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STATE MANDATED COSTS

In recognition of the sever fiscal consequences of the reduction in property taxes wrought by Proposition 13, the “Spirit of Proposition 13”, or Proposition 4, was passed on November 6, 1979, and became effective on July 1, 1980. The purpose of this proposition was to require the state to reimburse local government for the costs incurred for programs mandated by the state. The process had been in effect previously, through SB 901

, passed in the wake of the Supreme Court’s denunciation of school financing in Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584.

The mandate provision is contained in Article XIIIB, Section 6 of the California Constitution, and states:

Whenever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or higher level of service on any local government, the state shall provide a subvention of funds to reimburse such local government for the costs of such program or increased level of service, except that the Legislature may, but need not, provide such subvention of funds for the following mandates:

(a) Legislative mandates requested by the local agency affected; (b) Legislation defining a new crime or changing an existing definition

of a crime; or (c) Legislative mandates enacted prior to January 1, 1975, or

executive orders or regulations initially implementing legislation enacted prior to January 1, 1975.

Initially, the process of trying to obtain reimbursement required claims for reimbursement to be filed with the Board of Control. However, local government was not successful in obtaining reimbursement for claims filed. A suit filed by thirty eight counties sought to challenge the administrative process as futile, in County of Contra Costa v. State of California (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 62. However, the court held that the administrative process was not futile, and had to be pursued prior to seeking judicial redress. Administrative Process for Pursuing Test Claims In response to the difficulties experienced with the Board of Control, the Legislature created the Commission on State Mandates to hear and process claims. The authority and administrative procedures are contained in Government Code, Sections 17500 et seq., as well as 2 C.C.R., Sections 1181 et seq.

1 Chapter 1406, Statutes of 1972. SB-90 remains the common name for this program.

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Initially, a test claim is filed with the Commission. A test claim alleges that a statute, regulation or executive order imposes costs upon an entity of local government, whether city, county, special district, or school district, with estimated costs exceeding $200.00 per year. Government Code, Section 17521. It is the filing of a test claim which commences the administrative process to determine whether the program is a reimbursable mandate, and if so, what activities are reimbursable. The deadline for filing a test claim is December 31st of the year following the fiscal year for which reimbursement is first sought. Thus, a test claim may be filed for a program which has been in effect for several years, but until the test claim is filed, reimbursement for the prior years will not be obtainable. A test claim is a quasi class action. If a test claim is found to constitute a reimbursable mandate, all agencies which have costs in the discharge of the mandate are eligible for reimbursement. However, if an agency is not successful in pursuing a test claim yet does not file a writ of mandate, another agency may proceed to have a determination as to whether there is a reimbursable mandate, as there is no privity amongst local agencies. County of Fresno v. Lehman (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 340. Once a test claim is filed with the Commission, it is sent to all state agencies which are interested in the subject matter. All test claims are submitted to the Department of Finance for review and it appears at all hearings on a test claim. Government Code, Section 17553. The interested state agencies will submit their responses as to whether they believe that a program constitutes a reimbursable mandated program. Other interested parties have the ability to comment on the test claim as well. After those comments are received, the test claimant has the ability to file a rebuttal to any statements received. It should be noted that the Commission’s regulations require that all such filings related to test claims be under penalty of perjury. 2 C.C.R. 1183, 1183.02 and 1183.03. Prior to the Commission’s staff preparing a draft staff analysis for presentation to the Commission on State Mandates, the claimant may wish to request a prehearing conference. This is generally held at the offices of the Commission on State Mandates2

, and affords the claimant an opportunity to try and convince the various state agencies as well as the Commission’s staff as to the correctness of the claimant’s position.

The Commission’s staff prepares a draft staff analysis of the test claim, and it is presented to the Commission itself prior to the hearing. The draft staff analysis presents both the claimants and the state’s view of the extent to which a program may constitute a reimbursable mandate. At the hearing, both the claimant and state agencies have the opportunity to present evidence and argument. However, the better practice is to try and have a favorable staff analysis prior to the hearing. The hearing is similar in nature to a City Council meeting. Thus, although the Commission may be swayed concerning a particular activity, it is unusual that an unfavorable staff analysis will be ignored by the Commission at a hearing. 2 980 Ninth Street, Suite 300, Sacramento, California 95814.

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Once a test claim is found to constitute a reimbursable mandate at a hearing of the Commission, the Commission’s staff will prepare a Statement of Decision, which will be adopted by the Commission at the next hearing. Once the Statement of Decision has been adopted, the claimant has 30 days within which to submit Parameters and Guidelines. Unlike other deadlines, the failure of the claimant to submit the draft Parameters and Guidelines in a timely manner has penalties attached. The claimant’s reimbursement claim for the first 12 months will be reduced by 20%, unless the claimant can demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the Commission, the necessity for an extension of the 30 day requirement. Government Code, Section 17557, and 2 CCR, Section 1183.1. Parameters and Guidelines is the document which specifies what items of costs will be reimbursable. Unless an item of cost incurred in the program is included in this document, it will not be reimbursed by the State Controller. Again, after Parameters and Guidelines are submitted to the Commission, they are sent to various state agencies for comment, including the Department of Finance and the State Controller’s Office, as well as other interested parties. Again, these agencies may comment, and the claimant is given the opportunity to rebut any assertion made by either the state agencies or other interested parties. Once all of the comments and rebuttals are in, the Commission will schedule the Parameters and Guidelines for a hearing. It is not uncommon for there to be a prehearing conference scheduled the month prior to the hearing, in order to reduce possible issues at the hearing. After adoption of the Parameters and Guidelines by the Commission, the State Controller’s Office has 60 days within which to issue claiming instructions. Government Code, Section 17558. The Claiming Instructions form the basis for filing a reimbursement claim in order to obtain funds for the cost of the program. The initial reimbursement claim will cover all fiscal years from the first fiscal year covered by the test claim through the last fiscal year for which annual reimbursement claims have been filed. This is important, for although the Commission is supposed to have taken a mandate through the process from test claim to Statewide Cost Estimate within one year, previous staff shortages and complex claims resulted in a backlog, and it frequently takes at least two years to complete the process. From the time that Claiming Instructions are issued, each agency with costs incurred in the discharge of the program has 120 days within which to file a reimbursement claim with the State Controller’s Office. The practice has presently been that once all claims are received, the State Controller notifies the Commission of the total amount of all claims for initial reimbursement filed, and that amount will be presented to the Commission for adoption as the Statewide Cost Estimate. Once the Statewide Cost Estimate is adopted, this number will be included by the Commission in its semiannual report to the Legislature. Government Code, Section 17600. From the semiannual report, a local government claims bill is to be submitted to the legislature, which includes the initial reimbursement. Government Code, Section 17612. Thereafter, the mandate

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will be included in the annual budget, and claims are due to be filed on January 15 following the fiscal year for which costs were incurred. Government Code, Section 17560. These reimbursement claims may also include an estimate for the present fiscal year. It should be noted that all funds received by way of reimbursement through this process are totally unrestricted, and can be used for any governmental purpose. Government Code, Section 17563. Determining Whether A New Program Is Reimbursable Mandate As with all governmental programs, through the years, litigation and resulting court opinions has fleshed out the skeleton of the program. This is critical in determining whether a statute, regulation or executive order could result in a reimbursable mandate. First, with the creation of the Commission on State Mandates, the implementing legislation codified exceptions found in the Constitution and case law to the finding of a reimbursable mandate, and states as follows:

