 67,300

more loosely run and employed lax procedures. Braguse his staff more haphazardly, sending whoever seliaison missions, including his chief of staff who ncoordinated staff activities. Much of Braggs personal titu logistical details. Atrocious staffprocedures in Leoniheadquarters contributed to the confusion and delaysinitiation of the Confederate attack on 20 September.Rosecrans army was in excellent fighting trim.the Stones River and Tullahoma campaigns had alloand his soldiers had the high morale that only a seriesbring. In addition, he carried only 4 percent of his mena remarkably low figure for the Civil War. Moralesupport in Bragg% army could not match that ofNevertheless, his soldiers possessed a stubborn pride band they were defending their home regions. In additioknew of the coming reinforcements from Virginia.

Weapons

During the 185Os, in a technological revoluproportions, the rifle-musket began to replaceinaccurate smoothbore musket in ever-increasing nuEurape and America. This process, accelerated by


19/185


20/185


21/185

. ,smoothbore musket. Roth were single-shot murifled bore of the new weapon substantially inaccuracy. The rifling system chosen by the Uniteby Claude Mini&, a French Army officer. Wherearound, nonexpanding ball, the Mini& systemeylindro-conoidal projectile sIightly smaller thandropped easily into the barrel. When the powdera fulminate of mercury percussion cap, the reexpanded the base of the bullet into the rifledprojectile a ballistic spin.The Model 1855 Springfield rifle-musket warm to use the hollow-base, .58-caliber Ii&x%modified Model 1861 was the principal infantryWar, although two subsequent models in 1863equal quantities. The Model 1861 was 56 inches

inch barrel, and weighed 9 pounds 2 ounces. It2l-inch socket bayonet (with an l&inch triasocket) and had a rear sight graduated to 500effective range of the Springfield rifle-musketyards, although it had killing power at 1,000 ypenetrate 11 inches of white-pine board at 200at 1,000 yards, with a penetration of 1 inchequivalent of disabling a human being. Rangincreased by the use of the new weapon, but thstill obscured by the clouds of smoke producepropellant.TQ load a muzzle-loading rifle, the soldierin hand and tore the end of the paper with his tthe powder down the barrel and placed the bulletusing a metal ramrod, he pushed the bullet firuntil seated. He then cocked the hammer and

cap on the cone or nipple, which, when struck bthe gunpowder. The average rate of fire was thrA well-trained soldier could possibly load an


22/185


23/185

carbine and rifle models. The Model 1859 rifl47 118 nches long, and weighed 8 3/4 pounds, wcaliber, 39 l/8 inches long, and weighed 7 31used a linen cartridge and a pellet primer fSharps carbines were issued to Federal cavalryThe best known of the repeaters was prSpencer, -52 caliber, which also came in both ri

The rifle was 47 inches long and weighed 10 powas 39 inches long and weighed 8 l/4 pouninfantry unit to use Spencer repeating riflesJohn T. Wilders Lightning Brigade on 24Gap, Tennessee. The Spencer was also the firstU.S. Army that fired a metallic rimfire, selSoldiers loaded rounds through an opening inwhich fed into the chamber through a tubularof the trigger guard. The hammer still had tbefore each shot.

Better than either the Sharps or the SpenNever adopted by the US. Army in large quaprivately by soldiers during the war. The He.44-caliber rim&e cartridge repeater. It wasweighed 9 I.14 pounds. The tubular magazine lthe barrel had a fifteen-round capacity with anchamber. of the approximately 13,500 Henry10,000 saw limited service. The government pu

The Colt repeating rifle (or revolving carwas available to Civil War soldiers in limitedwas produced in several lengths and calibers, t32 inches to 42 l/Z inches, while its calibers we-36 and .44 calibers were made to chambercaliber had five chambers. The Colt Firearmsprimary supplier of revolvers, the .44-caliber.36-caliber Navy revolver being the mostpurchased). This was because they were simple,


24/185

that saw extensive use during the Civil War, theaccounted for approximately 20,000 in 1861. Thereplaced by a variety of carbines, including the M(14,495), Maynard 52 caliber (20,002), Gallager .53Smith .52 caliber (30,062), Burnside .56 caliber (55,.54 caliber (80,512). The next step in the evolutionaryrepeating carbine, the favorite by 1865 being the Sseven-shot repeater (94,194). Because of the Souths Icapacity, Confederate cavalrymen had a more difficthemselves. Nevertheless, they too embraced the firechoosing shotguns and muzzle-loading carbinesweapons. In addition, Confederate cavalrymen madebattlefield salvage by recovering Federal weaponSouths difficulties in producing the metallic-rimmrequired by many of these recovered weapons limitedField ArtiEZery

In 1841, the U.S. Army selected bronze as the sfor fieldpieces and at the same time adopted a neartillery. The 1841 fieId artillery system consissmoothbore muzzIe-loaders: 6- and 1Bpounder guns;pounder howitzers; and E&pounder mountain howitWar battery usually consisted of six fieldpieces-fourhowitzers, A 6-pounder battery contained four d-pounE-pounder howitzers, while a 12pounder battery haguns and two 2Cpounder howitzers. The guns firedspherical case, grapeshot, and canister rounds, whilshell, spherical case, grapeshot, and canister rounds.

The 6-pounder gun (effective range 1,523 yards)fieldpiece used from the time of the Mexican War unBy 1861, however, the 1841 artillery system basedwas obsolete. In 1857, a new and more versatile fipounder gun-howitzer (Napoleon), Model 1857, appeDesigned as a multipurpose piece to replace exihowitzers, the Napoleon fired canister and shell, lik


25/185

ea er.TabIe 4. Types of Artillery AvdabIBattle of Chickamauga

Bore

3.67 88.4 60 300A%2 788 a3 3004.62 220 52.31 2T74.625.82 1,318 69 1,126

6-pounderJames 3.8 880 60 300lo- pmderPam%t, s.0 890 74 soa

18633-inchordlnaoce &e 3.0 816 69 300(Rcdmdi

1,227 66 1.1%

Another new development in field artilleryof rifling. Although rifled guns provided greatersmoothbores were generally more reliable andammunition was semifixed, so the charge and tloaded separately. In addition, the canister loaperform as well as that of the smoothbore. Initiallwere rifled on the James pattern, but they soonbecause the bronze rifling eroded too easily. Tartillery was either wrought iron or cast ironreinforcing band.

