MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2021ME31Docket: Cum-20-235Argued: April6,2021Decided: June17,2021Panel: MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HORTON,andCONNORS,JJ.

STATEOFMAINEv.

MARKCARDILLIJR.GORMAN,J.

[¶1]VeryearlyinthemorningofMarch16,2019,MarkCardilliJr.shot

andkilledIsahakMuseattheCardillihomeinPortland.ACumberlandCounty

grandjurythenindictedCardillifortheintentionalorknowingmurderofMuse,

17-AM.R.S. § 201(1)(A) (2021), and, after a bench trial, the trial court

(CumberlandCounty,Mills,J.)foundCardilliguiltyofthelesserincludedoffense

ofmanslaughter (ClassA),17-AM.R.S.§203(1)(A) (2021). Cardilli appeals,

arguingthattheStatefailedtodisprovebeyondareasonabledoubtoneofhis

self-defense justifications and that the trial court erred in failing to analyze

anotherofhisself-defensejustifications.Weaffirmthejudgment.

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I.BACKGROUND

A. FactualBackground

[¶2] Thefollowingfactswerefoundbythetrialcourtandareall fully

supportedbytherecord.SeeStatev.Fournier,2019ME28,¶2,203A.3d801.

On March 4, 2019, Cardilli returned to his parents’ home in Portland after

serving five years in the Army. In the preceding year, there had been

considerable discord in the Cardilli household. Cardilli’s parents were

separatedandlivingindifferentbedrooms,andCardilli’sseventeen-year-old

sisterhadrecentlybeenplacedunderbailconditionsaftershewasfoundriding

inastolenvehiclewithhertwenty-two-year-oldboyfriend,Muse.

[¶3] Thebailconditionsprohibitedallcontactbetweenthesisterand

Muse, but the sister completely ignored that prohibition, as well as the

remainingbailconditions.Cardilli’sfatherattemptedtocontrolhisdaughter’s

behaviorandtorestricthertimewithMuse,butsheopenlydisobeyedbothhim

andthebailorder.Despitethebailconditions,Cardilli’sparentsoftengranted

Musepermissiontovisit.

[¶4] On March 15, 2019, Cardilli’s parents denied their daughter’s

requesttoallowMusetocometothehome.Indefianceofthatdenial,thesister

toldMusetocome,andhearrivedattheCardillihomeat10:00p.m.Thefamily

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arguedoverMuse’sarrival,buttheparentseventuallyagreedthatMusecould

stay until 1:00 a.m. Cardilli’s father asked Cardilli to check on his sister at

1:00a.m.tomakesureMuseleft. Musehadbeendrinkingalcoholalldayon

March15,andheandthesisterdrankalcoholtogetherthatnight.Bothwere

affectedbythealcoholthatnight.1

[¶5]Atapproximately1:00a.m.,Cardillisentatextmessagetohissister

informing her of the time. When that prompt failed to result in Muse’s

departure,Cardilliandhismotherwenttothesister’sroomandtoldMusethat

hehadtoleave.Overthecourseofthenexttentofifteenminutes,Musepleaded

withCardilli’smotherforpermissiontostay,butshecontinuedtotellhimto

leave.

[¶6]Eventually,Cardilli’sfatherjoinedtheargumentandreiteratedthe

messagethatMusehadtoleave. CardilliandhisfatherwalkedMusetoward

thedoortoabreezeway,andopenedthedoortogethimtoleave,but“hejust

wouldn’t go.” While Cardilli and his fatherwere attempting to getMuse to

leave, Cardilli’smother announced that her daughter had hit her, andMuse

pushedhiswayback intothekitchenandkeptpushingbothCardilliandhis

father.CardilliattemptedtograbMusebutcouldnotoverpowerhim.

1Atautopsy,Muse’sbloodalcoholcontentwas0.181gramsper100milliliters.

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[¶7]Believingthatthesituationwasescalating,Cardillileftthekitchen

andheadedtohisbedroomtoretrievehisgun.Hedecidedagainstbringingthe

gunbacktothekitchen,however,andreturnedwithoutit.Inthekitchen,he

foundMuse and his father “locked onto each other.” Cardilli pushedMuse

againstthecounter,promptingMusetothrowapunchatCardilli,whichmissed.