17556. The commission shall not find costs mandated by the state, as defined in Section 17514, in any claim submitted by a local agency or school district, if, after a hearing, the commission finds that: (a) The claim is submitted by a local agency or school district which requested legislative authority for that local agency or school district to implement the program specified in the statute, and that statute imposes costs upon that local agency or school district requesting the legislative authority. A resolution from the governing body or a letter from a delegated representative of the governing body of a local agency or school district which requests authorization for that local agency or school district to implement a given program shall constitute a request within the meaning of this paragraph. (b) The statute or executive order affirmed for the state that which had been declared existing law or regulation by action of the courts. (c) The statute or executive order implemented a federal law or regulation and resulted in costs mandated by the federal government, unless the statute or executive order mandates costs which exceed the mandate in that federal law or regulation. (d) The local agency or school district has the authority to levy service charges, fees, or assessments sufficient to pay for the mandated program or increased level of service. (e) The statute or executive order provides for offsetting savings to local agencies or school districts which result in no net costs to the local agencies or school districts, or includes additional revenue that was specifically intended to fund the costs of the state mandate in an amount sufficient to fund the cost of the state mandate.

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(f) The statute or executive order imposed duties which were expressly included in a ballot measure approved by the voters in a statewide election. (g) The statute created a new crime or infraction, eliminated a crime or infraction, or changed the penalty for a crime or infraction, but only for that portion of the statute relating directly to the enforcement of the crime or infraction.

Thus, before examining a new program, reference must be had to Government Code, Section 17556 to ascertain if there are any exceptions to a finding of a reimbursable mandate that are applicable. If there are no such exceptions, the following should be referred to in order to make sure that the new program will be found to be a mandate. 1. County of Los Angeles v. State of California (1987) 43 Cal.3d 46, 233 Cal.Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202. In determining whether increases in workers’ compensation benefits constitute a reimbursable mandate, the Supreme Court examined the purpose of the initiative. In so doing, the court held that reimbursement is not to be had unless the program is unique to local government. Thus, incidental and incremental costs to local government of a law of general application is not reimbursable. 2. County of Fresno v. State of California (1991) 53 Cal.3d 482, 280 Cal.Rptr. 92, 808 P.2d 235. This case sought to challenge the constitutionality of Government Code, Section 17556(d), for exempting from reimbursable mandates those with a self-funding mechanism. The court held that subvention is required only when the mandated program is paid from the proceeds of taxes. As “costs” are defined by Government Code, Section 17556(d) as being paid from other than the proceeds of taxes, such expenses are not required to be reimbursed. 3. Long Beach Unified School Dist. v. State of California (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 155, 275 Cal.Rptr. 449. Long Beach sought to recover its desegregation costs, which was approved by the Commission’s predecessor, the State Board of Control. However, the Legislature refused to fund the mandate on the ground that the regulations merely implemented federal law. In this matter, the court held that when an executive order requires the provision of a higher level of service by local government than is required either by the constitution or case law, it is a reimbursable mandate. 4. Lucia Mar Unified School Dist. v. State of California (1988) 44 Cal.3d 830, 244 Cal.Rptr. 677, 750 P.2d 318. This matter involved the claim for reimbursement for costs for educating severely handicapped pupils which had been previously paid by the state, and the costs of which were shifted to school districts. The Supreme Court held that the intent of Article XIIIB, Section 6 was to preclude the shifting of costs from the state to local government. Thus, to the extent that the costs of this program were shifted from the state to local government, the state must reimburse. 5. Hayes v. Commission on State Mandates (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1564, 15 Cal.Rptr. 2d 547. This case involved the special education programs, and the contention by the state that it was merely implementing a federal mandate. The court held that to the

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extent that a federal mandate does not require the costs be imposed upon local government but is the method by which the state chooses to implement the federal requirements, the state must provide a subvention. 6. City of Merced v. State of California (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 777, 200 Cal.Rptr. 642. The state imposed additional requirements for the payment of business goodwill when property is taken through eminent domain, and the City filed a claim, and when denied, a writ of mandate. The court examined the constitutional provisions and held that since eminent domain is not a mandate, as a local agency is not required to obtain any particular property and can also choose to purchase same without the power of eminent domain, that there was no state mandate involved. This case has been used by the Commission for the proposition that optional programs, and programs to the extent they are optional, are not reimbursable. 7. City of San Jose v. State of California (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1802, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 521. In this matter, the City of San Jose sought to recover costs it paid to the County of Santa Clara for booking fees. In its review of the matter, the court held that whereas the state is precluded from shifting its costs onto local government, there is nothing in the Constitution which precludes the shifting of costs between local governments. Thus, this case is interpreted to preclude reimbursement for costs that are shifted from one local governmental entity to another. 8. Redevelopment Agency of the City of San Marcos v. California Commission on State Mandates (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 976, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 270. This case sought to obtain reimbursement for the redevelopment agency’s required deposit into the low and moderate income housing fund. This mandated contribution was found not to be a state mandate, as tax increment funding is not the “proceeds of taxes”. The court analyzed both tax increment funding and the constitutional provision, and found that for there to be a mandate, there had to be costs incurred from tax proceeds. This case has been used to deny all requests for reimbursement from redevelopment agencies, as their funding comes from tax increments. 9. County of Sonoma v. Commission on State Mandates (December 19, 2000), A089524, First District, reh. den., Petition for hearing before the Supreme Court pending. This is the action brought by the County of Sonoma seeking to have the court find that the property tax shift to the Educational Revenue Augmentation Fund (ERAF) constituted a reimbursable mandate. Although successful at the trial court, the appellate court found that the purpose of Article XIIIB, Section 6 was to control costs and cap government spending, and did not preclude a revenue shift. The court further found that Proposition 98 did not require that funds to be utilized for school districts come solely from the state’s general fund, but allows the allocated local proceeds of property taxes. On that basis, the court found that there was no right to reimbursement under Article XIIIB, Section 6. A request for rehearing was denied, and a Petition for Hearing was filed before the Supreme Court. The time for the Attorney General to respond has not yet passed as of the date of these materials. (1/16/01).

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10. Carmel Valley Fire Protection District v. State of California (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 521, 234 Cal.Rptr. 795. This case involves the consequences of defunding the mandate for firefighter clothing and equipment. The court held that executive orders, in this instance regulations, constituted the type of executive orders entitled to subvention. Additionally, it is not a violation of the separation of powers to order reimbursement, and it was proper for the court to order that counties could offset the amount due from fines and forfeitures otherwise due the state.. Additionally, the case held that legislative disclaimers as to the reason why there should be no funding are irrelevant, as self-serving statements.3

3 Note that there is a new case, Carmel Valley Fire Protection District v. State of California (March 31, 1999), B113383, Second Appellate District. This case held that it was a violation of the separation of powers for the legislature to defund a mandate required by an administrative body it had created. If the legislature did not like the program, it can repeal the regulations through statute or address the matter directly with regard to the powers of the agency. A Petition for Hearing was filed by the State, and the California Supreme Court accepted review of this matter on June 30, 1999, and the case number is S078828.