The most commonly used rifled guns were tand the Rodman, or S-inch ordnance rifle. The Piron piece, easily identified by the wrought-ironbreech. The lo-pounder Parrott was made in t1861 had a 2.9-inch rifled bore with three lanslight muzzle swell, while the Model 1863 versand no muzzle swell. The Rodman or ordnance r


26/185

,guns. Solid shot, with its smashing or battering effecounterbattery role or against buildings and massedconical-shaped bolt lacked the effectiveness of the cait tended to bury itself on impact instead of boundinglike a bowling ball.Shell, also known as common or explosivespherical or conical, was a hoIlow projeetiIe filled

charge of black powder that was detonated by a timedesigned to break into jagged pieces, producing aeffect, but the low-order detonation seldom producedto five fragments. In addition to its casualty-producinhad a psychological impact when it exploded over theIt was also used against field fartifications and inrole. Case or case shot far both smoothbore and riflhollow projectile with thinner walls than shell. Thfilled with round lead or iron balls set in a matrixsurrounded a small bursting charge. Case was primantipersonnel role. This type of round had been invShrapnel, a British artillery afflcer, hence the term s

Lastly, there was canister, probably the most effthe round of choice at close range (400 yards or fess)troops. Canister was essentially a tin can filled with iin sawdust with no internal bursting charge. Whedisintegrated, and the balls followed their own paths tcanister round for the 12-pounder Napoleon consisted1 1/2-&h iron balls packed inside an elongatedextremely close ranges, men often loaded double chBy 1861, canister had replaced grapeshot in tbe ammfield batteries.W~aponsatCh;tckmauga

The variety of weapons available to both armiesWar is reflected at Chickamauga. A 5 June 1863 ifrom the Army of the Cumberland listed the folSpringfields; 29,277 Enfields; 4,352 Austrian rifles;


27/185


28/185

aro na w ree, av s eorg a w ree, anGeorgia with two. Refer again to table 4 for the major tyavailable to the two armies during the Battle of ChickamThe effectiveness of artillery at Chickamaugabecause of the rugged terrain and the dense vegetation,the Federals advantage in numbers of longer-range rinegated by the lack of good fields of fire. For the most par

both sides simply followed the brigades to which theyCertainly on 19 September, they spent most of theirunlimbering, and limbering weapons. As the victors, theacquired the spoils of the battle, including the artilleryreport after the battle acknowledged the loss of thirty-ninby the Army of the Cumberland. Because the captureusually an improvement over their own pieces, manybatteries incorporated the Federal weapons into their oshortly after the close of the battle.Tactics

Tactical Doctrine in 1861The Napoleonic Wars and the Mexican War winfluences on American military thinking at the beginniWar. The campaigns of Napoleon and Wellington prlessons in batt,le strategy, weapons employment, and lAmerican tactical doctrine reflected the lessons learn(1846-48). However, these tactical lessons were mislein Mexico relatively small armies fought only seven pBecause these battles were so small, almost all the tlearned during the war focused at the regimental,squadron levels. Future Civil War leaders had learnabout brigade, division, and corps maneuver in Mexico,were the basic fighting elements of both armies in P&61-The U.S. Army% experience in Mexico validateprincipleEcparticularly that of the offensive. In Mexico,differ greatly from those of the early nineteenth cent

-.


29/185

In Mexico, American armies employed artillboth offensive and defensive battle situations. Inmoved as near to the enemy lines as possible-nomusket range-in order to blow gaps in the eninfantry might exploit with a determined charartillery blasted advancing enemy lines with canithe enemy attack got within musket range. Carmys flanks and rear but held itself ready to chabecame disorganized or began to withdraw.

These tactics worked perfectly well with theof the Napoleonic and Mexican Wars. The inaccurate up to 100 yards but ineffective againstbeyond that range. Rifles were specialized weaaccuracy and range but slow to load and thereforeline troops. Smoothbore cannon had a range upshot but were most effective against infantry whranges under 400 yards. Artillerists worked theirfear of infantry muskets, which had a limitecantinued to use sabers and Iances as shock weapo

American troops took the tactical offensive ibattles with great success, and they sufferedUnfortunately, simiIar tactics proved to be obsolbecause of a major technological innovation fieldrifle-musket. This new weapon greatly increasedand accuracy and loaded as fast as a musket. Theversion of the rifle-musket in 1855, and by the bWar, rifle-muskets were available in moderateweapon of choice in both the Union and Confederawar, and by 1862, large numbers of troops onmuskets of good quality.

Official tactical doctrine prior to the beginndid not clearly recognize the potential of the new1855, the most influential tactical guide was Gethree-volume work, infantry Zczctics (18351, basmodels of the Napoleonic Wars. It stressed


30/185

-to appreciate the weapons impact on combined armessential shift the rifle-musket made in favor of theTuetics was the standard infantry manual used byoutbreak of war in 1861.If Scotts and Hardees works lagged behindinnovations, at Ieast the infantry had manuals to estbasis for training. Cavalry and artillery fell even frecognizing the potential tactical shift in favor of rifle-The cavalrys manual, published in 1841, was based othat focused on close-order offensive tactics. It favorecavalry attack in two ranks of horsemen armed withThe manual took no natice of the rifle-musket% potgive much attention to dismounted operations. Similarhad a basic drill book delineating individual crew actitactical manual. Like cavalrymen, artillerymen show

the potential tactical changes that the rifle-musket imRegular Army infantry, cavalry, and artillerybecame proficient in the tactics that brought success ifirst volunteers drilled and readied themselves for thofficers and noncommissioned officers taught the lessthe Napoleonic Wars and validated in Mexico, Thus,entered the Civil War with a good understanding o

had worked in the Mexican War but with little undethe rifle-musket might upset their carefully practicedEarly War Tactics

In the battles of 1861 and 1862, both sides emproven in Mexico and found that the tactical offensisuccessful-but only at a great cost in casualties. Meweapons in the defense generally ripped frontal assauif the attackers paused to exchange fire, the slaugreater. Rifles also increased the relative number oflanking units now engaged assaulting troops wienfilading fire. Defenders usually crippled the first aa second line of attackers could come forward in sup


31/185

discoveries of their own. Cavalry learned thatcharge did not work against infantry armedCavalry, hawever, continued its traditional intelliscreening roles and found its place as the eyes aArtillery, on its part, found that it could notcanister range as it had in Mexico, because taccurate beyond that distance. Worse yet, at rawere safe from rifle fire, artillery shot and shellthan canister. Ironically, rifled cannon did notboost to artillery effectiveness that the rifle-infantry. The increased range of cannons provedthe broken and wooded terrain over which so mawere fought.There are several possible reasons why Cicontinued to employ the tactical offensive long athe defensive was superior. Mast commanderswas the decisive form of battle. This lesson caNapoleonic Wars and the Mexican-American Wchose the tactical offensive usually retaineddefenders. Similarly, the tactical defensive depenemy choosing to attack at a point convenientcontinuing to attack until badly defeated. Althoccurred often in the Civil War, a prudent comcount on it for victory. Consequently, few comma

the defensive form of battle if they had the optionThe offensive may have been the decisive forvery hard to coordinate and even harder to controloften tried to attack the enemy% flanks and rearsuccess because of the difficulty involved. Not onlhave to identify the enemys flank or rear corrmove his force into position to attaek and thenwith attacks made by other friendly units. (Fmoving a regiment into line of battle from marchCommand and control of the type required towas quite beyond the ability of most CivilTherefore, Civil War armies repeatedly attacked


32/185

IIIIII


33/185

ever-growing casualty lists.Later War Taeties

Poor training may have contributed to higin the war, but casualties remained high and evethe armies became experienced. Continuedresulted because tactical developments failedweapons technology. Few commanders undermusket strengthened the tactical defensivcommanders made offensive innovations thatsuccess. When an increase in the pace of advadefending firepower (as Hardee suggested it woadvancing in more open order. But this sort ofappropriate mass to assault and carry preparedcommand and control problems beyond the abilityto resolve. Late in the war, when the difficultyfortifications under heavy fire became appaexpedients were employed. Attacking solidlyoften required whole brigades and divisions movirapidly cover intervening ground, seize the objethe inevitable counterattack. Seldom successfprepared defenses, these attacks were genertremendous casualties and foreshadowed the maof World War I. Sometimes, large formations attover short distances without, halting to fire. Thissuccess at Spotsylvania Court House in May 18Union division attacked and captured an exConfederate line. The attack succeeded becaucrossed the intervening ground very quicklpreparation and without stopping to fire theirConfederate defenses, the Union troops attemsuccess by continuing their advance, but loss ofmade them little better than a mob. Counterat