CardilliagaintoldMusethathehadto leave,atwhichpointthesisterbegan

hittingandscratchingherparentsandCardilli.

[¶8]Cardilliwentbacktohisbedroom,grabbedhisgun,andputitinhis

pocket.Hereturnedtothekitchenandtoldhisfathertogetbehindhim.Cardilli

thenpulledoutthegunandtoldMusethathehadtoleavebecausehewasdone

strugglingwithhim.Whenhesawthegun,Muserespondedbyyellingforhis

phoneinordertocallforaridehome.ThesisterthenchargedatCardilliand

began to strikehim, soCardilli pointed the gun away fromher. As soon as

Cardilliwasabletogethissisteroffhim,Musestartedpunchinghim.Cardilli’s

father was able to get Muse off Cardilli and threw Muse into the sister’s

bedroomontothebed. MusegotupandpunchedCardilliinthefaceatleast

fourorfivetimes.MusepunchedCardilliagainand,asMusestartedtothrow

anotherpunch,Cardilliraisedhisgunandshothim.BecauseMusehadraised

his left arm, the first shot grazed his left finger and his eyebrow. AsMuse

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twisted,Cardillishothimtwomoretimes. Musehadnoweaponsandnever

triedtograbCardilli’sgun.Aftertheshooting,whichoccurredatapproximately

1:43a.m.,CardillicalledthepoliceandreportedthathehadshotMuse.

[¶9]ThecauseofMuse’sdeathwastheinternalandexternalbleeding

resulting from the twogunshotwounds. Theentrancewoundswereon the

backoftherightsideofMuse’storso,andbothwerecontactentrancewounds,

meaningthat,atthetimetheshotswerefired,thegun’smuzzlewastouching

theoutersurfaceofMuse’sclothing. Cardilliandhisfathersufferedminimal

injuriesasaresultofthenight’sevents.

B. ProceduralBackground

[¶10] Cardilli was indicted for intentional or knowing murder,

17-AM.R.S. § 201(1)(A), a charge to which he pleaded not guilty. After a

five-dayjury-waivedtrialinDecemberof2019,thetrialcourtfoundCardillinot

guiltyofthechargeofintentionalorknowingmurder,butfoundhimguiltyof

manslaughter,17-AM.R.S.§203(1)(A). Inreachingthisconclusion, thetrial

court first found that theStatehadproved,beyonda reasonabledoubt, that

Cardilli’s killing of Muse was both voluntary and knowing. The court then

analyzedCardilli’sclaimedjustifications:physicalforceindefenseofhimselfor

otherspursuantto17-AM.R.S.§108(2)(B)(2021);useofforceindefenseof

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premises pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 104(3) (2021);2 and “imperfect

self-defense”pursuantto17-AM.R.S.§101(3)(2021).

[¶11] Applying section 108(2)(B), the court found that the State had

failedtoprovebeyondareasonabledoubtthatCardillididnotactuallybelieve

that(1)Musehadentered,attemptedtoenter,orsurreptitiouslyremainedin

the Cardilli home without a license; and (2) his use of deadly force was

necessary to prevent Muse from inflicting bodily injury upon Cardilli or

someoneelseinthehome.Thecourtalsofound,however,thattheStatehad

2 AlthoughCardilli’s arguments in his brief focused solely on theportions of the trial court’s

decisionwithregardto17-AM.R.S.§108(2)(B)(2021),henotedthathisargumentsapplyequallytothe trial court’s conclusion as to the justification of defense of premises pursuant to 17-AM.R.S.§104(3)(2021).TheStateagreesthatsimilarelementsapplyinassessingbothdefensesanddidnotaddresssection104(3)independently.Section104(3)provides,

3.Apersoninpossessionorcontrolofadwellingplaceorapersonwhoislicensed or privileged to be therein is justified in using deadly force uponanotherperson:

A.Underthecircumstancesenumeratedinsection108;or

B.Whenthepersonreasonablybelievesthatdeadlyforceisnecessarytopreventorterminatethecommissionofacriminaltrespassbysuchotherperson,whothepersonreasonablybelieves:

(1) Hasenteredorisattemptingtoenterthedwellingplaceor

has surreptitiously remained within the dwelling placewithoutalicenseorprivilegetodoso;and

(2) Is committing or is likely to commit some other crime

withinthedwellingplace.