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EXHIBIT A

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Test Claim of:

City of Newport Beach

Elder Abuse: Law Enforcement Training

Chapter 444, Statutes of 1997

STATEMENT OF THE CLAIM

A. MANDATE SUMMARY

The statute cited above on which this test claim is based, added Penal Code, Section 13515, which requires every city police officer or deputy sheriff at a supervisory level and below, who is assigned field or investigative duties, to complete an elder abuse training course certified by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training by January 1, 1999, or within 18 months of assignment to field duties. The statute specifically allows the training to be conducted by telecourse, video tape, or other means. The statute further requires that the course must, at a minimum, address relevant laws, recognition, reporting requirements and procedures, neglect and fraud.

As passed, Penal Code, Section 13515 reads as follows:

Every city police officer or deputy sheriff at a supervisory level and below who is assigned field or investigative duties shall complete an elder abuse training course certified by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and training by January 1, 1999, or within 18 months of assignment to field duties. Completion of the course may be satisfied by telecourse, video training tape, or other instruction. The training shall, at a minimum, address relevant laws, recognition, reporting requirements and procedures, neglect, and fraud. The course may be presented as part of a training program that includes other subjects or courses.

With the passage of this mandate, the City of Newport Beach has been required to provide each police officer with the. required training. This has been accomplished by requiring each of the approximately 150 police officers to watch a video which has been prepared by POST for two hours, after the conclusion of the regular shift. Additionally, each new police officer hired will be required to watch the two hour video, in order to complete this mandated training.

B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PRIOR TO 1975

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There was no requirement prior to 1975, nor in any of the intervening years, until the passage of Chapter 444, Statutes of 1997, filed on September 24, 1997, to mandate that police officers and sheriffs deputies be trained in the field of elder abuse.

C. SPECIFIC STATUTORY SECTIONS THAT CONTAIN THE MANDATED ACTIVITIES

As related above, the mandated activities are all contained within Penal Code, Section 13515. This section directly relates to the reimbursable provisions of this test claim.

D. COST ESTIMATES

1. Implementation Costs Commencing in Fiscal Year 1998-99

There are approximately 150 police officers with the City of Newport Beach, each of whom will receive the two hour training by video tape outside their usual duty hours. The salary and benefit cost, at time and a half, per hour is $62.48, for total training costs of $18, 744. Additionally, it will take approximately 10 hours of a sergeant's time to set up and prepare the training, which will be done during the sergeant's usual working hours. A sergeant's hourly rate, including benefits, is $49.34, for total estimated costs of $493.40. Accordingly, the total costs for the first year's implementation is estimated to be $19,237.40.

2. On-Going Costs

There are approximately 25 new officers hired each year by the City of Newport Beach. For those new officers who have not received elder abuse training, this training will need to be provided, and their hourly rate for two hours will be the ongoing cost for each new officer. If the training cannot be accommodated during the regular work day, the training will have to be after hours, at time and a half plus benefits.

E. REIMBURSABLE COSTS MANDATED BY THE STATE

The costs incurred by the City of Newport Beach as a result of the statute included in the test claim are all reimbursable costs as such costs are "costs mandated by the State" under Article XIII B (6) of the California Constitution, and Section 17500 et seq. Of the Government Code. Section 17514 of the Government Code defines "costs mandated by the state", and specifies the following three requirements:

1. There are "increased costs which a local agency is required to incur after July 1, 1980."

2. The costs are incurred "as a result of any statute enacted on or after January 1, 1975."

3 .The costs are the result of "a new program or higher level of service of an existing program within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution. "

All three of the above requirements for finding costs mandated by the State are met as described previously herein.

F. MANDATE :MEETS BOTH SUPREME COURT TESTS

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The mandate created by these three statutes clearly meets both tests that the Supreme Court in the County of Los Angeles v. State of California (1987) created for determining what constitutes a reimbursable state mandated local program. Those two tests, which the Commission on State Mandates relies upon to determine if a reimbursable mandate exists, are the "unique to government" and the .'carry out a state policy" tests. Their application to this test claim is discussed below.

Mandate Is Unique to Local Government

The statutory scheme set forth above imposes a unique requirement on local government. Only local government investigates, arrests and assists in the prosecution of criminal offenses. Only local government conducts investigations relative to elder abuse. Consequently, only local government is responsible for training its police officers and deputies sheriff. This mandate only applies to local government.

Mandate Carries Out a State Policy

From the legislation, it is clear that the state wishes all police officers and deputies sheriff involved in field duties or investigation to be cognizant and aware of the issues surrounding elder abuse. For that reason, the mandate was enacted, and thus carries out the state policy, through the requirement that all such officers be trained in elder abuse.

In summary, the statute mandates that the City of Newport Beach train its police officers in elder abuse, its recognition, investigation, reporting requirements, neglect and fraud. To this end, the City of Newport Beach has had to train its officers in order to comply with this legislation.

STATE FUNDING DISCLAIMERS ARE NOT APPLICABLE

There ate seven disclaimers specified in Government Code, Section 17556 which could serve to bar recovery of "costs mandated by the State", as defined in Government Code, Section 17556. None of the seven disclaimers apply to this test claim:

1. .The claim is submitted by a local agency or school district which requests legislative authority for that local agency or school district to implement the Program specified in the statutes, and that statute imposes costs upon the local agency or school district requesting the legislative authority.

2. The statute or executive order affirmed for the State that which had been declared existing law or regulation by action of the courts.

3. The statute or executive order implemented a federal law or regulation and resulted in costs mandated by the federal government, unless the statute or executive order mandates costs which exceed the mandate in that federal law or regulation.

4. The local agency or school district has the authority to levy service charges, fees or assessments sufficient to pay for the mandated program or increased level of service.

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5. The statute or executive order provides for offsetting savings to local agencies or school districts which result in no net costs to the local agencies or school districts, or includes additional revenue that was specifically intended to fund. the costs of the State mandate in an amount sufficient to fund the cost of the State mandate.

6. The statute or executive order imposed duties which were expressly included in a ballot measure approved by the voters in a Statewide election.

7. The statute created a new crime or infraction, eliminated a crime or infraction, or changed the penalty for a crime or infraction, but only for that portion of the statute relating directly to the enforcement of the crime or infraction.

None of the above disclaimers have any application to the City of Newport Beach's test claim.

CONCLUSION

The enactment of Chapter 444, Statutes of 1997 imposed a new state mandated program and cost on the City of Newport Beach, by requiring it to have all of its police officers at the supervisory level and below, who are involved in investigations or field work trained in elder abuse. The mandated program meets all of the criteria and tests for the Commission on State Mandates to find a reimbursable state mandated program. None of the so-called disclaimers or other statutory or constitutional provisions that would relieve the State from its constitutional obligation to provide reimbursement have any application to this claim.

G. CLAIM REQUIREMENTS

The following elements of this test claim are provided pursuant to Section 1183, Title 2, of the California Code of Regulations:

Exhibit 1: Chapter 444, Statutes of 1997

CLAIM CERTIFICATION

The foregoing facts are known to me personally and if so required, I could and would testify to the statements made herein. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the statements made in this document are true and complete to the best of my personal knowledge and as to all matters, I believe them to be true.