34/185

retain coherent formations if the terrain were suitablyoften, brigade attacks degenerated into a series of poregimental lunges through broken and waoded terraincommanders were often on the main battle line tryinregimental fights. Typically, defending brigades stoodand blazed away at attackers as rapidly as possible. Vodid not continue beyond the first round. Most of the timas soon as they were ready, and it was common for twotogether, one loading for the other to fire. Brigadesinvulnerable t,o attacks on their front and flanks if unitright held their ground or if reinforcements came uthreat.An example of this sort of brigade maneuveChickamauga on the morning of 20 September 1Confederates attacked the extreme left of the Uni

General John C. Breckinridges Division attempted toleft, while Major General Patrick R. Cleburnes Divfrontally. Two of Breckinridges brigades, led by BriDaniel W. Adams and Brigadier General Marcellus A.the Union flank and threatened its rear, but BrigBenjamin H. Helms brigade ran into Major GeneThomas main line and made no gains. Meanwhile,brigades, under Brigadier Generals Lucius E. Polk,and S. A. M. Wood attacked into the strength of the Unreinforcements, hawever, drove off Adams and Stovailline easily defeated the frontal attacks (see figure 5).Two or more brigades comprised a division. Wattacked, its brigades often advanced in sequence, frovice versa-depending on terrain, suspected enemnumber of brigades available to attack. At times, divwith two or more brigades leading, followed by one o

ready to reinforce the lead brigades or maneuver to thmore divisions comprised a corps that might conduct aof a larger plan controlled by the army commander. Moof divisions attacked under the control of a corps-lev


35/185

Ef


36/185


37/185

* It forced artillery to abandon its basic offeof moving forward to within canister range of defTactics at Chickamauga

By September 1863, CiviI War battle tacticpoint that brigades were the basic maneuver ufought the Battle of Chickamauga by maneuattacking or defending along brigade lines odivision commander controlled attacks made byunder his command. This required tremendosynchronization, which the Civil War commafailed to provide. Further, the Chickamauga bwooded, which made brigade and divisionaldif&ult. Much of the tactical confusion at Chickathe difficulty of maneuvering large bodies of trterrain with a command system that dependcommands.

At Chickamauga, the armies exhibited baway they employed their divisions and brigadesmost often advanced with all regiments on line sbrigades generally advanced with two regimenfollowing in a second line. Use of these formatiusually meant that a Confederate brigade woubrigade of similar size, giving Confederate divisiowider front. There was less uniformity withinlevel, but Union divisions tended to defend withand one brigade to the rear in support, Did thevolving doctrinal ideas? Were they responses toof the terrain? Did commanders choose these metability to control their units ? Perhaps thepersonalities, experiences, and abilities of thesides. Essentially, the Army of the Cumberlanbattle. Major General William S. Rosecrans conrapidly as possible in a position from which he coperational offensive or fall back on Chattanoog


38/185

, ,position to cooperate with attacks against Thomcomplications of coordinating this maneuver, howevesurely as the rifle-musket fire from Union reinforcemto the spot. Merely turning Thomas flank was not dacause the Union line to crumble. Thomas men stayfortifications, defeated Confederate attacks to theirreinforcements turn back the threat to their flank andLieutenant General James Longstreets assaultthe stroke that routed Rosecrans center, was a flucenter, a column af three divisions organized in fivehave been more an adaptation to space than a cAlthough it was well organized and gallantly led, thhad the singular advantage of striking a vacant stretcHad that line been properly held, Longstreets attfailed or, at best, achieved only local success at a heav

the confused breakthrough once again demonstratedCivil War tactical maneuvers, even in a case wherebroken and routed. Although the Confederates held afor over an hour, they could not exploit it because thcontrol to do so did not exist. Later, Longstreets attSnodgrass Hill position were typical frontal assaultscoordinated and culminated in heavy losses.At Chickamauga, both armies employed shortsigseldom achieved long-range, coordinated objectivehowever, profitably deviated from the norm. One CMajor General Alexander P. Stewarts Divisian, effectiunique battle drill. Stewart moved his brigades forwarbrigades, and when a brigade ran short of ammunitanother into its place. This had the effect of keepipressure of firepower against the Union defenders, wStewart% attack. Another unit that, had great tacChickamauga was Union Colonel John T. Wilder%brigade. Its five mounted infantry regiments, moSpencer repeating rifles, fought dismounted and wereoversized battery of artillery. In two important fire


39/185

.In sum, Chickamauga was like most othterms of tactics. Attacks were piecemeal, frontand they generally failed to dislodge defenders.innovations, such as the rotation maneuver usand the open order employed by Forrests cabetter chance of success. Employed defensiv

clearly showed how repeating rifles could dbattle. Unfortunately, these innovations werethan the rule. The same tactics that failedFredericksburg, and Murfreesboro failed againLogistical Support

Victory on Civil War battlefields seldomquantity of tactical logistics. On the operationhowever, logistical capabilities and concerns aand sometimes the outcomes of campaigns. Andthe logistical advantage shifted inexorabEy to tcontrolled the majority of the financial and indnation, and with their ability to import anyultimately created the best-supplied army thDespite suffering from shortages of raw mategenerated adequate ordnance, but they falterability to acquire other war materiel. The foarmies was often on the verge of collapse, largof the transportation network were compoundmismanagement. Still, the state of supply withisides depended more on the caliber of the peothan on the constraints of available materiel.

One of the most pressing needs at the ssufficient infantry and artillery weapons.outmoded muskets were on hand for both sideprivate hands, but the Federals initially had o


40/185

up to one-third of tbe Confederates were still armeModern artillery pieces were generally availablequantities, though the Confederates usually wAlthough breech-loading technology was availCanfederates had imported some Whit#worths from Eloading smoothbore or rifled cannon were the standarboth armies.With most of the government arsenals and privatecapability located in the North, the Federals ultimsufficient modern Qrearms for their armies, but the Caccumulated adequate quantities-either from battlefithrough the blockade. In addition, exceptional manageConfederate Ordnance Bureau led to the creation of athroughout the South that produced large quantitiesweapons.The Northern manufacturing capability permitteventually to produce and outfit their forces with repbest of which had been patented before 1861. InitiallyNorths conservative Ordnance Bureau would not risnew, unproven standard weapon that could lead tohuge quantities of ammunition in the midst of an ex1864, after the retirement of Chief of Ordnance JamesPresident Lincolns urging, Federal cavalry recei

Spencer repeating carbines, which greatly incapabilities.Both sides initially relied on the states and lprovide some equipment, supplies, animals, and foodsprogressed, more centralized control over productionemerged under both governments. Still, embezzlemencommon probIems for both sides throughout the war.its preponderance of railroads and developed watersupply and adequate distribution systems. The Soutproblem was subsistence. Arguably, the South produduring the war to provide for both military and civmismanagement, parochial local interests, and