Duetothesimilaritiesbetweenthestatutes,ouranalysisevaluatingCardilli’sargumentsundersection108(2)(B)(1)appliesequallytosection104(3)(B)(1).

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proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Cardilli’s beliefs as to both of these

conditions were objectively unreasonable. Because the court found that

Cardillihadanactualbeliefthatdeadlyforcewasnecessarytoprotecthimself

or someone else fromMuse, but also found that that belief was objectively

unreasonable,itappliedsection101(3)andfoundCardillinotguiltyofmurder,

but guilty of manslaughter, “a crime for which recklessness or criminal

negligencesuffices.”

[¶12] Cardilli then asked the trial court to reconsider its verdict and

requestedadditionalfindingsoffactandconclusionsoflaw.SeeM.R.U.Crim.P.

23(c).Cardilliarguedthatwhenaclaimofself-defenseisevaluatedregarding

achargeofmanslaughter—whererecklessnessorcriminalnegligencesuffices

for the state-of-mind element—the State must prove beyond a reasonable

doubtnotonlythatCardilli’sbeliefwasobjectivelyunreasonablebutfurther

thatthebeliefwasreckless,i.e.,agrossdeviationfromwhatareasonableand

prudentpersonwouldbelieve.Inpresentingthisargument,Cardillireliedon

Statev.Smith,472A.2d948,951(Me.1984),anditsprogeny.Thecourtdenied

themotion toreconsider its judgmentbutgranted themotion foradditional

findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its order, the court re-analyzed

Cardilli’sbeliefsunderthe“grossdeviation”standardandfound,

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In formulating his subjective but objectively unreasonablebeliefthat...Museentered,attemptedtoenter,orsurreptitiouslyremainedinthedwellingplacewithoutalicenseorprivilegetodoso,[Cardilli]actedrecklesslyorwithcriminalnegligenceand[his]disregardoftheriskorfailuretobeawareoftheriskwasagrossdeviationofthestandardofconductthatareasonableandprudentpersonwouldobserveinthesamesituation.

In formulating his subjective but objectively unreasonable

belief thatdeadly forcewasnecessary toprevent . . .Muse frominflictingbodilyinjuryupondefendantorathirdpersonpresentinthedwelling,[Cardilli]actedrecklesslyorwithcriminalnegligenceandhisdisregardoftheriskorfailuretobeawareoftheriskwasagrossdeviationof thestandardofconduct thatareasonableandprudentpersonwouldobserveinthesamesituation.

(Citationandfootnoteomitted.)

[¶13] The court found Cardilli guilty ofmanslaughter and imposed a

sentence of eleven years in prison, with all but seven and a half years

suspended,andfouryearsofprobation.Cardillitimelyappealed.See15M.R.S.

§2115(2021);M.R.App.P.2B(b)(1).

II.DISCUSSION

A. StandardofReview

[¶14]Onappeal,Cardilliarguesthat(1)theStatefailedtoprovebeyond

areasonabledoubtthathisbeliefs—thatMusewasnotlicensedorprivileged

toenterorhadsurreptitiouslyremainedintheCardillihomeandthatCardilli

neededtoshootMusetopreventhimfrominflictingbodilyinjuryasthatphrase

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isusedinsection108(2)(B)—weregrossdeviationsfromwhatareasonable

andprudentpersonwouldbelieve;and(2) the trial courterred in failing to

analyze his self-defense justification pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 108(2)(A)

(2021).