Executed this 19 day of January, 1999, at Newport Beach, California, by:

xxxx xxxxxxxx

Glen Everroad,

Finance Director

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DECLARATION OF GLEN EVERROAD

I, Glen Everroad, make the following declaration under oath:

I am the Revenue Manager for the City of Newport Beach, and as part of my duties, I am also the SB 90 Coordinator for the City. As part of my duties, I am responsible for the complete and timely recovery of costs mandated by the State.

I declare that I have examined the City's State mandated duties and resulting costs, in implementing the subject law, and find that such costs are, in my opinion, "costs mandated by the State", as defined in Government Code, Section 17514:

"'Costs mandated by the State' means any increased costs which a local agency or school district is required to incur after July 1, 1980, as a result of any statute enacted on or after January 1, 1975, or any executive order implementing any statute enacted on or after January 1, 1975, which mandates a new program or higher level of service of an existing program within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California Constitution."

I am personally conversant with the foregoing facts, and if so required, I could and would testify to the statements made herein.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct of my own knowledge, except as to the matters which are stated upon information or belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

Executed this 19 day of January, 1999 at Newport Beach, California.

xxxx xxxxxxxx

Glen Everroad

Revenue Manager

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BILL NUMBER: AB 870 CHAPTERED

BILL TEXT CHAPTER 444 FILED WITH SECRETARY OF STATE SEPTEMBER 24, 1997 APPROVED BY GOVERNOR SEPTEMBER 23, 1997 PASSED THE ASSEMBLY SEPTEMBER 9, 1997 PASSED THE SENATE SEPTEMBER 2, 1997 AMENDED IN SENATE AUGUST 7, 1997 AMENDED IN SENATE JULY 21, 1997 AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY MAY 5, 1997

INTRODUCED BY Assembly Members Hertzberg and Napolitano

FEBRUARY 27, 1997

An act to add Section 13515 to the Penal Code, relating to crime prevention. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST AB 870, Hertzberg. Elder abuse: law enforcement training. (1) Existing law requires various law enforcement officers to meet specified training standards pursuant to courses of training certified by the Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST) program.

This bill would require every city police officer or deputy sheriff at a supervisory level and below to complete an elder abuse training course certified by POST. By imposing additional duties on local agencies, it would impose a state-mandated local program. (2) The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement, including the creation of a State Mandates Claims Fund to pay the costs of mandates that do not exceed $1,000,000 statewide and other procedures for claims whose statewide costs exceed $1,000,000

This bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to these statutory provisions. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS: SECTION 1. Section 13515 is added to the Penal Code, to read:

13515. Every city police officer or deputy sheriff at a supervisory level and below who is assigned field or investigative duties shall complete an elder abuse training course certified by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training by January 1, 1999, or within 18 months of assignment to field duties. Completion of the course may be satisfied by telecourse, video training tape, or other instruction. The training shall, at a minimum, address relevant laws, recognition, reporting requirements and procedures, neglect, and fraud. The course may be presented as part of a training program that includes other subjects or courses.

SEC. 2. Notwithstanding Section 17610 of the Government Code, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the

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Government Code. If the statewide cost of the claim for reimbursement does not exceed one million dollars ($1,000,000), reimbursement shall be made from the State Mandates Claims Fund.

Notwithstanding Section 17580 of the Government Code, unless otherwise specified, the provisions of this act shall become operative on the same date that the act takes effect pursuant to the California Constitution.

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ITEM 10

PROPOSED STATEMENT OF DECISION APPROVED TEST CLAIM

Penal Code Section 13515

Statutes of 1997, Chapter 444 Elder Abuse Training

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background This test claim was heard on November 30, 2000. The test claim statute addresses elder abuse training for city police officers and deputy sheriffs at a supervisory level or below who are assigned field or investigative duties. The Commission approved the test claim with a vote of 7 to 0. Commission Findings The Commission concluded that the test claim statute is subject to article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution, because it imposes an obligation on local agencies to provide elder abuse training under the following circumstances:

• When the elder abuse training occurs during the employee's regular working hours; or

• When the elder abuse training occurs outside the employee's regular

working hours and there is an obligation imposed by an MOU existing on September 24, 1997 (the effective date of the statute) that requires the local agency to provide or pay for continuing education training.

The Commission further concluded that the test claim statute imposes costs mandated by the state upon local agencies within the meaning of article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution and Government Code section 17514 for the following activities :

• Costs to present the one-time, two-hour course in the form of trainer time and necessary materials provided to trainees; and

• Salaries, benefits and incidental expenses for .each city police officer or

deputy sheriff to receive the one-time, two-hour course on elder abuse in those instances where the police officer or deputy sheriff has already completed their 24 hours of continuing education when the requirement of section 13515 applied to the particular officer, and when a new two year -

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training cycle does not commence until after the deadline for that officer or deputy to complete elder abuse training.

The sole issue before the Commission is whether the Proposed Statement of Decision accurately reflects the vote of the Commission.4

Recommendation Staff recommends that the Commission adopt the Proposed Statement of Decision (beginning on page 3), which accurately reflects the Commission's decision.

1. Title 2, California Code of Regulations, section 1181.1, subdivision (g).

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ITEM 6 PROPOSED STATEMENT OF DECISION

APPROVED TEST CLAIM

Civil Code Sections 1815, 1816, 1834, 1834.4, 1845, 1846, 1847, and 2080; Food and Agriculture Code Sections 17005, 17006, 31108, 31752, 31752.5, 31753,

31754, 32001, and 32003;

Penal Code Sections 597.1 and 599d Business and Professions Code Section 4855 ;

As Added or Amended by Statutes of 1978, Chapter 1314; and

Statutes of 1998, Chapter 752

California Code of Regulations, Title 16, Division 20, Article 4, Section 2031 (renumbered 2032.3 on May 25, 2000)

Animal Adoption

Executive Summary

This test claim was heard on October 26, 2000 and November 30, 2000. The test claim legislation was enacted in an attempt to end the euthanasia of adoptable and treatable animals. Generally, the test claim legislation increased the holding period for stray and abandoned dogs, cats, and other specified animals; required the verification of the temperament of feral cats; required the posting of lost and found lists; required the maintenance of records for impounded animals; and required that impounded animals receive "necessary and prompt veterinary care. " The Commission, by a vote of 5 to 2, partially approved this test claim. The Commission concluded that ;the test claim legislation imposes a partial reimbursable state mandated program on local agencies pursuant to article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution and Government Code section 17514 for the increased costs in performing the following activities:

1. Providing care and maintenance during the increased holding period for impounded dogs and cats that are ultimately euthanized. The increased holding period shall be measured by calculating the difference between three days from the day of capture, and four business days from the day after impoundment, as specified below in 3(a) and 3(b) , or six business days from the day after impoundment (Food & Agr. Code, §§ 31108, 31752) ; 2. Providing care and maintenance for four business days from the day after impoundment, as specified below in 3(a) and 3(b) , or six business days from the day after impoundment, for impounded rabbits, guinea pigs, hamsters,