41/185

me ca am u ances, ut con cts omanageable. Department and army commaresources directly from the bureaus, andconsiderable power as they parceled out occasWhen essential equipment and suppliethrough normal channels, some commandersto procure them. One example of this practi

Wilder, who personally contracted for Spenbrigade in the Army of the Cumberland. WiIdpersonal loan to purchase the weapons, andfrom their pay. The Federal government picrifles worth was demonstrated in the Tullacampaigns.Typically, materiel flowed from the fa

directed by the responsible bureaus. Suppliadvanced depots, generally a city on a majsafely within the rear area of a department.armies established temporary advance depotranspartation. From these points, wagonforward to the field units. This principle ismodern theater sustainment organization.The management of this logistical scrucial A corps wagon train, if drawn bywould be spread out from five to eight miles,terrain, weather, and road conditions. The waof hauling 4,000 pounds in optimal conditionthat load in mountainous terrain. Sustenanmajor restriction, because each animal repounds of hay and grain a day to stay healthand hard to handle, this forage was a major c

planning. Wagons delivering supplies morefrom the depot could be forced to carry excforage, If full animal forage was to be carried,wagons to support a corps increased dr


42/185

an w ou comman sanc on w erever an army wencommand policy during Ulysses S. Grants VicksburgWilliam T. Shermans Atlanta campaign. Rosecranendure pressure from Washington and wait for the cornstarting his campaign in August 1863 was an examplimpact of animal forage on operations and also an ilcommander who understood some of the complexitiesmajor campaign.hgistics at Cftickamauga

Supplies for Rosecrans Chicskamauga campaigLouisville (a base depot) to Nashville (an advanced depdepots established near the Tennessee River at SteveCity, Braggs supply system, however, was macomplicated. Because Virginia could not producesustain Robert E. Lees army continuously, thegovernment designated Georgia as the sustainment arof Northern Virginia, with Atlanta as the primary dethat Bragg could not draw supplies from Atlanta evebarely 106 miles away. Although Bragg was ultimatelythe Atlanta depot, such policies created bureaucraticConfederate Army commanders throughout thestablished advance depots along the Western and AtlaResaca, Dalton, and Catoosa Station (near Ringgold)progressed.

Once Rosecrans left his rail lines by crossing the Twagons became even more crucial. Major Generalh&Cooks XX Corps, which contained three divisioChickamauga campaign, used over 850 wagons and amby over 4,700 mules and horses. These wagons, in addroutine daily supplies, tools, tentage, and personal bcarried three weeks* rations and enough ammunitionmajor battles, as well as three days forage for thesample of logistical data, see table 6). During movemewagons received priority, followed by food, medical. isupplies. Sutlers (private businessmen selling luxuri


43/185

1 lb, hard bread (hartackl3/4 lb. salt pork or l/4 Ib. fresh meat1 oz. coffee3 oz. sugar and salt

Forage (per fume per day):14 lbs. hay and 12 16s.grainFereonal equipment:

Includes rifle, bayonet, 60 rounds ofammunition, haversack, 3 daysrations, blanket, shelter half,canteen, personal itemsprecursors of the present-day post exchangewagons. Logisticians had learned early to pusas possible, so this train followed its units onwithin a few miles of the forward units whenthe start of the Battle of Chickamauga, the buto Chattanooga and relative safety, but ammuwith the divisions.

Units at Chickamauga used two techresupply during the battle. Either small groupmove back to the wagons to hand-carry the 9ammunition forward or regiments withdrewagons to refit. Artillery batteries usually srear to replenish their stocks. Although no wrthe subject, many units on both sides hadremarkably effective methods to handle resnumbw of battle reports, descriptions of resusome of the standard operating procedures thschools today,

Engineer SupportEngineers on bath sides performed manycampaign. Engineers trained at West Point

-


44/185

This cadre expanded to a four-company Regular engCongress aIso created a single company of topograpwhich joined the Regular battalion when the engineerin 1863. In addition, several volunteer pioneer recontaining up to 2,000 men, supported the various fiCorps of Engineers also initially cont,rolIed the fleCorps, which provided aerial reconnaissance. The ConfEngineers, formed as a small staff and one company ofand pontoniers in 1861, grew more slowIy and genedetails and contract labor rather than established uniengineers and craftsmen.Engineer missions for both sides included cfortifications; repair and construction of roads, bridgecases, railroads; demalition; limited construction ofconstruction or reduction of siege works. The Feder

Engineers, a separate prewar bureau, performed recproduced maps. The Confederates, however, neverfunctions in creating their Corps of Engineers. Experifirst year of the war convinced the Federals that all enshould be merged under a single corps because quaofficers tended to perform all related functions. AFederals also merged the Topographic Engineers intEngineers in March 1863.Bridging assets included wagon-mounted pontcarried either wooden or canvas-covered pontoon boequipment, trained engineer troops could bridge evenmatter of hours. The most remarkable pontoon bridgethe 2,200-foat bridge built by Army of the Potomac eover the James River-one of over three dozen pontoonsupport of campaigns in the east that year. In 1862, t

began developing pontoon trains after t,hey hadeffectiveness. In fact, during the Atlanta campaignJoseph Johnston had four pontoon trains availablearmy.


45/185

While the Federal engineer effort expamateriel as the war progressed, the Confederathampered by major problems. The relativorganized engineer units avaiIabEe forced Crely heavily on details or contract labor. Findihowever, was often difficult because of competislave owners were reluctant to provide laborcrucial to their economic survival. Despite conto conscript ZQ,OQO laves as a labor force, stcontinua!Ey hindered efforts to draft slaveproblem concerned the value of Confederate crequired huge sums for men and materiel, ywere small, and ahhough congressional apprthe war, inflation greatly reduced effective pproblem was the simple shortage of iron relimited the Confederates* ability to increase rproduce iron tools.In 1861, maps for both sides were also iareas in the interior, they were nonexistent.the Federals developed a highly sophisticateFederal topographic engineers performed perdevelop base maps reproduced them bydistributed them to field commanders. Phpresses, and eventually photochemical procesability to reproduce maps quickly. Westernoperated far from base cities, carried equipmecampaigns with their army headquarters.production exceeded 21,060 copies. Confedenever approached the Federal effort inConfederate topographers initially used tracimaps. Not until I.864 did the use of photogrwidespread in the South.Engineers at Chickamauga

Engineers in neither the Army of the Cuof Tennessee had a tactical role in the B


46/185

nearly 950 men. The technical expertise and construthese men were supplemented by infantry detailed tolabor, such as cutting trees and demolishing buildinmaterial.During the Chickamauga campaign, the 1st Mtre&le bridge across the Tennessee River at Bridgeporby two Federal divisions. The Pioneer Brigade was

railway southward from Nashville, building bridges aas well as constructing platforms at t.he temporary deAlabama. A company from this brigade built the pontothe Tennessee River at Capertons Ferry. Althouinfantry, neither unit was involved in combat duringalthough elements of the 1st Michigan had fought witStones River ten months earlier.Braggs engineers consisted of 4 companies weffective strength of just over 390 men. These compdetails of infantrymen, were supervised by BraggsCaptain S. W. Presstman. Limited information aboutexists, although one of the companies built and maintbridge across the Tennessee River at Chattanoogevacuated the city in early September.The engineer staff officers at the army headq

armies created maps. The Army of the Cumberlandportable photochemical process for reproducing mapstherefore created, updated, and distributed maps tolevel. Federal maps depicted the gross terrain featurand existing towns, including the locations of variousbut at best, these maps were only general guides.through areas, commanders noted new roads and ottheir maps and forwarded that information to the arupdated maps could be made and issued. Despite thlong-term control over the area, their maps were hardor more available than the Federal maps. Braggs chipersonally tasked with reconnaissance and mappingarmy evacuated Chattanooga.