[¶15] The present case requires us to examine the self-defense

justifications defined in section 108 and the application of “imperfect

self-defense” established by section 101(3). Our review of the trial court’s

interpretationofajustificationdefenseisdenovo.Statev.Cannell,2007ME

30,¶6,916A.2d231.“Indoingso,weinterprettherelevantstatuteaccording

toitsplainlanguage.Onlyifthatplainlanguageisambiguouswillwegoonto

consider other indicia of legislative intent to discern itsmeaning.” State v.

Carter,2016ME157,¶5,150A.3d327(citationomitted).

[¶16]InordertoaddressCardilli’sarguments,webeginbynotingthat,

in 2008, the Legislature enacted a significant change to section 101(3).

P.L.2007,ch.475,§10(effectiveJune30,2008). From1999until2008,the

statuteread,

Conductthatisjustifiableunderthischapterconstitutesadefensetoanycrime;providedthat, ifaperson is justified inusingforceagainstanother,butthepersonrecklesslyinjuresorcreatesariskofinjuryto3rdpersons,thejustificationaffordedbythischapterisunavailable in a prosecution for such recklessness. If a defenseprovided under this chapter is precluded solely because the

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requirement that theperson’sbeliefbe reasonablehasnotbeenmet, the person may be convicted only of a crime for whichrecklessness or criminal negligence suffices, and then, only ifholdingthebelief,whenviewedinlightofthenatureandpurposeoftheperson’sconductandthecircumstancesknowntotheperson,isgrosslydeviantfromwhatareasonableandprudentpersonwouldbelieveinthesamesituation.

(Emphasisadded.)P.L.1999,ch.357,§1(effectiveSept.18,1999);P.L.2007,

ch. 475, § 10 (effective June 30, 2008). In 2008, the Legislature amended

section101(3)bydeletingthelastphrase. P.L.2007,ch.475,§10(effective

June 30, 2008) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 101(3) (2021)). As amended, it

provides,

Conductthatisjustifiableunderthischapterconstitutesadefenseto any crime; except that, if a person is justified in using forceagainstanother,butthepersonrecklesslyinjuresorcreatesariskofinjuryto3rdpersons,thejustificationaffordedbythischapterisunavailable in a prosecution for such recklessness. If a defenseprovided under this chapter is precluded solely because therequirement that theperson’sbeliefbe reasonablehasnotbeenmet, the person may be convicted only of a crime for whichrecklessnessorcriminalnegligencesuffices.

17-AM.R.S.§101(3)(2021);17-AM.R.S.§101(3)(2008).

[¶17] Inshort, since2008, todisproveaclaimof self-defense forany

crime for which recklessness or criminal negligence suffices for the

state-of-mind element, the State is no longer required to prove beyond a

reasonabledoubt that thedefendant’sbelief is “grosslydeviant fromwhata

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reasonable and prudent person would believe in the same situation.”3

17-AM.R.S. § 101(3). If the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a

defendant’s actual beliefs concerning the justification requirements are not

reasonable,thedefendantcannotbeconvictedofacrimethatrequiresproofof

knowledgeorintent,buthecanbeconvictedofacrimethatrequiresproofof

criminalnegligenceorrecklessness.417-AM.R.S.§101(3).

3AsummaryoftheproposedlegislationprovidedbytheLegislature’sOfficeofPolicyandLegal

Analysisexplains,

Section10ofthebilleliminatesthecurrentpreconditionforaconvictionforacrimeforwhichrecklessnessorcriminalnegligencesufficesthattheState,inadditiontoprovingbeyondareasonabledoubtthattheperson’sbeliefisunreasonable,provebeyondareasonabledoubtthattheperson’sholdingofthatbelief“whenviewedinlightofthenatureandpurposeoftheperson’sconductandthecircumstancesknowntotheperson,isgrosslydeviantfromwhatareasonableandprudentpersonwouldbelieveinthesamesituation.”

L.D.1240,Summary(123dLegis.2008).4 For reasonswe cannot entirely explain, this change appears to have been largely ignored.