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pot-bellied pigs, birds, lizards, snakes, turtles, or tortoises legally allowed as personal property that are ultimately euthanized (Food & Agr. Code, § 31753) 3. For impounded dogs, cats, and other specified animals that are held for four business days after the day of impoundment, either: (a) Making the animal available for owner redemption on one weekday evening until at least 7:00 p.m. , or one weekend day; or (b) For those local agencies with fewer than three full-time employees or that are not open during all regular weekday business hours. establishing a procedure to enable owners to reclaim their animals by appointment at a mutually agreeable time when the agency would otherwise be closed (Food & Agr., Code §§ 31108, 31752, and 31753); 4. Verifying whether a cat is feral or tame by using a standardized protocol (Food & Agr. Code, § 31752.5); 5. Posting lost and found lists (Food & Agr. Code, § 32001); 6. Maintaining records on animals that are not medically treated by a veterinarian. but are either taken up, euthanized after the holding period, or impounded (Food & Agr. Code, § 32003); and 7. Providing "necessary and prompt veterinary care" for abandoned animals, other than injured cats and dogs given emergency treatment, that are ultimately euthanized (Civ. Code. §§ 1834 and 1846) .

The Commission also concluded that all other statutes included in the test claim legislation that are not listed above do not impose a reimbursable state mandated program within the meaning of article XIII B. section 6 of the California Constitution and Government Code section 17514. The sole issue before the Commission is whether the Proposed Statement of Decision accurately reflects the vote of the Commission (tit.2. Cal.Code Regs., § 1181.1. subd. (g)). Staff Recommendation Staff recommends that the Commission adopt the Proposed Statement of Decision (beginning on page 3) , which accurately reflects the Commission. s decision.

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Commission on state Mandates: November 30,2000 PUBLIC TESTIMONY

Appearing Re Item 6 continued On Behalf of the county of Los Angeles: LEONARD KAYE certified Public Accountant Office of Auditor-controller County of Los Angeles On Behalf of the California Department of Finance: JAMES Mo APPS Principal Program Budget Analyst State of California Department of Finance Appearing Re Item 7: (This item heard out of order) On Behalf of the city of Newport Beach: PAMELA STONE Legal Counsel DMG Maximus KENT STODDARD (Sergeant) Personnel & Training city of Newport Beach Police Department GLEN EVERROAD Revenue Manager city of Newport Beach On Behalf of the California Department of Finance: TOM E. LUTZENBERGER Budget Analyst Department of Finance DANIEL G. STONE Deputy Attorney General Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General

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1 --000-- 2 (The proceedings resumed at 12:51 p.m.) 3 CHAIR PORINI: All right, after a brief recess, 4 we'll call the meeting back to order. 5 And we're going to move directly to item 6 number 7. 7 MS. HIGASHI: That's correct. And before we 8 start this part of the hearing, may I just ask, have all 9 of the witnesses and parties at the table been sworn in? 10 (Chorus of "ayes" was heard.) 11 MS. HIGASHI: Thank you. 12 Item 7 is the test claim on Elder Abuse, Law 13 Enforcement Training. This item will be presented by 14 Staff Counsel Kathy Lynch. 15 MS. LYNCH: Good afternoon. This test claim 16 addresses elder abuse training ~or city police officers 17 and deputy sheriffs at a supervisory level and below, who 18 are assigned field or investigative duties. Staff finds 19 that the test claim statute is subject to Article XIII B, 20 section 6, of the California Constitution, because it 21 imposes an obligation on local agencies to provide elder 22 abuse training, when the training occurs during the 23 police officer or deputy sheriff's working hours, or when 24 the training occurs outside the police officer or deputy 25 sheriff's regular working hours, but the agency is 26 required to pay for the training because of an obligation 27 imposed on it by an existing memorandum of understanding. 28 Staff further finds that the test claim statute 1 constitutes a new program, since elder abuse training was 2 not required before the enactment of the test claim 3 statute. 4 Finally, staff finds that the test claim 5 statute imposes costs mandated by the state, but only for 6 the following activities: One, the cost to present the 7 one-time two-hour course in the form of trainer time and 8 necessary materials provided to trainees; and two, for 9 salaries, benefits and incidental expenses for each 10 police. officer or sheriff to receive the one-time 11 two-hour course, but only in cases where the police

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12 officer or deputy sheriff has already completed his or 13 her 24 hours of continuing education, and must also 14 complete an additional two hours under the --of elder 15 abuse training under the test claim statute. 16 Accordingly, staff recommends that the 17 Commission approve the elder abuse training test claim as 18 outlined above. 19 will the parties and witnesses please state 20 your name for the record? 21 MS. STONE: Good afternoon. Pamela Stone on 22 behalf of the city of Newport Beach. 23 MR. STODDARD: Ken Stoddard of Newport Beach 24 Police Department. 25 MR. EVERROAD: Glen Everroad, city of Newport 26 Beach, Revenue Manager. 27 MR. LUTZENBERGER: Tom Lutzenberger, Department 28 of Finance. 1 MR. STONE: Dan Stone, Deputy Attorney General, 2 for the Department of Finance. 3 CHAIR PORINI: All right, Ms. Stone? 4 MS. STONE: Thank you very much, Chairman 5 Porini. 6 Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, Members' 7 of the Commission. 8 We would like to concur with the draft staff 9 analysis, or the final staff analysis of your Commission 10 staff, and are very appreciative of the hard work that 11 has gone into this. 12 I would like to introduce Sergeant Kent 13 Stoddard, who is the training supervisor with the city of 14 Newport Beach Police Department, who will speak very 15 briefly on this matter. And we are all available for 16 questions. 17 CHAIR PORINI: All right. Mr. Stoddard? 18 MR. STODDARD: Good afternoon. 19 I'm a sergeant with the Newport Beach Police 20 Department. I've been there for over 30 years. I'm 21 currently assigned as the personnel and training 22 supervisor or sergeant, the same thing. I've been so 23 assigned for the past five years. 24 Elder abuse cases in the united states number 25 in excess of one million per year. Elders are people 26 over 60 years of age and they make up 13 percent of the

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27 population. They will increase to over 25 percent of the 28 population by the year 2050. 1 Three to ten percent of all elders are abused 2 or neglected. An abuse can be physical, psychological, 3 financial, sexual or through neglect. 4 The elder abuse training required by PC 13515 5 necessitated scheduling all of our field and 6 investigative officers and supervisors from various 7 shifts and days off for this special training session. 8 Required group training like this is difficult to 9 arrangement. Maintaining compliance with the 10 ever-increasing training demands placed on law 11 enforcement has become challenging in recent years. 12 And I'll be happy to answer any questions you 13 might have. 14 CHAIR PORINI: Questions from Members? 15 Next witness? 16 MR. EVERROAD: Glen Everroad, Revenue Manager 17 for the city of Newport Beach and SB 90 coordinator for 18 the City of Newport Beach. 19 I'd like to thank the Members for hearing this 20 test claim and the staff analysis for this test claim. 21 We agree with the staff's determination 22 relative to this test claim. 23 CHAIR PORINI: All right, questions? 24 Mr. Stone or Mr. Lutzenberger? 25 MR. STONE: Dan Stone, on behalf of the 26 Department of Finance. 27 The Department generally concurs with the staff 28 analysis and recommended decision. But we have a couple 1 points of clarification which I hope are just technical 2 and won't create any controversy. The one, I'll address; 3 and one, Mr. Lutzenberger will address. 4 The point I want to make is, I don't know your 5 page numbers in here (indicating), but on TC page 17, the 6 staff sets out in table form the circumstances under 7 which they believe reimbursement is appropriate. As I 8 say, we concur in that. 9 But then when it's set out at the bottom 10 paragraph of that page in text form, one of the elements