47/185


48/185

.chief in November 1863 and placed all telegraph acMilitary Telegraph Service.Although the Confederate Signal Corps visualcapabilities were roughly equal to those of the Federfield telegraph operations remained too limited to bsignificance. The Confederates existing telegraphstrategic communications capabilities similar to those

but the Tack of resources and factories in the South foprecluded their extending the prewar telegraph networCommunications at Chiekamartga

The Chiekamauga campaign presents, particulFederal side, a view of the complexities of the earlyintegration of different communications systems. Thsystem operated by the U.S. Military Telegraph Sstrategic communications. Thus, army commandersreceive messages from Washington on the same day.Cumberkands chief signal officer, Captain Jesse Merrilcapabilities of this fixed network by developing ?rainover 106 miles af uninsulated wire and poles on wagextend the tellegraph lines to the advancing army. UsiMerrills trained civilian operators established astations east of the Tennessee River in early SeptemSeptember, Rosecrans ordered Merrill to link thheadquarters with Chattanooga. Ry the morning oMerrill had established stations at Crawfish SpringGlenns cabin, aIong the Dry Valley Road weheadquarters, and at Major General Gordon G-angerheadquarters at Rossville.

The Signal Corps detachment of the Army of tunder Captain John C. Van Duzer, contained fiveBeardslee devices. These Ylying trains, operated bymen, carried some 460 slender pales and 10 miletelegraph wire on wagons. Although this system codirectly with the Military Telegraph Service, it did li


49/185

employed semaphore techniques, the Federawigwag system. Both sides used simple codes.two concentric rotating disks, one cantainingnumbers and the second containing the lettprearranging the set of the wheels, the Federaland change the set if necessary. This systeevidence exists that the Confederates brokeConfederates used a sheet with rows of letters,from a modern communications code book, anwords to modify the encoding sequence.procedures were often sloppy, and entries in Fthis code was frequently broken. Although thof some use in transmitting orders, they usuallproviding information about enemy activities,both armies were often visible from suitabllimited capabilities and the commanders ltelegraph and signal flag systems precludedbattle itself.

The courier system, using mounted ssoldiers to deliver orders and messages, wascommunications option short of commanderAlthough often effective, this system was fracouriers were captured, killed, or delaydestinations; commanders misinterpreted orsituations changed by the time a messaweaknesses of the courier system, though ndid tend to compound other errors or miscampaign. For instance, Bragg, using couriersubordinates to attack Major General Jamdivision in McLemores Cove on 10 Septembsent to notify Lieutenant General Daniel H. Hthe attack on the morning of 20 Septembegeneral in the dark woods. The Federalinformation offered by one of Thomas courierissue (by courier) the order that moved Briga


50/185

nes prov e y err s m ary e egrap ra ns,flying trains (with Beardslee devices), the Signal Costations, and the numerous couriers provided by eacMost of these systems were not compatibEe, theretransfer of the form of message at each node. Moreosystems were under the control of different men,including the army commander, fully understoodcapabilities or problems of the overall system.Medical Support

Federal and Confederate medical systems follpattern. Surgeons general and medical directors forserved many years in the prewar Medical Departhindered by an initial lack of administrative experielarge numbers of casualties, as we11as the state of mthe midnineteenth century. Administrative procedureexperience, but throughout the war, the simp1e lacabout the true causes of disease and infection led to mthan direct battlefield action.

After the disaster at the BattIe of First Bull RMedical Department established an evacuation and trdeveloped by Surgeon Jonathan Letterman At the hewere three precepts: consolidation of field hospitalsdecentralization of medical supplies down to regimecentralization of medical control of ambulances at allcasualty evacuated from the front line normally receiva regimental holding area immediately to the rear.wagons or ambulances carried wounded men to ahospital, normally within a mile of the battle lines. Semen could then be further evacuated by wagon, rail,general hospitals located usually in townscommunication in the armies rear areas.Although the Confederate system followed thprinciples, Confederate field hospitals were oftenbrigade rather than division level. A second differe


51/185

were intended to handle convalescents en routProcedures, medical techniques, and msides were virtually identical. Commandersleaving the battle lines to escort wounded bpractice was common, especially in less-established technique for casualty evacuatiolitter and ambulance dut.y. Both armies used

for this task. Casualties woufd move or be assline, where litter bearers evacuated themambulances or supp1y wagons. Ambulancestwo- or four-wheel carts with springs to limmade even short trips agonizing for woudivision surgeons staffed consolidated fieldconsiderations were the availability of watesupplement the hospital tents, and securityrifle fire. The majority of operations performeaftermath of battle were amputations, ApprCivil War wounds occurred in the extremities,shattered any bones that it hit. Amputationthen available to limit the chance of seriouwere genera11y well supplied with chlorofordrugs, though shortages did occur on thesurgeons often I&coked ritical drugs and mediMedical Support at Chickammga

Although the Letterman system hadArmy of the Tennessee by mid-1863, the Armedical system was then still in transition IDirector Glover Perin, a veteran of sixteenservice, had inherited an evacuation system imeasure, he convinced Rosecrans to give qambuIanees, but they were to respond to tdirectors or surgeons. This transitional sys1864, when Perin finally was able to implememore fully,


52/185

standard pattern, except for its unique general hSurgeon Samuel Stout, Bragg% general hospital dirgeneral hospitals to be mobile. Thus, general hospitalChattanooga and the surrounding towns evacuated athemselves closer to Atlanta in as little as seventy-twowithdrew from Chattanooga. In a series of genestablished between Dalton and Marietta, BrDepartment had nearly 7,500 available hospital beds.During the Battle of Chickamauga, seven Fhospitals gathered around Crawfish Spring, two milbattlefield, and one was established around the Cloudof the battlefield. Two division hospitals were formed ibattle lines in Dyer Field and near Snodgrass Hill untiforced them to displace rearward. On 20 September,battle line collapsed, the hospitals at Crawfish Sprin

evacuated to Chattanooga but were forced to leaseriously wounded and 52 surgeons to be captured by tThe Confederates used a mix of consolidated divisihospitals, which were set up generally along Chickamost of the battle.The greatest challenge for medical staffs occurredThe Confederates, already short of doctors and withstockage levels barely adequate for their own needs,numbers of wounded Federal troops in addit,ion to theiFederal wounded captured at hospitals and the thouwounded on the battlefield-added to the almost 15,battle injuries-initially overwhelmed the Confedertook the Confederates almost two weeks to finisbattlefield, and many soldiers lay for six to ten daysany medical attention. On 30 September, the Confede1,740 of the most seriously wounded Federals to Chatflag of truce. The Federal challenge after the battlebecause of the smaller numbers of wounded under thover 4,000 Federal casualties initially made their wayto Chattanooga, where the surgeons made every ef


53/185

them to the safer hospitals across the river. Byaf these wounded remained in medical facilitiesFederal and Confederate casualties, see table 7.