Although thirteen years have now elapsed since 2008,we have never addressed this significantchangeinthelaw.InJanuaryof2012,wecitedthestatutethreetimeswithoutquotingitinStatev.Ouellette,2012ME11,¶¶8,9,20n.4,37A.3d921.Twomonthslater,inStatev.Hanaman,wecitedtotheamendedversionofsection101(3).2012ME40,¶13n.4,38A.3d1278(“Ifadefendantactedwith imperfectself-defense, inthat itmayhavebeenunreasonable forhimtobelievethatdeadlyforcewasnecessary, then thedefendant ‘cannotbeheldcriminally liable foranycrimerequiringintentionorknowledgeoftheactor,buthecanbeheldresponsibleforacrimeforwhichrecklessnessorcriminalnegligencesufficesastheculpablementalstate.’”).WecitedthatlanguagefromHanamanfouryearslaterinStatev.Kimball,butdidnotmentionsection101(3).2016ME75,¶6,139A.3d914. Most recently, in State v. Marquis, we cited section 101(3) in a reference to imperfectself-defense.2017ME104,¶19n.5,162A.3d818.Innoneofthesecases,however,didwediscussthechangetosection101(3).And,perhapsasa

result,theprimarytoolrelieduponbytrialjudgesandtrialattorneysdraftingjuryinstructions—Alexander,MaineJuryInstructionManual§6-61at6-131to6-133(2020-2021ed.2020)—hasnotbeenupdatedtoreflectthechangeinthelaw.

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[¶18] Thus, in itsoriginal judgment,when itdeterminedwhether the

Statehadproved,beyondareasonabledoubt,thatCardilli’sbeliefsaboutthe

need to use deadly force were not objectively reasonable, the trial court

properly applied 17-A M.R.S. § 101(3). Cardilli’s demand that the court

consider whether the State had proved not only that the belief was

unreasonable,but that itwasreckless,wasbasedonstatutory languagethat

hasnotexistedsince2008.SeeP.L.2007,ch.475,§10.

[¶19]Withthisunderstandinginmind,weturntoCardilli’sclaimthat

hisactionsinshootingMusewerejustifiedaccordingtosection108(2)(B).

B. Section108(2)(B)

[¶20]BecausethetrialcourtconcludedthatCardillipresentedsufficient

evidencetoraisetheself-defensejustificationprovidedbysection108(2)(B),

wereviewwhethertheevidence—whenviewedinthelightmostfavorableto

theState—supportsthecourt’sfindingthattheStatedisprovedtheself-defense

justificationbeyondareasonabledoubt. Statev.Nadeau,2007ME57,¶10,

920A.2d452;17-AM.R.S.§101(1)(2021).

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[¶21]Section108providestwopossiblejustificationsforapersonwho

hasuseddeadlyforce.5Thesecondofthesejustifications,containedinsection

108(2)(B),providesthattheuseofdeadlyforceisjustifiedasfollows:

B.Whenthepersonreasonablybelieves:

(1)Thatsuchotherpersonhasenteredorisattemptingtoenteradwellingplaceorhassurreptitiouslyremainedwithinadwellingplacewithoutalicenseorprivilegetodoso;and

(2)Thatdeadlyforceisnecessarytopreventtheinflictionofbodilyinjurybysuchotherpersonuponthepersonora3rdpersonpresentinthedwellingplace.

[¶22]Section108(2)(B),consistentwithotherjustificationprovisions,

authorizestheuseofdeadlyforce,butonlywherethefactfinderdetermines

both(1)thatthedefendanthasareasonablebeliefregardingtheexistenceofa

conditionoroccurrenceofaneventandthenecessityofaparticularresponse

to that conditionor event and, (2) that the Statehas failed todisprove that

reasonablebeliefbeyonda reasonabledoubt. Seealso17-AM.R.S. §101(1)

(2021);Statev.Ouellette,2012ME11,¶8,37A.3d921.Thepersonmusthave

a “reasonable belief” about both the condition or event—the threatening

circumstances—andthenecessityofdeadlyforcetoaddressthosethreatening

5 Deadlyforceis“physicalforcethatapersonuseswiththeintentofcausing,orthataperson

knows to createa substantial riskof causing,deathor seriousbodily injury.” 17-AM.R.S. §2(8)(2021).