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11 of the table --and we think it's an important element -- 12 doesn't appear to be included in the text. 13 And all I'm saying is, if you read the table, 14 the reimbursement is required when a trainee has already 15 completed his or her 24 hours within the two-year cycle, 16 and must complete the elder abuse training before the 17 next two-year cycle of training begins. Because if they 18 have time to complete the training, the elder abuse 19 training within the new cycle, then it's two hours going 20 toward the new 24. 21 I just didn't see any language in the text, 22 either at that bottom paragraph on 17, or in the summary 23 of the mandate on 1.9, that reflected that second 24 requirement, that the deadline for completing the elder 25 abuse has to occur before the new cycle for two-year 26 training begins; otherwise, the two hours can be put 27 toward the new 24. 28 So I have language which, on page 19, at the 1 end of the last bullet there, where it says --the last 2 line, it says, "Education, when the requirement of 3 section 13515 applied to the" 4 MS. STONE: Excuse me, where are you located? 5 MR. STONE: Excuse me, TC 19. 6 MS. STONE: Where on that page? 7 MR. STONE: The last of the four bullet points, 8 and the last line of that bullet point. 9 I would change after "particular officer," 10 instead of a period, we would have a comma, and .then say 11 "and where a new two-year training cycle does not 12 .commence until after the deadline for that officer or 13 deputy to complete elder abuse training." 14 MS. STONE: Could you do that once more again, 15 very slowly? Because I can't --this is the first -- 16 just for the record, Commission Members, this is the 17 first we've heard of this. And it's very difficult to 18 try and understand Mr. Stone's meaning, when he speaks so 19 quickly that it's impossible to copy down what he's 20 .saying. 21 CHAIR PORINI: I'm sure that he will repeat it 22 until we all get it down. I also only got halfway 23 through .it. And we'll ask staff to comment, too. 24 MR. STONE: The first meeting was just to get 25 the thought across. And the Department is not wedded to

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26 this language. 27 But do you understand, Ms. Stone, the point, 28 and do the Members understand the point? We just want, 1. in the next, to reflect what staff has already 2 their analysis, in their table, which is -- 3 MS. STONE: correct. I have no problems 4 with that. 5 MR. STONE: Okay. 6 MS. STONE: My concern is, when there's a 7 request to put in additional language that we haven't 8 seen and it is stated so quickly, you have no opportunity 9 whatsoever to understand or comprehend -- 10 CHAIR PORINI: We'll make sure that everybody 11 gets it. 12 So maybe, Mr. Stone, if you have that written, 13 if you could pass it over. Or can you read it again for 14 us slowly? 15 MR. STONE: happy to read lot as slowly 16 as you wish. 17 CHAIR PORINI: So this is TC 19 after the 18 fourth bullet? The sentence -- 19 MR. STONE: The last line of the fourth bullet, 20 where it ends with "applied to the particular officer," 21 we would insert a comma there, and then the following 22 language, "and when a new two-year" 23 cycle does not commence until after the deadline for that 24 officer or deputy to complete elder abuse training." 25 MS. STONE: Was that "officer or" -- 26 MR. STONE: complete elder abuse 27 training." 28 MEMBER ROBECK: After "commence" 1 MR. STONE: After "commence"? "until after the 2 deadline for that officer." 3 MEMBER ROBECK: Okay, I got it. 4 MR. STONE: You got it? 5 CHAIR PORINI: Okay, everybody got it? 6 Okay, staff? 7 MS. LYNCH: That's consistent with our 8 analysis. 9 CHAIR PORINI: That would be consistent?

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10 MS. LYNCH: Yes, it is. 11 CHAIR PORINI: Great. 12 MS. STONE: I have no problems with that 13 language. 14 CHAIR PORINI: Great. 15 Mr. Lutzenberger? 16 MR. LUTZENBERGER: Madam Chair and Members of 17 the Commission, we would raise one other point as a 18 concern for clarification. And I say this before I go 19 into detail; this might be handled more appropriately 20 under Proposed Guidelines and Parameters, but we're not 21 sure, so that's why we raise it now. 22 with regards to the definition of what 23 constitutes --if the Commission decides that this .claim 24 constitutes a state mandate that is reimbursable under 25 state law, the staff analysis is somewhat ambiguous -- 26 and with all due respect to the Commission staff --with 27 regards to exactly what costs should be associated with a 28 trainer and necessary materials for the course. We would 1 request that clarification be made exactly what costs are 2 appropriate. And we raise this concern because it was 3 also agreed --we viewed that the staff analysis seems to 4 concur that the course developed by the commission on 5 Peace-Officer Standards and Training seems to be 6 appropriate for the program necessary to provide the 7 training. 8 CHAIR PORINI: Okay, I see a lot of heads 9 nodding. Who wants to take that on, on staff? 10 Pat? 11 MS. HART-JORGENSEN: This is something that is 12 appropriate for the for the P's and G's. And the 13 P's and G's would be drafted to reflect the staff 14 analysis where they discuss the fact that the training 15 program has already been developed and that it was 16 limited to the training time an~ getting the materials 17 together for the training. 18 CHAIR PORINI: Okay. Any questions or comments 19 from Members? 20 MEMBER BELTRAMI: Move for approval, Madam 21 Chair. 22 CHAIR PORINI: Mr. Beltrami moves. 23 Ms. Steinmeier? 24 MEMBER STEINMEIER: Second.

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25 CHAIR PORINI: We're open for discussion. 26 Hearing -- 27 MEMBER ROBECK: I assume that's as amended? 28 MEMBER STEINMEIER: As amended. 1 CHAIR PORINI: with the amended language, yes. 2 MEMBER STEINMEIER: It should be in your 3 motion. 4 CHAIR PORINI: All right, so the motion before 5 us is to adopt staff's recommendation, as amended. 6 Motion by Mr. Beltrami; second by Ms. Steinmeier. 7 May I have roll call, please? 8 MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Sherwood? 9 .VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Aye . 10 MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Steinmeier? 11 MEMBER STEINMEIER: Aye. 12. MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Beltrami? 13 MEMBER BELTRAMI: Aye. 14 MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Halsey? 15 MEMBER HALSEY: Aye. 16 MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lazar? 17 MEMBER LAZAR: Aye. 18 MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Robeck? 19 MEMBER ROBECK: Aye. 20 MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Porini? 21 CHAIR PORINI: Aye. 22 MS. STONE: Thank you. 23 MS. HIGASHI: This brings us to item 5. This 24 is a claim on Mentally Disordered Offenders' Extended 25 Commitment Proceedings. This item will be presented by 26 Staff Counsel Camille Shelton. 27 CHAIR PORINI: We'll give folks just a minute 28 to get situated. 1 All right, Ms. Shelton? 2 MS. SHELTON: This test claim involves 3 legislation that establishes civil commitment procedures 4 for the continued involuntary treatment of persons with 5 severe mental orders for one year following their parole 6 termination date. Staff recommends that the Commission 7 approve this test claim for the activities listed on 8 page three of the staff analysis.