54/185

again would that Southern army seriously threatterritory. Also in July, John C. Pembertons Armysurrendered 30,000 men at Vicksburg. Thus, in midTennessee was the only theater in which the Confedsuffered a major reversal. The last Confederatesigni&ance, General Braxton Bragg% Army of Tennmiddle Tennessee and Chattanooga against Major GenRosecrans Army of the Cumberland. They faced eMurfreesboro, where they had fought a great battle at thAlthough western Tennessee had fallen to the1862, much of middle and eastern Tennessee reConfederate control in the summer of 1863. The area wboth sides for many reasons. President Abrahamparticularly interested in liberating eastern Tennessmany loyal Unionists lived there. The most direct rbetween Virginia and the western part of the Confederthrough Knoxville. In the apportionment of commissConfederate armies in the east depended on this retionMiddle and eastern Tennessee contributed essential pthe Confederate commissary, as well as copper anpercussion caps and gunpowder.Chattanooga was an important military objectivebecause of its position as a gateway through the

Mountains into the Souths heartland. A city of appropeople, it was a central rail junction The MemphisRailroad ran west to the Mississippi River. TheChattanooga Railroad entered Chattanooga from midThe Western and Atlantic Railroad ran to the souAtlanta. To the northeast ran the East TennesseKnoxville, Bristol, and Lynchburg, Virginia, withRichmond. Furthermore, the South had valuablequartermaster, and ordnance depots in Chattanooga.Confederate hospitals were located in and near theconnection througb Atlanta linked Chattanooga withiron production centers in Georgia and Alabama. M

41


55/185

, , ,gaps ran several roads as well as the railroadChattanooga. Behind the hills about fortMurfreesboro lay the Duck River, a deep, nfords. Beyond the Buck, the country was roughills rising to a high, rolling plateau called ttopsoil of that desolate area barely coveretemporarily held rain, creating massive quFifteen mifes beyond the Duck River, anotherflowed westward out of the barrens. In turn,the range of mountains known as the CuTullahoma campaign, a preliminary phasecampaign, would occur in the area betweenCumberland Plateau.

East of the high plateaus and gorgeMountains, and generally parallel to them, lRiver. Rising in east Tennessee and flowing git entered northeast Alabama, the Tennemountains west of Chattanooga in a canyonSouth of the river, the land rose sharply toMountains, then dropped almost as sharply inCreek before rising again to Lookout Mountridges that slant southwest across the Tennborder. The northern end of Lookout Mountathree significant roads in 1863. The main roadfollowed the Tennessee River valley along anorthern promontory of the mountain whereMoccasin Bend. The next crossing was fourtChattanooga at Stevens Gap. Last was a roughmore than twenty miles farther south at WinBeyond Lookaut Mountain lay MissionaryChattanoogas eastern flank. East of Missibranehes of Chiekamauga Creek watered a sgently rolling hills. After a three-week cambanks of the Tennessee River and traversingthe two armies found themselves confrontingsides of West Chickamauga Creek.


56/185

,of Stones River in January 1863. After that bloodwithdrew to the Duck River and assumed the defencorps at SheIbyville and another at Wartrace, both inHis cavalry screened both flanks, and infantry canmountain gaps to his north through which he expArmy to advance. Rosecrans occupied Murfreesborcontent to remain there in spite of repeated urgingadministration to move forward.Both Rosecrans and Bragg thought their poRosecrans had about 80,000 men to Bragg% 50,000, bpercent of the Union Army had to guard supplyConfederate raids. Rosecrans cavalry force was weak,argument repeatedly in delaying his advance. Braggproblems were that Vicksburg had priority in the weLees army in the east drew much of its subsistence frwhich Bragg% army operated. Bragg had to detacharmy to aid Vicksburg, and this eliminated, at least idea that he should take the offensive against Rosecrfor Bragg, Rosecrams declined to advance. Soon, eventwest concluded with Confederate defeats at GettysburgBoth sides shifted their focus to middle Tennessee.

Under severe pressure from Washington, Rasecrforward on 24 June 1863. He used his cavalry andcarps as a diversion toward Shelbyville, then movebody to turn the Confederate right flank betweenManchester. Despite a pouring rain, bottomless roadsfights for the gaps through rough country southRosecrans successfully autflanked the Confederatwithdrew to Tullahoma after less than a week of mannext sought to cross the Elk River and seize controlline. Again, Bragg narrowly escaped the trap and withto Chattanooga, which he occupied on 4 July. In ninmaneuvering, Raseerans forced Bragg out of Tennessthan 600 casualties. This brilliant and relatively blooknown as the Tullahoma campaign.


57/185

osecrans a vance. n response, on ugus ,preparation and rest, Roseerans sent the Army othe Cumberland Mountains toward the Tennesfront. En ess than a week, his army closed to thforces near Stevenson and Bridgeport, AlabamTennessee. The next forward movement woulacross the Tennessee River, where Braggs veterWhen Rosecrans pushed the Army of the Cwide Tennessee River in early September 1863,to capture Chattanooga, Tennessee. Delaying hthe end of the summer when the corn ripenedNashville was repaired, in late August, hedeception operation to mislead the Confederatebrigades demonstrated opposite Chattanooga aof the Army of the Cumberland quietly gatheredfar below the city shielded by Sand and Lookowho had kept his infantry force concentrated nbadly served by Major General Joseph Wheelersscreened the river line below Chattanooga. Coand refitting after the arduous Tullahoma campmen were mainly located far back from the riveany of the crossings. NOF did they provideinformation of Federal activity. Blinded by awould have to cross the Tennessee River north o

to support Major General Ambrose E. BurnTennessee, Bragg and his principal subordinatesthe Federal crossings from a civilian.In early September, Rosecrans dividedsegments and began a wide-front advance thatBraggs army out of Chattanooga without aGeneral Thomas L. Crittendens XXI Corps advChattanooga along the railroad that passed thro

Mountain. Major General George II. Thomas XIand Lookout Mountains and entered McLemorLaFayette, Georgia. Major General Alexanderfollowed Major General David S. Stanleys Cava


58/185

railroad to his base at Atlanta, however, Bragg elearmy concentrated near LaFayette, Georgia. There, shiMountain, a spur of Lookout, the Army of Tennesseearrival of reinforcements and seize any opportunityscattered elements of the Army of the Cumberland inMajor General Simon B. Buckners forces from east Tfelt confident enough to strike the leading divisionCorps with overwhelming force in NcLemores Cove. UBragg, the leader of the expedition, Major GenerHindman, took counsel of his fears and dallied for tmaking a serious attack. Failing in McLemores Coturned northward to destroy a portion of CrittendensLee and Gordons Mill on West Chiekamauga Creek. Tentrusted to Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk, whoto engage the Federals as Bragg proposed. Frustrfailures, Bragg paused at LaFayette for several daysadditional troops from Mississippi and Virginia to app