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circumstances. 17-A M.R.S. § 108(2)(B). We have explained that such a

“reasonablebelief”containsbothasubjectiveandanobjectiveelement.State

v.Graham,2004ME34,¶13,845A.2d558.Inthecontextofsection108(2)(B),

this requires two findings. First, the fact finder must find the subjective

element,i.e.,thatthepersonactuallybelievesthatanotherpersonhasentered

or is attempting to enter a dwelling place or has surreptitiously remained

withinadwellingplacewithoutalicenseorprivilegetodoso,andthatdeadly

forceisnecessarytopreventtheinflictionofbodilyinjurybythatpersonupon

himselforathirdpersonpresentinthedwellingplace.17-AM.R.S.§108(2)(B);

seeOuellette,2012ME11,¶10,37A.3d921.

[¶23]Second,thefactfindermustfindtheobjectiveelement,i.e.,thatthe

person’sactualbeliefs—thatanotherpersonhasenteredor isattempting to

enteradwellingplaceorhassurreptitiouslyremainedwithinadwellingplace

without a licenseorprivilege todo so and thatdeadly force isnecessary to

preventthe inflictionofbodily injurybythatpersonuponhimselfora third

person present in the dwelling place—were reasonable. 17-A M.R.S.

§108(2)(B). The standard for judging the reasonableness of a defendant’s

beliefconcerningtheneedtousedeadlyforceisdeterminedfromthepointof

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view of a reasonable and prudent person under the same circumstances.

SeeSmith,472A.2dat951.

[¶24] To summarize, if a personhas an actual, reasonable belief that

anotherpersonhasenteredorisattemptingtoenteradwellingplaceorhas

surreptitiouslyremainedwithinadwellingplacewithoutalicenseorprivilege

todosoandactuallyandreasonablybelievesthatdeadlyforceisnecessaryto

protecthimselforsomeoneelsefrombodilyinjury,thatperson’sconduct—his

use of deadly force—constitutes self-defense pursuant to section 108(2)(B).

SeeGraham,2004ME34,¶13,845A.2d558.Thisjustificationwouldresultin

“acompletedefense,meaningthatitnegatesthecommissionofthecrime;an

actcommittedinself-defenseissimplynocrimeatall.”Ouellette,2012ME11,

¶9,37A.3d921(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶25]If,ontheotherhand,apersonlacksanactualbeliefthatanother

person has entered or is attempting to enter a dwelling place or has

surreptitiouslyremainedwithinadwellingplacewithoutalicenseorprivilege

todosoorlacksanactualbeliefthatdeadlyforceisnecessarytoprotecthimself

orsomeoneelsefrombodilyinjury,hisconductdoesnotconstituteself-defense

pursuanttosection108(2)(B).

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[¶26]Thereisathirdoption,however.Pursuanttosection101(3),ifa

defendantactuallybelievesthatanotherpersonhasenteredorisattemptingto

enteradwellingplaceorhassurreptitiouslyremainedwithinadwellingplace

withoutalicenseorprivilegetodosoandactuallybelievesthatdeadlyforceis

necessarytoprotecthimselforthirdpersonsfrombodilyinjury,butthebelief

astoeitherisnotreasonable,hemaynotbeconvictedofcrimewithintentional

orknowingstate-of-mindelements.17-AM.R.S.§108(2)(B).Nonethelesshe

may“beconvicted...ofacrimeforwhichrecklessnessorcriminalnegligence

suffices.”17-AM.R.S.§101(3).Thisisknownas“imperfectself-defense.”State

v.Hanaman,2012ME40,¶13n.4,38A.3d1278.