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9 will the parties please state your name for the 10 record? 11 MR. KAYE: Leonard Kaye, County of Los Angeles. 12 MR. APPS: Jim Apps, Department of Finance. 13 CHAIR PORINI: Okay, Mr. Kaye, would you like 14 to begin? 15 MR. KAYE: Yes. Again, I will be brief because 16 we agree with staff's analysis, conclusion and 17 recommendation that is before you now. 18 We also would like to note for the record that 19 we agree with staff's finding on page three of their 20 analysis, that "...there is no evidence that the action 21 of the District Attorney to sponsor Assembly Bill 1881 22 was performed on behalf of the county itself. Rather, 23 Government Code Section 26500.5 expressly authorizes the 24 District Attorney, on his or her own, to sponsor any 25 project or program to improve the administration of 26 justice," end quote. 27 We've also provided to the Commission 28 declarations of a John Lounsbery of our Chief 1 Administrative Office indicating, under penalty of 2 perjury, that the county did not request legislative 3 authority to implement AB 1881 or instruct the district 4 attorney to do so on its behalf; and that the county had 5 no position to amend, favor or oppose AB 1881. 6 Thank you very much. 7 MS. SHELTON: Just to mention, that declaration 8 is included as Attachment "L," Exhibit "L," page 463. 9 CHAIR PORINI: Any questions from Members? 10 MEMBER BELTRAMI: Madam Chair? 11 CHAIR PORINI: Mr. Beltrami? 12 MEMBER BELTRAMI: Do any of your elected 13 officials ever speak for the county? Besides the board 14 of supervisors, I'm talking about. Your parole officers, 15 your Sheriff, your D.A., your auditor --well, your 16 auditor is appointed --but whatever other elected 17 officials you have. 18 MR. KAYE: I would --not being able to defer 19 it to anyone else at the table, I guess I would say I 20 would assume, upon occasion, it may be construed that 21 they may be representing the county. However, in this 22 particular case, they clearly were not. 23 .MEMBER BELTRAMI: No? Thank you.

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24 CHAIR PORINI: All right, Mr. Apps? 25 MR. APPS: Thank you Madam Chair, Members. 26 We also agree with. the staff analysis and would 27 request that the Commission consider our November 6th, 28 2000, letter withdrawn; and that the February 1st, '99, 1 letter be considered our official position on it --on 2 the matter. 3 MEMBER ROBECK: It sounds good. 4 CHAIR PORINI: All right, Mr. Robeck? 5 MEMBER ROBECK: I move approval of the staff 6 analysis. 7 VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: I'll second that. 8 MEMBER STEINMEIER: What happened to this -- 9 CHAIR PORINI: Mr. Petersen. needs to take back 10 all of those unkind words he said about Department of 11 Finance. 12 All right, .we have a motion and a second to 13 adopt staff's recommendation. 14 MR. PETERSEN: That was all off the record. 15 MEMBER STEINMEIER: It was all off the record, 16 that's right. 17 CHAIR PORINI: We have a motion and a second to 18 adopt staff's recommendation. 19 Is there any discussion? 20 Okay, hearing none, roll call, please, 21 MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Steinmeier? 22 MEMBER STEINMEIER: Aye. 23 MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Beltrami. 24 MEMBER BELTRAMI: Yes. 25 MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Halsey? 26 MEMBER HALSEY: Yes. 27 MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lazar? 28 MEMBER LAZAR: Aye. 1 MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Robeck? 2 MEMBER ROBECK: Aye. 3 MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Sherwood? . 4 VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Aye. 5 MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Porini? 6 CHAIR PORINI: Aye. 7 MS. HIGASHI: Thank you.

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8 MR. KAYE: Thank you. 9 MEMBER BELTRAMI: Two in a row. 10 MEMBER STEINMEIER: We're on a roll here. 11 Let's keep going. 12 MS. HIGASHI: This brings us to item 6. 13 CHAIR PORINI: Mr. Kaye, was it something you 14 said? 15 MR. KAYE: This is the County of Alameda's test 16 claim, so:-- 17 CHAIR PORINI: All right. Well, we can wait 18 for a minute here. 19 MS. HIGASHI: Item 6 is the Extended Commitment 20 Youth Authority test claim. This item will be presented 21 by Staff Counsel Sean Avalos. 22 MR. AVALOS: Good afternoon. 23 The test claim legislation addresses changes in 24 the procedures for the extended commitment of dangerous 25 juvenile offenders, subject to the jurisdiction of the 26 California Youth Authority. 27 Prior to the 1984 test claim legislation, when 28 the Youthful Offender Parole Board determined that the 1 release of a juvenile offender from the California Youth 2 Authority posed a danger to the public, the Board was 3 required to petition the committing court to extend the 4 juvenile's commitment. 5 Now the test claim legislation specifies that 6 the prosecuting district attorney petition the committing 7 court on behalf of the Youthful Offender Parole Board. 8 All parties, including staff, agree that 9 counties have been reimbursed for the prosecuting 10 district attorney's costs of representing the Youthful 11 Offender Parole Board in extended commitment proceedings. 12 However, claimant and County of Los Angeles 13 argue that counties 'should also be reimbursed for the 14 public defender, transportation and custody costs. 15 Claimant supports this argument by noting that the 16 Commission has in the past approved these costs of the 17 test claims addressing similar extended commitment 18 proceedings. Staff notes that the test claim cited by 19 claimant, Mentally Disordered Sexual Offenders, Not 20 Guilty by Reason of Insanity and Sexually Violent 21 Predators were brand-new programs enacted after 1975. 22 Reimbursement for public defender, transportation and

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23 custody costs under these claims is consistent with 24 Article XIII B, Section 6, of the California Constitution 25 and Government Code section 17514, which requires the 26 state to reimburse counties for legislative mandates 27 enacted on or behalf January 1, 1975. 28 However, reimbursement for public defender, 1 transportation and custody costs under the present test 2 claim is not consistent with the California Constitution 3 and Government Code Section 17514. The 1984 and 1.998 4 test claim statutes did not require counties to incur 5 public defender, custody, or transportation costs. These 6 activities were required by the original 1963 legislation 7 which created the extended commitment program, and the 8 1971 amendment which added the right to trial. 9 And since these activities resulted from 10 legislative mandates enacted before 1975, staff finds 11 that reimbursement for public defender, custody and 12 transportation costs should be denied. 13 Therefore, staff recommends that the Commission 14 partially approve this test claim for the activities 15 listed on listed on page 12 of the staff analysis. 16 Would the parties please state your name for 17 the record? 18 MS. MEREDITH: Karen Meredith, Assistant 19 District Attorney with Alameda County 20 MS. STONE: Pamela Stone on behalf of Alameda 21 County. 22 MR. KAYE: Leonard Kaye, County of Los Angeles. 23 MR. APPS: Jim Apps, Department of Finance. 24 CHAIR PORINI: All right, Ms. Stone, do you 25 want to begin? 26 MS. STONE: Yes, good afternoon, Commission 27 Members. 28 We would like to thank staff very much. 1 for its draft staff analysis. We concur in its 2 recommendation. 3 I would like to introduce the Assistant 4 District Attorney Karen Meredith, who is responsible for 5 handling these matters, and I have a couple closing 6 remarks.

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7 CHAIR PORINI: All right. 8 MS. MEREDITH: Thank you. 9 It's my understanding by Ms. Stone that I'm 10 here to answer questions of the board pertaining to the 11 proceeding; and also, especially in the area of 12 prosecutorial discretion, as it would affect whether or 13 not the program is mandated. 14 Ultimately, what my belief is, is that once we 15 are requested by the parole board to file a petition, we 16 at that point have no -- 17 MEMBER STEINMEIER: Discretion? 18 MS. MEREDITH: All we can do at that point is 19 to receive their request and act upon it. We're 20 obligated by the statute at that point to review what is 21 given to us by the parole board and file a petition if, 22 after our review of the matter, it can be sustained. 23 Ultimately, that review takes --can lead to 24. further investigation, the hiring of witnesses, or 25 anything that we feel needs to be done in order to 26 sustain the petition. 27 CHAIR PORINI: Questions? 28 I'm sorry, Ms. Stone? 1 MS. STONE: Just a very brief conclusion. 2 The reason why we presented this, was to make 3 sure that your Commission Members understand that the 4 issue of prosecutorial discretion is not equivalent to an 5 optional program as you had in City of Merced with an 6 eminent domain matter. The issue is to make sure that 7 there is adequate evidence before proceeding forward so 8 as not to impose liability for deprivation of civil 9 rights upon the district attorney for proceeding in 10 absence of a colorable case. 11 CHAIR PORINI: Questions from Members? 12 Mr. Kaye? 13 MR. KAYE: Thank you. 14 We, of course, concur with staff and our 15 colleagues in the county of Alameda that the district 16 attorney's cost is clearly mandated and, as such, 17 reimbursable. 18 What I'd like to talk about briefly, is the 19 fact that the costs --the initial costs prior to 1975 in 20 the Chapter 1693, 1963 statute which established this 21 extended commitment procedure. It is true that it said

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22 that indigent defense counsel would be appointed by the 23 superior court judge. It didn't say who was responsible 24 for paying for that. 25 And I'd like to dwell for a moment on this very 26 critical issue, because it's our contention that we 27 clearly were not responsible for paying for it at that 28 point in time. 1 And these changes or costs were not ours. In 2 this. regard, Government Code section 29602 appears to be 3 dispositive. Section 29602 provides that indigent 4 offense, custody and transportation costs are our 5 obligation only if the following conditions are met: 6 Namely, such costs must be incurred in the support --and 7 I'm quoting --in the support of persons charged with or 8 convicted of a crime, and committed to the county jail! 9 and for other services in relation to criminal 10 proceedings for which no specific compensation is 11 provided by law," end quote. 12 Of course, the 1963 statute, chapter 1693, does 13 not provide for compensation, and deals only with civil, 14 not criminal, proceedings and with state wards, not 15 county jail inmates. Therefore, the test claim 16 legislation was not our obligation to-pay for --before 17 the test claim legislation it was not our obligation to 18 pay for, just as it is today. 19 And we request that the staff recommendation be 20 amended to provide the required reimbursement for 21 indigent defense, custody and transportation costs 22 imposed under this test "claim legislation. 23 Thank you. 24 CHAIR PORINI: Questions? 25 Mr. Beltrami? 26 MEMBER BELTRAMI: Madam Chair. 27 Mr. Kaye, are you saying that in '63, on, that 28 indigent costs .ware not the county's responsibility? 1 Whose responsibility were they? 2 MR. KAYE: The state's. And in many of these 3 extended commitment proceedings, in that period of 4 time --the late '70s and so forth --the state public 5 defender --like in the MBSO program, was actually

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6 appointed by the judge. 7 In other cases, we had large billing programs 8 that would actually invoice the state, in civil matters, 9 where it wasn't a normal criminal proceeding, where it 10 was not our county charge. 11 CHAIR PORINI: Mr. Robeck? 12 MEMBER ROBECK: I'd like staff to comment on 13 that. 14 CHAIR PORINI: Sean? 15 MR. AVALOS: It seems clear to me that this 16 test claim only addresses the duties of the district 17 attorney, therefore, reimbursement is for the costs 18 imposed upon the district attorney and the counties for 19 representing the Youthful Offender Parole Board. 20 Prior to this test, it didn't even address the 21 duties of the Public Defender cost and transportation 22 costs. Those weren't even the subject of this test 23 claim. Even if you were to amend those in to become 24 subject of this test claim, it would predate 1975, which 25 is not even in the universe of mandate reimbursement 26 CHAIR PORINI: All right, Mr. Apps? 27 MR. APPS: Thank you. 28 We, again --and this hurts to say this --we 1 support the staff's analysis. 2 MEMBER STEINMEIER: Did you say pains you to 3 say it? What did you say? 4 CHAIR PORINI: I think we just hit a jackpot 5 here. 6 MEMBER BELTRAMI: You've really mellowed since 7 you've retired. 8 MR. APPS: I don't think we --no. 9 Seldom have we supported this many test claim 10 approvals in a single hearing. But this is a great 11 claim. We support the staff analysis as currently 12 structured. 13 Thank you. 14 CHAIR PORINI: All right. Questions, comments 15 from Members? 16 Motion? 17 MEMBER LAZAR: I'd make a motion to adopt the 18 staff analysis. 19 VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Second. 20 CHAIR PORINI: All right, we have a motion and

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21 a second. 22 Discussion? 23 Roll call? 24 MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Beltrami? 25 MEMBER BELTRAMI: Yes. 26 MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Halsey? 27 MEMBER HALSEY: Aye. 28 MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Lazar? 1 MEMBER LAZAR: Yes . 2 MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Robeck? 3 MEMBER ROBECK: Yes. 4 MS. HIGASHI: Mr. Sherwood? 5 VICE CHAIR SHERWOOD: Yes. 6 MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Steinmeier? 7 MEMBER STEINMEIER: Aye. 8 MS. HIGASHI: Ms. Porini? 9 MEMBER PORINI: Aye. 10 Thank you. 11 MS. STONE: Thank you very much. 12 CHAIR PORINI: Thank you . 13 MS. HIGASHI: This brings us to item 8, another 14 test claim. [ 15 CHAIR PORINI: Let's wait just a moment. 16 MEMBER STEINMEIER: Hang on, we have to change 17 our binders. . 18 Ms. HIGASHI: You're right. I have to change 19 my binder, too. 20 Okay. We're now up to item 8. For item 8, we 21 have one participant who has not been sworn, so why don't 22 we start with that? 23 CHAIR PORINI: All right, Mr. Bell? 24 MS. HIGASHI: Do you solemnly swear or affirm 25 that the testimony you are about to give is true and 26 correct, based on your own personal knowledge, 27 information or belief? 28 MR. BELL: I do .