On discovering that Braggs army was not inAtlanta and recognizing the dangerous position hiRosecrans hastily began to concentrate his scatteredthem northward to cover Chattanooga. Because of ththe rough terrain, McCooks XX Corps was the slDelayed by faulty information, inadequate reconnaissheer difficulty of moving thousands of men and anifoot mountains, McCook did not join ThomasMcLemores Cove until 17 September. Together, thecontinued northward toward Crittendens positionGordons Mill. Their route generally followed the weChickamauga Creek, with Missionary Ridge on their lBragg would attempt to cut him off from Chattanooordered Thomas on 18 September to make a night mbeyond Crittendens position at the mill.His spirits raised by the continued arrival ofBragg devised a new battle plan. Believing that CrCorps was the northernmost unit of Rosecrans army,


59/185

o e e era rmy an r v ng e enMcLemores Cove and away from Chattanoogforces seized the crossings, Polks Corps and HilFederals along Chickamauga Creek.By the evening of 18 September, BushroMajor General John R. Hood and leading elGeneral James Longstreets Corps from Virgini

Bridge and had advanced southward into the fRoad. Walker and Buckner had also gainChickamauga Creek, although Walkers mecasualties for Alexander% Bridge. They, too, biin the woods north of what they believed to beBecause they had not gained the main north-sLaFayette and Rossville, however, they were uCorps as it marched northward through the nigon LaFayette Road at the Kelly farm. The onlywhen a brigade of Major General Gordon Grattempting to regain Reeds Bridge, bumpelements of Johnsons Confederates at a road ju

Believing that they had destroyed Reedsingle Confederate brigade west of the creek,early on the morning of 19 September. Oninformed Thomas, who resolved to destroy theThomas sent Brigadier General John M. Branninto the forest toward Reeds Bridge. Near Jaymet one of Brigadier General Nathan B. Forcovering the Confederate armys right rear, anFor the remainder of the day, both Rosecrans amore than feed reinforcements northward to exattempt to stabilize the situation. Their effortterrain, which consisted primarily of a thicoccasionally by a few small fields. Neither cofight a battle in the thickets between ChicLaFayette Road; Bragg had hoped to fight in ththe south, while Rosecrans had hoped to re


60/185

and Crittenden to assist Thomas. As theday progressBuckners Corps joined Polk and extended the Csouthward. Pressing forward with great spirit,shattered one of Crittendens divisions, gained LaFathreatened to split the Federal army in the vicinity ofarm. Federal reinfarcements from both north anpenetration finally forced the Confederates to relinquiwithdraw eastward into the forest, Hoods Corps thenthreat to the vital road in the vicinity of the Viniardfinally fought to a bloody standstill by elements of acorps When darkness closed the fighting, the FedLaFayette Road, but Thomas men had been presseddefensive position around Kelly Field.During the night, the Army of the Cumberlandcoordinated defense on the following day. Thomas s

position on the armys left with log breastworks, &slightly to refuse the armys right flank, and Crittenreserve position behind the army% center. Within tlines, Bragg brought forward several divisions thaengaged and devised an offensive plan. This placoordinated attack, beg&&g on the Confederate risouthward, that would again attempt to flank the Fdrive it southward away from Chattanooga. Longduring the night permitted Bragg to reorganize his fivinto two wings, with Longstreet commanding the Ldivisions and Polk the Right Wing of five divisionGeneral Daniel H. Hills Corps, now under Polks Rigbegin the attack at sunrise. Unfortunately, a combinatwork and the lack of initiative by senior commandersfrom learning of his critical mission until the day was

When the Confederate attack finally began-fourof Hills divisions actually got around Thomas flanksevera hundred yards into the Federal rear before beitimely arrival of Federal reinforcements. Thunsupported, because Hill had used Walkers Corps


61/185

orwar an was o ne y e rema n erFortuitously, Hoods column struck a segmentwas momentarily devoid of troops and crashedThe apening in the Federal line was theseries of events and misperceptions thatmorning. Even before the action began on thebeen calling for reinforcements, and he conti

the Confederate attacks. Both Rosecrans anfrom the armys center and right toward themovements, Rosecrans came to believe thaFederal right-center, and he responded by ordThomas J. Woods division, already in line, togap. Again, because of a combination of ciractually no gap in the Federal line until WoodMeCook agreed to fill Woods space, but Hoodbefore Wood could act, and the Federal line waAs Longstreets troops burst into Dyerboth sides of the break failed to reestablisRoseerans, McCook, and Crittenden, alongFederal divisions, were all swept from thcommanders finished the day in Chattanoogbrigades and fragments of several others rallieon high ground known as Horseshoe Rid

Separated from the remainder of the Federaholding the Kelly Field enclave, the units onto make a last stand. Just as they were abBushrod Johnsons Confederates, they wereGeneral James B. Steedmans division of CAlthough Confederate units continued todefenders throughout the remainder ofunable to drive the Federals from the ridge.sundown, Thomas received a message from Rsurviving Federal units to Rossville. Muehconducted cleanly, although the last units to lheavily and several regiments were left beNevertheless, Thomas successfully gathered


62/185

eav y a e amauga. osecrans a os ,and missing out of about 62,000 engaged, while Bragtotal of 18,454 casualties out of approximately 67,00losses meant that neither army could do much untilmen and materiel had been replenished. While Brremainder of Longstreet% command en route fromexchanged prisoners from the Vicksburg campaign,Cumberland received far more massive reinforcementArmy of the Potomac and the Army of the Tennessereinforcements would ultimately join the Army of thsweeping Braggs army from Tennessee.

Because his victory at Ghickamauga was not emeaningful way, Braggs triumph was short-lived.Confederate victory in the western theater, the battlebuy a little more time for the Southern cause. FederVirginia and Mississippi were diverted from their prirescue the Army of the Cumberland, thereby affectinfor Federal victory in those areas Otherwise, the grelives by both sides had little effect. Because they hwhile others stayed, Rosecrans, MeCook, and Crittendmilitary careers blighted as a result of the battle. NoBragg and Longstreet, gain much from their sucdistinguished were George Thomas (thereafter knowChickamauga) and the thousands of soldiers who corespective causes in the woods bordering theRiverlargest battle in the western theater.


63/185


64/185

and the entrances to some unimproved roadsVisitors need to pay particular attention to finarounds and parking only in authorized areas,the roads


65/185

Map 1. Sites of maps 2 through 5 in relation to the ChickamauChattanooga National Mibtary Park for day 1


66/185

. ,primary or old-growth forest with large numberSecond, the inhabitants required large quantitiesfences, and fuel, and they had consumed large quaand brush. Third, stock ran freely in the forest,the understory. As a result, in 1863, visibilityfrequently 150 to 200 yards, although patches ofthis range in certain areas. Today, succeeding grforest far different from that of September 1863,visibility.Teachiftg Points: Tactical doctrine and formationscover.Situ.cztion 2: Mintys final delay position, 18 SeColonel Robert H. G. Mintys cavalry brigade initiforward (east) of Reeds Bridge along the ridgeliVine Creek. Fighting dismounted, Mintys mGeneral Bushrod R. Johnsons four brigades into lshort time, the weight of the Confederate attackback, and his orderly delay became a footrace fReeds Bridge. &Iinty formed his new line justwhile his cavalrymen attempted to destroy the bJohnsons t,roops forced Minty to abandon the ebridge, and the Confederates crossed it between 1been delayed since 1200. Minty withdrew his foJays Mill and then down Brotherton Road to LaFreached a position near Viniard Field, There, he joWilders forces in forming a blocking position aRoad.Teaching Points: Covering foree operations, delay,site.Sifuation J: After crossing the West Chickamaugsite downstream and at Reeds Bridge, whicJohnsons force reached this road junction, then tiMill Road. By nightfall, most Confederatesintersection, except for some rear-echelon troops


67/185

Battery I-c.5th U.S. Artillerv mnn,,mpn

Starkweathersbrigadeplaqueb

74th Indian

B3d Ohi;,

ttery A, 1st MichiganderLight Artillery

Willichs Brigade plaque

monument nd Semples B

LJohn Ingrahams graveScogins Battery plaque

Maneys Brigade plaque

Map 2. Day 1, stands 1 thrwgh 16


68/185

the night, supported by Colonel John 6. MitcheReserve Corps. Meanwhile, Federal pickets advAround 0300, 19 September, M&oak sent theInfantry Regiment forward to destroy Reeds Bridgfire to the bridge but failed to destroy it before retuline. Back at the line, the regiment found McCopreparing to retreat, Leaving the area, McCookisolated M&airs Brigade west of the Chickamauevents in motion that triggered the battle.Vignette: Eli Shields was in the lead when we raand had the nerve to sing out in a clear voice,thoughtful Johnny replied, Keep your dam [sipulled Shields off and pushed him back into timmediate sight and hearing of the enemy, then cand picked up one after another, and placed theuntil we had taken twenty-two prisoners. Amongseveral belonging to a band, and their instrumenthem. There was also a rebel major, whose horsegave to Colonel h&Cook. (Henry J. Aten, NistoryRegiment Illinois Vhnteer Infantry, Hiawatha, KTeaching Poink: Effect of false assumptions,significant events.

Stand 2Jays Mill@&v-section of Jays Mill Road and Brotherton

S&&ion: 18 September 1863, p.m. Late in theJohnsons Division reached this road junction. Joturn onto Brotherton Road, but Major General Jpoint, took command of the column and directedJays Mill Road toward Alexanders Bridge.Confederate cavalry arrived from the south to scrrear and established a picket line not far south of J19 September 1863, a.m. Before sunrise, aGeorgia Cavalry approached the mill and found


69/185


70/185

,advance elements of Davidsons Brigade, andwoods west of Jays Mill. Although neither cofight in the woods bordering Chickamauga Cradditional units into the fight as they arrived.Vignette: At sunrise we halted by the road lonof coffee. On we went again and by 9 a.m. ourthe enemy-Soon the 2nd Brigade were [sic]halted in the edge of a wood, very soon our skithe run and a troop of RebeI Cavalry came ruson to our skirmishers-steady boys, wait for thour Cal--on came the cavalry, the advance haseeing us. One tremendous volley rang along twas smoke, then dust from struggling steeds,were running here and there, save which nocavalry troop. Thus began the battle of Chiekacavalry charges and seen them in print but thithe kind I had witnessed and truly it was aKellenberger, Corporal, Company I, 10th Indito a friend, 15 November 1863, Unit FileChattanooga National Military Park, Fort OglTeaching Points: Meeting engagement, comma

Stand 4Kings Brigade(Battery R, 5th U.S. Artillery monume

Situ&ion 1: 19 September 1863, a.m. When Forfor Davidsons troops, he met General BraxGeneral William H. T. Walker, the Reserve Cvicinity of Alexanders Bridge. In response tsupport, Walker directed CoIonel Claudiusbrigade northward. Beginning his advance at ainto action on Davidson% left, flanking Croxtoto this new threat, Croxton faced south with s


71/185

r ga e on e e , o one en am n . cr ner sright, and Brigadier General John C. Starkweathesupport, Seribner came up on Croxtons right, wCroxton to withdraw and resupply. Kings brigadRegular units, entered the position vacated by Crosoutheast, the direction in which Wilson had retirConfederates on his right flank, King began to oritoward the new threat but was hit by Brigadier GenLiddells Confederate division. Caught in a vulnerablbrigade broke and could not be rallied u&I it passDerveers position on Reed% Bridge Road.Vignette: I pushed everything to the front, my firstenemy before them for a mile, and meeting General Acommander, at about 10 a.m., was ordered to make a nangles with the other. I only had time, however to gInfantry and battery in position before beingoverwhelming force. At this time the troops on my riground to the enemy in confusion. I immediately gavbattery to limber up but it could not be done as the horbrought up to the guns were shot down.

The officers and men, finding it impossible towith their pieces (firing) until they were forcibly takethe enemy. It was at this time that I lost the First BatInfantry (made prisoners), with the exception ofofficers and 62 rnenm /Brigadier General John H. Kinthe RebeZZion:A Compilation of the CQWaZ RecordsConfederate Armies [Washington, DC: U.S. GovernGffice, 1699; reprint, Wilmington, NC: Braadfoot19851,vol. 36, pt. 1,309. Hereafter referred to as 0.R.)Tea.clcZngPoints: Nature of nonlinear battlefield, influnit cohesion, discipline, rallying a broken unit, rbattle.Situation 2: 19 September 1663, a.m. First LieutenaBurnhams Battery H, 5th U.S. Artillery (four 12pouand two Xl-pounder Parrotts) supported Kings brigad


72/185

limited fields of fire, infantry support ofimportance of battle drills.Situation 3: 19 September 1863, a.m. On RDerveers brigade had repulsed both Confedean attack by Brigadier General MatthewWalkers Reserve Corps by the time Kings roout of the woods. Chasing Kings Regulars werwho had already overrun another of Bairds brThe pursuing Confederates were stoppeappearance of Van Derveers men in their fronby the approach of Croxtons brigade on theLiddells Division withdrew eastward across BVignette: Then the firing broke out again . . .of skirmishers--then the terrific file firingartillery, then the rebel yell, and the firing gWe stood attentive and expectant for a few miline of men in blue appeared coming towardspeed accelerated by the firing and yelConfederates who were close behind them. I dappalling spectacle than this was for a few miit with grim composure, lying down until thepassed over our line, then rising and blazingfaces, which abruptly ended the yelling and texpected such a reception, and all efforts of ththeir men in line for a fight, were in vain Ththeir turn until out of range and out of sigConfederate Brigade of Liddells Division. (Bishop, 2d Minnesota Infantry, VanChickamauga, Glimpses of &e PJatiorts StruAug. Davis, Publisher, 190916:7--8.1Teaching Points: Command and control, disunits.


73/185

brigade. Before he could change directions, StarkweathCroxtons withdrawing troops. Next, Starkweathertoward the sounds of the fighting. As he attempted toby tucking them back, his front and right were strDaniel 6. Govans Brigade of Liddells Division. Disoriand struck from an unexpected direction, Starkcollapsed and raced to the rear. The brigade eventuallquarters of a mile north of this position. Late inStarkweathers and Scribners brigades moved back isupport of Brigadier General Richard W. Johnsons diviVignette: We had marched thus but a short distancethe slope of a hill when we were suddenly opened onenemys infantry lying concealed below its crest. . . .and confusion on the right of the regimen&it waverOur left companies now break and follow the right iTwenty-fourth Illinois and Twenty-first Wisconsikneeling to the rear of us. We pass over them andcompanies in their rear. But the companies have melstricken mob, and even brave men, seeing the

staff ride handbook for the battle of chickamauga 18-20 september 1863

Documents