[¶27] Here, the trialcourt foundthat theStatehad failed todisprove,

beyondareasonabledoubt,thatCardilliactuallybelievedboththatMusehad

enteredorwas attempting to enter theCardilli homeorhad surreptitiously

remainedwithintheCardillihomewithoutalicenseorprivilegetodosoand

thatdeadlyforcewasnecessarytopreventMusefrominflictingbodilyinjury

uponhimselforsomeoneelse. Thecourt,however,alsofoundthattheState

hadproved,beyondareasonabledoubt,thatCardilli’sactualbeliefsastoboth

conditionswereobjectivelyunreasonable.Basedonthatfinding,andinlightof

its earlier finding that Cardilli’s killing of Muse was both voluntary and

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knowing,thecourtfoundthattheStatehadproved,beyondareasonabledoubt,

thatCardilliwasguiltyofthelesserincludedoffenseofmanslaughter,forwhich

recklessnessorcriminalnegligencesuffices.See17-AM.R.S.§203(1)(A).The

court held that Cardilli’s actual but objectively unreasonable beliefs as to

whether circumstances existed thatwould allowhim to lawfully use deadly

forceagainstMuse“negate[d]thecommissionofthecrime”ofmurder,butnot

thecrimeofmanslaughter.Ouellette,2012ME11,¶9,37A.3d921.

[¶28] Contrary to Cardilli’s assertions, there was competent record

evidencetosupportthecourt’sdeterminationthatCardilli’sbeliefthatMuse

was not licensed or privileged to enter the Cardilli home or that he

surreptitiously remained therein was objectively unreasonable. The plain

language of the statute requires only thatMuse had license, i.e., consent, to

enter,seeStatev.Neild,2006ME91,¶11,903A.2d339,andthecourt’sexplicit

findingthatMusehadtheparents’consenttobepresentisfullysupportedby

therecord,includingCardilli’sowntestimony.Asthecourtfound,Cardilliknew

that Muse entered the home at 10:00 p.m. and knew that Muse had been

permittedtostayinthehomebyCardilli’sparents.

[¶29]EvenifMuseoverstayedhiswelcomeattheCardillihome,ashe

clearly did, that fact is irrelevant. Section 108(2)(B)(1) requires a focus on

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whetherMuse “entered or . . . attempt[ed] to enter [the Cardilli home] . . .

without a licenseorprivilege todo so,” andnotwhetherheremained there

withoutalicenseorprivilegetodoso.Personswhoselicenseorprivilegeto

stay is revoked can be deemed trespassers, and the law does permit

homeownerstousenondeadlyforcetoejecttrespassers.17-AM.R.S.§104(1)

(2021).Deadlyforce,however,canbeusedagainstonlytrespasserswhoare

about to commit arson, 17-AM.R.S. § 104(2) (2021), orwhose entry to the

buildingwaseitherunsanctionedorwhosecontinuedpresenceinthebuilding

is “surreptitious”andwhoarecommittingorabout tocommitacrimeother

thancriminaltrespass. 17-AM.R.S.§104(3)(2021). Inotherwords,deadly

forceindefenseofpremisesmaybeusedagainstintruderswhoarecommitting

or about to commit assault or some other crime and against arsonists.

17-AM.R.S.§104(2)-(3).

[¶30] Cardilli’s arguments concerning his belief as to whether Muse

surreptitiouslyremainedintheCardillihomearealsounpersuasive.InStatev.

Harding, we defined “surreptitiously remaining” as “stealthily, secretly[,] or

clandestinely” remaining on the premises. 392 A.2d 538, 542 (Me.1978).

Applyingthisdefinition,itisclearthatevenifCardilliheldabeliefthatMuse

surreptitiouslyremained in theCardillihomeafter1:00a.m., thatbeliefwas

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objectively unreasonable. The trial court explicitly found that Cardilli was

awarethatMusewasstillattheCardillihomeafter1:00a.m.Afterhisentryat

10:00p.m.onMarch15,Musedidnotleavethehomewhilehewasalive.

[¶31]Asexplainedabove,whenviewedinthelightmostfavorabletothe

State,Nadeau,2007ME57,¶10,920A.2d452,theevidenceamplysupports

the court’s finding that the State proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that

Cardilli’sbeliefthatMusewasnotlicensedorprivilegedtoenterorattemptto

enter or that Muse surreptitiously remained in the Cardilli home was

objectivelyunreasonable.Becausesection108(2)(B)isconjunctive,weneed

notdecidewhether thecourterred inconcluding thatCardilli’sbelief that it

wasnecessarytousedeadlyforcetopreventMusefrominflictingbodilyinjury

onCardilliorhisfamilywasalsoobjectivelyunreasonable.6SeeSmith,472A.2d

at951.

C. Section108(2)(A)

[¶32]Inhisappealtous,Cardillialsocontends,citingsection108(2)(A),

thatthetrialcourterredinfailingtoconsiderwhethertheStatedisprovedthat

he reasonablybelieved thatheneeded to shootMuse topreventMuse from

6Title17-AM.R.S.§108(2)(B)(2)(2021)requiresonlythatthedefendantbelieve“[t]hatdeadly

forceisnecessarytopreventtheinflictionofbodilyinjury,”and17-AM.R.S.§104(3)(B)(2)(2021)requiresonlythatthedefendantbelievethatdeadlyforceisnecessarytopreventtheintruderfromcommittinganycrimeotherthancriminaltrespass.

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shootingoneoftheCardillis.TheStatearguesthatCardilliexplicitlywaivedhis

right to challenge this issueon appeal bynot requesting that the trial court

applysection108(2)(A).

[¶33]“Ifadefendantexplicitlywaivesthedeliveryofaninstructionor

makesastrategicortacticaldecisionnottorequestit,wewilldeclinetoengage

inappellatereview,evenforobviouserror.”Statev.Nobles,2018ME26,¶34,

179A.3d910;Statev.Ford,2013ME96,¶16,82A.3d75(“[Section]101(1)...

specif[ies]thatatrialcourtisnotrequiredtoinstructonanaffirmativedefense

that has been waived by the defendant.”); 17-A M.R.S. § 101(1) (“This

subsectiondoesnotrequireatrialcourttoinstructonanissuethathasbeen

waivedbythedefendant.ThesubjectofwaiverisaddressedbytheMaineRules

ofUnifiedCriminalProcedure.”);M.R.U.Crim.P.51.

[¶34]TherecordclearlyshowsthatCardillinotonlyfailedtorequesta

self-defense justificationpursuanttosection108(2)(A),butexplicitlyargued

thattheevidencedidnotgeneratetheself-defensejustification.Hearguedina

writtenmemorandum in support of closing, “This is not a self-defense case

under [section] 108(2)(A) where the [c]ourt needs to determine whether

[Muse]wasgoingtoinflictdeadlyforceonanyoftheinhabitantsof[theCardilli

home].” Further, even though he asked the court to reconsider some of its

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rulings,Cardillineversuggestedthattheself-defensejustificationprovidedby

section108(2)(A)hadanyapplication.

[¶35] Even if we were to assume that Cardilli’s section 108(2)(A)

argument was not expressly waived, we find it unpersuasive. The court’s

findingsregardingthelevelof“threat”posedbyMuseprecludeafindingthat

Cardilli held an objectively reasonable belief that Muse was about to use

unlawful,deadlyforceagainstanyoneinthehousehold.Asmentionedabove,

thecourtexplicitlyfoundthatMusewasnotarmedandthathedidnotatany

time try to grab Cardilli’s gun. The court specifically found that Muse’s

responsetoseeingthegunwastoaskforhisphonesohecouldcallforaride

home.EvenifCardillihadanactualbeliefthatMusewasabouttousedeadly

forcebytakingcontrolofthegunthatCardillibroughtintothechaos—abelief

not asserted by Cardilli at trial—the court found that any such belief was

objectivelyunreasonable.Thecourtaptlynotedthat“Musehadbeendrinking

alldayonMarch15,2019andwasimpaired.Deadlyforcewasnotrequiredto

preventminimalbodilyinjuryortoremove...Musefromthehouse.”

Theentryis:

Judgmentaffirmed.

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JamesaJ.Drake,Esq.(orally),DrakeLawLLC,Auburn,andRoryA.McNamara,Esq.,DrakeLawLLC,York,forappellantMarkCardilliJr.AaronM.Frey,AttorneyGeneral,andLeanneRobbin,Asst.Atty.Gen.(orally),OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,Augusta,forappelleeStateofMaineCumberlandCountyUnifiedCriminalDocketdocketnumberCR-2019-1823FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY